Nagarjuna's Negative Dialectic And the Significance of

Emptiness

Of the two great schools in Buddhism, the Hinayana and the Mahayana, the
latter is divided into two major systems of thought, of which the Madhyamika
predominates. As the Mahayana school is the more widespread school that has evolved
from Buddha's original Order, so is the body of underlying principles of the
Madhyamika system of considerable importance in relation to other doctrines. Apart
from this distinction, it is considered to embody the central philosophy of Buddhism
and so created a revolution in that religion which carried over, in its influence, into the
whole of Indian philosophical thought (Murti, vii see Bibliography; citations are given
in parentheses within the text of this paper). I will discuss the negative dialectic process
of Nagarjuna (AD 200), the founder of Madhyamika, in order to clarify the doctrine of
Emptiness (sunyata).
Beyond what is given in the selective basic secondary Buddhist texts of Ch'en,
de Bary, Robinson, and Conze, there is actually little that need be said of the dialectic
"apparatus" and the significance of the doctrine of Emptiness. For these texts offer a
very good basic understanding of the doctrine, though they do not go into much detail.
But while Ch'en is precise in his excellent summary and de Bary is revealing in his very
clear explication, Conze and Robinson, especially the former, seem to have no deep
understanding of the doctrine, failing to see all of the considerable implications of the
statement of Emptiness. Nevertheless, I shall rely as much as possible upon readings
from Bapat, Koller, Murti, Raju, Stcherbatsky, and Streng.
Nagarjuna's central work was the Madhyamika-karika, considered to be a
masterpiece as it systematically presents the philosophy of the Madhyamika school
(Bapat, 106). His fundamentals are set forth in the invocation or dedication: that "There
is neither origination nor cessation, neither origination nor cessation, neither
permanence nor impermanence, neither unity nor diversity, neither coming-in nor
going-out in the law of Pratitya-samutpada" (or dependent arising, dependentlycoordinating-origination, etc.)(Bapat, 107). This is Buddha's "principle of relativity" or
svabhava-sunyata [(the emptiness of self-being)], which is to say that everything is
relative [and nothing absolute]. Starting from this point, Nagarjuna set out to prove that
no conceptual system can hold absolutely true. This he did by first accepting the
various concepts and propositions of the various opposing schools of thought current in
his day, and using the standard rules of formal debate, arrived at contradictions in all of
the systems. The consistency with which he was able to do this, and the sheer brilliance
of his dialect mind, has impressed many scholars who set out to study his "dialectic
apparatus" or method. His dialectic skill has never been surpassed (Raju, 127).
In more specific terms, Nagarjuna took causality the basis not only of
Buddhism but also very much the basis of all scientific thought and reduced ad
absurdum both our conception of the causal law and all realistic theories. That is, by
holding that there exist no separate, distinguishable real things or elements (dharmas),
he threw causality out the window. All relationships are thus seen to be false. If a
contradiction was seen to exist in a system, a proof of error was thereby found (Ch'en,
74). He sat about applying his results to each and every item of the Hinayanist

philosophical system (Stcherbatsky, 48). By taking logical argument as his tool,

Monism removed the possibility of knowing Truth conceptually through demonstrating
the absurdity of conceptualizing about what is real. Beginning with the premise that
systems of rations thought based on any absolute and definite statement of reality lead
only to self-contradiction, he proved the illogic of a rational approach to Truth. By
taking rational thought the only common sense that can exist between people in this
false world of words and names and forms (all of which are concepts) he shows that
thought is only relatively correct, is only of relative truth is therefore false. From this
we have a statement "whatsoever is relative is false, transient, and "illusory" (46).
An idea is formed of the nature of his arguments, which are very straightforward
and so laconic as to require considerable study to make sense out of them. This chore of
following this though becomes a delightful one, and the student is easily persuaded of
the complete validity of the argument. As an example I will present a paraphrase of
Chapter XIX, "An Analysis of Time (kala)," as it is the shortest, being of six verses.
(The entire work, "Fundamentals of the Middle Way," is translated in prose from Streng,
183-220; Ch. XIX is on p. 205). If the present and future exist presupposing the past
(i.e., if they are seen to have emerged from the past), then they must have already
existed in the past. If they did not exist in the past, they could not have emerged
therefrom. But if the past is not presupposed as the source of the present and future,
then these latter cannot be proved to exist: therefore neither present nor future time
exist. In this way, the two can be inverted; thus one would regard "highest," "lowest,"
and "middle," etc., or oneness and difference i.e., by arranging the past, present and
future, they are seen to be in different orders, or as all one, or as separate. A nonstationary time cannot be grasped; and a stationary time that can be grasped does not
exist; yet we cannot perceive time without grasping it. Sine time is dependent on a
thing (which will change, revealing time), how can it exist without a thing? No things
exist apart (svabhava), so how can time become something? Thus Time does not exist.
The only notable device used in his "analyses" that can be mentioned is noted by
Raju. In several cases, including the initial chapter on causality, Nagarjuna uses the
"four-cornered negation" i.e., he refutes an idea as being, as nonbeing, as both, and as
neither (Raju, 127). Belief in any of the four cases is an extreme thesis and must be
transcended by a higher synthesis through the dialectic method. This process, also
called "The Middle Path of Eightfold Negations," is one by which the Ultimate Truth is
eventually arrived at (de Bary, 191).
Now, if everything is relative, and all that is relative is false, then what Truth is
there? The answer is found in the doctrine of Sunyata, Emptiness. By saying that
concepts are false, the quality of Emptiness of pinpointed. Since all is false, Emptiness
is in all. This is [presented as] the Absolute Truth. The truth of emptiness is the same as
the unreality of all existing elements, which is to say that Samsara (the phenomenal
world, existence-in-flux) is Sunyata. But Nirvana is also the Truth, and Nirvana is the
same as Sunyata and Samsara (Bapat, 107). Furthermore, the Buddha-nature is the
Ultimate Reality of the basis of each person, and the Buddha-nature and Buddha
himself is empty (Koller, 167). The significance of this is great, as we shall see later.
Now we may add that since Nirvana is Enlightenment, Emptiness is Enlightenment
(Streng, 161f). With all of these implications, Nagarjuna cancelled the existing
definitions of reality and the whole edifice of Early Buddhism was undermined and
smashed." The idea of absolute would become meaningless if there is nothing to set it

