SSRN Id1781603

See
discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228118705
EmployeeEmployer Grievances: A Review

Article in International Journal of Management Reviews January 2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2370.2010.00283.x
CITATIONS
READS
11
1,629
2 authors:
Bernard Walker
Robert T. Hamilton
University of Canterbury
University of Canterbury
16 PUBLICATIONS 20 CITATIONS
73 PUBLICATIONS 1,781 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
All in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate,

letting you access and read them immediately.
SEE PROFILE
Available from: Robert T. Hamilton

Retrieved on: 04 August 2016
International Journal of Management Reviews, Vol. 13, 4058 (2011)

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2370.2010.00283.x
EmployeeEmployer Grievances:
A Review
ijmr_283
40..58
Bernard Walker and Robert T. Hamilton

Department of Management, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand
Email: bernard.walker@canterbury.ac.nz; bob.hamilton@canterbury.ac.nz
The focus of industrial conflict has shifted from collective confrontation to grievances
between employee and employer. This narrative review encompasses a range of international research on individual employeeemployer grievances. The literature is
reviewed in four key stages: (1) the incidence of grievable events; (2) the employees
response to a potential grievance issue; (3) the effectiveness of grievance processing;
and (4) outcomes. The incidence of grievable events cannot be estimated precisely,
because most are either not pursued by the employee or are settled informally (and so
not recorded). Most research has been done on the second stage, investigating when a
grievance will be pursued. The theoretical frame of exit, voice and loyalty, adapted from
A.O. Hirschman (Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations,
and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970) has been prominent, but
a series of findings have challenged the validity of this model and suggest a range of
competing theories which may explain the apparent conundrum of negative outcomes
associated with formal grievance procedures. The role of power has regained prominence, and this is part of a fuller understanding of grievance outcomes. The focus has
been on the employee perspective, and it is now timely to broaden the focus, modelling
a progression through a sequence of stages and emphasizing the role of employers in
designing and managing grievance processes which are effective and fair.
Introduction
Employeeemployer conflict is demanding increased
attention from both managers and researchers. The
decline of collective industrial relations and the individualization of the employment relationship have
transformed employment relations. In the UK, the
number of employment tribunal applications more
than trebled between 1988 and 1996 (Burgess et al.
2001). In North America, there has been a similar
effect, with the introduction of new federal employment legislation leading to a litigation explosion
(Lipsky et al. 2003, p. 54) as employees increasingly
filed complaints and lawsuits. Individual disputes
may now be the most relevant indicator of conflict
(Knight and Latreille 2000, p. 533), causing
individual-level dispute processes to take on
increased significance for managers, employees and
governments (Antcliff and Saundry 2009; Dickens
et al. 2005). Managers can be reluctant players in the

dispute process, especially when employee performance is at issue and outcomes may impose significant costs on employers (Den Hartog et al. 2004;
Hutchinson and Purcell 2003, p. 23). Most research
has taken the employee perspective, and more attention is needed regarding the role of managers and the
design and operation of grievance processes that are
fair to all parties.
Grievance procedures are a complex and evolving
area of research (Bemmels and Foley 1996). This
review focuses on the mechanisms for aggrieved
employees to protest and seek redress from some
aspect of their employment situation (Feuille and
Delaney 1992, p. 189). While these mechanisms are
generally based on common principles, they vary, as
do the legal frameworks in which they operate. These
variations may explain why the major research
streams in North America and the UK do not always
2010 The Authors

International Journal of Management Reviews 2010 British Academy of Management and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA
02148, USA
EmployeeEmployer Grievances
cite each other. While previous studies have chosen
to specialize in either unionized or non-unionized
issues in isolation (Bemmels and Foley 1996;
Bingham 2004; Colvin et al. 2006; Feuille and
Chachere 1995; Feuille and Delaney 1992; Lewin
1990, 1999, 2004, 2005; Peterson and Lewin 2000),
this review includes findings from both areas.
Research published in English language journals
is predominantly from the USA, Canada and the UK
and, while acknowledging this Anglo-Saxon bias, we
point to recent work in a range of countries and
cultures, including Barbados (Nurse and Devonish
2007), Germany (Behrens 2007), India (Varman and
Bhatnagar 1999), Sri Lanka (Reade and McKenna
2007) and Turkey (Kozan et al. 2007). Internationally, the UK, Australia and New Zealand emulated
many European nations by developing extensive
statutory protections for individual employees, along
with dispute resolution mechanisms through national
labour courts or employment tribunals. In contrast,
North America has its own mechanisms of employercentred access to justice, and employment at will
remains the basic legal principle for most employment disputes (Colvin 2005; Colvin et al. 2006).
Within this, the long-standing division between
union and non-union situations gives rise to two distinct North American literature streams. In unionized
sites, grievance provisions negotiated in collective
bargaining agreements have been the classical means
through which conflict is managed and justice
afforded to employees (Colvin 2003a; Lewin 2005).
A grievance in this context is usually defined as a
claim by an employee or the union that the employer
has violated the contract (Feuille and Hildebrand
1995, p. 344).1
In non-union settings in North America, there has
been a significant expansion of dispute resolution
systems which vary in scope and complexity, with
differing procedures and protections available
(Bingham and Chachere 1999; Colvin et al. 2006;
Lewin 2005; Mahony and Klaas 2008). In place of
the traditional union multi-step procedures culminating in neutral third-party arbitration, non-union
1
The term grievance procedures is used in a variety of

ways, sometimes solely in relation to union procedures
(Lewin 2004), while other writers use the term for both
union and non-union procedures (Feuille and Chachere
1995; Feuille and Delaney 1992; Feuille and Hildebrand
1995). This current discussion will adopt the broader
concept covering both union and non-union situations, as
well as other formal employment dispute resolution systems
outside North America.
41
systems have adopted a range of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) options including open-door
systems, early mutual assessment, review panels
(including peer-review), mediation and arbitration
(Bingham 2004, p. 145; Feuille and Delaney 1992).2
Initially non-union provisions typically performed a
similar role to union grievance procedures, dealing
mainly with in-house matters of contractual violations and violations of organizations own policies.
The term employment dispute resolution (EDR)
is a broad term which encompasses a range of types
of systems for resolving employment disputes
outside a collectively bargained grievance procedure,
using ADR options such as an ombuds programme,
mediation or arbitration (Bingham and Chachere
1999 p. 95). These include programmes offered by
administrative agencies and courts for resolving
employment disputes, as well as employer-based
systems (Bingham 2004 p.145). The scope of American EDR extends to cover not only the violations of
contractual matters and in-house policies in nonunion settings, but also matters such as occupational
safety disputes, workers compensation and complaints of discrimination under State and Federal law.
In those latter areas, some of the more controversial
forms of EDR are where employer-based programmes are substitutes for the legal remedies available through the courts and government agencies
(Bingham and Chachere 1999). EDR systems can
therefore exist both in non-union workplaces as well
as in union settings, where they operate alongside
union grievance procedures addressing matters
outside the collective bargaining agreement.
The focus of this review is on material published
since the mid-1980s. The earlier research was predominantly on arbitration and was largely descriptive
with few common themes (Bemmels and Foley 1996,
p. 360). Moreover, organizations have been transformed in recent times through deregulation, the
decline of manufacturing, and technological change.
There have also been marked shifts in the nature of
work, with reorganization of the workplace to
embrace high-performance work systems, flattened
organizational structures and team-based approaches
(Bamberger et al. 2008; Colvin 2003a; Kaminski
1999; Lipsky et al. 2003; van Gramberg and Teicher
2005). We review the grievance literature relating to
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) options have been

adopted in a range of areas, not solely employment, as an
alternative to traditional avenues such as litigation.
2010 The Authors

42
B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton
the processes that influence the initiation and course

of an individual-level employment dispute. In terms
of grievance outcomes, this review focuses on
individual-level (rather than organizational-level)
outcomes.3 We identify the four major stages in the
process: the incidence of grievable events; the
employees response to a potential grievable event
(including grievance initiation); the effectiveness of
grievance processing; and outcomes.
Theoretical perspectives
There is no complete theory of individual-level
employment dispute processes and Bemmels and
Foley (1996, p. 361) suggest that any all-embracing
theory would be incomprehensible. Research into
grievance procedures is complicated by the variety of
forms that these can take, and by a range of other
factors (Bemmels and Foley 1996). A grievance resolution process will involve a sequence of different
steps, and many individuals can become involved as
a dispute progresses, with a shift from first-line, local
staff in the early stages to more senior staff from the
union and the employer (and their professional advisers) as the dispute progresses to higher levels. There
are, however, well-established theories that pertain to
different phases of the grievance process.
Exit, voice and loyalty has been a dominant theoretical approach in research on how employees
respond to a grievance, and grievance outcomes. This
came from Hirschmans (1970) model of consumer
behaviour, which was adapted to explain the behaviour of individuals in the employment relationship,
with Freeman and Medoff (1985) and others proposing that the grievance procedure functions as a
voice mechanism. The individual employees
loyalty to the firm is the key determinant of whether
voice or exit behaviour will occur (Boroff and Lewin
1997).
Compensating wage/efficiency theory can be
traced through the works of Ichniowski and Lewin
(1987) and Cappelli and Chauvin (1991). The theory
posits that employers and employees engage in a
financial costbenefit reckoning with regard to grievances and grievance systems. In collective bargaining, union and management decisions to adopt or not
3
For a discussion of the literature regarding the relationship

between grievances and organizational-level outcomes such
as productivity and organizational performance, see Lewin
(1999).
adopt grievance procedures are bargaining choices

