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Adaptive Relay Setting for Distribution Systems


Considering Operation Scenarios of Wind Generators
C. S. Chen, Senior Member, IEEE, C.T. Tsai, S. C. Hsieh, C. T. Hsu, C. H. Lin

Abstract-- This paper presents a method for adaptive relay


setting for distribution systems with wind generators. The
Advanced Distribution Automation System (ADAS) is applied to
monitor the operational status of wind generators (WG) and line
switches. For the change of operational status of wind generators
or network reconfiguration of distribution system because of
operation of line switches, the function of adaptive relay setting is
activated by the ADAS control master station. Short-circuit
analysis is performed to solve the magnitude and direction of
fault-current flows. The protective relay settings are then revised
accordingly and loaded to the protective relays along the feeder to
achieve the adaptive fault protection. Sample distribution feeders
with an open-loop configuration and a closed-loop configuration
are used to demonstrate adaptive relay setting for distribution
systems with various operational scenarios of wind generators. It
is concluded that the fault currents contributed by wind
generators must be included in the design of the TAP/LEVEL
settings of protective relays by the ADAS system to achieve good
protection of smart distribution systems.
Index TermsAdaptive relay
distribution automation system

setting,

wind generator,

I. INTRODUCTION

HE development of various types of renewable energy


resources has become a critical issue for the
implementation of a sustainable environment in the future.
Although power generation by many types of renewable
energy systems is rather unstable as compared to that of
conventional bulk power generators, it still plays an important
role for the national energy plan to achieve the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions. Among various types of renewable
energy resources, wind power and solar energy have been
identified as having the most development potential. The
government in Taiwan has already set the target for wind
power installation at 3,000 MW by 2025. The Renewable

This work was supported in part by the National Science Council of


Republic of China under the Contract NSC 102-3113-P-214 -002
C. S. Chen is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, I-Shou
University, Dashu District, Kaohsiung 84001, Taiwan. He is also a joint
professor of the Department of Electrical Engineering, National Sun Yat-Sen
University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan.
C.T. Tsai is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, National Sun
Yat-Sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan.
S. C. Hsieh is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, I-Shou
University, Dashu District, Kaohsiung 84001, Taiwan.
C.T. Hsu is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Southern
Taiwan University of Science and Technology, Yung-Kang City 710, Taiwan.
C. H. Lin is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, National
Kaohsiung University of Applied Sciences, Kaohsiung, Taiwan.

Energy Initiatives have been launched in Taiwan to promote


more renewable energy projects by providing financial
subsidies for increasing the feed-in-tariff of power generation
by PV systems and wind generators (WG). With abundant
wind energy around Taiwan, an offshore wind farm of more
than 200 MW is under construction at Penghu Island. Besides,
many land-based wind generators are applying for integration
with the Taiwan Power Company (Taipower) distribution
system.
Because the short-circuit capacity of distribution system is
much smaller when compared to that of the transmission
system, intermittent power generation by WG often creates a
more severe impact to the power quality of distribution
systems. To solve the problem, a software tool has been
developed by Taipower to review the integration of dispersed
generators (DG) to ensure the voltage variation introduced by
the renewable power generation is less than 2.5 percent.
However, the integration of WG might cause a protection
coordination problem because the practice of conventional
protective relay design does not consider the fault current
contributed by DGs. In addition, the switching operation for
load transfer or fault restoration in distribution systems will
result in a change of network topology and cause variations in
fault-current magnitude and direction.
Protective coordination of overcurrent relays applied in
distribution systems with DGs becomes very difficult to
achieve because it lacks the flexibility of adaptive relay setting
for changes of the network configuration and of the
operational status of the WG [1-6]. For instance, a short-circuit
fault on one distribution feeder sometimes results in false
tripping a circuit breaker on a healthy feeder. This false trip
deteriorates the service reliability of the distribution system.
Many papers have illustrated that integration of dispersed
generation can downgrade the sensitivity of protective relays.
For distribution systems with renewable-energy generation, the
locations and installation capacity of DGs have to be
considered in the design of protective coordination. Moreover,
the variation of magnitude and direction of fault current
introduced by the changing operational status of DGs is
considered in adaptive relay setting. To allow more renewable
energy penetration in distribution systems, without causing the
improper protective coordination, the ADAS system monitors
the network configuration and WG operation. New relay
settings are adaptively adjusted and loaded to the overcurrent
relays [7-12].
At Taipower, the distribution system networks are designed

