Actions Speak Louder than Words:

Close Relationships between Humans

and Nonhuman Animals
Clinton R. Sanders
University of Connecticut

Symbolic interactionism and other sociological perspectives traditionally

have not attended to a significant form of close relationship—that which
exists between people and the companion animals with whom they share
their everyday lives. After a brief presentation of a portion of the relevant
literature that deals with how humans understand and interact with their
animal companions, I present the process by which caretakers come to
define the unique identities of their animals and the ways in which the
human-animal couple identity shapes public interaction. Since play, mutual
gaze, and “speaking for” animals are key elements of friendly human-animal
interaction, I discuss these activities as central to the process by which
caretakers establish and express intersubjective connections with their ani-
mals. Finally, I maintain that attention to human-animal relationships holds
promise for advancing an appreciative understanding of how personhood,
mind, and culture are constructed in the process of interaction. Of special
significance to the broadening of the interactionist perspective is that the
understandings and emotional connections that bind people and their ani-
mals are created and maintained in the absence of a shared body of lin-
guistic symbols.

Relationships, which are composed of routine and patterned interactions, are cen-
tral to the symbolic interactionist view of social life. Relationships range from those
that are instrumental, emotionally uninvolving, and typically of short duration to
those that are intrinsically rewarding and long-term and in which participants have
considerable emotional stake. Conventionally, interactionists and other analysts of
social life have seen the interdependence, commitment, and emotionality of close
relationships as existing within, and sustained by, the symbolic exchanges of hu-
mans. I maintain that this characterization of close relationships is overly restrictive.
It excludes from consideration a class of affiliations that are commonplace,1 imbued

Direct all correspondence to Clinton R. Sanders, Department of Sociology, Box U-2068, University of
Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269; e-mail: clinton.sanders@uconn.edu.

Symbolic Interaction, Volume 26, Number 3, pages 405–426, ISSN 0195-6086; online ISSN 1533-8665.
© 2003 by the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction. All rights reserved.
Send requests for permission to reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press,
Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223.
406 Symbolic Interaction Volume 26, Number 3, 2003

with emotion, and central to the shaping of the identities and selves of those in-
volved. Traditionally, conventional sociologists (e.g., Perrow 2000:473) have ignored
or denigrated relationships between people and their companion animals. How-
ever, the intense, involving, and routine interactions forming these relations are
worthy of serious attention and have the potential of adding significantly to the so-
ciology of intimate exchanges.
Until fairly recently, sociologists have disregarded human-animal relationships.2
Constrained by what Rollin (1997) calls the “commonsense of science,” sociology
routinely has portrayed nonhuman animals as mindless, emotionless, self-less, react-
ing rather than acting, apprehending rather than comprehending, and existing only
in the immediately situation.3 It has defined people’s associations with them as “fic-
tive” or the consequence of anthropomorphic “folk delusions.”
This dismissal is based largely on the linguicentric Cartesian assumption that,
lacking the ability to use symbols, nonhuman animals are qualitatively distinct from
humans. George Herbert Mead (1907, 1962) frequently used examples of non-
human animals as a backdrop to his discussion of the (supposedly) unique abilities
of humans to construct meaning; to engage in minded behavior; and to create, re-
flect on, and present the self. Lacking the basic resource of symbolization, animals
could not think or engage in the complex form of social interaction premised on
shared symbols.

The animal does not think. . . . In order that thought may exist there must be
symbols, vocal gestures generally, which arouse in the individual himself the re-
sponse which he is calling out in the other, and such that from the point of view
of that response he is able to direct his later conduct. (Mead 1962:73)

Following Mead’s lead, symbolic interactionists and other sociologists consistently

have excluded animals from serious consideration, since, “not being human, [they]
can in no way be social or cultural beings as this would be a contradiction in terms”
(Noske 1989:82–83).
In the following discussion, I reexamine close relationships to move beyond the
limiting anthropocentric orthodoxy that presents the bonds and interactions be-
tween humans and nonhuman animals as qualitatively different from—and, by im-
plication, inferior to—those between humans. Following a brief overview of the key
discussions of human-animal relationships that exist, I examine the relevance of
this type of social exchange for identity. Here I present the central issue of how
people come to ascertain the unique identities of their companion animals while in-
teracting with them. I also emphasize how a close relationship with a companion
animal shapes the human caretaker’s identity both as an individual and as a member
of the human-animal “couple.”
Next, I turn to examine the close relationship with a companion animal as a form
of friendship. Like human-to-human friendships, those between people and com-
panion animals assume intersubjectivity. Play, as I argue, requires participants to
evaluate the situation, define the perspective of the other, and—in the context of
Actions Speak Louder than Words 407

