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785 F.2d 26
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,v.Ayman KALLASH, Defendant-Appellant.
 No. 306, Docket 85-1222.
United States Court of Appeals,Second Circuit.
 Argued Oct. 30, 1985. Decided Jan. 21, 1986. As Amended March 17, 1986.
BACKGROUNDDonald E. Nawi, New Rochelle, N.Y., for defendant-appellant.Larry Krantz, Asst. U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Raymond J.Dearie, U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., Mary McGowan Davis, Asst. U.S. Atty.,E.D.N.Y., Brooklyn, N.Y., of counsel), for appellee.Before MANSFIELD, MESKILL and CARDAMONE, Circuit Judges.MESKILL, Circuit Judge:1This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for theEastern District of New York, Bramwell, J., affirming a judgment of convictionimposed upon appellant by Magistrate Caden for the unlawful conveyance of aUnited States Treasury check in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641 (1982). Weaffirm in part, reverse in part and remand to the district court for further  proceedings.2In May 1983 appellant Ayman Kallash obtained a $10,000 United StatesTreasury check made out to Lester and Helen Evenchick. The endorsement onthe check was a forgery. Kallash transferred the check in payment of a debt.3A superseding information filed on March 14, 1984 charged that Kallash:
 
[o]n or about the 16th of May, 1983, within the Eastern District of New York ... didknowingly and willfully, without authority, convey and dispose of a thing of value of the United States, specifically, United States Treasury Check No. 1,168,539, havinga value in excess of Ninety Dollars ($90.00). (Title 18, United States Code, Section641).45With the charge thus framed as a misdemeanor, Kallash's case was tried to a jury before Magistrate Caden on March 20 and 21, 1984. The parties stipulatedthat the check had been conveyed without authority. The only issue at trial waswhether Kallash had conveyed the check knowing at the time that it had beenstolen.
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6Magistrate Caden's jury instructions on the element of knowledge included thefollowing:7If you find from all the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant believed the the [sic] check was stolen but deliberately and consciously avoidedconfirming that it was stolen so that he could say, if he was apprehended, thathe did not know, you may treat this deliberate avoidance of positive knowledgeas the equivalent of knowledge.8In other words, you may find a defendant acted knowingly, if you find either that he actually knew the check was stolen or that he deliberately closed hiseyes to what he had every reason to believe was the fact.9App. of Appellant at 11-12 (emphasis added).
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10At a preliminary conference on the jury charge, the government attorneyobjected to the use of "believed," arguing that instead the charge should read:"the defendant was aware of the high probability that the check in question herewas stolen." Tr. 145. Magistrate Caden questioned whether this "high probability" language, recommended by this Court in United States v. Cano,702 F.2d 370, 371 (2d Cir.1983), comported with the government's burden of  proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Defense counsel agreed with theMagistrate on this point.11When the same government objection arose at the final charging conference,defense counsel explicitly commended the Magistrate for going beyond Cano.Defense counsel then made a general objection to the concept of consciousavoidance. The charge was given as originally proposed by the Magistrate.
 
Special condition of probation:Defendant is to make restitution in the amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00)if appropriate.12The Magistrate's jury instructions on the subject of reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence included the following:13A reasonable doubt means a doubt sufficient to cause a prudent person tohesitate to act in the most important affairs of his or her life. The law does notrequire certainty because only those present at an event can feel certain aboutwhat happened and even they can be wrong.App. of Appellant at 8 (emphasis added).
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14Only the government attorney made a specific objection to the sentence aboutcertainty. Defense counsel made only a vague statement that the charge on presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt was "not complete enough ...not a full enough explanation to accurately convey to the jury." Tr. 245-46. Thecharge was given as proposed by the Magistrate.15The jury returned a verdict of guilty less than ninety minutes after leaving thecourtroom to deliberate.16On August 6, 1984 Magistrate Caden denied Kallash's motion for a new trial.On August 7, 1984 the Magistrate filed an order suspending sentence, andimposing a term of three years probation and a fine of $1,000 to which wasadded the following:1718App. of Appellant at 6.19Kallash took an appeal as of right to the district court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec.3402 (1982), asserting that the above quoted portions of the jury charge onconscious avoidance, presumption of innocence and reasonable doubtconstituted reversible errors. The court, Bramwell, J., affirmed the conviction ina decision and order filed June 19, 1985 finding that Kallash had failed to preserve objections to the charge and that the asserted mistakes in the chargedid not amount to plain error.20Kallash now appeals from Judge Bramwell's decision and from the

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