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as an open-loop configuration and as a closed-loop


configuration. The overcurrent relays are applied for fault
protection by considering the protective coordination for all
line switches along the distribution feeders [13]. Short-circuit
analysis is performed to solve the magnitude and direction of
fault current flowing through each line switch to determine the
TAP/LEVEL settings for all overcurrent relays.
This paper proposes adaptive relay setting by using the
ADAS system to monitor the operational status of wind
generators and line switches. Short-circuit analysis solves the
fault currents through each line switch when the WG is started
and disconnected. A Matlab program was developed for the
adaptive relay setting method. Operation of line switches and
commitment of wind generators was assigned to ensure that
good protective relay coordination would always be obtained
for any system operational scenarios [11- 15].

has been represented in (1) [16].


t LEVEL

A

If
(
CTR TAP

(1)

, where If is the fault current magnitude ; the relay parameters


A, B, and P for the EI coordination curve are defined as 28.2,
0.1217, and 2.0 respectively. Then, the operating time of the
upstream relay tk-1 is determined [by (1)], which is used to
adjust the upstream relay LEVEL setting by considering the
constraints of CTI.
ADAS repeats this procedure starting from the relay at the
furthest bus to the relay at the first line switch at the bus outlet.
The flowchart for adaptive relay setting is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Different WG operational scenarios are considered to
investigate the impact of WG operation on the magnitude and

II. RELAY SETTING PROCEDURE


The ADAS has been applied in Taipower to perform the
function of supervisory control and data acquisition for
distribution systems. ADAS operates line switches to execute
load transfer among distribution feeders. Feeder terminal units
(FTU) collect the status of line switches and report to the
master station (MS) via optical fiber communication. The
topology processor embedded in the MS updates the
configuration of the distribution network according to the
connectivity attributes and operational status of the line
switches. Also, ADAS monitors the operational status of all
WGs to determine locations and capacities of all WGs in
operation.
When the network configuration has been altered because
of line switches operation and operational status changes of the
WG, then short-circuit analysis is performed to calculate the
magnitude and direction of fault current through each line
switch. The settings of all protective relays are revised
according to the change of fault currents, which are then
loaded to the relays to achieve adaptive protective
coordination for all line switches.
For the design of protective relay settings, Taipower defines
the minimum clearing limit (tc) of fault current for the line
switch at the fault location as 0.15 seconds. Also, the
coordination time interval (CTI) between the relays at the fault
location and the upstream relay is set to 0.1 seconds [1,2].
ADAS uses Matlab toolbox to perform a short-circuit analysis,
solving the fault currents for the 3-phase fault at each line
switch. The TAP values of the protective relays for the faulted
bus and the upstream bus are to be within the constraint
If
4
6 , where CTR is the CT ratio. The LEVEL
CTR TAP
setting of the protective relay at the faulted bus is then
determined by ensuring the relay operating time to be less than
tc , using the operation curves of overcurrent relays.
For protective coordination in this paper, the overcurrent
relay employs the extreme inverse (EI) coordination curve of
IEEE C37.112 [17]. The corresponding relay operating time

Fig. 1. Flowchart of adaptive relay settings for distribution systems

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direction of fault currents at the line switches. In this manner,


the adaptive relay setting method achieves proper protective
coordination.
III. DISTRIBUTION AUTOMATION SYSTEMS (DAS)
Often, an open-loop distribution system with radial
structure is used to serve the residential and commercial areas
in Taiwan because protective coordination can be easily
obtained for distribution feeders. In this case there are no
dispersed generators to provide the fault current from the
customer side. Each feeder is configured with an open tie
switch at the end of the feeder, which is connected to another
feeder.
When a fault contingency occurs on the primary feeder
section, the substation overcurrent relay trips the feeder circuit
breaker (FCB) to clear the fault. At the same time, the fault
detection, isolation and service restoration (FDIR) function is
activated. The SCADA system collects the fault flags
generated by all of the feeder terminal units (FTU) at the line
switches. The master station identifies the faulted section by
referring to the pre-fault feeder topology and to this
combination of fault flags. All of the boundary line switches of
the faulted section are then opened remotely to isolate the
faulted section, and are followed by reclosing the FCB to
restore upstream customer service.
After verifying the capacity reserve of the neighboring
supporting feeders and main transformers in the substation,
then the open tie switch is closed to restore the downstream
customer service. In case the supporting feeder does not have
sufficient reserve capacity to cover the entire downstream
load, partial load shedding of the unfaulted and out of service
area is executed before closing the open tie switch to restore
the rest of the out-of-service area.
With the distribution automation system (DAS) shown in
Fig. 2, the power service of upstream customers and
downstream customers can be restored quickly. Improvements
in downtime have been from more than one hour, to 20
seconds upstream and 2 minutes downstream, after the fault.
Therefore, the reliability index of SAIDI has been enhanced
significantly because of the dramatic reduction of the
customer's outage duration using the FDIR function of the
DAS system.
Remote
Controllable
Automatic Switch

