6/22/2016

Bhutto&USnuclearpoliticsNewspaperDAWN.COM

Bhutto & US nuclear politics

RABIA AKHTAR PUBLISHED 2 DAYS AGO

The writer is director, Centre for

Security, Strategy and Policy Research at
the University of Lahore.

ZULFIKHAR Ali Bhuttos eating grass comment after the

1965 Indo-Pak war is famously related to his determination
to nuclearise Pakistan. In his reply to a question about
Pakistans response if India went nuclear, Bhutto, minister
of foreign affairs at the time, had remarked with great
resolve, Then we should have to eat grass and get one or buy
one, of our own.
A decade later as Pakistans prime minister in 1975, Bhutto
assured the international community of the opposite and
said: For poor countries like us, [the] atom bomb is a mirage
and we dont want it. In 1965, when I was the foreign
minister, I said that if India had the atom bomb, we would
get one too, even if we had to eat grass. Well, we are more
reasonable nowadays. In reality, his earlier resolve had
anything but weakened in the 10 years since.
After the Indian nuclear test in May 1974, the London
Suppliers Group was established to strengthen nuclear
exports and safeguards. Now called the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), it initially included four nuclear-weapon states
(NWS), with the exception of China: the US, the Soviet
http://www.dawn.com/news/1265958/bhuttousnuclearpolitics/print

1/5

6/22/2016

Bhutto&USnuclearpoliticsNewspaperDAWN.COM
(NWS), with the exception
of China: the US, the Soviet

Union, the United Kingdom, France (after some persuasion)

and three non-NWS West Germany, Canada and Japan.
More than the Indian Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE), the
main US concerns to be addressed through this platform
were a) West Germanys agreement with Brazil to export
nuclear reactors and construction of a complete nuclear fuel
cycle in Brazil in 1975 and b) two French agreements for
export of plutonium reprocessing plants to South Korea in
1975 and Pakistan in 1976.
The US was able to exert pressure on South Korea to cancel
the French reprocessing agreement due to its economic and
security dependence on the US but Pakistan was not under
the US nuclear umbrella and though it was a recipient of US
foreign assistance, it was not entirely dependent on it. The
US administration was aware that in the absence of leverage
over Pakistan due to the decade-old arms embargo (19651975), the Pakistan government had sought nuclear
cooperation agreements with countries like Canada, France
and Germany.

Americas contradictory policies towards

Pakistans nuclear ambitions have a long
history.
The talk of refusing arms sales to Pakistan by the US would
later only create an air of mistrust and bad faith whilst
proving ineffectual as a coercive strategy. However, driven by
congressional pressure, the administration decided to
reinforce its stance on non-proliferation with Pakistan in
explicit terms: no A-7 jets for Pakistan (that were in the
offer) if it proceeded with the reprocessing plant deal.
Kissinger travelled to Lahore on Aug 8, 1976 to convince
Bhutto in person but to no avail.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1265958/bhuttousnuclearpolitics/print

2/5

6/22/2016

Bhutto&USnuclearpoliticsNewspaperDAWN.COM

Bhutto in person but to no avail.

In public, Kissinger sought reconciliation but his private tone

with Bhutto was cautionary. At a dinner reception given by
Bhutto, Kissinger proposed a toast to the long-lasting
friendship between Pakistan and the American people and
sagely articulated that in the lives of all nations, there is
a process of constant renewal, and nations have periodically
to reprocess themselves. And they have to decide what it is
that is worth reprocessing and what it is that is better left
alone.
After Kissingers visit, Dawn in its editorial raised the issue
of dichotomy in the US attitude towards India and Pakistan.
It mentioned the shipment of 20,000 lbs of enriched
uranium to India for use in the American-built Tarapur
nuclear plant and the US administration taking shelter
behind the contract signed in the past between India and the
US, even after Indias breach of trust. The editorial suggested
that if the US wished to be such a stickler for reliability of
contract, it should not find it difficult to uphold the
Pakistan-French contract.
For the Ford administration, rationale for the continuation of
US-supplied enriched uranium to India post-1974 was
difficult to justify to the domestic as well as the international
audience. Immediately after the Indian test, the US had
distanced itself from any role in the Indian nuclear
explosion. Within the administration, there was confusion
about its position on the US role in the event. In July 1976,
David Elliott, member National Security Council, scientific
affairs, outlined the administrations new position in his
briefing memorandum to then national security adviser Gen
Brent Scowcroft. He said that new information provided by
Canada and India had made it clear that the initial US heavy
water loading of the unsafeguarded CIRUS reactor had not
completely evaporated or leaked as was previously believed
and that some US heavy water was in the reactor during the

http://www.dawn.com/news/1265958/bhuttousnuclearpolitics/print

3/5

6/22/2016

Bhutto&USnuclearpoliticsNewspaperDAWN.COM

and that some US heavy water was in the reactor during the
period when the plutonium was produced for the Indian
explosion.
The quid pro quo that the Ford administration was trying to
establish in order for Pakistan to quit the nuclear
reprocessing deal did not work with Bhutto. Pakistan and
France held their positions against strong US opposition. The
outgoing French prime minister, Jacques Chirac, before his
resignation on Aug 25, 1976 announced that the Pak-French
deal would go through despite US objections. However, with
Chirac out of office, French president Valery Giscard
dEstaing aligned his non-proliferation policy to that of the
incoming Carter administration and cancelled the $1 billion
reprocessing plant deal with Pakistan in 1978.
Bhutto had issues with Fords differing non-proliferation
policy because: a) Pakistans attempts to access nuclear
technology from France and West Germany, both opposed by
the US, were for peaceful purposes, and b) US was
contemplating the sale of enriched uranium to India for its
nuclear plants even after India had violated the terms of the
Canadian-American agreement and conducted a nuclear
explosion in 1974 using US heavy water.
These two contradictory policies whereby the US tried to stop
Pakistans latent proliferation activities while enabling India
to continue its nuclear programme by supplying enriched
uranium for its Tarapur plant augmented Bhuttos nuclear
resolve instead of weakening it. During the Ford years,
Bhutto managed to keep Pakistans uranium enrichment
project under wraps by keeping the administration focused
on Pakistans plutonium reprocessing attempts. For
Pakistan, Bhutto was the winner for not giving in to US
pressure.
The writer is director, Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy
Research at the University of Lahore.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1265958/bhuttousnuclearpolitics/print

4/5

6/22/2016

Bhutto&USnuclearpoliticsNewspaperDAWN.COM
Research at the University
of Lahore.

Published in Dawn, June 20th, 2016

TODAY ON IMAGES
OOOO

CORE vs Studio
X: Where should
one go for indoor
cycling in
Karachi?

Mohenjo Daro
trailer out:
Hrithik Roshan
shines in this
Game of Thrones
inspired epic
drama

http://www.dawn.com/news/1265958/bhuttousnuclearpolitics/print

5/5