Clarifying the Cult

Author(s): Colin Campbell

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Sep., 1977), pp. 375-388
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science
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Britishjrournalof Sociology lzolume

e8 J%umber
3 September
I977

Colin Campbell

Clarifying
the cult
ABSTRACT

This paper is an attempt to clarify the concept of cult and, in

particular,an attempttoreplacethe presentpredominantly
empirical
conceptwithone whichmorecloselyresemblesan idealtype.The key
to sucha formulationis seen to lie in the identificationof a distinctly
cultic systemof beliefs,whlch possessinternalcoherenceand imply
a particularform of social organization.Such a systemis foundin
Troeltsch'soriginaldescriptionof 'spiritualreligionand Mysticism'
which is here presentedas the ideal-typicalcult religion.This form
of belief is then shown as logically implying the existenceof the
mystic collectivity,whilst the cult, as this has been conventionally
described,is relegated to the category of a primarilyempirical
construct.
INTRODUCTION

The need for a more adequateformulationof the conceptof cult has

becomeincreasinglyapparent.lAlthoughthe vagueand unsatisfactory
nature of this term has long been commentedon, it has taken the
renewedsociologicalinterestin cults and culticphenomenain the late
sixtes and early seventies2to highlight this deficiency.Attemptsto
remedythis throughgreaterconceptualclarificationhave been made,3
but it is still the case, as Wallis has observed,that Canalyticeffort
directedat the cult has . . . issuedin little theoreticaladvance'.4The
aim of this paperis to identifythe problemswhichhave preventedthe
successfulformulationof a conceptuallycoherentconceptof the cult
and to proposethat analysishas so far failedto distinguishadequately
betweenthe empiricalconstructof the cult and the ideal typeconceptof
the mysticcollectivity.
In TheSocialTeaching
of theChristian
Churches,
5 Troeltschdistinguished
three main types of Christianthought and traced both their interconnectionsandimplicationsforsociallife up to the eighteenthcentury.
His three types were churchreligion,sect religionand mysticismor
'spiritualand mysticalreligion'.The first two he identifiedwith the
dichotomousformsof religiousorganization,the churchand the sect,

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ColinGampbell

whilsthe describedthethirdtypeasa formof anti-associational

individualism which, althoughit did not lead to the formationof religious
organizationsin the conventionalsense, might be the occasion for
small,informaland transientgroups.
However,most studiesof the cult derivetheir inspirationless from
TroeltschthanfromHowardBecker,6whoseconceptof the cult a kind
of quasi-groupembodyingan individualisticsearch-forecstaticexperience-did not so much violate Troeltsch'susage as sever it from its
close associationwith a particularformof religion.WhereasTroeltsch
had been principallyconcernedwith distinguishing
systemsof religious
belief and demonstratingthat each had distinctivesociologicalconsequences,Beckerwas merelyconcernedto delineatetypes of religious
organization.Thus, although there is a resemblancebetween their
respectiveformulations,theirmannerof approachis verydiffierent.
For
Troeltschthe cult was merelya phenomenoncontingenton mystical
religion, whilst for Becker a vague mysticismbecame a contingent
featureof the cult.
SubsequentAmericansociologistsbroke entirely with Troeltsch's
originalconception,droppingall referencesto mysticismand mystical
religion,and indeed in some instancesto religionof any kind, being
contentto specifycultic beliefsas those which were deviantfrom the
perspectiveof religiousand secularorthodoxy.7This usageis not only
at odds with Troeltsch'sformulationbut also contrastswith Becker's,
neitherof whommadeuseofthe criterionof deviancy.In Britain,David
Martinrevivedan importantfeatureof Troeltsch'soriginalperspective
when he identifiedthe cult as embodyingthe mostradicallyindividualisticformof religiousexperience8andrecentstudieshaveeitherfollowed
this line of argument,stressingthe principleof 'epistemological
individualism',9or have attemptedto synthesizethe Britishand American
approachesto the conceptualization
of the cult.l
The currentstateof conceptualization
is thussomewhatconfusedand
unsatisfactory.
Thereis still no standardusageand no obviousmanner
of reconcilingthe traditionsof thoughtwhichstemfromTroeltschand
Beckerwith the morerecenttendencyto definethe cult as a 'deviant'
formof religion.Neitheris there any agreementover the sub-varieties
of the cult. The distinctionproposedby David Martin betweenthe
mystic-religiouscult and the quasi-religious,'manipulative'cult has
not becomewidelyadopted;ll nor does it look as if GeoffreyNelson's
categorizationof cults as 'Permanent','Centralized'and the like will
find readyacceptance.l2In addition,thereis an absenceof agreement
over the questionof whethercults are necessarilynon-Christian,for
althoughTroeltschformulatedhis conceptionof mysticreligionfroma
study of Christianity,David Martin and BentonJohnsonhave both
suggestedthat cults are essentiallynon-Christianin character.l3In
view of these diXerencesit is not surprisingto End that there is little
agreementovertheoriesof the origin,developmentanddemiseof cults.l4

thecult
C;larifying

377

CULT AS A NON-GROUP

There is some agreementabout the structuralfeaturesof the cult.

