Grace Poe vs COMELEC(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)

Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years
and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good.
Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and
Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She
immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006,
the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA
9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming
her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to
satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly,
among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove
that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she
committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-borncitizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates (Read
Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC,
and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction
over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over
the President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications
of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized
proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision
cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into
grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent of
the Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification
issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.
Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)
Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of
the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are
typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99%
chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her
parents nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under
Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd,
if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that
the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by
treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory
to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of
the country in which the foundling is found.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in
acquiring a new domicile.
Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when
her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases which decree
that an aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa
or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the
circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual
stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys actual continuous stay in the

Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for
good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is
suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny
due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a
candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC
regarding her citizenship and residency. ##
Carpio Dissent (Highlights): Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino CitizensBrion Dissent
(Highlights): COMELECs Broad Quasi-Judicial Power Includes the Determination of a Candidates
Eligibility

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. 3 However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. 4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. 5
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national
elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." 10To
further bolster his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a
computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has
been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines.
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order 13 requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to
present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

ISSUES:
A. WON an intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
B. WON The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a
positive and voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship;
WON it divests Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation .
C. WON Maquiling is a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
HELD:
a. YES.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First
Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6.Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention
may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been
no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En
Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to
the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC 30 are present and therefore would not
be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate
the matter before this Court.
Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and
respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be
sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is
only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the
disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

b. Yes
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. 32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when,
after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his
continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his
foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country
before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to
determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November
2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter
to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport,
Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring
before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all
attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at
any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation
of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the
foreign country which granted the citizenship.

c. He is not a second placer.

With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he
obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC 54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a
void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is
still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not
constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of
eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are
participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to
the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

G.R. No. 210164 Political Law Election Law Republic Act No. 9225 Qualifications of
Local Elective Candidates Citizenship Requirements Dual Allegiance
Remedial Law Formal Offer of Evidence Evidence not Offered
Rommel Arnado was a natural-born Filipino. Later, however, he became an American citizen.
On July 10, 2008, he re-acquired his Filipino citizenship by executing an oath of allegiance to
the Philippines.
On April 3, 2009, he executed an affidavit renouncing his American citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, he filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 elections.
A rival candidate (Linog Balua) then filed a disqualification case against Arnado on the
ground that Arnado used his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship in April 2009. It
was argued that such act of using a US passport constitutes dual allegiance and that is a
ground for disqualification under the Local Government Code. In short, it was argued that
Arnado remained a US citizen.
In his defense, Arnado argued that he is qualified to run for public office because he
complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 9225 which provides that a former
Filipino citizen may run for elective public office if (1) they meet the qualifications for the
elective office they desire, and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships which must be done before the filing of the COC.
Arnado explained that his use of his US passport after April 2009 was because of the fact
that he did not know yet that he had been issued already a Philippine passport; that when
he received said Philippine passport, he used it since then; that at any rate, Arnado, on
November 30, 2009, again executed an Affirmation of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance
before a notary public.
Balua however presented proof that Arnado again used his US passport in January 2010 and
in March 2010.
Eventually, the Commission on Elections disqualified Arnado, who won the 2010 elections,
and declared another rival candidate as the rightful mayor. This was affirmed by the
Supreme Court (G.R. No. 195649).

Later, on October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his COC for mayor for the May 2013 elections.
Another rival candidate (Casan Maquiling) filed a petition to disqualify Arnado based on the
ruling in G.R. No. 195649. While the case was pending, Arnado won the 2013 elections as
he even acquired 84% of the votes cast for mayor in Kauswagan.
Later however, the COMELEC disqualified Arnado from running in the May 2013 Elections
and his declaration as Mayor of Kauswagan was voided. Arnado sued the COMELEC as he
argued that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion. He averred that he was able
to comply with the requirements of RA 9225; and that his disqualification only
disenfranchised 84% of the Kauswagan voters.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments raised by Arnado are tenable.
HELD: No.
1. Firstly, the fact that he obtained a landslide victory does not override the requirements
set by law. The fact that he garnered 84% of the total votes cast in Kauswagan cannot
override

