GRAHAM VS GRAHAM

Facts. Mr. and Mrs. Graham were married for six years. During that period, Mrs.
Graham worked full time and Mr. Graham worked part time and obtained a Bachelors
degree as well as Masters in Business Administration (MBA). As part of the divorce
proceeding, the trial court ruled that the MBA was divisible property and estimated its
worth and future earnings potential. The appellate court reversed and Mrs. Graham
appealed.
Issue. Whether a M.B.A constitutes marital property that can be divided in a divorce
proceeding.
Held. Affirmed
An educational degree is not encompassed by even a broad interpretation of
property. It does not have any of the characteristics of the concept of
property.
An educational degree cannot be transferred. It has no exchange value on the
open market and terminates upon death.
Dissent. The dissent focused on the fact that the husbands increased
earnings potential was the most valuable asset obtained during the
marriage. Equity, the dissent argued, demanded that the court seek
extraordinary remedies to prevent extraordinary injustice.

Discussion. The court discussed the purpose of dividing marital property as

allocating to each spouse what equitably belongs to each. The court noted
that the legislature wanted the definition of property to be broad, but that
there must be limits. The court went on to note that a spouse that provides
support to a spouse obtaining a degree is not without remedy. She or he can
obtain relief when the court takes this fact into account, when dividing the
marital property

GOODRIDGE VS DOH
FACTS
In Mass., a gay and lesbian support organization (GLAD) sued the states
Department of Health for their failure to issue same-sex married couples a
marriage license. GLAD sued under the equal protection clause. GLAD also
argued that there are many other benefits accompanying a marriage license,
such as property rights and tax benefits which same-sex couples unjustly
cannot receive. The state of Mass. argued that there was a legitimate
governmental interest in discriminating on the basis of gender, in that the
institution of marriage existed to promote procreation; and because same-sex
couples could not further than goal, the state had an interest in disallowing
their marital rights. The state also argued that there were parental benefits
in promoting different sex relationships. Finally, the state argued that there
would be administrative inconvenience in suddenly allowing same sex
couples to marry..
ISSUE
Whether the denial of a marriage license to same sex couples violates the
equal protection clause and/or the Mass. state constitution.
HOLDING/ANALYSIS
Yes, the law is invalid and same sex couples shall be allowed marital rights in
the state of Mass. The court wrote that the states arguments for denying
marital rights to same sex couples did not supply enough justification in
terms of the governmental interest sought in their procurement. The court
argued that modern day technology and fertilization techniques nullified the
procreation argument. Same sex couples, through adoption of other
fertilization methods could procreate. Secondly, the court found no
productive argument favoring the notion that same sex couples were inferior
parents to children. Finally, the court believed the state did not demonstrate
adequate administrative difficulty to fully deny a single class of citizens their
basic marital rights. As such, the state failed to supply their legitimate
governmental interest burden.

REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN

PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Jennifer Cagandahan
FACTS
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate before the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna. She asserted that she
was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing
up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), which is a condition where persons
thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. Tests revealed
that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has STOPPED GROWING and
she has no breast or menstrual development; she has become a male person.
In her petition with the RTC to have her birth certificate be corrected such
that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff, her physician testified on her condition by
presenting a medical certificate to back her alleged condition. The RTC
granted her petition, recognizing her proven medical condition. Thus (OSG)
filed this petition seeking areversal of the above mentioned ruling based on
(1) violations on Rule 108 of the Rules of Court regarding (a) Cagandahans
failure to implead the local civil registrar in her petition with the RTC and (b)
her plea to have her gender changed in the birth certificate (OSG believes her
condition does not make her male; and (2) a violation on Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, in which Cagandahan failed to state that respondent is a bona
fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3)
years prior to the date of such filing. The court dismissed the two procedural
issues on Rules 108 and 103, and decided on the substantive merit regarding
the change of gender in Cagandahans records due to her medical condition.
ISSUES
WON the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her name and gender, on the ground of
her medical condition known as CAH.
RULING
The Republics petition is denied.
RATIO DECIDENDI
No. The respondents condition, CAH, is one of many conditions involving
intersexuality, which apply to human beings who cannot be classified as
either male or female. Here, the rule of determining a persons gender at
birth cannot apply because the sexual development in cases of intersex
persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. Instead, it is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. Thus, the
Court is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex,
the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the

individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. In the case of respondent, his having ordered his
life to that of a male is backed by preponderant biological bases. Unlike in the
case of individuals who
underwent sexual reassignment, respondent here has simply let nature take
its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what
he was born with. In the absence of a
law on such an unusual matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle
preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to
reverse the male tendency due to CAH.

