MS 79

AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC GOALS
IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

Andreas H. Glas, Markus Schaupp, Michael Essig

Andreas Glas1, andreas.glas@unibw.de, +49 89 6004
2297
Markus Schaupp1, markus.schaupp@unibw.de, +49 89
6004 4707
Michael Essig1, michael.essig@unibw.de, +49 89 6004
4220
1

Research Center for Law and Management of Public

Procurement, Bundeswehr University Munich, WernerHeisenberg-Weg 39, 85577 Neubiberg (Germany),
ABSTRACT
Public procurement is bound to a tight legislation which
sets and enforces strategic goals such as innovation or
sustainability. The purpose of this paper is to analyze if
different archetypes of public procurement organization
(central or decentral; state-level or local level) perceive
and implement strategic goals differently. A survey with
data from 162 entities is used for this purpose. The
findings reveal that strategy implementation is different in
central or state-level organizations compared to decentral
or local organizations. Centralized organizations give
objectives such as innovation, transparency, and
sustainability a high priority, while local ones highlight
regional development and SME support.
KEY WORDS. Public procurement, organization, strategy,
survey, discriminant analysis

INTRODUCTION
A common view found in the literature is that an
organizations ability to accomplish its goals involves
congruence between the organizational structure and its
strategic orientation (Chandler, 1962). The argument that
organizations should adapt to coherent and distinctive
strategies, and adapt their internal characteristics to
reflect these strategies, has a venerable status in the
management literature and is also researched in the
context of public organizations (Andrews et al., 2009).
Referring to public procurement within the European
Union, recent years saw a trend to manifest hitherto
latent strategic objectives into legislation. The EU
directive 2014/24/EU sets the legal framework for the
public regulations of the 28 member states of the EU.
That framework postulates the support of different
strategic objectives such as sustainability goals like green
procurement and social aspects, innovation, the support
of small and medium sized enterprises (SME) or broader
government objectives.
The directive addresses the 28 EU member states as the
field of application, which stand for an economic value of
14.64 trillion, 22% of the world GDP (Statista, 2015) and
a total public procurement volume that amounts to a sum
of about 1.786 trillion for the year 2013 (EC, 2015). In
the European Union public procurement is conducted by
numerous public procurement organizations on state,
regional or local level. Following the argument of the
strategy-structure fit of organizations, it is assumed that
the ability to adapt to strategic changes is different for
public procurement organizations on state or local level
respectively for centralized or decentralized public
procurement organizations.

Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to investigate that

assumption by testing if organizational archetypes in
public procurement can be differentiated according to
their perception of strategic objectives. Two main
hypotheses are of importance in that context, which are
explained later in detail:
H1: Centralized public procurement organizations have a
higher strategic fit to up-to-date strategic objectives than
decentralized organizations.
H2: State-level public procurement organizations have a
higher strategic fit to up-to-date strategic objectives than
local organizations.
For the purpose of the analysis data of a survey in
Germany is used. Discriminant analysis is used as the
method of analysis. The findings provide insights how
strategic
objectives
are
implemented
in
the
heterogeneous public procurement organization and if a
specific archetype of organizational form better suits for
strategic adoption, implying strategy implementation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The
upcoming section provides theoretical foundations of
strategic goals in public procurement. Next, the
methodology is explained and the sample characteristics
are provided. This is followed by the findings section,
subdivided in a section for H1 and another for H2. These
findings are discussed and the recommendations are
outlined in the subsequent sections. The paper concludes
with implications for research and practice.
STRATEGIC GOALS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
The inclusion of strategic goals into public procurement
policies and practices has been progressively emphasized
over the past years. Examples for their implementation