which may be traded for wages, benefits, work
changes or other conditions. Similarly, employees
who feel unfairly treated weigh up the costs and
benefits of grievance filing versus other options such
as not filing or quitting (Peterson and Lewin 2000).
Procedural-distributive justice theory, or organizational justice, is about how employees judge
whether they have been treated fairly, and the ramifications of this for organizational functioning in
areas such as job satisfaction, commitment and withdrawal. Organizational justice to some extent followed from the due process4 approach of the 1970s
and 1980s, which concerned the extent to which
fair and orderly procedures provide aspects such as
timeliness and impartiality (Olson-Buchanan and
Boswell 2008b). Justice theory has applications to
grievance initiation, but has been applied mainly to
the grievance processing stage. Employees who think
that they have been treated fairly will then engage in
pro-social organizational behaviours. Conversely,
treatment deemed unfair will give rise to feelings of
resentment, which may lead to acts of retribution
against the employer (Colquitt et al. 2001; Folger
and Cropanzano 1998; Nowakowski and Conlon
2005).
Organizational punishment/industrial discipline
theory deals with issues of retaliation or revenge by
the employer against individuals involved in taking a
formal grievance. The employees are seen as having
let the employer down and breached the informal
code of behaviour that managers expect. Retribution
can also be taken against the first-line supervisor
involved in the grievance. This theory addresses
issues towards the end of the grievance process, and
there is evidence that potential retribution does vary
with grievance type and outcome (Arvey and Jones
1985; Lewin and Peterson 1999; OReilly and Weitz
1980; Olson-Buchanan 1996).
These theories represent a range of perspectives
proposed as potential explanations for various
aspects of grievance behaviour. The stages of the
4
Due process refers to a term of art from the Constitution

defined by the courts to include notice, reasonable discovery
of relevant evidence, an opportunity to be heard, to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, the right to counsel or a representative, an impartial hearing officer, a record of the
proceedings, and a reasoned decision explaining what evidence persuaded the decision maker (Bingham and Chachere 1999, p. 114). As such, it concerns the extent to which
fair and orderly procedures offer aspects such as timeliness
and impartiality (Olson-Buchanan and Boswell 2008b).
2010 The Authors

grievance process are analysed next, moving from
the initial occurrence of grievable events through to
post-grievance outcomes, outlining the questions
that the theories seek to address.
Incidence of grievable events

An individual-level employment dispute begins with
a perception that a grievable event has occurred
(Bemmels and Foley 1996, p. 362; Olson-Buchanan
and Boswell 2008a), with the potential to develop
into a formal grievance application. A number of
studies have suggested that the incidence of grievable
events is high, but there are only sparse data to enable
their frequency to be determined (Bemmels and
Foley 1996; DTI 2005a,b; Lewin 1999; Lewin and
Peterson 1988). What is significant is the apparent
drop-off between the large numbers of potential
grievances and the much smaller number filed as
grievances. Informal resolution among the parties
represents an important early part of the process. In
the USA, most workplace grievances are never put in
writing, but are instead dealt with informally in discussions between workers and supervisors (Lewin
1999). As these disputes are not reflected in the
formal grievance statistics, their incidence is
unknown. It is estimated that, in union firms for
example, there are about 10 unwritten grievances for
every one filed formally (Lewin and Peterson 1988).
In the non-unionized sector of North America, the
source of filing data comes mainly from studies of
individual companies. The definition of a grievance
varies according to what the companys system
allows and, overall, these studies suggest a mean
annual filing rate of around 5%, or five grievances
per 100 employees (Lewin 2004, 2005). In contrast,
union sector studies report a grievance-filing rate,
across all sectors, of approximately 10%, twice that
of non-union workers (Bemmels 1994; Bemmels
et al. 1991; Lewin 2004; Lewin and Peterson 1988).
Colvin (2003a) proposes that one reason for the
lower non-union filing rate is the lack of due process
protections compared with union systems. Conversely, union filing rates can also be elevated due to
union-related economic and political motivations.
These include links to contract renegotiation times
when unions use grievances as an extra bargaining
mechanism (Lewin 2005; Lewin and Peterson 1988).
In the UK, grievance incidence data come instead
from applications to an external forum, the state
employment tribunal, whose jurisdiction covers a
43
relatively narrow range of statutory issues, including
redundancy payments, wage deductions, breach of
contract, discrimination and dismissal (Knight and
Latreille 2000). For workplaces with 25 or more
workers, the annual rate of these applications was 1.9
per thousand, or 0.2% of employees (Knight and
Latreille 2000). Of those actually lodged, around
75% are resolved without the need for a formal
hearing, with a substantial proportion using conciliation assistance (DTI 2004; Gibbons 2007, p. 9).
Beyond these aggregated figures however, American, British, Canadian and other studies report wide
variation in grievance rates across industries or
sectors (Bemmels 1994; Bemmels and Foley 1996;
Bemmels et al. 1991; Department of Labour 2003b;
Earnshaw et al. 1998; Hayward et al. 2004; Lewin
and Peterson 1988), but little is known about the
causes of this variation (Bemmels and Foley 1996;
Lewin 1999).
Employee responses: grievance

initiation
An employee confronted by a perceived wrongdoing
by their employer has options ranging from formal
action, to informal action, or no action. The research
focus has been on why some employees initiate
formal action when others do not. Research has taken
a number of different paths, with particular
approaches dominating certain periods as the
research has evolved. This review uses a modified
grouping of the research compared with other
authors (Bemmels and Foley 1996; Labig and Greer
1988), with three main categories: (i) applied studies
of the individual and the context of their work; (ii)
employee decision-making models; and (iii) studies
associated with Hirschmans (1970) exitvoice
loyalty model and competing alternative models.
The individual and the context of work
Early research into grievance filing behaviour
focused on individual attributes such as demographic
and job-related characteristics, as well as personality
traits, and sought to discriminate between those
employees who had filed a grievance (filers), and
non-filers (Allen and Keaveny 1985; Labig and
Greer 1988; Lewin 1987; Lewin and Peterson 1988).
This approach assumed that grievance-filing could
be explained by the personal disposition or characteristics of the actor. The research generally produced
2010 The Authors

44
inconsistent findings and was criticized for being

descriptive rather than theory based (Bacharach and
Bamberger 2004; Feuille and Hildebrand 1995;
Olson-Buchanan 1997; Peterson and Lewin 2000).
In the North American context, filers in union settings tend to be younger, male, better educated and
hold more skilled jobs than non-filers (Peterson and
Lewin 2000). Non-union filers, while also younger
and male, are less well educated, have blue-collar
roles and are white (Lewin 2004). British findings
vary, with more recent data showing employees who
are white, male, aged 45 and over, and in managerial
occupations as having an above-average incidence of
claims (Hayward et al. 2004).5 North American
research suggests that the issue is further compounded, with the relationships between demographic variables and filing also varying by grievance
issue; for example, in non-union environments
gender is the main determinant of performance
evaluation and promotion grievances, whereas age is
linked with discrimination grievances (Bemmels
1994; Bemmels and Foley 1996; Bemmels et al.
1991; Lewin 2004; Lewin and Peterson 1988).
Other studies have explored the work context and
possible work-related determinants, based on the
premise that these may have independent effects on
grievance filing. In union settings, supervision and
job conditions are the most frequently grieved issues
across a range of sectors (Bacharach and Bamberger
2004; Lewin and Peterson 1988), therefore more
aversive supervision or job characteristics should
result in increased grievance filing (Bamberger et al.
2008; Klaas 1989a). In unionized settings, higher
perceived supervisor capability has been linked with
lower grievance initiation rates (Bemmels 1994;
Bemmels et al. 1991), but research regarding production and goal achievement has generated inconsistent findings (Bacharach and Bamberger 2004;
Bemmels 1994; Bemmels and Foley 1996; Bemmels
et al. 1991).6 Secondly, concerning job conditions,
no consistent link was found between technology
variables (such as the need to follow strict
5
As examples of the inconsistency, in the USA Lewin and

Peterson (1988, 1999) found that union grievants were more
likely to be younger, less educated (rather than more educated), and ethnic minority workers, while Knight and
Latreille (2000) proposed a different UK list comprising
manual workers and ethnic minorities.
6
Bamberger et al. (2008) argue, however, that this research
may now be somewhat dated given the changed nature of
supervisory roles, with a new focus on leadership, coaching
and mentoring (p. 233).
schedules and procedures, routines, and task interdependence) and grievance filing (Bemmels and Foley
1996; Bemmels et al. 1991; Peterson and Lewin
2000). While neither work conditions nor demographic factors have exhibited direct effects, Bamberger et al. (2008) proposed that demographic
factors may, however, serve as a moderator in the
relationship between aversive work conditions and
grievances, finding stronger links for women and
minorities.
Unions and management are also influential
through their policies and practices. When management and unions have a policy of committing grievances to writing, grievance rates increase in the USA
(Lewin and Peterson 1988), and similarly in Britain,
legal requirements for in-house procedures brought
increased formality and escalation of disputes among
smaller businesses (Antcliff and Saundry 2009;
Gibbons 2007). Managerial monitoring of employees
was also linked with increased grievance rates in a
large unionized company (Kleiner et al. 1995). In the
USA, a union policy of taking certain grievances
through the procedure was also positively related to
grievance filing rates (Lewin and Peterson 1988). At
a shop steward level, attempting to resolve disputes
informally was negatively associated with grievance
rates, while initiation (direct or indirect) of filing
functioned in the opposite direction (Bemmels 1994;
Bemmels et al. 1991). Among employees, the frequency of complaints to stewards was positively
related to filing (Bemmels 1994; Bemmels et al.
1991). Once more, however, the situation was complicated by the fact that effects varied significantly
across grievance issues (Bemmels 1994).
Employee decision-making models
Another line of enquiry has addressed employee
decision-making, focusing on the initial decision to
file a grievance. Gordon and Bowlby (1989) assessed
the role of reactance and attribution in grievance
initiation. Reactance theory suggests that people will
react to restore freedoms perceived to have been lost.
Attribution theory is about how untrained observers
make sense of the actions of others, attributing the
causes to either the internal personal dispositions of
the other party or to external factors. These authors
found a significant relationship between both reactance and attribution and the intention to file a grievance. The strongest intent occurred when there was a
greater perceived threat to the workers freedom
(high reactance) or where the offending actions were
2010 The Authors