PEOPLE VS. SANTIAGO

No. 27972
October 31, 1927

FACTS:
On November 23, 1926, herein appellant Felipe Santiago raped
Felicita Masilang, his wifes niece, in an uninhabited place across a river in
Gapan, Nueva Ecija. After the deed, he took her to the house of his brother,
Agaton Satiago, who in turn fetched a protestant minister who there and then
officiated the ceremony of their marriage. After having given money by
Felipe, Felicita proceeded home to her father and told what had just occurred.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage executed by the protestant minister is
of legal effect.
HELD:
The marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant
hoped to escape from the criminal consequence of his act. It shows that he
had no bona fide intention of making her his wife and the ceremony cannot
be considered binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore
void for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the
prosecution of the wrongdoer.

BUCCAT VS MANGONON DE BUCCAT

FACTS
The plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938. After several dates, they were
engaged on 19 September of that year. On 26 November the same year, the
plaintiff married the defendant in the Catholic Cathedral of the City of Baguio.
After living together as husband and wife for eighty-nine days, the defendant
gave birth to a child of nine months, on February 23, 1939. Because of this
the plaintiff abandoned the defendant and did not return to their life as
husband and wife. The plaintiff then requests the annulment of the marriage
he had with the defendant on the grounds that he consented to the marriage
because the defendant had assured him that she was virgin.
ISSUES
WON annulment can proceed given plaintiffs claim that he had been
defrauded by his wife whom he thought was a virgin.
RULING
The judgment appealed from is deemed to be in accordance with law, and is
thus affirmed.
RATIO DECIDENDI
NO. The plaintiffs allegation that he had not suspected the pregnancy of the
defendant when he married her is highly improbable, given her obvious
advanced pregnancy. Therefore it is unnecessary to consider the appellants
allegation of fraud. He also argued that it is not uncommon to find people
with big stomachs, but we find this argument too puerile to even consider,
especially since the appellant is a freshman in law school. Marriage is a most
sacred institution: it is the cement, the very foundation, on which society
rests. For annulment to proceed, it is entirely necessary that the pieces of
evidence provided be clear and reliable. No such evidence can be found in
this case.

Eigenmann vs. Guerra

Facts:
Petition was instituted by Eduardo Eigenmann to annul his marriage to
Maryden Guerra on the grounds that he was a minor who needed consent
from his parents when he
married (16-20 years old) and such consent was not given. He alleged that he was
threatened and coerced into the marriage and that the solemnizing officer who
administered the marriage license was not authorized thereby rendering the said
license void ab initio.
Held:
The marriage license confirmed that plaintiff misrepresented himself to be of
legal age there for he is subject to an estoppel preventing himself to invoke
minority. (this is as to the needed consent and not the lack of minimum age) The
said threat was not sufficient to hold that he was coerced into consenting to the
marriage because it was not really threatening. Lastly, marriages solemnized by a
license obtained wrongfully, merely renders the marriage to be irregular and is not
null, void or voidable.
FACTS
Eduardo Eigenmann [who represented himself as of legal age] and Maryden
Guerra got married before Judge Prudencio Encomienda as solemnizing officer and 4
witnesses, including Eduardos mother. After living together for quite a time,
Eduardo filed an action for the annulment of his marriage to Maryden Guerra on the
grounds of his age and lack of parental consent, his consent not freely given [use of
force, intimidation by Froilan Guerra, wifes father], and lack of legal authority of the
one who administered the oath [councillor of Quezon City] making the marriage
void ab initio.
ISSUES
WON his lack of statutory age and lack of parental consent may be grounds
for annulment of marriage WON his consent being not freely given may render the
marriage void WON the marriage is void ab ignition because of the lack of legal
authority by the officer who administered the oath.
HELD
No. He is estopped because of his misrepresentation of his age [claimed to be
25yrs,8mos] when he applied for marriage license. With regards to the consent of
his mother, the fact that the mother was a witness to the marriage and did not
object to the marriage implies consent. Consent may be given in any form
[written,oral or implied] A written consent under oath is not necessary.
No. There was no factual or legal for the claim.The Court did not see any
reasonable or well-grounded fear of an imminent danger and grave evil upon
Eigenmanns person or property that would arise from the statement of Froilan
Guerra [Balita ko lumiligaw ka sa aking anak. Pag niloko mo iyan, mag-ingat ka.]
The statement for the court was only an admonition natural for a father and not a
threat.

No. What is declared null and void by the law are marriages solemnized w/o a
marriage license. A marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the
license was wrongfully obtained. The local civil registrar and the solemnizing officer
are not required to inquire about the authority of the officer administering the oath.

