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Ducat vs Villalon and ducusin

Villalon is the family lawyer of ducats. the original title of ducat sr was handed to villalon.
The handing over has two contradictory versions of reason, first because it is given as part of process
to convey the land because of the good services of villalon as villalon claimed, on the other hand,
allegedly because the latter reasoned that he shall check the measurements of the land subject of title
as alleged by ducat jr.
Ducat sr allegedly because of his want to give the land to villalon executed a deed of sale of the land in
favor of villalon. But because it was discovered that the land is registered in the name of ducat jr,a
deed of sale was forged to make it appear that there was one, ducusin was the notary public there
Ruling: villalon is guilty of gross misconduct for being involved in fraudulent notarization and forgery of

A.M. No. 44 November 29, 1983

EUFROSINA YAP TAN, complainant,
Bar Matter No. 59 November 29, 1983
BENJAMIN CABIGON, complainant,
SBC No. 624 November 29, 1983
At issue in the above-entitled consolidated cases is the petition of respondent Nicolas El.
Sabandal, a successful Bar examinee in 1978, to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be
allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
Complainants have charged respondent with: illegal practice of law for accepting clients and
for his appearances as a lawyer even if he has not yet been admitted to the Bar; dishonesty,
for filling up daily tune records as an Investigator of the Bureau of Lands during those days
that he appeared as counsel; falsification of public documents; gross dishonesty in public
service; and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.Sabandal waived his right to
attend the investigations for reasons of financial constraints and his belief that the evidence
he had already submitted together with his pleadings are sufficient to prove his case.
In support of her charge of deception by appearing as counsel and accepting clients, Eufrosina
Yap Tan, in Bar Matter No. 44, testified on and submitted the following documentary evidence:
(1) photostatic copies of transcripts of stenographic notes of
(a) the hearing in CAR Case No. 347 entitled Eufrosina Y. Tan vs. Spouses Daniel Iman and
Rosa Carreon, et als., before the Court of Agrarian Relationswherein respondent manifested
"Atty. Nicolas Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor" and alleged that Atty.
Senen Angeles, counsel of record, was sick;

(b) the hearings in Civil Case No. 98 entitled Benjamin Cabigon, et al. vs. FlorentinaBuntoran,
et al., for Forcible Enter and Damages, before the Municipal Court of Roxas, Zamboanga del
Norte, on September 23, 1980, wherein one of the appearances recorded was that of "Atty.
Nicolas Sabandal: For the defendants", and where respondent manifested "Your Honor
please, appearing for the defendants in collaboration with Atty., Angeles ", and on
December 16, 1980 when respondent made a manifestation for the defendants ;
(2) xerox copy of a letter dated June 21, 1981 written by respondent to the Station
Commander of Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte, Obdulio Villanueva, which respondent wrote in
part: "we are informed that our office is being used by Mrs. Tan to harass our clients
.: and
(3) copy of the Order of Judge Nicanor M. Ilicito, Jr., in CAR Case No. 326, entitled Sps. Daniel
and RoskIman vs. Eufrosina Yap Tan, stating in part that "plaintiffs, through Atty. Nicolas
Sabandal, informed the Court that plaintiff's counsel on record, Atty. Cyril Ruiz, is
in bed and could not come in today's hearing"
On the same issue, in Bar Matter No. 59, complainant Benjamin Cabigon testified on and
presented the following exhibits:
(1) the appearance of respondent in Forcible Entry case entitled. Cabigon vs. Bonturan before
the Municipal Court of Roxas already mentioned by Eufrosina Tan in Bar Matter No. 44;
(2) a Certification by the Court Clerk, Interpreter 1, of the Municipal Court of Roxas,
Zamboanga del Norte, that respondent had appeared before said Court on October 1, 1981 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607, and 622; on October 16, 1981 and August 12, 1981 in Criminal
Case No. 622; and on July 29, 1981 in Criminal Case No. 667
(3) the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 667 (People vs. FlorentinaBonturan, et
als.) for qualified Theft of Forest Products wherein Felipe Inggo testified that respondent was
the lawyer of the Bonturans, while accused Bernardo Gatina declared that respondent was his
lawyerso also with the accused, Antonio Ganuran, who gave the same declaration and added
that he used to pay respondent and Atty. Angeles for handling his cases
In his defense, respondent maintained that the charges against him were "baseless and mere
products of oppositor'sbedevilled mind, for the truth being that petitioner's admission to the
Philippine Bar is a sharp thorn in the throat of oppositorEufrosina Tan, who had been waging a
campaign of ejectment against her tenant-farmers some of whom are relatives and friends of
petitioners"; and a scheme by Cabigon "to stifle anybody who extends assistance to his
opponents and to press the Subano settlers of Gusa, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, to give up
their ancestral lands to Cabigon.
The evidence supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. While respondent's
infraction may be mitigated in that he appeared for his in-laws in CAR Cases where they were
parties, it is clear from the proceedings in CAR Case No. 347 that he clarified his position only
after the opposing counsel had objected to his appearance. Besides, he specifically
manifested "Atty. Nicolas Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor". He called
himself "Attorney" knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the bar.
Oppositors' evidence sufficiently shows that respondent had held himself out as an
attorney" in the agrarian, civil and criminal cases mentioned by said oppositors.
Respondent cannot shift the blame on the stenographer, for he could have easily asked for
rectification. Even if respondent appeared merely in collaboration with Atty. Senen Angeles in