mutually understood rules—make decisions about how to act in concert. In addi-

tion, I discuss gaze and mutual direction of attention as central elements of the inter-
subjectivity that supports interspecies friendship. This section on human-animal
friendship concludes with a brief presentation of a typical feature of the relation-
ship. Caretakers commonly give voice to what they understand to be the thoughts
and feelings of their animal companions. This process of “speaking for” demon-
strates the practical definition of the (animal) other that arises out of routine rela-
tional experience.
After discussing central components of human friendships with animals and
showing how these relationships are established and sustained, I suggest three is-
sues of basic interest that we may conceptualize more broadly and fruitfully explore
by directing systematic attention to interspecies relationships. First, I maintain that
a sociology of human-animal relationships provides a rich context in which to ex-
plore how we construct and assign the designation “person.” Next, I present the is-
sue of “mindedness” and argue that the conventional, linguicentric perspective on
mind-as-internal-conversation is inadequate and confining. In contrast, I propose
an expanded view of mind that, like personhood, we can best understand as arising
out of social interaction. In essence, I maintain that people “do mind” as a coopera-
tive interpretive process that does not depend on the ability of all parties to express
their thoughts lingustically. Finally, I discuss culture as a collection of shared under-
standings that arises out of face-to-face interaction. Culture provides the basis for
evaluating immediate situations, interpreting the perspective of others, and devising
means for achieving goals, and, as such, it establishes the foundation for effective
collective action. As caretakers pursue the everyday routines that express and solid-
ify their relationships with their animal companions, they cooperatively create a
private, interspecies culture that is simple and immediate and acts as an effective
practical basis for interaction.
Identity, personhood, empathy, love, mindedness, culture, and other key issues
are of considerable interest to interactionists and are of central relevance for the so-
ciology of close relationships. The central point of this article is that these key issues
may be fruitfully explored if we turn serious and appreciative attention to the human-
animal bond and the social exchanges that both define and result from this unique
form of sociation. This task requires that we move beyond the analytic restraints
imposed by the presumption that shared symbols are the sole foundation for “real”
intimate relationships and “authentic” interactions.

THE LITERATURE ON HUMAN-ANIMAL RELATIONSHIPS

Since Bryant (1979) advocated that increased attention should be paid to the “zoo-
logical connection,” analysts of social behavior from a variety of disciplines have
been heeding his call. Due to early interest in the therapeutic utility of interactions
with animals (Levinson 1965), a significant proportion of the extant literature has
focused on the positive impact of relationships with animals on the physical and
408 Symbolic Interaction Volume 26, Number 3, 2003

psychological well-being of their human partners (e.g., Baun et al. 1984; Beck and
Katcher 1996:125–59; Friedmann et al. 1980; Hendy 1984). A related body of work
has examined the uniquely intense relationships between people with disabilities
and their assistance animals. These works highlight the impact of the human-animal
relationship on people’s identities and self-definitions (e.g., Michalko 1999; Sanders
2000), emotional health (e.g., Valentine, Kiddoo, and LaFleur 1993; Zee 1983), and
public encounters (e.g., Hart, Hart, and Bergin 1987; Warnath and Seyfarth 1982).
Since people’s interactions with companion animals typically occur in the family
context, the place of animals in familial relationships has received considerable at-
tention. This literature regards household pets as full-fledged participants in the
family system (e.g., Cain 1983, 1985; Hickrod and Schmitt 1982) and as playing a
significant role in shaping relationships among human family members (e.g., Beck
and Katcher 1996:40–62; Smith 1983).
Arguably, the richest body of literature dealing with human-animal relationships
focuses on how people come to define their animal companions as unique individu-
als, comprehend their mental experience, and organize everyday exchanges based
on these understandings. Fidler, Light, and Costall (1996), for example, interviewed
students about their evaluations of dogs’ thought processes after showing them a
series of videotaped sequences. They found that experienced pet caretakers were
significantly more likely to define the filmed behavior as having resulted from the
dog’s understanding of the situations and responding with deliberate actions. In a
similar vein, Rassmussen, Rajecki, and Craft (1993) surveyed students to ascertain
their perceptions of animal mentality and, in a later study, used the same research
approach to examine the defined differences between the thoughts and feelings of
dogs and humans (Rassmussen and Rajecki 1995). In general, the authors found, al-
though the students acknowledge that dogs and humans have different cognitive
abilities, they hold that the mental processes of dogs and humans are qualitatively
similar.
Studies employing ethnography, semistructured interviews, and introspective
analysis of personal experience with companion animals have added depth to the
portrayal of people’s understanding of the mentality and emotions of animals and
how they use this understanding to shape interactions and relationships. For ex-
ample, Sanders (1993) discussed how dog owners come to regard their nonhuman
companions as unique, thoughtful, and emotional participants in social exchanges.
In a parallel article, Alger and Alger (1997) examined the similar perceptions and
experiences of cat owners. Focusing on human relationships with dogs and horses,
respectively, Shapiro (1990) and Wipper (2000) have emphasized the central role
played by touch in establishing the human-animal relationship and communicating
feelings and intentions in the course of interaction (see also Beck and Katcher
1996:78–95).
Although this is not an exhaustive list of the growing literature on human-animal
relationships produced by analysts of social relationships and behavior, it pro-
vides ample testimony to the increased interest in the topic. As I maintain, this area of
Actions Speak Louder than Words 409

interest provides an excellent foundation for examining not only the substantive is-
sues listed above but also matters of central relevance to the interactionist study of
intimate relationships. Since companion animals typically are regarded as friends
and act as partners in everyday interaction,4 attention to people’s associations with
them can offer a unique view of how close relationships shape the construction and
communication of identity, give rise to routine interactions that express and sustain
friendship, and may be effectively grounded in empathetic understandings without
the limits imposed by language.

IDENTITY AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH COMPANION ANIMALS

Identity is a central concept in sociological psychology. Although scholars disagree
somewhat about the specific elements of the concept (Cerulo 1997; Strauss 1997;
Stryker and Burke 2000), identity is, essentially, a social categorization composed of
the characteristics one uses when defining his or her self and those that are employed
by others to orient interaction. Identity is both the basis for and consequence of inter-
action. As Stone states:
[I]dentity establishes what and where the person is in social terms. . . . [W]hen
one has an identity, he is situated—that is, cast in the shape of a social object by
acknowledgment of his participation or membership in social relations. . . . To
have an identity is to join with some and depart from others, to enter and leave
social relations at once. . . . To engage meaningfully in some transactions it
is enough to know merely “what” the parties are—to know their identities.
(1981:188–90)

Identities arise and are employed in specific situations and serve as major defini-
tional “pegs” (Goffman 1963a:57) by which actors make sense of themselves, co-actors,
and the situation that encompasses and constrains their interactions. In turn, identity is
connected to actors’ roles, statuses, histories, and group memberships. It establishes a
person’s connections to others and demonstrates his or her uniqueness from others.