are the fixation of strategic criteria, like green and social

goals which were introduced in EU procurement law in
2004 (Directive 2004/18/EC) or innovative aspects which
were amongst others extensively described by the EU in
2007 (COM(2007) 799) and were ultimately included with
the reform in 2014 (Directive 2014/24/EC). Before, the
desire to integrate such other policy objectives into public
procurement was already widespread throughout Europe,
but member states of the European Union implemented
strategic policy goals (green, social, innovative
procurement) in different ways and with different contents
(Kahlenborn et al. 2011). For example in German public
procurement law strategic aspects are present since 2009
(Modernization of the German Procurement Law, 2009).
In the scientific debate about strategic goals in public
procurement Erridge and McIlroy (2002) identified three
sets of sometimes conflicting goals against which public
procurement policy may be analyzed: (1) regulatory goals,
(2) commercial goals, and (3) socio-economic goals. This
is in line with other frameworks which also divide
economic, governance, and political goals (Schapper et
al., 2006). The existence of different strategic goals call
for priorities and a high awareness of possible goal
conflicts (Table 1).
Table 1
Goals of public procurement
Goals
Regulatory goals

Commercial goals

Description
Focus on the compliance with
the European Union Public
Procurement Directives.
Focus on the use of market
mechanisms
to
achieve
procurement
goals
like
reduced cost and increased
quality.

Socio-economic goals

Focus on the use of public

procurement to support wider
government
policy
like
sustainability
and
social
welfare.

Source: Erridge and McIlroy (2002).

Erridge (2005) was one of the very first research works
which assessed the UK public procurement policy practice
against these regulatory, commercial and socio-economic
goals, proposing an analytical framework for evaluating
the delivery of public procurement policies. The
contribution states, that although the achievement of
regulatory and commercial goals and values remains
important, opportunities to deliver wider socio-economic
policies through public procurement should be pursued
more extensively. In this respect the promotion of small
and medium-sized companies (SMEs) as well as green and
social aspects should be considered, while innovation
goals are not mentioned explicitly (Erridge, 2005).
Following this argument Schapper et al. (2006) created a
theoretical background for the inclusion of strategic goals
in public procurement including a strategic and political
dimension into their framework of public procurement
goals. That dimension is considered as an equal goal
dimension besides of regulatory (conformance, fair
dealing, compliance with the procurement law) and
commercial goals (efficiency, effectiveness, value for
money).
Together the three dimension are illustrated in form of a
goal triangle, what makes the conflict obvious, as each
goal could only be achieved regarding the other goal
dimensions i.e. value for money is bound to legal
conformity. For example long-term supplier relationships
may have positive effects on value for money, but stand

in contrast to transparency and non-discrimination rules.

Policy-driven goals like the procurement of green products
to support environmental goals may stand in contrast to
cost efficiency.
Possible goal conflicts are also stressed by Edquist and
Zabala-Iturragagoitia (2012) who argue that additional
socio-economic goals lower the overall efficiency of the
procurement process. The inconsistency of the efficiency
goal with the goal of innovation is especially emphasized
by Yeow et al. (2012). The overall necessity to balance
and prioritize strategic goals is described by Thai (2006)
procurement officials [] have been walking on a tight
rope
It remains unclear why innovation goals where not
explicitly mentioned in the frameworks given by Schapper
and Erridge, as there are various preceding sources that
link public procurement with an strategic inclusion of
innovation goals (Rothwell, 1994; Geroski, 1990; Dalp et
al., 1992; Dalp, 1994; Edquist et al., 2000).
Overall, strategic goals in public procurement can be
grouped in three categories. Social and green respectively
ecological targets are often summarized under the
headline of sustainability (McCrudden, 2004; Brammer
and Walker, 2007). Sustainability is defined as
procurement that is consistent with the principles of
sustainable development, such as ensuring a strong,
healthy and just society, living within environmental
limits, and promoting good governance. (Brammer and
Walker, 2007)
Another category is SME support (Loader, 2005; Loader,
2007) by easing the entrance of SMEs to government
contracts or explicitly aiming for small enterprises with
contract design. According to Uyarra and Flanagan (2010)
this would favor greater competition and would make the