the

constitutional

and

statutory

requirements

for

qualifications

and

disqualifications. Election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election

eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will
become toothless.
2. The COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified Arnado.
Arnado failed to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. Although he did swear allegiance
to the Philippines and renounced his US citizenship prior to filing his COC in November 2009,
such acts were deemed recanted or withdrawn when he again used his US passport.
In fact, Arnado did not controvert the allegations that he used his US passport in January
2010 and March 2010. As such, he remained a US citizen and is therefore disqualified to run
for public office.
What Arnado could have done, for the purposes of running in the 2013 elections, was to
renounce again (for the third time) his US citizenship. But he never did that hence he was
rightfully disqualified in the 2013 elections too.
Note also that assuming that Arnado never used his US passport in January 2010 and March
2010, he is still disqualified.
Arnado averred that his use of his US passport prior to November 2009 was cured when he
again made a second renunciation of his US citizenship on November 30, 2009. However,

the Affidavit of Renunciation he offered in court during trial was a mere photocopy of the
original. Under the Best Evidence Rule (Section 3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court), the
original must be presented unless the same is lost. In this case, the original was never
alleged to have been lost. Further, the said Affidavit was being used belatedly by Arnado. In
fact, it was never formally offered. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court,
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.

CABALLERO VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 209835

FACTS:
The Comelec cancelled Caballeros certificate of candidacy (COC) on May 3, 2013, or 10
days before the 2013 midterm elections.
While he renounced his Canadian citizenship and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines, the Comelec found that he was unable to "re-establish his domicile [of origin] in
Uyugan" a requirement to be eligible to run for elective office.
He still won, however, against Jonathan Nanud and was the first proclaimed mayor on May
14, 2013. He asked the Comelec to reconsider the cancellation of his COC on May 16, 2013,
but, on the next day, his opponent Nanud filed a petition to annul his proclamation.
The Comelec denied Caballeros petition on November 6, 2013, after which he brought the
case to the SC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion is cancelling petitioners
COC.
HELD:
NO.
The court argued that the period from September 13, 2012 when Caballero re-acquired his
Filipino citizenship to May 12, 2013 "was even less than the one-year residency required by
law."
The court also did not agree with Caballero, who claimed that his 9-month actual stay in
Uyugan was substantially compliant with the residency requirement.
He even claimed that the requirement is not strictly based on the period of residence in the
place where he is seeking an elective office, but based on how familiar he is with the needs
of his constituents.
"The Comelec found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that he
was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year immediately
preceding the May 13, 2013 elections," the SC said in its decision.

Lonzanida vs. Comelec

Facts:

Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the
1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC
null and void on the ground of failure of elections.

On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida
vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Juan
Alvez, Lonzanidas opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term.

In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent,
Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already
served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida
was proclaimed winner.

The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.

Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution maintaining that he
was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in
1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit
for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in
the May 1995 elections. He also argued that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over

the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections
as the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court
under Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The private respondent maintained that the petitioners assumption of office in 1995 should
be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for
almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral
elections.

Issues:

1. WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995
to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the threeterm limit for elective local government officials.

2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after
petitioner was proclaimed winner.

Held:

1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is
not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office,

he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and
second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office.

After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by
final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his
previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as
mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently
declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office
on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive
winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida
did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998
because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive
winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with
finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.

The

respondents contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term
from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis
to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e.,
that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional

provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he
was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in
this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity
of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections,
not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution
issued by the COMELEC to that effect.

Such involuntary severance from office is an

interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 19951998 mayoral term.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the
full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted
as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC
finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should
therefore be set aside.

2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the
assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending
before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the
case and to resolve it on the merits.

Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election
to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal
of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved
after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said
candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of
the petition until after he has been proclaimed.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the

candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not
signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a
separate investigation. (Lonzanida vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999)