CONSTRUCTING ANIMAL IDENTITY

Identity construction in the context of interspecies interaction has some unique fea-
tures in that problems involved in the linked processes of altercasting (Weinstein
and Deutschberger 1970) and taking the role of the other are reduced when coac-
tors share similar experiences, orientations, and symbol systems. Nonhuman ani-
mals do not employ conventional symbols and have perspectives markedly differ-
ent from those used by their human associates. Thus the mutual understanding and
assignment of complementary roles that are the foundation for routine collective
action typically are tentative and emergent.
Within the person-companion animal relationship the caretaker’s approach to
the animal-other presupposes a preexisting identity: the animal is elementally defined
as a “species representative.” He or she is assigned the characteristics encompassed
410 Symbolic Interaction Volume 26, Number 3, 2003

by culturally shaped definitions such as “cat,” “dog,” “bird,” and so forth. The hu-
man actor refines this basic “categorical identity” (Cahill 1998:136) when he or she
takes into account the “breed characteristics” of the companion animal. To a certain
degree, understandings of species characteristics are an element of the general pop-
ular culture (e.g., dogs are friendly and tractable; cats are aloof and resistant to
training). Knowledge of breed characteristics is central to the subcultural worlds
that revolve around particular species and commonly is incorporated in practical
guides intended to aid inexperienced people interested in acquiring a companion
animal: Dalmatians are “unpredictable,” terriers are “high strung and energetic,”
Arabian horses are “fiery,” quarter horses are “solid,” and so forth (e.g., Hart and
Hart 1988; Pugnetti 1980; Rees 1984). Those embarking on relationships with com-
panion animals can use this basic categorical identity information to anticipate the
problems they might encounter and match their requirements and personalities to
the animal they eventually acquire.
While the defined attributes contained in species and breed categories form the
foundation for a person’s assignment of a basic identity to his or her companion an-
imal, the person sees the nonhuman other as much more than a species or breed re-
presentative. Typically, the person regards the animal as an individual with an iden-
tifiable history, discrete personality, and unique tastes. For example, an experienced
dog owner interviewed by Sanders described the characteristics of her dog’s breed
and then spoke of her animal companion as a unique individual who did not display
these categorical features:
She wanted to be Shirley Temple, but was born a dog instead. . . . Malamutes are
peculiar dogs. Some people just don’t know how to deal with them. They expect
them to be like a Golden or something—“Go over there and sit in the corner!”—
and they just do it. You have to be strong with a Malamute. They aren’t that domes-
ticated. They are raised to pull sleds and you want them to be able to decide things
like if the ice is too thin—to think for themselves. If you aren’t strong with them
then they think they are the boss and you are going to have real trouble. She’s not
like that. She’s just the sweetest. She is like that in the show ring. She makes eyes at
the judges and charms them. She’s sweet with most people. (1999:155)
In very different terms the phenomenological psychologist Shapiro describes the
centrality of shared historical experience in shaping his relationship with and feel-
ing for his dog, Sabaka:
History informs the experience of a particular animal whether or not it can tell
that history. Events in the life of an animal shape and even constitute him or her.
. . . Sabaka is an individual in that he is not constituted through and I do not live
toward him as a species-specific behavioral repertoire or developmental se-
quence. More positively, he is an individual in that he is both subject to and sub-
ject of “true historical particulars.”. . . I can not replace him, nor, ethically, can I
“sacrifice” him for he is a unique individual being. (1989:187)
The process of assigning names to encountered objects is central to the produc-
tion of the namer’s orientation to and action toward that object. As Strauss
(1997:20–24) puts it:
Actions Speak Louder than Words 411

To name is to know and the extent of knowing is dependent upon the extent of
the naming. . . . The act of naming is central to any human’s cognition of his
world. . . . The naming of an object provides a directive for action . . . and arouses
a set of expectations toward the object thus classified.

A major means, therefore, by which the caretaker solidifies the unique identity of
the animal companion is by assigning the animal a name. One indication of the
crucial importance of naming as a way to cast the individuality and unique identity
of an animal is that conventional ethologists5 strongly discourage the assignment of
names. Settings such as factory farms and animal “shelters”6 also strongly discour-
age naming. In these settings, workers conventionally regard animals as objects
rather than individual beings and believe that affording them individual identities
could potentially thwart organizational goals. Phillips (1994), for example, discusses
the strong disinclination of laboratory scientists (but not technicians) to individual-
ize lab animals by assigning them names. As she points out, naming an animal
would transform it from a “piece of scientific equipment” into a “pet.” Such individ-
ualization would, in turn, make the use of the animal in painful experiments and his
or her eventual “sacrifice” more emotionally problematic.7
A variety of factors shape the choice of the name assigned to a companion ani-
mal. Popular culture plays a role, as humans name animals after those in films,
newspaper comics, and on television (e.g., Garfield, Tramp). The animal’s individual
attributes also shape this choice as he or she is named for special physical features
(e.g., Freckles, Fluffy, Brandy) or notable behaviors and interests (e.g., Nibbles,
Spinner, Bones). However, the most common convention is to give the companion
animal a human name, thereby symbolically casting him or her in the role of virtual
person with uniquely individual characteristics (see Cain 1983:75; Harris 1983). As
Beck and Katcher (1996:11–12) observe:

The pet’s name goes beyond the individuality provided by breed and the asso-
ciation . . . to some word or symbol that links that animal and person. . . . The
act of naming implies that these animals are going to be given special treat-
ment and that individual attributes or personalities are likely to be claimed for
them.