formation of cartels more unlikely [and] raise the number

of competing solutions and improving the chance of an
innovative solution being selected.
Another category are innovation-oriented targets like the
procurement of new and innovative products or services
as well as the sourcing of R&D-services in order to satisfy
anticipated government needs. The intention is to
promote
innovation
in
order
to
support
the
competitiveness of Europes industries and to safeguard
the economic region. Basic concept for these measures is
the intention to innovate and improve government
services while also promoting innovation in companies
diffusing innovations, as introduced by the EU with their
Community Lisbon Programme (COM(2005) 488) and
defined in their Innovation-Strategy (COM(2006) 502).
The most recent and comprehensive framework which
encompasses strategic goals in different dimensions is
proposed by Harland et al. (2007). The various goals are
described as a seven-stage-maturity-model with the
adherence to higher-ranking commercial and regulatory
priorities as a basis of lower-ranking strategic topics at the
pinnacle, explicitly mentioning green and sustainability
goals as well as innovation. This classification is still
approximate as it does not describe links between the
goals, considering for example that the purchase of a
green product can also support social sustainability and
innovation goals as well as the support for SMEs at the
same time. However, the framework serves as an
appropriate starting point for the empirical analysis of
goal dimensions in this paper.
Table 2
Maturity model of strategic goals in public
procurement
Stage of

Low-ranking High-ranking

development

Deliverer of broader
policy objectives

Supporter of
6 broader policy
objectives

Innovation;
sustainability;
social
inclusion;
broader
government
objectives
Equal
opportunity;
green
procurement

5 Value for money

4 Accountability

Ethics

Efficient use of
public funds

Compliance with
2 legislation/regulatio
n

Sourcing &
1 delivering goods
and services

Source: Harland et al. (2007).

Value for
money
Accountability;
transparency;
probity
Competition;
efficiency;
education
Legal
compliance;
costeffectiveness;
education
-

ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

The organizational practice of public procurement is
basically divided in two perspectives (political and
administrative). The political organization sets the
strategic goals in form of rules, regulations and in
particular through laws. Then, the administration is tasked
with the execution. This paper is focusing on the
organization of the administrative part of public
procurement organization, what includes the procurement
tasks in the narrower sense (demand description, award
of contracts, contracting. etc.)
Archetypes of public procurement organizations are on
the one hand side regional or local units with a high level
of autonomy and on the other hand federal or state-level
organizations (a.o. Thai, 2009, Johnson et al. 2003). This is
also resembled in the division and authority on budgets.
Another prominent differentiation of organizations is the
distinction of a central and decentral purchasing
organization. Following the procurement literature on
organizations (Arnold, 1999) there are various arguments
in favor of a central and decentral structure (Table 3).
Table 3
Comparison of central and decentral procurement
organization
Central
1. Stronger negotiating
position vs. suppliers,
hence better prices and
terms.
2. Construction of a
group purchasing and
procurement strategy.
Uniformity leads to
economies of scale.

Decentral
1. Local management
responsible for all costs
including purchasing might
become frustrated if they
lose control over such an
important cost item.
2. Close cooperation
between local buyers and
users. Good fit with local

3. Acquisition of better,
more profound
knowledge of the
market. Establishment of
a global supply view.
4. Efficient use of
available purchasing
skills.
5. Less administrative
work and reduction of
purchasing organization
expenses.

requirements.
3. Choice of local
suppliers, better and faster
service, shorter delivery
times, sometimes better
terms, goodwill to local
community.
4. Local buyers more
motivated

Source: Arnold (1999)

Thai (2009) describes the tradeoff between central and
decentral organizational forms, meaning that a perfect
decentral or central structure is very unlikely. However, as
an archetype the definition is as follows: Centralization
occurs when all of the rights, powers, duties, and
authority relating to public procurement are vested in a
central procurement officer [while] decentralization occurs
when procurement personnel from other functional areas
can decide unilaterally on sources of supply or negotiate
with suppliers directly (Thai, 2009).
Compared to a decentral organization, a central
procurement authority comes along with a higher volume
of procurement actions both in number and budgetary
terms due to the aggregated demands as well as more
and higher trained staff due to the localization at one
place and the need for procurement specialists. Another
aspect that relates to the procurement targets mentioned
beforehand is a higher rate of transparency coming along
with better information systems for reporting and
recording of transactions and therefore leaving less room