seen to be motivated by dispositional (personal)
rather than environmental causes.
Klaas (1989a) used expectancy theory as the basis
for a model of decision-making, which sought to
integrate the literature on both the determinants of,
and behavioural responses to, grievance activity
(Olson-Buchanan and Boswell 2008a). This divided
the grievance filing process itself into several stages,
commencing at the point where an employee perceives a grievance opportunity (p. 447). How
employees react to such opportunities is critical.
There are those motivated by a sense of unfairness
due to perceived mistreatment, and others who will
file for instrumental reasons such as political or economic gain. The model proposes a rational, calculative decision-making process (Klaas 1989a, p. 451)
where, in terms of expectancy theory, employees
assess the relative attractiveness or utility of filing.
This takes into account factors such as the likelihood
of winning, and expected remedies, and compares
these with inaction, or alternative responses such as
being absent, lowered productivity, quitting, or disruptive workplace behaviour (Bamberger et al.
2008). If those employees motivated by a sense of
unfairness do not perceive filing as sufficient
to restore equity, they are likely also to engage in
alternative responses, whereas those filing for instrumental reasons are less likely to do this. OlsonBuchanans (1997) laboratory study demonstrated a
link between such attitudinal-perceptual variables
and grievance filing, finding that those more likely to
file were satisfied with their job performance; rated
their job performance highly; and valued rewards
such as the compensation potentially available from
filing. These findings were interpreted as supporting
Klaass expectancy model as well as being consistent
with procedural-distributive justice theory (Lewin
2004). Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) developed their
own efficiency model of decision-making. Using
data from a unionized organization, they identified
that labour market conditions, such as high unemployment, and higher wage premiums (compared
with the local labour market), were both associated
with increased grievance filing. They proposed that
employees who feel unfairly treated will weigh up
the cost and benefits (or effectiveness) of grievance
filing, compared with other responses such as quitting or remaining silent, consistent with Klaas
(1989a). In particular, Cappelli and Chauvin (1991)
interpreted the labour market differential factors, that
is, greater advantages of workers current jobs, as
indicated by wage premiums or high levels of un-
45
employment in the outside market, as increasing the
costs of exit, making grievance-filing the more
attractive option. The proposed dynamics resembled
the compensating differentials model of collective
unionmanagement bargaining and decisions, in
which grievance procedures may be traded for
wages, benefits, workable changes or other conditions of employment (Ichniowski and Lewin 1987;
Peterson and Lewin 2000). Cappelli and Chauvins
(1991) proposals were also consistent with the findings of Brown et al. (1997) whose 30-year data from
Germany and Britain showed the demand for grievance procedures to be cyclical: macro-level factors
such as changes in the flow into unemployment
and the vacancy rate exerted a much stronger influence than changes in the legal infrastructure, with
higher unemployment accompanied by increased
demand.7
Bacharach and Bamberger (2004) extended and
refined Cappelli and Chauvins (1991) efficiency
model. Their survey of unionized blue-collar workers
found little support for the original efficiency
models proposed direct relationships between grievance initiation and either unemployment or wage
premiums. To explain these apparently inconsistent
findings, their model introduced the concept of
labour power derived from power dependence
theory (Lawler 1992), meaning the employees perception of the extent to which the employer is dependent on the employee. They found that, under
conditions of high labour power, the wage premium
was positively associated with grievance filing as
predicted by Cappelli and Chauvin (1991). However,
under conditions of low labour power, the relationship between wage premiums and grievance filing
weakened or reversed; higher wages were associated
with a reduced likelihood of grievance filing. Thus
labour power, or perceived employer dependence,
was proposed as a key determinant of employees
filing decisions.
More recently, Olson-Buchanan and Boswell
(2008a) proposed a model which seeks to unify the
separate aspects of the dispute process into an integrated theoretical framework. This model differs
from others by using a sense-making perspective
which incorporates individuals perceptions before,
during, and after grievance activity, providing an
In contrast however, using UK data, Burgess et al. (2001)

proposed that the level of unemployment was not a significant factor.
2010 The Authors

46
account of how individuals first conclude they

have been mistreated, and then respond to this
mistreatment.
The exit, voice, loyalty line of research

Hirschmans (1970) exitvoiceloyalty model has
been the dominant employee decision-making
model. Applying this model to industrial relations,
Freeman and Medoff (1985) proposed that, by giving
employees voice, unions produced positive benefits
for organizations (Boroff and Lewin 1997; Lewin
2005). The model predicted that, by offering this
resort to voice rather than exit, employers would
benefit through reduced turnover, as well as learning
about problems more quickly, and gaining more specific information to address the issues. Similarly,
employees could also benefit through being able to
resolve disputes, restoring their employment relationship and allowing them to remain with the
company. The traditional wisdom became that voice
action, through grievances, was preferable for both
employers and employees (Feuille and Delaney
1992).
The research using Hirschmans (1970) model is
not limited to the initial grievance-filing decision,
but extends to other aspects, particularly the predicted grievance outcomes. Thus the debate encompasses a number of competing models which form
potential alternative explanations for those outcomes. This research, discussed further below, has
important implications for both understanding how
employees respond to perceived mistreatment, and
for possible changes in the employeremployee
relationship.
Effectiveness of grievance processing

Grievance processing refers to when, where, and
how grievances are resolved (Bemmels and Foley
1996, p. 372). The focus is on the grievance system,
but research findings are often intertwined with
details of the structures and procedures in a particular context, thus restricting their generalizability.
Numerous measures have been used to evaluate
grievance processing, but the two main criteria are
speed and satisfaction (Budd and Colvin 2008). First,
the speed literature emphasizes the length of time
until settlement (Lewin and Peterson 1988; Ponak
and Olson 1992; Ponak et al. 1996), the level or
step at which settlement occurs,8 and settlement rates

(Dastmalchian and Ng 1990; Lewin 1999; Lewin and
Peterson 1988; Ng and Dastmalchian 1989). Across
both union and non-union settings, the bulk of grievances are typically settled at the first or second steps
(for example, 60% and 25% of non-union grievances, respectively, are settled at those steps), with
only a very small proportion (around 2%) settled at
the final step of either procedure (Bemmels 1994;
Feuille 1999; Lewin 2004, 2005; Lewin and Peterson
1988).
Satisfaction measures typically consider parties
perceptions of procedures, with the predominant
issue being perceived fairness. Of particular importance is the organizational justice literature, addressing how employees determine whether they have
been treated fairly, and the impact of those perceptions on organizational functioning (Bingham and
Chachere 1999; Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001;
Greenberg and Lind 2000). Those extensive findings
indicate that employees who believe they are treated
fairly will be favourably disposed toward the organization. This represents a broader theoretical framework which does have applicability across varying
grievance systems. The conventional four factor
model proposes that justice has distributive, procedural and interactional dimensions, with the latter
including interpersonal and informational types
(Colquitt et al. 2001, 2005). Recently, however,
Nabatchi et al. (2007) have challenged this model,
which is premised on interactions between two
parties, proposing instead a six-factor model as more
relevant to contexts such as workplace mediation
which typically involve a third party. This model
divides procedural justice into process and mediator
aspects, as well as separating interpersonal justice
into disputantdisputant and disputantmediator
aspects. Applying the justice model to grievance processes, findings generally confirm the importance of
perceptions of fairness in employees assessments of
the effectiveness of systems (Bemmels and Lau
2001; Blancero 1995; Blancero and Dyer 1996;
Boroff 1991), with procedural justice components
being particularly salient, consistent with the general
organizational justice literature (Greenberg and Lind
8
The steps of a typical grievance procedure consist of: (1)

discussion with the employees supervisor; (2) a formal
written grievance submission handled by the union grievance committee and management; (3) a formal grievance
meeting with additional higher-level management representatives; (4) in some instances a fourth step of grievance
mediation, culminating in third-party neutral arbitration.
2010 The Authors

2000; Lewin 1999; Nowakowski and Conlon 2005;
Nurse and Devonish 2007).
Specifically, for employees, the fairness of the
process can be more important than speed (Gordon
and Bowlby 1989; Lewin 1999), with perceived procedural justice leading to a belief in overall workplace justice (Fryxell 1992), and to satisfaction with
the union and management (Fryxell and Gordon
1989). Use of grievance procedures, which can itself
be used as a criterion (Bingham 2004), has also generally been found to be associated with the perceived fairness of the system, with positive
employee perceptions of procedure effectiveness
related to increased employee use (Lewin and Peterson 1988, Mesch and Dalton 1992; Peterson and
Lewin 2000). Blancero and Dyer (1996) for
example, report systems perceived as credible,
accessible and safe were used more, while Colvin
(2003a) suggested that using non-managerial
decision-makers produces a neutrality effect which
then influences use.
There is, however, a lack of consensus as to what
actually constitutes effectiveness in grievance procedures (Lewin 1999). Budd and Colvin (2008)
argue that, for both union and non-union contexts,
this needs considerable theoretical development.
They propose the three central concepts of equity,
efficiency and voice as core standards which
could be used for comparison and evaluation of procedures. The evaluation of dispute resolution systems
takes on particular significance with regard to nonunion procedures and EDR systems using alternative
resolution processes. Comparisons are made
between these newer systems and traditional
avenues, including union-based grievance procedures, in terms of the various measures of effectiveness. Among these, a key question concerns the
extent to which the newer alternative systems provide
workplace justice, especially for employees
(Bingham 2002, 2004; Colvin 2003a, 2005; Klaas
et al. 2006; Mahony and Klaas 2008). Traditional
systems contain strong procedural safeguards with
well-established due process protections. Bingham
and Chachere (1999) report, however, that very few
studies have examined procedural due process
aspects within non-union procedures and in
employer-designed EDR plans (Bingham 2004). The
studies that have examined non-union procedures
have generally found varying employee-protections,
often offering much less due process than unionnegotiated procedures. Both Feuille and Delaney
(1992) and Feuille and Hildebrand (1995) reported
47
that non-union systems varied widely in terms of
their procedural formality (that is, the extent and
specificity of the procedural rules) but, compared
with union procedures, these offered only modest
levels of due process protection and independence
from management, especially the final decisionmaker. Feuille and Chachere (1995) noted that nonunion procedures tended to give management a
markedly greater share of process-control and
decision-control over complaints, with limits on due
process aspects. Specific shortcomings are identified
for each of the various ADR forms (Budd and Colvin
2008; Mahony and Klaas 2008); however, Binghams (2004) review of the existing evidence suggests that mediation produces better organizational
outcomes than either no intervention or arbitration.
System design is an important influence upon the
justice afforded by grievance procedures. Unlike
bilaterally negotiated union procedures, non-union
and EDR systems can be designed unilaterally and
imposed by an employer. An especially controversial
issue concerns the ability of an employer to impose
binding arbitration, precluding employees access to
external forums for statutory claims, as a condition
of employment (Bingham 2004; Mahony and Klaas
2008). Research suggests that mandatory arbitration
of discrimination claims may have adverse effects on
both procedural and distributive justice (Cohen and
Domagalski 1998). Mahony and Klaas (2008) summarize what is known concerning how the differing
ADR procedures affect employees. Alternative
dispute resolution can enhance workplace justice;
however, justice may be denied, for example when
employers institute mandatory systems requiring
employees to waive their right to pursue claims
through the courts. The newer dispute resolution
systems are essentially private, being confidential
and/or in-house systems, and the paucity of studies
means that comparatively little is known concerning
their impact on the justice afforded to participants, or
whether the functioning of alternative systems may
even undermine the enforcement of public law
(Bingham 2004).
Outcomes
Grievance outcomes have been studied over different
time intervals: the immediate winners and losers in
the formal process; the implications over the shortto-medium term for employees who remain with the
employer; and when the grievance process (irrespec-
2010 The Authors