The pivotal importance of the companion animal’s name as an identity reference

point in human-animal interaction is illustrated in Mitchell and Edmonson’s re-
search (1999). In their observations of play exchanges between dogs and their care-
takers, they note that the animal’s name was the second most repeated utterance
(next to the command “Come”) used during interspecies play.

THE IMPACT OF THE HUMAN-ANIMAL RELATIONSHIP

ON CARETAKER IDENTITY
One of the most significant connections between identity and associations with com-
panion animals is seen in the animals’ impact on how caretakers are socially defined.
412 Symbolic Interaction Volume 26, Number 3, 2003

Historically, in Western cultures the ownership of expensive and “nonfunctional”

animals indicated upper-class status (Ritvo 1987; Serpell 1986:38–47). In contrast,
when owned by members of the lower classes, these animals were defined as an
“unwarranted indulgence” (Ritvo 1988:27).
To some extent, ownership of expensive, pedigreed, or rare animals continues to
demonstrate a person’s economic position. More commonly, however, animal com-
panions now symbolize important elements of their caretakers’ lifestyles, recre-
ational interests, and self-identities (Aylesworth, Chapman, and Doscha 1999). In
addition, pet keeping demonstrates the caring and sociable nature of the person.
Lockwood (1983), for example, found that undergraduate college students rated
people pictured with animals in TAT-style scenes more sociable, happier, and less
tense than those who were not.
The identity-shaping impact of association with a companion animal is especially
apparent when people and animals are together in public. In these circumstances
the human and animal assume a “couple identity” (Blumstein 1997:308–9; Felmlee
and Sprecher 2000:367–68) as those they encounter treat them as a unit. For good
or ill, other people socially link the identities and behaviors of people and their ani-
mal companions.
The vast majority of extant research demonstrates the positive identity effects of
being accompanied in public by an animal. Companion animals act as “social facili-
tators” (Robins, Sanders, and Cahill 1991).8 In one of the best-known studies of the
sociability effects of being accompanied by a companion animal, Messent (1983,
1984) observed people walking in an urban park. Those with dogs spoke with
strangers more frequently during each walk and held significantly longer exchanges
than did those without a dog present (see also Rogers, Hart, and Boltz 1993).
Studies of persons with disabilities accompanied in public by their assistance ani-
mals show a similar pattern. Disabled individuals interviewed by Hart, Hart, and
Bergin (1987) reported that they had an average of eight positive encounters with
strangers when in the company of their service dogs. In contrast, they only had one
positive encounter when alone. In an observational study of wheelchair users both
with and without assistance dogs, Eddy, Hart, and Boltz (1988) found that people
accompanied by dogs received significantly more social acknowledgment than did
those without dogs.
In public situations of identity construction and display, therefore, animals serve as
social facilitators in that they are sources of “mutual openness” (Goffman 1963a:131–
39). They offer strangers an easy and nonthreatening focus of short-term inter-
action. However, for both everyday pet owners and those who depend on service
animals, being defined as constituting a “with” (Goffman 1971:19) with an animal is
not always an identity-enhancing experience. The visually impaired guide dog users
interviewed by Sanders (2000), for example, spoke of their assistance animals as
sometimes stigmatizing in that they publicly demonstrated their owners “degraded”
identity (Goffman 1963b). In addition, the service dog frequently attracted un-
wanted attention; strangers initiated unsolicited and inconvenient interaction with
Actions Speak Louder than Words 413

the owner, defining him or her as an “open person” because of the dog (Goffman
1963a:126). For example:

The major thing that annoys me the most about having a dog has nothing to do
with the dog itself. It’s going into public places like shopping malls and having
people kind of invading your personal space. [They want to] pet the dog, talk
about the dog, ask about the dog; their kids are going crazy over the dog. It is an
invasion of personal space. It’s like when you go to the mall you are a movie star
or something. You can’t get anywhere and you can’t get done what you want to
do. It is something you get used to, but it does get to you. (Sanders 2000:135; see
also Cahill and Eggleston 1994)

The linked identity of people and their companion animals has yet another po-
tential problematic consequence. As the most “responsible” member of the human-
animal couple, everyone expects the person to control the animal. Consequently,
when the animal bites, fails to “mind” the caretaker, jumps on strangers, or in other
ways breaches the boundaries of “appropriate” public behavior, the caretaker’s
identity suffers. He or she becomes the focus of others’ judgmental responses and
must engage in “remedial work” (Goffman 1971:95–187) to repair the identity dam-
age and reestablish the more or less smooth flow of human-to-human interaction.
Based on observations of dog-person couples in public settings and in a “puppy kin-
dergarten,” Sanders (1990) details eight “excusing tactics” (placing blame on the im-
mediate situation, redefining the impropriety as “cute,” overtly disciplining the of-
fending animal, and so forth) employed by caretakers to remedy the negative identity
effects precipitated by their dogs’ misbehavior. Use of these remedial moves dem-
onstrates that people are aware of a negative “reflection process” (Cialdini and
Richardson 1980) relative to their association with their animal companions. They
recognize that their social identities are linked to the identity of the human-animal
couple in that people and their animals act together to present both collective and
individual definitions of self and the situation (Goffman 1959).
Identity, then, clearly is central to the relationship between people and compan-
ion animals. To the extent that a person is more or less successful in taking the role
of the (animal) other, his or her mutual interactions are knowable and predictable,
and then the person and his or her animal can effectively engage in collective ac-
tion. Further, the person’s association with the animal companion affects his or her
identity. The person-animal couple identity shapes human-to-human interactions.
In both public and private situations, the human partner must offer excuses, explain
the animal’s experience, exercise control, and engage in other forms of “identity
work” (Blumstein 1997:308–9) whereby the shared identity of the human-animal
couple is displayed, enhanced, or repaired.
As with other close relationships, the linkage between the person and the animal
companion has a significant impact on the self-identity of the human partner
(Blumstein 1997). To the extent that human-animal interactions proceed more or
less smoothly and rewardingly, the person incorporates certain positive elements
(responsible, knowledgeable, etc.) into his or her self-definition.9 Since, as discussed
414 Symbolic Interaction Volume 26, Number 3, 2003

next, a person commonly defines his or her relationship with a companion animal as
a form of friendship, routine interactional experiences within this close relationship
have special salience for the person’s self-identity and general level of relational
satisfaction.