the several cases, that collaboration could only have been ostensibly as a lawyer. Oppositors
had also presented evidence of proceedings wherein witnesses testified as to respondent's
being their lawyer and their compensating him for his services. It may be that in the Court of
a municipality, even non-lawyers may appear (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court). If
respondent had so manifested, no one could have challenged him. What he did, however, was
to hold himself out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station Commander of Roxas,
complaining of harassment to "our clients", when he could not but have known that he could
not yet engage in the practice of law. His argument that the term "client" is a "dependent or
person under the protection of another and not a person who engages in the profession" is
Respondent's additional defense that the code of professional ethics does not apply to him as
he is not yet a member of the Bar proves him unfit to be admitted to the profession that
exacts the highest ethical conduct of all its members, and good moral character even for
applicants for admission to the Bar. He could at least have shown his fitness for admission by
showing adherence to and observance of the standards of conduct required by all who aspire
to profess the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition of Nicolas El. Sabandal to be allowed to take the oath as member
of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court is hereby denied.
FACTS: The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the
defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of
general circulation, that appeared on the front page of the issue of September 14, 1948. The
story was preceded by the headline in large letters "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS,"
followed by another in slightly smaller letters "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed;
One School Favored," under the name "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." He
stated in said report that students of a private university in Sampaloc had been seen with
copies of the mimeographed questions one week prior to the exams. This came to the
attention of the Supreme Court and an investigation was conducted. However, Parazo
consistently refused to reveal his source of information. The basis of his claim is Section 1, RA
53 which provides that:
SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper,
magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source
of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in
confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or
committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the
Parazo contends that interest of the state as an exemption, pertains the security of the
state only when national security or public safety is involved.
ISSUE: Whether or not Parazo may be compelled by the court to reveal his source within the
purview of the exemption interest of the state.
HELD: Yes, he can be compelled to do so. The phrase "interest of the state" can not be
confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. The phrase
"interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and broader
than "security of the state." Although not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest"
which may include most anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public. The
present case to fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state,"
involving as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and
colleges, and of the entire legal profession of this country as well as the good name and

reputation of the members of the Committee of Bar Examiners, including the employees of
the Supreme Court having charge of and connections with said examinations, but also the
highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the three coordinate and
independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government.
Pangan v. Ramos (1981)
A.M. No. 1053 August 31, 1981
NOTE: This particular case made a reference to the previous Pangan v. Ramos case (1971),
wherein Atty. Ramos used a different name in a different case. The 1979 case is the 8 th case
under Title II, Introduction to Legal Ethics, in our syllabus. Apparently, this 1981 case was the
case that was delayed because of Atty. Ramos act of appearing in another court and using a
different name.
FACTS: Respondent Dionisio Ramos was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1964. He was legally
married to and living with Editha Encarnado the marriage with her having been celebrated on
September 4, 1963. Both complainant and respondent were officemates in the Office of
Councilor Lito Puyat, City Hall, Manila since 1967. With the convenience thus offered,
respondent, representing himself to be "single," began courting complainant, proposed civil
marriage to her to be later followed with a church celebration after which they will live
together as husband and wife. From January 1968 to February 1971, they had carnal
knowledge of each other in various hotels in Manila. Sometime in June 1970, complainant
informed respondent that she was pregnant. Whereupon, both agreed to get a quick
marriage. After the marriage, complainant and respondent agreed to have a church marriage
before they live together as husband and wife, although they continued to have sexual trysts.
Respondent was invited by complainant to meet the latter's mother to whom respondent
expressed his desire to marry complainant, to which proposal complainant's mother agreed,
provided respondent bring his parents with him to ask for complainant's hand. Several weeks
had passed and respondent failed to bring his parents to complainant's home. Complainant
and her mother became suspicious. They made inquiries about the personal status of
respondent and they ultimately discovered that respondent was already married to one Editha
Encarnado. As such, Santa Pangan filed a verified complaint charging respondent Atty.
Dionisio Ramos with gross immorality, the latter having misrepresented himself as still
"single" when he started courting complainant, proposed marriage to her and finally
succeeded in marrying her even with full consciousness that his first marriage to his first wife
was still valid and subsisting.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dionisio Ramos is guilty of grossly immoral conduct / committed a
grossly immoral act.
HELD: YES. His own declarations in his affidavit corroborate this imputation of immorality.
Thus, in his affidavit subscribed before Asst. Fiscal Primitive Pearanda of Manila on Feb. 22,
1967, respondent frankly admitted having carnal relations with complainant for several times.
What is more, respondent claimed that he was threatened and forced by complainant's
brothers to celebrate the marriage dated June 18, 1980, but in the same breath, he admitted
having carnal affairs with complainant after the celebration of the marriage. Worse still,
respondent misrepresented his civil status as "single", courted complainant, proposed
marriage to her knowing his legal impediments to marry complainant, respondent's
motives were clearly and grossly immoral won her confidence and married her while his
first marriage to his present wife still validly subsists.
It is of importance that members of the ancient and learned profession of law must conform
with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics: "The lawyer should aid in guarding the Bar against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and
to improve not only the law but also the administration of justice."