48
tive of outcome) is linked with the eventual termination of the employeeemployer relationship.
Individual systems identify which party is more
likely to win; for example, in the North American
union environment, Feuille and Hildebrand (1995)
suggested that most grievances are resolved in the
employees favour. These authors noted, however,
that there was no single explanation for why employees prevail in some grievances and not in others, and
this is symptomatic of the lack of theoretical development. Determinants investigated include the grievants work background (Klaas 1989b), the industrial
relations climate of the organization, the salary of the
grievant, the grievance issue (Ng and Dastmalchian
1989), the nature of the forum (labour versus
employment arbitration) (Bingham and Mesch 2000;
Klaas et al. 2006), as well as demographic factors
such as the gender of the grievant and/or decisionmaker (Bemmels 1991; Dalton and Todor 1985;
Dalton et al. 1987). Firm size is implicated: smaller
firms are both more likely to be involved in dispute
hearings (Department of Labour 2007) and more
likely to lose compared with large firms (Saridakis
et al. 2008). Representation is another recurrent
topic; for example, while Antcliff and Saundry
(2009) recently found no links with UK company
grievance hearing outcomes, high union density was
linked with more favourable outcomes for employees. McAndrew (1999) found professional representation was associated with a greater likelihood of
successful outcomes in the New Zealand employment tribunal.
Post-settlement outcomes: competing explanations
Much of the early research used in support of Hirschmans (1970) exitvoiceloyalty model was at a
very broad level, assessing the effects of union coverage by comparing factors such as quit rates among
workers who were, or were not, covered by grievance
procedures. As such, this research did not focus on
the processes involved in the grievance procedures
themselves. A major challenge arose when a series of
studies reported negative outcomes following grievance filing and settlement, seeming to contradict the
received wisdom and raising questions about the
exitvoice model as a sufficient explanation of
employee behaviour.
First in non-union organizations, Lewin (1987)
used individual worker data to compare employees
and supervisors involved in grievances with those
who were not. One year after grievance settlement,
both performance ratings and promotion rates were

lower, but turnover rates (especially voluntary turnover) were significantly higher, for grievance filers
compared with non-filers. No significant differences
existed between the filer and non-filer groups in
these areas prior to, or during, grievance filing and
settlement. The effects were greater when employees proceeded to higher steps of the grievance
process or won the dispute. A similar pattern of outcomes occurred among the supervisors of the
employees in grievances, with lower promotion rates
and performance ratings, and higher turnover rates
(especially in voluntary turnover) post-settlement
(Lewin 1987).
Using a similar pre-test, post-test, control-group
design on unionized organizations, Lewin and Peterson (1988), and later Lewin and Peterson (1999),
obtained analogous results, finding that grievants
again had lower performance ratings and promotion
rates plus higher turnover rates. Furthermore, among
union groups, there were also lower work attendance
rates. As with Lewin (1987), this was despite there
not being significant differences between the groups
before or during grievance filing and settlement
(Lewin 1999). Once more, the supervisors of grievants also experienced the same outcomes, including
increased involuntary turnover (Lewin and Peterson
1999; Peterson and Lewin 2000).
Employees who used grievance procedures and
their direct supervisors appeared to suffer negative
outcomes in the short to medium term postsettlement. The exitvoiceloyalty model was interpreted as predicting that voice action should have
resulted in improved performance, along with a
reduction in turnover (exit). However, the results
obtained were the reverse of this. In contrast, an
organizational punishmentindustrial discipline
model (Arvey and Jones 1985; OReilly and Weitz
1980; Sheppard et al. 1992) predicts that grievance
filers will be punished for violating the informal
rules of the organization. Thus, one potential explanation is retaliation, meaning that employees who
file grievances will be punished for doing so, as will
their supervisors (Lewin and Peterson 1999). The
declines in work attendance, performance ratings and
promotion rates, along with increased turnover, all
matched this model. Managers may have sought
reprisal so that grievants would win the grievance
battle in the short run but lose the career war in the
long run (Feuille and Delaney 1992, p. 224). Evidence for this is also to be found in Lewins (1987)
original study, where internal surveys indicated that
2010 The Authors

fear of management reprisal was the main reason
for not filing, even though a large proportion of
employees believed they had one or more issues that
merited a grievance.
An alternative explanation is that of revealed performance; that is, the negative post-settlement outcomes may be due to actual behavioural differences,
with grievants and their supervisors genuinely being
poorer performers. Under this scenario, the true performance of this group may have been lower all
along but, prior to grievance filing, this had not been
detected. The process of grievance filing and resolution, however, prompts employers to pay closer attention to their performance, which then reveals the
performance deficits (Lewin and Peterson 1999;
Olson-Buchanan 1996).
Exploring this issue, Klaas and de Nisi (1989)
analysed performance evaluation records from a
unionized organization. They found that postgrievance outcomes varied according to the type of
grievance, with employees who filed personal
grievances against their supervisors disciplinary
actions being significantly more likely to receive
lower ratings (especially if the employee won),
whereas employees who filed policy grievances
concerning management policies experienced little
impact on their ratings (Lewin and Peterson 1999).
These negative consequences disappeared when
employees were rated by a different supervisor
from the one involved in the grievance. Klaas and
de Nisi (1989) therefore proposed that the differences in ratings were due to managerial reactions,
with managers responding negatively to grievances
directed against them, consistent with a punishment
model.
Overall, the consistent findings of negative, and
potentially punishment-like, outcomes across these
studies represented a strange irony, since grievance
systems are intended to protect employees (Boswell
and Olson-Buchanan 2004). On the basis of the evidence available, it seemed that the outcomes were at
least partly due to grievance-filers being punished,
consistent with an organizational punishmentindustrial discipline perspective (Klaas and de Nisi
1989; Lewin 1987). There were limitations in these
studies, however, as they had been limited to
aggregate-level analyses using archival data. As a
consequence, little was known about the comparison
group of non-filers, particularly whether or not they
had actually experienced some perceived mistreatment, and hence a deterioration in their relationship
with the organization.
49
Lewin and Boroff (1996) and Boroff and Lewin
(1997) both addressed this shortcoming using field
study samples which consisted exclusively of
employees who believed they had been unfairly
treated at work, comparing mistreated employees
who did choose to file with those who did not. In
contrast to earlier research, the studies found a negative relationship between loyalty and exit, with more
loyal employees being less likely to leave the organization, consistent with the exitvoiceloyalty
model. However, contrary to this exitvoiceloyalty
model, there was a negative relationship between
loyalty and filing, with loyal employees actually less
likely to use grievance procedures. As with Lewin
(1987), fear of reprisal was negatively associated
with filing. These two studies seemed to add to the
increasing body of research that called into question
the core conceptual foundations and the empirical
validity of the exitvoiceloyalty framework (Boroff
and Lewin 1997, p. 60). Furthermore the researchers
now concluded that, rather than exercising voice,
loyal employees suffer in silence (Boroff and Lewin
1997, p. 60).
Olson-Buchanan (1996) sought to clarify the
extent to which these punishment effects reflected
an actual change in grievants behaviour. The
design of this study was different from previous
research in several key aspects. In place of the correlation analysis which had limited the ability to
assess causality, Olson-Buchanan (1996) instead
used a laboratory simulation. This study involved a
group of people who all experienced a similar complaint (mistreatment), but who either did or did not
have the opportunity to voice their discontent
through the grievance procedure. Finally, where
earlier research had measured performance indirectly through supervisors ratings, OlsonBuchanan (1996) sought objective measures. The
findings created several interesting new perspectives on post-grievance outcomes. First, in terms of
access to a grievance system, employees who had
access were significantly less likely to exit, compared with those without access, suggesting that, by
providing a voice option, this (simulated) grievance system had potential to mitigate the negative
effects of a dispute, and thus reduce turnover, consistent with procedural justice theory. In terms of
filing activity, while previous studies had suggested
that filers had higher turnover, this study found
instead that grievance filers had lower turnover
intent, consistent with a key exitvoice prediction.
However, once more, grievance filers had signifi-
2010 The Authors

