Changes in

Perceptions of
Corruption and
Presidential
Approval in
Mexico
Ricardo R. Gmez-Vilchis
Abstract
Are citizens eager to punish the president with a low level of approval when he is
not working to address corruption? This article uses Mexico to examine the relationship between perceptions of corruption and presidential approval. Based on eleven
national surveys from 1994 to 2006, the study analyzes the effects of perceptions of
corruption on presidential approval before and after the 2000 democratic transition
in Mexico. The main proposition is that corruption became a relevant issue after the
transition and had a strong effect on citizen evaluations of the president.
Keywords: corruption, democracy, presidential approval, transition
In 1995, Raul Salinas, called by the media the uncomfortable brother of the former
president of Mexico, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, was arrested and accused of illicit
enrichment amounting to $181 million (Agustn 2008, 67).1 In 2001, it was discovered
that funds from the workers union of the Mexican state oil monopoly, Pemex (Petrleos
Mexicanos), had been illegally directed to support the campaign of Francisco Labastida, the presidential candidate of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 2000
(Crdova and Murayama 2006, 39). More than a headache, political corruption has
been a serious illness in Mexico for many years. However, corruption is not exclusive
to Mexico; it is a common problem in Latin America. In 2005, Alejandro Toledo,
former president of Peru, was involved in allegations of corruption (Hagopian and
Mainwaring 2005, 48). Nestor Kirchner, former president of Argentina, was accused of
Public Integrity, Fall 2012, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 341360.
2012 ASPA. Permissions: www.copyright.com
ISSN 10999922 (print)/ISSN 15580989 (online)
DOI: 10.2753/PIN1099-9922140402

Ricardo R. Gmez-Vilchis

irregularities and payoffs, particularly in public works and other government contracts
(Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005, 53). The puzzle to solve is this: Are citizens eager
to punish the president with a low level of approval when he is not working to address
corruption? This article uses Mexico as a case study to analyze whether perceptions
of corruption affect presidential approval in Latin America.
Like Mexico, most of the Latin American countries have done a poor job of
addressing corruption. Empirical data indicate that they have failed to eradicate
this problem from their societies and governments (Nef 2001, 171). According to
the Transparency International Corruption Score, Venezuela, Paraguay, Honduras,
Ecuador, and Nicaragua were among the most corrupt nations in 2010 (Transparency International 2010, 2). Public enthusiasm for democracy is allegedly lacking
in these countries because they have not performed well. They are accused of being
corrupt and unfair, favoring the rich through the imposition of unpopular economic
reforms, and by failing to establish the rule of law, ameliorate inequality, or govern
in response to the will of the people. Most Latin Americans evidence ambivalence
toward democratic regimes, and regularly witness mounting allegations of corruption and malfeasance. Elected presidents, for example, have been forced from
office by mass protests against corruption in Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia, and Haiti
(Hagopian 2004, 123).2
The Mexican case can shed light on corruption and its effects on public support
for political leaders in Latin America. There are no consistent explanations of how
perceptions of corruption affect presidential approval after a democratic transition
takes place. If corruption becomes a relevant issue in an emerging democracy, how
does the newly elected president deal with it? How do perceptions of corruption
affect voters support for the president before and after the transition? If citizens
consider corruption to be a salient issue in a democratic context, what reasons explain
this change in peoples perceptions? This study contributes to an understanding of
an issue that is a concern for most Latin American countries: voters view of corruption as a key determinant that may decrease public support for institutions and
political leaders.
The research presented below analyzes the effects of perceptions of corruption
on presidential approval in Mexico from 1994 to 2006 (i.e., before and after the
2000 transition). The main proposition is that corruption became a more important
issue after the 2000 presidential election and had a stronger effect when citizens
evaluated the president. A democratic transition can affect expectations about the
responsiveness of the government. In an emerging democracy, political issues gain
salience. Voters consider that the newly elected president must be worried about
peoples main concerns because keeping citizens satisfied is the best way to get
political support, in contrast to an authoritarian regime that uses manipulation of
election results, vote buying, fraud, and clientelism to stay in office (Cornelius and
Craig 1991, 25).

Literature Review: Corruption and Emerging Latin American

Democracies
Empirical data indicate that most Latin American governments have failed to reduce
corruption. In the new democracies, tolerance for governmental lack of efficiency
in addressing problems has varied, and this has affected the eventual consolidation
342 public integrity fall 2012

