G.R. No.

136921

April 17, 2001

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner

vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27
May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in
1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a
whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young
couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and
respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel
barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple
established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own
house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the
couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together - when
respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem,
17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly
showed signs of "psychological incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His
"true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became
apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with
friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning.
When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would
beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun
and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children
themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode
to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his
violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she
returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did
not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted
petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was
battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the
Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and
abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case

was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of
imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed
with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued
respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the
custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite .
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on
25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an
answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court
ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties.
Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect
that she found no evidence to establish that there was collusion between the
parties. 1wphi1.nt
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an
answer, and the same, although filed late, was admitted by the court. In his
answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the
birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the
complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied,
however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court
rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part
of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending
that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to
declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate
court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the
appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article
68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the
marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital
responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the
root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and
has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and
incurable in nature.

"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity." 1
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of
Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court
of Appeals,2 promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 3 promulgated on 13 February 1997,
should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina
ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be
taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner
argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its
dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its
assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown to
prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined
inSantos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of
a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court,
in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological incapacity'
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family
Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic
Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases').
Article 36 of the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter

insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated."
The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - "legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law. 3 The interpretation or construction
placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the
law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of
that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied
on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith 5 under
the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely
novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of
the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is
in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina,
that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts
and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on
psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint
and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part
of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to
warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution
and the foundation of the family6that the State cherishes and protects. While the
Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with
respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily
be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up,
neither should we.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001
FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. She alleged that he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. He was a

habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize his drinking,
her husband would hurt her. There was even a time when she was chased by a
loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of their children. The
children also suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their children left the
home. Two months later, they returned upon the promise of respondent to
change. But he didnt. She was battered again. Her husband was imprisoned for
11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA
reversed RTCs ruling. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of Republic vs
CA & Molina should be taken in consideration in deciding in this case.
HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case
would fall under the category of psychological incapacity to declare a marriage
null and void. This decision has force and effect of a law. These guidelines are
mandatory in nature. Petition denied.

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law.

G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S.
TATAD, petitioners,
vs.
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B.
FERNAN, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters
falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Constitutional respect and
a becoming regard for she sovereign acts, of a coequal branch prevents this
Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. Where no provision of
the Constitution or the laws or even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to
have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot
be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain
steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
The Case
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad
instituted an original petition forquo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of
Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of
the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the
respondents and the solicitor general "to file COMMENT thereon within a nonextendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice." On August 25, 1998, both
respondents and the solicitor general submitted their respective Comments. In
compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners
filed their Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this
Court gave due course to the petition and deemed the controversy submitted for
decision, without need of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent
jurisdiction 1 to hear and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts
impels a filing of such petitions in the lower tribunals. 2 However, for special and
important reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the
present case, this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine. 3 In fact, original
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of

legislative officers like the Senate President 4 and the Speaker of the
House 5 have been recognized as exceptions to this rule.
The Facts
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding
officer, convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh
Congress. At the time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition of the Senate
was as follows: 6
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United
Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCDUMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members Independent

23 total number of senators 7 (The last six members are all

classified by petitioners as "independent".)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F.
Ople to the position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen.
Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam
Defenser Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, 8 Senator Fernan was declared the duly
elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and
Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the
position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator
Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan
M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party
numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The
following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators
Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the
Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of
a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, 9 stating that they had
elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the
Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject
petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for
resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
The Court's Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings 10 and a careful deliberation on the
arguments, pro and con, the Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity
or grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of and the assumption into
office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.
First Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in arguing that this Court has
jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They
submit that the definitions of "majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation

of the Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof, stating that

"[t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members."
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in
common that the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal
matter pertaining exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over which the
Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the
fundamental law does not provide for the office of a minority leader in the
Senate. The legislature alone has the full discretion to provide for such office
and, in that event, to determine the procedure of selecting its occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no
question involving an interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or
even the Rules of the Senate; neither are there "peculiar circumstances"
impelling the Court to assume jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor general
adds that there is not even any legislative practice to support the petitioners'
theory that a senator who votes for the winning Senate President is precluded
from becoming the minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated
on the various important cases involving this very important and basic question,
which it has ruled upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Court's
power of judicial review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or
application of a provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of
either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over
questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in
nature, whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies." 12
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of
who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political
controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion
for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in
the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the
resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision
on the presence of a quorum to hold a session 13 and therein elect a Senate
President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with the majority
that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present . . . so as to establish
in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well." 14

Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:

Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the
upper chamber of Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the
House of Representatives. It has already involved the President of
the Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national crisis,
and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from any
quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the
people for an effective settlement are pinned. 15
. . . This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can
settle or decide if this Court should refuse to decide them. 16
. . . The constitutional question of quorum should not be left
unanswered. 17
In Taada v. Cueno, 18 this Court endeavored to define political question. And we
said that "it refers to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government.' It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
[the] legality, of a particular measure." 19
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of
these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but
was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. 20 Thus, the Court held that
not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the
issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia, 21 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
wrote that the Court "had authority to and should inquire into the existence of
the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege
of the writ [of habeas corpus]." This ruling was made in spite of the previous
pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker 22 andMontenegro v. Castaeda 23 that "the
authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege . . .) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive'
upon the courts and upon all other persons." But the Chief Justice cautioned: "the
function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to
ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom
of his act."
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive
Secretary: 24

The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of
similar character are justiciable, not political, is plain and simple.
One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called
political questions is the principle of separation of powers
characteristic of the presidential system of government the
functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their
nature, into three (3) categories, namely, 1) those involving the
making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department;
2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and
of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which
belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing with the
settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights,
duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable,
which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere
but only within such sphere each department is supreme and
independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only
to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of
the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the
advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or
decisions made by the other departments provided that such
acts, measures or decisions are within the area allocated thereto by
the Constitution.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or
subject to limitations, the issue of whether or not the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations
respected is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem
being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom.
Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations
particularly those prescribed by the Constitution would be set at
naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the
settlement thereof are the main functions of the courts of justice
under the presidential form of government adopted in our 1935
Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its
basic predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority
nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under
the ineluctable obligation made particularly more exacting and
peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the
land, to support and defend the Constitution to settle it. This
explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it
was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power," to
determine whether another branch of the government has
"kept within constitutional limits."
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the
scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the

courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the

political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 25
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements
of the Court. Daza v. Singson,26 Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr. 27 and Guingona Jr. v.
Gonzales 28 similarly resolved issues assailing the acts of the leaders of both
houses of Congress in apportioning among political parties the seats to which
each chamber was entitled in the Commission on Appointments. The Court held
that the issue was justiciable, "even if the question were political in nature,"
since it involved "the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the
Commission on Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the
Constitution."
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v. Angara, 29 wherein the
petitioners sought to nullify the Senate's concurrence in the ratification of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: "Where an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute." The Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over
petitions questioning, an act of the political departments of government, it will
not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it down
only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave
abuse of discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 30 (HRET), the
Court refused to reverse a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that
said tribunal had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority had been conferred upon the
electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and of the Senate as sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, the returns, and the qualifications
of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive. 31 The
Court may inquire into a decision or resolution of said tribunals only if such
"decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion" 32
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia, 33 was asked to reexamine the
enrolled bill doctrine and to look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives that the bill, which was later enacted as Republic Act
8240, was properly approved by the legislative body. Petitioners claimed that
certain procedural rules of the House had been breached in the passage of the

bill. They averred further that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House
rules was a violation of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of
concerned the internal procedures of the House, with which the Court had no
concern. It enucleated: 34
It would-be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as
void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own
rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena
to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of
its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of discretion
were it to do so. . . . In the absence of anything to the contrary, the
Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and
deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
In the instant controversy, the petitioners one of whom is Senator Santiago, a
well-known constitutionalist try to hew closely to these jurisprudential
parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the constitution, has not
been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke
the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on
the part of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of
the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is
entitled to the relief asserted. 35 In light of the aforesaid allegations of
petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well
within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused
their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue:
Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial
question: In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did
the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the
Constitution or the laws?

Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the
constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President "by
majority vote of all members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine the
concepts of "majority" and "minority," as well as who may elect a minority
leader. They argue that "majority" in the aforequoted constitutional provision
refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President
and (2) accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the
losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority, to
whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners
assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he
voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of
the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not
belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted committee
chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no
clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even
from practices of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When
referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the
number greater than half or more than half of any total." 36 The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the
Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators.
Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority,"
much less the "minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that the
framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these
terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must
be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso
facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader.
Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically
become the minority leader.
The Comment 37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents,
which were not contested in petitioners' Reply. During the eighth Congress, which
was the first to convene after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
nomination of Sen. Jovito R Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a
member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. 38 During the ninth regular
session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a
consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to all senators,
including those belonging to the minority. 39This practice continued during the
tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was allowed to chair a
committee. 40History would also show that the "majority" in either house of
Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of

lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to a party with a

lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority
may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of
votes," 41 not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as
plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number
of votes or adherents than the majority." 42Between two unequal parts or
numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be
the majority while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more
than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled
to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multiparty system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners
themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be
indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the
general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members
either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or
statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the
independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority
leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President
and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the
other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that
"[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To
our mind, themethod of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to
determine the rules of its proceedings." 44 Pursuant thereto, the Senate
formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal affairs. 45Pertinent to
the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
Sec 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a
President, a President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-atArms.
These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the
discharge of their duties.
Rule II

ELECTION OF OFFICER
Sec. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority
vote of all its Members. Should there be more than one candidate
for the same office, a nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the
elections shall be by viva voce or by resolution.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such
offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders
thereof, At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually
extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of
the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic
concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs
of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to
do its work. 46 Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court
is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown
to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may
intervene.47
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the
imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they
"are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them." 48 Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no
concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body 49 at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to
provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own
jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this
prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into
that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is
bound to protect and uphold the very duty that justifies the Court's being.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate.
To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain
steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to
judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the
practice of the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been lodged in the

legislative department, this Court may still inquire whether an act of Congress or
its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion. 50 This is the plain
implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers
upon the judiciary the power and the duty not only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but likewise "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part: 51
. . . the powers of government are generally considered divided into
three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary.
Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy[, the] power to determine
whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or
so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of
this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the
actions, first, of Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue:
Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of
power 52 by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law
thereto. 53 A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine
the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment. 54 The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public
prosecutor 55 or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. 56 The action shall be brought

against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding
of exercising such office. 57
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must
show that he or she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise
the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the
respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in
determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid
down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power
has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that
illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption and exercise
of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave
abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as
minority leader.
Fourth Issue:
Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government" is restricted only by the definition and confines of the term "grave
abuse of discretion."
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. 59
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse
his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties
in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members
of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after
at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally
allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be
accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and

despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the

Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to
have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot
be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions

MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part;

I concur in the judgment of the Court, but I disagree that "[it] has jurisdiction
over the petition [in this case] to determine whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives." 1
The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The question who constitute the
minority in the Senate entitled to elect the minority leader of that chamber is
political. It respects the internal affairs of a coequal department of the
government and is thus addressed solely to that august body.
Courts have no power to inquire into the internal organization and business of a
house of Congress except as the question affects the rights of third parties or a
specific constitutional limitation is involved.
For this reason this Court has declined to take cognizance of cases involving the
discipline of members 2 of the legislature and the application and interpretation
of the rules of procedure of a house. 3 For indeed, these matters pertain to the
internal government of Congress and are within its exclusive jurisdiction.
Dean Sinco has pointed out that the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate are not state officers. They do not attain these
positions by popular vote but only by the vote of their respective chambers. They
receive their mandate as such not from the voters but from their peers in the
house. While their offices are a constitutional creation, nevertheless they are
only legislative officers. It is their position as members of Congress which gives
them the status of state officers. As presiding officers of their respective
chambers, their election as well as removal is determined by the vote of the
majority of the members of the house to which they belong. 4 Thus, Art VI, 16(1)
of the Constitution provides:

The Senate shall elect its President and the of Representatives its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
This is likewise true of the "other officers" of each house whose election
and removal rest solely within the prerogative of the members and is no
concern of the courts.
Indeed, in those cases in which this Court took cognizance of matters pertaining
to the internal government of each house, infringements of specific constitutional
limitations were alleged.
In Avelino v. Cuenco, 5 the question was whether with only 12 senators present
there was a quorum for the election of the Senate President, considering that, of
the 24 members, one was in the hospital while another one was abroad. The
case called for an interpretation of Art. VI, 10(2) of the 1935 Constitution which
provided that "A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business. . . ." While initially declining to assume jurisdiction, this Court finally
took cognizance of the matter. As Justice Perfecto, whose separate opinion in
support of the assumption of jurisdiction was one of the reasons which
persuaded the Court to intervene in the Senate imbroglio, stated, "Whether there
was a quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators . . . is a question that
calls for the interpretation, application and enforcement of an express and
specific provision of the Constitution." 6 In his view, "The word quorum is a
mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact mathematical meaning.
A majority means more than one-half (1/2)." 7
In Taada v. Cuenco, 8 the question was whether the majority could fill the seats
intended for the minority party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal when there are
not enough minority members in the Senate. Again, the question was governed
by a specific provision (Art. VI, 11) of the 1935 charter which provided that the
Electoral Tribunals of each house should be composed of "nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court . . . I and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen by each House, three upon the nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second
largest number of votes therein." There was, therefore, a specific constitutional
provision to be applied.
The cases 9 concerning the composition of the Commission on Appointments
likewise involved the mere application of a constitutional provision, specifically
Art. VI, 18 of the present Constitution which provides that the Commission shall
be composed of "twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered

under the party-list system represented therein." Undoubtedly, the Court had
jurisdiction over the cases.
On the other hand, as long as the proportional representation of political parties
and organizations is observed the Court has held itself to be without jurisdiction
over the choice of nominees. In Cabili v. Francisco, 10 it declined to take
cognizance of a quo warranto suit seeking to annul the recomposition of the
Senate representation in the Commission and to reinstate a particular senator
after satisfying itself that such recomposition of the Senate representation was
not a "departure from the constitution mandate requiring proportional
representation of the political organizations in the Commission on
Appointments."
It is true that in Cunanan v. Tan 11 this Court took cognizance of the case which
involved the reorganization of the Commission as a result of the realignment of
political forces in the House of Representatives and the formation of a temporary
alliance. But the Court's decision was justified because the case actually involved
the right of a third party whose nomination by the President had been rejected
by the reorganized Commission. As held in Pacete v. The Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments. 12 where the construction to be given to a rule
affects persons other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is judicial in character.
In contrast to the specific constitutional limitations involved in the foregoing
cases, beyond providing that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall
elect a President and Speaker, respectively, and such other officers as each
house shall determine "by a majority vote of all [their] respective Members," the
Constitution leaves everything else to each house of Congress. Such matters are
political and are left solely to the judgment of the legislative department of the
government.
This case involves neither an infringement of specific constitutional limitations
nor a violation of the rights of a party not a member of Congress. This Court has
jurisdiction over this case only in the sense that determining whether the
question involved is reserved to Congress is itself an exercise of jurisdiction in
the same way that a court which dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction must in
a narrow sense have jurisdiction since it cannot dismiss the case if it were
otherwise. The determination of whether the question involved is justiciable or
not is in itself a process of constitutional interpretation. This is the great lesson
of Marbury v. Madison 13 in which the U.S. Supreme Court, while affirming its
power of review, in the end held itself to be without jurisdiction because the
Judiciary Act of 1789 granting it jurisdiction over that case was unconstitutional.
In other words, a court doing a Marbury v. Madison has no jurisdiction except to
declare itself without jurisdiction over the case.
I vote to dismiss the petition in this case for lack of jurisdiction.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion;

"Loyalty to petrified opinion never yet broke a chain or freed a human soul."
These words vividly inscribed just beneath Mark Twain's bust at the Hall of Fame
veritably speaks about the creativity and dynamism which ought to characterize
our perspective of things. It instructs us to broaden our horizon that we may not
be held captive by ignorance. Free and robust thinking is the imperative.
But there are times when one has to render fealty to certain fundamental
precepts and I believe that this occasion presents an opportunity to do so. Thus,
as I join the majority and cast my vote today for the denial of the instant petition,
may I just be allowed to reiterate jurisprudential postulates which I have long
embraced, not for the sake of "loyalty to petrified opinion" but to stress
consistency in doctrine in the hope that all future disputes of this nature may be
similarly resolved in this manner.
This is not actually the first time that the Court has been invited to resolve a
matter originating from the internal processes undertaken by a co-equal branch
of government, more particularly the Senate in this case. Earlier, in the landmark
case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al., 1 we were confronted, among
other things, by the issue of whether a significant tax measure namely, Republic
Act. No. 7716 (Expanded Value-Added Tax Law), went through the legislative mill
in keeping with the constitutionally-mandated procedure for the passage of bills.
Speaking through Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the majority upheld the tax
measure's validity, relying on the enrolled bill theory and the view that the Court
is not the appropriate forum to enforce internal legislative rules supposedly
violated when the bill was being passed by Congress. I took a different view,
however, from the majority because of what I felt was a sweeping reliance on
said doctrines without giving due regard to the peculiar facts of the case. I
underscored that these principles may not be applied where the internal
legislative rules would breach the Constitution which this Court has a solemn
duty to uphold. It was my position then that the introduction of several provisions
in the Bicameral Committee Report violated the constitutional proscription
against any amendment to a bill upon the last reading thereof and which this
Court, in the exercise of its judicial power, can properly inquire into without
running afoul of the principle of separation of powers.
Last year, 2 Arroyo, et al. v. de Venecia, et al. 3 presented an opportunity for me
to clarify my position further. In that case, Congressman Joker Arroyo filed a
petition before the Court complaining that during a session by the House of
Representatives, he was effectively prevented from raising the question of
quorum which to him tainted the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, or the socalled "sin taxes" law. The Court, speaking again through Justice Mendoza,
dismissed Mr. Arroyo's petition, arguing in the main that courts are denied the

power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress

failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a
violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
Concurring with the majority opinion, I discerned a need to explain my position
then because of possible misinterpretation. I was very emphatic that I did not
abandon my position in Tolentino, the facts as presented in Arroyo being
radically different from the former. In keeping with my view that judicial review is
permissible only to uphold the Constitution, I pointed out that the legislative
rules allegedly violated were purely internal and had no direct or reasonable
nexus to the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of
a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention.
In the instant case, at the risk of being repetitious, I again take a similar stand as
the ones I made in the two cited cases.
Although this case involves the question of who is the rightful occupant of a
Senate "office" and does not deal with the passage of a bill or the observance of
internal rules for the Senate's conduct of its business, the same ground as I
previously invoked may justify the Court's refusal to pry into the procedures of
the Senate. There is to me no constitutional breach which has been made
and, ergo, there is nothing for this Court to uphold. The interpretation placed by
petitioners on Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution clearly does not
find support in the text thereof. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is
expressed puts an end to that which is implied. The majority vote required for
the election of a Senate President and a Speaker of the House of
Representatives speaks only of such number or quantity of votes for an aspirant
to be lawfully elected as such. There is here no declaration that by so electing,
each of the two Houses of Congress is thereby divided into camps called the
"majority" and the "minority." In fact, the "offices" of Majority Floor Leader and
Minority Floor Leader are not explicitly provided for as constitutional offices. As
pointed out by my esteemed colleague, Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who
penned the herein majority opinion, even on the theory that under paragraph 2,
Section 16 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution, each House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary, still "the method of choosing who will
be such officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision." With the prerogative
being, therefore, bestowed upon the Senate, whatever differences the parties
may have against each other must be settled in their own turf and the Court,
conscious as it is of its constitutionally-delineated powers, will not take a perilous
move to overstep the same.

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

The 1987 Constitution, like the counterpart 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, has
continued to be implicit in its recognition of the time-honored precept of

separation of powers which enjoins upon each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative,
the Executive and the Judiciary proper acknowledgment and respect for each
other. The Supreme Court, said to be holding neither the "purse" (held by
Congress) nor the "sword" (held by the Executive) but serving as the balance
wheel in the State governance, functions both as the tribunal of last resort and
as the Constitutional Court of the nation. 1Peculiar, however, to the present
Constitution, specifically under Article VII, Section 1, thereof, is the extended
jurisdiction of judicial power that now explicitly allows the determination of
"whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." 2 This expanded concept of judicial power seems to have been
dictated by the martial law experience and to be an immediate reaction to the
abuse in the frequent recourse to the political question doctrine that in no small
measure has emasculated the Court. The term "political question," in this
context, refers to matters which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, should not be thought of as having been
tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. I
find it here opportune to reiterate what I have stated inTolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance, 3 viz:
I cannot yet concede to the novel theory, so challengingly
provocative as it might be, that under the 1987 Constitution the
Court may now at good liberty intrude, in the guise of the people's
imprimatur, into every affair of government. What significance can
still then remain, I ask, of the time honored and widely acclaimed
principle of separation of powers if, at every turn, the Court allows
itself to pass upon at will the disposition of a co-equal, independent
and coordinate branch in our system of government. I dread to think
of the so varied uncertainties that such an undue interference can
lead to. The respect for long standing doctrines in our jurisprudence,
nourished through time, is one of maturity, not timidity, of stability
rather than quiescence.
Pervasive and limitless, such as it, may seem to be, judicial power still
succumbs to the paramount doctrine of separation of powers. Congress is
the branch of government, composed of the representatives of the people,
that lays down the policies of government and provides the direction that
the nation must take. The Executive carries out that mandate. Certainly,
the Court will not negate that which is done by these, co-equal and coordinate branches merely because of a perceived case of grave abuse of
discretion on their part, clearly too relative a phrase to be its own sentinel
against misuse, even as it will not hesitate to wield the power if that abuse
becomes all too clear. The exercise of judicial statesmanship, not judicial

tyranny, is what has been envisioned by and institutionalized in the 1987

Constitution.
There is no harnbook rule by which grave abuse of discretion may be
determined. The provision was evidently couched in general terms to make it
malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any contemporary or emerging
millieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, amounting, to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or at
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner such as by reason of
passion or personal hostility. When the question, however, pertains to an affair
internal to either of Congress or the Executive, I would subscribe to the dictum,
somewhat made implicit in my understanding of Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 4 that
unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres
the Court will not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other
two branches of government. Verily, in this situation, it is an impairment or a
clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt
the steel door for judicial intervention.
In the instant settings, I find insufficient indication to have the case hew to the
above rule.
Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part;
I concur in the judgment of the Court, but I disagree that "[it] has jurisdiction
over the petition [in this case] to determine whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives." 1
The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The question who constitute the
minority in the Senate entitled to elect the minority leader of that chamber is
political. It respects the internal affairs of a coequal department of the
government and is thus addressed solely to that august body.
Courts have no power to inquire into the internal organization and business of a
house of Congress except as the question affects the rights of third parties or a
specific constitutional limitation is involved.
For this reason this Court has declined to take cognizance of cases involving the
discipline of members 2 of the legislature and the application and interpretation
of the rules of procedure of a house. 3 For indeed, these matters pertain to the
internal government of Congress and are within its exclusive jurisdiction.
Dean Sinco has pointed out that the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate are not state officers. They do not attain these

positions by popular vote but only by the vote of their respective chambers. They
receive their mandate as such not from the voters but from their peers in the
house. While their offices are a constitutional creation, nevertheless they are
only legislative officers. It is their position as members of Congress which gives
them the status of state officers. As presiding officers of their respective
chambers, their election as well as removal is determined by the vote of the
majority of the members of the house to which they belong. 4 Thus, Art VI, 16(1)
of the Constitution provides:
The Senate shall elect its President and the of Representatives its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
This is likewise true of the "other officers" of each house whose election
and removal rest solely within the prerogative of the members and is no
concern of the courts.
Indeed, in those cases in which this Court took cognizance of matters pertaining
to the internal government of each house, infringements of specific constitutional
limitations were alleged.
In Avelino v. Cuenco, 5 the question was whether with only 12 senators present
there was a quorum for the election of the Senate President, considering that, of
the 24 members, one was in the hospital while another one was abroad. The
case called for an interpretation of Art. VI, 10(2) of the 1935 Constitution which
provided that "A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business. . . ." While initially declining to assume jurisdiction, this Court finally
took cognizance of the matter. As Justice Perfecto, whose separate opinion in
support of the assumption of jurisdiction was one of the reasons which
persuaded the Court to intervene in the Senate imbroglio, stated, "Whether there
was a quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators . . . is a question that
calls for the interpretation, application and enforcement of an express and
specific provision of the Constitution." 6 In his view, "The word quorum is a
mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact mathematical meaning.
A majority means more than one-half (1/2)." 7
In Taada v. Cuenco, 8 the question was whether the majority could fill the seats
intended for the minority party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal when there are
not enough minority members in the Senate. Again, the question was governed
by a specific provision (Art. VI, 11) of the 1935 charter which provided that the
Electoral Tribunals of each house should be composed of "nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court . . . I and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen by each House, three upon the nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second

largest number of votes therein." There was, therefore, a specific constitutional

provision to be applied.
The cases 9 concerning the composition of the Commission on Appointments
likewise involved the mere application of a constitutional provision, specifically
Art. VI, 18 of the present Constitution which provides that the Commission shall
be composed of "twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein." Undoubtedly, the Court had
jurisdiction over the cases.
On the other hand, as long as the proportional representation of political parties
and organizations is observed the Court has held itself to be without jurisdiction
over the choice of nominees. In Cabili v. Francisco, 10 it declined to take
cognizance of a quo warranto suit seeking to annul the recomposition of the
Senate representation in the Commission and to reinstate a particular senator
after satisfying itself that such recomposition of the Senate representation was
not a "departure from the constitution mandate requiring proportional
representation of the political organizations in the Commission on
Appointments."
It is true that in Cunanan v. Tan 11 this Court took cognizance of the case which
involved the reorganization of the Commission as a result of the realignment of
political forces in the House of Representatives and the formation of a temporary
alliance. But the Court's decision was justified because the case actually involved
the right of a third party whose nomination by the President had been rejected
by the reorganized Commission. As held in Pacete v. The Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments. 12 where the construction to be given to a rule
affects persons other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is judicial in character.
In contrast to the specific constitutional limitations involved in the foregoing
cases, beyond providing that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall
elect a President and Speaker, respectively, and such other officers as each
house shall determine "by a majority vote of all [their] respective Members," the
Constitution leaves everything else to each house of Congress. Such matters are
political and are left solely to the judgment of the legislative department of the
government.
This case involves neither an infringement of specific constitutional limitations
nor a violation of the rights of a party not a member of Congress. This Court has
jurisdiction over this case only in the sense that determining whether the
question involved is reserved to Congress is itself an exercise of jurisdiction in
the same way that a court which dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction must in
a narrow sense have jurisdiction since it cannot dismiss the case if it were
otherwise. The determination of whether the question involved is justiciable or

not is in itself a process of constitutional interpretation. This is the great lesson

of Marbury v. Madison 13 in which the U.S. Supreme Court, while affirming its
power of review, in the end held itself to be without jurisdiction because the
Judiciary Act of 1789 granting it jurisdiction over that case was unconstitutional.
In other words, a court doing a Marbury v. Madison has no jurisdiction except to
declare itself without jurisdiction over the case.
I vote to dismiss the petition in this case for lack of jurisdiction.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion;