for corruption and financial mismanagement (OECD,

2000; Albano and Sparro, 2010).
According to the literature the central organization
promotes the usage of social, environmental and
technical standards as well as innovation. Regional policy
goals as well as the support of SMEs are expected to
decrease due to higher contract sizes and a higher
distance to suppliers and are linked to a decentral
structure and to local authorities (OECD, 2000; Albano
and Sparro, 2010).
The organization of public procurement within the
European Union remains very scattered and decentral,
following the rationale that by placing the procurement
function closer to the needs of the final user, it is likely to
be more economically efficient and better able to promote
the development of the private sector, including small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (OECD, 2000). But
recently also growing efforts to centralize certain parts of
the system can be detected. (OECD, 2000; Brezovnik et
al., 2015).
As this study is conducted with data from Germany, the
German situation is as follows: The public procurement
structure in Germany is traditionally highly decentralized
due to its government system dividing in federal state
(Bund), (regional) states (Laender) and local authorities as
well as publicly owned or influenced companies and
organizations (Eig et al., 2008). But in recent years some
government bodies and municipalities partly centralized
their purchasing departments due to budget pressure,
forming some big procurement players like the Federal
Office of Defense Technology and Procurement or the
Acquisition Office of the Federal Ministry of the Interior
(Eig et al., 2008).
METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE

This paper uses data from a survey of public buyers in the

German federal state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. The
main purpose of the survey was to evaluate the effect of
the newly introduced minimum wage law on public
procurement performance. Therefore, this analysis is a
secondary data analysis, as the research is conducted
with already existing data. The survey suits to the
purpose and aims of this study, as the organizational form
and the perception of strategic goals were included in the
questionnaire.
The survey contained three parts, with the first part
asking for general views and opinions on public
procurement goals, tools and future developments. The
second part was dedicated to the minimum wage aspects
and part three recorded detailed information about the
procurement offices.
The survey was conducted between March and April 2014
via the Ministry of Economics, Construction and Tourism of
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern using both internet and paper
based surveys and was sent out to every procurement
office located in the state. In total 1.045 institutions were
contacted, what also is an indicator for the highly
decentralized structure of the public procurement system
in Germany. In total 162 returns were received relating to
a response rate of 15.5%.
Due to response bias and incomplete data, a number of
questionnaires were excluded from the analysis.
Additionally returns from publicly owned companies were
excluded as they were too less in numbers and did not fit
the goal of comparing state and local authorities
respectively central and decentral procurement offices.
The characteristics of the filtered sample (N = 104) are
presented in table 4.

Table 4:
Sample Characteristics
Administrative
Level:
State level
Local (municipality)
level
Procurement
volume:
>= 5 million EUR
<5 million and >1
million EUR
<=1 million EUR
Procurement
Personnel:
>=10
10> and >2
<=2
Trained Personnel:
Yes
No

N = 104
51

49.5%

53

50.5%
N = 84

15

14.6%

20

19.4%

49

67.0%
N = 87

10
38
39

11.5%
43.7%
44.8%
N = 96

27
69

28.1%
71.9%

A two-group discriminant analysis is used to determine

the following: whether the perception of different strategic
goals of public procurement predicts the organizational
form of the procurement entity. The descriptive statistics
(see table 5) indicate that there are interdependencies
(e.g. significant correlations) between strategy goals and
the
organization.
The
question
is,
if
these
interdependencies really predict organization significantly.
If the hypothesis must be rejected, then there is no
significant difference in the strategy-structure fit
(Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984). If the variables
(strategy goals) are able to predict the organizational
form, then there is a different strategy-structure fit.

Discriminant analysis then could reveal which strategy

goal accounts most for the differences in the average
score profiles of the two groups.