50
cantly lower objective job performance than nonfilers, contradicting exitvoice predictions. One new
insight was the finding that conflict between an
employee and manager does affect the employees
objective job performance, and not simply the managers evaluation; having a basis for dispute, on its
own, was associated with both lowered job performance and increased turnover intent. Overall, these
findings revived support for the exitvoice model,
but importantly, at the same time they did not completely support the organizational punishment
theory, since the so-called punishment effects
seemed also to reflect changes in actual behaviour,
rather than being entirely due to managerial retribution.
Boswell and Olson-Buchanan (2004) further separated out the role of experiencing mistreatment as
distinct from voicing the mistreatment. Significantly,
they found that the experience of mistreatment on its
own was significantly linked to exit, and that grievance filing was somewhat incidental to this. This
suggests that some of the negative outcomes may be
partly due to the initial experience of mistreatment
itself, and not solely a consequence of taking grievance action. Consistent with the organizational
justice literature, a person who perceives mistreatment may respond by changing their behaviour
and/or leaving. The type of mistreatment was also
particularly important; drawing on Klaas and De
Nisis (1989) distinction between grievance types,
they found that personalized mistreatment was
linked with higher work withdrawal than policyrelated mistreatment.
Throughout this exploration of Hirschmans
model, one core assumption which had remained
largely unchallenged was the way in which voice
had only been operationalized in terms of the use of
a grievance system. Using a field study, OlsonBuchanan and Boswell (2002) broadened the options
for voice to include varying degrees of formality.
Contrary to Boroff and Lewins (1997) claim that
loyal employees will just suffer in silence, they found
that loyal employees do actually use voice, but prefer,
and use, less formal methods, and that use of these
methods is associated with lower intent to quit; all of
which were consistent with the exitvoiceloyalty
model.
Pursuing a similar theme, Luchak (2003) reconceptualized voice, proposing two separate forms:
direct voice, involving employees efforts to
remedy issues directly with another member of the
organization; and representative voice, which
involves communicating indirectly through a thirdparty representative or process. Luchak (2003)

also reconceptualized loyalty, and the field
study findings suggested that differing forms of
loyalty were related to different expressions of
voice. Employees attached through an affective,
emotional bond were more likely to use direct
voice, whereas employees with a more rational, calculated attachment were more likely to use representative voice.
In summary, it seems that after grievances have
been settled, employees do experience negative outcomes, particularly in the areas of performance,
promotion, attendance and exit. The unanswered
question, however, concerns the precise causes of
this. It is unclear as to whether, and perhaps to what
extent, these outcomes are consequences of actual
differences in employees work behaviour, or
whether they result from punishment and retribution from employers. Shifting the focus from the
actual grievance procedures, there may even be
behaviour changes which result purely from the
original mistreatment incident, as distinct from any
grievance activity. The issue is not straightforward,
and it is possible that there may even be several of
these supposedly contending options at work, each
partially contributing to the overall effect. Amidst
the debate, one significant conclusion emerges. If
the dispute sequence is triggered by deterioration in
the relationship between the employee and their
employer, it would seem that formal grievance
activities often do not restore that relationship
irrespective of whether or not the grievance procedures themselves contribute to that deteriorated
state.
Reinstatement or separation
Unlike situations where the grievant remains with the
employer during and immediately after the grievance
being resolved, cases involving dismissal and subsequent reinstatement are different. There are again
marked differences across national settings. In the
Canadian setting for example, reinstatement has
typically been restricted to workers under a collective
agreement (Eden 1994; Williams and Taras 2000)
whereas, in situations such as New Zealand, reinstatement is potentially available to all workers as the
primary remedy for dismissals (Employment Relations Act 2000 s125), although it is rarely sought by
applicants (Department of Labour 2003a,b; McAndrew et al. 2004).
2010 The Authors

The North American reinstatement literature is
limited by the fact that it is rather dated and tends to
focus on arbitration awards for dismissal cases. In
terms of incidence, reinstatement occurs in about
half the grievance cases with disciplinary action substituted for dismissal (Lewin 1999; Williams and
Taras 2000). Simply being awarded reinstatement is
only part of the issue however, and the success of
reinstatement is sometimes defined in terms of the
numbers who are both awarded reinstatement, and
who actually choose to return to work. There is wide
variation among the findings regarding such returns,
with figures ranging from 38% to 91% (Eden 1994;
Lewin 2005; Malinowski 1981; Williams and Taras
2000). Either way, it would seem that a significant
number of grievants are reluctant to return to work,
but the specific dynamics that account for this phenomena are not clear. Some propose that unionization is a relevant factor, with union settings
associated with the higher return rates (Eden 1994).
Alongside this, one reason frequently cited by
employees is again fear of retaliation from the
employer (Bemmels and Foley 1996; Lewin 2005).
The issue does not end at the point when a reinstated employee chooses to return to work, as there
are major issues concerning the actual viability of
post-reinstatement employment. Despite the fact that
employers report being generally satisfied with the
subsequent performance of reinstated workers
(Lewin 2005; Williams and Taras 2000), and postreinstatement discipline problems are not significant
(Lewin 2005), turnover is nonetheless high. While
earlier studies suggested that reinstated employees
were not subject to repercussions (Ponak 1991),
other evidence again suggests that unfair treatment
after reinstatement is the main reason for this turnover, implying that employee fears of retaliation may
be well founded, and surveys of non-union employees do report unjust treatment following reinstatement (Bemmels and Foley 1996; Eden 1994; Lewin
2005; Trudeau 1991). Lewin (1999) notes that reinstated Canadian workers report high levels of unfair
treatment post-reinstatement and have significantly
higher turnover rates than other employees, while
earlier British research suggests that reinstated
employees also experienced difficulties in their organizations (Dickens et al. 1984).
Again the results differ by setting, with surveys of
employers in unionized workplaces reporting high
rates of actual returns to work, as well as favourable
evaluations of employee performance, whereas a
non-union survey indicated the reverse (Eden 1994).
51
Other survey findings suggest that employers can
resent reinstatement orders (Malinowski 1981),
believing that reinstatement negatively affects both
workforce morale and working relationships between
reinstated workers and other employees (Lewin
2005; Ponak 1987). Employees who have been completely exonerated can be significantly more likely to
leave their employment than those partially exonerated (Lewin 1999; Williams and Taras 2000). Workplace size may also be significant, with workers more
easily integrated into large-scale workplaces, while
positive unionemployer relationships and workplace culture may also assist reintegration (Williams
and Taras 2000).
Overall, the research suggests that, while employees may obtain a reinstatement award, the broader
workplace dynamics often result in the demise of the
relationship. These findings raise significant questions concerning the extent to which reinstatement is
effective as a remedy for unjust dismissal (Eden
1994, p. 99) and, importantly, there remains a lack of
theory to explain such outcomes (Lewin 1999).
Conclusions and further research

Grievance research has moved away from what
Bemmels and Foley (1996) refer to as systems
approaches to a focus on specific aspects of grievances, but this has produced a fragmented and
incomplete picture, with a lack of theory evident
across the stages of the grievance process. Although
there are descriptive data on the incidence of grievances, few explanations are offered. Research into
decision-making processes has been dominated by a
narrow focus on employees initial filing decisions as
part of the grievance initiation stage. Within this
there have been some notable developments, with
attention moving from the earlier models based on
compensating wage/efficiency theory (Cappelli and
Chauvin), for example, to other promising models as
proposed by Bacharach and Bamberger (2004) and
Olson-Buchanan and Boswell (2008a). Outside this,
however, the range of other decisions that employees
make, as well as the involvement of parties such as
unions and management, have been little explored.
Considerable effort has gone into investigating the
conundrum of post-settlement outcomes, but this has
produced mixed findings concerning the role of exit
voiceloyalty and the alternative explanations of
organizational punishment, revealed performance
and behaviour changes due to the mistreatment itself.
2010 The Authors

52
Many studies have in common Hirschmans exit

voiceloyalty theory, but we question whether this
model remains relevant as a core framework for analysing employment disputes. Instead, Lewins (2007)
recent pilot work concerning the reactions of managers to these post-settlement findings suggests a
new direction for both researchers and practitioners,
addressing what employers do in response to negative post-settlement outcomes. This work could
extend to an exploration of the divergence between
the intent of legislators and designers, and the actual
outcomes, across a range of settings.
While the role of organizational justice theory has
been affirmed in relation to grievance processing, the
lack of theory persists in this area and is reflected, for
example, in the absence of agreed measures of
effectiveness (Budd and Colvin 2008). This need is
heightened as the issue of justice takes on increasing
importance, especially in relation to non-traditional
forms of dispute resolution. At the same time, newer
organizational approaches such as employee involvement and self-managing teams may represent a new
environment, bringing new, less formal forms of
dispute handling, yet this issue has been little
explored (Colvin 2003a,b, 2004). Similarly, although
the existing research suggests that reinstatement may
not be effective, there is little theory to explain this
(Lewin 1999).
Together, these factors lead to the broader issue
of how grievances are framed in future research.
Grievances need to be reconceptualized as dynamic
processes which move through multiple stages and
involve a cast of actors (De Dreu and Gelfand 2008;
Klaas 1989a). In addition, their heterogeneity needs
to be recognized in a more sophisticated typology
of grievances. Many studies have noted differing
effects by grievance type (for example, see
Bemmels 1994; Klaas and de Nisi 1989; Boswell
and Olson-Buchanan 2004; Ng and Dastmalchian
1989; Olson-Buchanan and Boswell 2008a), and the
conflict literature contains a longstanding recognition of the need to distinguish conflict types (Jehn
1995, 1997; Jehn et al. 2008; Jameson 1999), yet
this has not translated into a conceptually based
grievance typology.
This reframing requires researchers to develop a
longitudinal understanding of each partys perspective. There is no evidence to assume, for example,
that the initial filing decision is the sole decision
made by an employee as the grievance process
unfolds (Lewin 1999). Nor can it be assumed that the
nature of that decision and what motivates prior and
subsequent decisions, will be the same as the decision to file. There is a need to understand the factors
influencing a partys decisions throughout all the
stages of a grievance, and the research also needs to
be broadened to include the perspectives of all
parties involved. To take one issue, despite propositions about managerial retribution, there is no significant body of research on what influences
managers attitudes and conduct with respect to
grievance claims and their settlement. There has been
work concerning the role of managers in a variety of
related areas; for example, disciplinary decisions
(Judge and Martocchio 1995; Klaas and Dellomo
1997; Klaas and Wheeler 1990; Rollinson 1992,
2000), in arbitration (Bingham and Chachere 1999;
Bingham and Mesch 2000), as well as in the selection and function of newer ADR procedures (Colvin
2003a; Klaas et al. 2006; Mahony and Klaas 2008).
In contrast with the extensive work on employee
grievance-perspectives, there is a need to develop the
employer side of grievances (Dennison and Corby
2005; Klaas et al. 1999; Lewin 2004; Mahony and
Klaas 2008).
The conceptual model proposed (but not tested) by
Olson-Buchanan and Boswell (2008a) of how an
employee experiences, makes sense of, and responds
to mistreatment is an important step in the direction
of more developed theory. This model integrates
earlier insights regarding separate components of the
grievance process, and proposes a set of processes
which potentially extend across the multiple stages
of a grievance. Furthermore, the model points to the
need to capture the interaction of parties, and integrate concepts from the conflict literature (Folger
et al. 2005; Jameson 1999; Pondy 1967, 1992; Pruitt
and Kim 2004; Thomas 1976, 1992) to produce more
dynamic theory. Exploring such a perspective may
indicate that the intent to resolve disputes and restore
relationships through the later, more formal stages of
the grievance process may be misguided (Antcliff
and Saundry 2009; Ury et al. 1988). The chances of
achieving full resolution which addresses and
resolves the core issues associated with a conflict
may be low and, instead, formal grievance activities
may only achieve closure or settlement, but not preserve the employment relationship (Pruitt and Kim
2004).
While the pre-filing stage of grievances seems to
represent an area where much successful resolution
occurs, it remains little explored. To use Lewins
(1999) terminology, there remains a need to develop
preventive conflict resolution approaches which use
2010 The Authors