Control Center

Substation(S/S)

Remote
Controllable
Connection Switch

Feeders

Communication
Server

Master Station
Data Acquisition
and Monitoring
Feeder Automation
Data Maintenance

RTU

RTU

RTU
Data Acquisition of
Substation
-Active Power etc.
-FCB Status (ON/OFF)
FCB Control(ON/OFF)

Customer

Communication Line

FTU
Data Acquisition of
SW Status(ON/OFF)
SW Control(ON/OFF)
RTU : Remote Terminal Unit
FTU : Feeder Terminal Unit

Fig. 2. Configuration of the Distribution Automation System

The FDIR function alters the distribution feeder for load


transfer to restore downstream customer service, and to
transfer load between feeders to achieve load balance. The
fault currents at the line switches are changed, which results in
improper coordination of the protective relays. For the
traditional distribution systems without dispersed generators,
the fault current is always contributed by the utility bulk
transmission system; protective relay coordination is achieved
easily. With more and more DGs being integrated in the
distribution systems, the magnitude and direction of fault
current flows along the feeder are varied. Therefore,
protective relay coordination has to be revised adaptively
according to the DGs operational scenarios.
IV. PROTECTIVE COORDINATION OF DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
(OPEN-LOOP CONFIGURATION) [15]
Fig. 3 shows the network configuration of a sample
distribution feeder in Taipower, which is served by a main
transformer with a 69/11.4-kV, -Y connection in the
substation. The main transformer has a capacity of 25 MVA,
with an impedance of 9 percent. The short-circuit capacity at
the transformer primary side is 366 MVA. The primary feeder
uses 477-MCM overhead conductors with unit impedance of
0.131+j0.371 (/km). The sample feeder has a total length of
15 km and is divided into 3 sections, with 3 normal close line
switches and one normally open tie switch (to be connected to
another feeder). Two wind generators with a capacity of 2.5
MVA each and a sub-transient impedance of 20 percent are
connected at Bus 2 and at Bus 4, respectively. A step-up
transformer with rated capacity of 3 MVA, rated voltage of 3.3
kV/11.4 kV, and an impedance of 8 percent is used for the
integrating WGs to the sample feeder.

Fig. 3. Sample Distribution Feeder with Wind Generators

A. Protective coordination of the open-loop distribution


system (w/o WG)
In Fig. 3, when the WGs are disconnected from service, the
fault current is provided by the utility bulk power system only.
For the 3-phase, short-circuit fault at Bus 4, the fault current is
939 A. This fault current flows through relays 1CW, 2CW,
3CW and 4CW (CW is clockwise). By selecting the
TAP/LEVEL setting of 1.95/0.0479 for the end relay 4CW,
the relay operating time is 0.0952 seconds [by (1)], which is
less than the minimum operating time constraint of 0.15
seconds. By selecting the TAP/LEVEL setting of 1.95/0.0978
for 3CW, the relay operating time is 0.1943 seconds. The CTI
between 4CW and 3CW is 0.0991 seconds, which is within the
tolerance of 0.01 seconds from the CTI constraint of 0.1

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seconds. Table I shows the proposed TAP /LEVEL settings for


all protective relays along the feeder. The fault currents and
the corresponding relay operating time for a short-circuit fault
at various locations have also been illustrated in Table I. Fig. 4
shows the coordination curves of the relays for a fault at Bus 4,
which shows that good protective coordination has been
obtained.
TABLE I
FAULT CURRENT AND RELAY OPERATING TIME FOR DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
WITH OPEN-LOOP CONFIGURATION
faulted bus
relay

