Effect of Absence of Witnesses

Perido V Perido - 63 SCRA 97

Perido v.Perido, 63 SCRA 97 CASE DIEGST
FACTS: Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married
twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with
whom he begot 3 children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After
Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had 5
children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio died in
1942, while his second wife died in 1943. Margarita is the only
living child of the first marriage. The children and grandchildren of
the first marriage and second marriage filed a case regarding the
partition of the properties of Lucio Perido. Margarita et al asserted
that the children and grandchildren of the second marriage were
illegitimate.
ISSUE: W/N the children and grandchildren of the second marriage
of Lucio Perido were legitimate, entitling them for the partition of
lands
HELD: Yes. A person who was not at the marriage ceremony
cannot testify as an eyewitness that the marriage did not take
place. In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place a
man and a woman living together as husband and wife are
presumed married.

Balogbog vs. CA - GR No. 83598

March 7, 1997
FACTS:

Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and

accounting against their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition
and accounting of their grandparents estate at the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and
Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the
lower courts decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and
1961 respectively. They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and
Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso
was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by
Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third
share in the estate of their grandparents. However, Leoncia and
Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and
that he was married. They started to question the validity of the
marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how
Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding
that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder
brother Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their
parents marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then
mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both
testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and
that they have three children. Catalina herself testified that she was
handed a receipt presumably the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as
but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single
at the family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the
local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office did not have
a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by
Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing
as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and
Catalina should have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54

of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time
of the alleged marriage was celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of
1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in
the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have
been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case
any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents
of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that
the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children
is also submitted in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.
HELD:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of
Appeals in rendering Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus
entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their grandparents estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of
Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor
General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of
this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since
this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the
marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil
Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as
they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the
Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
failure to present it would not mean that marriage did not take place.
Other evidence may be presented where in this case evidence
consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove
the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three
children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they
are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate
children of Gavino.

MARRIAGE CEREMONY
Navarro v Domogtoy - 259 SCRA 129
Facts: Respondent Judge was alleged to have committed two
specific acts exhibiting gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law:
a) Respondent Judge solemnized the marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the lack
of a summary proceeding for the declaration of Mr. Tagadans first
wifes (Ida Pearanda) presumptive death. Respondent states that
the joint affidavit presented by the groom confirming the fact that
Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for
almostseven years is sufficient proof of Ida Pearandas
presumptive death, and therefore, an ample reason for him to
proceed with themarriage ceremony.
b) Respondent Judge performed a marriage ceremony between
Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his
courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent maintains
that this is not a violation of Article 7 (1) of the Family Code which
states that: Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction; and that
Article 8 which states, a marriage can be held outside of the
judges chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1)
at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect thereof applies to the case in question.
Issues:

(1) Whether or not the marriages solemnized by the respondent

judge are valid under the Family Code; and
(2) Whether or not respondent is subject to administrative liability
Held: First marriage is not valid. Article 41 of the Family Code
requires that even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage. Since Gaspar Tagadan failed to
present such judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Pearanda. Respondent judge erred in accepting the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom. The marriage solemnized has resulted in
a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage as provided under
Article 35 of the Family Code, The following marriage shall be
void from the beginning; (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not
falling under Article 41.
Second marriage is valid. Under Article 3 of the Family Code, one
of the formal requisites of marriage is the authority of the
solemnizing officer. Under Article 7(1), marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the
Judiciary within the Courts jurisdiction. Respondent Judge
holds jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. MariaBurgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario was solemnized at
the respondent Judges residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area. Article 8, which is
a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Article
8 requires both parties to present a written request. The written
request presented addressed to respondent judge was made by
only one party, Gemma del Rosario. Where a judge solemnizes a

marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, while there is a resultant

irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, the
validity of the marriage is not affected. It is the officiating official,
respondent Judge, who shall be subject to administrative liability.