Successivestudieshave led sociologiststo endorseBecker'sdescription
of a 'veryamorphous,loose-textured,uncondensedtype of socialstructure',l5whilst it is generallyagreedthat cults are transient,tolerant,
non-exclusive,lack a clear distinctionbetween membersand nonfrom the surroundingcultic
membersand are poorly diffierentiated
milieu.l6To this extentit may appearas if somevery real progresshas
been madein buildinga coherentconceptof the cult. But appearances
can be deceptive.
In the firstplace,thisconsensusis largelyan agreementoverwhatthe
cult is not, ratherthanwhatit is. The cultis describedas a groupwhich
one does not join, which is not permanentand enduring,which is not
exclusiveand which does not have clearlyarticulatedbeliefs.Although
there are some termsused, such as 'tolerant',which are positive,the
overwhelmingbias of this descriptionis negative. Consequently,its
value is very much less than it otherwisemight have been. What, one
wonders,is the actual denotativepower containedin such terms as
and 'undefined'? What, therefore,is
'amorphous','loosely-structured'
the value of a generalagreementto definethe cult in such terms?
Secondly,what is even more disturbing,is that this consensusof
whichtendto negatethe conceptof
opinionfocusesuponcharacteristics
a socialgroup,when it is a type of socialgroupwhich is being distinguished.Becker'sdescriptionis of a groupwhich lacksstructure:
The cult is the most ephemeralof all types of religiousstructureindeed, it is usuallyso looselyintegratedand so transitorythat the
term 'structure'is almosta misnomer.17
Fromthis it wouldappearthat the distinguishingfeatureof the cult is
that it is 'almost'not a group.18Indeed, the negativecharacteristics
mentionedabove as characterizingthe cult are exactlythose conventionallyusedto identifythe conceptof a socialgroup,i.e. membership,
structureand commonbeliefs.19If the cult is identifiedby its lack of
these, then we are forced to conclude that the cult is that kind of
religiousgroupwhichis not a group.This conclusionappearsunacceptable becauseillogical,20but it servesto demonstratethat the consensus
of the cult is based upon a double
over the structuralcharacteristics
upon the view that the cult is that
based
is
it
all,
of
First
negativity.
formof religiousorganizationwhich is not a sect,churchor denomination as theseare conventionallyunderstood,and secondly,that the cult
is that formof socialphenomenonwhich comesclosestto resemblinga
is boundto suggestthat cultis littlemore
non-group. Sucha formulation
than a residualcategory.21
It is apparentfrom this that no designationof the cult in termsof
structurealonewill suffice,norcan any amountof attentionto structure
cc

378

ColinCampbell

makeup forthe lackof an adequatestatementof culticbelief.A formof

non-sect,non-denomination,non-church,non-group(or quasi-group)
is not a sufficientdefinitionif this conceptis to have any value for the
sociologyof religion.There has to be some designationof a form of
religiousbelief,and such beliefshave to be clearlyrelatedto structure.
Unfortunately,there has been a persistenttendency to ignore the
questionof belief in mostdiscussionsof the cult. This appearsto stem
from the widespreadopinion that cultic beliefs are so various and
fluctuatingthat they have no obvious common denominator,other,
perhaps,than a certainstraintowardmysticism.22
On the one hand,
there have been detailedstudiesof beliefsystemssuch as Scientology
and Spiritualism,and, on the other, vague comments about the
'mystical'or 'individualistic'characterof cultic belief in general.But
there have been no attemptsto specify'cult religion'as such. Consequently, when it comes to definingthe cult in terms of its cultural
characteristics,
it hasbeennecessaryto fallbackon suchnon-substantive
featuresas devianceor individualism.Theselattercriteria,however,are
quite inadequateas a basisfor distinguishingthe cult fromthe sect or
church,or indeedfromsecular'quasi-groups'.
If the assumptionthat cult beliefs are so various as to lack any
commondenominator(other than the exclusionof sect religion and
churchreligion)is to be takenseriously,then one would be forced to
conclude that the concept of cult is meaningless.For if there is no
determinateset of religiousbeliefs,the definitionof cult wouldhave to
rest entirelyupon structuralfeaturesand, althoughthis mightidentify
a particularform of social organization,it would not be a concept
which wouldhave any specialsignificancefor the sociologyof religion.
If, on the other hand, the assumptionis made that cultic beliefsare
distinguished,not by their intrinsiccontent, but by some contingent
featuresuch as devianceor an individualisticmodeof adherence,then
we find that thesecharacteristics
are muchtoo vagueand unspecificto
enableus eitherto adequatelydifferentiatecultsfromsects,denominations and secularinterestgroups,or to demonstratehow it is that the
distinctivestructuralfeaturesof the cult followfromtheseculturalones.
What is required,in orderfor an ideal type of the cult to be constructed,is that thereshouldbe somespecificationof a distinctiveset of
cultic beliefs.Beliefsthat constitutea systemand possessmeaningful
coherenceand whilst specific enough to contrastwith those which
typify sectarianismand church religion, are yet broad enough to
embraceparticularbeliefsystems.In addition,such a systemof beliefs
shouldgenerateimplicationsfor socialactionthat lead to a distinctive
'cultic'socialphenomenon.