3.24

5 - Quality
improvement

3.09

6 - Security of
supply

3.04

7 - Regional
development

2.88

8 - Budget
consolidation

2.85 .737 .107

10 - Social
responsibility
11 - Ecology

n Competitio

consolidatio Budget

supply Security of

cy Transparen

.
.
-.27
.615
346* 1
196* 5**
*
.
.
.628 .074 -.141 381*
1
227*
*
.
.
.
.835 .047 -.186 258* 265* 332* 1
*
*
*
.
-.21
.722
557* .041 -.048 .054 .064
9*
*

4 - Transparency

9 - Competition

Local State /

1
-.19
3.55 .500 .150
3*

improveme Quality

-.035

Money Value for

N=104

developme Regional

3 - Value for Money

N=104

decentral Central /

1 - Central /
decentral
2 - State / Local

Deviation Standard

Strategic goal

Mean

Table 5
Correlation matrix of perceived importance of
strategic goals

.
.
.129 -.007 .133 .170 309* 1
198*
*
.
.
.
.
.
2.83 .753
,170 .182
333* .156 1
208*
219* 202* 241*
*
.
.
.
2.79 .536
-.025 .179 .188 290* 258* .150 .041 .148
217*
*
*
.
.
.
.
2.69 .692 271* .042
.128 .169 .171 .193
262* 6
206*
044*
*
*

.
.
.
.
12 - SME support
2.63 .754 .166 429* .143 -.079 .103 .007 339* 304* 374* *
*
*
*
.
.
13 - Innovation
2.29 .777 409* .080 .101 .134
.139 .161 .134 .090
242*
*
.
.
.
14 - Example for
2.25 .825 150 -.080 304* .191 349* 264* .135 .176 .171 4
industry
*
*
*
*Correlation is significant with p<0.05; ** Correlation is
significant with p<0.01; N=104

FINDINGS H1
In this section H1 is explored, testing if centralized public
procurement organizations have a different strategic fit as
decentralized public procurement organization. A
discriminant function was estimated for the two groups
central organizations and decentral organizations (see
Table 6). The canonical correlation associated with this
function is 0.561. The square of this correlation is 0.314
and indicates that 31.4% of the variation in the type of
organization is explained by this model. To test for the
significance of this function, the Wilks statistic was
examined. The value of Wilks L is 0.685 which transforms
to a chi-square of 31.014 with 12 degrees of freedom (p <
0.002). This indicates that the model is significant and
explains the strategic perception of different public
procurement organizations.
The relative importance of the predictor variables was
determined by examining the structure correlations, also
called canonical loadings. The results suggest that
innovation, transparency, Ecology, competition and social
responsibility are the five most important predictors that
discriminate between the two groups, compromising all
strategic goals. The other factors have canonical loadings
< 0.3 and thus have only minor influence.
Table 6
Discriminant analysis results
Variables
(Strategic
objectives)

Structure
matrix
(canonical
loadings)

Innovation
Transparency
Ecology

.575
.354
.350

Unstandardize
d canonical
discriminant
function
coefficient
.471
.246
.253

Competition
Social
responsibility
Value for money
SME support
Regional
development
Quality
improvement
Budget
consolidation
Example for
industry
Security of
supply

.346
.335

.351
.356

.299
.279
-.275

.146
.306
-.706

.245

-.141

.244

.290

.206

-.144

.084

-.195

The findings and the model fit can be illustrated by the

plot of the canonical discriminant function 1 for H1 (see
Figure 1). Obviously, decentral organizations (mean -0.29,
SD 0.976) differ from the distribution of central public
procurement organizations (mean 1.56, SD = 1.120).
Figure 1
Canonical discriminant function
20
18
16
14
12
10

Decentral

Central

6
4
2
0
-4 -2 0

The classification results (see Table 7) were examined:

83.3% of the cases were correctly classified. Since it has
been suggested that the classification accuracy achieved
by discriminant analysis should be approximately 25%
greater than that obtained by chance (Malhotra 1996),
the model seems to have satisfactory predictive power.
H1 could not be rejected, central public procurement
organizations
adopt
different
from
de-centralized
organizations and according to strategic objectives.
Table 7
Classification results
Predicted group
decentral

central

Sum of
cases

Numbe
r
Percen
t

decentr
al

64

12

76

central

11

14

decentr
al

84,2

15,8

100,0

central
21,4
78,6
100,0
a. 83,3% Percentage of grouped cases correctly
classified.
FINDINGS H2
In this section H2 is explored, testing if state-level public
procurement organizations have a different strategic fit as
local public procurement organizations. For this purpose
also a discriminant function was estimated for the two
groups state-level and local-level organizations (see
Table 8). The canonical correlation associated with this
function is 0.764. The square of this correlation is 0.583
and indicates that 58.3% of the variation in the type of
organization is explained by this model. Also for this
discriminant analysis, the test for the significance was
examined with Wilks statistics. The value of Wilks L is
0.416 which transforms to a chi-square of 71.98 with 12
degrees of freedom (p < 0.000). This indicates that the
model is significant and explains the strategic perception
of different public procurement organizations.
The canonical loadings provide indications about the
relative importance of variables (Table 8), suggesting that
regional development and SME support are the only two
factors of (high) relevance (> 0.3 loading). Obviously, the
factor regional development is key for discriminating the
two types of organizations, whereas the other strategic
factors of social and ecologic responsibility as well as
innovation are not important for predicting group
membership.

Table 8
Results of the discriminant analysis
Variables
(Strategic
objectives)

Structure
matrix
(canonical
loadings)

Unstandardize
d canonical
discriminant
function
coefficient
.800

Regional
.680
development
SME support
.379
.564
Transparency
-.270
-.290
Value for money
-.227
-.318
Security of
-.204
-.312
supply
Quality
-.179
-.326
improvement
Competition
.137
-.077
Budget
.112
-.151
consolidation
Innovation
-.098
-.005
Ecology
.082
-.116
Example for
.022
.161
industry
Social
0.19
.242
responsibility
The findings and the model fit is illustrated by the plot of
the canonical discriminant function 1 for H2 (see Figure
2). The distributions overlap, but state-level organizations
(mean -1.31, SD 1.082) differ from local-level ones (mean
1.05, SD = 0.929).
Figure 2
Canonical discriminat function 1

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-4 -2 0

4
Local / Municipality

State

The classification results (see Table 9) reveal that 91.3%

of organizations were grouped correctly according to
the two types of organizations. This is a very high value,
as the classification accuracy achieved by discriminant
analysis should be approximately greater than 75%
(Malhotra 1996). Thus, the model seems to have very
high predictive power. H2 could not be rejected, statelevel public procurement organizations adopt different
from de-centralized organizations and according to
strategic objectives.
Table 9
Classification results
Predicted group
Sum of
cases
State
Local
37
3
40
Numbe State
r
Local
5
45
50
92.5
7.5
100,0
Percen State
t
Local
10.0
90.0
100,0
a. 91.1% Percentage of grouped cases correctly
classified.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The findings show, that the hypothesis H1 and H2 could
not be rejected, and thus central and state-level
organizations differ in their strategic perception from
decentral or local-level organizations. However, the
discriminant functions for the prediction of group
membership differ completely for central/decentral
respectively state/local organizational archetypes.
This is interesting, as it could be assumed that central
organizations are also on state level and decentral
organizations are on local level. As can be seen in the
descriptive analysis already (table 5), the organizational
archetypes do not correlate significantly. A further look on
the sample through cross-tabulation reveals that the
cases are distributed almost equally on state/local or
central/decentral level (table 10).
Table 10
Cross-Tabulation of organizational types
State
Local
Total

Central
8 (53.3%)
7 (46.7%)
15 (100%)

Decentral
43 (48.3%)
46 (51.7%)
89 (100%)

Sum
51
53
104

There is no significant relationship in the sample between

the archetypes of organizational forms (Chi-square .129;
Cramr-V 0.35; approximate significance .719). Therefore
each of the four archetypes has its own perception of
strategic goals, which are the major results of this study.
The administrative given de facto existence of different
organizational types on regional levels (in Germany on
federal, regional, and municipality level) and their
administrative
given
responsibilities
(central
and
decentral procurement tasks) can be predicted by their
perception of strategic goals.