1CW
2CW
3CW
4CW

TAP/
LEVEL
setting
4.7 /
0.0879
2.75 /
0.101
1.95 /
0.0978
1.95 /
0.0479

fault
current
(A)

1
operation
time
(S)

fault
current
(A)

2
operation
time
(S)

fault
current
(A)

3
operation
time
(S)

0.0243

0.1726

0.5534

0.0734

0.1989

7630

2278

1331

fault
current
(A)

4
operation
time
(S)
1.4073
0.4131

939

0.0999

0.1943

0.0952

Fig. 5. Improper Coordination of Protective Relays for Fault at Bus 3 (one


WG at Bus 2 and one WG at Bus 4)

For protecting the study feeder with two attached WGs in


Fig. 3, the settings of TAP/LEVEL for relays 3CW and 2CW
are revised to 2.1/0.0972 and 3.05/0.0982, respectively. For
the fault at Bus 3 with fault current of 1,471A, the operating
times of relays 3CW and 2CW (with new relay settings) are
0.0947 seconds and 0.1939 seconds, respectively. The relay
operating time difference between both relays is 0.0992
seconds, which complies with the coordination constraint.
Table II shows the adaptive relay settings and the
corresponding operating time of protective relays before and
after the adjustment of relay settings.
TABLE II
ADAPTIVE RELAY SETTINGS CONSIDERING WG OPERATION (OPEN-LOOP WITH 2
WGS)
relay

Fig. 4. Coordination Curves of Protective Relays for Fault at BUS 4

B. Protective coordination of the open-loop distribution


system (with two WGs)
When two wind generators are connected in operation as
shown in Fig. 3, the fault current is 1,471A for the 3-phase,
short-circuit fault at Bus 3. It is larger than the fault current of
1,331 A in Table I for the same fault because of the fault
current contributed by WG1. With the same previous relay
setting in Table I, the operating time of relay 3CW is 0.0835
seconds, which is less than the minimum clearing time of 0.15
seconds. Also, the operating time of relay 2CW becomes
0.1626 seconds for a fault current of 1,471 A. The difference
in operating times between both relays is 0.0791 seconds,
violating the CTI constraint of 0.1 seconds. The fault current
through Bus 1 has been reduced to 1,231 A because of the
increase of residual voltage at Bus 2 during a fault. With the
previous relay settings in Table I, the operating time of relays
1CW, 2CW, and 3CW is shown in Fig. 5. Note that improper
protective coordination has been introduced because of the
integration of WG.
To solve the problem of improper coordination for
protective relays because of wind generators, the settings of
TAP/LEVEL for all protective relays have to be revised
adaptively with the operational scenarios of WGs in
distribution feeders.

1CW
2CW
3CW
4CW

original setting
fault
current(A)
TAP/LEVEL
1231
4.7/0.0879
1471
2.75/0.101
1471
1.95/0.0978
1.95/0.0479

operation revised setting


time(s)
TAP/LEVEL
0.6699
4.7/0.0825
0.1626
3.05/0.0982
0.0835
2.1/0.0972
3.0/0.0486

operation
time(s)
0.6287
0.1939
0.0947

C. Protective coordination of the open-loop distribution


system (with one WG)
When WG1 at Bus 2 is disconnected, the fault current
through relay 3CW is reduced from 1,471A to 1,331A for the
fault at Bus 3. With the same relay settings of TAP/LEVEL in
Table II, Fig. 6 shows the relay coordination curves. Note that
the operating times of relays 3CW and 2CW are 0.1144
seconds and 0.2386 seconds, respectively. The relay operating
time difference between both relays is 0.1242 seconds, which
is greater than 0.1 seconds and violates the CTI constraint. To
solve this improper feeder coordination (one WG at Bus 4),
the settings of TAP/LEVEL for relays 3CW and 2CW are
adjusted to 1.95/0.0974 and 2.75/0.1009, respectively. The
operating times of relays 3CW and 2CW are 0.1005 and
0.1995 seconds respectively, which complies with the CTI
constraint. Fig. 7 shows the relay coordination curve after the
relay settings adjustment.

