Summery Corfu Channel Case; United Kingdom Vs Albania 1946:

Facts/ background:
On May 15th. 1946 the British warships passed through the Channel without the approval of the
Albanian government and were shot at. Later, on October 22nd, 1946, a squadron of British warships
(two cruisers and two destroyers), left the port of Corfu and proceeded northward through a channel
previously swept for mines in the North Corfu Strait.
Both destroyers were struck by mine and were heavily damaged. This incident resulted also in many
deaths. The two ships were mined in Albanian territorial waters in a previously swept and check-swept
channel.
After the explosions of October 22nd, the United Kingdom Government sent a note to the Albanian
Government, in which it announced its intention to sweep the Corfu Channel shortly. The Albanian
reply, which was received in London on October 31st, stated that the Albanian Government would not
give its consent to this unless the operation in question took place outside Albanian territorial waters.
Meanwhile, at the United Kingdom Government's request, the International Central Mine Clearance
Board decided, in a resolution of November 1st, 1946, that there should be a further sweep of the
Channel, subject to Albania's consent. The United Kingdom Government having informed the
Albanian Government, in a communication of November 10th, that the proposed sweep would take
place on November 12th, the Albanian Government replied on the 11th, protesting against this
'unilateral decision of His Majesty's Government'. It said it did not consider it inconvenient that the
British fleet should undertake the sweeping of the channel of navigation, but added that, before
sweeping was carried out, it considered it indispensable to decide what area of the sea should be
deemed to constitute this channel, and proposed the establishment of a Mixed Commission for the
purpose.
It ended by saying that any sweeping undertaken without the consent of the Albanian Government
outside the channel thus constituted, i.e., inside Albanian territorial waters where foreign warships
have no reason to sail, could only be considered as a deliberate violation of Albanian territory and
sovereignty. After this exchange of notes, 'Operation Retail' took place on November 12th and 13th.
One fact of particular importance is that the North Corfu Channel constitutes a frontier between
Albania and Greece, that a part of it is wholly within the territorial waters of these States, and that the
Strait is of special importance to Greece by reason of the traffic to and from the port of Corfu.
Issues:
The British government claimed the minefield which caused the explosions was laid between May
15th, 1946, and October 22nd, 1946, by or with the approval or knowledge of the Albanian
Government. Thus Albania was responsible for the explosions and loss of life and had to compensate
the UK government.
In addition to the passage of the United Kingdom warships on October 22nd, 1946, the second
question in the Special Agreement relates to the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on
November 12th and 13th, 1946 when the British government carried out a minesweeping operation
called 'Operation Retail' without the consent of Albania.
UK held the opinion the passage on October 22nd, 1946 was innocent and that according to rules of
international law it had the right to innocent passage through the North Corfu Channel as it is

considered part of international highways and does not need a previous approval of the territorial state.
The Albanian Government does not dispute that the North Corfu Channel is a strait in the geographical
sense; but it denies that this Channel belongs to the class of international highways through which a
right of passage exists, on the grounds that it is only of secondary importance and not even a necessary
route between two parts of the high seas, and that it is used almost exclusively for local traffic to and
from the ports of Corfu. Thus a previous approval of the territorial state is necessary.
1) Should the North Corfu Channel as it is considered part of international highways?
2) Is Albania responsible under international law for the explosions which occurred on the 22nd
October 1946 in Albanian waters and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted from them
and is there any duty to pay compensation?'
Analysis:
The court analyses the geographical situation of the channel connects two parts of the high seas and is
in fact frequently being used for international navigation. Taking into account these various
considerations, the Court concludes that the North Corfu Channel should be considered as belonging
to the class of international highways through which an innocent passage does not need special
approval and cannot be prohibited by a coastal State in time of peace.
The UK government claims that on October 22nd, 1946, Albania neither notified the existence of the
minefield, nor warned the British warships of the danger they were approaching. According to the
principle of state responsibility, they should have done all necessary steps immediately to warn ships
near the danger zone, more especially those that were approaching that zone. In fact, nothing was
attempted by the Albanian authorities to prevent the disaster. These grave omissions involve the
international responsibility of Albania.
But Albania's obligation to notify shipping of the existence of mines in her waters depends on her
having obtained knowledge of that fact in sufficient time before October 22nd; and the duty of the
Albanian coastal authorities to warn the British ships depends on the time that elapsed between the
moment that these ships were reported and the moment of the first explosion.
Conclusion of the court:
The Court therefore reaches the conclusion that Albania is responsible under international law for the
explosions which occurred on October 22nd, 1946, in Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of
human life which resulted from them, and that there is a duty upon Albania to pay compensation to the
United Kingdom.
In the second part of the Special Agreement, the following question is submitted to the Court:
(2) Has the United Kingdom under international law violated the sovereignty of the Albanian People's
Republic by reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on the 22nd October and on the
12th and 13th November 1946 and is there any duty to give satisfaction?
Albania was in fact in war with Greece which means that the coastal state was not in time of peace.
UK had not an innocent passage due to the way it was carried out. The court assessed the manner of
UK warships after they had been shot at May 15th. Having thus examined the various contentions of
the Albanian Government in so far as they appear to be relevant, the Court has arrived at the