Respondent, however, submits that having been acquitted by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XXI, of the charge of bigamy, the immorality charges filed against him in this
disbarment case should be dismissed. The acquittal of respondent Ramos upon the criminal
charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law.
A.M. No. 944 July 25, 1974
FLORA NARIDO, complainant, vs.ATTORNEY JAIME S. LINSANGAN, respondent.
Facts: Jaime S. Linsangan and Rufino B. Risma, who represented adverse parties in a workmen's
compensation case, did mutually hurl accusation at each other. The charge against respondent
Linsangan filed by a certain Flora Narido is that he violated the attorney's oath by submitting a perjured
statement. When required to answer, not only did he deny the complaint but he would also hold
respondent Risma accountable for having instigated his client, the complainant, Flora Narido, to file a
false and malicious complaint resulting in what respondent Linsangan called "embarrassment,
humiliation and defamation" of a brother in a profession.
On September 9, 1971, this Court referred the above administrative cases to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Insofar as the first case against respondent Jaime S.
Linsangan is concerned, It was found as a fact that there was nothing improper in presenting such
affidavit, its alleged falsity not being proven. Even if it were otherwise, still there was no showing of
respondent having violated his attorney's oath for submitting a perjured affidavit.
It was the recommendation that on such charges, both respondents should be exculpated..
Issue: Whether or not the two administrative complaints have merit?
Held: NO, the complaint in Administrative Case No. 944 against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is
dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent Rufino B. Risma in Administrative Case No. 1025 is exculpated
from the charge of having instigated the filing of an unfounded suit. He is, however, admonished to
exercise greater care in ascertaining how much under our law he could recover by way of attorney's
fees. The contract entered into between him and his client as to his being entitled to fifteen per cent of
the award granted her in a workmen's compensation suit is declared to be of no force and effect, the
penalty imposed being that of admonition merely only because he had made no effort to collect on the
same and had even advanced expenses for a poor client.

8. Laput vs. Remotigue (1962)

Laput used to be the counsel for Nieves Barrera until the latter discharged her because she
lost trust and confidence in him due to dubious transactions that Laput handled while
representing her in a testate proceeding. One of the lawyers retained by Barrera to replace
Laput was Remotigue. In September 1957, Remotigue, without notice to Laput, asked the
court to direct Laput to turn over certain documents and titles to Barrera so that the latter
may properly disposed some estate properties. The court granted the same. But Laput
stubbornly kept the said documents as he claimed that said estate properties are subject to
his lien and that he needs to be paid first.
Whether or not Laput has the right to keep said documents.
No. It turns out that Laputs attorneys fees were already significantly paid while he was still
the counsel for Barrera (as backed by evidence presented by Remotigue) hence he no longer
has a lien to the properties of the estate. Therefore, he cannot retain the certificates of title in
question. On another note, he cannot now charge Remotigue with malice and bad faith when