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Fig. 6. Improper Coordination of Protective Relays for Fault at Bus 3 (one


WG at Bus 4)

D. Directional overcurrent relays


For protecting distribution systems with a closed-loop
configuration (Fig. 8), directional overcurrent relays [1-5] are
applied because the direction of fault current flows vary with
the location of the short-circuit fault. The directional
overcurrent relay uses the connectivity with 90 phase shift.
For instance, to detect an overcurrent in phase R, the voltage
VST is applied as shown by the phasor diagram in Fig. 9. When
the fault occurs in the relay protection zone (see Fig. 10), the
relay operates. Conversely, relay operation is inhibited when
the fault occurs outside the relay protection zone.
VR

maximum torque line

positive torque
60
IR
negative torque

30
VST
directional contact close
zero torque line

Fig. 9. Phasor Diagram of the Directional Overcurrent Relays


IF

Fig. 7. Coordination Curves of Protective Relays After Adaptive Setting for


the Study Feeder (one WG at Bus 4)

F1

RY

RY
IF

V. PROTECTIVE COORDINATION OF DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS


(CLOSED-LOOP CONFIGURATION)
To achieve high-reliability service for the distribution
system that serves critical areas such as the high-tech science
park in Taiwan, two distribution feeders are connected with a
closed-loop structure as shown in Fig. 8. Both feeders are
operated in parallel with all line switches closed. When a fault
occurs on the primary section, directional overcurrent relays
open the circuit breakers for the boundary line switches of the
faulted section to isolate the fault. Instead of tripping the FCB
to cause power interruption, all of the service customers
experience the voltage sag for only few milliseconds before
the fault is cleared. After that, the voltage is fully restored and
both feeders are operated as an open-loop system as described
in the previous section.
Bus 1
1CW

Bus 2
2CW

2CCW

Bus 3
3CW
3CCW

Bus 4a

4CCW

Substation
S/S
1CCW 6CW 6CCW 5CW 5CCW 4CW
Bus 6

Bus 5

Bus 4b

Fig. 8. Placement of Directional Overcurrent Relays for Closed-Loop


Distribution Systems

IF

F1

V
IF

(a)

(b)

Fig. 10. Operating Principle of Directional Overcurrent Relays for Zone


Protection

E. Protective coordination of the closed-loop distribution


system (w/o WG)
When the fault occurs at Bus 6 of the sample closed-loop
distribution system (Fig. 8), a fault current of 428 A flows
through all of the clockwise relays from 1CW to 6CW. With
Bus 6 as the end-terminal bus, the setting of TAP/LEVEL for
relay 6CW is 0.85/0.0524, and the corresponding operating
time of relay 6CW is 0.095 seconds [by (1)]. Also, with the
TAP/LEVEL setting of 0.85/0.1071 for relay 5CW, the
corresponding relay operating time is 0.1942 seconds, and thus
the CTI is 0.0992 seconds. Table III shows the proposed
TAP/LEVEL settings of the clockwise relays and the operating
time for a fault at Bus 6. Note that the operating times of
relays 6CW and 5CW are 0.095 and 0.1942 seconds
respectively, which complies with the constraints of both the
minimum operating time of 0.15 seconds and the CTI of 0.1
seconds. Although relay 1CW is not activated (because it is
too far from the fault location and the small fault current does
not trigger relay operation) the other relays provide sufficient
backup protection.

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6
TABLE III
PROPOSED SETTING AND OPERATING TIME OF CLOCKWISE PROTECTIVE RELAYS
relay

Relay

setting

1CW / 6CW

2CW

3CW

4CW

5CW

6CW

TAP

4.45

2.5

1.7

1.25

0.85

0.85

LEVEL

0.0856

0.1036 0.1085

0.102

0.1071

0.0524

operation
time(s)