"Loyalty to petrified opinion never yet broke a chain or freed a human soul."
These words vividly inscribed just beneath Mark Twain's bust at the Hall of Fame
veritably speaks about the creativity and dynamism which ought to characterize
our perspective of things. It instructs us to broaden our horizon that we may not
be held captive by ignorance. Free and robust thinking is the imperative.
But there are times when one has to render fealty to certain fundamental
precepts and I believe that this occasion presents an opportunity to do so. Thus,
as I join the majority and cast my vote today for the denial of the instant petition,
may I just be allowed to reiterate jurisprudential postulates which I have long
embraced, not for the sake of "loyalty to petrified opinion" but to stress
consistency in doctrine in the hope that all future disputes of this nature may be
similarly resolved in this manner.
This is not actually the first time that the Court has been invited to resolve a
matter originating from the internal processes undertaken by a co-equal branch
of government, more particularly the Senate in this case. Earlier, in the landmark
case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al., 1 we were confronted, among
other things, by the issue of whether a significant tax measure namely, Republic
Act. No. 7716 (Expanded Value-Added Tax Law), went through the legislative mill
in keeping with the constitutionally-mandated procedure for the passage of bills.
Speaking through Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the majority upheld the tax
measure's validity, relying on the enrolled bill theory and the view that the Court
is not the appropriate forum to enforce internal legislative rules supposedly
violated when the bill was being passed by Congress. I took a different view,
however, from the majority because of what I felt was a sweeping reliance on
said doctrines without giving due regard to the peculiar facts of the case. I
underscored that these principles may not be applied where the internal
legislative rules would breach the Constitution which this Court has a solemn
duty to uphold. It was my position then that the introduction of several provisions
in the Bicameral Committee Report violated the constitutional proscription
against any amendment to a bill upon the last reading thereof and which this

Court, in the exercise of its judicial power, can properly inquire into without
running afoul of the principle of separation of powers.
Last year, 2 Arroyo, et al. v. de Venecia, et al. 3 presented an opportunity for me
to clarify my position further. In that case, Congressman Joker Arroyo filed a
petition before the Court complaining that during a session by the House of
Representatives, he was effectively prevented from raising the question of
quorum which to him tainted the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, or the socalled "sin taxes" law. The Court, speaking again through Justice Mendoza,
dismissed Mr. Arroyo's petition, arguing in the main that courts are denied the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a
violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
Concurring with the majority opinion, I discerned a need to explain my position
then because of possible misinterpretation. I was very emphatic that I did not
abandon my position in Tolentino, the facts as presented in Arroyo being
radically different from the former. In keeping with my view that judicial review is
permissible only to uphold the Constitution, I pointed out that the legislative
rules allegedly violated were purely internal and had no direct or reasonable
nexus to the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of
a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention.
In the instant case, at the risk of being repetitious, I again take a similar stand as
the ones I made in the two cited cases.
Although this case involves the question of who is the rightful occupant of a
Senate "office" and does not deal with the passage of a bill or the observance of
internal rules for the Senate's conduct of its business, the same ground as I
previously invoked may justify the Court's refusal to pry into the procedures of
the Senate. There is to me no constitutional breach which has been made
and, ergo, there is nothing for this Court to uphold. The interpretation placed by
petitioners on Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution clearly does not
find support in the text thereof. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is
expressed puts an end to that which is implied. The majority vote required for
the election of a Senate President and a Speaker of the House of
Representatives speaks only of such number or quantity of votes for an aspirant
to be lawfully elected as such. There is here no declaration that by so electing,
each of the two Houses of Congress is thereby divided into camps called the
"majority" and the "minority." In fact, the "offices" of Majority Floor Leader and
Minority Floor Leader are not explicitly provided for as constitutional offices. As
pointed out by my esteemed colleague, Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who
penned the herein majority opinion, even on the theory that under paragraph 2,
Section 16 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution, each House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary, still "the method of choosing who will
be such officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision." With the prerogative
being, therefore, bestowed upon the Senate, whatever differences the parties

may have against each other must be settled in their own turf and the Court,
conscious as it is of its constitutionally-delineated powers, will not take a perilous
move to overstep the same.

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

The 1987 Constitution, like the counterpart 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, has
continued to be implicit in its recognition of the time-honored precept of
separation of powers which enjoins upon each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative,
the Executive and the Judiciary proper acknowledgment and respect for each
other. The Supreme Court, said to be holding neither the "purse" (held by
Congress) nor the "sword" (held by the Executive) but serving as the balance
wheel in the State governance, functions both as the tribunal of last resort and
as the Constitutional Court of the nation. 1Peculiar, however, to the present
Constitution, specifically under Article VII, Section 1, thereof, is the extended
jurisdiction of judicial power that now explicitly allows the determination of
"whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." 2 This expanded concept of judicial power seems to have been
dictated by the martial law experience and to be an immediate reaction to the
abuse in the frequent recourse to the political question doctrine that in no small
measure has emasculated the Court. The term "political question," in this
context, refers to matters which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, should not be thought of as having been
tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. I
find it here opportune to reiterate what I have stated inTolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance, 3 viz:
I cannot yet concede to the novel theory, so challengingly
provocative as it might be, that under the 1987 Constitution the
Court may now at good liberty intrude, in the guise of the people's
imprimatur, into every affair of government. What significance can
still then remain, I ask, of the time honored and widely acclaimed
principle of separation of powers if, at every turn, the Court allows
itself to pass upon at will the disposition of a co-equal, independent
and coordinate branch in our system of government. I dread to think
of the so varied uncertainties that such an undue interference can
lead to. The respect for long standing doctrines in our jurisprudence,
nourished through time, is one of maturity, not timidity, of stability
rather than quiescence.

Pervasive and limitless, such as it, may seem to be, judicial power still
succumbs to the paramount doctrine of separation of powers. Congress is
the branch of government, composed of the representatives of the people,
that lays down the policies of government and provides the direction that
the nation must take. The Executive carries out that mandate. Certainly,
the Court will not negate that which is done by these, co-equal and coordinate branches merely because of a perceived case of grave abuse of
discretion on their part, clearly too relative a phrase to be its own sentinel
against misuse, even as it will not hesitate to wield the power if that abuse
becomes all too clear. The exercise of judicial statesmanship, not judicial
tyranny, is what has been envisioned by and institutionalized in the 1987
Constitution.
There is no harnbook rule by which grave abuse of discretion may be
determined. The provision was evidently couched in general terms to make it
malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any contemporary or emerging
millieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, amounting, to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or at
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner such as by reason of
passion or personal hostility. When the question, however, pertains to an affair
internal to either of Congress or the Executive, I would subscribe to the dictum,
somewhat made implicit in my understanding of Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 4 that
unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres
the Court will not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other
two branches of government. Verily, in this situation, it is an impairment or a
clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt
the steel door for judicial intervention.
In the instant settings, I find insufficient indication to have the case hew to the
above rule.
Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.
Footnotes
1 21 (1), BP 129; 5 (1), Art. VIII, Constitution.
2 See Manalo v. Gloria, 236 SCRA 130, 138-139, September 1,
1994; citing People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415, 423-24, April 18,
1989, and Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633, 651-652,
January 27, 1993.
3 Uy v. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167, September 26, 1994; Vergara Sr.
v. Suelto, 156 SCRA 753, December 21, 1987.
4 Avelino v. Cueno, 83 Phil 17 (1949); Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, 214
SCRA 789, October 20, 1992.

5 Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997.

6 The solicitor general, in his Comment dated August 21, 1998,
attributed to the 23 members of the Senate the following party
affiliations:
"Senate President Marcelo B. Fernan Laban ng Masang
Pilipino(LAMP)
Sen. Raul S. Roco Aksyon Demokratiko
Sen. Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr. Lakas-National Union of
Christian DemocratsUnited Muslim Democrats
of the Philippines, (LakasNUCD-UMDP)
Sen. Franklin M. Drilon LAMP
Sen. Juan M. Flavier Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago People's Reform Party (PRP)
Sen. Sergio R. Osmea Liberal Party (LP)
Sen. Francisco S. Tatad PRP
Sen. Gregorio B. Honasan LP (Independent)
Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile LP (Independent)
Sen. Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng LAMP
Sen. Loren Legarda-Leviste Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Sen. Renato L. Cayetano Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III LAMP
Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimemtel, Jr. LAMP
Sen. Robert Z. Barbers Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Sen. Rodolfo G. Biazon LAMP

Sen. Blas F. Ople LAMP

Sen. John Henry R. Osmea LAMP
Sen. Robert S. Jaworski LAMP
Sen. Ramon B. Revilla Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Sen. Tessie Aquino-Oreta LAMP"
(Rollo, pp. 63-64. See also Comment of Respondent
Guingona, Jr., rollo, p. 41.)
7 One position was vacant, because of the election of the
incumbent, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, as the Vice President of the
Philippines.
8 Senator Fernan abstained from voting. (Petition, p. 4; rollo, p. 6.
Comment of the solicitor general, p. 2; rollo, p. 63.)
9 Senators Robert Z. Barbers, Renato L. Cayetano, Juan M. Flavier,
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., Loren Legarda-Leviste, Ramon B. Magsaysay
Jr., and Ramon B. Revilla.
10 The Petition was signed by both petitioners; the Comment of
Senate President Fernan, by Senator Fernan himself and Attys. Mary
Jane L. Zantua and Lani Grace R. Songco; the Comment of Senator
Guingona, by Atty. Ricardo G. Nepomuceno Jr.; the Comment of the
OSG, by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Carlos N. Ortega
and Associate Solicitor Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag; while the
Consolidated Reply, by Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago.
11 83 Phil 17 (1949).
12 Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, Vol. II, 1988 ed., p. 282.
13 10 (2), Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution, reads:
"(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and
under such penalties as such House may provide."
14 Supra, p. 72.

15 At p. 76.
16 At p. 78.
17 At p. 79.
18 103 Phil 1051, 1068 (1957), per Concepcion, J.
19 Ibid., p. 1067, citing 16 CJS 413.
20 11, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution.
21 42 SCRA 448, December 11, 1971.
22 5 Phil 87 (1905).
23 91 Phil 882 (1952).
24 50 SCRA 30, 84, 87, March 31, 1973.
25 Art. VIII, 1, par. 2.
26 180 SCRA 496, December 21, 1989, per Cruz, J.
27 187 SCRA 377, July 12, 1990, per Grio-Aquino, J.
28 214 SCRA 789, October 20, 1992, per Campos Jr., J.
29 272 SCRA 18, 47, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
30 199 SCRA 692, July 30, 1991, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
31 Citing Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391, 1988.
32 Citing Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780, 1990.
33 277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997, per Mendoza, J.
34 At p. 299.
35 Alleje v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 495, January 25, 1995;
Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 108, November 16, 1995;
Times Broadcasting Network v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 366,
June 19, 1997; Chico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122704, January
5, 1998.
36 Perez v. De la Cruz, 27 SCRA 587, 603 (1969), citing Webster's
International Dictionary, Unabridged; Concurring Opinion of J.

Perfecto in Avelino v. Cueno, supra, p. 80. See also Petition,rollo, p.

12, citing Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., 1990.
37 P. 15; rollo, p. 55.
38 Citing Record of the Senate, 8th Congress, Vol. I, No. 14, p. 9.
39 Citing Record of the Senate, 9th Congress, Vol. III, No. 47-A, pp.
88-94.
40 Then Minority Leader Ernesto C. Maceda chaired the Committees
on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws; and on
Foreign Relations. Senator Honasan chaired the Committees on
Agrarian Reform; on Peace, Unification and Reconciliation; and on
Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement. Senator Coseteng was
the chair of the Committees on Civil Service and Government
Reorganization; and on Labor, Employment and Human Resources.
(See footnote 40 of Respondent Guingona's Comment, supra.)
41 Webster's New World Dictionary, 2nd college ed., 1972.
42 Ibid.
43 16 (1), second par., Art. VI of the Constitution.
44 16 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution.
45 Rules of the Senate (see Appendix "A," Guide to the Senate by
Reginald M. Pastrana and Demaree J.B. Raval).
46 New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Steingut, 353
NE2d 558.
47 Concurring Opinion in Oposa v. Factoran Jr., 224 SCRA 792, 818,
July 30, 1993.
48 Osmea Jr. v. Pendatun, 109 Phil 863, 870-871 (1960), citing 76
CJS 870. See also Arroyo v. De Venecia, supra.
49 Ibid. See also Enrique M. Fernando, Constitution of the
Philippines Annotated, 1977, pp. 188-189.
50 Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656, 681, September 5,
1997.
51 I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436.

52 91 CJS 551, citing State ex rel Daniel v. Village of Mound, 48

NW2d 855, 863.
53 67 CJS 317, citing Wheat v. Smith, 7 SW 161.
54 Lota v. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 715, 718, June 30, 1961.
55 2, Rule 66, Rules of Court.
56 5, ibid. See also Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez
Sr., 239 SCRA 11, 18, December 6, 1994; Tarrosa v. Singson, 232
SCRA 553, 557, May 25, 1994.
In this regard, the Court notes that Petitioner Santiago has no
standing to bring the instant petition forquo warranto, for she does
not claim to be rightfully entitled to the position of Senate minority
leader. We have ruled in the past:
"Nothing is better settled than that a petitioner, in
a quo warranto proceeding to try title to a public office,
must be able to show that he is entitled to said office.
Absent such an element, the petition must be
dismissed. This is a principle that goes back to Acosta
v. Flor [5 Phil 18, 22], a 1905 decision. There, the
doctrine has been laid down that: 'No individual can
bring a civil action relating to usurpation of a public
office without averring that he has a right to the same;
and at any stage of the proceedings, if it be shown that
such individual has no right, the action may be
dismissed because there is no legal ground upon which
it may proceed when the fundamental basis of such
action is destroyed.' This has been the exacting rule,
since then, followed with stricter firmness in
Cuyegkeng v. Cruz [108 Phil 1147], where this Court
held that one who does not claim to be entitled to the
office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held or exercised
by, another, but who 'merely asserts a right to be
appointed' thereto, cannot question the latter's title to
the same by quo warranto. In other words, one whose,
claim is predicated solely upon a more or less remote
possibility, that he may be the recipient of the
appointment, has no cause of action against the office
holder." (Garcia v. Perez, 99 SCRA 628, 633-34,
September 11, 1980, per De Castro, J.)

However, any question on standing has been rendered moot by the

inclusion of Petitioner Tatad, who claims to have the right to the
contested office.
57 1, Rule 66, Rules of Court. In relation to this rule, Respondent
Fernan claims that he is not a proper party to the case, because he
did not usurp nor is he unlawfully holding or exercising the office of
minority leader. While the action commenced by petitioners was
denominated a quo warranto petition under Rule 66, the Court
notes that among the principal averments made was that
Respondent Fernan committed grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.
Such averment brings the petition within the purview of
a certiorariproceeding under Rule 65. A basic principle in remedial
law states that it is not the title given by the parties to the action
which determines its nature, but the averments made in the
pleadings. The case may, thus, be treated as a
joint certiorari and quo warranto action and, as such, Respondent
Fernan is a proper, if not necessary, party thereto.
58 Batario Jr. v. Parentela Jr., 9 SCRA 601, November 29, 1963;
Caraon-Medina v. Quizon, 18 SCRA 562, October 29, 1966.
59 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA
200, 209, June 4, 1996, per Kapunan, J.; citing Philippine Airlines,
Inc. v. Confesor, 231 SCRA 41, March 10, 1994, and other
cases. See also Imutan v. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 286, 292
January 27, 1981.
MENDOZA, J., concurring and dissenting opinion;
1 Majority Opinion. p. 18.
2 Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924) (suspension of senator
for disorderly conduct for assaulting a fellow senator): Osmea v.
Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960) (suspension of senator for disorderly
behavior for imputing bribery to President Garcia)
3 Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997) (power of each house
to determine its rules of proceedings)
4 VICENTE G. SINCO, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 171-172 (11th ed.
1962).
5 83 Phil. 17 (1949).
6 Id., at 50.

7 Id., at 79.
8 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
9 Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989); Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr., 187
SCRA. 377 (1990); Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789 (1992).
10 88 Phil. 654 (1951).
11 115 Phil. vii (1962).
12 40 SCRA 58 (1971).
13 Cranch 137, 2L.Ed. 60 (1803).
ROMERO, J., separate opinion;
1 235 SCRA 630.
2 August 14, 1997.
3 G.R. No. 127255; 277 SCRA 268 (1997).
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
1 Justice Jose C. Vitug, The court and its Ways, The Court System
Journal, June 1998, Volume 3 No. 2.
2 Sec. 1, Article VIII.
3 235 SCRA 630, 720.
4 277 SCRA 268, 289.

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. SEN.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, G.R. No. 134577,
November 18, 1998 Case Digest
FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular
session of the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of
officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were

nominated for the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator

Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority
while those who voted for him, belonged to the minority. During the discussion,
Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that the senators belonging to the
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No consensus was arrived at
during the following days of session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter
from the 7 members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected
Senator Guingona as minority leader. The Senated President then recognized
Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a
petition for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a position
that, according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
1.
Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2.

Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?

3.
Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader?
4.
Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority
leader. They also invoke the Courts judicial power to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its
officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate
President recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.

The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is
that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary." The court held that, the method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions
of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing
specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of
choosing the holders thereof. However, such offices, by tradition and long
practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to
determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of
respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene
in the internal affairs of the legislature.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has
a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the
office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case,
petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the
office of the Senate minority leader. The specific norms or standards that may be
used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been
laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the
power has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said
that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and
exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no
grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts
as minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion
as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader. The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the LakasNUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be
the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such
formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate
sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate
their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot
be accused of capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Where no provision of
the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown
to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
authority.

The Petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 139033

December 18, 2002

JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROSARIO TORRECAMPO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Camarines Sur,
Branch 33 and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The instant petition is one for the review, by way of appeal by certiorari, of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated November 20, 1998, and of the
Resolution dated June 14, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner was charged on March 8, 1983 with violation of Section 178 (nn) 2 of
the 1978 Election Code in Criminal Case No. F-1447 before Branch 33, Regional
Trial Court, Camarines Sur. The Information alleged:
That on May 17, 1982, (Barangay Election Day), at around 8:15 P.M. in Barangay
Ombao, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then and
there unlawfully conducted himself in a disorderly manner, by striking the
electric bulb and two (2) kerosene petromax lamps lighting the room where
voting center no. 24 is located, during the counting of the votes in said voting
center plunging the room in complete darkness, thereby interrupting and
disrupting the proceedings of the Board of Election Tellers. 3
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
On January 14, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment and declared petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD 1296,
otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code, as amended, and sentenced
petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year as
minimum to 3 years as maximum.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals which
eventually affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Said decision became
final and executory. Thus, the execution of judgment was scheduled on October
14, 1987.

On October 12, 1987, an urgent motion to reset the execution of judgment was
submitted by petitioner through his counsel. But it was denied for lack of merit.
During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted
the presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation
of his bond. However, petitioner was never apprehended. He remained at large.
Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial court a
motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of
the penalty imposed upon him. However, it was denied. His motion for
reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
assailing the orders of the trial court denying both his motion to quash the
warrant of arrest and motion for reconsideration.
On November 20, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed decision
dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the instant petition was
filed before us.
Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the
penalty imposed upon petitioner has not prescribed. Petitioner maintains that
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his
sentence. The Court of Appeals, in its interpretation of the said provision,
engaged in judicial legislation when it added the phrase "by escaping during the
term of the sentence" thereto, so petitioner claims.
Going over the merits of the petition, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals
did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
The threshold issue in the instant case is the interpretation of Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 157 of the same Code.
In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals ruled:
"Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
When and how penalties prescribe The penalties imposed by the final sentence
prescribed as follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty
of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
"And Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, provides as follows:

Computation of the prescription of penalties The period of prescription of

penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the
service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give
himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which his
Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before
the expiration of the period of prescription.
"The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is one (1) year of imprisonment
as minimum to three (3) years of imprisonment as maximum.
"The law under which the petitioner was convicted is a special law, the
1978 Election Code. This law does not provide for the prescription of
penalties. This being the case, We have to apply the provision of the
Revised Penal Code which allows the application of said code in suppletory
character when it provides that:
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws
are not subject to the provision of this code. This code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.
"The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is a correctional penalty under
Article 25 in relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code. Being a
correctional penalty it prescribed in ten (10) years.
"The petitioner was convicted by a final judgment on June 14, 1986. Such
judgment would have been executed on October 14, 1986 but the accused
did not appear for such proceeding. And he has never been apprehended.
"The contention of the petitioner is that said judgment prescribed on
October 24, 1996.
"The issue here is whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner
has prescribed.
"The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are as
follows:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence.
2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping
during the term of his sentence.
3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given himself
up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we
have no extradition treaty or committed another crime.
4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time
form the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the
convict.
(p. 93, Revised Penal Code by L. Reyes 93 ed.)