Navarro vs. Domagtoy

Facts:
This is an administrative case filed by Rodolfo G. Navarro against Hernando C.
Domagtoy who allegedly solemnized the marriage between Gaspar A. Tagadan and
Arlyn Borja despite knowledge that the groom was only separated with his former
wife who was already absent for seven years. Also, the respondent judge also
solemnized the marriage of Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside the
jurisdiction of the respondent.
Held: On the second marriage, there is a resulting irregularity because
marriage may only be conducted elsewhere only if there is a writtenr equest coming
from both parties. In the case at hand, the request only came from one party. Judges
may only officiate weddings within their jurisdiction otherwise there will be an
irregularity with the formal requisites. Article 8 states that marriages may be
conducted elsewhere provided that there is written request coming from both
parties to the marriage.
FACTS
Petitioner Rodolfo G. Navarro submitted evidence in relation to two specific
acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law: 1.) Respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the
groom is merely separated from his first wife. (In violation of Art. 41 of the FC) 2.)
Respondent judge performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario at the respondent judges residence in the
Municipal of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. (In violation of Art. 7 Par. 1 of the FC)2 In
response, Judge Domagtoy claimed that his act of solemnizing the marriage
between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F.
Borga was predicated on an affidavit supposedly ISSUEd by the Municipal Trial Judge
of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not
seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he
did not violate Article 7 Par. 1 of the Family Code, and that he merely worked within
the ambit of Art. 8 of the same code, which provides for other possible venues to
solemnize a marriage.
I believe its this issue and its corresponding ruling that would be important
for purposes of our discussion in class.
ISSUES
WON respondent exhibited gross misconduct and ignorance of the law.
RULING: Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is SUSPENDED for a period of six
(6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
RATIO DECIDENDI
YES. Judge Domagtoys gross ignorance of very basic legal principles
enshrined in the Family Code resulted to a bigamous and therefore void marriage

for the first marriage he solemnized, and to the second, a lack of the necessary
authority of the solemnizing officer, since he solemnized the marriage outside of his
jurisdiction. Judge Domagtoys reliance on the said affidavit of Tagadans 7-year
separation with his former wife, which said affidavit was proven to have not been
ISSUEd by the MTC Judge of Basey, Samar but only sworn before him, is insufficient
justification for his having solemnized Tagadans second marriage on the basis of his
wifes presumptive death. Regardless of whether Tagadan had a wellfounded belief
that his wife, who had not been heard of for almost 7 years, was dead, it was still
necessary for him to have undergone a summary proceeding officially declaring his
former wifes presumptive death. Absent such mandatory proceeding, the
subsequent marriage is considered bigamous, and therefore, void. Art. 7 Par. 1 of
the Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. For members of
the Appellate and Supreme courts, this jurisdiction extends throughout the
Philippines (ie. CA and SC judges/justices can solemnize marriages regardless of
venue, so long as the requisites are met). The same cannot be said, however, for
judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions (eg. MTC judges); they may only
officiate weddings within their areas; they lack the authority to solemnize weddings
in areas beyond their jurisdiction. While this may not affect the validity of the
marriage, it nonetheless results to an irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, namely, the authority of the solemnizing officer, which, as a result, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Meanwhile, the respondents defense on the applicability of Art. 8 in the same
code cannot stand since a.) the requisites for holding the marriage outside of the
official venues listed therein are not satisfied in this case since only one and not
both of the parties requested another venue, and the parties are neither at the
point of death nor in a remote place; and b.) Art. 8 is only a directory provision and
does not alter or qualify the authority of a solemnizing officer.

Aranes vs. Occiano (Article 9 and 34 of the Family Code)

Mercidita Aranes charged presiding judge Salvador Occiano of gross
ignorance of the law for solemnizing her marriage with her husband without a
license and outside his jurisdiction. Respondent judge claims that he agreed to
solemnizing the marriage provided that the license will be delivered to him on the
same day however, no such license ever came. No record of the application for a
marriage license because it was denied when the husband failed to present the
death certificate of his first wife.
Held: Respondent judge is liable for failure to ascertain the existence of a
marriage license. Presenting a marriage license after the solemnization of the
wedding does not, in anyway validate the marriage. Also, under BP 129,the
authority of the judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriage is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction. The authority of the judge to solemnize a marriage is derived
from the marriage license.
Marriage License
FC Article 9:
A marriage license shall be issued by the local registrar of the city or
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages
where no licenseis required in accordance with chapter 2 of this Title.
FC Article 34:
No marriage shall be necessary for themarriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any
legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
PD965:
A decree requiring applicants for marriage licenses to receive instructions on
family planning and responsible parenthood.