THE HUMAN-ANIMAL FRIENDSHIP

If you want a friend for life, get a dog.
—Harry Truman (quoted in Rubin 1985:15)

As a general form of association, close relationships are those in which participants

mutually shape and connect their behavior, emotions, and thoughts. This inter-
dependence consists of sharing strong and enduring commitments with frequent in-
teractions (Clark and Reis 1988; Kelley et al. 1983). In friendship, a special type of
close relationship, mutual understanding of the perspectives and routine responses
of the parties involved is of key importance (Kenny and Kashy 1994). This under-
standing allows friends to construct a stable and durable relationship and provides
the foundation for anticipating a mutual future (Blumstein 1997:316; Hays 1989:34).
In turn, friendships are emotionally rich because friends share companionship, pro-
vide mutual support, act as confidants, and enjoy shared activities. Emotional con-
nectedness assumes that friends like each other, see each other as warm and sup-
portive, and recognize each other’s unique and appealing personal characteristics
(Sprecher 1998). People symbolize and reinforce their friendship relationship by
close proximity, physical contact, and mutual gaze (Argyle 1992:56–57; Fehr 2000).
People commonly understand their connections to companion animals through
defining them as “members of the family” (Cain 1983; Voith 1983). Alternatively, or
in conjunction with this familial incorporation, caretakers most commonly define
their pets as “special” or “close” friends (Nieburg and Fischer 1982; Stallones et al.
1988). They understand and sustain their friendships with animal companions in
much the same way as they do human-to-human friendships. The partners in the re-
lationship spend time together and share routine activities. People feed, groom,
touch, speak to, and incorporate their pets into holidays and other ritual events
(Alger and Alger 1997; Sanders 1993; Smith 1983).
Play is a social activity in which players direct their actions toward a mutually de-
fined goal, but shared understandings about “appropriate” moves and counter-
moves constrain the means of achieving this goal. Play participants recognize that
the interaction is supposed to be frivolous or pleasurable (Mitchell 1990:200–204).
Mutual play is a central mode of interaction between people and their nonhuman
friends.10 In contrast to human-with-human play, in which competition is a central
factor, human-animal play does not have winners or losers since keeping the play
interaction going is the primary shared goal. In addition, because human and ani-
mal players have different levels of mental and physical ability (humans are more
deceitful and animals more agile, for example), participants must learn to adjust
their efforts in order to sustain the play interaction (Beck and Katcher 1996:31–33).
Actions Speak Louder than Words 415

In other words, both person and companion animal must, in a rudimentary way,
take the role of the other and adjust their actions on the basis of this orientation.
Human-animal play requires that the players communicate the definition of the
situation and the “rules” and goals of the game through their actions. Mechling em-
phasizes the communicative nature of play in describing interaction with his Labrador,
Sunshine:

The game of fetch was truly interactive. I was not always in control of the game.
Sometimes Sunshine would fetch the ball but stop on the way back to me some
ten feet away. He would begin a slow retriever stalk, then drop the ball in front
of him and assume the familiar canine “play bow”—forepaws extended flat on
the ground, the body sloping upward toward his erect hind-quarters, tail wag-
ging. This is the canine invitation to play. In this case, however, we were already
engaged in a game, so his message to me was that he, too, could exert some
power and control in the game. (1989:313; see also Shapiro 1990:186)

As a routine form of friendly interaction, then, human-animal play involves com-

municating a mutual definition of the situation and designating certain physical ob-
jects as “game pieces.” Playing necessitates that the players recognize and antici-
pate each other’s orientations and expectations (Allen and Bekoff 1997:87–114;
Mitchell and Thompson 1986). Although ostensibly frivolous, play is a key example
of human-animal communication. Within its mutually understood boundaries the
players honestly or deviously signal their intentions, adjust and shape their own and
the other’s actions, and reinforce the communicative connection at the heart of
effective collective action.
Shared focus of attention and mutual eye contact are central to all forms of face-
to-face interaction (Duncan and Fisk 1977:80–88; Kendon 1977:13–51), but they are
of special significance in interactions between friends. Sharing attention demon-
strates a measure of shared subjectivity (Myers 1998:95, 98). Sanders, using obser-
vations made while interacting with his companion dogs, discusses the importance
of mutual gaze and its implications for taking the role of the other:
When [the dogs] look at me they usually pay attention to my eyes. I have noticed
on walks how important looking is to them. A common way that one will com-
municate to the other that she wants to play is by staring. During play they have
a variety of ways of signaling “time out.” In addition to stopping and avidly sniff-
ing someplace, a player can effectively suspend the game by staring fixedly off
into the middle distance. The other dog typically responds to this move by look-
ing to see if there is actually anything important to look at. They do the same
with me. If on the walk I stop and look in a particular direction, they will stop,
glance at me, and gaze off in the direction I am looking. This seems a fairly clear
indication of their elemental ability to put themselves into my perspective. In a
literal sense they attempt to assume my “point of view.” If I look at something
they conclude that it is probably something important. (1999:144)
Sustained eye contact signals the close character of the relationship to coactors
(Argyle 1992:50) and to those in their presence (Goffman 1971:188–237). The re-
search on people’s interactions with their companion animals (e.g., Cain 1985;
416 Symbolic Interaction Volume 26, Number 3, 2003