conclusion that the United Kingdom did not violate the sovereignty of Albania by reason of the acts of
the British Navy in Albanian waters on October 22nd, 1946.
The United Kingdom Government does not dispute that 'Operation Retail' was carried out against the
clearly expressed wish of the Albanian Government. It recognizes that the operation had not the
consent of the international mine clearance organizations, that it could not be justified as the exercise
of a right of innocent passage, and lastly that, in principle, international law does not allow a State to
assemble a large number of warships in the territorial waters of another State and to carry out
minesweeping in those waters. The United Kingdom Government states that the operation was one of
extreme urgency, and that it considered itself entitled to carry it out without anybody's consent.
The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force,
such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present
defects in international organization, The United Kingdom Agent, in his speech in reply, has further
classified 'Operation Retail' among methods of self-protection or self-help. The Court cannot accept
this defense either find a place in international law.
Final conclusion of the court:
1) On the first question put by the Special Agreement of March 25th, 1948,
The court gives judgment that the People's Republic of Albania is responsible under international law
for the explosions which occurred on October 22nd, 1946, in Albanian waters, and for the damage and
loss of human life that resulted there from; and
Reserves for further consideration the assessment of the amount of compensation and regulates the
procedure on this subject.
2) On the second question put by the Special Agreement on the violation of state sovereignty,
The court gives judgment that the United Kingdom did not violate the sovereignty of the People's
Republic of Albania by reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters on October 22nd,
1946; and unanimously, gives judgment that by reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian
waters in the course of the Operation of November 12th and 13th, 1946, the United Kingdom violated
the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Albania, and that this declaration by the Court constitutes
in itself appropriate satisfaction.

Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute Case

(El Salvador v. Honduras),
Judgment of 11 September 1992
On 11 December 1986, El Salvador and Honduras jointly notified the Court of a Special Agreement
concluded between them on 24 May 1986 whereby a dispute referred to as "Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute" would be submitted for decision by a Chamber to be constituted according to Article 26
para.2 of the Statute. The Chamber would consist of three Members of the Court and two judges ad
hoc chosen by each Party. The Chamber finally consisted of Judges Oda, Sette-Camara and Sir Robert
Jennings and the ad hoc judges Valticos and Torres Bernrdez (cf. Digest, vol. 1, page 294).
The dispute was essentially rooted in the fall of the Spanish Colonial Empire in Central America in the 19th
century. Both Honduras and El Salvador belonged to the Captaincy-General of Guatemala, which itself was
a part of Mexico at the time. In 1821, Honduras and El Salvador joined the Federal Republic of Central
America and became independant in 1839 after the disintegration of the Federal Republic. Their respective
national borders corresponded to the administrative borders recognized for the former Spanish colonies
according to the uti possidetis iuris principle applied first in Central America and later in Africa.
As early as 1854, the legal status of the islands located in the Gulf of Fonseca became an issue of dispute;
the question of the land frontier followed in 1861. Border incidents led to mounting tension between the
States and, ultimately, to an armed conflict in 1969. However, in 1972 the parties were able to reach an
agreement on a substantial part of the land border between El Salvador and Honduras; only six sectors of
the frontier remained unsettled. A mediation process initiated in 1978 resulted in the conclusion of a peace
treaty in 1980.
Under this treaty a Joint Border Commission was created to determine the boundary in the remaining six
sectors as well as to decide upon the legal status of the islands and the maritime spaces. In the event that the
parties did not reach a settlement within five years, the treaty provided that the parties, within six months,
conclude a Special Agreement to submit the dispute to the ICJ. Accordingly, a Special Agreement was
concluded on May, 24, 1986 requesting the Court to delimit the frontier between El Salvador and Honduras
in the subject six sectors and to determine the legal status of the islands in the Gulf of Fonseca, and the
waters of the Gulf itself.
Regarding the land boundary, the decision of the Court was unanimous for all but the fourth sector, which
was decided against the vote of ad hoc Judge Valticos.
The Court relied on the uti possidetis juris principle, according to which the national boundaries of former
colonies correspond to the earlier administrative borders of the colonies. The Court underlined that it was
the application of this principle which provided States liberated from former colonial empires with
internationally recognized borders. The different titles invoked by the parties to the case were of different
legal value; thus, the Court decided to recognize only the title deeds granted by the Spanish crown as valid
proof of title as well as topographical characteristics in order to define a clearly recognizable borderline.
With regard to the islands in the Gulf of Fonseca, the Court decided in a vote of 4 to 1 (against : ad
hoc Judge Torres Bernrdez) that, according to Art. 2 para. 2 of the Special Agreement, the parties had
transferred general jurisdiction over all islands located in the Gulf to the Court as far as their national
affiliation was in dispute. Accordingly, the Court concluded that three islands were in dispute, namely El
Tigre, Meanguera and Meanguerita, refusing Honduras' contention that El Tigre had been part of Honduras
since 1854, without challenge.

The decision of the Court was based on the assumption that none of the islands had been terra nullius in
1821, the date of independance. Thus, sovereignty over the islands had been achieved according to the uti
possidetis juris principle. However, the application of this principle suffered from the lack of documents
that might have testified clearly the appertainance of the islands to one administrative district or the other.
Thus the Court was forced to concentrtate more on the behaviour of the parties with regard to the islands
after 1821. On this basis the Court found that El Tigre appertained to Honduras and Meanguera and
Meanguerita to El Salvador.
The decision on the legal situation of the maritime spaces of the Gulf constituted the part of the
proceedings where the intervention of Nicaragua had been admitted (Cf. Digest, vol. 1, p. 294f). The Court,
in this context, had first to decide whether the Special Agreement empowered it to draw the frontier only
within or also outside the closing line of the Gulf. Following the argument of El Salvador, the Court came
to the conclusion that it was not competent to delimit the waters of the Gulf, because the Special Agreement
did not contain indications in this sense. According to the Agreement, the Court had to determine the legal
status of the waters of the Gulf on the basis of applicable international law and, insofar as necessary, the
General Peace Treaty of 1980 between El Salvador and Honduras. In view of its general characteristics,
dimensions and proportions, the Gulf would today be regarded as a juridical bay in accordance with the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958 and the Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 1982. As a consequence thereof, if the Gulf was a single State bay, a closing line could be drawn and
the waters thereby enclosed and considered as internal waters. However, the Gulf was not a single State bay
but constituted a so called historical bay, which is neither defined in the 1958 Convention nor in the
Convention of 1982. From this fact the Court concluded that its decision had to be taken on the basis of
customary international law. After reviewing its own jurisprudence on the topic, the Court found that it had
to examine the history of the Gulf. In this context, much weight was accorded to a judgment of the Central
American Court of Justice of 1917 in a dispute between El Salvador and Nicaragua. That Court had come
to the conclusion that the Gulf of Fonseca effectively constituted a "closed sea" belonging to all three
coastal States communally, with the exception of a three mile zone established unilaterally by each coastal
State. Thus, the Central American Court viewed the Gulf of Fonseca as a condominium resulting from the
succession of the three States from Spain in 1821. Until then, the Gulf had been a single State bay
belonging to Spain alone. According to the Court, the decision of the Central American Court underlined
the fact that at the time of independance, no boundaries were delimited in the Gulf and thus the waters had
remained undivided. The Court, however, stressed that the decision of the Central American Court
constituted a binding judgment only between the two parties originally involved, namely El Salvador and
Nicaragua, and accordingly, the Court had to reach its own decision. With a 4 to 1 vote, the Court affirmed
that the Gulf of Fonseca was a case of "historic waters", whereby the three coastal States had succeeded to
communal sovereignty. In contrast to the frontier delimited on land, the waters of the Gulf had never been
divided or otherwise delimited after the independance of the three coastal States. Thus, the communal
succession for the three States was a logical consequence of the uti possidetis juris principle with regard to
the sovereignty of the Gulf.
Finally, the Court drew the closing line of the Gulf between Punta de Amapala and Punta Cosiguina and
determined that the special regime of the Gulf did not extend beyond this closing line. The legal status of
these waters inside the Gulf were defined by the Court as sui generis, but would be the same as that of
internal waters and not that of territorial sea, except for the three-mile coastal zone of each State.
As to the waters outside the Gulf, the Chamber noted that intirely new concepts of maritime law existed
present day, unheard of in 1917. The Chamber held in this context that there is a territorial sea proper
seawards of the closing line of the Gulf. Since there is a condominium of the waters inside the Gulf, there is

