Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Epilogue
This Court takes this occasion to remind members of
the bench to be precise in their ponencias, most
especially in the dispositions thereof. Accuracy and
clarity in substance and in language are revered
objectives in decision-making.
Having said that, we also lament the trial courts
convoluted attempt at sophistry, which obviously
enabled the petitioner to delay the service of his
imprisonment and to unnecessarily clog the dockets of
this Court and of the Court of Appeals. His Honors
expressed desire to accept with modesty the orders
and decisions of the appellate court was, in truth and
in fact, merely a sarcastic prelude to his veiled
rejection of the superior courts order modifying his
earlier decision. His sophomoric justification of his
refusal to obey for fear of being found to be grossly
ignorant of the law does not deserve one whit of
sympathy from this Court. Lady Justice may be
blindfolded but she is neither blind nor naive. She can
distinguish chicanery from wisdom, fallacious
argument from common sense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above
order. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 9, 1995, respondent Judge issued his
assailed Order of April 11, 1996, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for
Reconsideration dated 9 November 1995 is hereby
denied for lack of merit considering that, based on the
foregoing facts, the proceedings in this case have not
been prolonged unreasonably nor were there
oppressive delays and unjustified postponements in
violation of the Accuseds constitutional right to speedy
trial.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Aggrieved by the foregoing order, petitioner filed
before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
against the presiding judge of Branch 139 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, RCBC and the
People of the Philippines. In a resolution dated
November 21, 1996, respondent appellate court denied
the petition due course and dismissed it for lack of
merit. Petitioners motion to reconsider it was likewise
denied for lack of merit in a resolution dated January 7,
1997.
Before us, petitioner maintains that the appellate court
erred in sustaining the trial court which, in turn, had
gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, when it reconsidered the order which
dismissed the criminal cases against him. Petitioner
asserts that this reversal was a violation of the doctrine
of double jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially
dismissed for an alleged violation of petitioners
constitutional right to a speedy trial.[7]
The issue for resolution is whether, in petitioners cases,
double jeopardy had set in so that petitioners
constitutional right against such jeopardy had been
violated.
Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
xxx
Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid
indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after
arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered,
and (5) when the defendant was convicted or
acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the
accused.[8]
In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a
violation of the right to speedy trial was made upon
motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial
court. It was made at the instance of the accused
before the trial court, and with his express
consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case
resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of
the accused or upon his own motion will not place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits
of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence
and denial of the right to speedy trial.[9] Double
jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been
prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accuseds
right to speedy trial.[10]
Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable
delay in the conduct of the trial so that violation of the
right to speedy trial of the accused, herein petitioner,
resulted. For it must be recalled that in the application
of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be
taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case.[11] Both the trial court and the appellate court
noted that after pre-trial of petitioners case was
terminated on October 21, 1994, continuous trial was
set in the months of December 1994, and January and
February of 1995. The scheduled hearings, however,
were cancelled when the presiding judge was
promoted to the Court of Appeals, and his successor as
trial judge was not immediately appointed, nor another
judge detailed to his sala.
criminal action. Petitioner submits that the nonpayment of filing fees on the amount of the claim for
damages violated the doctrine in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149
SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7
dated March 24, 1988.[19] He avers that
since Manchester held that The Court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fees, the appellate court was without
jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240,
much less award indemnity and damages.
Private respondents argue that
the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant
case. They ask us to note that the criminal case, with
which the civil case was impliedly instituted, was filed
on July 1, 1983, while the Manchester requirements as
to docket and filing fees took effect only with the
promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on March
24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not allege the
amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then
customarily or legally required that the civil damages
sought be stated in the information, the trial court had
no basis in assessing the filing fees and demanding
payment thereof. Moreover, assuming that
the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under
the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the damages
awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there
is no violation of the Manchester doctrine to speak of.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the
implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions
was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules
of Court.[20] As correctly pointed out by private
respondents, under said rule, it was not required that
the damages sought by the offended party be stated in
the complaint or information. With the adoption of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment
of Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July 7,
1988, it is now required that:
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability
against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for
such civil action as provided in these Rules shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an
award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than
actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.
The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time private
respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case
No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature
of a curative statute, the amendment applies
Myka (or Mika) Banzon (or Vanson), but she was not
there. Dela Cruz, with Yael in his tricycle, were about to
go to Banzon's boarding house when appellant
approached them, insisting that Yael take him first to
Magdalena Village. Afraid of appellant, Yael
agreed. When they got there, particularly where
Barte's tricycle turned over earlier, appellant walked
towards a mango tree. Curious, Dela Cruz followed
him. Dela Cruz saw appellant hitting Fuentes on the
head with his gun. She was lying down face up,
groaning. Dela Cruz admonished and pushed appellant
away, telling him to have pity on Fuentes. Since he did
not want to get involved further nor did he want to see
any more of what appellant was up to, Dela Cruz
walked back to the tricycle. He took a last look back
and saw appellant getting something from the pocket
of Fuentes and putting it inside the pocket of
his chaleco. Soon enough, appellant caught up with
Dela Cruz and Yael as they were about to leave and
they all went back to Kingsmen Building.
