Mamaril v.

The Boy Scout of the Philippines

G.R. No. 179382
January 14, 2013
Facts: Spouses Mamaril are jeepney operators since 1971. They lost and never recovered 6
passenger jeepneys, which were parked inside the BSP compound. According to the security
guards Pea and Gaddi of AIB Security Agency, Inc. (AIB) with whom BSP had contracted for its
security and protection, a male person who looked familiar to them took the subject vehicle out
of the compound. Sps. Mamaril filed a complaint for damages against BSP, AIB, Pea and
Gaddi, averring that the loss of the subject vehicle was due to the gross negligence of the
above-named security guards on-duty. They therefore prayed that Pea, Gaddi, AIB and BSP,
be held liable for the value of the vehicle, its accessories, the daily loss of income and damages.
BSP denied any liability contending that Sps. Mamaril directly dealt with AIB with respect to the
manner by which the parked vehicles would be handled, and the parking ticket itself expressly
stated that the "Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any of its
accessories or article left therein." It also claimed that Sps. Mamaril erroneously relied on the
Guard Service Contract, since they are not parties thereto and its provisions cover only the
protection of BSP's properties, its officers, and employees. AIB also alleged that it has observed
due diligence in the selection, training and supervision of its security guards.
W/N Pea, Gaddi, AIB and BSP should be held liable for the loss of the vehicles due to their
negligence.
YES for Pea, Gaddi and AIB but NO for BSP.
The proximate cause of the loss of Sps. Mamaril's vehicle was the negligent act of security
guards Pea and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to drive out the subject vehicle.
Moreover, Pea and Gaddi failed to refute Sps. Mamaril's contention that they readily admitted
being at fault during the investigation that ensued. But there is no negligence on the part of BSP.
Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code apply in this
case. Pea and Gaddi were assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP pursuant to the Guard
Service Contract. Thus, no employer-employee relationship existed between BSP and the
security guards. Consequently, the latter's negligence cannot be imputed against BSP but
should be attributed to AIB, the true employer of Pea and Gaddi. Where the security agency,
as here, hires the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such
guards and watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts of the security guards attaches to the
employer agency, and not to the clients of such agency.
Nor can it be said that a principal-agent relationship existed between BSP and the security
guards Pea and Gaddi as to make the former liable for the latter's complained act. BSP merely
hired the services of AIB, which, in turn, assigned security guards, solely for the protection of its
properties and premises, not for AIB to be appointed as an agent of BSP. The parties only
intended a pure principal-client relationship whereby for a consideration, AIB rendered its
security services to BSP.
W/N BSP should be held liable for the loss of the vehicles based on the Guard Service Contract
that BSP entered into with AIB and their parking agreement with BSP.
NO. Sps. Mamaril are not parties to the Guard Service Contract. Neither did the subject
agreement contain any stipulation pour autrui (contract in favor of third parties). Under the

principle of relativity of contracts, they cannot validly claim any rights or favor under the said
agreement. Also, the contract does not indicate any obligation and/or liability on the part of the
parties therein in favor of third persons such as herein plaintiffs-appellees.
Moreover, the contract between the parties herein is lease. It has been held that the act of
parking a vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a lease. Even in a majority of
American cases, it has been ruled that in that case the possession and control of the car,
necessary elements in bailment, do not pass to the parking lot operator, hence, the contractual
relationship between the parties is one of lease.
On this score, Article 1654 of the Civil Code provides that "the lessor (BSP) is obliged: (1) to
deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a condition as to render it fit for the
use intended; (2) to make on the same during the lease all the necessary repairs in order to
keep it suitable for the use to which it has been devoted, unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary; and (3) to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for
the entire duration of the contract."
In relation thereto, Article 1664 of the same Code states that "the lessor is not obliged to answer
for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on the use of the thing leased; but
the lessee shall have a direct action against the intruder." Here, BSP was able to provide Sps.
Mamaril a parking space for their jeepneys; hence, it should not be held liable for the loss
suffered by Sps. Mamaril.
Padillo v. Rural Bank of Nabunturan
G.R. No. 199338
January 21, 2013
Facts: Due to liquidity problems, the Bank took out retirement/insurance plans with Philam Life
for all its employees for the possible closure, including Padillo. Padillo suffered a mild stroke and
he impaired his ability to effectively pursue his work. He wrote to Oropeza to avail of an early
retirement package, but his request was unheeded. Padillo was separated from employment
due to his poor and failing health as reflected in a Certification issued by the Bank. Padillo filed
a complaint for the recovery of unpaid retirement benefits, asserting that the Bank had adopted
a policy of granting its aging employees early retirement packages, pointing out that one of his
co-employees, Nenita Lusan (Lusan), was accorded retirement benefits. The Bank and Oropeza
countered that the claim of Padillo for retirement benefits was not favorably acted upon for lack
of any basis to grant the same.
W/N Padillo is entitled to his claim of retirement benefits.
NO. There is no retirement plan, collective bargaining agreement or any contract between the
parties which provide for the retirement of employees, except the Philam Life Plan which
premiums had already been paid by the Bank. Neither was it proven that there exists an
established company policy of giving early retirement packages to the Banks aging employees.
In this relation, petitioners bare allegation of the solitary case of Lusan cannot sufficiently
establish that the Banks grant of an early retirement package to her (Lusan) evolved into an
established company practice precisely because of the lack of consistency. In the absence of