"From the foregoing elements, it is clear that the penalty imposed has not
prescribed because the circumstances of the case at bench failed to
satisfy the second element, to wit That the convict evaded the service of
the sentence by escaping during the service of his sentence. As a matter
of fact, the petitioner never served a single minute of his sentence.
The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the ruling of
this Court in Tanega vs. Masakayan, et. al.,4 where we declared that, for
prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the
culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compelling reason
to deviate from our earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in
the Tanega case.
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties
shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the
date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the
same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who
have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his
sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and
for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of
prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed
to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before
the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now
petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a
life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of
his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court
accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioners guilt was
proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he
committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence
and applicable laws. It did not engage in judicial legislation but correctly
interpreted the pertinent laws. Because petitioner was never placed in
confinement, prescription never started to run in his favor.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Del Castillo vs. Torrecampo (G.R. No. 139033)

Facts: Petitioner was charged on March 8, 1983 with violation of Section 178
(nn) of the 1978 Election Code.
On January 14, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment and declared petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD 1296,
otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code, as amended, and sentenced
petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year as
minimum to 3 years as maximum.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals which

eventually affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Said decision became
final and executory. Thus, the execution of judgment was scheduled on October
14, 1987.

During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted

the presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation
of his bond. However, petitioner was never apprehended. He remained at large.
Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial court a
motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of
the penalty imposed upon him. However, it was denied. His motion for
reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty has prescribed.

Held: The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is one (1) year of imprisonment
as minimum to three (3) years of imprisonment as maximum.

The law under which the petitioner was convicted is a special law, the 1978
Election Code. This law does not provide for the prescription of penalties. This
being the case, We have to apply the provision of the Revised Penal Code which
allows the application of said code in suppletory character when it provides that:
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provision of this code. This code shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is a correctional penalty under Article
25 in relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code. Being a correctional
penalty it prescribed in ten (10) years.

The petitioner was convicted by a final judgment on June 14, 1986. Such
judgment would have been executed on October 14, 1986 but the accused did
not appear for such proceeding. And he has never been apprehended.

The contention of the petitioner is that said judgment prescribed on October 24,
1996.

The issue here is whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has
prescribed.

The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are as follows:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence.
2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during
the term of his sentence.
3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given himself up, or
been captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no
extradition treaty or committed another crime.
4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time form the
date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict.

In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before
the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now
petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a
life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of
his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court
accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioners guilt was
proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he
committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

G.R. No. 178552

October 5, 2010

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the

South-South Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed Group Engagement,
and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178554
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by its Chairperson Elmer
Labog, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO
(NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President Joselito V. Ustarez
and Secretary General Antonio C. Pascual, and CENTER FOR TRADE
UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, represented by its Executive Director Daisy
Arago, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
NORBERTO GONZALES, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of National
Defense, HON. RAUL GONZALES, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice,
HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as AFP
Chief of Staff, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, in his
capacity as PNP Chief of Staff, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178581
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), GENERAL ALLIANCE
BINDING WOMEN FOR REFORMS, INTEGRITY, EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP
AND ACTION (GABRIELA), KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP),
MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL),
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG

MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), SOLIDARITY OF CAVITE WORKERS, LEAGUE OF

FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), ANAKBAYAN, PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG
KILUSANG MAMAMALAKAYA (PAMALAKAYA), ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED
TEACHERS (ACT), MIGRANTE, HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY
(HEAD), AGHAM, TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., DR. BIENVENIDO LUMBERA,
RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., SISTER MARY JOHN MANANSAN OSB, DEAN
CONSUELO PAZ, ATTY. JOSEFINA LICHAUCO, COL. GERRY CUNANAN (ret.),
CARLITOS SIGUION-REYNA, DR. CAROLINA PAGADUAN-ARAULLO,
RENATO REYES, DANILO RAMOS, EMERENCIANA DE LESUS, RITA BAUA,
REY CLARO CASAMBRE, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and
Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY
RONALDO PUNO. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO
TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE
OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME,
THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and investigative
elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178890
KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS,
represented herein by Dr. Edelina de la Paz, and representing the
following organizations: HUSTISYA, represented by Evangeline
Hernandez and also on her own behalf; DESAPARECIDOS, represented
by Mary Guy Portajada and also on her own behalf, SAMAHAN NG MGA
EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT PARA SA AMNESTIYA (SELDA),
represented by Donato Continente and also on his own behalf,
ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE (EMJP), represented
by Bishop Elmer M. Bolocon, UCCP, and PROMOTION OF CHURCH
PEOPLE'S RESPONSE, represented by Fr. Gilbert Sabado,
OCARM, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and
Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARTY EDUARDO ERMITA,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY
RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO
TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE

OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED

FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME,
THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and investigative
elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179157
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), represented by Atty.
Feliciano M. Bautista, COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY
(CODAL), SEN. MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL and FORMER
SENATORS SERGIO OSMEA III and WIGBERTO E. TAADA, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND THE MEMBERS OF THE
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC), Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179461
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN TAGALOG (BAYAN-ST),
GABRIELA-ST, KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHYANG MAGSASAKA-TIMOG
KATAGALUGAN (KASAMA-TK), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR
CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), PEOPLES MARTYRS, ANAKBAYAN-ST,
PAMALAKAYA-ST, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE-ST),
PAGKAKAISA'T UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA LAGUNA (PUMALAG),
SAMAHAN NG MGA MAMAMAYAN SA TABING RILES (SMTR-ST), LEAGUE
OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), BAYAN MUNA-ST, KONGRESO NG MGA
MAGBUBUKID PARA SA REPORMANG AGRARYO KOMPRA, BIGKIS AT
LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (BALATIK),
SAMAHAN AT UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGSASAKANG KABABAIHAN SA TIMOG
KATAGALUGAN (SUMAMAKA-TK), STARTER, LOSOS RURAL POOR
ORGANIZATION FOR PROGRESS & EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN NIO LAJARA,
TEODORO REYES, FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO, JANNETTE E. BARRIENTOS,
OSCAR T. LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN DE CLARO, SALLY P. ASTRERA, ARNEL
SEGUNE BELTRAN, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and
Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMEN T SECRETARY
RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINCANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO
TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE
OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING

COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME,

THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and investigative
elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from
Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007, 1signed into law
on March 6, 2007.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, 2 petitioner Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and
Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No.
178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation
of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union
and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective officers 3 who are
also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554.
The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
(BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality,
Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP),
Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for
Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE),
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers
(SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng
Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT),
Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by
their respective officers,4 and joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John
Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry
Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes,
Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya,
Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa
Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and
Promotion of Church Peoples Response (PCPR), which were represented by their
respective officers5 who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the
Defense of Liberty (CODAL),6Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio
Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 179157.

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional

chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog Region, 7 and
individuals8 followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari
and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations
raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism
Council9 composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as
Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense
Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as
members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine
National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council
like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of
Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service
of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational
Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative elements.
The petitions fail.
Petitioners resort to certiorari is improper
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functionshas acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity
how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
be the lis mota of the case.10

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the
most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
Petitioners lack locus standi
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.11
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary 12 summarized the
rule on locus standi, thus:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and
personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is
invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby
in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must
show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected
"communist fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas
individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine
and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental public importance dispenses
with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of
suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal
legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.
Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as
will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R.
No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to "close security surveillance

by state security forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and

"vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with
military build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of
the [S]tate."14
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show
any connection between the purported "surveillance" and the implementation
of RA 9372.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan,
PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R.
No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged
action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA).
The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription
without following the procedure under the law. 15 The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al.
in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1)
the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well
and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be
known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide
in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced
by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed
fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable
of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to
the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life,
or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and
are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are
universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or
other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal
notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming
part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of
man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially
noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial
notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence
of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge. 16 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial
notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no
specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three
years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat
emanating from the so-called tagging.

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554,
who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to
particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would
result in direct injury to their organization and members.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization,
the United States of America17(US) and the European Union18 (EU) have both
classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations.
The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would
adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist
organizations.19 Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before
the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic
terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in
effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitionerorganizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat
of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list
Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano and
Luzviminda Ilagan,20 urged the government to resume peace negotiations with
the NDF by removing the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of
designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist
organizations. Considering the policy statement of the Aquino Administration 21 of
resuming peace talks with the NDF, the government is not imminently disposed
to ask for the judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied
organizations.
More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and
specific interests in the questions being raised.22 Of recent development is the
filing of the first case for proscription under Section 1723 of RA 9372 by the
Department of Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu
Sayyaf Group.24 Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to the
Abu Sayyaf Group.
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a
prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges against them.
In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in
2006 against then Party-List Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano
of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casio and
Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion
charges were petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato
Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being
front organizations for the Communist movement were petitioner-organizations
KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE. 26
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners.
For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA
9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished
under the Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more
imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it
easier to charge a person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered.

Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to

prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three
years after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on
their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA
9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the
law.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however,
suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing. 27 The IBP failed to
sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts
against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL
have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject
of "political surveillance," also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity,
let alone legal basis, of the claim of "political surveillance," the Court finds that
she has not shown even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372.
Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Taada and Senator
Sergio Osmea III, who cite their being respectively a human rights advocate and
an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no
concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos
Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they raise are of
transcendental importance, "which must be settled early" and are of "farreaching implications," without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372
under which they have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of
human rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with
locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining,
direct injury as a result of the laws enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to
corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest
shared by the general public.
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers
and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the
spending or taxing power of Congress,28 whereas citizen standing must rest on
direct and personal interest in the proceeding. 29
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from
Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens
has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion
of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal
interest is key.
Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case
or controversy.

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.30(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the Court ruled that the power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated
to actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 32
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC 33 cannot be
more emphatic:
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other
hand; that is, it must concern a real and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the Municipality of
Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be premature as it was tacked on
uncertain, contingent events.34 Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an
application for a license to operate a radio or television station has been denied
or granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy, and
merely wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem. 35
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on
Elections36 for failure to cite any specific affirmative action of the Commission on
Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v.
Commission on Elections,37 to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein
petitioners based merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions
of the Muslim Code and those of the national law, there being no actual
controversy between real litigants.
The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory
grounds goes on ad infinitum.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a
perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for

mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the

requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to
intelligently adjudicate the issues. 38
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project,39 allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged
on vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution"
and "should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the
sole means of seeking relief."40 The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a
federal court to assail the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18
U.S.C. 2339B (a) (1),41 proscribing the provision of material support to
organizations declared by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist
organizations. They claimed that they intended to provide support for the
humanitarian and political activities of two such organizations.
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an
anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the
conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a
justiciable controversy.42
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show
that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected
conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been
established, much less a real and existing one.
Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being
tagged as "communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of
prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an
advisory opinion, which is not its function. 43
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again,
declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the
activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a
public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of
ripeness.44
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take
the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such
possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by
law may be abused.45 Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events
before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases,
wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
definition of the crime of terrorism46under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread
and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness

and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines
apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not
speech.
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative
to outline the schools of thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of
limiting the application of the two doctrines to free speech cases. They
particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan 47 and Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan.48
The Court clarifies.
At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word "intervene" in
Section 549 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad. The Court stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness
doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases," and are "not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes." 50 It added that, at any rate,
the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not
vague.51
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,52 the
Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it
nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the
therein subject election offense53 under the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with
which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language. 54
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion 55 of Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estradacase, where the Court found the Anti-Plunder
Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the
definition of the crime of plunder.
The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to
the concept of a "facial" invalidation as opposed to an "as-applied" challenge. He
basically postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad
do not justify a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the
Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main
Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible"chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory
is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others

may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible

inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is
allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting
laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to
free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the
U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims,
if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has
been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set
of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the
vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law
as applied to the conduct of others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations
in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth
challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court
review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down
entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from
the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions
to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.
But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and
requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is
rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative
remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required lineby-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is

wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they

might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last
resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a
statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a
case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is
charged.56 (Underscoring supplied.)
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth
and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a
penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech
regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate
rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not
operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 58
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes
that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly
refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected. 59
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts
affecting real litigants, a facialinvalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to
the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities.60
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle 61 in his concurring opinion that
the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are
not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount
a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth
grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to
avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not
at all times be abridged.62 As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to

plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring
socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize
acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from
diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. 63
The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal
statute may be challenged" and "underscored that an on-its-face invalidation of
penal statutes x x x may not be allowed." 64
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no
case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The
rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A
strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal
statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the
doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial
power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute
is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to
consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the
allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair
the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that
can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere
showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad,
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him. 65(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth
doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost
always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be
properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself
only to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an
exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or
her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of
the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third
parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those
rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and
the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for"
so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized
court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from
the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect
of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit.
The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on

the speech of those third parties. 66 (Emphasis in the original omitted;

underscoring supplied.)
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at
least two cases,67 observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an
overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment, 68 and
that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.69 In Virginia
v. Hicks,70 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed
against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speechrelated conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
"transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression." 71
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as
applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of
"terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent
chargeagainst them
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the
operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein
petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law "on its
face and in its entirety."72 It stressed that "statutes found vague as a matter of
due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular
defendant."73
American jurisprudence74 instructs that "vagueness challenges that do not
involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of
the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity."
For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants
claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine
hailed as "among the most important guarantees of liberty under law." 75
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due
process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal
statutes. In at least three cases, 76 the Court brought the doctrine into play in
analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on
fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the
Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the
two Romualdezand Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein
assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.
There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a
facial analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA
9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act
punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under
any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate
crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to
coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech,
petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of
terrorism77 must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not
speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying
phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first
element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a
protected speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it
unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every
commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender
like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the
amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An
analogy in one U.S. case78 illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on
discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to take down
a sign reading "White Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be
analyzed as one regulating speech rather than conduct.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal
conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor
the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori
in the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of
making the element of coercion perceptible.
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most
instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been
deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of
conduct illegal merely because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an
expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press
would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in
restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed
injurious to society.79 (italics and underscoring supplied)
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they
merely evidence a prohibited conduct. 80 Since speech is not involved here, the
Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.1avvphi1
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis
of the therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein petitioners
inasmuch as they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on
vagueness grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review
the assailed penal statute on its face and in its entirety.

In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement
review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since the therein
plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required
to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a
credible threat of prosecutionunder RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis
of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court
reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling
on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be
used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Title: Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council
SCRA Citation: 632 SCRA 146
Date Promulgated: October 5, 2010

Petitioners: This is a consolidation of 6 petitions, thus:

Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc.

NGO

Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr.

Concerned
citizen,
taxpayer, and
lawyer

GR No.
178554

KMU, NAFLU-KMU, CTUHR

citizens

GR No.
178581

BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL,

COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS,
PAMALAKAYA, ACT, HEAD, Guingona,
Jr., Lumbera, Constantino, Jr., Sr.
Manansan, OSB, Dean Paz, Atty.
Lichauco, Ret. Col. Cunanan, SiguionReyna, Dr. Pagaduan-Araullo, Reyes,
Ramos, De Jesus, Baua, Casambre

GR No.
178552

GR No.
178890
GR No.
179157
GR. No.
179461

SELDA, EMJP, PCPR

IBP, CODAL, Senator Madrigal, Osmena
III, and Taada
BAYAN-ST, other regl chapters and
orgs mostly based in Southern Tagalog

certiorari and
prohibition

Respondents:

Anti-Terrorism Council, composed

of:
o Chairperson Eduardo Ermita
o Vice-Chair Raul Gonzales
o Acting Defense Secretary
Alberto Romulo
o National Security Adviser
Norberto Gonzales
o DILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno
o Finance Secretary
MargaritoTeves
AFP Chief of Staff General
HermogenesEsperon
PNP Chief General Oscar Calderon
PGMA
Support agencies of the AntiTerrorism Council, namely:
o National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency
o NBI
o Bureau of Immigration
o Office of Civil Defense
o Intelligence Service of the
AFP
o Anti-Money Laundering
Center
o Philippine Center on
Transnational Crime
o PNP intelligence and
investigative elements

FACTS:

This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA

9372, An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,
aka Human Security Act of 2007.
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standion the basis of being
suspected communist fronts by the government, whereas individual
petitioners invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they
have been subjected to close security surveillance by state security
forces, their members followed by suspicious persons and vehicles
with dark windshields, and their offices monitored by men with military
build. They likewise claim they have been branded as enemies of the
State.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS,
Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD, and Agham would like the
Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of tagging them

as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA. They claim such
tagging is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the
procedure under the law.
Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn
duty to uphold the Constitution.
Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and
coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous,
leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the
prohibited acts.

ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

WON petitioners resort to certiorari is proper NO.

WON petitioners have locus standiNO.
WON the Court can take judicial notice of the alleged tagging NO.
WON petitioners can invoke the transcendental importance doctrine
NO.
WON petitioners can be conferred locus standi as they are taxpayers and
citizens NO.
WON petitioners were able to present an actual case or controversy NO.
WON RA 9372 is vague and broad in defining the crime of terrorism NO.
WON a penal statute may be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners NO.
WON there is merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to
permit a facial analysis of its validity NO.

HELD AND RATIO:

1. Petition for certiorari is improper.
a. Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court states that petition for certiorari applies when any tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
b. Petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity
how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective
jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
c. The power of judicial review has 4 requisites:
i. There must be an actual case or controversy.
ii. Petitioners must possess locus standi.
iii. Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity.
iv. The issue of constitutionality must be the lismota of the
case.
The present case lacks the 1st 2 requisites, which are the most
essential.

2. Petitioners lack locus standi.

a. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure concrete adverseness.
b. In Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary,locus
standihas been defined as that requiring:
i. That the person assailing must have a direct and personal
interest AND
ii. That the person sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct inquiry as a result of the act
being challenged.
c. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional
question, he must show that:
i. He has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury;
ii. The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; AND
iii. The injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
d. RA 9372 is a penal statute. While Chavez v. PCGG holds that
transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement
that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering
direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of
penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of
constitutional litigation. Such necessitates closer judicial scrutiny
of locus standi.
e. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does no,
however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with
standing. They failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate
under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights
and duties.
f. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal who claims to have
been the subject of political surveillance also lacks locus standi.
The same is true for WigbertoTaada and Osmea III, who cite their
being a human rights advocate and an oppositor, respectively. No
concrete injury has been pinpointed, hence, no locus standi.
3. Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging.
a. Matters of judicial notice have 3 material requisites:
i. matter must be one of common and general knowledge
ii. must be well and authoritatively settled, not doubtful or
uncertain or capable of accurate and ready
determination
iii. known to be within thelimits of the jurisdiction of the
court
b. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to
be judicially known is that of notoriety. It can be said that judicial
notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited
to: (1) facts evidenced by public records and (2) facts of general
notoriety.
c. A court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is
dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the
Court has no constructive knowledge.
d. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea.
That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9371 has been filed
against them, 3 years after its effectivity, belies any claim of
imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called

tagging. They fail to particularize how the implementation of

specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their
organization and members.
e. Notwithstanding the statement of Ermita and Gonzales that the
Arroyo administration will adopt the US and EU classification of CPP
and NPA as terrorist organizations, there is yet to be filed before the
courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as
domestic terrorist or outlawed organization under RA 9372.
4. In Kilosbayan v. Guingona,to invoke the transcendental doctrine, the
following are the determinants:
a. The character of the funds or other assets involved in the case
b. The presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government;
c. The lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest
in the questions being raised
In the case at bar, there are other partiesnot before the Court
withdirect and specific interests in the questions being raised.
5. Petitioners cannot be conferred upon them as taxpayers and
citizens.
a. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the
spending or taxing power of Congress, whereas citizen standing
must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.
b. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any
appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of
the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal
interest in the implementation of the law.
c. Generalized interest, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a
public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and
personal interest is key.
6. Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy. None of
them faces any charge under RA 9372.
a. Judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy. An actual case or controversy means an existing case
or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion.
b. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
scholarly interest. The pleadings must show:
i. an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right and
ii. a denial thereof
c. However, a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived
threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for
mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by
the presence of sufficient facts.
d. Prevailing American jurisprudence allows adjudication on the merits
when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged
prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to
do, as there would be a justiciable controversy. However, in the case
at bar, the petitioners have failed to show that the challenged
provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or
activity. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a
real and existing one.

e. Petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported

surveillance and the implementation of RA 9372. Petitioners
obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly being
tagged as communist fronts in no way approximate a credible
threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being
lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function. If the
case is merely theorized, it lies beyond judicial review for lack of
ripeness. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events.
7. The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no
application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to
free speech cases and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not
speech.
a. Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan: The overbreadth and the vagueness
doctrines have special application only to free speech cases, and
are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.
b. Romualdez v. COMELEC:A facial invalidation of criminal statutes is
not appropriate, but the Court nonetheless proceeded to conduct a
vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election
offense under the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with which the
therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.
c. The aforementioned cases rely heavily on Justice Mendozas
Separate Opinion in the Estrada case: Allegations that a penal
statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its
validity. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute
and to one, which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect
upon protected speech. This rationale does not apply to penal
statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect.
If facial challenge is allowed, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. Overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal
statutes.
8. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as
applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the
definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent
an actual or imminent chargeagainst them.
a. The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth
do not operate on the same plane.
i. A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when:
1. It lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution in 2 ways:
a. Violates due process for failure to accord fair
notice of conduct to avoid
b. Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
ii. The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means,
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms.
b. A facial challenge is likewise different from an as

applied challenge.
i. As applied challenge considers only extant facts affecting
real litigants.
ii. Facial challenge is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its
actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities.
1. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge. If facial challenge to a
penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes
may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible.
9. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as
to permit a facial analysis of its validity.
a. Section 3 of RA 9372 provides the following elements of the crime of
terrorism:
i. Offender commits an act punishable under RPC and the
enumerated special penal laws;
ii. Commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace;
iii. The offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand.
b. Petitioners contend that the element of unlawful demand in the
definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through
some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. The
argument does not persuade. What RA 9372 seeks to penalize is
conduct, not speech.
c. Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely
inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of
the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some
mincing of words on the part of offender. Utterances not
elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the
criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish
socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as
conduct and not speech.
Concurring opinion of Justice Abad:
- He concurs with the majority opinion, but he says he needs to emphasize that
the grounds for dismissal in this case are more procedural than substantive.
Hence, when an actual controversy arises and when it becomes ripe for
adjudication, the specific questions raised here may be raised again.

G.R. No. 167011

April 30, 2008

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R.

ROMUALDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by
petitioners Spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez seeking to
annul and set aside the Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 1 and 27 January
20052 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in E.O. Case No. 2000-36. In
the Resolution of 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc directed the Law
Department to file the appropriate Information with the proper court against
petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for violation of Section
10(g) and (j)3 in relation to Section 45(j)4 of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise
known as The Voters Registration Act of 1996. 5 Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration thereon was denied.
The factual antecedents leading to the instant Petition are presented hereunder:
On 12 July 2000, private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino
Apostol6 filed a Complaint-Affidavit7 with the COMELEC thru the Office of the
Election Officer in Burauen, Leyte, charging petitioners with violation of Section
261(y)(2)8 and Section 261(y)(5)9 of the Omnibus Election Code, similarly
referred to as Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and Section 12 10 of Republic Act No.
8189.
Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal ages and
residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
Quezon City; on 9 May 2000 and 11 May 2000, petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez
and Erlinda R. Romualdez, applied for registration as new voters with the Office
of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced by Voter Registration
Record Nos. 42454095 and 07902952, respectively; in their sworn applications,
petitioners made false and untruthful representations in violation of Section
1011 of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by indicating therein that they are residents of
935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still
are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
Quezon City, and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, as evidenced by Voter Registration
Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that petitioners, knowing fully well

said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in said
applications corresponding to the length of time which they have resided in
Burauen, Leyte. In fine, private respondent charged petitioners, to wit:
Respondent-spouses, Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes
Romualdez committed and consummated election offenses in violation of
our election laws, specifically, Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (2),
for knowingly making any false or untruthful statements relative to any
data or information required in the application for registration, and of Sec.
261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (5), committed by any person who,
being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an application for
cancellation of his previous registration, both of the Omnibus Election
Code (BP Blg. 881), and of Sec. 12, RA 8189 (Voter Registration Act) for
failure to apply for transfer of registration records due to change of
residence to another city or municipality." 12
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be
conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding
Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
the prosecution of the same.
Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss 13 dated 2 April
2001. They contended therein that they did not make any false or untruthful
statements in their application for registration. They avowed that they intended
to reside in Burauen, Leyte, since the year 1989. On 9 May 2000, they took
actual residence in Burauen, Leyte, by leasing for five (5) years, the house of
Juanito and Fe Renomeron at No. 935, San Jose Street in Burauen, Leyte. On even
date, the Barangay District III Council of Burauen passed a Resolution of
Welcome, expressing therein its gratitude and appreciation to petitioner Carlos S.
Romualdez for choosing the Barangay as his official residence. 14
On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal, COMELEC
Investigating Officer, issued a Resolution, recommending to the COMELEC Law
Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division), the filing of the appropriate
Information against petitioners, disposing, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and
Prosecution Division), RECOMMENDS to file the necessary information
against Carlos Sison Romualdez before the proper Regional Trial Court for
violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic
Act 8189 and to authorize the Director IV of the Law Department to
designate a Comelec Prosecutor to handle the prosecution of the case with
the duty to submit periodic report after every hearing of the case. 15
On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to depart from the
recommendatory Resolution of 28 November 2003, and ordered, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department is hereby directed
to file the appropriate information with the proper court against
respondents CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA ROMUALDEZ for
violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of the
Republic Act No. 8189.16

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.