"Dela Cruz finally found Banzon at the third floor of the
building and informed her that he was going to bring
her home already. She passed by the ladies' room while
he stood watch outside. Appellant arrived and told Dela
Cruz and Banzon that they had to talk inside the ladies'
room. He was giving Dela Cruz and Banzon P600.00
each, but they declined to accept the money. Appellant
threatened Dela Cruz not to squeal whatever he knows
or appellant will kill him and his family. When appellant
insisted in giving the money, Dela Cruz took it only to
place it on the sink, then, he and Banzon left.
"Dela Cruz and Banzon were leaving for her boarding
house aboard Yael's tricycle when appellant caught up
with them again and ordered Yael to first take him to
Ceres terminal. As they passed the Tumbokan Memorial
Hospital, they came across Barte driving his
tricycle. After signaling for Barte to stop, appellant
gave him money. Dela Cruz and Banzon quickly
transferred to Barte's tricycle since Yael still had to take
appellant to the terminal. In the course of the transfer
to the other tricycle, appellant placed something inside
the pocket of Dela Cruz who thought nothing of it as he
was in a hurry to go home.In Banzon's boarding house,
Dela Cruz found out that what appellant had put in his
pocket was a blood-stained necklace wrapped in a
piece of paper. Banzon also showed him a bag she
found at the place where Barte's tricycle turned
turtle. Dela Cruz planned to return the necklace and
the bag the next day.
"In the evening of June 5, 1995, Dela Cruz reported for
work. Appellant asked him for the necklace so that he
could pawn it. Dela Cruz, however, was unable to give
the necklace back because in the morning of June 6,
1995, the police raided the boarding house of
Banzon. Among those confiscated by the police was his
wallet where he placed the necklace. The police invited
Dela Cruz to the police station to shed light on what he
"III.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT CARLOS FELICIANO FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION DESPITE THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM." [7]
The Court is inclined to agree with appellant that state
witness Rodel de la Cruz appears to be far from being
the inculpable young man who has simply been an
unwitting and reluctant accomplice to a gruesome
crime. Several incidents militate against his
innocence. The events, related by him, make tenuous
the purported threat and intimidation exerted by
appellant over him.
The behavior of Rodel de la Cruz during and
immediately after the crime could not be that of a
threatened, frightened man. If he indeed wanted to
escape, he had in his possession his own service gun,
and he was in control of the tricycle. He had enough
advantage and chances to escape, if he really wanted
to, from Feliciano who was at that time engrossed at
restraining a struggling victim. In fact, it was de la Cruz
who was caught in the possession of the dead womans
necklace. Another damning evidence against de la Cruz
was the letter introduced by police inspector Winnie
Jereza, Chief of Intelligence of the Philippine National
Police of Kalibo, Aklan, who, after taking the witness
stand for the prosecution, testified for the defense. The
letter, dated 02 June 1995, came from one Roger R.
Zaradulla, proprietor of the Rheaza Security Agency,
addressed to SPO3 Gregorio F. Ingenerio of the Kalibo
Police Station, to the effect that the detail order of
Rodel de la Cruz to the Kingsmen Disco pub had
expired as of 31 May 1995. According to Zaradulla, de
la Cruz was nowhere to be found and his whereabouts
were unknown. Apprehensive that de la Cruz had gone
on AWOL without first surrendering to the agency the
firearm issued to him, Zaradulla sought the arrest of de
la Cruz by the police.
The evident attempt, nevertheless, of the accused
turned state witness to mitigate his own culpability did
not adversely affect his discharge nor did it render
completely weightless the evidentiary value of his
testimony.
The rules of procedure allowing the discharge of an
accused to instead be a witness for the state [8] is not a
home grown innovation but is one with a long and
interesting history. It has its origins in the common law
of ancient England where faithful performance of such
an agreement with the Crown could entitle a criminal
offender to an equitable right to a recommendation for
executive clemency. The practice, soon recognized
through widespread statutory enactments in other
jurisdictions, finally has found its way to our own
criminal procedure in a short and compact military
General Order No. 58 issued in 1900. Its adoption
SO ORDERED.
[1]
The trial court correctly rejected the appellants selfdefense theory. When an accused invokes self-defense,
he thereby admits authorship of the crime. The burden
of proof is thus shifted on him to prove all the elements
SO ORDERED.[16]
Hence, appellants interposed the instant appeal,
raising the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT DID NOT ACQUIT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT CONVICTED THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS OF MURDER.
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED THE SECOND
DECISION DATED JULY 10, 1998.
THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED
ALL THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.