a tripartite presence at the closing line. Only seaward of the closing line could modern territorial seas exist,
as otherwise, the Gulf waters could not be waters of a historic bay. Therefore, the three coastal States, joint
sovereigns of the internal waters, must each be entitled outside the closing line to a territorial sea,
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. It is, however, for the three States to decide whether this
situation should be upheld or replaced by a division and delimitation into three separate zones.

Sierra Club v. Morton

403 U.S. 727 (1972)
Disney was trying to build a ski resort in the Mineral King Valley, inside Sequoia
National Forest. They got a permit from the US Forest Service (USFS) to lease the
property for 30 years.
o In addition, California agreed to build a twenty mile highway right through the
middle of Sequoia National Park to get to the ski resort.

The Sierra Club objected to the construction. They attempted to get the USFS to hold
public hearings on the proposed development, and when that failed, they sued for an
injunction.
o

The Sierra Club argued that various aspects of the proposed development
contravened Federal laws and regulations governing the preservation of
national parks, forests, and game refuges.

Sierra Club argued that they had standing to sue because they were a
"membership corporation with a special interest in the conservation and the
sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of the
country."

The Trial Court granted the injunction. Disney appealed.

o

The Trial Court found that Sierra Club had standing to sue, and that they had
"raised questions concerning possible excess of statutory authority, sufficiently
substantial and serious enough to justify a preliminary injunction."

The Appellate Court reversed. Sierra Club appealed.

o

The Appellate Court found that Sierra Club had no standing to sue.

The Appellate Court found that there was, "no allegation in the
complaint that members of the Sierra Club would be affected by the
actions of the respondents other than the fact that the actions are
personally displeasing to them."

The US Supreme Court affirmed.

o

The Sierra Club argued that they had standing to sue under the Administrative
Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. 702), which says that, "A person suffering legal
wrong because of agency actionis entitled to judicial review thereof.

However, the US Supreme Court found that Sierra Club had not suffered a
'legal wrong', and instead just had a 'mere interest in the problem', and a mere
interest, no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified
the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render
the organization adversely affected.

The Court felt that in order to have standing, Sierra Club would have to
show that its members used the National Forest, and that those uses
would be specifically damaged by the construction of the ski resort.

In a dissent it was argued that the Mineral King Valley was an inanimate object and
thus could not sue by itself. If Sierra Club didn't have standing to sue, who would have
standing to protect the forest?
o

Corporations and ships have a 'legal personality' that allows them to bring suits,
why shouldn't a national forest have the same ability?

Sierra Club was allowed to go back and amend their complaint to try to show that they
had standing. By the time they re-filed, the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) had passed, requiring Disney to write an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS).
o

That's known as injury in fact.

The EIS found that there would be severe impacts to the environment, and the
project was cancelled.

Since this case, the US Supreme Court has articulated four requirements in order to
have standing to sue. The plaintiff must allege that:
o

The challenged action will cause the plaintiff some actual or threatened injury
in fact,

The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action,

The injury is redressable by judicial action, and

The injury is to an interest arguably within the zone of interests to be protected

by the statute alleged to have been violated.