ARAES VS OCCINO
FACTS
Aranes charged respondent Occiano, Presiding Judge of the MTC of Batalan,
Camarines Sur with gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing her marriage with
late Dominador Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. Aranes and Orobia lived as
husband and wife until the death of Orobia. Then Aranes discovered that she cannot
inherit the properties of Orobia, nor get his pension as a retired Navy Commodore
because their marriage was a nullity. In his comment, Occiano averred that he was
requested to solemnize the wedding in Nabua, due to Orobias difficulty in walking.
He examined the documents before the ceremony and upon discovering the
absence of a marriage license he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, the
couple assured him that they will deliver the license to him immediately after.
The petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance attesting that the judge did
refuse to solemnize her marriage at first and, upon reading the comment of the
judge, realized her own shortcomings.
ISSUE
WON respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law.
HELD
YES. Respondent judge was guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly
issued license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. The Affidavit of
Desistance cannot exculpate Occiano because withdrawal of complaint does not
necessarily have a legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.
Respondent judge is fined 5,000 pesos with a stern warning that a repetition
in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Castro

Facts: Angelina M. Castro filed a petition for a judicial declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Edwin F. Cardinas which was granted by the Court of Appeals. Then
petitioner Castro was separated after four months of marriage with Cardinas. As
such, Castro sought for the nullity of her marriage before she left for the US. Plaintiff
Republic of the Philippines challenged the decision of the appellate court because
Castros claim that there was no marriage license was only supported by a due
search and inability to find certification issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig
and Castros own testimony.
Held: No marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license otherwise
it will be rendered void ab initio. The certification of due search and inability to
find is sufficient to hold that no proof of license exists and the testimony is
sufficient because the marriage was a secret marriage and under the circumstances
it is understandable that there can be no other witness.
Republic vs CA and Castro
Republic vs. CA and Castro
GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994
FACTS:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with
Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon
Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein
the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and
Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her
daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a
petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found
out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their
marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted
to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the
parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that
the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact
that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground
to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case.
Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he
chose to ignore.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial

evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the
absence of the subject marriage license.

Moreno vs. Bernabe

Facts: Marilou Nama Moreno filed the complaint against Judge Jose C.
Bernabe for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. According to the
complainant, respondent judge solemnized her marriage with Marcelo Moreno,
assured that the contract will be released after 10days. Respondent judge claims
that the failure to produce the contract was due to the failure of the Local Registrar
of Pasig to release the marriage license. He was assured, when he solemnized the
marriage, that the license was forthcoming as such, he agreed to conduct the
ceremony but reminded the plaintiff and her husband of the consequences of
conducting the ceremony without a marriage license.
Held: Marriage ceremonies, absent of a marriage license, are void ab initio.
Moreno vs. Bernabe 246 SCRA 120
Facts: Marilou Nama Moreno and Marcelo Moreno were married before the
respondent Judge Jose Bernabe on October 4, 1993 but did not process the papers
for the marriage contract. The complainant at that time was pregnant and begged
to the judge to have her and her husband to be married by him. The complainant
then filed a complaint allegedly for deceiving her that the marriage is valid.
Issue: Whether or not that a Judge who held a wedding without issuing a
marriage contract should be held liable even if the complaint had expressly
withdrawn by the complainant.
Ruling: Even with the withdrawal of the complainant against the respondent
the Supreme Court insisted that it should still be dealt with accordingly as the
accused was a member of the judiciary and a conduct of a higher level were
expected. The judge displayed ignorance of the law which is unacceptable for his
position and is therefore fined with 10, 000.00 pesos and is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of a similar act should be punished severely.

People vs. Borromeo

Facts: Defendant Elias Borromeo appealed his conviction of parricide and his
sentence of reclusion perpetua. On July 3, 1981, defendant killed his wife, Susana
Borromeo. He claimed that Susana Borromeo was not his wife because no marriage
contract was executed during their marriage.
Held: Defendant testified that he was indeed, married to Susana Borromeo.
Nevertheless, had there been an actual absence of a marriage contract, persons
living together in apparent matrimony are presumed to be married unless evidence
is presented to show otherwise. Such is the common order of society. If parties
were not what they hold themselves to be, they will be living in constant violation of
the law.
People Vs. Borromeo 133 SCRA 106 (Persons and Family Relations)
Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias
Borromeo told Matilde Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming
because Elias was killing her. Taborada told her to inform her son, Geronimo
Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and together, they went to Susanas
hut. There they found Susanas lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias
mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accused-appellant,
Elias, said that because they were legally and validly married, he should only be
liable for homicide and not parricide. He thinks such because there was no
marriage contract issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in his
testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that they were married in a
chapel by a priest.
Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage
void?
Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being
married, are presumed married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the
common order of society. Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides on the
fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the marriage which are : legal capacity
and consent. The absence of the record of such marriage does not invalidate the
same as long as the celebration and all requisites are present.
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant
violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). And, the mere
fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not
invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its
validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the
registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The appealed
decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000.