Changes in Perceptions of Corruption and Presidential Approval in Mexico

of the democratic systems. Analysis shows that citizens strongly associate political
demands as the main duties of democratic regimes (Camp 2001, 17; Klesner 2001,
126). Over 45 percent of Costa Ricans perceive corruption as the main obstacle
to a democratic consolidation, in Chile only 20 percent, but in Mexico 42 percent
(Clark 2001, 87; Klesner 2001, 127). Moreover, Latin American people associate
politicians with corruption: 75 percent of Costa Ricans, 58 percent of Chileans, and
76 percent of Mexicans state that almost all government officials are corrupt and
accept bribes (Clark 2001, 88; Klesner 2001, 128).
The present study relies on evidence from Mexican survey data. The country
was chosen for several reasons. First, the case permits an exploration of how citizens evaluate the president during a semi-authoritarian regime. Since authoritarian
governments attempt to manage the flow of political information to the public, they
rarely permit survey research. However, the availability of data allows this research
to analyze presidential approval during the last years of the PRI era: 1994, 1995, and
2000.3 The second reason to study the Mexican case is that, after the transition, the
new government had been in office for almost ten years. This condition of political
stability provides an opportunity to examine citizens perceptions in a medium-length
time period. Finally, the 2000 transition itself and the data collected during the past
five years allow the use of democratization as the treatment of a quasi-experimental
design, which tests the effects of perceptions of corruption on presidential approval
before and during the transition.
Democratization has been defined as the transition to a more democratic political
regime (Linz and Stepan 1996, 232; Smith 2005, 49; Whitehead 2002, 26). It may
be the transition from an authoritarian political system to a semi-democracy or the
transition from a semi-authoritarian political regime to a democratic political order. In
the Mexican case, the process took decades,
and the turning point of the transition was the Corruption is a complex problem
2000 presidential election, when the opposithat takes different forms: abuse
tion, the National Action Party (PAN), won
the presidency for the first time after more and misuse of power, manipulation
of electoral results, black market
than seven decades of one-party rule.
Although corruption has been one of the operations, illegal foreign
most relevant issues in Mexican politics, transactions, unaudited revenues,
scholars, on the whole, have focused on the fraud, perversion of justice, extortion,
economy (Buenda 1996, 567; Domnguez
falsification of records, unauthorized
and McCann 1995, 34; Magaloni 2006, 82;
Villarreal 1999, 132).4 Their studies have sale of public offices, and tax evasion.
made significant contributions to the analysis
of presidential approval, yet they overlook the effects of the political variables on
approval. Buenda (1996) and Magaloni (2006) argue that real variations of economic
conditions affect voters support in Mexico. Domnguez and McCann (1995, 36) and
Villarreal (1999, 134) explain that citizens assessments of the economy and economic policies have a strong effect on political opinions. The present study focuses
on Mexico and tests the effects of perceptions of corruption on public opinion, a
relevant issue in most Latin American emerging democracies.
Corruption is a complex problem that takes different forms: abuse and misuse
of power, manipulation of electoral results, black market operations, illegal foreign
transactions, unaudited revenues, fraud, perversion of justice, extortion, falsification
public integrity fall 2012 343

Ricardo R. Gmez-Vilchis

of records, unauthorized sale of public offices, and tax evasion (Caiden 2001, 17). It
has been defined as an activity that involves behavior on the part of officials in the
public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or those close to them, by the misuse of the public power
entrusted to them (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2008,
23). Although the meaning of corruption has not been regularly surveyed in Mexico,
empirical data suggest that bribe-taking by officials and fraudulent elections are the two
main types of corruption identified by citizens. People associate corruption with the
use of public office for personal gain. In 1998, 76 percent of Mexicans perceived that
most government officials were corrupt and accepted bribes (Klesner 2001, 127).
Mexicans also view fraud in electoral results as a serious form of corruption.
In 1998, 61 percent of respondents stated that elections were regularly fraudulent
(Klesner 2001, 127). The empirical evidence suggests that voters consider corruption to be a problem primarily entailing both the acceptance of improper gifts
(bribes) by officials and illegal actions in political competitions (fraudulent elections) (Klesner 2001, 125).

The Mexican Context

Mexicos semi-authoritarian regime and emerging democracy created two different
kinds of political imperatives. First, the PRI was in power for more than seventy
years, using vote buying, fraud, clientelistic policies, and selective repression as its
main mechanisms. Second, the new regime considered that keeping citizens satisfied
was the best way to get political support and stay in office.
The PRI government established close relationships with peasants, organized
labor, and the military, the three major sectors of society. The peasant sector endorsed PRI candidates for office in exchange for distribution of land. Organized
labor expressed support through mass demonstrations, campaign rallies, and voter
registration drives in exchange for nonwage benefits, such as subsidized food,
clothing, housing, health care, and transportation. The military endorsed the PRI
government in crises through the use of armed repression of dissident groups,
counterinsurgency campaigns against rural guerrillas, and the breaking of major
labor strikes. In return, the military received regular salary increases and a variety
of generous nonwage benefits, such as housing, medical care, loans, and subsidized
consumer goods (Cornelius and Craig 1991, 8595). These interchange relationships of political support and the allocation of private benefits through clientelistic
strategies allowed the PRI to stay in office.
The PRI succeeded in attending to most demands. Between 1940 and 1960 the
gross domestic product (GDP) more than tripled, and during the 1960s Mexico
achieved a solid per capita growth rate averaging 3.3 percent per year. This came
to be known as the Mexican miracle, an exemplary combination of economic
progress and political stability within the developing world (Cornelius and Craig
1991, 90). However, the situation began to change in the early 1980s. In 1981, the
expansion of the public sector was threatened by a decline in oil prices, a dramatic
increase in the interest rates on the loans that Mexico had used to fuel its growth,
and increasing signs of runaway inflation. The economy went into a tailspin. Annual
production per capita declined by 2.9 percent, the deficit reached 16.9 percent of
GDP, prices increased by almost 60 percent per annum, and President Lpez Portillo
344 public integrity fall 2012

Changes in Perceptions of Corruption and Presidential Approval in Mexico

Percent

Figure 1
Main Obstacles to Achieving Democracy in Mexico
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