379

Clarifying
thecult
CRITERIA

OF CULT

BELIEP

Deviance, individualism and mysticism are the three criteria which

have been employed, sometimes individually, sometimes in combination, to distinguish cultic beliefs. None of these, however, adequately
delineate the cult from other phenomena nor account for the peculiar
structural characteristicsof the cult.23
The identification of the cult as a deviant group was made by
Dohrman,24whilst Lofland has adopted a similar perspective, describing cults as groups which break offfrom the conventional consensusand
'espouse very diffierentviews of the real, the possible and the moral'.25
Glock and Stark also identify cults as 'religiousmovements which draw
their inspiration from other than the primary religion of the culture'.26
The deficiencies of this approach are several. Firstly, deviance and
variance are particularly diScult to distinguishin the highly pluralistic
cultures of modern societies as indeed is the 'conventional consensus'.Is
Mormonism perhaps a cult in North America? Do the Sikhs constitute
a cult in Great Britain? Is The Order of The Crossnot a cult because it
does draw its inspiration from the primary religion of the culture?
Clearly this negative characterization of the cult is far from helpful,
stressingonce again its status as a residual category. Secondly, it fails to
distinguish between cultic and sectarian forms of deviant religiosity for,
as Wallis has observed, 'Deviance . . . is a distinguishingfeature of both
cult and sect'.27 Thirdly, the fact that cultic beliefs are deviant is not
suicient to explain the peculiar 'quasi-group' characteristicsof cultic
bodies. Although one could argue that people who hold deviant beliefs
feel the need to gather together for mutual reassuranceand protection
in the face of a hostile or critical society, it is hard to see why they should
gather in ephemeral, loosely-structuredgroups rather than in tight-knit,
permanent, 'sectarian' ones.
The stressupon individualism as a crucial characteristicof the cult is
found in Becker's formulation as well as constituting an important
ingredient in Troeltsch'smystical religion. Beckerstated that 'tendencies
toward religion of a strictly private, personal character . . . come to full
fruition in the cult' and that for the cult believer the 'center of his
cosmos is his "I" '.28 Martin endorsesthis view declaring that 'The term
"cult" indicates the most radically individualistic forms of religious
experience'29and that 'the fundamental criterion of the cult is therefore
individualism'.30 More recently, Roy Wallis has developed this
perspective by identifying epistemological individualism as the crucial
characteristicof the cult.31
This criterion has more to recommend it than does 'deviance', but it
too leaves much to be desired. For example, it is far from obvious what
individualism is taken to imply, other than perhaps an absence of any
concern with fellowship. It may refer to the fact that cult adherents are
overwhelminglyself-concerned,as Beckerimplies, or that individualism

380

ColinGampbell

is a featureof eult organizationand authoritystructures.As a eriterion

of eultie belief,it is mostusuallyinterpretedto mean that thesebeliefs
are ones whieh are 'prineipallyeoneernedwith the problemsof individuals'.32Sueha statementis elearlytoo vagueto distinguisheultiefrom
non-eultiereligiousor seeularbeliefs.Religionsin generalean be saidto
addressthemselvesto the problemsof individuals,espeeiallytllosewhieh
foeusupon suffering,death, and the path to salvation,and even if the
ehurehlyand seetarianformsof religiondo on oeeasiongive greater
attentionto soeialandpolitiealmatters,theystillgivepersonalproblems
a majoremphasis.What is more,sueh a criteriondoes not distinguish
seeularfromreligiousbeliefsdealingwith 'personal'problems;nor is it
elear how 'individualistie'beliefslead to the formationof the 'quasigroup'structurestypiealof the eult.33Indeed, tllereis somethingdisturbing about speeifying individualisul as the primary defining
ellaraeteristie
of a soeialgroup,forunlesssomeeountervailingprinciple
can be invokedto showhow the straintowardindividualismis keptin
eheck,it mustlogicallylead to the group'sdisbandment.
The third, and last, of the criteriawhiell has been used to distinguish the cult is mysticism.In consideringthis as a possibledefining
characteristic,
one is struckby the contrastbetweenTroeltseh'soriginal
treatmentof tllisthemeandthatof all subsequenteommentators.
Wllilst
Troeltsehoutlined the characterof mysticismas a form of religionn
subsequentdeseriptionsof the eult llave merelyreferredto the stress
upon mystiealexperienee.Beeker,for example,refersto the goal of the
eult adherentas that of 'purelypersonalecstatieexperienee,salvation,
eomfortand physiealhealing',34and GeoffreyK. Nelson eclloestllis
whenhe distinguisheseultsas groupsbasedupon mystieal,psyehieand
eestaticexperiences.35
What was for Troeltscha complexof beliefs,is
for Beckerand Nelsonmerelya stressupon mysticalexperienee.
One obviousobjeetionto sueh a formulationas Beeker'sis that by
lumpingmystiealexperieneetogetherwitheomfort)mentalandphysieal
healing, the distinctionbetweenseeularand mysticcults has become
obscured.The insisteneeon mysticexperieneealonedoesat leasthelpus
diseriminatethe eult fromseeularorganizations.Unfortunately,it does
not diseriminatethe eult from other religiousbodies,for if the desire
for mystie experieneeis made the erueial eriterionthen groups of
individualswho belong to ehurehesand denominationswould neeessarily be ineluded. A high valuation of religiousexperieneeis not
neeessarilyat odds with membershipof ehurches,denominations,or
even some seets. Furthermore,it is not obvious how a stressupon
mysteal experieneewould, in itself, lead to the emergeneeof the
distinetive, quasi-group,struetureof the eult. An emphasisupon
mystieismmay,in someeases,be seento lead to greatertoleration,nonexelusiveness
andindividualism,but thiswill dependuponthe systemof
beliefs whieh serve to 'interpret'the experienees.If that system is
highly traditionalor authoritarian,then the stressupon experienee