Seguisabal vs. Cabrera

Facts: Andon Seguisabal charged Judge Jose Cabrera of gross misconduct and
grave ignorance of the law for solemnizing the marriage of Jaime Sayson and Marlyn
Jagonoy without the requisite marriage license. The respondent was also said to
have failed to transmit a copy of the marriage contract he signed to the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Toledo City within the required 15days. The Respondent judge
contended that he agreed to solemnize the marriage of the two parties with the
agreement that the marriage license will be given in the afternoon, which the
couple failed to do. Years later when Marlyn Jagonoy returned asking for the
marriage contract so that she can claim the pension of her deceased husband,
respondent judge issued a marriage contract despite of the knowledge that there is
still no marriage license as the deceased and his widow failed to attend a family
planning session.
Held: Cabrera was expected to follow the dictates of his profession. His
decision to commit an act outside the boundaries of the law cannot be justified by
good faith. Marriages solemnized without a marriage license is void ab initio.
Ceremony
FC Article 6:
No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. It shall be necessary however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This
declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by
the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.
In case of marriage in
articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage
certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the
name of said party, which fat shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. Requisites
of Marriage Ceremony:-For both parties to appear personally before the solemnizing
officer;-That there is presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age;-That both
party take each other as husband and wife
FC Article 8:
The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except incases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer
in writing in which case, the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.- Whatever venue is chosen,
it must be within the jurisdiction of the solemnizing officer.

Martinez vs. Tan

Facts: Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan signed a petition directed to the Justice
of Peace stating therein their agreement to contract marriage. The document was
signed by the defendant and plaintiff and the Justice of Peace and two witnesses
namely Zacharias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. A certificate of marriage was likewise
signed by the Justice and the witnesses attesting that a marriage did ensue. Plaintiff
alleged that she did not attend the ceremony and that she only signed it. Rosario
Bayot attested that on the day of the marriage, the plaintiff never left her company.
Pacita Ballori attested otherwise. Apart from that, several letters from the plaintiff
for the defendant prove that plaintiff indeed intended to marry the defendant.
Held: The documents signed were sufficient to prove that what took place
before the Justice of Peace was legal and the ceremony amounted to a wedding.
Martinez v. Tan, 12 Phil 731
FACTS: There was received in evidence at the trial what is called Rosalia
Martinez and Angel Tan were married before a justice of the peace in Leyte. They
executed an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and consists,
first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of
September, 1907, signed both by Martinez and Tan, in which they state that they
have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of the
peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Marriage was solemnized
with two witnesses. The couple did not live together and when Martinez went home
to Ormoc, her relatives convinced her to file charges claiming that the marriage was
not valid since she signed the document in her own home thinking that it was a
paper authorizing Tan to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.
ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid.
HELD: Yes. They were married since there was an expression of mutual
consent and both of them appeared before the justice of the peace. They both
understood Spanish thus they knew the contents of the document they were
signing.

Melecio Madridejo vs. Gonzalo de Leon

Facts: Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez had one childDomingo de Leon.
In the year 1915,Eulogio died leaving Flaviana with Domingo.Flaviana later lived
with Pedro Madridejo and bore a childMelecio. On June 8, 1920, Flaviana, knowing
that she will die soon, married Pedro. She died the following day. Melecio Madridejo
claimed that he is the next of kin of Domingo de Leon who died as well. Defendant
claimed that the wedding of Pedro and Flaviana was not valid because the
solemnizing officer failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the Municipal
Secretary. Also, Melecio Madridejo was allegedly not a legitimate child.
Held: Forwarding of the marriage certificate is not an essential requisite of
the marriage. Failure to do so does not invalidate the marriage. For a subsequent
marriage to effectively legitimate a child born out of wedlock, the child must be
acknowledged by the parents in some public document or be in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child. In the case at hand, Melecio Madridejo
was not legitimated. No public document to that effect exists and he was not able to
prove that he has been in an uninterrupted status of the natural child.
Presumption of Marriage CC Article 220:
In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus,
every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
RC Section 3 Rule 131:
That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of co
partnership;
1. That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
2. That property acquired by a man and a woman who is capacitated to marry
each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under void marriage, has been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry
3. That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not
capacitated to marry each other and who have acquire properly through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions and their
corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are
equal.

Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil 1

FACTS: Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez were man and wife and had one
child, Domingo de Leon. Eulogio de Leon died in 1915. During her widowhood,
Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana
Perez had a child named Melecio Madridejo. On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being
at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by
virtue of articulo mortis, by the parish priest of Siniloan. She died on the following
day, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son in her first marriage, and Melecio Madridejo,
her son in her second husband. The parish priest failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary.
ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid
HELD: Yes, the failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate
does not affect the validity of their marriage because it is only an irregularity of a
formal requisite. Failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate to
the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not
appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in
the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of
said essential requisites.

Trinidad vs. CA, Trinidad and Trinidad

Facts: Arturio Trinidad, was the son of Inocentes Trinidad and nephew of
Lourdes and Felix Trinidad. The three siblings, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix,
inherited a piece of land from their father, Patricio Trinidad. Defendants claimed that
the land in question has been in their possession since the death of their father and
that Inocentes died in 1941 and not in 1944 as alleged by Arturio. They also
contend that Inocentes never fathered a child nor was he ever married. Arturio on
the other hand alleged that his father was married to Felicidad Molato, his mother.
Several witnesses living within the neighborhood testified to the marriage and the
birth of Arturio and that Arturio contrary to the claims of Lourdes and Felix had lived
in their house for some time. Relevant public documents valuable as evidence were
destroyed during the war.
Held: Marriage may be proven by relevant evidences such as: testimony of a
witness to the matrimony, public and open cohabitation, birth and baptismal
certificate signed by the couple or a mention of the marriage in other public
documents. Two witnesses attested that th couple cohabited and that Arturio was
their son. As proof of filiation with Felix and Lourdes, two family pictures were shown
where Arturio was in the company of Lourdes and Felix and the witnesses likewise
attested that Arturio had lived with his aunt and uncle. The preponderance of
evidence supported the claims of Arturio.
Trinidad v. CA 289 SCRA 189
Facts
Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad, who together with
Felix and Lourdes, his siblings, are heirs to four parcels of land of their deceased
father. He presented the following evidence.
a. testimony of Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a
child
b. testimony of Meren that she was present in the marriage of Inocentes
c. His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been destroyed)
d. Family pictures and his own testimony that he lived with Lourdes, until
he got married.
Lourdes, the aunt of Inocentes, presented the following evidence to refute
Arturios claims:
a. testimony of Briones that Inocentes was never married
b. her own testimony that Inocentes died childless and she claimed that
Arturio was simply a neighbor. She denied knowledge of the pictures Arturio
presented, where she is shown holding the baby of Arturio, together with Arturio
and his wife.
Issue
Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturios filiation
are sufficient.
Held

Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient
proof of marriage: fact of marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties, birth
certificate of the child, and other documents. Arturio presented the first 3. For
filiation, when the birth certificate cant be produced, other evidence like the
baptismal certificate, is admissible. Use of surname without objection is also
presumptive evidence of legitimacy.

Vda. De Jacob vs. CA and Pilapil

Facts: Plaintiff claimed to be the surviving spouse of Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and
appointed special administrator for his estates by virtue of are constructed marriage
contract recognized by their solemnizing officer who admitted that he lost the
marriage contract earlier on. The court of appeals ruled against the plaintiff on the
grounds that no copy of the contract was sent and no record of the marriage existed
and that Dr. Alfredo signed the contract with his thumb mark and not with his own
name. Lastly, court of appeals stated that the reconstructed marriage contract was
signed by Benjamin Molina and not by Jose Centera who the plaintiff said allegedly
lost the marriage contract.
Held: Dr. Alfredo and Plaintiff Tomasa had lived together for over five years
and the deceased signed an affidavit to that effect. According to Article 76 of the
Civil Code, no marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have reached the age of majority have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years. Also, failure to send a copy of the marriage certificate for record
purposes does not invalidate the marriage. It was not the petitioners duty to ensure
that the copy reached the civil registrars office. Secondary evidence proved that
there was a ceremony. The solemnizing officer and Adela Pilapil attested to that
effect. Also the name of the couple was recorded in the Book of marriages.
- In the absence of a marriage contract, there should be proof of due
execution which can be given by witnesses and proof of loss of marriage certificate
before the reconstructed certificate may be admitted.

VDA DE JACOB VS. CA

Facts
Plaintiff-appellant claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo
E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the
deceased. Defendant-appellee Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the
legally-adopted son of Alfredo. Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr.
Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because there was neither a
marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.. Appellant claims that the marriage
between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP,
Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original
copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when
Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. Based on the
evidence presented, the trial court ruled for Pilapil sustaining his claim as the
legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. CA affirmed trial
courts ruling.
Issues:
a.) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob
and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and
b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E.
Jacob.
Held
The Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob
and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID and the
claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No
pronouncement as to costs.
With regard to the contention the marriage was void ab initio because of the
lack of a marriage license, it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. An affidavit to this effect was
executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11 Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional
in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. With regard to the loss of the marriage certificate, the execution of a
document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those
to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. In the present
case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the
event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the
officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in
court. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidence testimonial and documentary may be admitted
to prove the fact of marriage..