42

25

22

Perceptions
11

Corruption

The
government

Political
parties

Others

Source: Hewlett Foundation/MORI Internacional, 1998 (Klesner 2001, 127). The question was:
In your opinion, what has been the major obstacle to democracy in this country?

devalued the peso (Centeno 1999, 189). Consequently, the PRI regime had difficulty
maintaining its political support. Because of the erosion of the PRI, the opposition
was able to advance through electoral reforms in 1977, 1986, 1990, 1994, and 1997
(Becerra, Salazar and Woldenberg 2000, 1163), creating conditions conducive
to democracy.5 The opposition favored the context for a different kind of political
regime, and citizens did not see the PRI as the best choice for their demands.
In 1994, opposition parties jointly controlled 11 percent of the countrys thirty-two
gubernatorial posts, 40 percent of the seats in the national Chamber of Deputies, and
26 percent of the Senate positions. In June 2000, just weeks before the election, opposition parties controlled 34 percent of the governorships, 52 percent of the deputy
positions, and 41 percent of the Senate seats (Camp 2004, 28; Domnguez 2004, 336).
Even the PRI contributed to establishing a positive atmosphere for democracy. In the
2000 presidential election, its supporters established an open primary system for nominating the PRIs presidential candidate, breaking the tradition in which the outgoing
president had the right to handpick the presidential candidate (Lawson 2004, 3).
A more competitive election and an eventual transition encouraged citizens to
associate democracy with the eradication of corruption. Figure 1 reveals that before
the 2000 election, 42 percent of people considered corruption to be the main obstacle
to democracy (Klesner 2001, 127). The PRI government attempted to convince voters
that it was able to address these concerns. However, the evidence shows that citizens
did not see its efforts as credible. Voters considered the PRI the main symbol of
corruption. In 1995 almost 60 percent of Mexicans perceived Ernesto Zedillo, the
last PRI president, as corrupt (Gmez-Vilchis 2009, 20). While people associated
the old regime with corruption, they perceived that the opposition would bring a
more efficient and competent government. The 2000 election was the expression
of a desire for change, based mostly on expectations that the next president would
show greater competence in both managing the economy and reducing corruption
(Magaloni and Poir 2004, 315). Moreover, when citizens saw the desire for change
as the main reason to vote, the candidate who benefited the most was Vicente Fox
(Camp 2004, 33).
public integrity fall 2012 345

Ricardo R. Gmez-Vilchis

The association between democracy and anti-corruption policies in citizens

minds was strengthened after the transition. During his tenure, Fox made battling
corruption a priority of his administration. The vision of the kind of government
he aimed to achieve is summarized in following statement: The challenge is to
forge a good government that is competitive, transparent, honest, participative
and proactive, that works better, costs less and generates more benefits to society
(Prez 2004, 2).
Citizens had high expectations for Foxs
Citizens had high expectations for
anti-corruption plans. They thought that the
Foxs anti-corruption plans. They
new president was determined to implement
thought that the new president was
reforms in such areas of the public policy
agenda as telecommunications, energy, taxadetermined to implement reforms
tion, and reduction of corruption. Foxs antiin such areas of the public policy
corruption strategy attempted to implement
agenda as telecommunications, energy,
extensive changes that integrated a range of
taxation, and reduction of corruption.
agencies and initiatives (Morris 2001, 1).
It primarily centered on the creation and
the work of the Comisin Intersecretarial para la Transparencia y el Combate a la
Corrupcin (Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Transparency and the Combat
Against Corruption) and the Programa Nacional para la Transparencia y contra la
Corrupcin (National Program for Transparency and Against Corruption). The former
was announced during the presidential inauguration and established by presidential
accord. The Inter-Ministerial Commission was composed of eighteen secretaries of
state, the attorney general, and five officials from the office of the presidency. Its
purposes were to coordinate policies and actions to combat corruption, strengthen
transparency in the federal administration, and conduct annual follow-ups on programs within various agencies (Morris 2001, 7). The National Program embodied the
overall strategy and approach of the government in battling corruption. It outlined
four objectives: (1) prevent corruption and impunity by the implementation of a new
monitoring mechanism that reduces immunity to prosecution and exemption from
legal action, (2) control and detect corruption, (3) penalize acts of corruption and
impunity, such as manipulation of electoral results, fraud, vote buying, and ballot
stuffing, and (4) gain the involvement of society. The program delineated a series
of measures and strategic policies to be implemented in each agency of the federal
administration (Morris 2001, 9).

Hypothesis
According to Moreno (2009, 42), the 2000 presidential election served as a critical
election, defined as one in which the depth and intensity of electoral involvement
are high, in which more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of
power within the community, and in which new and durable electoral groupings
are formed (Key 1955, 4). After the election, in which the PRI lost the presidency
for the first time, regime cleavage (PRI vs. anti-PRI) began to fade, allowing for a
redefinition of left and right positions around other issues of economic and social
content (Moreno 1999, 126; 2006, 43). The present study extends Morenos argument. If Moreno is right, and the 2000 electoral process functioned as a critical
election, it is likely that the election also altered perceptions of the presidency. More
346 public integrity fall 2012

Changes in Perceptions of Corruption and Presidential Approval in Mexico

Figure 2
Trust in Mexican Presidents During First Year of Tenure
70
63
60

Percent
Percentage

50

44

40

33

Perceptions

30
20
10
0
Salinas (1989)