Clarifying
tie GU/t

38I

could just as well lead to intoleranceor an elitist form of fellowship.3

This brief survey suggests that most of the criteria commonly
employedare simplytoo vague and unspecificto serve adequatelyto
identifytypical cultic beliefsand consequentlyto distinguishthe cult
fromotherconcepts.In addition,theirveryvaguenessmeansthat there
is little possibilityof deducingany distinctivestructuralfeaturesfrom
the cultural characteristicidentified.To a considerableextent, this
situationhas arisenbecausethe contentof cultic beliefshas beerloverlookedin favourof an emphasisupon some non-substantive
characteristic such as deviance or tlle mode of adherence. Clearly greater
specificityis required and it is Troeltsch'soriginal formulationof
spiritualand mysticalreligionwhich promisesto provideit.
THE

RELIGION

OF MYSTICISM

Troeltschstressedthat the religionof mysticismwas not the samething

as an emphasisupon mysticalor spiritualexperience.Mysticisnzas an
ingredientof a religionhe describedas 'merelythe insistenceupon the
direct,inwardand presentreligiousexperience'n37
an insistencewhich
can be combinedwitheverykindof worship,mythanddoctrineandcan
manifestitselfin manyformsand hence has no particularlydistinctive
sociologicalconsequences.The religionof mysticism,on the otherhand,
ariseswhen mysticismbecomes'independentin principle,contrasted
with concretereligion'38and seeksto take the place of the established
rellglon:
s.

When this happens mysticismrealizes that it is an independent

religiousprinciple;it sees itself as the real universalheart of all
religion, of which the various myth-formsare merely the outer
garment.It regardsitself as the means of restoringan immediate
unionwith God; it feelsindependentof all institutionalreligion,and
possessesan entireinwardcertainty,which makesit indiffierenttowardseverykindof religiousfellowship. . . Henceforurard
unionwith
God, deification,self-annihilation,ibecome
the real and the only subject of religion.39
As such,mysticalreligionconsistsof beliefsaboutthe nature,originand
characterof such experiencesand consequently'explainsthe religious
experienceto itself'.40Mysticismin this 'narrower'and 'technical'sense
of the wordis a distinctphilosophyof religionwhichis concernedwith
the correctinterpretationof the religiousprocess.Here mysticismis no
longermerelyan aspector ingredientof religionbut a distinctreligion
irlits own rightwith a distinctsystemof beliefs.AmongthoseTroeltsch
mentionsare 'the unity of the divineground',Cthedivineseed'and the
belief in spiritualevolution.It is these beliefsratherthan any single