Sanders 1999:143) shows that mutual “face gazing” is an extremely common form of
nonverbal interaction. As in close human relationships, sustained eye contact is an el-
ement of intimacy that symbolizes and reinforces the human-animal connection, and
attention to facial expression provides interactants—both human and animal—with
information about the subjective experience of the other. In their observations of
the interactions between veterinary clients and their animals in a waiting room,
Beck and Katcher (1996:43, 85–89) noted that a person would frequently hold the
animal’s head and stare into his or her eyes in much the same way parents make eye
contact with their children.
The ability to give voice to what another is thinking is a key indicator of intersub-
jectivity and an important element of the mutual knowledge of the other shared by
intimates. This activity is commonly seen when parents speak for their infant children
(what Kaye [1982:182] terms the “he says phenomenon”) and is an important factor
in defining the nonlinguistic other as a person (Cahill 1998:139–40; Goffman 1981:86–
87). This display of intersubjectivity is also a common feature of people’s relation-
ships with their companion animals. Myers (1998:12), for example, notes how the
nursery school children he observed tended to “put words in the mouth” of the ani-
mals with whom they interacted. Similarly, Arluke and Sanders (1996:61–81), using
observations of human-animal interactions in a veterinary clinic, describe a number
of examples of people giving voice to what was “on the [animal’s] mind.” Frequently,
speaking for the animal is “primed” when the caretaker asks the animal a question
and then voices his or her response. In the veterinary clinic clients would commonly
speak for the patient when describing the symptoms that precipitated the visit. In
speaking for his or her animal in this way, the person demonstrates special knowledge
of the other and cooperatively constructs the mind of the nonhuman friend.
All of these friendly routines are sustained within a highly emotionalized rela-
tionship. Caretakers regularly speak of the ability of their animals to feel emotion11
and empathically understand the emotions of their human friends (Alger and Alger
1997; Sanders 1993). This understanding of the other’s emotional experience orients
the human actor’s behavior toward the animal and acts as a practical basis for suc-
cessful and satisfying collective action. Further, the animal’s defined ability to read
and respond appropriately to the caretaker’s emotional experience enhances the
friendship. An individual interviewed by Sanders touchingly described his golden
retriever’s empathetic abilities:
He just seems to sense [your mood] somehow. You can be in a different room
and be down. Recently when [my daughter] was in her room he just seemed to
know where to go . . . he sensed that somewhere in this house—his doghouse—
there was something that was not quite right. He sought [her] out and was just
there. One day I was sitting on the front porch kind of blue about some things
and he just snuggled in there—totally noninvasive. Just “If you want to pet me,
pet me. I’m here if you need me.” (1999:21–22)

Close relationships, which involve emotional bonds and shared intimate knowl-
edge, have negative as well as positive elements. Intense conflicts, fear of loss, concern
Actions Speak Louder than Words 417

with overinvolvement, and other painful experiences are part of the “dark side”
(Felmlee and Sprecher 2000:371) of friendships. Consequently, friends commonly
experience some degree of ambivalence about the quality, consequences, and
course of their shared close relationship (Hays 1989; Kurth 1970).
In that people perceive them as both objects to be possessed and used and indi-
vidual beings to be understood and loved, companion animals have a liminal status
that results in a distinctly ambivalent general cultural orientation to them (Arluke
and Sanders 1996:167–86; Tuan 1984). This cultural ambivalence, together with the
subordinate status of companion animals within the human-animal association, all
too frequently leads to abuse, thoughtless disregard, and, ultimately, termination of
the relationship.
More commonly, however, the emotional connection that binds the typical close
relationships between people and their companion animals means that committed
owners anticipate and react to the termination of these relationships—through ill-
ness, accident, straying, or voluntary euthanasia precipitated by the animals’ age or
infirmity—with intense sorrow. For example, a dog owner interviewed by Sanders
offered an “acquisition story” in which she described special feelings she had for
her dog and her sorrowful anticipation of eventual loss:
I just told my parents I wanted a dog. I was living with my parents then. A lady
down the street had a litter. I went in and immediately he came right over to
me. It was love at first sight—he chose me. I remember it was really snowing
that night and we couldn’t get to the grocery store. My mother made him
chicken soup. To this day he goes wild when he smells chicken soup. Every
time I make it he gets half. Sometimes this annoys my roommate “Hey, I
wanted some of that.” But he is more important. He’s not a dog to me. He’s my
best friend. He loves me and I love him. When I come home from work he’s
happy to see me and I am happy to see him. I try to spend quality time with
him every day. . . . He gives me love. He can’t live without me and I can’t live
without him. It’s so hard to see him getting old. I just don’t know what I would
do without him. (1999:23)12
Like other close relationships, then, those between people and companion ani-
mals are characterized by commitment and ambivalence, rewards and problems,
connectedness and loss. As seen above, these sociologically “neglected” relation-
ships (Felmlee and Sprecher 2000:370) share many of the characteristics found in
friendships between humans. However, unique differences between the partici-
pants in these common and emotionally involving relationships—specifically, that
the interactants are members of different species and the animal partner lacks the
ability to use human language—provide a foundation for exploring issues of key
interest and expanding the scope of symbolic interactionism. In short, through ex-
amining the everyday exchanges between people and animals we can gain an en-
riched understanding of the social processes by which the designation “person” is
constructed and applied, the phenomenon of “mind” arises within social relation-
ships, and culture is interactionally created as a framework for effective collective
action.
418 Symbolic Interaction Volume 26, Number 3, 2003