Bus 1
Bus 2
Bus 3
Bus 4a
1CW 2CCW 2CW 3CCW 3CW 4CCW

If1

Substation
S/S

WG1

WG2

If2

1CCW 6CW 6CCW 5CW 5CCW 4CW

--

2.8139

0.9084

0.4135

0.1942

0.0950
Bus 5

Bus 6

F. Protective coordination of the closed-loop distribution


system (with 4 WGs)
The closed-loop distribution system with 4 WGs connected
at Bus 2, Bus 4a, Bus 4b, and Bus 6 respectively (see Fig. 11)
is selected for adaptive relay setting according to the
operational status of the wind generators. For the 3-phase,
short-circuit fault at Bus 4b, the magnitude of fault current
through clockwise relays 1CW and 2CW is 738 A and 929 A,
respectively. The fault current from the bulk transmission
system is reduced because of the fault current contributed by
WG1. Without revising the relay settings in Table III, the
operating time of relay 1CW is 2.6540 seconds and the
operating times of relays 2CW and 3CW are 0.3526 and
0.1682 seconds, respectively. The fault current through 4CW
is 1842 A and the corresponding operating time is 0.0316
seconds. The protective coordination curves are shown in Fig.
12. With the previous TAP/LEVEL settings of 2.5/0.1036 and
1.7/0.1085 for counter-clockwise relays 6CCW and relay
5CCW, respectively, the operating time of 6CCW for a fault
current of 929 A is 0.2873 seconds; the operating time of
5CCW is 0.161 seconds. The coordination time interval
between relays 6CCW and 5CCW is 0.1263 seconds, which
violates the coordination constraint of CTI.
To solve the problem of improper coordination because of
integration of WGs for the fault at Bus 4b, the settings of
TAP/LEVEL of relays 4CW and 3CW are adjusted to
2.3/0.0991 and 1.9/0.091, respectively. The operating times of
both relays are 0.0762 seconds and 0.1755 seconds,
respectively, with CTI being equal to 0.0993 seconds; these
times comply with the coordination constraint. Fig. 13 shows
the coordination curves after the relay settings adjustments.
Table IV shows the adaptive relay settings of TAP/LEVEL
and the coordination operating time for the fault at Bus 4b
before and after 4 WGs are connected.

Bus 4b
WG4

WG3

Fig. 11. Fault Current Flows of the Closed-Loop Distribution System with 4
WGs

Fig. 12.

Coordination Curves of Protective Relays for the Closed-Loop


Distribution System with 4 WGs (before setting adjustment)

Fig. 13. Coordination Curves of Protective Relays for the Closed-Loop


Distribution System with 4 WGs (after setting adjustment)
TABLE IV
ADAPTIVE SETTINGS OF PROTECTIVE RELAYS
Fault at Bus 4
Relay

Fault
current(A)

1CW

Before adjustment(w/o WGs)

After adjustment(with 4 WGs)

TAP/LEVEL

Time(s)

TAP/LEVEL

Time(s)

738

4.45/ 0.0856

2.6540

4.65/ 0.0772

2.9041

2CW

929

2.5/ 0.1036

0.3526

2.9/ 0.0915

0.4321

3CW

929

1.7/ 0.1085

0.1682

1.9/ 0.091

0.1755

4CW

1842

1.25/ 0.102

0.0316

2.3/ 0.0991

0.0762

5CCW

929

1.7/ 0.1085

0.161

1.9/ 0.091

0.159

6CCW

929

2.5/ 0.1036

0.2873

2.9/ 0.0915

0.3378

G. Protective coordination of the closed-loop distribution


system (with two WGs)
When the WGs at Bus 4a and Bus 4b are disconnected from
operation in Fig. 11, the fault current through relay 4CW is
reduced from 1842 A to 929 A for the fault at Bus 4b. Without
executing the adaptive adjustment of TAP/LEVEL setting, the
operating time of relays 4CW and 3CW are 0.2798 and 0.1755

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seconds, respectively. Note that the operating time of


downstream relay 4CW is greater than that of relay 3CW,
which violates protection coordination.
To solve the improper coordination problem for the closedloop distribution system, the relay settings of TAP/LEVEL are
shown for various operational scenarios of WGs as shown in
Table V. The TAP/LEVEL settings of relays 4CW and 3CW
are adjusted to 1.4/0.0989 and 1.9/0.1062, respectively, for 2
WGs connected at Bus 2 and Bus 6. The corresponding
operating times for both relays are 0.105 and 0.204 seconds,
respectively with CTI of 0.099 seconds; this time complies
with the coordination constraint. Fig. 14 shows the protective
coordination curves with the adaptive relay settings applied.
TABLE V
ADAPTIVE RELAY SETTING FOR VARIOUS OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS OF WIND
GENERATORS