the latter filed without notice of Laput motions to direct Laput to surrender said certificates
because as records proved, even though no notice was sent to him, he had regularly checked
on the record of this case hence he would have come across the same.
Facts: Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and
Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine
V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from
the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on
separate occasions, without his knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with
four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of
claims they might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal
and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents
was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law.In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his corespondents had taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various ReAdmission Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices.
Issue:whether or not the respondent is guilty of violation under the canon9
Held:Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the students were
represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their
parents without at the very least communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who
was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by design or
because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter
disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a
lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically Canon
9 thereof, viz:
"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented
by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should
only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that
may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as
to law."
Facts: The suit filed by the plaintiff, W. W. Robinson, is for the collection of various sums owed by the
defendant, Marcelino Villafuerte, the payment of which is secured by a mortgage on the real properties
set out in the two notarial documents evidencing the debt inscribed in the property registry of the
Province of Tayabas. Notwithstanding the demands made upon Villafuerte, he did not comply with his
obligations. In his answer, the defendant debtor denied the existence of the obligations contained in
the said instruments and asserted that the powers of attorney executed in favor of Vicente Marcelo
Concepcion were false. Jose Moreno Lacalle, law clerk and employee of the plaintiff's attorneys in this
suit, was permitted to address questions to some of the witnesses during the hearing of the case,
notwithstanding the presence of Attorney Agustin Alvarez.
Issue: Whether or not the intervention of Lacalle was proper.

Held: The Court ruled that it is unquestionable that the intervention of the said law clerk and employee
of plaintiff's attorneys in this suit, was improperly admitted; it was not authorized by law, for the reason
that the said Lacalle did not have the capacity and qualifications of a lawyer admitted under oath to
practice his profession before the courts of these Islands, even if Attorney Agustin Alvares, plaintiff's
representative, was present. A lawyer may not delegate to any layman any work which involves a study
of the law or its application, such as the examination of witnesses or the presentation of evidence.
Notwithstanding this, the acts performed in the course of some of the proceedings under the direction
of Jose Moreno Lacalle are not subject to annulment, as no positive detriment was caused to the
defendant, although such intervention is in no manner permitted by the law of procedure.

Tan Tek Beng vs Atty. Timoteo David

126 SCRA 389 Legal Ethics Malpractice Solicitation of Cases
In 1970, Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng, a non-lawyer, entered into an agreement whereby Tan
Tek Beng will supply clients to Atty. David and in exchange thereof, Atty. David shall give Tan
Tek Beng 50% of the attorneys fees collected as the latters commission. Atty. David also
agreed not to deal with clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng directly without the latters consent.
The agreement went sour due to allegations of double-cross from both sides. Tan Tek Beng
denounced Atty. David before the Supreme Court but did not seek the enforcement of their
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. David is guilty of Malpractice.
Yes. The agreement between Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng is void because it was
tantamount to malpractice which is the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer.
Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term malpractice.
That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional.
On the agreement to divide the attorneys fees, the Supreme Court noted: No division
of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of
service or responsibility.
On the agreement that Atty. David shall not deal with clients supplied by Beng directly:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law agency,
personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyers responsibilities
and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of
his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyers relation to his client should be
personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. . . .

Director of Religious Affairs vs Estanislao Bayot

74 Phil 579 Legal Ethics Malpractice
In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage
licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes marriage
arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor; and that everything is
confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot for
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the same
and asked for the courts mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.
Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.

Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. The advertisement he caused to be published is a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. . It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again
emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayots plea for
leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of the ad, the
Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.
Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of
Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those
allowed by law. The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res.
& Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought
in his petition as herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements
at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of
"legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the
case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised
by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the
subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute
practice of law. The definition of practice of law is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs.
Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description
of the services it has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to
the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and nondiagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign
laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client,
and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it
will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on
the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That
activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent
clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to
court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or
skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the
best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good
and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and
to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

A.M. No. L-363 July 31, 1962


Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on
October 5, 1945. He was convicted of the murder of FilemonSamaco, former municipal mayor
of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty ofdeath. Upon
review by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956, butthe penalty
was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was
granted aconditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958.
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case,
filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll
of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127,section 5.
Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant
regardingpardon in defense.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office
as attorney by theSupreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral
turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such acrime. The term "moral turpitude" includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or goodmorals.
Whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places himbeyond the scope of
the rule on disbarment.
Respondent Gutierrez must be judgedupon the fact of his conviction for murder without
regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime wasqualified by treachery and
aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his officialposition
(respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs.
Diosdadoposition (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor
The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental andmoral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of
Court not only prescribe a test of academicpreparation but require satisfactory testimonials of
good moral character. These standards are neither dispensedwith nor lowered after
admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension
WHEREFORE, Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of