382

6,aliZt

Campbell

emphasisupon religiousexperience,which marks oWspiritualand

mysticalreligionfromthe churchlyand sectarianvarieties.
A centralbeliefis that all finite beingshave their existencewithin
God,who is the groundof the soul,the 'seed'or 'spark'of all creatures.
Some formof union with God (or moreproperlyre-union)is thus the
goal of this form of religiorl;a goal that can only be realizedby the
developmentof the divineseedinto a powercapableof overcomingthe
world.Thereis, thus,a beliefin a 'scaleof spirituality'whichmarksthe
progressionof the soul's relationshipwith the divine, a conception
which is necessarilyemanationistand denies dualismin favourof a
spiritualmonism.There is no belief in a fundamentaloppositionof
'flesh'and 'spirit'or naturallaw and Christianmiraclebut merelyin
diffierences
in the degreeto whichthe finiteis separatedfromthe divine.
Consequentlyan ascetictemperis excludedthoughthereis an opposition to the selSsllnessand materialismof 'the world'. Indeed secular
concernsare regardedas unimportantand the placing of religion
above ethicsleadsto Antinomianismand Libertarianism.
Thisformof religionregardsreligiousexperienceas a validexpression
of that universalreligiousconsciousness
whichis basedin the ultimate
divineground;a view which leads to an acceptanceof religiousrelativity as far as all specificformsof belief are concernedand to the
doctrineof polymorphism,in which the truthof all religionsis recognized.Hence,not only arewidelydifferingviewsof the centraltruthsof
Christianitytolerated,but all formsof religionareregardedas identical.
Nevertheless,its own teachings,which emphasizethe truthsobtained
throughmysticand spiritualexperience,are regardedas representing
the 'purest'formof religion:
This type of mysticismbecomesan independentreligiousphilosophy,
which recognisesthat the religiousprocessis the same universal
expressionand consciousness
of the metaphysicalconnectionbetween
absoluteand finite being, and which discoverseverywhere,beneath
the concreteformsof religion,the samereligiousgerm,which,however, only reachescompleteand pure maturityunder its fostering
care . . .41
This polymorphismleads into another defining characteristicof
mysticreligion,which is syncretism,especiallythe syncretismof religious and philosophicalideas.Becauseof its rejectionof dualismand its
indiSerenceto literal truth, spiritualand mysticalreligiondoes not
necessarilylead to a positionof hostilityin relationto secularculture.
It is, of course,firmlyopposedto materialismand to rationalismand to
a this-worldlytemper, but has an affinitywith idealisticand metaphysical philosophicalsystems. Idea-systemswhich are frequently
combined with a Christian-inspired
mystic religion are Buddhism,
Hinduism, Sufi Islam, Neo-Platonism,Gnosticismand Romantic
Idealism.42Even scienceand naturalphilosophycan be relatedto the

thecult
Clarifying

383

tenetsof mysticreligionin the workof metaphysicallyinclinednatural

such asJung, WilliamJames,or Whitehead.
philosophers
By definition,mysticaland spiritualreligion cannot be identified
with any one religioustradition.It is a philosophyof religionwhich
identifiessometruthin all religionsbut no specialor exclusivetruthin
anyone of them. Also, althoughit does not have equal prominencein
everyreligioustradition,it is foundin all of them.43Troeltsch'sformulation naturallytends to be couchedin 'Christianlanguage'but the
beliefswhich he identifiesare by no meansspecificallyChristian.44
It can be seen that Troeltsch'sconceptionof spiritualand mystical
religionprovidesjust the kindof specificationof a systemof beliefthat
is requiredin orderto constructan ideal type constructof the cult. The
systemof beliefsinvolvedis specificenough to avoid confusionwith
churchlyor sectarianformsof religion(the distinctionsare set out by
Troeltschhimself)whilstthereis little dangerof confusionwith purely
secularorganizations.At the sametime, the beliefsare generalenough
of beliefwhichmightcharacterize
to subsumethe specificmanifestations
an individualcult. Unfortunately,there is one majordrawback;the
form of social organizationlogically 'necessitated'by Troeltsch's
spiritualand mysticalreligionis not the cult as this has been conventionallyconceived,but the conceptof the mysticcollectivity.
TIlE MYSTIC COLLECTIVITY

The individualismthat is so mucha featureof tlle religionof mysticism

stems from the statementof its primary aim as personalholiness,
perfectionor deification,and the consequentconcentrationupon inwardnessandfulfilmentof the individual'sspiritualpotential.Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is no concernwith relationships
betweenindividuals,merelythat individualsare regardedas relatedto
each other throughGod and the divine. Hence by movingnearerto
Godthe individualis necessarilybeingunitedwith all othersouls.Thus
to seekout or initiatesecularfellowshipswouldbe an irrelevantor even
action.Indeed,it couldimply a lack of faithin the
counter-productive
reality of the spiritualfellowshipand hence constitutean heretical
tendency. It is interestingin this context that Troeltschspeaks of
organizedformsassociatedwith mysticreligionas constituting'mere
concessionsto humanfrailty'.45Obviouslyin its pureformthis type of
religiondoes not lead to the constructionof any type of socialgroup,
but acceptsa beliefin the realityof an 'invisiblechurch':
Henceat this point therearisesthe idea of fellowshippeculiarto this
kind of 'spiritualreligion':the idea of the InvisibleChurch,of the
purelyspiritualfellowship,knownto God alone, about which man
does not need to concernhimselfat all, but whichinvisiblyrulesall
believers,withoutexternalsignsor othermeans.The conceptionof a