Bus with WG
Relay

2,4a,4b,6

2,6

2,4a

4a,4b

For the operational scenario of 4 WGs operated at Bus 6,


the fault currents If1 and If2 contributed by WGs are 1060A and
212 A, respectively. The fault current If3 from the bulk
transmission system is 7643 A. The total fault current flow
through 1CW is 8703 A, which is the sum of If1 and If3. With
the previous relay settings in Table III, without considering the
fault current contributed by WGs, the operating times of relays
1CW and 6CW are 0.0488 and 0.0356 seconds, respectively.
Note that improper coordination has been introduced because
relay 6CW operates before relay 1CW to isolate the fault,
causing an outage on both feeders. To solve the problem, the
settings of TAP/LEVEL for relays 1CW and 6CW are revised
to 4.7/0.0814 and 2.75/0.477, respectively. After that, the
operating time of relays 1CW and 6CW are adjusted as 0.0204
and 0.1272 seconds, respectively.
I. POTT protective scheme for the closed-loop distribution
system.
B

TAP/LEVEL
6CW

2.65/ 0.0481

2.05/ 0.0479

1.4/ 0.0500

1.6/ 0.0497

5CW

1.6/ 0. 0982

0.95/ 0.1056

1.3/ 0.1038

1.5/ 0.1035

4CW

2.3/ 0.0991

1.4/ 0.0989

1.9/ 0.0995

2.25/ 0.0973

3CW

1.9/ 0.0910

1.9/ 0.1062

1.9/ 0.096

1.7/ 0.0929

2CW

2.9/ 0.0915

2.9/ 0.0973

2.85/ 0.0953

2.6/ 0.0907

1CW

4.65/ 0.0772

4.55/ 0.0798

4.5/ 0.0795

4.55/ 0.0825

Direction
unit

51

Permission

&

OR

Communication
Channel
Trip Brk

Trip Brk

Permission

OR

&

Direction
unit

51

Fig. 16. POTT Protective Scheme

Fig. 14. Coordination Curves of Protective Relays for the Closed-Loop


Distribution System with WG at Bus 2 and Bus 6 (after setting adjustment)

H. Protective coordination of the closed-loop distribution


system (with multiple WGs at Bus 6)
For the closed-loop distribution system with multiple units
of WGs installed at Bus 6 (as shown in Fig. 15), the fault
current contributed by the WGs varies with the number of WG
units operated.
Bus 1
Bus 2
Bus 3
Bus 4a
1CW 2CCW 2CW 3CCW 3CW 4CCW
If3
Substation
S/S

If1

If2

1CCW 6CW 6CCW 5CW 5CCW 4CW

Bus 6

Bus 5

Bus 4b

With more and more dispersed generators in distribution


systems, protective coordination using conventional
overcurrent relays will be very complicated because of the
various WG operational scenarios. To prevent improper
coordination for closed-loop distribution systems with many
WGs, permissive overreaching transfer trip (POTT) [1,2] is
considered in this paper (see Fig. 16). For each line switch
along the primary distribution feeder, the conventional load
break switches (LBS) are replaced with circuit breakers.
There are two CBs with directional overcurrent relays for the
protection of the primary feeder section. Optical fiber
communications is used for data transmission between the line
switches installed at the boundary of the line section to be
protected. For a remote-station-A external fault, the blocking
signal is generated and transmitted to relay B after the
directional device identifies the fault current direction.
Although the overcurrent relay at remote station B is activated,
a blocking signal from remote station A inhibits tripping of the
circuit breaker at station B. When a fault occurs within the
protected primary section, no blocking signal is generated and
transmitted to the counterpart relays from remote stations A
and B.. Therefore, the circuit breakers at both stations A and B
operate to isolate the fault. With the proposed POTT
protection scheme, fault protection of the closed-loop
distribution system can be obtained easily regardless of the
operational scenarios of the wind generators.

WGs

Fig. 15. Fault Current Flow from the Substation and Wind Generators at
Bus 6

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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented the adaptive relay setting method
for distribution systems with wind generators. The sample
distribution systems with an open-loop configuration and a
closed-loop configuration are studied for the design of the
adaptive relay setting method, according to the operational
status (startup and shutdown) of wind generators. The function
of adaptive relay setting is activated when the ADAS system
detects a change in operational status of the wind generators.
The relay settings are then revised and loaded to the
corresponding protective relays to ensure good protective
coordination of distribution.
With the integration of wind generators in open-loop
distribution feeders, fault current from the bulk transmission
system is reduced because of the greater residual voltage
during fault contingency. The relay settings of TAP/LEVEL
are adjusted to prevent violations of coordination time interval
(CTI) constraint between relays.
For distribution systems with a closed-loop configuration,
the magnitude and direction of fault currents vary with the
locations and numbers of wind generators in operation.
Directional overcurrent relays are applied to trip the boundary
line switches of the faulted section to isolate the fault. The
TAP/LEVEL setting for clockwise and counter-clockwise
protective relays are then adjusted according to the change of
the operational scenario of wind generators to achieve proper
protective coordination.
The POTT protective scheme has also been proposed to
simplify the protective coordination for closed-loop
distribution systems.
The ADAS system has been considered by Taipower to
provide adaptive relay settings according to the change of fault
currents caused by network configuration and operation of
wind generators. Using this technique, more wind generators
can be integrated into smart distribution systems without
causing improper coordination.