any applicable contract or any evolved company policy, Padillo should have met the age and
tenure requirements set forth under Article 300 of the Labor Code to be entitled to the retirement
benefits provided therein. Unfortunately, Padillo fell short with respect to the (60)-year age
requirement given that he was only (55) years old when he retired.
There is also no bad faith in any of respondents actuations as they were within their right,
absent any proof of its abuse, to ignore Padillos misplaced claim for retirement benefits. While
the Court mindfully notes that damages may be recoverable due to an abuse of right under
Article 21 in conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the following
elements must, however, obtain: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) exercised in bad faith; and
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Records reveal that none of these
elements exists in the case at bar and thus, no damages on account of abuse of right may he
recovered.
Ermitao vs. Paglas
G.R. No. 174436
January 23, 2013
Facts: Ermitao leased in favor of Paglas a residential lot and a house. Paglas paid
petitioner P2,000 as security deposit to answer for unpaid rentals and damage that may be
cause to the leased unit. Paglas received information that Ermitao mortgaged the property in
favor of a certain Yap and that the same was already foreclosed with Yap as the purchaser of
the disputed lot in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale. Paglas bought the subject property from
Yap, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale of Real Property. However, the Deed provided that the
property was still subject to Ermitaos right of redemption. Prior to Paglas purchase of the
subject property, Ermitao filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of the mortgage in favor of Yap
and the sheriff's provisional certificate of sale issued after the disputed house and lot were sold
on foreclosure. Ermitao demanded Paglas to pay the rentals and vacate the leased premises,
but Paglas ignored both letters. Ermitao filed a case for unlawful detainer.
W/N Ermitao is entitled to the possession of the residential lot and house.
YES. There is no dispute that at the time that respondent purchased Yap's rights over the
subject property, petitioner's right of redemption as a mortgagor has not yet expired. During the
period of redemption, it cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the owner of the
foreclosed property, since the rule up to now is that the right of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale
is merely inchoate until after the period of redemption has expired without the right being
exercised. It is only upon the expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor
having made use of his right of redemption, that the ownership of the land sold becomes
consolidated in the purchaser.
During the period of redemption, the mortgagor, Ermitao in this case, being still the owner of
the foreclosed property, remains entitled to the physical possession thereof subject to the

purchaser's right to petition the court to give him possession and to file a bond pursuant to the
provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. The mere purchase and certificate of sale
alone do not confer any right to the possession or beneficial use of the premises. She is also
entitled to the rents, earnings and income derived therefrom. Thus, absent respondent's filing of
petition in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135 and bond prior to the
expiration of the period of redemption, coupled with her failure to pay her rent, she did not have
the right to possess the subject property.

132.
Beckett vs. Sarmiento, Jr., 689 SCRA 494, January 30, 2013
Excerpt : 1. law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which tends to erode the
public trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he personifies. Not to know the
law as basic, almost elementary, as the Rules of Court, or acting in disregard of established rule
of law as if he were not aware of the same constitutes gross ignorance whence no one is
excused, especially an RTC judge. Civil Law ; Child Custody; Res Judicata; The matter of
custody is not permanent and unalterable and can always be re-examined and adjusted; In a
very real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a minor child cannot be accorded the
force and effect of res judicata.Respondent judge, in granting
Beckett v. Sarmiento, Jr.
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326
January 30, 2013
Facts:
Cabahug v. National Power Corporation
G.R. No. 186069
January 30, 2013
Facts: Spouses Cabahug are the owners of two parcels of land. They were among the
defendants in a suit for expropriation earlier filed by NPC for its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection
Project. The suit was later dismissed when NPC opted to settle with the landowners by paying
an easement fee equivalent to 10% of value of their properties. Jesus Cabahug granted NPC a
continuous easement of right of way for the latters transmissions lines, but Jesus Cabahug
agreed not to construct any building or structure whatsoever, nor plant in any area within the
Right of Way that will adversely affect or obstruct the transmission line of NPC. He also
reserved the option to seek additional compensation for easement fee. The Spouses Cabahug
filed the complaint for the payment of just compensation, damages and attorneys fees against
NPC, claiming that they have been totally deprived of the use of the portions of land. NPC
averred that it already paid the full easement fee and that the reservation in the grant referred to
additional compensation for easement fee, not the full just compensation sought by the Spouses
Cabahug.
W/N Spouses Cabahug is entitled to the payment of just compensation.

payment of just compensation.