Acting on the Motion, the COMELEC found no cogent reason to disturb the
assailed En Banc Resolution of 11 June 2004,17 rationalizing, thus:
However, perusal of the records reveal (sic) that the arguments and issues
raised in the Motion for Reconsideration are merely a rehash of the
arguments advanced by the Respondents in [their] Memorandum received
by the Law Department on 17 April 2001, the same [w]as already
considered by the Investigating Officer and was discussed in her
recommendation which eventually was made as the basis for the En
Bancs resolution.
As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing of request for the
cancellation and transfer of Voting Registration Record does not
automatically cancel the registration records. The fact remains that at the
time of application for registration as new voter of the herein Respondents
on May 9 and 11, 2001 in the Office of Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte
their registration in Barangay 4419-A, Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame
Quezon City was still valid and subsisting. 18
On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law Department of the
COMELEC filed with the RTC, Burauen, Leyte, separate Informations against
petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez19 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to
Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, and against petitioner Erlinda R.
Romualdez20 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic
Act No. 8189, subsequently docketed as Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4185 and Crim.
Case No. BN-06-03-4183, respectively. Moreover, separate Informations for
violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189
were filed against petitioners. 21
Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition, submitting the following
arguments:
I
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION;
and
II
COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PREMISED ITS
RESOLUTION ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND FAILED TO
CONSIDER CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT
CONCLUSION.22
On 4 May 2006, petitioners filed a Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt, 23 alleging that two
separate Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, were filed with the RTC by
the COMELEC against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for violation of Section
10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No.
BN-06-03-9184; and for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of

Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9185. Similarly, the Motion
alleged that the COMELEC filed with the RTC, two separate Informations, both
dated 12 January 2006, against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez, charging her
with the same offenses as those charged against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez,
and thereafter, docketed as Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9182, and No. BN-06-039183.
On 20 June 2006, this Court issued a Resolution 24 denying for lack of merit
petitioners Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt.
We shall now resolve, in seriatim, the arguments raised by petitioners.
Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged by
private respondent are entirely different from those which they stand to be
accused of before the RTC by the COMELEC. According to petitioners, private
respondents complaint charged them for allegedly violating, to wit: 1) Section
261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code, and 2) Section 12
of the Voters Registration Act; however, the COMELEC En Banc directed in the
assailed Resolutions, that they be charged for violations of Section 10(g) and (j),
in relation to Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act. Essentially, petitioners
are of the view that they were not accorded due process of law. Specifically, their
right to refute or submit documentary evidence against the new charges which
COMELEC ordered to be filed against them. Moreover, petitioners insist that
Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act is vague as it does not refer to a
definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election
offense; hence, it runs contrary to Section 14(1) 25 and Section 14(2),26 Article III
of the 1987 Constitution.
We are not persuaded.
First. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is
couched in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support the
charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189.
A reading of the relevant laws is in order, thus:
Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provide as follows:
SEC. 10 Registration of Voters. - A qualified voter shall be registered in
the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality
wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a
voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration
as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election
Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the
qualifications of a voter.
The application shall contain the following data:
xxxx
(g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;

xxxx
(j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of any
precinct;
The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures
of the applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his left and right
thumbprints, with four identification size copies of his latest photograph,
attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the Commission.
Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the
Election Officer shall inform him of the qualifications and disqualifications
prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to it that the
accomplished application contains all the data therein required and that
the applicants specimen signatures, fingerprints, and photographs are
properly affixed in all copies of the voters application.
Moreover, Section 45(j) of the same Act, recites, thus:
SEC. 45. Election Offense. The following shall be considered election
offenses under this Act:
xxxx
(j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
Significantly, the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit which was filed with the
Law Department of the COMELEC, support the charge directed by the
COMELEC En Banc to be filed against petitioners with the RTC. Even a mere
perusal of the Complaint-Affidavit would readily show that Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 8189 was specifically mentioned therein. On the matter of the acts
covered by Section 10(g) and (j), the Complaint-Affidavit, spells out the following
allegations, to wit:
5. Respondent-spouses made false and untruthful representations in their
applications (Annexes "B" and "C") in violation of the requirements of
Section 10, RA 8189 (The Voters Registration Act):
5.1 Respondent-spouses, in their sworn applications (Annexes "B"
and "C", claimed to be residents of 935 San Jose [S]treet, Burauen,
Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of
113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa [S]treet, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
Quezon City and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng
Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, a copy of the
Certification issued by Hon. Emmanuel V. Gozon, Punong Barangay,
Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City is hereto attached and
made an integral part hereof, as Annex "D";
5.2 Respondent-spouses knowing fully well said truth, intentionally
and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in their applications
(Annexes "B" and "C") corresponding to the length of time they
have resided in Burauen, Leyte;

6. Respondent-spouses, in (sic) all intents and purposes, were and still are
residents and registered voters of Quezon City, as evidenced by Voter
Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively;
photocopies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "E" and "F"[.]
Likewise, attached is a "Certification" (Annex "G") of Ms. Evelyn B.
Bautista, Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Election Officer, Fourth
District, Quezon City, dated May 31, 2000, together with a certified copy of
the computer print-out of the list of voters of Precinct No. 4419-A (Annex
"G-1" ) containing the names of voters Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda
Reyes Romualdez. The Certification reads as follows:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per office record MR. CARLOS
ROMUALDEZ and MS. ERLINDA REYES ROMUALDEZ are registered
voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon
City, Precinct Number 4419A with voters affidavit serial nos.
26195824 and 26195823, respectively.
This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve."
7. Respondent-spouses, registered as new voters of the Municipality of
Burauen, Leyte, [in spite of] the fact that they were and still are,
registered voters of Quezon City as early as June 22, 1997;
7.1 That, Double Registration is an election offense.
A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to register once.
If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a subsisting
registration, the new application for registration will be disapproved.
The registrant is also liable not only for an election offense of
double registration, but also for another election offense of
knowingly making any false or untruthful statement relative to any
data or information required in the application for registration.
In fact, when a person applies for registration as a voter, he or she
fills up a Voter Registration Record form in his or her own
handwriting, which contains a Certification which reads:
"I do solemnly swear that the above statements regarding my
person are true and correct; that I possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications of a voter; that the thumbprints,
specimen signatures and photographs appearing herein are mine;
and that I am not registered as a voter in any other precinct."27
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the
election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely
different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as
charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity
between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the
Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private
respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and
Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC

against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the
same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondents ComplaintAffidavit.
Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying on the case
of Lacson v. Executive Secretary.28Citing Lacson, petitioners argue that the real
nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the
Complaint or Information; and that the object of such written accusations was to
furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him, as will
enable him to make his defense. Let it be said that, inLacson, this court resolved
the issue of whether under the allegations in the subject Informations therein, it
is the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the
multiple murder case against therein petitioner and intervenors. In Lacson, we
underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by
the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial.29 Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the
real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual
recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.30
Petitioners reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of
due process because, as we have said, the charges contained in private
respondents Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to
be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal
charges in private respondents Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges
contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC
Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners cannot claim that they
were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against the charges that
the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because
they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private
respondents Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the
Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to
Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a
Memorandum before the said body. Finding that due process was not dispensed
with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the stance of the
Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of the
nature and description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing
that preliminary investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were
informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They
were given the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their defense.
In all these stages, petitioners actively participated.
The instant case calls to our minds Orquinaza v. People,31 wherein the concerned
police officer therein designated the offense charged as sexual harassment; but,
the prosecutor found that there was no transgression of the anti-sexual
harassment law, and instead, filed an Information charging therein petitioner
with acts of lasciviousness. On a claim that there was deprivation of due process,
therein petitioner argued that the Information for acts of lasciviousness was void
as the preliminary investigation conducted was for sexual harassment. The court
held that the designation by the police officer of the offense is not conclusive as
it is within the competence of the prosecutor to assess the evidence submitted
and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged.

Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained all the
allegations to support the charge of acts of lasciviousness under the Revised
Penal Code; hence, the conduct of another preliminary investigation for the
offense of acts of lasciviousness would be a futile exercise because the
complainant would only be presenting the same facts and evidence which have
already been studied by the prosecutor. 32 The court frowns upon such superfluity
which only serves to delay the prosecution and disposition of the criminal
complaint.33
Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45(j) of Republic Act
No. 8189 vague, on the ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of
the 1987 Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of
thereof. Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no
reference to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would
constitute an election offense.
We are not convinced.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.34 However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a
criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court
has declared that facial invalidation35 or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate.36 We have so enunciated in no uncertain terms
in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 37 thus:
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that
'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might
be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in
the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on
the ground of ambiguity." While mentioned in passing in some cases, the
void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our
jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found
unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not
because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec
Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion
of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative
powers, not because of vagueness.
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would
result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have
even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a

departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and

controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract
context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil
was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:
"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies,
and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into
effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on
the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative
and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly
unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they
might be decided."
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation
of statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have
allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the
conduct with which the defendant has been charged. (Emphasis
supplied.)
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent
which seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of
provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An
appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only
to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189
the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of
the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners case would be
antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there must
be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
and not conjectural or anticipatory.
We further quote the relevant ruling in David v. Arroyo on the proscription anent
a facial challenge:38
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity
of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are
considered "harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct."
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may
properly be held void on its face and when such summary action is
inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least,
that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our
traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at
the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior
that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech
toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls within
the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate

state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over

harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words"
and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected conduct." Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum
of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is
"generally disfavored;" The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the
traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that
a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a
law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to
others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. A writer and
scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that
it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails,
the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the
rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so
that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized
court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to
depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not
courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad
laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will
require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects,
not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression.
Xxx xxx xxx
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must

establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may
be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this
situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of
vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine"
which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application." It is subject to the same principles governing
overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is
said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague
in all its possible applications.
Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to
the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice.39 This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.40
As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election
offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its
specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is
an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged
provision renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the challenged
provision involves no guesswork. We do not see herein an uncertainty that
makes the same vague.
Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the
import or meaning of which they do not understand. This is in stark contrast to
the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan42 where therein petitioner sought for
statutory definition of particular words in the challenged statute. Even then, the
Court in Estrada rejected the argument.
This Court reasoned:
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not
rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use.
Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will,
and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not
necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the
legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act,
which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law."
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that
words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and

ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that

the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words. The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in
such a manner is always presumed.
Perforce, this Court has underlined that an act will not be held invalid merely
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be
impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. 43
The evident intent of the legislature in including in the catena of election
offenses the violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, is to
subsume as punishable, not only the commission of proscribed acts, but also the
omission of acts enjoined to be observed. On this score, the declared policy of
Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The law articulates the policy of the State
to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters. A reading of Section 45 (j)
conjointly with the provisions upon which petitioners are charged, i.e., Sections
10 (g) and (j) would reveal that the matters that are required to be set forth
under the aforesaid sections are crucial to the achievement of a clean, complete,
permanent and updated list of voters. The factual information required by the
law is sought not for mere embellishment.
There is a definitive governmental purpose when the law requires that such facts
should be set forth in the application. The periods of residence in the Philippines
and in the place of registration delve into the matter of residency, a requisite
which a voter must satisfy to be deemed a qualified voter and registered in the
permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he
resides. Of even rationality exists in the case of the requirement in Section 10 (j),
mandating that the applicant should state that he/she is not a registered voter of
any precinct. Multiple voting by so-called flying voters are glaring anomalies
which this country strives to defeat. The requirement that such facts as required
by Section 10 (g) and Section 10 (j) be stated in the voters application form for
registration is directly relevant to the right of suffrage, which the State has the
right to regulate.
It is the opportune time to allude to the case of People v. Gatchalian44 where the
therein assailed law contains a similar provision as herein assailed before us.
Republic Act No. 602 also penalizes any person who willfully violates any of the
provisions of the Act. The Court dismissed the challenged, and declared the
provision constitutional. The Court in Gatchalian read the challenged provision,
"any of the provisions of this [A]ct" conjointly with Section 3 thereof which was
the pertinent portion of the law upon which therein accused was prosecuted.
Gatchalian considered the terms as all-embracing; hence, the same must include
what is enjoined in Section 3 thereof which embodies the very fundamental
purpose for which the law has been adopted. This Court ruled that the law by
legislative fiat intends to punish not only those expressly declared unlawful but
even those not so declared but are clearly enjoined to be observed to carry out
the fundamental purpose of the law. 45 Gatchalian remains good law, and stands
unchallenged.

It also does not escape the mind of this Court that the phraseology in Section
45(j) is employed by Congress in a number of our laws. 46 These provisions have
not been declared unconstitutional.
Moreover, every statute has in its favor the presumption of validity. 47 To justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. 48We hold that
petitioners failed to overcome the heavy presumption in favor of the law. Its
constitutionality must be upheld in the absence of substantial grounds for
overthrowing the same.
A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota. In the
case at bar, the lis mota is the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC
in finding probable cause for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners.
Third. Petitioners maintain that the COMELEC En Banc, premised its finding on a
misapprehension of facts, and committed grave abuse of discretion in directing
the filing of Informations against them with the RTC.
We are once again unimpressed.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC finds statutory
expression under Section 26549of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Election Code.50 The task of the COMELEC whenever any election
offense charge is filed before it is to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
case, and make a determination of probable cause. Under Section 8(b), Rule 34
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the investigating officer makes a
determination of whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that a crime
has been committed.51 In Baytan v. COMELEC,52 this Court, sufficiently elucidated
on the matter of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses, viz:
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution
of election offenses rests in the COMELEC's sound discretion. The
COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts
or omissions constituting election frauds, offense and malpractices.
Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC
absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle
emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws
and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. 53
It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable
cause by the COMELEC in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.54
According to the COMELEC En Banc, the investigating officer, in the case at bar,
held that there was sufficient cause for the filing of criminal charges against

petitioners, and found no reason to depart therefrom. Without question, on May 9

and 11 of 2001, petitioners applied for registration as new voters with the Office
of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of
petitioners registration records as registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A of
Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City. The directive by
the COMELEC which affirmed the Resolution 55 of 28 November 2000 of
Investigating Officer Atty. Tangaro-Casingal does not appear to be wanting in
factual basis, such that a reasonably prudent man would conclude that there
exists probable cause to hold petitioners for trial. Thus, in the aforesaid
Resolution, the Investigating Officer, found:
A violation therefore of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election
offense.
In the instant case, when respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda
Romualdez filed their respective applications for registration as new voters
with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte on May 9 and 11,
2001, respectively, they stated under oath that they are not registered
voters in other precinct (VRR Nos. 42454095 and 07902941). However,
contrary to their statements, records show they are still registered voters
of Precinct No. 4419-A, barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV,
Quezon City, as per VRR Nos. 26195825 and 26195823. In other words,
respondents registration records in Quezon City is (sic) still in existence.
While it may be true that respondents had written the City Election Officer
of District IV, Quezon City for cancellation of their voters registration
record as voters (sic) therein, they cannot presume that the same will be
favorably acted upon. Besides, RA 8189 provides for the procedure in
cases of transfer of residence to another city/municipality which must be
complied with, to wit:
"Section 12. Change of Residence to Another City or Municipality. Any
registered voter who has transferred residence to another city or
municipality may apply with the Election Officer of his new residence for
the transfer of his registration records.
The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the
requirements of notice and hearing and the approval of the Election
Registration Board, in accordance with this Act. Upon approval, of the
application for transfer, and after notice of such approval to the Election
Officer of their former residence of the voter, said Election Officer shall
transmit by registered mail the voters registration record to the Election
Officer of the voters new residence."
They cannot claim ignorance of the abovestated provision on the
procedure for transfer of registration records by reason of transferred new
residence to another municipality. Based on the affidavit executed by one
Eufemia S. Cotoner, she alleged that the refusal of the Assistant Election
Officer Ms. Estrella Perez to accept the letter of respondents was due to
improper procedure because respondents should have filed the required
request for transfer with the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte. Despite
this knowledge, however, they proceeded to register as new voters of

Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of their previous

registrations in Quezon City.
In their subsequent affidavit of Transfer of Voters Registration under
Section 12 of Republic Act 8189, respondents admitted that they
erroneously filed an application as a new voter (sic) with the office of the
Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, by reason of an honest mistake, which
they now desire to correct. (underscoring ours).
Respondents lose sight of the fact that a statutory offense, such as
violation of election law, is mala prohibita. Proof of criminal intent is not
necessary. Good faith, ignorance or lack of malice is beside the point.
Commission of the act is sufficient. It is the act itself that is punished.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department respectfully submits that
there is probable cause to hold respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda
Romualdez for trial in violation of Section 10(g) and (j) in relation to
Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189. There is no doubt that they applied
for registration as new voters of Burauen, Leyte consciously, freely and
voluntarily.56
We take occasion to reiterate that the Constitution grants to the COMELEC the
power to prosecute cases or violations of election laws. Article IX (C), Section 2
(6) of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in
court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and where
appropriate, prosecute cases or violations of election laws, including acts
or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
This power to prosecute necessarily involves the power to determine who shall
be prosecuted, and the corollary right to decide whom not to
prosecute.57 Evidently, must this power to prosecute also include the right to
determine under which laws prosecution will be pursued. The courts cannot
dictate the prosecution nor usurp its discretionary powers. As a rule, courts
cannot interfere with the prosecutors discretion and control of the criminal
prosecution.58 Its rationale cannot be doubted. For the business of a court of
justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or
failure of the prosecution to prosecute.59 Every now and then, the prosecution
may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral
courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the
defense.60
Fourth. In People v. Delgado,61 this Court said that when the COMELEC, through
its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an
election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the
Information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject
to the approval of the court. The records show that Informations charging
petitioners with violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of

Republic Act No. 8189 had been filed with the RTC. The case must, thus, be
allowed to take its due course.
It may be recalled that petitioners prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before this Court to restrain
the COMELEC from executing its Resolutions of 11 June 2004 and 27 January
2005. In a Resolution dated 20 June 2006, this Court En Banc denied for lack of
merit petitioners Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt. Logically, the normal course of trial
is expected to have continued in the proceedings a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions, dated 11 June
2004 and 27 January 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

01 Romualdez vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008

FACTS
COMELEC Law Department filed two separate informations before the RTC
Barauen, Leyte against spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez
for knowingly making false or untruthful statement in their application for voters
registration relative to their place of residence and non registration in other
areas, which are violations of Sections 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
RA 8189 or the Voters Registration Act, to wit:
SEC. 10 Registration of Voters. xxx The application shall contain the following
data: x x x (g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of
registration; x x x (j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of
any precinct;

SEC. 45. Election Offense. The following shall be considered election offenses
under this Act: x x x (j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.

Pending the above case, the spouses filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
against COMELEC, on the ground, among others, of the unconstitutionality of

Section 45(j) for being contrary to the fair notice requirement Section 14(1) and
Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as such penal provision is
vague on its face.
ISSUE

WON Section 45(j) of RA 8189 is unconstitutional for having uncertain election

prohibition.
RULING
No, the Supreme Court held. Using the void for vagueness doctrine, it the law is
said to be facially invalid only if men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

As structured, Section 45 of RA 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under

the same Act. Section 45(j) clearly specifies that a violation of any of the
provisions of RA 8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is
precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no other interpretation and
involves no guesswork.

G.R. No. 186571

August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on
certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On January 18, 2005,
Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due
to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after
the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree
took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. 5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina
to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert
went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce
decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to
be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a
notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but
was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested
that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be
able to remarry under Philippine law. 9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind
the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as
determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the provision was enacted
to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination
of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the
alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse
an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper

party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina
fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be
on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and
Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void 15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. 18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, 19 enacted Executive Order
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as
follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge
the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce
decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the
foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The
Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered
still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x

cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country.
The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides
the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration
for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose
status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. 26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting
the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other
words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition
before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as
a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or

final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment
or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or
final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before
our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we
have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of
the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official
acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2)
copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, 30 but failed to
include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. 31 Under this situation, we can, at
this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article
26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other

interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners

presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition
is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata
effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns
marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. 34We consider
the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the
bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The
law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a
persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or
the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status
of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in
their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and
naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the
law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize
the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement
of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a
court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 37 both of which required
a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment,
dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless,
allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration
of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently
void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC
may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court,
for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.
It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the

RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made
parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation. 40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the
petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured
and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the
October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as
well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010
Nature of the Case: Direct Appeal from RTC decision, a petition for review on
certiorari
Facts:

Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian

citizenship through naturalization. He was married to the respondent but was

shocked of the infidelity on the part of his wife. He went back to Canada and filed
a petition for divorce and was granted. Desirous to marry another woman he
now loved, he registered the divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was
informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where respondent
failed to submit any response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the
petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed before the Court.

Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right
to petition a court of this jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
Decision:

The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art

26 of the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of

the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26
of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for
the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized
Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity
of foreign divorce decree with conformity to aliens national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign
decree of divorce on the petitioner and respondents marriage certificate without
judicial order recognizing the said decree. The registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is void.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is reversed and
Court ordered t6he remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings
in light of the ruling.
G.R. No. 177333

April 24, 2009

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)

represented by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE GAMING JURISDICTION INCORPORATED (PEJI), ZAMBOANGA
CITY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, et al., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for Prohibition.
Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which was enacted into law on February
23, 1995, created the Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone
(ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things, the
law gives the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f),
viz:

Section 7.
xxxx
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license
to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and
recreational and sports facilities;
xxxx
Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public
respondent ZAMBOECOZONE Authority passed Resolution No. 2006-08-03 dated
August 19, 2006 approving the application of private respondent Philippine EGaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of online/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance.
PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising campaigns representing itself as
such licensor/regulator to the international business and gaming community,
drawing the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) to file the
present petition for Prohibition which assails the authority of the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation
of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically Section 7(f) thereof, does not
give power or authority to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or
regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE. Citing three
(3) statutes, which it claims are in pari materia with R.A. No. 7903 as it likewise
created economic zones and provided for the powers and functions of their
respective governing and administrative authorities, PAGCOR posits that the
grant therein of authority to operate games of chance is clearly expressed, but it
is not similarly so in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903.
Thus PAGCOR cites these three statutes and their respective pertinent
provisions:
Republic Act No. 7227, or the "Bases Conversion and Development Authority Act"
enacted on March 13, 1992:
Section 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.
xxxx
(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. The Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority, otherwise known as the Subic Authority, shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxxx
(7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism-related activities subject to
priorities and standards set by the Subic Authority including games and
amusements, except horse-racing, dog-racing and casino gambling which shall
continue to be licensed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

(PAGCOR) upon recommendation of the Conversion Authority; to maintain and

preserve the forested areas as a national park;
xxxx
Republic Act No. 7922 or the "Cagayan Economic Zone Act of 1995" enacted on
February 24, 1995:
Section 6. Powers and Functions of the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority The
Cagayan Economic Zone Authority shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license
to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements, recreational
and sports facilities such as horse-racing, dog-racing gambling, casinos, golf
courses, and others, under priorities and standards set by the CEZA;
xxxx
And Republic Act No. 7916 or the "Special Economic Zone Act of 1995," enacted
on February 24, 1995 authorizing other economic zones established under the
defunct Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and its successor Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) to establish casinos and other games of chance
under the license of PAGCOR by way of the ipso facto clause, viz:
SECTION 51. Ipso Facto Clause. - All privileges, benefits, advantages or
exemptions granted to special economic zones under Republic Act No. 7227 shall
ipso facto be accorded to special economic zones already created or to be
created under this Act. The free port status shall not be vested upon the new
special economic zones.
PAGCOR maintains that, compared with the above-quoted provisions of the
ecozone-related statutes, Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 does not categorically
empower the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or authorize entities
to operate games of chance in the area, as the words "games" and "amusement"
employed therein do not include "games of chance." Hence, PAGCOR concludes,
ZAMBOECOZONE Authoritys grant of license to private respondent PEJI
encroached on its (PAGCORs) authority under Presidential Decree No. 1869 vis-avis the above-stated special laws to centralize and regulate all games of chance.
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, in its Comment,1 contends that PAGCOR has no
personality to file the present petition as it failed to cite a superior law which
proves its claim of having been granted exclusive right and authority to license
and regulate all games of chance within the Philippines; and that, contrary to
PAGCORs assertion, the words "games" and "amusements" in Section 7(f) of R.A.
No. 7903 include "games of chance" as was the intention of the lawmakers when
they enacted the law.
In its Reply Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam,2 PAGCOR cites the November 27, 2006
Opinion3 rendered by the Office of the President through Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite, the pertinent portions of which read:

Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows

the operation of tourism-related activities including games and
amusements without stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of
authority to ZAMBOECOZONE.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise
(RA 7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any gaming
activity by itself unless expressly authorized by law or other laws specifically
allowing the same. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate and/or license games of chance/gambling.
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o
operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to
others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational
and sports facilities."
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.4
The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that
the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention
or will, and preclude the court from construing it differently. For the legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used them advisedly, and
to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there
should be no departure.5
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings
in law which are clearly different from "game of chance" or "gambling." In its
ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest; while an "amusement"
is a pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or enjoyment. 6 On the other
hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in which chance rather than skill
determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined as "making a bet" or "a
play for value against an uncertain event in hope of gaining something of
value." 7
A comparison of the phraseology of Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 with similar
provisions in the three cited statutes creating ECOZONES shows that while the
three statutes, particularly R.A. No. 7922 which authorized the Cagayan
Economic Zone Authority to directly or indirectly operate gambling and casinos
within its jurisdiction, categorically stated that such power was being vested in
their respective administrative bodies, R.A. No. 7903 did not.
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of
the lawmakers.8 Not any of these instances is present in the case at bar,
however. Using the literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude

"games of chance" and "gambling" does not lead to absurdity, contradiction, or

injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the legislators. The lawmakers could
have easily employed the words "games of chance" and "gambling" or even
"casinos" if they had intended to grant the power to operate the same to the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A. No. 7922 enacted a day
after R.A. No. 7903. But they did not.
The Court takes note of the above-mentioned Opinion of the Office of the
President which, after differentiating the grant of powers between the Cagayan
Special Economic Zone and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, states that while the
former is authorized to, among other things, operate gambling casinos and
internet gaming, as well as enter into licensing agreements, the latter is not. The
relevant portions of said Opinion read:
The difference in the language and grant of powers to CEZA and
ZAMBOECOZONE is telling. To the former, the grant of powers is not only explicit,
but amplified, while to the latter the grant of power is merely what the law (RA
7903) states. Not only are the differences in language telling, it will be noted that
both charters of CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE were signed into law only one (1)
day apart from each other, i.e., February 23, 1995 in the case of
ZAMBOECOZONE and February 24, 1995 in the case of CEZA. x x x Accordingly,
both laws have to be taken in the light of what Congress intended them to be,
and the distinction that the lawmakers made when they enacted the two laws.
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the
operation of tourism-related activities including games and amusements without
stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to
ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the grant to CEZA included such activities
as horse-racing, dog-racing and gambling casinos.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise
(RA 7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any gaming
activity by itself unless expressly authorized by law or other laws specifically
allowing the same. (Emphasis supplied)
Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office of the
President, the latters interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and deserves
respect under the doctrine of respect for administrative or practical construction.
In applying said doctrine, courts often refer to several factors which may be
regarded as bases thereof factors leading the courts to give the principle
controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves.
These factors include the respect due the governmental agencies charged
with administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and
informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of
the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the
legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the
statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique
opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or
improvements in the statute.8

In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power to
operate and/or license games of chance/gambling.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Public respondent Zamboanga Economic
Zone Authority is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from exercising jurisdiction to
operate, license, or otherwise authorize and regulate the operation of any games
of chance. And private respondent Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated is
DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from operating any games of chance pursuant
to the license granted to it by public respondent.
SO ORDERED.

PAGCOR vs. PEJI, G.R. No. 177333

April 24, 209, J. Carpio Morales
Facts: Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which was enacted into law
on February 23, 1995, created the Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone
(ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things, the
law gives the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f),
viz:
Section 7.
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or
license to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and
recreational and sports facilities;
Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision,
public respondent ZAMBOECOZONE Authority passed Resolution No. 2006-08-03
dated August 19, 2006 approving the application of private respondent Philippine
E-Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of online/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance.
PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising campaigns representing
itself as such licensor/regulator to the international business and gaming
community, drawing the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) to file the present petition for Prohibition which assails the authority of
the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of
games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE. PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903,
specifically Section 7(f) thereof, does not give power or authority to the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of
games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
PAGCOR maintains that Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 does not categorically
empower the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or authorize entities
to operate games of chance in the area, as the words "games" and "amusement"
employed therein do not include "games of chance." Hence, PAGCOR concludes,
ZAMBOECOZONE Authoritys grant of license to private respondent PEJI

encroached on its (PAGCORs) authority under Presidential Decree No. 1869 vis-avis the above-stated special laws to centralize and regulate all games of chance.
Issue: WON the authority of ZAMBOECOZONE to operate/license games
includes games of chance/gambling.
Held: The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate and/or license games of chance/gambling.
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
"[t]o operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license
to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and
recreational and sports facilities."
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index
animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption
that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intention or will, and preclude the court from construing it differently. For the
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used them
advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are found in
the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous
meanings in law which are clearly different from "game of chance" or
"gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest; while
an "amusement" is a pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or
enjoyment. On the other hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in which chance
rather than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined as
"making a bet" or "a play for value against an uncertain event in hope of gaining
something of value."
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal
meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear
purpose of the lawmakers.8 Not any of these instances is present in the case at
bar, however. Using the literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to
exclude "games of chance" and "gambling" does not lead to absurdity,
contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the legislators. The
lawmakers could have easily employed the words "games of chance" and
"gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to grant the power to operate
the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A. No. 7922
enacted a day after R.A. No. 7903. But they did not.
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows
the operation of tourism-related activities including games and amusements
without stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to
ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the grant to CEZA included such
activities as horse-racing, dog-racing and gambling casinos.

Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office
of the President, the latters interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and
deserves respect under the doctrine of respect for administrative or practical
construction. In applying said doctrine, courts often refer to several factors which
may be regarded as bases thereof factors leading the courts to give the
principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in
themselves. These factors include the respect due the governmental
agencies charged with administration, their competence, expertness,
experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently
are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on
which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working
out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency
with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies,
inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.
In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the
power to operate and/or license games of chance/gambling.
Petition granted.

G.R. No. 162059

January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran ** accused, along with her
brother, of swindling government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at
ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng
bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to
quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the
Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government
scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21,
1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1,
2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. 2 On September 4, 2000,
petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). 3
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the
OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the
funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. 5 The succeeding
student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary
General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within
the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public
Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. 6
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause
to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan. 7 The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special
Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D.
SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph
2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as
follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a
high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to
her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to
gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of
the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as
"President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose
accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN
MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of

the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses
and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank
Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN
MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently
encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and
misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated
demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the
said accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of
the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan
does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in
her capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No.
8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has
jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes
Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II
of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was
duped. Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came
from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government. 10
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her
person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely
represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions
in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did not
receive any salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or
funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since
it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to
receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official
functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the
case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioners interpretation of
the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains
the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the
prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It
should be threshed out during a full-blown trial. 13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public
officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of administration
and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a
public office, petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a
public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office.

Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By

this definition, petitioner was compensated. 14
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
motion for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within
the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution,
Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and
employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single
doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed
by a public official in relation to his office.
Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of
the student body, she was never a public officer since she never received
any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no
moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has
original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials
enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because
the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature
of their responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the
Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant
belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and

corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate

to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by law for the
support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and
to enact for the government of the university such general ordinances and
regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the
university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of the
University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the
University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other
duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its
discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate,
any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove
them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only
through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock
corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing
body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of
the Philippines is performing functions similar to those of the Board of
Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that
being a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within
the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with
original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not
occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same
of P15 Million was received from former President Estrada and not from
the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be
properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case. 16
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. 17 The
motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004. 18
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING
THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION."19
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public
officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense
charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question
personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to

quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural
grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal
case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go
to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their
motion to quash.20Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a
motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. 21 The evident reason for
this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action. 22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained
and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely
interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order
is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in
such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse,
reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule
applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing
an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of
acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying
the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition
lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or
accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper
venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made
with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of
judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain
and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the
general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss
based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted
the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila
and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash
based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the
petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further
proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to
dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition for
prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of
the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss
based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to

dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition
for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was
denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action
in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash
based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case
was dismissed by this Court.24
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of
the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to
quash before the Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats the reference in the instant
petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical
error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite
corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A
brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest
norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the
concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people.29
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.30
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further
altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30,
1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended
on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended
or higher;
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'"
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit
trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the
exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction
as herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including
quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed
under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided,
That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court
of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding,
the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of
civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and
jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve
the filing such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be
recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore

been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and
the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise
the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17,
1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons
alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of
the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. 32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously
cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with
prohibition on private individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for
any person having family or close personal relation with any public official
to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal
relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or
material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some
business, transaction, application, request or contract with the
government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation
shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the
third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close
personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional
employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such
public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any
public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft
and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not
among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting
this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a
sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur
inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong
kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at
katawa-tawa.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference

to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole
text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. 35 In other words,
petitioners interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must
be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a
statute is the statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum
statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa
kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na
interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by
public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to
exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to
the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b)
the offense is committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of
the National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The
Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an
Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of the
Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No.
30). It was later designated as the National Parks Development Committee
(NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda
R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and ViceChairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the
Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on
December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to
PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the
Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a
regular government agency under the Office of the President and
allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct
to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater
firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in
Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the
Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not have

jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of

the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the
government employees separately charged for the same crimes, has not
altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment
of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by government employees
in conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are
within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They
simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the
fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would
nonetheless not be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any
salary or remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the
last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. InKhan, Jr. v. Office
of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a
public officer.39The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers.
Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and
jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by
law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion
of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for
the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1).
The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not
a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of
some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid.,
Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an
office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am.
Jur. 881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public
office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by
law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion
of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for
the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer." 42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in
fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not
only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No.
1606. InGeduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A)

covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27
and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction
of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as
she is placed there by express provision of law. 44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed
out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a nonstock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of
public office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. 47
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment
in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. 48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the
Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing
advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the
Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for
profit.50
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the
Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was
not committed in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the
approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR
authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were
not ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act
was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the
information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the
theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or
a motion to quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost
entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent. 53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that
petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her
official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking
advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE

IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan
when it did not quash the information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private
funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no
leg to stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of
the President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under
the information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the
President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and
misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No.
91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of
the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial
on the merits of the instant case.54
A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his
reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No.
3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition forcertiorari and his
memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the
Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty
Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a
criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a
name different from that with which he was authorized. We severely
reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension
or disbarment.56
We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation.
A lawyers conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and
fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act
with complete candor and honesty before the courts. 58
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162059

January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UP-Cebu.
She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a
student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and
ending on December 31, 2000. On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her
siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3 One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of
the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as
financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President. The renovation of
Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine
Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA
sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with
the Office of the Ombudsman.6 The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa and filed the case to the
Sandiganbayan.7 Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that
the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or
over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. The Sandiganbayan
denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied with finality.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an estafa
case? (2) Whether or not petitioner is a public officer with Salary Grade 27?

DOCTRINE: (1) Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 which defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan reads: Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. (2) While the first part of
Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under
the jurisdiction of the said court.

RATIONALE:

(1) The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a
sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. 33 Every
section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to
each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. 34
Evidently, from the provisions of Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials
in relation to their office. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their
office.

(2) Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even if she does
not have a salary grade 27, as she is placed there by express provision of law. 44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed
out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a nonstock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

G.R. No. 154598

August 16, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child
SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner,

vs.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002
resolution1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
and lack of substance. The dispositive portion 2 read:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the
grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28,
1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year
later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer
Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain
housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a
nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever
petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends,
leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued
her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with
her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that
she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in
Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that
the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the
whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them
there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a
certification3 that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular phone
bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila
and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this
time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus
enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it
did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family
Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980):

Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction
was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction
of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It
provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases:
xxx

xxx

xxx

b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas

corpus in relation to the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902
insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in
custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did,
because there is no other meaning of the word "exclusive" than to
constitute the Family Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a
court other than the Family Court also possesses the same competence,
then the jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent and
such an interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA
8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a
petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent can
easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by just
moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the
writ has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is
conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in
this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or
necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this
Court or any court for that matter to determine. The enactment of a
law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the legislature. When
there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form
the courts but only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors
in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors
(A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot.
Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in

the Supreme Court,4 Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. 5
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in
RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the
custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP
129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of
habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be
construed any other way.
We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous
situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining
custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors
they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family
courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another,
which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be
left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention
of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed
by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to
"protect the rights and promote the welfare of children." The creation of
the Family Court is geared towards addressing three major issues
regarding childrens welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during
the deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family
Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid
further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and
specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as
to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains
protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We
rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of
minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for
habeas corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain
and transient will not result in one of the situations that the legislature
seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex
parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of
the childs privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the
appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by
the legislature: the childs welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive"
as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor

General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,6 the heirs of miners killed in a
work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under
the Workmens Compensation Act, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner
had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it
supports petitioners submission that the word "exclusive" in the Family
Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic foreclosure of the
jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In
the same manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective,
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar
is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus
enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in
cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ
cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the
same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2,
Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court,
or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court
of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by
law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any
member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge
thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be
granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day
and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only
within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioners "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort
to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said
that it was merely applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of
social justice in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil
Code. It also applied the well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit
and intent, not the letter, of the law:
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of
the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. In the words of
Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of

the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code,
is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience
to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation
aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in
more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is
not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation

may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction. 7 In the

case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave
injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of
children"8 under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve
as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not
favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof
must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The
rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est
optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and
brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed
to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted
conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any
implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and
give effect to all laws on the subject." 9
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating
to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA
8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not
prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas
corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369
must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption
of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus
in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ
of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family
Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable
to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and
decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases
where the custody of minors is involved.

One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the
country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of
Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the
Solicitor General:10
That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the
country" does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle,
since such a task is no more different from or difficult than the duty of the
peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise
enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus
in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
SO ORDERED.

Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, Aug. 16, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were
married and had one daughter. After 3 years, the woman grew restless and
bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return to her old job as GRO in a
nightclub. One day, the woman left the family home together with their
daughter and told her servants that she was going to Basilan. The
husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court
in Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in Basilan. When
he went to Basilan, he didnt find them and the barangay office issued a
certification that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner filed
another petition for habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of
habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied
by CA on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case since
RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980.)

ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases

involving custody of minors in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving
family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.

HELD: Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because

nothing in RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors. The reasoning of CA cant be affirmed because
it will result to iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course in
obtaining custody. The minor could be transferred from one place to
another and habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy since
family courts take cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction. Literal
interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice,
and contradiction. The literal interpretation of exclusive will result in
grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote
welfare of children.

G.R. No. 153866

February 11, 2005

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY (PHILIPPINES), respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Business companies registered in and operating from the Special Economic Zone
in Naga, Cebu -- like herein respondent -- are entities exempt from all internal
revenue taxes and the implementing rules relevant thereto, including the valueadded taxes or VAT. Although export sales are not deemed exempt transactions,
they are nonetheless zero-rated. Hence, in the present case, the distinction
between exempt entities and exempttransactions has little significance, because
the net result is that the taxpayer is not liable for the VAT. Respondent, a VATregistered enterprise, has complied with all requisites for claiming a tax refund of
or credit for the input VAT it paid on capital goods it purchased. Thus, the Court
of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that it is entitled to
such refund or credit.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
set aside the May 27, 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP
No. 66093. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition for review
is DENIED for lack of merit."3

The Facts
The CA quoted the facts narrated by the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), as follows:
"As jointly stipulated by the parties, the pertinent facts x x x involved in this case
are as follows:
1. [Respondent] is a resident foreign corporation duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission to do business in the Philippines, with
principal office address at the new Cebu Township One, Special Economic Zone,
Barangay Cantao-an, Naga, Cebu;
2. [Petitioner] is sued in his official capacity, having been duly appointed and
empowered to perform the duties of his office, including, among others, the duty
to act and approve claims for refund or tax credit;
3. [Respondent] is registered with the Philippine Export Zone Authority (PEZA)
and has been issued PEZA Certificate No. 97-044 pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 66, as amended, to engage in the manufacture of recording components
primarily used in computers for export. Such registration was made on 6 June
1997;
4. [Respondent] is VAT [(Value Added Tax)]-registered entity as evidenced by VAT
Registration Certification No. 97-083-000600-V issued on 2 April 1997;
5. VAT returns for the period 1 April 1998 to 30 June 1999 have been filed by
[respondent];
6. An administrative claim for refund of VAT input taxes in the amount
of P28,369,226.38 with supporting documents (inclusive of the P12,267,981.04
VAT input taxes subject of this Petition for Review), was filed on 4 October 1999
with Revenue District Office No. 83, Talisay Cebu;
7. No final action has been received by [respondent] from [petitioner] on
[respondents] claim for VAT refund.
"The administrative claim for refund by the [respondent] on October 4, 1999 was
not acted upon by the [petitioner] prompting the [respondent] to elevate the
case to [the CTA] on July 21, 2000 by way of Petition for Review in order to toll
the running of the two-year prescriptive period.
"For his part, [petitioner] x x x raised the following Special and Affirmative
Defenses, to wit:
1. [Respondents] alleged claim for tax refund/credit is subject to administrative
routinary investigation/examination by [petitioners] Bureau;
2. Since taxes are presumed to have been collected in accordance with laws and
regulations, the [respondent] has the burden of proof that the taxes sought to
be refunded were erroneously or illegally collected x x x;
3. In Citibank, N.A. vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 459 (1997), the Supreme
Court ruled that:

"A claimant has the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of his or her
claim for tax credit/refund."
4. Claims for tax refund/tax credit are construed in strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer. This is due to the fact that claims for refund/credit [partake of] the
nature of an exemption from tax. Thus, it is incumbent upon the [respondent] to
prove that it is indeed entitled to the refund/credit sought. Failure on the part of
the [respondent] to prove the same is fatal to its claim for tax credit. He who
claims exemption must be able to justify his claim by the clearest grant of
organic or statutory law. An exemption from the common burden cannot be
permitted to exist upon vague implications;
5. Granting, without admitting, that [respondent] is a Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA) registered Ecozone Enterprise, then its business is not subject
to VAT pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. ([RA]) 7916 in relation to
Section 103 of the Tax Code, as amended. As [respondents] business is not
subject to VAT, the capital goods and services it alleged to have purchased are
considered not used in VAT taxable business. As such, [respondent] is not
entitled to refund of input taxes on such capital goods pursuant to Section
4.106.1 of Revenue Regulations No. ([RR])7-95, and of input taxes on services
pursuant to Section 4.103 of said regulations.
6. [Respondent] must show compliance with the provisions of Section 204 (C)
and 229 of the 1997 Tax Code on filing of a written claim for refund within two (2)
years from the date of payment of tax.
"On July 19, 2001, the Tax Court rendered a decision granting the claim for
refund."4
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the Decision of the CTA granting the claim for refund or issuance
of a tax credit certificate (TCC) in favor of respondent in the reduced amount
of P12,122,922.66. This sum represented the unutilized but substantiated input
VAT paid on capital goods purchased for the period covering April 1, 1998 to June
30, 1999.
The appellate court reasoned that respondent had availed itself only of the fiscal
incentives under Executive Order No. (EO) 226 (otherwise known as the Omnibus
Investment Code of 1987), not of those under both Presidential Decree No. (PD)
66, as amended, and Section 24 of RA 7916. Respondent was, therefore,
considered exempt only from the payment of income tax when it opted for the
income tax holiday in lieu of the 5 percent preferential tax on gross income
earned. As a VAT-registered entity, though, it was still subject to the payment of
other national internal revenue taxes, like the VAT.
Moreover, the CA held that neither Section 109 of the Tax Code nor Sections
4.106-1 and 4.103-1 of RR 7-95 were applicable. Having paid the input VAT on
the capital goods it purchased, respondent correctly filed the administrative and
judicial claims for its refund within the two-year prescriptive period. Such
payments were -- to the extent of the refundable value -- duly supported by VAT
invoices or official receipts, and were not yet offset against any output VAT
liability.

Hence this Petition.5

Sole Issue
Petitioner submits this sole issue for our consideration:
"Whether or not respondent is entitled to the refund or issuance of Tax Credit
Certificate in the amount ofP12,122,922.66 representing alleged unutilized input
VAT paid on capital goods purchased for the period April 1, 1998 to June 30,
1999."6
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.
Sole Issue:
Entitlement of a VAT-Registered PEZA Enterprise to a Refund of or Credit for
Input VAT
No doubt, as a PEZA-registered enterprise within a special economic
zone,7 respondent is entitled to the fiscal incentives and benefits 8 provided for in
either PD 669 or EO 226.10 It shall, moreover, enjoy all privileges, benefits,
advantages or exemptions under both Republic Act Nos. (RA) 7227 11 and 7844.12
Preferential Tax Treatment Under Special Laws
If it avails itself of PD 66, notwithstanding the provisions of other laws to the
contrary, respondent shall not be subject to internal revenue laws and
regulations for raw materials, supplies, articles, equipment, machineries, spare
parts and wares, except those prohibited by law, brought into the zone to be
stored, broken up, repacked, assembled, installed, sorted, cleaned, graded or
otherwise processed, manipulated, manufactured, mixed or used directly or
indirectly in such activities.13 Even so, respondent would enjoy a net-operating
loss carry over; accelerated depreciation; foreign exchange and financial
assistance; and exemption from export taxes, local taxes and licenses. 14
Comparatively, the same exemption from internal revenue laws and regulations
applies if EO 22615 is chosen. Under this law, respondent shall further be entitled
to an income tax holiday; additional deduction for labor expense; simplification
of customs procedure; unrestricted use of consigned equipment; access to a
bonded manufacturing warehouse system; privileges for foreign nationals
employed; tax credits on domestic capital equipment, as well as for taxes and
duties on raw materials; and exemption from contractors taxes, wharfage dues,
taxes and duties on imported capital equipment and spare parts, export taxes,
duties, imposts and fees,16local taxes and licenses, and real property taxes. 17
A privilege available to respondent under the provision in RA 7227 on tax and
duty-free importation of raw materials, capital and equipment 18 -- is, ipso facto,
also accorded to the zone19 under RA 7916. Furthermore, the latter law -notwithstanding other existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary -extends20 to that zone the provision stating that no local or national taxes shall
be imposed therein.21 No exchange control policy shall be applied; and free

markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and future shall be allowed and
maintained.22Banking and finance shall also be liberalized under minimum
Bangko Sentral regulation with the establishment of foreign currency depository
units of local commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign banks. 23
In the same vein, respondent benefits under RA 7844 from negotiable tax
credits24 for locally-produced materials used as inputs. Aside from the other
incentives possibly already granted to it by the Board of Investments, it also
enjoys preferential credit facilities 25 and exemption from PD 1853.26
From the above-cited laws, it is immediately clear that petitioner enjoys
preferential tax treatment.27 It is not subject to internal revenue laws and
regulations and is even entitled to tax credits. The VAT on capital goods is an
internal revenue tax from which petitioner as an entity is exempt. Although
the transactions involving such tax are not exempt, petitioner as a VAT-registered
person,28 however, is entitled to their credits.
Nature of the VAT and the Tax Credit Method
Viewed broadly, the VAT is a uniform tax ranging, at present, from 0 percent to
10 percent levied on every importation of goods, whether or not in the course of
trade or business, or imposed on each sale, barter, exchange or lease of goods
or properties or on each rendition of services in the course of trade or
business29 as they pass along the production and distribution chain, the tax being
limited only to the value added30 to such goods, properties or services by the
seller, transferor or lessor.31 It is an indirect tax that may be shifted or passed on
to the buyer, transferee or lessee of the goods, properties or services. 32 As such,
it should be understood not in the context of the person or entity that is
primarily, directly and legally liable for its payment, but in terms of its nature as
a tax on consumption.33 In either case, though, the same conclusion is arrived at.
The law34 that originally imposed the VAT in the country, as well as the
subsequent amendments of that law, has been drawn from the tax credit
method.35 Such method adopted the mechanics and self-enforcement features of
the VAT as first implemented and practiced in Europe and subsequently adopted
in New Zealand and Canada.36Under the present method that relies on invoices,
an entity can credit against or subtract from the VAT charged on its sales or
outputs the VAT paid on its purchases, inputs and imports. 37
If at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes 38 charged by a seller39 are
equal to the input taxes40 passed on by the suppliers, no payment is required. It
is when the output taxes exceed the input taxes that the excess has to be
paid.41 If, however, the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess shall be
carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters. 42 Should the input taxes
result from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transactions or from the
acquisition of capital goods,43 any excess over the output taxes shall instead be
refunded44 to the taxpayer or credited45 against other internal revenue taxes.46
Zero-Rated and Effectively Zero-Rated Transactions
Although both are taxable and similar in effect, zero-rated transactions differ
from effectively zero-rated transactions as to their source.