the informal consultation and discussion which typically occur in the first stage in the grievance process,
rather than focusing on reactive conflict approaches
of subsequent formal grievance handling where the
relationship has deteriorated and may decline even
further.
This reconceptualization of grievances must
include the longstanding industrial relations concept
of power which has regained prominence in the contemporary debates regarding ADR options (Colvin
2005; Mahony and Klaas 2008; van Gramberg 2001).
As Bingham observes:
I bring to this discussion a particular frame: power.
Control over dispute system design makes a fundamental difference in both what form a workplace
conflict management system takes and how it functions. The key distinguishing feature in new workplace systems is that employers design them
unilaterally, without union participation. They are
designed by employers in order to meet employer
interests. (Bingham 2005, p. 131)
Research into the role of power is not limited to
system design and the newer dispute procedures.
Aside from passing mention in the first generation
of research (Lipsky and Avgar 2004), the concept has
received little explicit attention in the grievance literature, despite the prospect of powerful players
being involved on one or both sides of a dispute. The
issue of power takes on greater significance for
employees, given the decline in union coverage and
the concurrent individualization of the employment
relationship. The existing research does examine a
range of variables such as those associated with
expectancy models, post-grievance outcomes and
management retribution, which have connotations of
power and could be reframed as power-related phenomena. Bacharach and Bamberger (2004), however,
are among the few recent researchers actually to take
the step of reconceptualizing one specific set of variables, in their case labour market factors, as explicitly power-related elements. This reframing of the
phenomena in terms of power does not occur in the
majority of the research though.
Managers now face increased pressure to deal
directly with employee grievances. New human
resource management methods involve companies
designing their own in-house conflict management
procedures (Colvin 2003a; Costantino and Merchant
1996; Gadlin 2005; Lipsky and Avgar 2004). At the
same time, there are also external pressures as governments move to decentralize dispute resolution to
the workplace level, promoting earlier, low-level
53
resolution among the parties directly involved
(Chapman et al. 2003; Cullinane and Donald 2000;
Earnshaw et al. 2000; Van Gramberg 2006). The difficulties of research access in this field are well recognized (Bingham 2005, 2007; Bingham and
Chachere 1999, p. 97; Lewin 1999, p. 171), nonetheless, further development of research is needed to
ensure that new procedures are well-grounded in
theory, effective in practice and are fair to all
parties.
References
Allen, R.E. and Keaveny, T.J. (1985). Factors differentiating
grievants and non-grievants. Human Relations, 38, pp.
519534.
Antcliff, V. and Saundry, R. (2009). Accompaniment, workplace representation and disciplinary outcomes in British
workplaces just a formality? British Journal of Industrial Relations, 47, pp. 100121.
Arvey, R.D. and Jones, A. (1985). The uses of discipline in
organisational settings. In Staw, B.M. and Cummings,
L.L. (eds), Research in Organizational Behavior: An
Annual Series of Analytical Essays and Critical Reviews.
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 367408.
Bacharach, S. and Bamberger, P. (2004). The power of labor
to grieve: the impact of the workplace, labor market, and
power-dependence on employee filing. Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, 57, pp. 518539.
Bamberger, P., Kohn, E. and Nahum-Shani, I. (2008). Aversive workplace conditions and employee grievance filing:
the moderating effects of gender and ethnicity. Industrial
Relations, 47, pp. 229259.
Behrens, M. (2007). Conflict, arbitration, and dispute resolution in the German workplace. International Journal of
Conflict Management, 18, pp. 175192.
Bemmels, B. (1991). Attribution theory and discipline arbitration. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 44, pp.
548562.
Bemmels, B. (1994). The determinants of grievance initiation. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 47, pp. 285
301.
Bemmels, B. and Foley, J.R. (1996). Grievance procedure
research: a review and theoretical recommendations.
Journal of Management, 22, pp. 359384.
Bemmels, B. and Lau, D.C. (2001). Local union leaders
satisfaction with grievance procedures. Journal of Labor
Research, XXII, pp. 653667.
Bemmels, B., Reshef, Y. and Stratton-Devine, K. (1991).
The roles of supervisors, employees and stewards in
grievance initiation. Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, 45, pp. 1530.
Bingham, L.B. (2002). Why suppose? Lets find out: a
public policy research program on dispute resolution.
Journal of Dispute Resolution, 1, pp. 101126.
2010 The Authors

54
Bingham, L.B. (2004). Employment dispute resolution: the

case for mediation. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 22, pp.
145174.
Bingham, L.B. (2005). The impacts of alternative dispute
resolution on workplace outcomes discussion. In Labor
and Employment Relations Association Series, Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meeting. Urbana-Champaign, IL:
Labor and Employment Relations Association, pp. 131
133
Bingham, L.B. (2007). Evaluation dispute resolution programs: traps for the unwary. In Labor and Employment
Relations Association Series, Proceedings of the 59th
Annual Meeting. Urbana-Champaign, IL: Labor and
Employment Relations Association, pp. 104115.
Bingham, L.B. and Chachere, D.R. (1999). Dispute resolution in employment: the need for research. In Eaton, A.E.
and Keefe, J.H. (eds), Employment Dispute Resolution
and Worker Rights in the Changing Workplace. UrbanaChampaign, IL: Industrial Relations Research Association, pp. 95136.
Bingham, L.B. and Mesch, D. (2000). Decision making in
employment and arbitration. Industrial Relations, 39, pp.
671694.
Blancero, D. (1995). Non-union grievance systems: system
characteristics and fairness perceptions. Academy of Management Journal, Special Issue: Best Paper Proceedings,
pp. 8488.
Blancero, D. and Dyer, L. (1996). Due process for nonunion employees: the influence of system characteristics
on fairness perceptions. Human Resource Management,
35, pp. 343359.
Boroff, K.E. (1991). Measuring the perception of the effectiveness of a workplace complaints procedure. Advances
in Industrial and Labor Relations, 5, pp. 5063.
Boroff, K.E. and Lewin, D. (1997). Loyalty, voice, and
intent to exit a firm: a conceptual and empirical analysis.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 51, pp. 50
63.
Boswell, W.R. and Olson-Buchanan, J.B. (2004). Experiencing mistreatment at work: the role of grievance filing,
nature of mistreatment, and employee withdrawal.
Academy of Management Journal, 47, pp. 129139.
Brown, S., Frick, B. and Sessions, J. (1997). Unemployment,
vacancies and unjust dismissals: the cyclical demand for
individual grievance procedures in Germany and Great
Britain. Review of Labour Economics and Industrial
Relations, 11, pp. 329349.
Budd, J.W. and Colvin, A.J.S. (2008). Improved metrics
for workplace dispute resolution procedures: efficiency,
equity, and voice. Industrial Relations, 47, pp. 460
479.
Burgess, S., Propper, C. and Wilson, D. (2001). Explaining
the Growth in the Number of Applications to Employment
Tribunals, 19721997. Employment Relations Research
Series, Number 10. London: Department of Trade and
Industry.
Cappelli, P. and Chauvin, K. (1991). A test of an efficiency

model of grievance activity. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 45, pp. 313.
Chapman, C., Gibson, J. and Hardy, S. (2003). ADR in
Employment Law. London: Cavendish.
Cohen, C.F. and Domagalski, T. (1998). The effects of mandatory arbitration of employee discrimination claims: perceptions of justice and suggestions for change. Employee
Rights and Responsibilities Journal, 11, pp. 2740.
Cohen-Charash, Y. and Spector, P. (2001). The role of
justice in organisations: a meta-analysis. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 86, pp. 278
321.
Colquitt, J.A., Conlon, D.E., Wesson, M.J., Porter, C.O.L.H.
and Ng, K.Y. (2001). Justice at the millennium: a metaanalytic review of 25 years of organizational justice
research. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, pp. 425
445.
Colquitt, J.A., Greenburg, J. and Zapata-Phelan, C.P. (2005).
What is organisational justice? A historical overview. In
Colquitt, J.A. and Greenburg, J. (eds), Handbook of
Organisational Justice. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, pp. 356.
Colvin, A.J.S. (2003a). The dual transformation of workplace dispute resolution. Industrial Relations, 42, pp.
712735.
Colvin, A.J.S. (2003b). Institutional pressures, human
resource strategies, and the rise of non-union dispute resolution procedures. Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
56, pp. 375392.
Colvin, A.J.S. (2004). The relationship between employee
involvement and workplace dispute resolution. Relations
Industrielles, 59, pp. 681704.
Colvin, A. (2005). Inequalities in access to justice in the
workplace. In Labor and Employment Relations Association Series, Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meeting.
Urbana-Champaign, IL: Labor and Employment Relations Association, pp. 122130.
Colvin, A., Klaas, B. and Mahony, D.M. (2006). Research
on alternative dispute resolution procedures. In Lewin, D.
(ed.), Contemporary Issues in Employment Relations.
Urbana-Champaign, IL: Labor and Employment Relations Association, pp. 103147.
Costantino, C.A. and Merchant, C.S. (1996). Designing
Conflict Management Systems: A Guide for Creating Productive and Healthy Organisations. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Cullinane, J. and Donald, D. (2000). Personal grievances in
New Zealand. In Burgess, J. and Strachan, G. (eds),
Research on Work, Employment and Industrial Relations
Conference 2000; Proceedings of the14th AIRAANZ Conference, February, Newcastle, NSW, Australia. Available
at: http://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/depts/SML/Airaanz/
old/conferce/newscastle2000/proceedings2000.htm.
Dalton, D.R. and Todor, W.D. (1985). Composition of the
dyads as a factor in the outcomes of workplace justice:
2010 The Authors