YES. The Grant of Right of Way executed by Jesus Cabahug in favor of NPC as a valid and
binding contract between the parties. Moreover, Jesus Cabahug reserved the option to seek
additional compensation for Easement Fee, based on a Supreme Court Decision "NPC vs.
Gutierrez" case. Thus, Spouses Cabahugs receipt of the easement fee did not bar them from
seeking further compensation from NPC. SC ruled that CA erred in holding that the payment of
additional sums to the Spouses Cabahug would be violative of the parties contract and amount
to unjust enrichment. Indeed, the rule is settled that a contract constitutes the law between the
parties who are bound by its stipulations which, when couched in clear and plain language,
should be applied according to their literal tenor.
Even without the reservation made by Jesus Cabahug in the Grant of Right of Way, the
application of Gutierrez to this case is not improper as NPC represents it to be. Where the right
of way easement, as in this case, similarly involves transmission lines, which not only
endangers life and limb but restricts as well the owner's use of the land traversed thereby, the
ruling in Gutierrez remains doctrinal and should be applied. It has been ruled that the owner
should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land if, as here, the easement is
intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the
imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property
or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of
ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or
increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land
is necessary. Measured not by the takers gain but the owners loss, just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
Republic v. Encelan
G.R. No. 170022
January 9, 2013
Facts: Cesar is married to Lolita. To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia, but
while he was still in Saudi Arabia, he learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin
Perez. Cesar filed a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based
on Lolitas psychological incapacity. Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin, and insisted
that she is not psychologically incapacitated. She left their home because of irreconcilable
differences with her mother-in-law. At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity
and subsequent abandonment of the family home. He testified that he continued to provide
financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima
Flores, finding that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness," but had
been "unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital
relationship"; her "transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems
with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions"; and "her refusal to go with
her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship."
W/N Cesars petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with Lolita should be
granted based on Lolitas psychological incapacity.
NO. Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar merely
mentioned in passing Lolitas alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling. Also, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not

necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.
To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the
erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.
No evidence on record exists to support Cesars allegation that Lolitas infidelity and
abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness. He mistakenly relied on Dr.
Flores psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity.
Dr. Flores observation on Lolitas interpersonal problems with co-workers does not to prove that
she was at the time of her marriage psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage.
Moreover, a wifes psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her
professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from
their marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and
relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as
measures of comparison with one another. Dr. Flores further belief that Lolitas refusal to go
with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere
generalization unsupported by facts.
Manila Insurance Company v. Amurao
G.R. No. 179628
January 16, 2013
Facts: Respondent Spouses Amurao entered into a Construction Contract Agreement
(CCA) with Aegean Construction and Development Corporation for the construction of a
commercial building. To guarantee its full and faithful compliance with the terms and conditions
of the CCA, Aegean posted performance bonds secured by petitioner The Manila Insurance
Company, Inc. and Intra Strata Assurance Corporation. Due to the failure of Aegean to complete
the project, spouses filed a Complaint against petitioner and Intra Strata to collect on the
performance bonds. Petitioner, however, seeks the dismissal of the Complaint on the grounds of
lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
W/N the Spouses Amurao are entitled to collect the performance bonds.
NO. Petitioner claims that respondent-spouses have no cause of action against it because at
the time it issued the performance bond, the CCA was not yet signed by respondent-spouses
and Aegean. But the Court ruled that the Performance Bond reveals that the "bond is
coterminous with the final acceptance of the project." Thus, the fact that it was issued prior to
the execution of the CCA does not affect its validity or effectivity.
While there is a cause of action against petitioner, the complaint must still be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction, because the CIAC has jurisdiction over the case, not the RTC. The jurisdiction of
the CIAC may include but is not limited to violation of specifications for materials and
workmanship, violation of the terms of agreement, interpretation and/or application of
contractual time and delays, and the like. Excluded from the coverage of the law are disputes
arising from employer-employee relationships.