Zero-rated transactions generally refer to the export sale of goods and supply of
services.47 The tax rate is set at zero.48 When applied to the tax base, such rate
obviously results in no tax chargeable against the purchaser. The seller of such
transactions charges no output tax, 49 but can claim a refund of or a tax credit
certificate for the VAT previously charged by suppliers.
Effectively zero-rated transactions, however, refer to the sale of goods 50 or
supply of services51 to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws or
international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory effectively
subjects such transactions to a zero rate.52 Again, as applied to the tax base,
such rate does not yield any tax chargeable against the purchaser. The seller
who charges zero output tax on such transactions can also claim a refund of or a
tax credit certificate for the VAT previously charged by suppliers.
Zero Rating and Exemption
In terms of the VAT computation, zero rating and exemption are the same, but
the extent of relief that results from either one of them is not.
Applying the destination principle53 to the exportation of goods, automatic zero
rating54 is primarily intended to be enjoyed by the seller who is directly and
legally liable for the VAT, making such seller internationally competitive by
allowing the refund or credit of input taxes that are attributable to export
sales.55 Effective zero rating, on the contrary, is intended to benefit the
purchaser who, not being directly and legally liable for the payment of the VAT,
will ultimately bear the burden of the tax shifted by the suppliers.
In both instances of zero rating, there is total relief for the purchaser from the
burden of the tax.56 But in an exemption there is only partial relief,57 because the
purchaser is not allowed any tax refund of or credit for input taxes paid. 58
Exempt Transaction >and Exempt Party
The object of exemption from the VAT may either be the transaction itself or any
of the parties to the transaction.59
An exempt transaction, on the one hand, involves goods or services which, by
their nature, are specifically listed in and expressly exempted from the VAT under
the Tax Code, without regard to the tax status -- VAT-exempt or not -- of the party
to the transaction.60 Indeed, such transaction is not subject to the VAT, but the
seller is not allowed any tax refund of or credit for any input taxes paid.
An exempt party, on the other hand, is a person or entity granted VAT exemption
under the Tax Code, a special law or an international agreement to which the
Philippines is a signatory, and by virtue of which its taxable transactions become
exempt from the VAT.61 Such party is also not subject to the VAT, but may be
allowed a tax refund of or credit for input taxes paid, depending on its
registration as a VAT or non-VAT taxpayer.
As mentioned earlier, the VAT is a tax on consumption, the amount of which may
be shifted or passed on by the seller to the purchaser of the goods, properties or
services.62 While the liability is imposed on one person, theburden may be
passed on to another. Therefore, if a special law merely exempts a party as a

seller from its direct liability for payment of the VAT, but does not relieve the
same party as a purchaser from its indirect burden of the VAT shifted to it by its
VAT-registered suppliers, the purchase transaction is not exempt. Applying this
principle to the case at bar, the purchase transactions entered into by
respondent are not VAT-exempt.
Special laws may certainly exempt transactions from the VAT. 63 However, the Tax
Code provides that those falling under PD 66 are not. PD 66 is the precursor of
RA 7916 -- the special law under which respondent was registered. The
purchase transactions it entered into are, therefore, not VAT-exempt. These are
subject to the VAT; respondent is required to register.
Its sales transactions, however, will either be zero-rated or taxed at the standard
rate of 10 percent,64 depending again on the application of the destination
principle.65
If respondent enters into such sales transactions with a purchaser -- usually in a
foreign country -- for use or consumption outside the Philippines, these shall be
subject to 0 percent.66 If entered into with a purchaser for use or consumption in
the Philippines, then these shall be subject to 10 percent, 67 unless the purchaser
is exempt from the indirect burden of the VAT, in which case it shall also be zerorated.
Since the purchases of respondent are not exempt from the VAT, the rate to be
applied is zero. Its exemption under both PD 66 and RA 7916 effectively subjects
such transactions to a zero rate, 68 because the ecozone within which it is
registered is managed and operated by the PEZA as a separate customs
territory.69 This means that in such zone is created the legal fiction of foreign
territory.70 Under the cross-border principle71 of the VAT system being enforced by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),72 no VAT shall be imposed to form part of
the cost of goods destined for consumption outside of the territorial border of the
taxing authority. If exports of goods and services from the Philippines to a foreign
country are free of the VAT,73 then the same rule holds for such exports from the
national territory -- except specifically declared areas -- to an ecozone.
Sales made by a VAT-registered person in the customs territory to a PEZAregistered entity are considered exports to a foreign country; conversely, sales
by a PEZA-registered entity to a VAT-registered person in the customs territory
are deemed imports from a foreign country.74 An ecozone -- indubitably a
geographical territory of the Philippines -- is, however, regarded in law as foreign
soil.75 This legal fiction is necessary to give meaningful effect to the policies of
the special law creating the zone.76 If respondent is located in an export
processing zone77 within that ecozone, sales to the export processing zone, even
without being actually exported, shall in fact be viewed as constructively
exported under EO 226.78 Considered as export sales,79 such purchase
transactions by respondent would indeed be subject to a zero rate. 80
Tax Exemptions Broad and Express
Applying the special laws we have earlier discussed, respondent as an entity is
exempt from internal revenue laws and regulations.

This exemption covers both direct and indirect taxes, stemming from the very
nature of the VAT as a tax on consumption, for which the direct liability is
imposed on one person but the indirect burden is passed on to another.
Respondent, as an exempt entity, can neither be directly charged for the VAT on
its sales nor indirectly made to bear, as added cost to such sales, the equivalent
VAT on its purchases. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Where
the law does not distinguish, we ought not to distinguish.
Moreover, the exemption is both express and pervasive for the following reasons:
First, RA 7916 states that "no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed on
business establishments operating within the ecozone." 81 Since this law does not
exclude the VAT from the prohibition, it is deemed included.Exceptio firmat
regulam in casibus non exceptis. An exception confirms the rule in cases not
excepted; that is, a thing not being excepted must be regarded as coming within
the purview of the general rule.
Moreover, even though the VAT is not imposed on the entity but on the
transaction, it may still be passed on and, therefore, indirectly imposed on the
same entity -- a patent circumvention of the law. That no VAT shall be imposed
directly upon business establishments operating within the ecozone under RA
7916 also means that no VAT may be passed on and imposed indirectly. Quando
aliquid prohibetur ex directo prohibetur et per obliquum. When anything is
prohibited directly, it is also prohibited indirectly.
Second, when RA 8748 was enacted to amend RA 7916, the same prohibition
applied, except for real property taxes that presently are imposed on land owned
by developers.82 This similar and repeated prohibition is an unambiguous
ratification of the laws intent in not imposing local or national taxes on business
enterprises within the ecozone.
Third, foreign and domestic merchandise, raw materials, equipment and the like
"shall not be subject to x x x internal revenue laws and regulations" under PD
6683 -- the original charter of PEZA (then EPZA) that was later amended by RA
7916.84 No provisions in the latter law modify such exemption.
Although this exemption puts the government at an initial disadvantage, the
reduced tax collection ultimately redounds to the benefit of the national
economy by enticing more business investments and creating more employment
opportunities.85
Fourth, even the rules implementing the PEZA law clearly reiterate that
merchandise -- except those prohibited by law -- "shall not be subject to x x x
internal revenue laws and regulations x x x" 86 if brought to the ecozones
restricted area87 for manufacturing by registered export enterprises, 88 of which
respondent is one. These rules also apply to all enterprises registered with the
EPZA prior to the effectivity of such rules.89
Fifth, export processing zone enterprises registered 90 with the Board of
Investments (BOI) under EO 226 patently enjoy exemption from national internal
revenue taxes on imported capital equipment reasonably needed and exclusively
used for the manufacture of their products;91 on required supplies and spare part
for consigned equipment;92 and on foreign and domestic merchandise, raw

materials, equipment and the like -- except those prohibited by law -- brought
into the zone for manufacturing.93 In addition, they are given credits for the value
of the national internal revenue taxes imposed on domestic capital equipment
also reasonably needed and exclusively used for the manufacture of their
products,94 as well as for the value of such taxes imposed on domestic raw
materials and supplies that are used in the manufacture of their export products
and that form part thereof.95
Sixth, the exemption from local and national taxes granted under RA 7227 96 are
ipso facto accorded to ecozones. 97 In case of doubt, conflicts with respect to such
tax exemption privilege shall be resolved in favor of the ecozone. 98
And seventh, the tax credits under RA 7844 -- given for imported raw materials
primarily used in the production of export goods, 99 and for locally produced raw
materials, capital equipment and spare parts used by exporters of non-traditional
products100 -- shall also be continuously enjoyed by similar exporters within the
ecozone.101Indeed, the latter exporters are likewise entitled to such tax
exemptions and credits.
Tax Refund as Tax Exemption
To be sure, statutes that grant tax exemptions are construed strictissimi
juris102 against the taxpayer103 and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. 104
Tax refunds are in the nature of such exemptions. 105 Accordingly, the claimants of
those refunds bear the burden of proving the factual basis of their claims; 106 and
of showing, by words too plain to be mistaken, that the legislature intended to
exempt them.107 In the present case, all the cited legal provisions are teeming
with life with respect to the grant of tax exemptions too vivid to pass unnoticed.
In addition, respondent easily meets the challenge.
Respondent, which as an entity is exempt, is different from its transactions which
are not exempt. The end result, however, is that it is not subject to the VAT. The
non-taxability of transactions that are otherwise taxable is merely a necessary
incident to the tax exemption conferred by law upon it as an entity, not upon the
transactions themselves.108 Nonetheless, its exemption as an entity and the nonexemption of its transactions lead to the same result for the following
considerations:
First, the contemporaneous construction of our tax laws by BIR authorities who
are called upon to execute or administer such laws 109 will have to be adopted.
Their prior tax issuances have held inconsistent positions brought about by their
probable failure to comprehend and fully appreciate the nature of the VAT as a
tax on consumption and the application of the destination principle.110 Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. (RMC) 74-99, however, now clearly and correctly
provides that any VAT-registered suppliers sale of goods, property or services
from the customs territory to any registered enterprise operating in the ecozone
-- regardless of the class or type of the latters PEZA registration -- is legally
entitled to a zero rate.111
Second, the policies of the law should prevail. Ratio legis est anima. The reason
for the law is its very soul.

In PD 66, the urgent creation of the EPZA which preceded the PEZA, as well as
the establishment of export processing zones, seeks "to encourage and promote
foreign commerce as a means of x x x strengthening our export trade and
foreign exchange position, of hastening industrialization, of reducing domestic
unemployment, and of accelerating the development of the country." 112
RA 7916, as amended by RA 8748, declared that by creating the PEZA and
integrating the special economic zones, "the government shall actively
encourage, promote, induce and accelerate a sound and balanced industrial,
economic and social development of the country x x x through the
establishment, among others, of special economic zones x x x that shall
effectively attract legitimate and productive foreign investments." 113
Under EO 226, the "State shall encourage x x x foreign investments in industry x
x x which shall x x x meet the tests of international competitiveness[,] accelerate
development of less developed regions of the country[,] and result in increased
volume and value of exports for the economy." 114 Fiscal incentives that are costefficient and simple to administer shall be devised and extended to significant
projects "to compensate for market imperfections, to reward performance
contributing to economic development,"115 and "to stimulate the establishment
and assist initial operations of the enterprise." 116
Wisely accorded to ecozones created under RA 7916 117 was the governments
policy -- spelled out earlier in RA 7227 -- of converting into alternative productive
uses118 the former military reservations and their extensions, 119as well as of
providing them incentives120 to enhance the benefits that would be derived from
them121 in promoting economic and social development.122
Finally, under RA 7844, the State declares the need "to evolve export
development into a national effort"123 in order to win international markets. By
providing many export and tax incentives,124 the State is able to drive home the
point that exporting is indeed "the key to national survival and the means
through which the economic goals of increased employment and enhanced
incomes can most expeditiously be achieved." 125
The Tax Code itself seeks to "promote sustainable economic growth x x x; x x x
increase economic activity; and x x x create a robust environment for business to
enable firms to compete better in the regional as well as the global
market."126 After all, international competitiveness requires economic and tax
incentives to lower the cost of goods produced for export. State actions that
affect global competition need to be specific and selective in the pricing of
particular goods or services.127
All these statutory policies are congruent to the constitutional mandates of
providing incentives to needed investments, 128 as well as of promoting the
preferential use of domestic materials and locally produced goods and adopting
measures to help make these competitive.129 Tax credits for domestic inputs
strengthen backward linkages. Rightly so, "the rule of law and the existence of
credible and efficient public institutions are essential prerequisites for
sustainable economic development."130
VAT Registration, Not Application for Effective Zero Rating, Indispensable to VAT
Refund

Registration is an indispensable requirement under our VAT law. 131 Petitioner

alleges that respondent did register for VAT purposes with the appropriate
Revenue District Office. However, it is now too late in the day for petitioner to
challenge the VAT-registered status of respondent, given the latters prior
representation before the lower courts and the mode of appeal taken by
petitioner before this Court.
The PEZA law, which carried over the provisions of the EPZA law, is clear in
exempting from internal revenue laws and regulations the equipment -- including
capital goods -- that registered enterprises will use, directly or indirectly, in
manufacturing.132 EO 226 even reiterates this privilege among the incentives it
gives to such enterprises.133 Petitioner merely asserts that by virtue of the PEZA
registration alone of respondent, the latter is not subject to the VAT.
Consequently, the capital goods and services respondent has purchased are not
considered used in the VAT business, and no VAT refund or credit is due. 134 This is
a non sequitur. By the VATs very nature as a tax on consumption, the capital
goods and services respondent has purchased are subject to the VAT, although at
zero rate. Registration does not determine taxability under the VAT law.
Moreover, the facts have already been determined by the lower courts. Having
failed to present evidence to support its contentions against the income tax
holiday privilege of respondent,135 petitioner is deemed to have conceded. It is a
cardinal rule that "issues and arguments not adequately and seriously brought
below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 136 This is a "matter of
procedure"137 and a "question of fairness."138 Failure to assert "within a
reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or declined to assert it." 139
The BIR regulations additionally requiring an approved prior application for
effective zero rating140 cannot prevail over the clear VAT nature of respondents
transactions. The scope of such regulations is not "within the statutory authority
x x x granted by the legislature.141
First, a mere administrative issuance, like a BIR regulation, cannot amend the
law; the former cannot purport to do any more than interpret the latter. 142 The
courts will not countenance one that overrides the statute it seeks to apply and
implement.143
Other than the general registration of a taxpayer the VAT status of which is aptly
determined, no provision under our VAT law requires an additional application to
be made for such taxpayers transactions to be considered effectively zero-rated.
An effectively zero-rated transaction does not and cannot become exempt simply
because an application therefor was not made or, if made, was denied. To allow
the additional requirement is to give unfettered discretion to those officials or
agents who, without fluid consideration, are bent on denying a valid application.
Moreover, the State can never be estopped by the omissions, mistakes or errors
of its officials or agents.144
Second, grantia argumenti that such an application is required by law, there is
still the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty.145 Respondents registration carries with it the presumption that, in the
absence of contradictory evidence, an application for effective zero rating was

also filed and approval thereof given. Besides, it is also presumed that the law
has been obeyed146 by both the administrative officials and the applicant.
Third, even though such an application was not made, all the special laws we
have tackled exempt respondent not only from internal revenue laws but also
from the regulations issued pursuant thereto. Leniency in the implementation of
the VAT in ecozones is an imperative, precisely to spur economic growth in the
country and attain global competitiveness as envisioned in those laws.
A VAT-registered status, as well as compliance with the invoicing
requirements,147 is sufficient for the effective zero rating of the transactions of a
taxpayer. The nature of its business and transactions can easily be perused from,
as already clearly indicated in, its VAT registration papers and photocopied
documents attached thereto. Hence, its transactions cannot be exempted by its
mere failure to apply for their effective zero rating. Otherwise, their VAT
exemption would be determined, not by their nature, but by the taxpayers
negligence -- a result not at all contemplated. Administrative convenience cannot
thwart legislative mandate.
Tax Refund or Credit in Order
Having determined that respondents purchase transactions are subject to a zero
VAT rate, the tax refund or credit is in order.
As correctly held by both the CA and the Tax Court, respondent had chosen the
fiscal incentives in EO 226 over those in RA 7916 and PD 66. It opted for the
income tax holiday regime instead of the 5 percent preferential tax regime.
The latter scheme is not a perfunctory aftermath of a simple registration under
the PEZA law,148 for EO 226149also has provisions to contend with. These two
regimes are in fact incompatible and cannot be availed of simultaneously by the
same entity. While EO 226 merely exempts it from income taxes, the PEZA law
exempts it from all taxes.
Therefore, respondent can be considered exempt, not from the VAT, but only
from the payment of income tax for a certain number of years, depending on its
registration as a pioneer or a non-pioneer enterprise. Besides, the remittance of
the aforesaid 5 percent of gross income earned in lieu of local and national taxes
imposable upon business establishments within the ecozone cannot outrightly
determine a VAT exemption. Being subject to VAT, payments erroneously
collected thereon may then be refunded or credited.
Even if it is argued that respondent is subject to the 5 percent preferential tax
regime in RA 7916, Section 24 thereof does not preclude the VAT. One can,
therefore, counterargue that such provision merely exempts respondent from
taxes imposed on business. To repeat, the VAT is a tax imposed on consumption,
not on business. Although respondent as an entity is exempt, the transactions it
enters into are not necessarily so. The VAT payments made in excess of the zero
rate that is imposable may certainly be refunded or credited.
Compliance with All Requisites for VAT Refund or Credit

As further enunciated by the Tax Court, respondent complied with all the
requisites for claiming a VAT refund or credit. 150
First, respondent is a VAT-registered entity. This fact alone distinguishes the
present case from Contex, in which this Court held that the petitioner therein was
registered as a non-VAT taxpayer. 151 Hence, for being merely VAT-exempt, the
petitioner in that case cannot claim any VAT refund or credit.
Second, the input taxes paid on the capital goods of respondent are duly
supported by VAT invoices and have not been offset against any output taxes.
Although enterprises registered with the BOI after December 31, 1994 would no
longer enjoy the tax credit incentives on domestic capital equipment -- as
provided for under Article 39(d), Title III, Book I of EO 226 152 -- starting January 1,
1996, respondent would still have the same benefit under a general and express
exemption contained in both Article 77(1), Book VI of EO 226; and Section 12,
paragraph 2 (c) of RA 7227, extended to the ecozones by RA 7916.
There was a very clear intent on the part of our legislators, not only to exempt
investors in ecozones from national and local taxes, but also to grant them tax
credits. This fact was revealed by the sponsorship speeches in Congress during
the second reading of House Bill No. 14295, which later became RA 7916, as
shown below:
"MR. RECTO. x x x Some of the incentives that this bill provides are exemption
from national and local taxes; x x x tax credit for locally-sourced inputs x x x."
xxxxxxxxx
"MR. DEL MAR. x x x To advance its cause in encouraging investments and
creating an environment conducive for investors, the bill offers incentives such
as the exemption from local and national taxes, x x x tax credits for locally
sourced inputs x x x."153
And third, no question as to either the filing of such claims within the prescriptive
period or the validity of the VAT returns has been raised. Even if such a question
were raised, the tax exemption under all the special laws cited above is broad
enough to cover even the enforcement of internal revenue laws, including
prescription.154\
Summary
To summarize, special laws expressly grant preferential tax treatment to
business establishments registered and operating within an ecozone, which by
law is considered as a separate customs territory. As such, respondent is exempt
from all internal revenue taxes, including the VAT, and regulations pertaining
thereto. It has opted for the income tax holiday regime, instead of the 5
percent preferential tax regime. As a matter of law and procedure, its
registration status entitling it to such tax holiday can no longer be questioned. Its
sales transactions intended for export may not be exempt, but like its purchase
transactions, they are zero-rated. No prior application for the effective zero
rating of its transactions is necessary. Being VAT-registered and having
satisfactorily complied with all the requisites for claiming a tax refund of or credit

for the input VAT paid on capital goods purchased, respondent is entitled to such
VAT refund or credit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 153866. February 11, 2005]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
TECHNOLOGY (PHILIPPINES), respondent.

vs.

SEAGATE

Business companies registered in Special Economic Zone in Naga, Cebu -are entities exempt from AIRT, including the VAT. Although export sales are not
deemed exempt transactions, they are nonetheless zero-rated. Hence, in the
present case, the distinction between exempt entities and exempt transactions
has little significance, because the net result is that the taxpayer is not liable for
the VAT.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the May 27, 2002 Decision [2] of the CA.
The Facts
The CA quoted the facts narrated by the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), as
follows:
1. Seagate
- is a resident foreign corporation duly registered with the SEC to do
business in the Philippines, with principal office address at
theNaga, Cebu;
- engaged in the manufacture of recording components primarily
used in computers for export
- April 2, 1997 VAT-registered
- June 6, 1997 - registered with the PEZA
- April 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999 filed VAT returns
- October 4, 1999 filed a claim for refund of VAT input P
P28,369,226.38 with supporting documents (inclusive of the
P12,267,981.04 VAT input taxes subject of this Petition for Review)
RDO 83 Talisay, Cebu
- BIR no action
- July 21, 2000 Seagate elevated the case to CTA by way of
Petition for review in order to toll the running of prescriptive period
2. Special and Affirmative Defenses of the BIR:
- the claim for tax refund/credit is subject to administrative routinary
investigation/examination by the BIR.
- Since taxes are presumed to have been collected in accordance with
laws and regulations, the [respondent] has the burden of proof that
the taxes sought to be refunded were erroneously or illegally collected;
- Claims for tax refund/tax credit are construed in strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer. This is due to the fact that claims for
refund/credit [partake of] the nature of an exemption from tax.;

- Granting, without admitting, that [respondent] is a Philippine Economic

Zone Authority (PEZA) registered Ecozone Enterprise, then its business
is not subject to VAT. As such, the capital goods and services it
purchased are considered not used in VAT taxable business. Thus, it is
not entitled to refund of input taxes on such capital goods pursuant to
Section 4.106.1 of Revenue Regulations No. ([RR])7-95, and of input
taxes on services pursuant to Section 4.103 of said regulations.
- [Respondent] must show compliance with the provisions of Section 204
(C) and 229 of the 1997 Tax Code on filing of a written claim for refund
within two (2) years from the date of payment of tax.
3. CTA
- July 19, 2001 - granted the claim for refund in the reduced amount of
P12,122,922.66. This sum represented the unutilized but substantiated
input VAT paid on capital goods purchased for the period covering April
1, 1998 to June 30, 1999.
ISSUE:
WON Seagate, a VAT-Registered PEZA Enterprise
the refund.

is entitled to

RULING:
YES. Respondent, a VAT-registered enterprise, has complied with all
requisites for claiming a tax refund of or credit for the input VAT it paid on capital
goods it purchased.
It is not subject to internal revenue laws and regulations and is even entitled
to tax credits. The VAT on capital goods is an internal revenue tax from which
petitioner as an entity is exempt. Although the transactions involving such tax
are not exempt, petitioner as a VAT-registered person, [28] however, is entitled to
their credits.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition for
review is DENIED for lack of merit.[3]
a PEZA-reg. enterprise w/n a special economic zone is entitled to the fiscal
incentives and benefits[8] provided for in either PD 66 or EO 226. It shall,
moreover, enjoy all privileges, benefits, advantages or exemptions under both
Republic Act Nos. (RA) 7227[11] and 7844.[12]Respondent benefits under RA 7844
from negotiable tax credits[24] for locally-produced materials used as inputs. Aside
from the other incentives possibly already granted to it by the Board of
Investments, it also enjoys preferential credit facilities [25] and exemption from PD
1853.[26]
Nature of the VAT and the Tax Credit Method
VAT is a uniform levied on every importation of goods, whether or not in the
course of trade or business, or imposed on each sale, barter, exchange or
lease of goods or properties or on each rendition of services in the course of
trade or business.
It is an indirect tax that may be shifted or passed on to the buyer, transferee
or lessee of the goods, properties or services. [32] As such, it should be understood
not in the context of the person or entity that is primarily, directly and legally

liable for its payment, but in terms of its nature as a tax on consumption. [33] In
either case, though, the same conclusion is arrived at.
If at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes [38] charged by a seller[39]
are equal to the input taxes[40] passed on by the suppliers, no payment is
required. It is when the output taxes exceed the input taxes that the excess has
to be paid.[41] If, however, the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess
shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters. [42] Should the input
taxes result from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transactions or from the
acquisition of capital goods,[43] any excess over the output taxes shall instead be
refunded[44] to the taxpayer or credited[45] against other internal revenue taxes.[46]
Zero-Rated vs. Effectively Zero-Rated Transactions (in effect similar ; As
to source different)

As
source

to

Zero-rated
transactions
export sale of
goods and supply of
services.[47] The tax rate
is set at zero.[48]

In effect

Effectively Zero-rated transactions

sale of goods[50] or supply of services[51] to
persons or entities whose exemption
under special laws or international
agreements to which the Philippines is
a signatory effectively subjects such
transactions to a zero rate

results in no tax chargeable against the purchaser. The seller of

such transactions charges no output tax,[49] but can claim a
refund of or a tax credit certificate for the VAT previously
charged by suppliers.