People v Borromeo - 133 SCRA 106

Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of
Susana & Elias Borromeo told Matilde Taborada (mother of Susana)
that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her. Taborada
told her to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn,
told his father and together, they went to Susanas hut. There they
found Susanas lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias
mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The
accused-appellant, Elias, said that because they were legally and
validly married, he should only be liable for homicide and not
parricide. He thinks such because there was no marriage
contract issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in
his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that
they were married in a chapel by a priest.
Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a
marriage void?
Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the
image of being married, are presumed married unless proven
otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society.
Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or
presence of the requisites of the marriage which are: legal
capacity and consent. The absence of the record of such marriage
does not invalidate the same as long as the celebration and all
requisites are present.

Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the

absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation
of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). And,
the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry
of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the
celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is
not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The
appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from
12,000 to 30,000

Martiateque v CA - 205 SCRA 337

Mariategui v. CA, 205 SCRA 337
FACTS: Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages during his
lifetime. He had 4 children with his first wife, Eusebia Montellano.
He had 1 child with his second wife, Flaviana Montellano. And he
had 3 children with his third wife, Felipa Velasco. Lupo died
instestate. Upon his death, descendants from his first and second
marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition on Lot No.
163. However, the children on Lupos third marriage filed with the
lower court an amended complaint claiming that they were
deprive on the partition of Lot No. 163 which were owned by their
common father. The petitioners, children on first and second
marriage, filed a counterclaim to dismiss the said complaint. Trial
court denied the motion to dismiss and also the complaint by the
respondents, children on third marriage. Respondents elevated the
case on CA on the ground that the trial court committed an error

for not finding the third marriage to be lawfully married and also in
holding respondents are not legitimate children of their said
parents. CA rendered a decision declaring all the children and
descendants of Lupo, including the respondents, are entitled to
equal shares of estate of their father. However, petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration of said decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were able to prove their
succession rights over the said estate.
HELD: With respect to the legal basis of private respondents'
demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of
Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate
children of the deceased. Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were
alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is
based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to
Jacinto who testified that "when his father was still living, he was
able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get
married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the
community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was
introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to
controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of
the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present. Under these circumstances, a
marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa.

Tenebro v CA - GR No.150158 - Feb 18, 2004

Tenebro v. CA, G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004

FACTS: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private

complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until
the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he
had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this
previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling
which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit
with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet
another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a
handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico
Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that
his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being
no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage,
with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological
incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD: Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second marriage as
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.

Would the absolute nullity of either first or second marriage prior

to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense
in a criminal action for bigamy? Yes. Except for a void marriage on
account of psychological incapacityvoid marriages are inexistent
from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to
establish their nullity. The complete nullity of a previously
contracted marriage being void ab initio and legally inexistent can
outrightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy. Strong
reservation on the ruling that bigamy is still committed though
marriage is ab initio null and void (if marriage is contracted before
th judicial declaration of its nullity). Canon law-reconcile grounds
for nullity of marriage. Reasons why except those due to
psychological incapacity:
a) Breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of
marriage
b) Other grounds are capable of relatively easy demonstration,
psychological incapacity however, being a mental state may not
be so readily evident
c) It remains valid and binding until declared judicially as void

Republic v Dayot - GR No.175581 - 28 March

2008
FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall
on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they
executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least
5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993

an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint

with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a
complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity
of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was
a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid
considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the
marriage license requirement.
HELD: CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not
lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the
celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts
of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the
falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period
of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage
license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and
Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an
action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to
impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175581

March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are
Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab
initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the
Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. 2 In lieu of a
marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, 3 also dated 24 November
1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being
unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint 4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that
he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the
same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter,
he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some
three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,
ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia.
At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three
folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the
papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so.
However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed
by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the
pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February
1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that
he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he
perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with
Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity
of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and
wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred
contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. 5 In her pre-trial brief,
Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993,
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose
and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by
both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a

favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered

DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed
Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or
her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something
was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it
[was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said
package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact
that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will
not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that
the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose]
does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride"
by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly
notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year
after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false.
[Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be
contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why
her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then.
This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully
wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she
signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate
(T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he
voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29,
1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that
Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of
his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud. 10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It
cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of

marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery
of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa]
through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he
discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any
action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x. 12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to
be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. 13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa
as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court
observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the
parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of
fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals
struck down Joses appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in
giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already
prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by
fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after
the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or
intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the
complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa. 15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to
Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was
solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the
parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded
that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as

husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the
marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained
therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance
of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further
noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the
solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their
marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor
Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According
to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 17 of the Civil Code did not require that either one of
the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church
or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 7 18 of the Family Code
which does not govern the parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man
and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
1avvphi1