VII. REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]

[5]
[6]
[7]

[8]

J. L. Blackburn, Protective Relaying Principles and Applications. New


York: Marcel Dekker, 1987.
W. A. Elmore, Protective Relaying Theory and Applications, ABB
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WILEY & SONS INC., APRIL 1956.
W.J. Lee, J.C., Gu, R.J. Li, P. Didsayabutra, A Physical laboratory for
protective relay education, IEEE Trans. Education, Vol. 45, No. 2,
MAY 2002.
S. H. Horowitz, A. G. PHADKE, Power System Relaying, JOHN
WILEY & SONS INC., 2005.
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P. Fuangfoo, W. J., Lee, M.T. Kuo, Impact study on intentional
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[9]

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[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

C. Chompoo-inwai, W.J. Lee, P. Fuangfoo, M. Williams, J. Liao,


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163-168, Jan./Feb. 2005.
S. WANG, Distributed generation and its effect on distribution
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M. Baran, I., El-Markabi, Adaptive overcurrent protection for
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Power Systems Conference and Exposition, pp. 715-719.
J.A. Silva, H. B. Funmilayo, K. L. Butler-Purry, Impact of distributed
generation on the IEEE 34 node radial test feeder with overcurrent
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X. Y. SI, Q. Chen, Z.J. Gao, L. Wang, The study on protection scheme
for distribution system in presence of distributed generation, in Proc.
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J. A. Bright, W.J. Lee, Integrated monitoring, protection, and control
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equations for over-current relays, 1996.

VIII. BIOGRAPHIES
Chao-Shun Chen (M84-SM06) received the B.S. degree from National
Taiwan University in 1976 and the M.S, Ph.D. degree in Electrical
Engineering from the University of Texas at Arlington in 1981 and 1984,
respectively.
From 1984 to 1994 he was a professor of Electrical Engineering at
National Sun Yat-Sen University. From 1989 to 1990 he was with Empros
Systems International. In 1994 he worked as the Deputy Director General of
Department of Kaohsiung Mass Rapid Transit. In.1997 and 1998 he was with
the National Taiwan University of Science and Technology as a professor.
From 1998 to 2008 he was with the National Sun Yat-Sen University as a
professor. Since 2008, he is a chair professor at I-Shou University and a joint
professor at National Sun Yat-Sen University. His major areas of interest are
computer control of power systems, smart grid technologies, and renewable
energy.
Cheng-Ta Tsai received the M.S. degree in Electrical Engineering from
National Sun Yat-Sen University in 2004. He is presently pursuing a Ph. D.
degree in Electrical Engineering at National Sun Yat-Sen University.
Shih-Chieh Hsieh (M92) received the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in
electrical engineering from Texas A&M University in 1992 and 1996,
respectively. He is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, I-Shou
University, Kaohsiung City, Taiwan. His current research interests are in
distribution automation and planning.
Cheng-Ting Hsu (M90) received the B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees in
electrical engineering from National Sun Yat-Sen University, Kaohsiung,
Taiwan, in 1986, 1988, and 1995, respectively. From 1990 to 1992, he was a
Power Electronics Engineer with Phoenixtec Power Company Limited,
Taipei, Taiwan. He is presently a Professor of electrical engineering at
Southern Taiwan University of Science and Technology, Yung-Kang City,
Taiwan.
Chia-Hung Lin(S95-M98) received the B.S. degree from National
Taiwan Institute of Technology in 1991, M.S. degree from University of
Pittsburgh in 1993, and Ph. D. degree in Electrical Engineering from
University of Texas at Arlington in 1997.
He is presently a full professor at National Kaohsiung University of
Applied Sciences. His areas of interest are distribution automation and
computer applications to power systems.

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