Zedillo (1995)

Fox (2001)

Percent

Source: BIIACS (http://biiacs-dspace.cide.edu). The question was: Do you trust the president
when he announces a new policy?

precisely, the 2000 transition was a determinant political event that modified how
citizens viewed the president. People began to see the presidency in a different way,
70
and had expectations of a greater competence63
in the next president to manage not
60
only economic but also political issues (Magaloni and Poir 2004).
50 The 2000
44democratic transition affected how people perceived the presidency. Voters
began
to
have more trust in the president and his determination to address political
40
33
Perceptions
problems. Foxs anti-corruption campaign encouraged a process
of modernization
30
of the federal administration, a significant cultural change in favor of legality, and
20
the creation of a more competitive and professional civil service; yet expectations
10
were high and anti-corruption reform was unable to eradicate corruption. Although
it0 was difficult and unlikely for him to address most of their main concerns in the
(1989)of hisZedillo
(1995)
Fox (2001)
short Salinas
time period
term in
office, people
nonetheless considered Fox to be a
different and more determined president. As Figure 2 illustrates, the levels of trust
in Fox were clearly higher than those of Salinas and Zedillo after the first year of
each presidential term (Gmez-Vilchis 2010, 37).
The president was expected to immediately fix the country and eliminate political
problems such as corruption. The empirical evidence presented above shows that
citizens considered corruption to be the main obstacle to an eventual democratic consolidation (Klesner 2001, 127). Thus, one would expect that after the 2000 transition
there would be a stronger relationship between presidential approval and perceptions
of corruption because of citizen expectations about the presidents determination to
address this problem. The analysis formulates this hypothesis:
H1: After democratization takes place, corruption becomes a salient
political issue. Mexicans consider corruption to be the main obstacle to
democracy, and the political context encourages them to be more critical
of the president when they believe corruption is increasing. All else being
equal, the effect of citizens perceptions of corruption on presidential approval should be stronger after the 2000 transition than during the PRI
regime. After the 2000 transition, voters had more expectations that the
newly elected president would address corruption.
public integrity fall 2012 347

Ricardo R. Gmez-Vilchis

Data and Method

The eleven national surveys on which this study is based were organized by the
private polling firm Parametra (www.parametria.com.mx) and by the Oficina de la
Presidencia de la Repblica Mexicana (Mexican Office of the Presidency; hereinafter
MOP), the presidential pollster in Mexico.6 Polls are funded by the federal budget;
surveys are confidential for governmental use. However, the Asesora Tcnica de
la Presidencia de la Repblica (Technical Consultancy of the Presidency of the
Republic) made them public after Salinas and Zedillo finished their tenures. Data
of all surveys are now public and available at www.biiacs.cide.edu, the Web site
of the Banco de Informacin para la Investigacin Aplicada en Ciencias Sociales
(Information Bank for Applied Research in Social Science; hereinafter BIIACS).
While the MOP designed the questionnaires, the surveys were conducted by
Opinion Profesional (Professional Opinion) S.A. de C.V., a private company specializing in policy polling and focus groups. Field workers were not informed of
the clients identity. They identified themselves to respondents only as employees
of Professional Opinion.
In total, the surveys contain almost 18,000 household interviews and 600 telephone interviews from November 1994 to November 2006. This period covers three
different presidentsCarlos Salinas de Gortari and Ernesto Zedillo, both of whom
were Priistas (members of the PRI), and the Panista (PAN member) Vicente Fox.
There is one poll for Salinass presidency (in 1994) and two surveys for Zedillos
presidency (1995 and 2000), all conducted by the Technical Consultancy of the
Presidency of the Republic. There are eight surveys for Foxs administration, six
conducted by the Technical Consultancy (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004), and two by
Parametra in 2006. Three surveys were conducted in 2001.
The MOP surveys located households through a multistage, stratified, and probability sampling procedure. An interview of about 40 minutes was conducted with one
adult respondent in each household, selected at random, with about equal proportions
of men and women. Parametra surveys located households through a multistage,
nonstratified, and probability sampling procedure. An interview of about 25 minutes
was conducted with one respondent in each household, selected at random.
The analysis conducted for the present study measured the probability that voters approved of the president before and after the transition. The study employed
logic regressions (i.e., nonlinear regression models specifically designed for binary
dependent variables). Because a regression with a binary dependent variable Y
models the probability that Y = 1, it makes sense to adopt a nonlinear formulation
that forces the predicted values to be between 0 and 1 (Stock and Watson 2007,
389). The dependent variable is presidential approval, and it can take two values: 1
if citizens approve the president; 0 if this is not the case. Table 1 presents both the
operationalization and the codification of the variables. The key explanatory variable
is perception of corruption.
The analysis also includes a series of control variables that were widely used in
prior presidential approval research (Domnguez and McCann 1995, 39; Magaloni
2006, 165; Moreno 2006, 35; 2009, 279; Villarreal 1999, 136): party identification
(id) and citizens perceptions of economic issues (unemployment and inflation).7
The approach controls for sociodemographic variables, such as income, education,
age, and gender. In the first case, the base line group is poor; for the variable educa-