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ColinCampbell

purelyspiritualfellowshipis the baekgroundof thissentiment,and in

this the individualis thereforerelievedof all obligationto organize
and evangelize,and from all eonneetionwith ecclesiasticaland
sectarianorganization.46
It followsthatthe greaterthe emphasisgivento thisdistinctiveteaching,
the more firmlywill the reality of the invisiblechurchbe accepted,
with the consequencetllat all formsof socialorganizationare regarded
as redundant.Furthermore,this formof religion,with its stressupon
first-llandexperience,is hostileto dogmaand tlle 11istorical
dimension
of Christianity,thus eliminatingthe centre aroundwilich a religious
organizationcan form.As a result,in reality,it tendsto be independent
of)if not hostiletoward,anyformof socialorganization47
andis 'entirely
unorganized'having'no desireforan organizedfellowship',48
mysticism
in particularbeing likely to be 'independentof all institutionalreligion'.49Hence tllis form of religion 'createsno communities'50
and
causesthe conceptof the religiouseommunityto lose all significanee51
for 'the idea of tlle Churclland of religiousorganizationis alien'.52It
is quite clear frornthese and other remarksthat Troeltschneverconsideredthere was any typieal form of social organizationnecessarily
associatedwith mysticreligion,but that on the contrary,logic worked
againstany organizedsecularfellowship.
Troeltsch did recognize, however, that certain forms of protoorganization might empirically be associated with spiritual and
mysticalreligion,but suchformshad a purelysecularand not religious
rationale:
Whateverorganizedformsit does adopt are loose and provisional,
mere coneessionsto human frailty, without any sense of inwar
necessityand Divineinspiration.53
He addsto this by remarkingthat even the mysticis human,and feels
the needfor the give-and-takeof intimatefellowshipwith othersouls.54
HenceTroeltscllrefersto Philadelphianism
and the formationof groups
round'spiritualdirectorsand deeplyexperiencedleaders'55and it is in
this context that he outlinesthe kind of looselystructuredvoluntary
associationwhichhasbecomethe basisforthe conceptof cult.However,
it is quite clear that these 'cultic'formsof organizationcannotderive
any firm legitimationfor their existeneefrom the eommonbeliefsof
their 'adherents'but only fromsueh seeulareonsiderations
as the need
for companionship,instruction,or proteetionfrompersecution.
Troeltsehregardedthe absenceof any form of social organization
as a principalsociologicalcharaeteristicand coneomitantof spiritual
and mysticalreligionand consideredthe formlessand ephemeral'cultlike' structuresas merelya possibleeontingentphenomenon.Although
approximatingto those formsof soeial organizationmost frequently
associatedwith this form of religion,the more spiritualand mystieal

Clarifying
thecult

385

religionapproachesthe 'puretype',the moreit will be characterizedas

a cultural configurationand associatedpersonalethic without any
visible formal social organization.This is in marked contrastwith
churchand sect religionwherethe organizationalformis 'inherent'in
the culturalideal type.
An examinationof the discussionsof the cult fromBeckeronwards
revealshow often the logic of the argumenthas pointed to this conclusiononly forthe sociologistto drawbackfromit at the last moment;
Beckerhimselfcame as closeto anyoneto sayingthat the cult was that
formof religiousphenomenonwhichwas not a socialgroup,but clung
to his 'almost'and failedto restatehis insightin a positiveform.David
Martinalsocorrectlynotedthat the pureexpressionof religiousindividualismnegatedthe very idea of a social fellowshipand hence of the
social group but went on to make the doubtful assertionthat this
renderedmysticisma purelypsychologicalpllenomenon.56
The fact that spiritualand mysticalreligioninvolvesa powerfulantiassociationalimpulse and in its pure form 'createsno communities'
does not mean that it is a strictlypsychologicalphenomenon,of no
interestto the sociologist.For it does have definitesociologicalconsequencesand, althoughit does not lead to the formationof groupsand
organizations,it does lead to the existenceof socialcollectivities.
The term, collectivity,has been used by Leopoldvon Wiese and
Howard Becker,Florian Znanecki,Talcott Parsonsand Robert K.
Mertonto describethosepeople'amongthegreatestpartof whomthere
is no socialinteraction,althoughtheydo sharea bodyof socialnorms.'57
Collectivitiesthereforeconsist of those people who have a sense of
solidarityby virtueof sharedcommonvaluesandwhohavealsoacquired
an attendant sense of moral obligation to fulEll common roleexpectations.58
Clearlythe adherentsto spiritualand mysticreligion
constitutejust such a collectivityin that tlley sharecommonvaluesderivedfrom a commonweltanschauung-and
a commondefinitionof
theirreligious'duties'.Althougllthereis little or no interactionamong
the majorityof the membersof this collectivity,thelNe
is neverthelessa
commonconsciousnessof membershipin 'the invisiblechurch'or its
equivalent.It is possiblethat some of the membersare in directcommunicationwith each other and it is from such informalgroupsthat
mystic cults arise, but the majorityare probably only in indirect
communicationof the kind mediatedby their readershipof the same
booksand magazines.
As Merton observes,one of the most significantcharacteristicsof
collectivitiesis that they functionas a baseforgroupformation;collectivitiesare 'potentialsforgroup-formation',
the commonfundof values
facilitatingsustainedsocialinteractionamongpartsofthe collectivity.59
This fact is crucialfor it helpsus to understandthe processof cult formation.Since,however,the membersof the mysticcollectivitymayalso
be membersof conventionalreligiousorganizations,whether of the

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ColinCampbell

churchor denominationvariety,this conceptmay also help to explain

spiritualand mysticalmovementsthat arisewithin these bodies.Not
that thisconceptis adequatein itselfto accountforsuchmovementsbut
it does help explainone basisof theirsupport.
CONCLUSION