Zero Rating and Exemption (In

extent of relief different)
Automatic Zero-rating
intended to be enjoyed by the
seller who is directly and
legally liable for the VAT,
making such seller internationally
competitive by allowing the refund
or credit of input taxes that are
attributable to export sales

terms of the VAT computation same; the

Effective zero rating
intended to benefit the
purchaser who, not being
directly and legally liable
for the payment of the VAT,
will ultimately bear the
burden of the tax shifted by
the suppliers.

In both, there is total relief for the purchaser from the burden of
the tax

Exempt Transaction vs. Exempt Party

In
exemption
there
is
only
partial relief
because the
purchaser is not
allowed any tax
refund
of
or
credit for input
taxes paid.[58]

The object of exemption from the VAT may either be the transaction itself or
any of the parties to the transaction.[59]
exempt transaction
involves goods or services
expressly exempted from the
the Tax Code, without regard
status -- VAT-exempt or not
party to the transaction

exempt party
which are
VAT under
to the tax
-- of the

person or entity granted VAT

exemption under the Tax Code, a
special
law
or
an
international
agreement

such transaction is not subject to the

VAT, but the seller is not allowed any
tax refund of or credit for any input
taxes paid.

Such party is also not subject to the

VAT, but may be allowed a tax refund
of or credit for input taxes paid,
depending on its registration as a VAT or
non-VAT taxpayer.

Tax Refund as Tax Exemption

To be sure, statutes that grant tax exemptions are construed strictissimi
juris[102] against the taxpayer[103] and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. [104]
Tax refunds are in the nature of such exemptions.
VAT Registration, Not Application
Indispensable to VAT Refund

for

Effective

Zero

Rating,

Registration is an indispensable requirement under our VAT law. [131] Petitioner

alleges that respondent did register for VAT purposes with the appropriate
Revenue District Office. However, it is now too late in the day for petitioner to
challenge the VAT-registered status of respondent, given the latters prior
representation before the lower courts and the mode of appeal taken by
petitioner before this Court.
Tax Refund or Credit in Order
Having determined that respondents purchase transactions are subject to a
zero VAT rate, the tax refund or credit is in order.
Compliance with All Requisites for VAT Refund or Credit
As further enunciated by the Tax Court, respondent complied with all the
requisites for claiming a VAT refund or credit. [150]
First, respondent is a VAT-registered entity. This fact alone distinguishes the
present case from Contex, in which this Court held that the petitioner therein was
registered as a non-VAT taxpayer. [151] Hence, for being merely VAT-exempt, the
petitioner in that case cannot claim any VAT refund or credit.
Second, the input taxes paid on the capital goods of respondent are duly
supported by VAT invoices and have not been offset against any output taxes.
Summary

To summarize, special laws expressly grant preferential tax treatment to

business establishments registered and operating within an ecozone, which by
law is considered as a separate customs territory. As such, respondent is exempt
from all internal revenue taxes, including the VAT, and regulations pertaining
thereto. It has opted for the income tax holiday regime, instead of the 5 percent
preferential tax regime. As a matter of law and procedure, its registration status
entitling it to such tax holiday can no longer be questioned. Its sales transactions
intended for export may not be exempt, but like its purchase transactions, they
are zero-rated. No prior application for the effective zero rating of its transactions
is necessary. Being VAT-registered and having satisfactorily complied with all the
requisites for claiming a tax refund of or credit for the input VAT paid on capital
goods purchased, respondent is entitled to such VAT refund or credit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
[7]

Referred to as ecozone, it is a selected area with highly developed, or which

has the potential to be developed into, agro-industrial, industrial,
tourist/recreational, commercial, banking, investment and financial
centers. 4(a), Chapter I of RA 7916, otherwise known as The Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995.

[28]

A VAT-registered person is a taxable person who has registered for VAT

purposes under 236 of the Tax Code. Deoferio and Mamalateo

[38]

Output taxes refer to the VAT due on the sale or lease of taxable goods,
properties or services by a VAT-registered or VAT-registrable person. See
last paragraph of 110(A)(3) and 236 of the Tax Code.

[39]

Presumed to be VAT-registered.

[40]

By input taxes is meant the VAT due from or paid by a VAT-registered person
in the course of trade or business on the importation of goods or local
purchases of goods or services, including the lease or use of property from
a VAT-registered person. See penultimate paragraph of 110(A)(3) of the
Tax Code.

[43]

These are goods or properties with estimated useful lives greater than one
year and which are treated as depreciable assets under 34(F) [formerly
29(f)] of the Tax Code, used directly or indirectly in the production or sale
of taxable goods or services. 3rd paragraph of 4.106-1(b) of RR 7-95.

[53]

Under this principle, goods and services are taxed only in the country where
these are consumed. Thus, exports are zero-rated, but imports are taxed.
Id., p. 43.

[54]

In business parlance, automatic zero rating refers to the standard zero

rating as provided for in the

A customs territory means the national territory of the Philippines outside of

the proclaimed boundaries of the ecozones, except those areas specifically
declared by other laws and/or presidential proclamations to have the
status of special economic zones and/or free ports. 2.g, Rule 1, Part I of
the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 7916, otherwise
known as The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.

This circular is an example of an agency statement of general applicability that

takes the form of a revenue tax issuance bearing on internal revenue tax
rules and regulations. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA, 329 Phil.
987, 1009, August 29, 1996, per Vitug, J., citing RMC 10-86. See 2(2),
Chapter 1, Book VII of Executive Order No. (EO) 292, otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987 dated July 25, 1987.
[77]

An export processing zone is a specialized industrial estate located

physically
and/or
administratively
outside
customs
territory,
predominantly oriented to export production, and may be contained in an
ecozone. 4(a) and (d), Chapter I of RA 7916.

[87]

A restricted area is a specific area within an ecozone that is classified and/or

fenced-in as an export processing zone. 2.h, Rule I, Part I of the Rules
and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 7916, otherwise known as
The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.

[88]

A registered export enterprise is one that is registered with the PEZA, and
that engages in manufacturing activities within the purview of the PEZA
law for the exportation of its production. 2.i, Rule I, Part I of the Rules
and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 7916, otherwise known as
The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.

G.R. No. 166735

November 23, 2007

SPS. NEREO & NIEVA DELFINO, Petitioners,

vs.
ST. JAMES HOSPITAL, INC., and THE HONORABLE RONALDO ZAMORA,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us for Resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of private respondent
St. James Hospital, Inc., seeking the reversal of Our Decision dated 5 September
2006. Respondent assails the Decision on the ground that the Court had
erroneously interpreted the 1991 Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) or the
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna, in
ruling that the St. James Hospital is a non-conforming structure under the 1991
Zoning Ordinance and that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a fourstorey, forty-bed capacity medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo
Subdivision is prohibited under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
Moreover, respondent now contends that the case must now be decided in
accordance with the latest Zoning Ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa Rosa
Zoning Ordinance which was only submitted as evidence in the instant Motion for
Reconsideration.
Respondent now claims that the legislative history of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance
shows that commercial and institutional uses were expressly allowed in Sec. 2,
par. 1 of said Ordinance as it retained uses that are commercial and institutional
as well as recreational in character and those for the maintenance of ecological
balance. Thus, respondent postulates that even if parks, playgrounds and

recreation centers which were expressly provided for in the 1981 Zoning
Ordinance under letters (h) and (k) were excluded in the enumeration in the
1991 Zoning Ordinance, the same cannot, by any stretch of logic, be interpreted
to mean that they are no longer allowed. On the contrary, respondent explains
that what appears is the fact that parks, playgrounds, and recreation centers are
deemed to have been covered by Sec. 2, par. 1 of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance
which speaks of "x x x other spaces designed for recreational pursuit and
maintenance of ecological balance x x x." Hence, respondent concludes that the
same reading applies in the non-inclusion of the words hospitals, clinics, school,
churches and other places of worship, and drugstores which cannot be
interpreted to mean that the aforesaid uses are to be deemed non-conforming
under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance as these uses are allegedly covered by the
clause allowing for institutional and commercial uses.
Arising from this interpretation, respondent maintains that the Court erred in
applying Sec. 1 of Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance which pertains only to
existing non-conforming uses and buildings, since, according to respondent, the
St. James Hospital and its expansion are consistent with the uses allowed under
the zoning ordinance.
To address this matter, we deem it necessary to reiterate our discussion in our
Decision dated 5 September 2006, wherein we have thoroughly examined the
pertinent provisions of the 1981 and 1991 Zoning Ordinances, to wit:
Likewise, it must be stressed at this juncture that a comprehensive scrutiny of
both Ordinances will disclose that the uses formerly allowed within a residential
zone under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance such as schools, religious facilities and
places of worship, and clinics and hospitals have now been transferred to the
institutional zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance 1 . This clearly demonstrates
the intention of the Sangguniang Bayan to delimit the allowable uses in the
residential zone only to those expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, which no longer includes hospitals.
It is lamentable that both the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals
gave undue emphasis to the word "institutional" as mentioned in Section 2,
Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance and even went through great lengths to
define said term in order to include hospitals under the ambit of said provision.
However, they neglected the fact that under Section 4, Article VI of said
Ordinance2 , there is now another zone, separate and distinct from a residential
zone, which is classified as "institutional", wherein health facilities, such as
hospitals, are expressly enumerated among those structures allowed within said
zone.
Moreover, both the Office of the President and the appellate court failed to
consider that any meaning or interpretation to be given to the term
"institutional" as used in Section 2, Article VI must be correspondingly limited by
the explicit enumeration of allowable uses contained in the same section.
Whatever meaning the legislative body had intended in employing the word
"institutional" must be discerned in light of the restrictive enumeration in the
said article. Under the legal maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius, the
express mention of one thing in a law, means the exclusion of others not
expressly mentioned3 . Thus, in interpreting the whole of Section 2, Article VI, it
must be understood that in expressly enumerating the allowable uses within a
residential zone, those not included in the enumeration are deemed excluded.

Hence, since hospitals, among other things, are not among those enumerated as
allowable uses within the residential zone, the only inference to be deduced from
said exclusion is that said hospitals have been deliberately eliminated from those
structures permitted to be constructed within a residential area in Santa Rosa,
Laguna.
Furthermore, according to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a
thing omitted must be considered to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore,
with the omission of the phrase "hospital with not more than ten capacity" in the
new Zoning Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to
another zone classification, the only logical conclusion is that the legislative body
had intended that said use be removed from those allowed within a residential
zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St. James Hospital,
within a residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
xxxx
Having concluded that the St. James Hospital is now considered a nonconforming structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, we now come to the
issue of the legality of the proposed expansion of said hospital into a four-storey,
forty-bed medical institution. We shall decide this said issue in accordance with
the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance relating to non-conforming
buildings, the applicable law at the time of the proposal. As stated in Section 1 of
Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance:
Section 1. EXISTING NON-CONFORMING USES AND BUILDINGS. The lawful uses of
any building, structure or land at the point of adoption or amendment of this
Ordinance may be continued, although such does not conform with the
provisions of this Ordinance.
1. That no non-conforming use shall be enlarged or increased or
extended to occupy a greater area or land that has already been
occupied by such use at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance, or
moved in whole or in part to any other portion of the lot parcel of land where
such non-conforming use exist at the time of the adoption of this
Ordinance.4 (Emphasis ours.)
It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance that the
expansion of a non-conforming building is prohibited. Hence, we accordingly
resolve that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed
capacity medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision as prohibited
under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
From our discussion above, it is clear that the position of respondent is
erroneous.1awp++i1 As stated in our Decision, a comprehensive scrutiny of both
zoning ordinances will disclose that the uses formerly allowed within a residential
zone under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance such as schools, religious facilities and
places of worship, and clinics and hospitals have been transferred to the
institutional zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. This clearly indicates that
the allowable uses in the residential zone have been delimited only to those
expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance,
which no longer includes hospitals.

With respect to respondents claim that the controversy must now be decided in
light of latest Zoning Ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa Rosa Zoning
Ordinance, it must be stressed at this point that the present case arose in 1994
when respondent St. James Hospital, Inc., applied for a permit with the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to expand its hospital into a four-storey,
forty-bed capacity medical institution, at which time, the zoning ordinance in
effect was the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. It is a well-settled rule that the law in
force at the time of the occurrence of the cause of action is the applicable law
notwithstanding its subsequent amendment or repeal. 5 Hence, in resolving the
instant case, the zoning ordinance to be used in interpreting the legality or
illegality of said expansion is that which was in full force and effect at the time of
the application for expansion which is the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, regardless of
its subsequent amendment or repeal by the passage of the 1999 Zoning
Ordinance.
Moreover, pleadings, arguments and evidence were submitted by both parties as
regards the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance only. Apparently, the 1999
Zoning Ordinance was already enacted and in effect by the time the petitioners
appealed their case to this Court on 7 February 2005. Petitioners, however, in
their appeal, consistently maintained their argument that the expansion
undertaken by the respondent in 1994 violated the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, and
respondent likewise limited itself to the defense that it had complied therewith. It
bears to emphasize that respondent called the attention of this Court to the
enactment of the 1999 Zoning Ordinance and asserted its compliance with this
latest zoning ordinance only in its Motion for Reconsideration before this Court.
Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a
reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. 6 This
rule holds even more true when the points of law, theories, issues and
arguments are belatedly raised for the first time in the motion for
reconsideration of this Courts decision.
Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent St. James Hospital,
Inc., is hereby DENIED. However, this is without prejudice to respondent St.
James Hospital, Inc.s reapplication for expansion in accordance with the
requirements under zoning ordinances now in effect.
SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINE OF CASUS OMISSUS

Spouses Nereo and Nieva Delfino v. St. James Hospital Inc. G.R. No. 166735,
September 5, 2006 Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS: Respondent St. James Hospital, which was established in 1990 as a tenbed capacity hospital, applied for a permit with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) to expand its hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed
capacity medical institution, for which a temporary clearance for the expansion
of said hospital was issued. Said issuance was challenged by herein petitioners
spouses on the ground that the proposed expansion is in violation of the
provisions of the 1981 Santa Rosa Municipal Zoning Ordinance. Aggrieved by the
decision of HLURB, respondent elevated the matter to Office of the President,
which was subsequently affirmed by the appellate court, arguing that: (1) the
establishment of a ten-bed capacity hospital, is allowed within a residential zone
under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance, the law existing at the time of the founding of
the St. James hospital, but the term hospital was deleted from the list of
conforming establishments within a residential zone under the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance; (2) that under Section 2, Article 6 of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance,
certain activities that are commercial and institutional in character are allowed
within the residential zone, and; (3) that the term "institutional", as used in 1991
Zoning Ordinance, include hospitals and other medical establishments. ISSUE:
Whether or not the proposed expansion of St. James Hospital may be permitted
under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, in view of the deletion therein of the phrase
hospitals with not more than ten capacity from those enumerated as allowable
uses in a residential zone as contained in the 1981 Zoning Ordinance. HELD: No.
It was held that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, fortybed capacity medical institution is prohibited under the provisions of the 1991
Zoning Ordinance because of the following reasons: 1. The enactment of the
1991 Zoning Ordinance effectively repealed the 1981 Zoning Ordinance. The
inclusion of the general repealing provision in the ordinance predicated the
intended repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior acts. This is what is known as repeal by implication, which
proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that
intention must be given effect. 2. It must be considered that any meaning or
interpretation to be given to the term "institutional" as used in Section 2, Article
VI must be correspondingly limited by the explicit enumeration of allowable uses
contained in the same section. Whatever meaning the legislative body had
intended in employing the word "institutional" must be discerned in light of the
restrictive enumeration in the said article. Under the legal maxim expressio unius

est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one thing in a law, means the
exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. 3. The rule of casus omissus in
statutory construction, a thing omitted must be considered to have been omitted
intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of the phrase "hospital with not more
than ten capacity" in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer
of said allowable usage to another zone classification, the only logical conclusion
is that the legislative body had intended that said use be removed from those
allowed within a residential zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions,
such as St. James Hospital, within a residential zone is now prohibited under the
1991 Zoning Ordinance

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 132051

June 25, 2001

TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP., petitioner,

vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This principle of adherence to precedents
has not lost its luster and continues to guide the bench in keeping with the need
to maintain stability in the law.
The principle finds application to the case now before us.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolution dated December 23, 1997 of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 44257.
Under Republic Act No. 337 (General Banking Act), commercial banks are allowed
to invest in real property subject to the limitation that:
"Sec. 25. Any commercial bank may purchase, hold and convey real estate
for the following purposes:
"(a) such as shall be necessary for its immediate accommodation in the
transaction of its business: Provided, however, that the total investment in
such real estate and improvements thereof, including bank
equipment, shall not exceed fifty percent (50%) of net worth x x x x x x ."
(Emphasis Ours)
Investments in real estate made by savings and mortgage banks are likewise
subject to the same limitation imposed by the aforequoted provision. 1

Bound by such limitation, the management of Banco Filipino Savings and

Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino for brevity) devised means to pursue its endeavor
to expand its banking operations. To this end, Tala Realty Services Corporation
(Tala for brevity) was organized by Banco Filipino's four (4) major stockholders
namely, Antonio Tiu, Tomas B. Aguirre, Nancy Lim Ty and Pedro B. Aguirre. Tala
and Banco Filipino agreed on this scheme Tala would acquire the existing
branch sites and new branch sites which it would lease out to Banco Filipino.
On August 25, 1981, pursuant to their agreement, Banco Filipino sold its eleven
(11) branch sites all over the country to Tala. In turn Tala leased those sites to
Banco Filipino under contracts of lease executed by both parties on the same
day.
Years after, dissension between Tala and Banco Filipino arose in connection with
their lease contracts resulting in a chain of lawsuits for illegal detainer. Some of
these cases are still pending in courts. At present, three of the illegal detainer
cases have been passed upon by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar, involving Banco Filipino's Iloilo City branch site, is one of those
cases for illegal detainer filed by Tala against Banco Filipino based on these
grounds: (a) expiration of the period of lease and (b) non-payment of rentals.
The facts of the present controversy may be summed up as follows:
In its complaint in Civil Case No. 51(95) filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Iloilo City on March 29, 1995, Tala alleged that on the basis of a contract of
lease executed on August 25, 1981 which provides in part:
"1. That the term of this LEASE shall be for a period of eleven (11) years,
renewable for another period of nine (9) years at the option of the LESSEE
under terms and conditions mutually agreeable to both parties." 2,
its contract with Banco Filipino expired on August 31, 1992. However, Banco
Filipino has continued to occupy the premises even after the expiration of the
lease.
On June 2, 1993, Tala imposed upon Banco Filipino the following terms and
conditions: that the bank should pay P70,050.00 as monthly rental retroactive as
of September 1, 1992, with rental escalation of 10% per year; and advance
deposit equivalent to rents for four months, plus a goodwill of P500,000.00.
Banco Filipino did not comply and in April 1994, it stopped paying rents.
In its letter dated April 14, 1994, Tala notified Banco Filipino that the lease
contract would no longer be renewed; that it should pay its back rentals,
including goodwill, deposit and adjusted rentals in the amount of P2,059, 540.00
and vacate the premises on or before April 30, 1994. 3 In its second letter dated
May 2, 1994, Tala demanded upon Banco Filipino to pay the rents and vacate the
premises.4
In answer to Tala's complaint, Banco Filipino denied having executed the lease
contract providing for a term of eleven (11) years; claiming that its contract with

Tala is for twenty (20) years, citing the Contract of Lease executed on August 25,
1981 providing:
"That the term of this LEASE shall be for a period of twenty (20) years,
renewable for another period of twenty (20) years at the option of the
LESSEE under terms and conditions mutually agreeable to both parties." 5
On July 1, 1996, the MTC rendered judgment holding that the eleven (11)-year
lease contract superseded the twenty (20)-year lease contract. Thus, the court
ordered the ejectment of Banco Filipino from the premises on these grounds:
expiration of the eleven (11)-year lease contract and non-payment of the
adjusted rental. Banco Filipino was likewise ordered to pay back rentals in the
amount of P79,050.00 corresponding to the period from May 1994 up to the time
that it shall have surrendered to Tala possession of the premises. 6
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Iloilo City affirmed the MTC
decision.7
Banco Filipino elevated the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the challenged decision.8
Banco Filipino sought for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision,
invoking in its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration the Decisions of the
same court in two of the other illegal detainer cases initiated by Tala against
Banco Filipino, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 39104 and 40524. In these cases,
the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the lease contract providing for a
period of twenty (20) years. Finding Banco Filipino's motions for reconsideration
meritorious, the Court of Appeals issued the herein assailed Resolution, thus:
"This Court agrees with petitioner that its Decision of August 30, 1996 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 39104, having been declared final and executory by no less
than the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 127586, now constitutes the law of the
case between the parties in the present case. Accordingly, this Court is not
at liberty to disregard or abandon the same at will without wreaking havoc
on said legal principle.
"WHEREFORE, petitioner's motion for reconsideration and supplemental
motion for reconsideration are hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court's
Decision of August 25, 1997 is hereby SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, a
new one is rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the appealed
decision and DISMISSING the complaint for ejectment filed against herein
petitioner in the Municipal Trial Court of Iloilo City." 9
Tala now comes to this Court on the lone ground that:
"The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering that principle of 'the
law of the case' finds application in the instant case." 10
Petitioner Tala contends that its complaint for illegal detainer should not have
been dismissed by the Court of Appeals on the basis of its decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 39104. Petitioner claims that this decision is not a precedent.