two field assessments. Academy of Management Journal,
28, pp. 704712.
Dalton, D.R., Todor, W.D. and Owen, C.L. (1987). Sex
effects in workplace justice outcomes: a field assessment.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 72, pp. 156159.
Dastmalchian, A. and Ng, I. (1990). Industrial relations
climate and grievance outcomes. Relations Industrielles,
45, pp. 311325.
De Dreu, C.K.W. and Gelfand, M.J. (2008). Conflict in the
workplace: sources, functions, and dynamics across multiple levels of analysis. In De Dreu, C.K.W. and Gelfand,
M.J. (eds), The Psychology of Conflict and Conflict Management in Organizations. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum,
pp. 354.
Den Hartog, D.N., Boselie, P. and Paauwe, L. (2004). Performance management: a model and research agenda.
Applied Psychology: An International Review, 53, pp.
556569.
Dennison, P. and Corby, S. (2005). Images in the adversarial
mirror: a study of the employment tribunal system in
Britain. International Employment Relations Review, 11,
pp. 2136.
Department of Labour (2003a). Department of Labour
Annual Report 2002/2003. Wellington, New Zealand:
Department of Labour.
Department of Labour (2003b). Evaluation of the ShortTerm Impact of the Employment Relations Act 2000. Wellington, New Zealand: Department of Labour.
Department of Labour (2007). Personal Grievance Determinations in the Employment Relations Authority: 17
Jul18 August 2007. Wellington, New Zealand: Department of Labour.
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2004). The Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). London:
HMSO.
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2005a). Employment Rights at Work Survey of Employees. London:
HMSO.
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2005b). Fair
Treatment at Work Survey. London: HMSO.
Dickens, L., Hall, M. and Wood, S. (2005). Review of
Research into the Impact of Employment Relations Legislation. Employment Relations Research Series Number
45.London: DTI.
Dickens, L., Hart, M., Jones, M. and Weekes, B. (1984). The
British Experience under a statute prohibiting unfair dismissal. Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 37, pp.
497514.
Earnshaw, J., Goodman, J., Harrison, R. and Marchington,
M. (1998). Industrial Tribunals, Workplace Disciplinary
Procedures and Employment Practice. Employment relations research series report, No. 2 (DTI). London: HMSO.
Earnshaw, J., Marchington, M. and Goodman, J. (2000).
Unfair to whom? Discipline and dismissal in small
establishments. Industrial Relations Journal, 31, pp.
6273.
55
Eden, G. (1994). Reinstatement in the non-union sector: an
empirical analysis. Relations Industrielles, 49, pp.
87101.
Feuille, P. (1999). Grievance mediation. In Eaton, A.E. and
Keefe, J.H. (eds), Employment Dispute Resolution and
Worker Rights in the Changing Workplace. UrbanaChampaign, IL: Industrial Relations Research Association, pp. 187218.
Feuille, P. and Chachere, D.R. (1995). Looking fair or being
fair: remedial voice procedures in non-union workplaces.
Journal of Management, 21, pp. 2742.
Feuille, P. and Delaney, J.T. (1992). The individual to suit of
organisational justice: grievance procedures in non-union
workplaces. Research in Personnel and Human Resources
Management, 10, pp. 187232.
Feuille, P. and Hildebrand, R.L. (1995). Grievance procedures and dispute resolution. In Ferris, G.R., Rosen, S.D.
and Barnum, D.T. (eds), Handbook of Human Resource
Management. London: Blackwell Sage, pp. 340369.
Folger, R.G. and Cropanzano, R. (1998). Organizational
Justice and Human Resource Management. Thousand
Oaks: Sage.
Folger, J.P., Poole, M.S. and Stutman, R.K. (2005). Working
Through Conflict: Strategies for Relationships, Groups,
and Organizations. Boston: Pearson.
Freeman, R.B. and Medoff, J.L. (1985). What Do Unions
Do? New York: Basic Books.
Fryxell, G.E. (1992). Perceptions of justice afforded by
formal grievance systems as predictors of belief in a
just workplace. Journal of Business Ethics, 11, pp. 635
647.
Fryxell, G.E. and Gordon, M.E. (1989). Workplace justice
and job satisfaction as predictors of satisfaction with
union and management. Academy of Management
Journal, 32, pp. 851866.
Gadlin, H. (2005). Bargaining in the shadow of management: integrated conflict management systems. In
Moffitt, M.L. and Bordonne, R.C. (eds), The Handbook of
Dispute Resolution. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, pp. 371
385.
Gibbons, M. (2007). Better Dispute Resolution: A Review of
Employment Dispute Resolution in Great Britain.
London: Department of Trade and Industry.
Gordon, M.E. and Bowlby, R.L. (1989). Reactance and
intentionality attributions as determinants of the intent
to file a grievance. Personnel Psychology, 42, pp. 309
329.
Greenberg, J. and Lind, E.A. (2000). The pursuit of organizational justice: From conceptualisation to implication to
application. In Cooper, C.L. and Locke, E.A. (eds), Industrial and Organizational Psychology: Linking Theory
with Practice. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 72108.
Hayward, B., Peters, M., Rousseau, N. and Seeds, K. (2004).
Findings from the Survey of Employment Tribunal Applications. Employment Relations Research Series, 33.
London: DTI.
2010 The Authors

56
Hirschman, A.O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty:

Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hutchinson, S. and Purcell, J. (2003). Bringing Policies to
Life the Vital Role of Front Line Managers in People
Management. London: Chartered Institute of Personnel
and Development.
Ichniowski, C. and Lewin, D. (1987). Grievance procedures
and firm performance. In Kleiner, M.M., Block, R.N.,
Roomkim, M. and Salsburg, S. (eds), Human Resources
and the Performance of the Firm. Washington DC: Industrial relations Research Association, Bureau of National
Affairs, pp. 159193.
Jameson, J.K. (1999). Toward a comprehensive model for
the assessment and management of intraorganizational
conflict: developing the framework. International Journal
of Conflict Management, 10, 268294.
Jehn, K.A. (1995). A multimethod examination of the benefits and detriments of intragroup conflict. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 40, pp. 256282.
Jehn, K.A. (1997). A qualitative analysis of conflict types
and dimensions in organizational groups. Administrative
Jehn, K.A., Bezrukova, K. and Thatcher, S. (2008). Conflict,
diversity, and faultlines in workgroups. In De Dreu,
C.K.W. and Gelfand, M.J. (eds), The Psychology of Conflict and Conflict Management in Organizations. New
York: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 179210.
Judge, T.A. and Martocchio, J.J. (1995). The role of fairness
orientation and supervisor attributions in absence disciplinary decisions. Journal of Business and Psychology,
10, pp. 115137.
Kaminski, M. (1999). New forms of work organization and
their impact on the grievance procedure. In Eaton, A.E.
and OKeefe, J.H. (eds), Employment Dispute Resolution
and Worker Rights in the Changing Workplace. UrbanaChampaign, IL: Industrial Relations Research Association, pp. 219246.
Klaas, B.N. (1989a). Determinants of grievance activity and
the grievance systems impact on employee behaviour: an
integrative perspective. Academy of Management Review,
14, pp. 445457.
Klaas, B.N. (1989b). Managerial decision making about
employee behaviours: the impact of the grievants work
history. Personnel Psychology, 42, pp. 5368.
Klaas, B.N. and De Nisi, A. (1989). Managerial reactions to
employee dissent: the impact of grievance activity on
performance ratings. Academy of Management Journal,
32, pp. 705711.
Klaas, B.N. and Dellomo, G.G. (1997). Managerial use of
dismissal: organizational-level determinants. Personnel
Psychology, 50, pp. 927953.
Klaas, B.S., Gainey, T.W. and Dellomo, G.G. (1999). The
determinants of disciplinary system effectiveness: a linemanagement perspective. Industrial Relations, 38, pp.
542553.
Klaas, B.N. and Wheeler, H.N. (1990). Managerial decision

making about employee discipline: a policy capturing
approach. Personnel Psychology, 43, pp. 117133.
Klaas, B.S., Mahony, D.M. and Wheeler, H.N. (2006).
Decision-making about workplace disputes: a policycapturing study of employment arbitrators, labor arbitrators, and jurors. Industrial Relations, 45, pp. 6895.
Kleiner, M.M., Nickelsburg, G. and Pilarski, A. (1995).
Monitoring, grievances, and plant performance. Industrial Relations, 34, pp. 169189.
Knight, K.G. and Latreille, P.L. (2000). Discipline, dismissals and complaints to employment tribunal. British
Journal of Industrial Relations, 38, pp. 533555.
Kozan, M.K., Ergin, C. and Varoglu, D. (2007). Third party
intervention strategies of managers in subordinates conflicts in Turkey. International Journal of Conflict Management, 18, pp. 128147.
Labig, C.E. and Greer, C.R. (1988). Grievance initiation: a
literature survey and suggestions for future research.
Journal of Labor Research, IX, pp. 127.
Lawler, E.J. (1992). Power processes in bargaining. Sociological Quarterly, 33, pp. 1734.
Lewin, D. (1987). Dispute resolution in the non-union firm.
Journal of Conflict, 31, pp. 465502.
Lewin, D. (1990). Grievance procedures in non-union workplaces: an empirical analysis of usage, dynamics, and
outcomes. Chicago-Kent Law Review, 66, pp. 823844.
Lewin, D. (1999). Theoretical and empirical research on the
grievance procedure and arbitration: a critical review. In
Eaton, A.E. and OKeefe, J.H. (eds), Employment Dispute
Resolution and Worker Rights in the Changing Workplace.
Urbana-Champaign, IL: Industrial Relations Research
Association, pp. 137186.
Lewin, D. (2004). Dispute resolution in the non-union organization: key empirical findings. In Sherwyn, D. and
Estreicher, S. (eds), Alternative Dispute Resolution in the
Employment Arena: Proceedings of New York University
Annual Conference Series. New York: Kluwer, pp. 379
403.
Lewin, D. (2005). Unionism and employment conflict resolution: rethinking collective voice and its consequences.
Journal of Labor Research, 26, pp. 209239.
Lewin, D. (2007). Management responses to non-union
dispute resolution outcomes: a political analysis. Labor
and Employment Relations Association Series, Proceedings of the 59th Annual Meeting. Urbana-Champaign, IL:
Labor and Employment Relations Association, pp.
85103.
Lewin, D. and Boroff, K.E. (1996). The role of exit in loyalty
and voice: a conceptual and empirical analysis. Advances
in Industrial and Labor Relations, 7, pp. 6996.
Lewin, D. and Peterson, R.B. (1988). The Modern Grievance
Procedure in the United States. NewYork: Quorum Books.
Lewin, D. and Peterson, R.B. (1999). Behavioural outcomes
of grievance activity. Industrial Relations, 38, pp. 554
576.
2010 The Authors