348 public integrity fall 2012

Changes in Perceptions of Corruption and Presidential Approval in Mexico

Table 1
Explaining Presidential Approval

Concept
Dependent Variable:
Presidential Approval
Independent Variables:
Perceptions of Rising
Corruption

Perceptions of Rising
Unemployment

Perceptions of Rising
Inflation

Partisanship (matching
presidents party)

Question
Do you approve of the way
the president is handling his
job?
Since Salinas (Zedillo, Fox)
became president, do you
think that corruption has
increased or decreased in
Mexico?
Since Salinas (Zedillo, Fox)
became president, do you
think that unemployment has
increased or decreased in
Mexico?
Since Salinas (Zedillo,
Fox) became president, do
you think that inflation has
increased or decreased in
Mexico?
Do you consider yourself
a Panista, a Priista, or a
Perredista? (Member of
the Party of the Democratic
Revolution)

Income

What is the range of your

family income?

Age

How old are you?

Education

What year of school did you

reach?

Male

Respondents supplied information in this category

PRI

Operationalization and
codification
Disapprove
Approve
Decreased
No change
Increased

Decreased
No change
Increased

Decreased
No change
Increased

Dummy variable: (1) If voter

belongs to presidents party;
(0) if not the case. From
1994 to 2000, (1) if voter was
Priista. From 2001 to 2005,
(1) if voter was Panista.
Poor, from 0 to 1 Minimum
Salary (MS)
Lower Middle Class, from
more than 1 MS to 3 MS
Middle Class and Rich, more
than 3 MS
Young, 18 to 25 years
Young-Mature, 26 to 40
Mature, 41 to 60
Elderly, 61 or more
None
Elementary
Junior High School
Senior High School
University or more
Female
Male
After PRI era, from 2001 to
2006
During PRI hegemony, from
1994 to 2000

Note: Most of the original values of the variables were recorded.

public integrity fall 2012 349

Ricardo R. Gmez-Vilchis

tion, it is people who do not have higher education; for age, people from eighteen
to twenty-five years of age; for gender, female.
It is expected that when citizens think corruption is increasing, they will disapprove of the way the president is handling his job. Perceptions of rising corruption
are negatively associated with presidential approval. Expectations about unemployment and inflation are similar to those of corruption. Citizens punish the president
with a low approval rating when they believe that unemployment and inflation
are increasing. The analysis anticipates that partisanship has a positive effect on
presidential approval.
Perception of corruption is the cause, and presidential approval the consequence.
However, a counterargument may be that when a presidents popularity and approval
ratings decline, voters are more likely to see the faults of the political system over
which the president presides. If this were the case, there would be an endogeneity
problem. Nevertheless, it is argued here that the main direction of the causality goes
from specific performance assessments to overall approval, not from presidential
approval to perceptions of corruption. That is, it is problematic to think that citizens
like a president without issue-based reasons and then assess the presidents performance on specific policy areas. What would drive citizens to approve of the president
without taking account of issue evaluations? Moreover, the evidence suggests there
is a significant variation of presidential popularity and approval of specific issue
evaluations across Latin American countries. Popular presidents are not necessarily viewed as efficient policymakers addressing peoples concerns, and unpopular
presidents sometimes enjoy citizens trust to eradicate corruption.8
Presidential approval can be affected by both the party identification and the
personal attributes of the president. Studies in the United States show that party supporters of the president approve of his performance (Fiorina 1981; Green, Palmquist,
and Schickler 2002; Kiewiet 1983; Miller and Shanks 1996). Moreover, American
scholars have found that citizens focus on perceived character, image, and personal
characteristics (honesty, charisma, empathy, and determination) when evaluating
political leaders and especially the president (Newman 2002; Page 1978; Thomas,
Sigelman, and Baas 1984). The present analysis controls for party identification,
but not for the personal qualities of the president, because there were no questions
about voters perceptions of the presidential image in most of the surveys.
The research design can be considered as a quasi-experiment (Trochim 2001,
188), in which the treatment is the 2000 election. The analysis uses perceptions of
corruption before the transition as a pretest and voter opinion on corruption after the
election as a posttest. The subjects observed were not randomly assigned, but were
grouped according to a characteristic they already possessed (citizens behavior in
two political systems, a semi-authoritarian regime and an emerging democracy).
Thus the study was a separate-sample, pretest-posttest design (Campbell and Stanley
1966, 53). Some samples were measured prior to the treatment, and the others subsequently. Some of the risks to internal validity were maturation, instrumentation,
and history threats (Trochim 2001, 176).9 The internal validity of the research design
was enhanced by including most of the control variables used in previous research.
External validity does not represent a problem here as the study was conducted under
real conditions. Thus, the causal relationship between the construct (perceptions of
corruption) and the effects (variations in presidential approval) may be generalized
to other cases in Latin America (Trochim 2001, 22).
350 public integrity fall 2012

Changes in Perceptions of Corruption and Presidential Approval in Mexico

Government-sponsored surveys can sometimes be criticized for loading questions

in ways that elicit responses favorable to the political objectives of the president.
This limitation can create a reliability problem. However, in the surveys organized
by the MOP and Parametra, respondents were offered explicit pro and con choices
on issues, including the performance of the president, their opinions on the political
context (corruption), and their perceptions of economic problems (unemployment and
inflation). Although the MOP and Parametra did not do a pilot to test the reliability
of their instruments, the interviewers of both polling agencies were professionally
trained, and the questions to measure the dependent and independent variables had
been widely used in both the American and the comparative literatures.