It wouldseemthat, if thereis an ideal-typeconceptto be foundin the

body of sociologicalliteratureon the cult, then that conceptis not the
cult itselfas this has been conventionallyunderstood,but the concept
of the mystic collectivity.This is the true counterpartto Troeltsch's
mysticandspiritualreligionin the way that the sectand the churchare
the structuralconcomitantsof sect religionand churchreligion.The
mysticcollectivityis here understoodto referto all those people who
hold to the tenetsof mysticalreligionand consequentlyhave a senseof
commonsolidarityand obligation,even thoughthey do not interact.
Conceivedin thisway,whilstthe sectandthe churchareconventionally
identifiedas differentkinds of religiousgroups (embodyingthe contrasting principles of inclusivenessand exclusiveness),the mystic
collectivityis distinguishedfrom both by the contrastbetweengroup
and collectivity.The religiouscult, therefore,(asopposedto the secular
therapeuticcult) is to be seen as an extrusion,precipitatedin all
probabilityby some secularconsideration,fromthe substratumof this
collectivity;one whichdoesnot happento occurwithinthe confinesof
an existingreligiousorganization,and will, in all probability,dissolve
beforelong backinto the collectivityonce again.
ColinCampbell,
B.SC., PH.D.,
SeniorLecturer
in Sociology
University
of Sork
Notes
2. For evidence of this new interest
I. This need has been commentedon
by Wallis and Nelson, see Geoirey K. see Daniel Bell, 'Religionin the sixties',
vol. 30, no. 3 (Autumn
Nelson, 'The SpiritualistMovementand SocialResearch,
Marcello Truzzi,
the need for a redeSnition of cult', I 97 I ), pp. 447-97;
Journalfor the Scientific
Studyof Religion, CTheOccultRevivalin PopularCulture:
some random observationson the old
vol. 8, no. I (SpringI969), pp. I52-60,
Quarterly,
and 'The Concept of Cult', Sociologicaland nouveauwitch',Sociological
vol. I 3, no. I (WinterI 97 I ), pp. I 6-36;
Review,vol. I6, no. 3 (NovemberI968),
pp.
35 I-62;
Roy Wallis, 'Scientology: Jacob Needleman, The JWewReligions,
therapeuticcult to religioussect', Socio- Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co.,
logy,vol. 9, no. X (January I 975), pp. I970, and the completeissue of iournal
vol. 5, no. 3 (Winter
89-I00,
and 'Ideology, authority and of PopularCulture,
the developmentof cultic movements', I97I).
3. See GeoffreyK. Nelson (I 968), op.
SocialResearch,
vol. 4I, no. 2, (Summer
cit. and Roy Wallis,op. cit.
I 974), pp. 298-304.

thecult
Clarifying

387

4. Roy Wallis, 'Ideology, Authority idealtypicalconceptof the cult it can be

and the development of cultic move- disregarded.
I9. For a deSnitionof the concept of
ments', Social Research,vol. 4I, no. X
social group, see Robert K. Merton,
(SummerI 974), p. 299.
Glencoe,
andSocialStructure,
5. ErnstTroeltsch,EfieSocialTeaching SocialTheory
GeorgeAllen and Ill., Free Press,I957, p. 284.
Churches,
of theChristian
20. As will be argued later, this conUnwin, I 93I, 2 vols.
6. L. von Wiese and HowardBecker, clusionis, in fact, not unacceptable,but
on the Basis of the entirelynecessary.
SystematicSociolog)J
of Leopold 2I. For a valuable discussionof the
and Gebildelehre
Beziehungslehre
natureand functionof residualcategories
vonWiese.
7. H. T. Dohrman, CaliforniaCult: in theorizingsee Talcott Parsons, The
of SocialAction,New York, Free
7CheStory of MankindUnited,Boston, Structure
Beacon Press, I958; John Lofland and Press,I968 (I937), pp. I6-I9.
RodneyStark,'Becominga world-saver: 22. One attemptto draw a boundary
a theoryof conversionto a deviantper- around cultic beliefs is to be found in
Review,vol. Colin Campbell,op. cit., pp. I22-6.
Sociological
spective',American
30, pp. 862-75; John Lofland,Doomsday 23. To some extent this difficultyhas
Cult,EnglewoodCliffis,N. J., Prentice- arisen because the term cult has been
applied to non-religiousorganizations
Hall, I966.
and movements.That thisshouldhappen
8. David A. Martin, Pacifiism:An
Study,New York, is understandableenough, as many of
andSociological
Historical
the prominentcults,suchas Spiritualism,
SchockenBooks,I966, pp. I93-7.
9. Roy Wallis(JanuaryI975), Op. cit. Buchmanismand Scientology,are essentially quasi-religiousin character,comOp.
I 0. Geoffrey K. Nelson ( I 968),
bining religious and secular items in
Cit.
their belief-systemsand satisfyinginstruI I. David A. Martin, op. cit., pp.
mental and expressiveneeds for their
I 94-6.
Op.
adherents.Nevertheless,there is a clear
I2. Geoffrey K. Nelson (I968),
analyticdistinctionbetweenthe religious
cit., pp. 358-6I.
cult properand secular,voluntaryassociI 3. David A. Martin,op. cit., pp. I-4
and I93; BentonJohnson, 'On church ations with 'cult-like' characteristics.
and sect', AmericanSociologicalReview, For a discussionof this distinctionsee
David A. Martin, ( I 966) op. cit., pp.
vol. 28 (AugustI963), pp. 539-49
I 93-7 and John Jackson and Ray
I4. Compare,for example, the work
of Wallisand Nelsonalreadymentioned, Jobling. 'Toward an analysis of contogether with the approach of Eister; temporarycults', in David Martin, ed.,
inBritain,
ofReligion
Searbook
AllanW. Eister,'Anoutlineof a structural A Sociological
theoryof cults', yournalFor TheScientific London, Student Christian Movement
Studyof Religion,vol. 2, no. 4 (December Press,I 968, pp. 97-8.
24. H. T. Dohrman,op. cit.
3I9-33
pp
I972),
29. John Lofland,op. cit., p. I.
I5. Howard Becker, op. cit., p. 627.
26. C. Y. Glockand R. Stark,Religion
I6. For a summaryof the structural
characteristicsof the cult and the use of and Societyin Tension,Chicago, Rand
the term 'culticmilieu'see Colin Camp- McNally, I965, p. 245.
27. Roy Wallis (I975), op. cit., p.
bell, 'The cult, the cultic milieu and
secularization',in Michael Hill, ed., A 90.
28. Howard Becker,op. cit., p. 6X7.
of Religionin Britain,
Eearbook
Sociological
29. David A Martin,op. cit., p. 5.
vol. 5, London,StudentChristianPress,
30. Ibid., p. I94.
pp. I I9-36.
I972,
I7. HowardBecker,op. cit., p. 627.
3I Roy Wallis (I975), op. cit.
3X. Geoffrey K. Nelson ( I 968), op.
I8. Becker'suse of the term 'almost'
has significanceonly if cult is being con- cit., p 354
33. Roy Wallis (op. cit., I 975) has
sideredas an empiricalconstruct;insofar
as the concern here is to arrive at an helped to account for many of the