Alcantara vs Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage
against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he
and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to the
Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding
before a certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went
through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26
March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate
lives. In her Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and
maintained that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She
alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children and
that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.
Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage
with the Rosita was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he
and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer who
arranged everything for them. He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite,
to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona,
Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita was a resident of the
place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
cannot be given weight because the certification states that Marriage
License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and
Miss Rosita Almario but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033
for their marriage license number.

ISSUE:
Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?
HELD:
No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio. To be considered void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil
registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued,
namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact
that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification
enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and
the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of
official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a
marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage.
Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of
the parties are residents of the city or municipality which issued the same is
a mere irregularity that does not affect the validity of the marriage. An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its
validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it
is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error. It
does not detract from the conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of
said marriage license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,
petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the
marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite
marriage license. Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila
City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage
ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate
himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no
longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle (Alcantara vs Alcantara,
G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007).
GR NO. 183896, JANUARY 30, 2013 ABBAS VS ABBAS DIGEST
DECEMBER 16, 2014 CASE EATERS LEAVE A COMMENT
GR No. 183896, January 30, 2013
Abbas vs Abbas

Facts: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of
marriage license, as provided for in Article 4 of the Family Code.
Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992. When they
arrived in the Philippines on December 1992, a ceremony was conducted between
them solemnized by Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and
Mary Ann Ceriola. Present also is Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of Syed. During the
ceremony, he and Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he did not know the
nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage.
In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License
No 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR being issued to
other couple.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.

Ruling:
No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was solemnized on
January 9, 1993, the Family Code is the applicable law, particularly Articles 3, 4 and
35 (3).
Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage. Article 4 provides the
effects of the absence of the essential and formal requisites. And Article 35,
Paragraph 3 provides that those marriages which are solemnized without a license
are void from the beginning in exception to those covered by the preceding
chapter.

Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy relied on the

marriage contract and testimonies to prove the existence of the said license.
Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.

Graham vs. Graham

Facts: On September 17, 1940, Sydney Graham contracted with Margarethe
Graham to the effect that Margarethe shall pay Sydney the amount of $300 per
month until such time that the parties no longer desire to continue with such an
arrangement. On July 11, 1933, the married couple divorced. The plaintiff then filed
a suit against his former wife in order to claim the remaining amount of money that
he should be accorded by virtue of the contract. Plaintiff alleged the contract was
done so that he can accompany his wife on her travels. The total amount claimed
until November 7, 1939was $25,000 with 3% interest per annum. The defendant on
the other hand alleged that the contract was not within the powers of a married
woman under a Michigan law and that the divorce should have effected the
termination of the said contract.
Held: Under the Michigan law invoked by the defendant, women have no
general power to enter into a contract except in separation of properties. Also,
private contracts between married individuals which are contrary to public policy
are unenforceable by virtue of Sec. 587entitled Bargain to Change Essential
Obligations of Marriage. The court held that if contracts which are contrary to the
essential obligations of marriage were permitted, it would invite an endless field of
controversy and litigation and would destroy the element of flexibility needed in
making adjustments to the new conditions of marital life.

Dunn vs. Palermo

Facts: Rosary Palermo who is married to Denty Cheatham has continued to
use her maiden name since her marriage. Because of a state-wide compulsory
registration law, Palermo lodged information of her change of address listing her
name as Palermo. The registrar was prompted to purge the name of Palermo from
the registration list because Palermo refused to change her name, citing Sec. 2-206
which states that registration of a person shall be purged 90 days after he changes
his name or otherwise. Palermo went to court seeking that the interpretation of the
said rule be declared erroneous or the statute be declared unconstitutional, it being
in violation of the 14th amendment due process and equal protection clause.
Held: The use of a husbands name is customary and as such, the common
law does not compel women to use their husbands name. In the past, the
husbands name was used to indicate the marital status of a woman. A person has a
common right to adopt any name he or she wantsto be known with. The use of
husbands name was mainly for indicating marital status. It was more by practice
rather than by law.

Goodridge vs. Department of Public health

Facts: In March and April of 2001, each of the plaintiff couples attempted to
obtain the marriage license from their respective city or town clerks office. After
their requirements had been completed, the clerk in each case refused to accept
the notice of intention to marry or denied a marriage license on the ground that
Massachusetts does not recognize same-sex marriages. Plaintiffs filed a suit
alleging that exclusion of same-sex couples from access to marriage license and
civil marriage and its benefits is in violation of Massachusetts law.
Held: Without the right to marry or the right to choose to marry, one is
excluded from the full range of human experience and denied full protection of the
laws for ones commitment to lasting human relationships.
Held: Defense of procreation is not sufficient because same-sex couples are
still capable of procreation although their methods may not be traditional. Likewise,
these couples are capable of rearing children in such a setting, affirmed by the
Massachusetts law which allows adoption for same-sex couples. Same-sex couples
should be afforded the same benefits as opposite-sex couples by virtue of the Equal
Protection and Due Process clause of the 14thamendment.