PERSONS, MINDS, AND CULTURE

The designation “person” is the most elemental social identity. It provides the foun-
dation for, and is constructed in the context of, relationships. As a basic categorical
identity, personhood may be acquired or lost, given or taken away, solidified or ad-
justed within the flow of interaction that comprises relationships. Everyday, face-to-
face social exchanges provide the materials used in the “collaborative manufacture”
(Cahill 1998:136) of the person as interactants define the immediate situation, act in
particular ways, and attend to each other’s responses. To the extent that responses
are “appropriate” to the situation and coactors’ understanding of each other, person-
identities are enacted and reinforced.
Based on a shared history and knowledge of the other’s unique personality,
tastes, emotions, and routine responses, caretakers come to regard the compan-
ion animals with whom they have relationships as persons and treat them as
such. The animal’s personhood is an interactive accomplishment based on his or
her definition as it arises in the context of the relationship (Bogdan and Taylor
1989:136). In applying a “person schema” (Howard 1995:93) to shape and under-
stand his or her interaction with the animal, the caretaker commonly makes a
distinction between “person” and “human.” The animal is a person in the sense
that his or her perspective and feelings are knowable; interaction is predictable;
and the shared relationship provides an experience of closeness, warmth, and
pleasure. In an important way, the distinction between relationships with hu-
mans and with animal-persons is central to the special character of the human-
animal bond. Because they are not human relationships, those with companion
animals are constant rather than contingent. The animal’s response to his or her
companion does not depend on the latter’s appearance, age, economic fortunes,
abilities, or the other vagaries that, for good or ill, constrain human-to-human
relationships.
Similarly, mind is an interactional accomplishment. Mead (1962:73) regarded
mind as an internal linguistic activity, and, therefore, denied its existence in non-
human animals. This Meadian conception of mind-as-self-conversation is, I main-
tain, unnecessarily restrictive. As we interact with others, we premise our actions
and responses on the presumption that the content of our minds has some basic re-
lationship to what and how our coactors are thinking. However, the elemental evi-
dence for this presumption is drawn from our interpretations of others’ behavior
and the predictive utility of these interpretations. As people interact with infants
(Russell 1997), alingual humans (Bogdan and Taylor 1989; Goode 1994), and non-
human animals (Alger and Alger 1997, Wieder 1980), they regard the ability to
focus attention, manipulate objects, seek or avoid certain experiences, and engage in ac-
tion directed at achieving particular ends as persuasive evidence of mind. The greater
familiarity with the other—the closer our relationship with him or her—the more
confidence we have in our understanding of the content of his or her mind and our
ability to gauge his or her intentions (Herzog and Galvin 1997). Casting off the
Actions Speak Louder than Words 419

linguicentric and anthropomorphic restraints of conventional views of mind frees

us to appreciate an expanded world of social relationships and understand the in-
teractions from which they are constructed. On the other hand, denying the reality
of “wordless minds” (Terrace 1987) would not allow us to make sense of the follow-
ing description offered by an experienced dog owner or draw the reasonable con-
clusion at which she arrives.

We halfheartedly train the dogs to sit on the floor in a long stay while we eat
our meal. I think sharing food is very important; so do they. It becomes, how-
ever, too disturbing, and we’ve limited them to table food at the end of the
meal. But Toby has problems with waiting when there’s butter on the table.
Toby lies down, hops up, drops his head on the table, positions it next to the
butter—it is always the butter—sighs over the butter. . . . He must think we
are awfully stupid not to understand what he wants. . . . Once, though, the
temptation being overwhelming, Toby thought through the problem of how
to get the bread and butter. He did not lie down on command but left the
room. We heard him rummaging around in the house, up and down the stairs,
until he finally appeared with a treasure: a roasted pig ear. . . . Toby is al-
lowed to take one out of the box each day. He had obviously hidden this one.
He laid it at my feet. Naturally Toby received a piece of bread with slabs of
butter. Toby reasoned and came up with the idea of trade. (Lerman
1996:112–13)

Culture, like personhood and mindedness, is constructed and shared through

interaction. As Becker (1986) observes, the “most minimal definition” of culture is
that it is composed of mutual understandings (“conventions”) that interactants use
to coordinate their activities (“collective action”). Culture arises as a response to
situations and lends predictability to interaction.
In the relational context of friendship, interactants commonly create what Fine
(1981:267) refers to as a “private culture.” Friends use these “dyadic traditions” to
“test whether they are sensitive to the same aspects of the immediate experience
and whether they share a common orientation toward this experience, to symbol-
ize their intimacy, and to activate a sense of a shared past” (Mechling 1989:312–
13). As is the case in human-with-human friendships, close relationships between
people and companion animals give rise to a dyadic culture that encompasses es-
tablished routines (what Collins [1989] calls “natural interaction rituals”), mutual
knowledge of and feeling for the other, and expectations about the predictable
course of interaction. What is unique about the culture shared by humans and ani-
mals, and of special significance in advancing an interactionist understanding of
human-animal relationships, is that these conventions arise and are effectively
communicated despite the fact that the parties in the relationship do not share the
ability to employ a common system of linguistic symbols. As with the definition of
personhood and the social construction of mind, the creation, communication, and
competent use of culture is not dependent on language (see Depre 1990; de Waal
1999:636).
420 Symbolic Interaction Volume 26, Number 3, 2003

CONCLUSION
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their
simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something because it is al-
ways before one’s eyes.)
—Ludwig Wittgenstein (quoted in Fine 1998:102)