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE
and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C.
Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial
v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of
majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and
that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within
the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of
the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception.
It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local
civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning.
Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to
the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the
absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate
court rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that
the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set
aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared
valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No.
179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007,
this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the
Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution. 23

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of
its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE
VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied
Nial.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the
parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in
her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment
of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been
filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity
of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a
considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by
petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa
echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals. 26 To buttress its
assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24
November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics
position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the
solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was

legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their
affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage was
solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties
and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To
further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Joses
notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote
Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay
Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had
lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card,
dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a
false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in
order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24
November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code
governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis
ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil
Code, but not those under Article 75. 28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear
that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this

being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage contract. 30 This is in stark contrast to the old
Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage
void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil
Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. 32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2,
Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in
articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote
places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious
ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed
marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the
Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity
attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of
cohabitation from legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have
attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry
each other."37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity
of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the
minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack
of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of
statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly 38 but reasonably
construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. 40 Where
a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the
former or add to the latter by implication. 41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a
sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of
majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but
to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article
76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a
minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law
can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five
years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a
marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed
with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes
of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite facts 42 in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years
at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic
admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five
months before the celebration of their marriage. 43 The Court of Appeals also noted
Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. 44 The appellate court
also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced
to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum
five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to

decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. 46Under Rule 45, factual findings
are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this
Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial
court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the
exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court
or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain
conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on
substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and
Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the
parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal
requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot
be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the
formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit
legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the
same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a
presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. 50 The present case does not involve an
apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24
November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that every intendment of law or fact
leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and
extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa
was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent
requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a

marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be
used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which
was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid
one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to
allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal
measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage
under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained,
so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have
cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former
is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of
one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation
in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage
license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the
essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper,
without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on
equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot
thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated
that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. 54 There is a law on the
ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of
the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed
estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is
claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding
Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took
Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set
in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. 56 Jose and Felisas
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached

except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not
prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed
back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of a marriage. 57 It covers the years immediately preceding
the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken. 58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of
Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to
their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Morigo v People - GR No. 145226 - 6 Feb 2004

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145226

February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the
judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4,
in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven
(7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution 3 of the
appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years
(from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each
other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to
join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on
August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January
17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago 4 at
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of
accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually
took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information 5 filed
by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. 6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil
case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in
the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No.
8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio
Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7)
Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of
Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense
in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that
their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration
of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v.
Gmur,9 which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the
parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition
anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage,
the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know
the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the
law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before
the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring
the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initiosince no marriage ceremony

actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final
and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020
could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article
34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the
first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage
was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from
the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article
1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be
rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that
the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law
(such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of
merit.16 However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts
original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the
opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the
first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to
speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and
since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be
convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE.
COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT
WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy
and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the
second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be
doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a
conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies
punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack
of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a
difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act.
Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is
tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in
the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon
our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully
prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 19 of the
Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry.
Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone
is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he
was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is
negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we
must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively
dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following
decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the
annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing
of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The
trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles
322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that
such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for
all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage
as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was,
under the eyes of the law, never married." 24 The records show that no appeal was
taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision
had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been
legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to
Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married
"from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking
this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to
Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and
the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is
but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In
the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void." 26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized
not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly
issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at
least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab
initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage
for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the
presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of
the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also
find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or
lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October
21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of
the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho
is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been
proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.

Morigo vs. People

GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004

FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol.

They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete
and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got
married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991
she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In
1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage
ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a
suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a
prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty
claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner
contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of
his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be
free from the bigamy case.
HELD: Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that
there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage
contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity
of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with
Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the
case filed.