388

ColinCamj7bell

strueturalfeaturesof the eult by identi- view,for,asJacksonandJoblingobsersre,

fying the crucial principleof epistemo- a highlyindividualisticmystical-spiritual
Iogieal individualism. By so doing, formof religionhas been a constantelehowever,he has alsodrawnattentionto a mentin the Christiantradition.('Toward
erueial question: what are the beliefs, an analysis of eontemporaryeults' in
distinetiveof cults, whieh serve to justify David Martin (ed.), A Soszological
Learthis prineiple?
book of Relzgzonin Brztazn,London,
34. HowardBecker,op. cit., p. 627.
Student Christian Movement Press,
35. Geoff*reyK. Nelson ( 1968), op.
68, pp. 97-8.
eit., p 354
44. For a discussionof the mystieal
36. It mightappearas if tlle anselerto beliefss^7hich
are commonto the world's
the eonundrumof eonceptualizingthe re]igionssee AldousHuxley, The Perencult would be to amalgamatesomeor all nzalPhilosophy,
New York, Harper and
of these three eriteria.This, indeed, has Row, I 944
45. Ernst Troeltscll,op. cit., p. 743.
been the strategy adopted by Nelson
( I 968). Though such a eonstruct may
46- Ibid., p. 745.
have some empiricalrelevenceit eannot
47. Ibid., p. 38I .
meet the need for an ideal type concept
4t3-Ibid., p. 377.
becausethe componentparts possessno
49. Ibid. p. 377.
neeessary or lo;,ical relationshipsvith
50. Ibid., p. 7gfi.
each other.
5I Ibid.,p.795.
37. Ernst Troeltseh,op. eit., p. 730.
52. Ibid., p. 800.
53 Ibid., p. 743.
38 Ibid., p. 734.
54 Ibid., p. 749.
39- Ibid., p. 734.
55 Ibid., p. 749.
40. Ibid., p. 735.
56. David A . Martin, op. cit., pp.
4I * Ibid., p. 735.
I 94-742 Ibid., p. 736.
43. It is an interestingparadox that
57. Leopold von Wiese and Howard
althoughTroeltschillustratedmysticism Becker,op. cit., eh. I 7; FlorianZnanecki,
and spiritual religion entirely by ex- Social Actions,New York, Farrar and
amples drawn from Christianity,both RinehartdI936, pp. 364-5; Talcott ParDavid Martin(Pacifsm:AnHistorical
and sons, TheSocialSystem,
Glencoe,Ill., The
Sociological
Study,New York, Schocken Free Press, I95I, pp. 77-8; Robert K.
Books, I966) and BentonJohnson ('On Merton,SocialTheoryandSoszalStructure,
Church and Sect' American
Sociological Glencoe,Ill., Free Press,I957, pp. 299Review,vol. 28. (AugustI963), pp. 539- 3oo.
49) have argued that mystic cults are
58. RobertK. Merton,op. cit., p. 299.
59. Ibid., p. 299.
somehowalien to the Christiantradition.
There is little evidencein favourof this