According to the discriminant functions, it is also possible

to do a first interpretation in the next paragraphs
according to the strategic goal frameworks (goal triangle
of political, regulatory, and commercial goals) and the
maturity model (level 1-7) from the review (Schapper et
al., 2006; Harland et al., 2007):
It seems that central public procurement organizations
are strategists, as they discriminate according to real
political goals the support of innovation, transparency,
ecologic sustainability, promotion of competition and
social responsibility (political goal dominance; maturity
level 6-7).
In contrast, it seems that decentral public procurement
organizations are traditionalists, as they perceive
these goals not that relevant, what implies a stronger
focus on non-political goals, such as cost efficiency and
regulatory
goals
(governance).
(regulatory
and
commercial goal dominance; maturity level 1-5)
The discrimination of state-level public procurement
organizations and their distribution seem to reveal that
these organizations perceive the factors of regional and
SME
support
less
important.
Therefore,
these
organizations are accountability levers, as their
separation from suppliers support good governance and
transparency (regulatory goal dominance; maturity level
4).
Local public procurement organizations seem to be
regional developers, as they discriminate from the
state-level group by a high perception of regional and SME
support goals (political goal dominance; maturity level 6 equal opportunity of regional /small firms).
Overall, the analysis of the organizations and their
adoption to strategy goals reveals four different ways of

strategy implementation. If these empirical finding is

supported even in broader studies in other country
contexts, research should refer its strategy analysis
efforts not on generic public sector-wide studies, but
rather focus on distinct organizational archetypes. Public
procurement practice should follow the same logic, and
discuss the possibility to use specific organizational
archetypes for the implementation of peculiar strategic
goals (i.e. innovation, sustainability at strategists), while
other organizational archetypes are used for other goals
(competition at accountability levers). The consequence
for practice would be to leave the beaten track of one
(strategic) regulation (i.e. legislation/ directive) fits all to
a strategy differentiation according to organizations.

CONCLUSIONS
This paper explores the strategy-structure fit in public
procurement organizations and provides several new
insights to the wider research area of public procurement
organization and strategy implementation. First, it
supported the hypothesis that central organizations adopt
different
to
strategy
objectives
than
decentral
organizations. This is also the case for state-level versus
local level organizations.
Second, it supported the assumption that central
organizations (strategists) perceive up-to-date strategic
objectives (recently manifested in a new legislation
directive)
more
important
than
decentralized
organizations (traditionalists). On the other hand statelevel organizations (accountability levers) perceive the
support of distinct local need differently from local-level
ones (regional developers).
Finally, this supports the wider assumption that strategy
implementation is successful if the normative (political)
goal setting considers the peculiar behavior of different
public procurement organizational archetypes. It also
explains to some extend a low degree of strategy goal
achievement of some organizations, as these are
confronted with goals, they simply could not adopt with
(as good as other organizational forms).
This has several implications for practice. If decentralized
and local public procurement organizations adopt
differently to strategic changes, it would be necessary to
have different strategic objectives or at least different
implementation strategies for either central (state-level)
or decentral (local-level) procurement organizations.
Conversely a growing political interest in the fulfilment of
strategic goals would call for further centralization efforts

of procurement offices. This should be the area of further

research.
Next steps could put the findings of this study on a
broader basis by expanding the sample size or the
country scope, and by including regional organizations as
hybrids
between
local
and
state-level
public
procurement organizations.

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APPENDIX A:
Item
Which of the following
goals are especially
important for your
procurement entity?
Which administrative
level fits your
organization?
What procurement
volume was recorded
for your entity in 2012
respectively 2013?
How many employees
are dealing with
procurement in your
organization?
Is the procurement
staff of your
organization especially
trained in public
purchasing?

Scale
4 point likert
scale
(not important
to very
important)
Nominal scale
(state, local,
others)
Open scale

Source
Goals
derived from
Harland et al
(2007)
Eig et al
2008,
Thai 2009

OECD 2000,
(the average
Albano and
was used for the
Sparro 2010
classification)
Open scale

Ordinal scale
(yes, no)

OECD 2000,
Albano and
Sparro 2010
OECD 2000,
Albano and
Sparro 2010