against or relate it to. As well, the phenomenal would cease to be if there was nothing
non-phenomenal for contrast. And so, the Absolute becomes as relative as all other
ultimates and is filled with Sunyata: there is no difference between the Absolute and the
Phenomenal (Stcherbatsky, 45, 48). Strangely, there is no contraction here, even though
Samsara, which is "false," becomes indistinct from Sunyata, which is "true." The key is
in the flexibility of "real" or "true," which is being widened in its definition through
these comparisons.
One paradox that seems to crop up is indicated by an argument against the
Madhyamika doctrine. The argument is that Nagarjuna's arguments are themselves
empty. But so is this argument against him, etc. Every logical argument can be reduced
to absurdity (de Bary, 78). But Nagarjuna had made his point, and his system of
thought designed to rid us of theories is not a theory itself. Nevertheless, the Sunyata or
doctrine of Emptiness is certainly empty itself. Where are we left? Murti writes,
"Negation is not total annulment but comprehension without abstraction" (128). The
dialectic is primarily a judgment on the limitation of reason which simply clears the
mind for a perception or apprehension of reality by a higher faculty that of intuition.
This intuition is perfection of wisdom or prajna (126). So the logical system of
dialectics was meant to be abandoned from the beginning, which further evidences
Nagarjuna's brilliance. He says that clinging to it as a false system is worse that
clinging to a non-existent self. He actually shows the Emptiness of his "Treatise on
Relativity" if the Relative is significant, then the non-relative surely has meaning, else
the Relative would fall by having nothing to relate to. But there is nothing that exists
outside of Samsara (interdependency, or relativity) if everything is relative. Therefore,
Relativism itself is meaningless. What remains to use is only intuitive sensitivity to the
Truth, to the Buddha, whereby we can attain Nirvana or perfection of wisdom or
prajna-paramita.
Here, then, is a strong indication that meditation-yoga techniques are aids for
realizing Emptiness, allowing an "ultimate indifference" to "pervade the mind, feelings,
and activities of the religions student. Emptiness is an answer to the quest for
enlightenment when it promotes a practical solution to the problem of sorrow" (Streng,
163). For Conze, "Wisdom is understood as a refined dialectics which kills all thought"
(162). Pure consciousness the absence of thought and perception in the mind is
achieved by an extremely high-level meditation. Dialectics means, "if you think
properly and deeply on anything, you arrive at contradictions, i.e., at statements which
to some extent cancel each other out" (17). What is left but Emptiness as the middle
path between all extremes?
The significance of the non-difference between Nirvana and Samsara is this:
Nirvana is here and now. It is all around us and in us (actually, we are in it, being of the
whole), as is the Buddha-nature and Buddhahood. We need only to be awakened to it.
Chinese and Japanese modifications of the Madhyamika doctrine show in their
Buddhists "a frank acceptance of the beauty of the world, and especially of the beauty
of nature, as a vision of Nirvana here and now" (de Bary, 78). This places Nirvana in
Samsara. This realization of Nirvana does put an end to suffering and suggests a
revision of the strongly Buddhist statement that "all life is suffering." For
enlightenment allows one to enjoy life here and to appreciate the beauty of life. The
"problem of sorrow" solved, we have hope which is what any religion will offer us
and a clarification of Buddha's main doctrine (of suffering).

Conze notes that Sunyata was symbolized in art by an empty circle, representing
absence of self or self-effacement. Now, this self-denying aspect of Buddhism of
Nirvana as a "blowing out" of the self is disturbing to one who believes in
individuality. But we have a more complete understanding of the dialectics that remove
the subject-object distinction and so abolish the individual. Conze is unclear on this
point: The self is certainly destroyed as a concept, but the believer in the doctrine need
not efface himself to become empty. He is allowed to be amused with the illusion of
self, understanding all the while that the individual only seems to exist