Private Contracts: When Valid, When Void?
In Re: Santiago
Facts: This is an administrative case concerning Atty. Roque Santiago who
executed a document wherein it was stipulated that Ernesto Baniquit and his wife
Soledad Colores were from then on, separated, allowing either parties to marry
again without danger of becoming subject to any legalaction from either of the two
parties. With this ,Baniquit got married to Trinidad Aurelio. Santiagos mistake,
according to him, was due mainly to his idea that a seven-year separation will allow
for such action. In finding out his mistake, he called on Baniquit who at that time,
was already married to someone else.
Held: The advice given and the document tended to subvert the vital
foundation of the family. Marriage, as stated in Article 1 of the FamilyCode, is not
subject to the stipulation.

Selanova vs. Mendoza

Facts: Judge Alejandro Mendoza prepared and ratified a document
extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of Saturnino Selanova and
Avelina Ceriza. It was stipulated in the document that the spouses should withdraw
the adultery and concubinage cases each had filed against another. The defendant
ratified the document with the assurance that the spouses would ask the Court of
First Instance to approve the agreement. According to the respondent, the basis of
the decision was Part 4 of Article 191 of the Civil Code which stated that husband
and wife may agree upon the dissolution of marriage subject to judicial approval.
Held: Respondents action was void as it violated Article 221 of the Civil Code
which states that contracts and any extrajudicial agreements are void. Judicial
sanction for annulment of marriage should have been secured beforehand.
Requisites of MarriageEssential Requisites of MarriageFC Article 2:
Essential Requisites of marriage are1.Legal capacity of contracting parties
who must be male or female.2.Consent that is freely given in the presence of a
solemnizing officer authorized by the state to conduct such marriage.

Jones vs. Hallahan

Facts: Two women appealed the decision of the Circuit Court which held that
both of them cannot marry one another. Plaintiffs claim that the decision abridges
the Equal Protection clause and Due Process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Held: Marriage, in many widely circulated dictionaries, are defined as a
union between man and woman, and there is no authority to the contrary. The
plaintiffs were not being prevented by the statutory provision to marry. Rather, they
were being prevented by themselves.

People vs. Felipe Santiago

Facts: Felipe Santiago raped Felicita Masilang, 18years old, a few paces from
Manila North Road. After the deed was done, defendant brought the girl to the
house of Agaton Santiago, the defendants uncle, who later found a protestant
minister who administered the marriage of Santiago to Masilang. After the
marriage, the victim was given a few pesos and was told to leave.
Held: The marriage is void first, because the victim did not have his fathers
consent to marry and second, because the victim was under duress and was
thereby incapable of giving her consent freely. Also, Felipe Santiago did not really
intend to marry Felicita Masilang. He only did so to escape criminal liability. As such,
the marriage is void because the consent of Santiago is not freely given. The
consent referred to here is not the consent of Felicita but that of Felipe who had no
intention of marrying Felicita.

Sevilla v. Cardenas, 497 SCRA 429

FACTS: Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas were married at Manila
City Hall where they executed a marriage contract. A marriage license number was
indicated in the contract, which Jaime never applied for. A church ceremony was
conducted on May 31, 1969 using the same license. They lived as husband and wife
and later on went to Spain for Jaimes medical education supported by Jaimes
parents. When in Spain their marriage turned bad since Jaime was having a hard
time balancing marriage and medical studies; obsession of Jaime with Carmelitas
knees which he would take countless pictures of, intrafemural sex between her
knees which are attributed to Jaimes drug addiction. Their marriage became
unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break
up in their marriage. Jaime went to the US to get a divorce in 1981 and a judicial
separation in 1983. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in
1991 in the United States. Sevilla presented 3 certifications from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan which states that the marriage license with that number
cannot be found. The parish where they were wed presented a Certified copy of a
Marriage certificate dated April 11, 1994. RTC ruled that marriage is null due to lack
of marriage license. CA reversed RTCs decision. Marriage license was probably
issued but cannot be located
ISSUE: W/N the marriage is valid
HELD: Valid. Decision of the CA affirmed. The local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792
is registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired."
Failure to locate does not mean non-existence of the marriage license. Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the indissolubility of marriage bonds.
Always presume marriage.