Results
Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the regression analysis. Model 1 in Table 2 tests
a general baseline model solely with the key explanatory variable, perceptions of
rising corruption. Model 2 introduces the control variables, perceptions of rising unemployment, rising inflation, partisanship, and sociodemographic indicators. Taken
together, the results indicate that before and after the 2000 democratic transition,
perceptions of rising corruption decreased presidential approval. The same is true
for perceptions of rising unemployment and inflation. Partisanship has strong and
positive effects on presidential approval. Most of the sociodemographic indicators
(i.e., education, income, and age) are not significant except for the variables Male
and University or More (education). These findings suggest that men are more critical
than women in evaluating the president, perhaps because men have more information than women to criticize the executive. In the case of the variable University or
More, the analysis shows that the most educated people are more critical when they
approve of political leaders.
While the discussion suggests that perceptions of corruption affect presidential
approval, it is important to examine whether this variable has the same effects in two
different political contexts, a semi-authoritarian regime in transition and an emerging democracy. In Model 3, the analysis tests the hypothesized differences between
two periods, the predemocratic period and the emerging Mexican democracy, by
including a battery of interaction effects for each of the independent variables. Every
interactive variable is the product of the variable PRI (the nondemocratic age) and
the key explanatory variables. Each time an interactive variable is significant (PRI
Era Perceptions of Rising Corruption, PRI Era Perceptions of Rising Unemployment, PRI Era Perceptions of Rising Inflation), the analysis reveals that the
explanatory variable has a different impact in these two periods. This is the case for
perceptions of rising corruption, unemployment, and inflation.
The raw coefficients of the logistic analysis are essential in determining the accuracy of the research; however, it is quite difficult to interpret them in nonlinear
specifications (a regression function with a slope that is not constant). To address
this problem and to highlight substantive findings, the estimated probabilities of
presidential approval in two different periods, before and after the 2000 transition,
are presented. The evidence illustrates that there were important differences in the
way voters assessed two Priista presidents (Salinas and Zedillo) and a president
from the opposition (Fox). Table 3 presents the results of all the possible changes in
the probability of the most significant variables, but the analysis focuses on the findpublic integrity fall 2012 351

Ricardo R. Gmez-Vilchis

Table 2
Perceptions of Corruption as Determinant of
Presidential Approval (19942006)

Perception of rising corruption

Model 1

Model 2

1.05*
(0.02)

0.51*
(0.03)
0.68*
(0.03)
0.62*
(0.03)
1.8*
(0.05)
0.04
(0.06)
0.04
(0.06)
0.08
(0.05)
0.10
(0.06)
0.10
(0.08)
0.06
(0.10)
0.10
(0.11)
0.17
(0.11)
0.28*
(0.12)
0.15*
(0.04)

Perception of rising unemployment

Perception of rising inflation
Partisanship
Lower Middle Class
Middle Class and Rich
Young-Mature People
Mature People
Elderly People
Elementary
Junior High School
Senior High School
University or More
Male
PRI Era
PRI Era Perceptions of Rising
Corruption
PRI Era Perceptions of Rising
Unemployment
PRI Era Perceptions of Rising
Inflation
PRI Era Partisanship
PRI Era Lower Middle Class
PRI Era Middle Class and Rich
PRI Era Young-Mature People
PRI Era Mature People
PRI Era Elderly People

352 public integrity fall 2012

Model 3
(Interactive Test)
0.67*
(0.04)
0.73*
(0.04)
0.51*
(0.04)
1.7*
(0.08)
0.19*
(0.08)
0.35*
(0.08)
0.07
(0.07)
0.28*
(0.08)
0.30*
(0.10)
0.11
(0.13)
0.05
(0.14)
0.15
(0.14)
0.17
(0.15)
0.14*
(0.05)
0.84*
(0.25)
0.38*
(0.06)
0.19*
(0.06)
0.29*
(0.07)
0.17
(0.10)
0.51*
(0.13)
0.84*
(0.13)
0.28*
(0.10)
0.31*
(0.12)
0.34
(0.18)

Changes in Perceptions of Corruption and Presidential Approval in Mexico

PRI Era Elementary

PRI Era Junior High School
PRI Era Senior High School
PRI Era University or More
PRI Era Male
Constant

0.05*
(0.02)
18,597
0.10

N
Pseudo R

0.92*
(0.12)
15,818
0.29

0.10
(0.23)
0.11
(0.24)
0.03
(0.25)
0.21
(0.25)
0.001
(0.08)
0.58*
(0.15)
15,818
0.30

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is presidential approval. p 0.10;
*p 0.05. Included are year dummies except for one year in the estimation of the models (not
shown); some of them are significant.