The first in the series of illegal detainer cases filed by Tala against the bank
which reached the Supreme Court is CA-G.R. SP No. 39104. This involves the site
in Malabon. The Court of Appeals held that Banco Filipino cannot be ejected from
the subject premises considering that the twenty (20)-year lease contract has
not expired. Tala elevated this Court of Appeals decision to the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 127586. In a Resolution dated March 12, 1997, the Supreme Court
dismissed Tala's petition as the "appeal" was not timely perfected, thus:
"Considering the manifestation dated January 31, 1997 filed by petitioner
that it is no longer pursuing or holding in abeyance recourse to the
Supreme Court for reasons stated therein, the Court Resolved toDECLARE
THIS CASE TERMINATED and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to INFORM the
parties that the judgment sought to be reviewed has become final and
executory, no appeal therefrom having been timely perfected." 11
We agree with petitioner Tala that the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 39104 holding that the twenty (20)-year contract of lease governs the
contractual relationship between the parties is not a precedent considering that
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 127586 did not decide the case on the merits. The
petition was dismissed on mere technicality. It is significant to note, however,
that the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 129887,12through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de
Leon, resolved the identical issue raised in the present petition, i.e., whether the
period of the lease between the parties is twenty (20) or eleven (11) years, thus:
"Second. Petitioner Tala Realty insists that its eleven (11)-year lease
contract controls. We agree with the MTC and the RTC, however, that the
eleven (11)-year contract is a forgery because (1) Teodoro O. Arcenas,
then Executive Vice-President of private respondent Banco Filipino, denied
having signed the contract; (2) the records of the notary public who
notarized the said contract, Atty. Generoso S. Fulgencio, Jr., do not include
the said document; and (3) the said contract was never submitted to the
Central Bank as required by the latter's rules and regulations (Rollo, pp.
383-384.).
"Clearly, the foregoing circumstances are badges of fraud and simulation
that rightly make any court suspicious and wary of imputing any
legitimacy and validity to the said lease contract.
"Executive Vice-President Arcenas of private respondent Banco Filipino
testified that he was responsible for the daily operations of said bank. He
denied having signed the eleven (11)-year contract and reasoned that it
was not in the interest of Banco Filipino to do so (Rollo, p. 384). The fact
was corroborated by Josefina C. Salvador, typist of Banco Filipino's Legal
Department, who allegedly witnessed the said contract and whose initials
allegedly appear in all the pages thereof. She disowned the said marginal
initials (id., p. 385).
"The Executive Judge of the RTC supervises a notary public by requiring
submission to the Office of the Clerk of Court of his monthly notarial report
with copies of acknowledged documents thereto attached. Under this
procedure and requirement of the Notarial Law, failure to submit such
notarial report and copies of acknowledged documents has dire

consequences including the possible revocation of the notary's notarial

commission.
"The fact that the notary public who notarized petitioner Tala Realty's
alleged eleven (11)-year lease contract did not retain a copy thereof for
submission to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the proper RTC militates
against the use of said document as a basis to uphold petitioner's claim.
The said alleged eleven (11)-year lease contract was not submitted to the
Central Bank whose strict documentation rules must be complied with by
banks to ensure their continued good standing. On the contrary, what was
submitted to the Central Bank was the twenty (20)-year lease contract.
"Granting arguendo that private respondent Banco Filipino deliberately
omitted to submit the eleven (11)-year contract to the Central Bank, we do
not consider that fact as violative of the res inter alios acta aliis non
nocet (Section 28, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court provides, viz.: 'Sec. 28.
Admission by third party - The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.';
Compania General de Tabacos v. Ganson, 13 Phil. 472, 477 [1909]) rule in
evidence. Rather, it is an indication of said contract's inexistence.
"It is not the eleven (11)-year lease contract but the twenty (20)-year
lease contract which is the real and genuine contract between petitioner
Tala Realty and private respondent Banco Filipino. Considering that the
twenty (20)-year lease contract is still subsisting and will expire
in 2001 yet, Banco Filipino is entitled to the possession of the
subject premises for as long as it pays the agreed rental and does
not violate the other terms and conditions thereof (Art. 1673,
New Civil Code)." (Emphasis supplied)
The validity of the twenty (20) year lease contract was further reinforced on June
20, 2000 when the First Division of this Court, this time, speaking through
Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, rendered a Decision in G.R. No.
137980, likewise upholding the twenty (20)-year lease contract, thus:
"In light of the foregoing recent Decision of this Court (G.R. No. 129887),
we have no option but to uphold the twenty-year lease contract over the
eleven-year contract presented by petitioner. It is the better practice that
when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases
where the facts are substantially the same. 'Stare decisis et non quieta
movere.'
"That the principle of stare decisis applies in the instant case, even though
the subject property is different, may be gleaned from the pronouncement
in Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 110398,
281 SCRA 534, 542-543 (1997)], to wit
'Petitioner criticizes the lower court's reliance on the Mecenas case,
arguing that although this case arose out of the same incident as
that involved in Mecenas, the parties are different and trial was
conducted separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this

case should be based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and

evidence adduced in it, or, in short, on the record of this case.
'The contention is without merit. What petitioner contends may be
true with respect to the merits of the individual claims against
petitioner but not as to the cause of the sinking of its ship on April
22, 1980 and its liability for such accident, of which there is only
one truth. Otherwise, one would be subscribing to the sophistry:
truth on one side of the Pyrenees, falsehood on the other!
'Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court's policy of
maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance with the legal
maxim 'stare decisis et non quieta movere' (Follow past precedents
and do not disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case,
the same questions relating to the same event have been put
forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated
and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar
to any attempt to relitigate the same issue (J.M. Tuason & Corp. v.
Mariano, 85 SCRA 644 [1978]). In Woulfe v. Associated Realties
Corporation (130 N.J. Eq. 519, 23 A. 2d 399, 401 [1942]), the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that where substantially similar
cases to the pending case were presented and applicable principles
declared in prior decisions, the court was bound by the principle of
stare decisis.Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger v. Gill (75 Ohio App.,
62 N.E. 2d 760 [1944]), it was held that under the doctrine of stare
decisis a ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to the
original proceeding and not bound by the judgment under the res
judicata doctrine. The Philadelphia court expressed itself in this
wise: 'Stare decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which
follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different' (Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa.
448, 452, 118A, 394, 395 [1922]. Manogahela Street Ry, Co. v.
Philadelphia Co., 350 Pa 603, 39 A. 2d 909, 916 [1944]; In re Burtt's
Estate, 353 Pa. 217, 4 A. 2d 670, 677 [1945]). Thus, in J.M. Tuason
v. Mariano, supra, this Court relied on its rulings in other cases
involving different parties in sustaining the validity of a land title on
the principle of 'stare decisis et non quieta movere.'(underscoring,
Ours)
"Here, therefore, even if the property subject of the Decision of G.R. No.
129887 is located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan while that in the instant case is
located in Davao, we can very well apply the conclusion in G.R. No.
129887 that it is the twenty-year lease contract which is controlling
inasmuch as not only are the parties the same, but more importantly, the
issue regarding its validity is one and the same and, hence, should no
longer be relitigated."
Considering the above rulings, we hold that the term of the lease in the present
case is also twenty (20) years.
Resolving now the issue of whether or not respondent Banco Filipino should be
ejected for non-payment of rentals, the First Division of this Court in the same
G.R. No. 137980 held:

"Coming now to the issue of whether or not respondent should be ejected

for non-payment of rentals, we do not agree with the ruling in G.R. No
129887 that since the unpaid rentals demanded by petitioner were based
on a new rate which it unilaterally imposed and to which respondent did
not agree, there lies no ground for ejectment. In such a case, there could
still be ground for ejectment based on non-payment of rentals. The recent
case of T & C Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 13 is
instructional on this point. It was there cautioned that
'The trial court found that private respondent had failed to pay the
monthly rental of P1,800.00 from November 1992 to February 16,
1993, despite demands to pay and to vacate the premises made by
petitioner. Even if private respondent deposited the rents in arrears
in the bank, this fact cannot alter the legal situation of private
respondent since the account was opened in private respondent's
name. Clearly, there was cause for the ejectment of private
respondent. Although the increase in monthly rentals from P700.00
to P1,800.00 was in excess of 20% allowed by B.P. Blg. 877, as
amended by R.A. No. 6828, what private respondent could have
done was to deposit the original rent of P700.00 either with the
judicial authorities or in a bank in the name of, and with notice to,
petitioner. As this Court held in Uy v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA
671, 676 [1989]):
'The records reveal that the new rentals demanded since 1979
(P150.00 per month) exceed that allowed by law so refusal on the
part of the lessor to accept was justified. However, what the lessee
should have done was to deposit in 1979 the previous rent. This
deposit in the Bank was made only in 1984 indicating a delay of
more than four years.
'From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the lessor was correct in
asking for the ejectment of the delinquent lessee. Moreover, he
should be granted not only the current rentals but also all the
rentals in arrears. This is so even if the lessor himself did not appeal
because as ruled by this Court, there have been instances when
substantial justice demands the giving of the proper reliefs.' x x x
"While advance rentals appear to have been made to be applied for the
payment of rentals due from the eleventh year to the twentieth year of the
lease, to wit'3. That upon the signing and execution of this Contract, the LESSEE
shall pay the LESSOR ONE MILLION TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
ONLY (P1,020,000.00) Philippine Currency representing advance
rental to be applied on the monthly rental for period from the
eleventh to the twentieth year',
"the records show that such advance rental had already been applied for
rent on the property for the period of August, 1985 to November, 1989.
"Thus, when respondent stopped paying any rent at all beginning April,
1994, it gave petitioner good ground for instituting ejectment proceedings.

We reiterate the ruling in T & C Development Corporation, supra, that if

ever petitioner took exception to the unilateral or illegal increase in rental
rate, it should not have completely stopped paying rent but should have
deposited the original rent amount with the judicial authorities or in a bank
in the name of, and with notice to, petitioner. This circumstance, i.e.,
respondent's failure to pay rent at the old rate, does not appear in G.R. No.
129887. Thus, while we are bound by the findings of this Court's Second
Division in that case under the principle of stare decisis, the fact that
respondent's failure to pay any rentals beginning April 1994, which
provided ground for its ejectment from the premises, justifies our
departure from the outcome of G.R. No. 129887. In this case, we uphold
petitioner's right to eject respondent from the leased premises."
It bears stressing that the facts of the instant case and those of G.R. Nos. 129887
and 137980 are substantially the same. The only difference is the site of
respondent bank. The opposing parties are likewise the same.
Clearly, in light of the Decisions of this Court in G.R. Nos. 129887 and 137980,
which we follow as precedents, respondent Banco Filipino may not be ejected on
the ground of expiration of the lease. However, since it stopped paying the rents
beginning April 1994, its eviction from the premises is justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 44257 is MODIFIED insofar as it denies petitioner
Tala's prayer for ejectment of respondent Banco Filipino.
Judgment is rendered ordering respondent Banco Filipino to vacate the subject
premises and to restore possession thereof to petitioner Tala. Respondent is also
ordered to pay Tala the monthly rental of P21,100.00 computed from April 1994
up to the time it vacates the premises.1wphi1.nt
Costs against respondent.

Tala Realty Services Corp.

v. Banco Filipino Savings
and
Mortgage Bank
G.R. No. 132051
June 25, 2001
FACTS:
Tala alleged that on the basis of a contract of lease executed on August 25, 1981.
its contract with Banco Filipino expired on August 31, 1992. However, Banco
Filipino has continued to occupy the premises even after the expiration of the
lease. On June 2, 1993, Tala imposed upon Banco Filipino the following terms and

conditions: that the bank should pay P70,050.00 as monthly rental retroactive as
of September 1, 1992, with rental escalation of 10% per year; and advance
deposit equivalent to rents for four months, plus a goodwill of P500,000.00.
Banco Filipino did not comply and in April 1994, it stopped paying rents. Banco
Filipino denied having executed the lease contract providing for a term of eleven
(11) years; claiming that its contract with Tala is for twenty (20) years, citing the
Contract of Lease executed on August 25, 1981.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the eleven-year lease contract superseded the twenty-year lease
contract
HELD:
The eleven (11)-year contract is a forgery because (1) Teodoro O. Arcenas, then
Executive Vice-President of private respondent Banco Filipino, denied having
signed the contract; (2) the records of the notary public who notarized the said
contract, Atty. Generoso S. Fulgencio, Jr., do not include the said document; and
(3) the said contract was never submitted to the Central Bank as required by the
latter's rules and regulations. It is not the eleven (11)-year lease contract but the
twenty (20)-year lease contract which is the real and genuine contract between
petitioner Tala Realty and private respondent Banco Filipino. Considering that the
twenty (20)-year lease contract is still subsisting and will expire in 2001 yet,
Banco Filipino is entitled to the possession of the subject premises for as long as
it pays the agreed rental and does not violate the other terms and conditions
thereof. The validity of the twenty (20) year lease contract was further reinforced
on June 20, 2000 when the First Division of this Court rendered a Decision in G.R.
No. 137980, likewise upholding the twenty (20)-year lease contract, thus:
"In light of the foregoing recent Decision of this Court (G.R. No. 129887), we
have no option but to uphold the twenty-year lease contract over the elevenyear contract presented by petitioner. It is the better practice that when a court
has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same. 'Stare decisis et non quieta movere.
That the principle of stare decisis applies in the instant case, even though the
subject property is different, may be gleaned from the pronouncement in Negros
Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals. Stare decisis simply declares that, for
the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to
those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different. Considering the above rulings, the term of the lease in
the present case is also twenty (20) years.

G.R. NO. 177127

October 11, 2010

J.R.A. PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Stare decisis et non quieta movere.
Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus, once a case has been decided one
way, courts have no choice but to resolve subsequent cases involving the same
issue in the same manner.1
We ruled then, as we rule now, that failure to print the word "zero-rated" in the
invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input value-added tax
(VAT) on zero-rated sales.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
set aside the January 15, 2007 Decision2 and the March 16, 2007
Resolution3 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner J.R.A. Philippines, Inc., a domestic corporation, is engaged in the
manufacture and wholesale export of jackets, pants, trousers, overalls, shirts,
polo shirts, ladies wear, dresses and other wearing apparel. 4 It is registered with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a VAT taxpayer 5 and as an Ecozone
Export Enterprise with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). 6
On separate dates, petitioner filed with the Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 54
of the BIR, Trece Martires City, applications for tax credit/refund of unutilized
input VAT on its zero-rated sales for the taxable quarters of 2000 in the total
amount of P8,228,276.34, broken down as follows:
1st quarter P 2,369,060.97
2nd quarter 2,528,126.02
3rd quarter 1,918,015.38
4th quarter 1,413,073.977
The claim for credit/refund, however, remained unacted by the respondent.
Hence, petitioner was constrained to file a petition before the CTA.
Proceedings before the Second Division of the Court of Tax Appeals
On April 16, 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for Review 8 with the CTA for the
refund/credit of the same input VAT which was docketed as CTA Case No.

6454 and raffled to the Second Division of the CTA.

In his Answer,9 respondent interposed the following special and affirmative
defenses, to wit:
4. Petitioners alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative
routinary investigation/examination by the Bureau;
5. Being allegedly registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority
as an export enterprise, petitioners business is not subject to VAT
pursuant to Section 24 of R.A. No. 7916 in relation to Section 109 (q) of the
Tax Code. Hence, it is not entitled to tax credit of input taxes pursuant to
Section 4.103-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95;
6. The amount of P8,228,276.34 being claimed by petitioner as alleged
unutilized VAT input taxes for the year 2000 was not properly documented;
7. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to
establish its right to refund, and failure to [do so] is fatal to the claim for
refund/ credit;
8. Petitioner must show that it has complied with the provisions of Section
204 (c) and 229 of the Tax Code on the prescriptive period for claiming tax
refund/credit;
9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the
same partake the nature of exemption from taxation.10
After trial, the Second Division of the CTA rendered a Decision 11 denying
petitioners claim for refund/credit of input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales
due to the failure of petitioner to indicate its Taxpayers Identification NumberVAT (TIN-V) and the word "zero-rated" on its invoices. 12 Thus, the fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE, and, accordingly,DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.13
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 14 to
which respondent filed an Opposition.15 Petitioner, in turn, tendered a Reply. 16
The Second Division of the CTA, however, stood firm on its Decision and denied
petitioners Motion for lack of merit in a Resolution 17 dated October 5, 2005. This
prompted petitioner to elevate the matter to the CTA En Banc.18
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
On January 15, 2007, the CTA En Banc denied the petition, reiterating that failure
to comply with invoicing requirements results in the denial of a claim for
refund.19 Hence, it disposed of the petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of
merit. ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated June 30, 2005 and Resolution dated

October 5, 2005 of Second Division of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A Case No.
6454 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.20
Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta (Presiding Justice Acosta) concurred with the
findings of the majority that there was failure on the part of petitioner to comply
with the invoicing requirements; 21 he dissented, however, to the outright denial
of petitioners claim since there are other pieces of evidence proving petitioners
transactions and VAT status.22
Petitioner sought reconsideration23 of the Decision but the CTA En Banc
denied the same in a Resolution24 dated March 16, 2007. Presiding Justice Acosta
maintained his dissent.
Issue
Hence, the instant Petition with the solitary issue of whether the failure to print
the word "zero-rated" on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund
of input VAT on zero-rated sales.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner submits that:
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED BY DECIDING QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN
A MANNER THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, IN THAT:
A. THE INVOICING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE 1997 TAX CODE DO
NOT REQUIRE THAT INVOICES AND/OR RECEIPTS ISSUED BY A VATREGISTERED TAXPAYER, SUCH AS THE PETITIONER, SHOULD BE
IMPRINTED WITH THE WORD "ZERO-RATED."
B. THE INVOICING REQUIREMENTS PRESCRIBED BY THE 1997 TAX
CODE AND THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE WORDS "ZERO-RATED" BE
IMPRINTED ON THE SALES INVOICES/OFFICIAL RECEIPTS UNDER
REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 7-95 ARE NOT EVIDENTIARY RULES
AND THE ABSENCE THEREOF IS NOT FATAL TO A TAXPAYERS CLAIM
FOR REFUND.
C. RESPONDENTS REGULATIONS ARE INVALID BECAUSE THEY DO
NOT IMPLEMENT THE 1997 TAX CODE BUT INSTEAD, [EXCEED] THE
LIMITATIONS OF THE LAW.
D. PETITIONER PRESENTED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT
UNEQUIVOCALLY PROVED PETITIONERS ZERO-RATED
TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 2000.
E. NO PREJUDICE CAN RESULT TO THE GOVERNMENT BY REASON OF
THE FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO IMPRINT THE WORD "ZERO-RATED"
ON ITS INVOICES. PETITIONERS CLIENTS FOR ITS ZERO-RATED
TRANSACTIONS CANNOT UNDULY BENEFIT FROM ITS "OMISSION"

CONSIDERING THAT THEY ARE NON-RESIDENT FOREIGN

CORPORATIONS [that] ARE NOT COVERED BY THE PHILIPPINE VAT
SYSTEM.
F. IN CIVIL CASE[S], SUCH AS CLAIMS FOR REFUND, STRICT
COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IS NOT
REQUIRED. MOREOVER, A MERE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
WILL SUFFICE TO JUSTIFY THE GRANT OF A CLAIM. 25
Respondents Arguments
Emphasizing that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions which are
strictly construed against the claimant, respondent seeks the affirmance of the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the CTA En Banc. 26 He insists that the denial
of petitioners claim for tax credit/refund is justified because it failed to comply
with the invoicing requirements under Section 4.108-1 27 of Revenue Regulations
No. 7-95.
Our Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The absence of the word "zero-rated" on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim
for credit/refund of input VAT
The question of whether the absence of the word "zero-rated" on the
invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input VAT is not novel. This
has been squarely resolved in Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation
of the Philippines (formerly Matsushita Business Machine Corporation of the
Philippines) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 28 In that case, we sustained
the denial of petitioners claim for tax credit/refund for non-compliance with
Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, which requires the word "zero
rated" to be printed on the invoices/receipts covering zero-rated sales. We
explained that:
Zero-rated transactions generally refer to the export sale of goods and services.
The tax rate in this case is set at zero. When applied to the tax base or the
selling price of the goods or services sold, such zero rate results in no tax
chargeable against the foreign buyer or customer. But, although the seller in
such transactions charges no output tax, he can claim a refund of the VAT that
his suppliers charged him. The seller thus enjoys automatic zero rating, which
allows him to recover the input taxes he paid relating to the export sales, making
him internationally competitive.
For the effective zero rating of such transactions, however, the taxpayer has to
be VAT-registered and must comply with invoicing requirements. x x x
xxxx
Petitioner Panasonic points out, however, that in requiring the printing on its
sales invoices of the word "zero-rated," the Secretary of Finance unduly
expanded, amended, and modified by a mere regulation (Section 4.108-1 of RR
7-95) the letter and spirit of Sections 113 and 237 of the 1997 NIRC, prior to their

amendment by R.A. 9337. Panasonic argues that the 1997 NIRC, which applied to
its payments specifically Sections 113 and 237 required the VAT-registered
taxpayers receipts or invoices to indicate only the following information:
(1) A statement that the seller is a VAT-registered person, followed by his
taxpayers identification number (TIN);
(2) The total amount which the purchaser [paid] or is obligated to pay to
the seller with the indication that such amount includes the value-added
tax;
(3) The date of transaction, quantity, unit cost and description of the
goods or properties or nature of the service; and
(4) The name, business style, if any, address and taxpayer's identification
number (TIN) of the purchaser, customer or client.
Petitioner Panasonic points out that Sections 113 and 237 did not require the
inclusion of the word "zero-rated" for zero-rated sales covered by its receipts or
invoices. The BIR incorporated this requirement only after the enactment of R.A.
9337 on November 1, 2005, a law that did not yet exist at the time it issued its
invoices.
But when petitioner Panasonic made the export sales subject of this case, i.e.,
from April 1998 to March 1999, the rule that applied was Section 4.108-1 of RR
7-95, otherwise known as the Consolidated Value-Added Tax Regulations, which
the Secretary of Finance issued on December 9, 1995 and [which] took effect on
January 1, 1996.1avvphil It already required the printing of the word "zero-rated"
on the invoices covering zero-rated sales. When R.A. 9337 amended the 1997
NIRC on November 1, 2005, it made this particular revenue regulation a part of
the tax code. This conversion from regulation to law did not diminish the binding
force of such regulation with respect to acts committed prior to the enactment of
that law.
Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95 proceeds from the rule-making authority granted to
the Secretary of Finance under Section 245 of the 1977 NIRC (Presidential Decree
1158) for the efficient enforcement of the tax code and of course its
amendments. The requirement is reasonable and is in accord with the efficient
collection of VAT from the covered sales of goods and services. As aptly
explained by the CTAs First Division, the appearance of the word "zero-rated" on
the face of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers from falsely
claiming input VAT from their purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If,
absent such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the government
would be refunding money it did not collect.
Further, the printing of the word "zero-rated" on the invoice helps segregate
sales that are subject to 10% (now 12%) VAT from those sales that are zerorated. Unable to submit the proper invoices, petitioner Panasonic has been
unable to substantiate its claim for refund. 29
Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, petitioners claim for credit/ refund
of input VAT for the taxable quarters of 2000 must be denied. Failure to print the

word "zero-rated" on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of

input VAT on zero-rated sales.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
January 15, 2007 and the Resolution dated March 16, 2007 of the Court of Tax
Appeals En Banc are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
J.R.A. PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 177127 October 11, 2010
Del Castillo, J.
Doctrine:
The absence of the word zero rated on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a
claim for credit/refund of input VAT.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Courts are bound by prior decisions.
Thus, once a case has been decided one way, courts have no choice but to
resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner.
Facts:
Petitioner, a PEZA Corporation, filed applications for tax credit/refund of
unutilized input VAT on its zero-rated sales for the taxable quarters of 2000. The
claim for credit/refund, however, remained unacted by the respondent. Hence,
petitioner was constrained to file a petition before the CTA.
The CTA eventually denied the petition for lack of the word zero-rated on the
invoices/receipts.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure to print the word zero-rated on the invoices/receipts
is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of input VAT on zero-rated sales
Held:
Yes. The absence of the word zero rated on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a
claim for credit/refund of input VAT. This has been squarely resolved in Panasonic
Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines (formerly Matsushita
Business Machine Corporation of the Philippines) v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (G.R. No. 178090, 612 SCRA 28, February 8, 2010). In that case, the
claim for tax credit/refund was denied for non-compliance with Section 4.108-1 of
Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, which requires the word zero rated to be
printed on the invoices/receipts covering zero-rated sales.

From the abovementioned decision, the Court ruled that the appearance of the
word zero-rated on the face of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents
buyers from falsely claiming input VAT from their purchases when no VAT was
actually paid. If, absent such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the
government would be refunding money it did not collect.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Courts are bound by prior decisions.
Thus, once a case has been decided one way, courts have no choice but to
resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner [Agencia
Exquisite of Bohol, Incorporated v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos.
150141, 157359 and 158644, February 12, 2009, 578 SCRA 539, 550].