Lipsky, D.B. and Avgar, A.C. (2004). Commentary: research
on employment dispute resolution: toward a new paradigm. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 22, pp. 175189.
Lipsky, D.B., Seeber, R.L. and Fincher, R.D. (2003). Emerging Systems for Managing Workplace Conflict: Lessons
from American Corporations for Managers and Dispute
Resolution Professionals. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Luchak, A.A. (2003). What kind of voice do loyal employees use? British Journal of Industrial Relations, 41, pp.
115134.
McAndrew, I. (1999). Adjudication in the employment tribunal: some facts and figures on caseload and representation. New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 24,
pp. 365382.
McAndrew, I., Moreton, J. and Geare, A. (2004). The
employment institutions. In Rasmussen, E. (ed.), Employment Relationships: New Zealands Employment Relations Act. Auckland: Auckland University Press, pp.
98118.
Mahony, D.M. and Klaas, B.S. (2008). Comparative dispute
resolution in the workplace. Journal of Labor Research,
29, pp. 251271.
Malinowski, A.A. (1981). An empirical analysis of discharge cases and the work history of employees reinstated
by labor arbitration. The Arbitration Journal, 36, pp.
3146.
Mesch, D. and Dalton, D.R. (1992). Unexpected consequences of improving workplace justice: a six year time
series assessment. Academy of Management Journal, 35,
10991114.
Nabatchi, T., Bingham, L.B. and Good, D.H. (2007). Organizational justice and workplace mediation: a six-factor
model. International Journal of Conflict Management, 18,
pp. 148174.
Ng, I. and Dastmalchian, A. (1989). Determinants of grievance outcomes: a case study. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 42, pp. 393403.
Nowakowski, J.M. and Conlon, D.E. (2005). Organisational
justice: looking back, looking forward. International
Journal of Conflict Management, 16, pp. 429.
Nurse, L. and Devonish, D. (2007). Grievance management
and its link to workplace justice. Employee Relations, 29,
pp. 89109.
OReilly, C.A.I. and Weitz, B.A. (1980). Managing marginal
employees: the use of warnings and dismissals. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25, pp. 467484.
Olson-Buchanan, J.B. (1996). Voicing discontent: what
happens to the grievance filer after the grievance? Journal
of Applied Psychology, 87, pp. 11671174.
Olson-Buchanan, J.B. (1997). To grieve or not to grieve:
factors relating to discontent in an organizational simulation. International Journal of Conflict Management, 8, pp.
132147.
Olson-Buchanan, J.B. and Boswell, W.R. (2002). The role of
employee loyalty and formality in voicing discontent.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, pp. 11671174.
57
Olson-Buchanan, J.B. and Boswell, W.R. (2008a). An integrative model of experiencing and responding to mistreatment at work. Academy of Management Review, 33, pp.
7696.
Olson-Buchanan, J.B. and Boswell, W.R. (2008b). Organizational dispute resolution systems. In De Dreu, C.K.W.
and Gelfand, M.J. (eds), The Psychology of Conflict and
Conflict Management in Organizations. New York:
Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 321352.
Peterson, R.B. and Lewin, D. (2000). Research on unionised
grievance procedures: management issues and recommendations. Human Resource Management, 39, pp. 395
406.
Ponak, A. (1987). Discharge arbitration and reinstatement in
the Province of Alberta. Arbitration Journal, 42, pp.
3946.
Ponak, A. (1991). Discharge arbitration and reinstatement:
an industrial relations perspective. In Kaplan, W., Sack, J.
and Gunderson, M. (eds), Labour Arbitration Yearbook.
Toronto: Butterworths/Lancaster House, pp. 3140.
Ponak, A. and Olson, C. (1992). Time delays in grievance
arbitration. Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations,
47, pp. 690705.
Ponak, A., Zerbe, W., Rose, S. and Corliss, O. (1996). Using
event history analysis to model delay in grievance arbitration. Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 50, pp.
105121.
Pondy, L. (1967). Organizational conflict. Administrative
Pondy, L.R. (1992). Reflections on organizational conflict.
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 13, pp. 257261.
Pruitt, D.G. and Kim, S.H. (2004). Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Reade, C. and McKenna, M.R. (2007). From antiquity to the
factory floor: reviving original dispute resolution in the
Sri Lankan subsidiary of a multinational enterprise. International Journal of Conflict Management, 18, pp. 108
127.
Rollinson, D. (1992). Individual issues in industrialrelations an examination of discipline, and an agenda
for research. Personnel Review, 21, pp. 4657.
Rollinson, D. (2000). Supervisor and manager approaches to
handling discipline and grievance: a follow-up study. Personnel Review, 29, p. 743.
Saridakis, G., Sen-Gupta, S., Edwards, P. and Storey, D.
(2008). The impact of enterprise size on employment
tribunal incidence and outcomes: evidence from
Britain. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 46, pp.
469499.
Sheppard, B.H., Lewicki, R.J. and Minton, J.W. (1992).
Organizational Justice: The Search for Fairness in the
Workplace. New York: Lexington Books.
Thomas, K.W. (1976). Conflict and conflict management.
In Dunnette, M. (ed.), Handbook of Industrial and
Organisational Psychology. Chicago: Rand McNally, pp.
889935.
2010 The Authors

58
Thomas, K.W. (1992). Conflict and negotiation processes in

organizations. In Dunnette, M.D. and Hough, L.M. (eds),
Handbook of Industrial and Organisational Psychology,
2nd edn. Palo Alto: California Consulting Psychologists
Press, pp. 651717.
Trudeau, G. (1991). Is reinstatement a remedy suitable to
at-will employees? Industrial Relations: A Journal of
Economy and Society, 30, pp. 302315.
Ury, W.L., Brett, J.M. and Goldberg, S.B. (1988). Getting
Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of
Conflict. San Franciso: Jossey-Bass.
Van Gramberg, B. (2001). Mediation, structural violence
and industrial relations. 15th Conference of the Association of Industrial Relations Academics of Australia and
New Zealand. Woollongong: New South Wales.
Van Gramberg, B. (2006). Managing Workplace Conflict:

Alternative Dispute Resolution in Australia. Sydney: Federation Press.
Van Gramberg, B. and Teicher, J. (2005). Managing neutrality and impartiality in workplace conflict resolution: the
dilemma of the HR manager. Working Paper 57/05,
Department of Management Working Paper Series. Melbourne, Australia: Monash University.
Varman, R. and Bhatnagar, D. (1999). Power and politics
in grievance resolution: Managing meaning of due
process in an organisation. Human Relations, 52, pp.
349380.
Williams, K. and Taras, D.G. (2000). Reinstatement in arbitration: the grievors perspective. Relations Industrielles,
55, pp. 227249.
2010 The Authors


SSRN Id1781603

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

SSRN Id1781603

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

See

discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at:

EmployeeEmployer Grievances: A Review

73 PUBLICATIONS 1,781 CITATIONS

All in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate,

Available from: Robert T. Hamilton

International Journal of Management Reviews, Vol. 13, 4058 (2011)

Bernard Walker and Robert T. Hamilton

et al. 2005). Managers can be reluctant players in the

2010 The Authors

The term grievance procedures is used in a variety of

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) options have been

2010 The Authors

B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton

the processes that influence the initiation and course

For a discussion of the literature regarding the relationship

adopt grievance procedures are bargaining choices

Due process refers to a term of art from the Constitution

2010 The Authors

Incidence of grievable events

Employee responses: grievance

2010 The Authors

B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton

inconsistent findings and was criticized for being

As examples of the inconsistency, in the USA Lewin and

2010 The Authors

In contrast however, using UK data, Burgess et al. (2001)

2010 The Authors

B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton

account of how individuals first conclude they

The exit, voice, loyalty line of research

Effectiveness of grievance processing

step at which settlement occurs,8 and settlement rates

The steps of a typical grievance procedure consist of: (1)

2010 The Authors

2010 The Authors

B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton

both performance ratings and promotion rates were

2010 The Authors

2010 The Authors

B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton

involves communicating indirectly through a thirdparty representative or process. Luchak (2003)

2010 The Authors

Conclusions and further research

2010 The Authors

B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton

Many studies have in common Hirschmans exit

2010 The Authors

2010 The Authors

B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton

Bingham, L.B. (2004). Employment dispute resolution: the

Cappelli, P. and Chauvin, K. (1991). A test of an efficiency

2010 The Authors

2010 The Authors

B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton

Hirschman, A.O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty:

Klaas, B.N. and Wheeler, H.N. (1990). Managerial decision

2010 The Authors

2010 The Authors

B. Walker and R.T. Hamilton

Thomas, K.W. (1992). Conflict and negotiation processes in

Van Gramberg, B. (2006). Managing Workplace Conflict:

2010 The Authors