Stonehill v.

Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Concepcion, CJ
Facts:
1. Respondent (prosecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the
petitioner and the corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due
to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code
and the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted
in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises.
2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated
the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus, he filed a petition with
the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized
effects from being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The
court issued the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in
both premises
RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the
corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a
corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein
petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said corporation,
and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly
object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third
party. The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and
things seized from the offices and the premises).

RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one
subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with
the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on
elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent
capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the
title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By
the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is
holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or
election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the
limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and
void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its
approval is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence,
which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law;
hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo
v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional
mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not
considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14,
2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of
candidacy.
ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.
W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is
a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.

HELD:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its
contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title
is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the
other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media
for election propaganda, does not violate the one subject-one title rule. This Court has held that
an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found
cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure,
some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad
policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the
Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the
government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the
legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are
matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to
bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing
Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the
provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose.
Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election
process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and
orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall
take effect immediately upon its approval, is defective. However, the same does not render the
entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended.

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional
law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a
statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the
validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No
such transgression has been shown in this case.

Placer vs Villanueva
G.R. Nos. 60349-62, December 29, 1983
Facts: Following receipt of informations from petitioners that probable cause has been
established which necessitates the issuance of warrants of arrest, respondent judge issued an
order the hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing
the corresponding warrants of arrest. After said hearing, respondent issued the questioned orders
requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of
judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners
Petitioners contended that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the
existence of a probable cause in a preliminary examination/investigation, and that their findings
as to the existence thereof constitute sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the
court.
Issues: Whether the certification of the investigating fiscal in the information as to the existence
of probable cause obligates respondent City Judge to issue a warrant of arrest.
Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest,
compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation.
Held: 1. No. 2. Yes.
The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:
Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination
conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been
committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he
must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.
Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before
issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and require the submission of the affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has
been the rule since U.S. vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas. And this evidently is the reason for
the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13,
1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter
of long-standing practice had been attached to the informations filed in his sala, respondent

found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable cause. For as the
ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required affidavits, respondent
wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the cases where he was satisfied that probable
cause existed.
The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the complainant and of his
witnesses is to enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the case outright or to require
further proceedings.

Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas

FACTS:
On June 3 1936, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas issued
a search warrant on the basis of affidavit of Agent Mariano Almeda in whose oath he declared
that he had no personal knowledge but through information from a reliable source. In other
words, the applicant's knowledge of facts is based on a mere hearsay. In the affidavit presented to
the judge, the description is as follows: "That there are being kept is said premises books
documents, receipts, lists chits, and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as
money lender, charging a usurious rate of interests, in violation of the law." At 7 pm on June 4,
by virtue of the warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the store and residence
of Narciso Alvarez seized some articles such as internal revenue license, ledger, journals. cash
bonds, check stubs, memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories, bill of lading, credit
receipts, correspondence, receipt books, promissory notes and checks. On July 8, Alvarez filed a
petition alleging that the search was illegal based on the lack of personal knowledge, that it was
made at night and for non compliance in the particularity description rule in issuing warrant. On
September 10, the Court of First Instance ruled against the Alvarez and upheld the validity of the
search warrant.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N the search warrant is legal when the affidavit is based on hearsay.(2) W/N a search
warrant can be made at night.(3) W/N the search warrant satisfies the particularity of
description as required by the law.
RULING:
(1) No. The search warrant is ILLEGAL because the affidavit is based on mere hearsay. RATIO:
The general rule is that when the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient
facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there
exists probable cause. But when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the
affidavit of one or more witnesses having personal knowledge of facts is necessary. The Court
held that the warrant is illegal because it is based on the affidavit of an agent who had no
personal knowledge of the facts. The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to
warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury
could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused.(2) Yes, the search can be
made at night. RATIO: Section 101 of General Orders number 58 authorizes a search made at
night when it is positively asserted that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched. However, since the search warrant is declared illegal (RULING 1), such search could
not be legally made at night.(3) Yes, it satisfied the requirement of particularity of description.

RATIO: Article III of the Constitution and section 97 of General Orders Number 58 requires that
the affidavit must contain a particular description of the placed to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized. But, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be
rather general, it is not required that technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue. Based on the description of the affidavit, and taking into consideration the
nature of the articles as described it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description
could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the
contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions
because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to identify the articles in question, which he did.

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of Metropolitan
Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in
subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants
issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the
warrant were real properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be
searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was
evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the
case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling that machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so
when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless
such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the
owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case,
the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property
susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford
vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched
and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

Anonymous Letter-Complaint Against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, MeTC

of Manila
19 November 2008
FACTS:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an unsigned, undated letter of
complaint regarding Atty. Miguel Morales of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC). The
letter alleged that Atty. Morales was consuming his work hours filing and attending to
personal cases, and was using office supplies, equipment and utilities.
Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben Dela Cruz conducted a spot investigation
and gained access to Morales personal computer. Pleadings to two of Atty. Morales
personal cases were found among the computer files. The computer was seized and
taken to the custody of the OCA.
Morales filed a motion for the release of his computer. The Court granted his motion but
ordered that the files be retrieved first.
Morales filed a letter-complaint addressed to then CJ Davide against DCA Dela Cruz for
alleged conspiracy and culpable violation of the Constitution. Morales asserted that the raid
conducted by DCA Dela Cruz without search and seizure orders violated his right to
privacy and the articles seized should therefore be considered inadmissible.
ISSUE:
1. Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales personal computer admissible in the
administrative case against him?
RULING: DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence
1. No
Article III Section 2 of the Constitution enshrines the inviolable right of the people to
be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Additionally, Article III Section 3(2) bars the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of such right. Any violation of this right renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
One of the exceptions to the rule is consented warrantless search. DCA Dela Cruz
claims that they were able to obtain the pleadings with Atty. Morales consent.
However, the Court finds his assertion insufficient to make the present case fall
under the exception. Consent to a search must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently
given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. It must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence.
To constitute a valid consent, it must be shown that: (1) the right exists, (2) that the
persons involved had the knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of
the right, and (3) that the person had actual intention to relinquish the right.
In this case, it was not shown that Atty. Morales had an actual intention to relinquish
his right. He may have agreed to opening his computer and printing the files during
the spot investigation, but he immediately filed an administrative case against the

DCA and his team, specifically invoking his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin
Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia
Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the
employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another
residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her
liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was
applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she
could be allowed to leave.
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without
returning the advance payment it gave?
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective
employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no
physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less
real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to
another, freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral
compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary
power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element
that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual
effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is
entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived
of liberty by duress or physical coercion.

Marcos vs Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989

FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought
to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the
respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to
bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant
by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the
President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment
(Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power
(Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to
the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.