I have offered a brief, and admittedly somewhat rhetorical, discussion of a type of

close relationship that until fairly recently has been largely unexamined in conven-
tional sociology. My primary goal has been to advocate the movement of inter-
species interactions and relationships into the repertoire of issues on which interaction-
ists focus. This movement requires that we reject (or at least bracket) conventional
social scientific and cultural beliefs about the qualitative differences between hu-
mans and nonhuman animals. Serious attention to human-animal relationships re-
quires that the anthropocentric “commonsense of science” be replaced with the
“ordinary commonsense” of everyday social actors derived from their routine expe-
riences with their animal companions (Silverman 1997).
The primary goal of symbolic interactionism is to make social life intelligible.
The central orienting principle guiding the achievement of this goal is that humans
act toward things based on the meanings that emerge through social interaction
(Blumer 1969). It may be that the “reality” of those who foster close relationships
with companion animals, see them as thoughtful and reciprocating, construct their
unique identities, and regard them as full-fledged partners in collective action is an
anthropomorphic “delusion.” Clearly Mead believed this to be the case:
We, of course, tend to endow our domestic animals with personality, but as we
get insight into their conditions we see there is no place for this sort of importa-
tion of the social process into the conduct of the individual. They do not have the
mechanism for it—language. So we say that they have no personality; they are
not responsible for the social situation in which they find themselves. . . . We put
personalities into the animals, but they do not belong to them. . . . And yet the
common attitude is that of giving them just such personalities as our own. We
talk to them and in our talking to them we act as if they had the sort of inner
world that we have. (1962:182–83)
But, to remain true to the interactionist view of human beings as actively in-
volved in evaluating situations, defining others, having goals, devising reasonable
plans of action, and coordinating their interactions with others, I submit that we
must see those who foster close relationships with animals as more than the delu-
sional victims of “folk psychology.”13 As active and practical creators of meaning,
caretakers base understandings of their animal companions and construct effective
relationships with them on routine experience with their “behavior in context”
(Mitchell and Hamm 1997).
Theories—be they folk or sociological—are best judged by how useful they are
rather than by whether they are right or wrong (Bernstein 1990; Feyerabend 1975).
Because of the linguicentric constraints imposed by our Meadian heritage we have
emphasized the differences that exist between humans and nonhuman animals and
Actions Speak Louder than Words 421

have “lost sight of all that we share with them” (Murphy 1995:692). In failing to rec-
ognize the fact that we live in an interactional community composed of both human
and nonhuman members, we have ignored an area of social life that is common-
place, emotionally rich, and of significant analytic interest. Moving nonhuman ani-
mals and people’s relationships with them into the realm of “sociological visibility”
(Oakley 1974:5) promises to shed light on commonplace worlds of social inter-
action to which conventional interactionism has, until recently, turned a blind eye.

Acknowledgments: I am grateful to Kathy Charmaz and the anonymous review-

ers for their comments and suggestions. Portions of this discussion were presented
at the 8th International Conference on Human-Animal Interactions (Prague, 1998)
and the meetings of the Eastern Sociological Society (Boston, 2002).

NOTES
1. According to recent figures collected by the American Veterinary Medical Association (1997),
companion animals live in 58.9 percent of U.S. households. Americans own 59 million cats,
52.9 million dogs, 12.6 million birds, 5.7 million rabbits and ferrets, 4.8 million rodents, 3.5 mil-
lion reptiles, and 55.6 million fish.
2. For an early exception, see Bain 1929.
3. For critiques of Mead’s views with regard to the social abilities of nonhuman animals, see
Alger and Alger 1997; Myers 1998:120–25; Sanders 1993.
4. Testimony to the centrality of people’s relationships to their pets is seen in a survey conducted
by the American Animal Hospital Association (1996) in which close to half of the women
questioned said that they relied more on their dogs and cats for affection than they did on
their husbands or children. Fifteen percent of the elderly questioned in a Swedish study
(Adell-Bath et al. 1978) stated that they considered their pets their “most significant” source
of social contact and that this relationship gave their lives meaning.
5. See Speier (1970:209–17) for a discussion of the centrality of personal names in close inter-
human relationships.
6. An anonymous reviewer with personal experience in an animal shelter observed that dogs and
cats typically were given names by the workers in her facility. An important distinction here is
the difference between “kill” and “no-kill” shelters. In the former, the emotional toll of eutha-
nizing healthy but unadopted animals is increased when the animals are named and thus indi-
vidualized (see Arluke 1994). In no-kill shelters, in contrast, naming is routine since the individ-
ualized animals will, at worst, simply remain as residents of the shelter (see Alger and Alger
2003).
7. When she attempted to publish a paper based on her early work with chimpanzees, the prima-
tologist Jane Goodall encountered criticism from reviewers because she insisted on naming
the animals she observed and referred to them as “he” and “she” rather than “it” (Bekoff
1998:16).
8. Eighty-three percent of pet owners questioned by Adell-Bath and her associates (1979)
agreed with the statement “My dog gives me the opportunity of talking with other people.”
Thirty-seven percent of the members of pet-owning families studied by Cain (1983) observed
that their companion animals helped to increase their social contacts.
9. A study by Kidd and Feldmann (1981) found that elderly pet owners used more positive ad-
jectives when describing themselves than did nonowners, and Serpell (1981) reports that
women who owned dogs saw themselves as significantly more attractive than did nonowners.
422 Symbolic Interaction Volume 26, Number 3, 2003

10. Hart (1995:164–65) cites one study in which dog owners maintained that 44 percent of their
interaction with their dogs involved play (36 percent for cat owners).
11. For a general discussion of animal emotion see Masson and McCarthy (1995).
12. See Simon 1984 and Stallones 1994 for discussions of the negative features of close relation-
ships with companion animals.
13. Cahill (1998) makes the same point in his discussion of “folk psychology” and the part it plays
in the social construction of the person.

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