Table 3
Changes in Probability of Determinants of Presidential Approval

When this
characteristic

Shifts from
to

Perceptions of Rising Rising Corruption

Corruption
decreases (0)

Changes in
probabilities
pre-democratic era
(19942000)

Changes in
probabilities
democratic period
(20012006)

7% decreases

14% decreases

does not change

(1)

6% decreases

10% decreases

does not change

(1)

13% decreases

24% decreases

13% decreases

15% decreases

12% decreases

11% decreases

25% decreases

26% decreases

increases (2)
decreases (0)
increases (2)
Perceptions of Rising Rising
Unemployment
Unemployment
decreases (0)
does not change
(1)
does not change
(1)
increases (2)
decreases (0)
increases (2)

(continues)

public integrity fall 2012 353

Ricardo R. Gmez-Vilchis

Table 3 (continued)

When this
characteristic
Perceptions of
Rising Inflation

Shifts from
to

Changes in
probabilities
pre-democratic era
(19942000)

Changes in
probabilities
democratic period
(20012006)

Rising Inflation
decreases (0)
19% decreases

10% decreases

17% decreases

7% decreases

37% decreases

18% decreases

32% increases

18% increases

7,057

8,761

does not change (1)

does not change (1)

increases (2)

decreases (0)
increases (2)

Partisanship

Number of
Observations

Not member of
presidents party
(0)
Member of presidents party (1)

Note: Simulated probabilities of presidential approval are calculated with the use of Clarify (Tomz
et al. 2003). All the independent variables are held at their median values.

ings when a variable shifts from its minimum to its maximum value (the underlined
results in the table). These results suggest that after the transition, perceptions of
corruption became more salient and had a stronger effect on presidential approval.
When citizens thought corruption had increased, the likelihood of their approving
the president decreased by 13 percent before the transition, and by 24 percent after
the PRI regime. Thus, after democratization, corruption became a salient political
issue, and the political context encouraged citizens to be more critical of the president
when they believed corruption was increasing.
Perceptions of economic issues have different effects than perceptions of corruption. When citizens thought that unemployment was increasing, their likelihood of
approving the president decreased by 25 percent before the emergence of the new
Mexican democracy, and by 26 percent after democratization. Thus, perceptions of
unemployment had much the same effect during the predemocratic period and in
the democratic era. Whereas citizens believed that the new president would be more
successful than his predecessor in eradicating corruption, their expectations about
the presidents determination to address unemployment were more or less the same
after the PRI era as during the PRI regime.
Holding constant the other variables, when voters believed that inflation had increased, their probability of approving the president decreased by 37 percent before
354 public integrity fall 2012

Changes in Perceptions of Corruption and Presidential Approval in Mexico

democratization, and by 18 percent in the democratic period. The high inflation levels
in 1995 because of the economic crisis may explain the stronger effect of perceptions
of rising inflation on presidential approval during the predemocratic period.
The effect of party identification on presidential approval was stronger before
rather than during the democratic period. The probability that a party supporter approved of the president increased by 32 percent during the predemocratic era and by
18 percent after democratization took place. This suggests that after democratization,
it is less likely that citizens will use party identification as a shortcut to approve of
the president. In a democratic context they punish the president with a low level of
approval when they believe corruption is expanding.

Conclusion
The research presented in this article argues that corruption has become a more
relevant political issue in Mexico since the 2000 transition. Citizens view it as the
main obstacle to a democratic consolidation. Thus, after the election, the turning
point of the transition, voters began to evaluate the president in terms of his anticorruption policies and performance.
The main theoretical goal of this article was to explain how perceptions of corruption affect presidential approval. The evidence suggests that citizens have expectations about the government, and that the presidents behavior in addressing these
concerns is restricted by the political regime. As noted, an authoritarian regime uses
manipulation of election results, vote buying, fraud, and clientelism as strategies to
stay in office. In contrast, in a democratic system political leaders attempt to keep
voters satisfied by the implementation of efficient policies, because this is the best
way to get support. In Mexico, after democratization took place, corruption became
more important, and the political context encouraged citizens to be more critical of
the president when they believed corruption was worsened.
President Fox attempted to address corruption by an ambitious plan that implemented extensive changes and integrated a range of agencies and initiatives. His
objective was to strengthen a significant cultural change in favor of legality. He
promised to jail the most important politicians and business figures who were dishonest. However, only some sectors of the bureaucratic system were affected by his
anti-corruption plans. Why did Fox fail to reduce corruption? Future presidents will
have to be aware that big problems such as corruption cannot be addressed in a short
time period. To establish a different and new culture opposed to corruption may take
years, and the president should explain this to the citizenry. Foxs promises increased
expectations that he would decrease corruption, but he did not take into account that
in order to implement new policies he needed the support of other political actors
(parties, legislators, state governors, civil society). In the future, Mexican presidents
should not promise magical results for the solution of complex problems.
Perceptions of corruption have a stronger effect in the democratic period than
during the PRI semi-authoritarian system. This suggests several implications for
a democratic transition. First, in an emerging democratic system, voters associate
democracy with political demands; in Mexico, people perceive corruption as one
of the main obstacles to a democratic consolidation. Second, a new, democratically
elected president should address concerns about economic and political issues. After
democratization, voters expect the president to be more competent in managing
public integrity fall 2012 355

Ricardo R. Gmez-Vilchis

both the economy and political issues, such as corruption. Third, support for the
president may be a key determinant for the consolidation of a new democracy. A
popular and successful president who addresses corruption may be able to implement the necessary policies to strengthen the emerging democratic regime because
he is then in a strong position to bargain with the legislature.
Beyond Mexico, this research makes two contributions to the study of perceptions of corruption and presidential approval in comparative politics. First, political
behavior does not occur in a vacuum. The political context affects the way in which
citizens evaluate a presidents anti-corruption policies. The evidence suggests that
a democratic context encourages citizens to be more critical of the president when
they believe corruption is increasing. Second, cases such as Mexico show that
findings about perceptions of corruption and support for leaders in new democratic
systems should be reevaluated. Democracy is not only about elections; it is also
about peoples main concerns.
Notes
1. The Information Bank for Applied Research in Social Science (BIIACS) of the
Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE) facilitated the national surveys
organized by the Mexican Office of the Presidency (MOP). Francisco Abundis, associate director of Parametra, provided survey data for 2006 (President Foxs tenure). This
research was improved by the comments of Jacob Allen, Adam Brown, Wayne A. Cornelius, Alberto Daz-Cayeros, Samuel H. Kernell, Thadd Kousser, David Mares, Carlos
H. Waisman, and Christopher Woodruff. The invaluable feedback of the Public Integrity
editorial team and anonymous reviewers was critical for the completion of this article.
Two main institutions funded portions of this work: the National Council on Science and
Technology (CONACYT) and the University of California Institute for Mexico and the
United States (UC MEXUS).
2. In Argentina, even though Fernando de la Ra was elected on a platform of combating corruption, his anti-corruption plans dramatically failed. In August 2000, allegations
surfaced that officials had bribed a handful of senators in an effort to pass labor reform
legislation. Vice President Carlos lvarez called for a serious investigation. The scandal
destroyed support for both De la Rua and his government (Hagopian and Mainwaring
2005, 81). In Chile, citizens identify corruption as a serious problem that requires government attention and are pessimistic about its being rooted out. Chileans concerns can
be explained by several spectacular high-level corruption scandals in President Lagoss
government (Hagopian 2004, 132). Although Brazilians have taken steps in the past decade to control corruption, most of their policies have ended in failure. In 1992, President
Fernando Collor de Mello was impeached for extorting bribes from businesspersons,
profiting from the privatization of state companies, and diverting public funds for his
and his wifes personal entertainment. A congressional investigation exposed a scandal
involving committee members who had taken bribes for patronage projects, resulting in
the expulsion in 1993 of seven deputies (Hagopian 2004, 133).
3. Unfortunately, it is not possible to include observations for every year. During
the Salinas and Zedillo tenures, public perceptions of economic issues were not regularly
surveyed. In the case of Fox, in 2005 questions about citizens perceptions of corruption
were not included in the surveys.
4. One of the seminal studies of presidential approval in Mexico, Davis and Langley
(1995, 33) revealed that citizens evaluate the president based on partisan cues and their
perceptions of anti-corruption policies.
5. Most of these reforms attempted to strengthen political competition by implementing mechanisms for proportional representation that eventually gave the opposition
the opportunity to advance both in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

356 public integrity fall 2012

Changes in Perceptions of Corruption and Presidential Approval in Mexico

6. Unfortunately, it is not possible to control for a possible polling firm effect on

presidential approval (Cohen 2003, 215). A dummy variable called Parametra was created to address this problem but was dropped because of the small variation (only two
polling firms). However, a correlation test shows that presidential approval and the dummy
variable Parametra were weakly correlated (0.002). Therefore, the effect of polling firm
on approval should be weak.
7. Questions about voters opinion on inflation were not included in 2006. Thus, for
this year the analysis uses perceptions of the economy as a proxy to measure the effects
of perceptions of rising inflation on presidential approval. The year 2006 saw very low
levels of inflation in Mexico and economic stability. In the rest of the surveys, whenever
questions were asked about perceptions of inflation and the economy, the correlation
between them was approximately 85 percent. The strong association between these two
variables reveals that they are measuring something very similar.
8. Some examples in Latin America question the argument that presidential approval
drives voters evaluation of specific issues. While in 2006 presidents Evo Morales (Bolivia), Hugo Chvez (Venezuela), and Nstor Kirchner (Argentina) reached high levels of
approval, respectively 81, 80, and 71 percent (Mitofsky 2006, 3), citizens in each country
considered that their governments were doing a poor job of addressing corruption, according to the Transparency International Corruption Score (Transparency International
2006, 2). Unpopular presidents who earn peoples trust to address corruption reinforce the
statement that citizen evaluation of corruption determines approval, and not vice versa.
Presidents Michelle Bachelet (Chile) and Tabare Vzquez (Uruguay), who were not very
popular, with respectively 55 and 44 percent approval in 2006 (Mitofsky 2006, 3), won
voter support for anti-corruption plans (Transparency International 2006, 1).
9. However, in the first case, maturation, the effect of the respondents growing
older, was unlikely to be involved as an alternative explanation, because the samples
were large and ages were heterogeneous. Instrumentation does not represent a hazard in
this case, because the questions to measure perceptions of corruption before and after the
transition were the same. History is the main threat to this design, because any historical
event that occurred during the period of analysis may be an explanation for the outcome.
Nevertheless, no political event in Mexico has stronger effects on citizen perceptions than
the transition itself (Camp 2004, 39).

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About the Author

Ricardo R. Gmez-Vilchis received his Ph.D. from the University of California, San
Diego. His research interests include corruption, crime, democratic transition, and citizen
evaluation of political leaders. He has recently presented papers about presidential approval in Mexico at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference and the Latin
American Studies Association Conference. He is an assistant professor at the department
of political science, universidad de Guanajuato.

360 public integrity fall 2012

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