For the CIAC to acquire jurisdiction two requisites must concur: "first, the dispute must be
somehow connected to a construction contract; and second, the parties must have agreed to
submit the dispute to arbitration proceedings." In this case, both requisites are present. The
parties agreed to submit to arbitration proceedings "any dispute arising in the course of the
execution and performance of the CCA by reason of difference in interpretation of the contract.
The fact that petitioner is not a party to the CCA cannot remove the dispute from the jurisdiction
of the CIAC because the issue of whether respondent-spouses are entitled to collect on the
performance bond, as we have said, is a dispute arising from or connected to the CCA.
287.
Republic vs. AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System, 688 SCRA 628, January 16,
2013
Republic v. AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System
G.R. No. 180463
January 16, 2013
Facts: Lots X, Y-1 and Y-2 lands of the public domain consisting of 52,678 square meters
located in Barrio Dadiangas, General Santos Municipality (now General Santos City) were
reserved for recreation and health purposes by virtue of Proclamation No. 168 4 (Proc. 168),
which was issued in 1963. In 1983, Proclamation No. 22735 (Proc. 2273) was issued amending
Proc. 168, and removing and segregating Lots Y-1 and Y-2 from the reservation and declaring
them open for disposition to qualified applicants. As a result, only Lot X which consists of
15,020 square meters remained part of the reservation now known as Magsaysay Park.
The record discloses that respondents-intervenors waged a campaign through petitions and
pleas made to the President to have Lots Y-1 and Y-2 taken out of the reservation for the
reason that through their predecessor Cabalo Kusop (Kusop), they have acquired vested private
rights over these lots. This campaign resulted in Proc. 2273, which re-classified and returned
Lots Y-1 and Y-2 to their original alienable and disposable state.
In 1997, respondents-intervenors filed applications6 for the issuance of individual miscellaneous
sales patents over the whole of Lot X with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) regional office in General Santos City, which approved them. Consequently,
16 original certificates of title7 (OCTs) covering Lot X were issued in the names of respondentsintervenors and several others. In September 1997, these 16 titles were simultaneously
conveyed8 to herein respondent AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS),
resulting in the issuance of 16 new titles (the AFP-RSBS titles) Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) No. T-81051 through T-81062, T-81146-T-81147, and T-81150-T-81151.9
On September 11, 1998, herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines instituted Civil Case No.
6419, which is a Complaint10 for reversion, cancellation and annulment of the AFP-RSBS titles,
on the thesis that they were issued over a public park which is classified as inalienable and nondisposable public land.
Respondents-intervenors intervened11 in Civil Case No. 6419, and, together with the defendant
AFP-RSBS, argued that their predecessor-in-interest Kusop had acquired vested interests over
Lot X even before Proc. 168 was issued, having occupied the same for more than 30 years.
They claimed that these vested rights, taken together with the favorable recommendations and
actions of the DENR and other government agencies to the effect that Lot X was alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, as well as the subsequent issuance of sales patents and
OCTs in their names, cannot be defeated by Proc. 168. They added that under Proc. 168,

private rights are precisely recognized, as shown by the preliminary paragraph thereof which
states:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant
to the authority vested in me by law, I, Diosdado Macapagal, President x x x, do hereby
withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for recreational and health resort site purposes,
under the administration of the municipality of General Santos, subject to private rights, if any
there be x x x12 (Emphasis supplied.)

288.
Mondragon Personal Sales, Inc. vs. Sola, Jr., 689 SCRA 18, January 21, 2013
Mondragon Personal Sales, Inc. v. Sola, Jr.
G.R. No. 174882
January 21, 2013
Facts: Petitioner Mondragon Personal Sales Inc., a company engaged in the business of selling
various consumer products through a network of sales representatives, entered into a Contract
of Services3 with respondent Victoriano S. Sola, Jr. for a period of three years commencing on
October 2, 1994 up to October 1, 1997. Under the said contract, respondent, as service
contractor, would provide service facilities, i.e., bodega cum office, to petitioner's products, sales
force and customers in General Santos City and as such, he was entitled to commission or
service fee as follows:
The agreement then came into effect when petitioner's goods were delivered to respondent's
bodega and were sold by petitioner's employees. Prior to the execution of the contract,
however, respondents wife, Lina Sola, had an existing obligation with petitioner arising from her
Franchise Distributorship Agreement with the latter. On January 26, 1995, respondent wrote a
letter5 addressed to Renato G. de Leon, petitioner's Vice-President for Finance, wherein he
acknowledged and confirmed his wifes indebtedness to petitioner in the amount
of P1,973,154.73 (the other accountability in the sum of P1,490,091.15 was still subject to
reconciliation) and, together with his wife, bound himself to pay on installment basis the said
debt. Consequently, petitioner withheld the payment of respondent's service fees from February
to April 1995 and applied the same as partial payments to the debt which he obligated to pay.
On April 29, 1995, respondent closed and suspended operation of his office cum bodega where
petitioner's products were stored and customers were being dealt with.
On May 24, 1995, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao, a
Complaint6 for accounting and rescission against petitioner alleging that petitioner withheld
portions of his service fees covering the months from October 1994 to January 1995 and his
whole service fees for the succeeding months of February to April 1995, the total amount of
which was P222,202.84; that petitioner's act grossly hampered, if not paralyzed, his business
operation, thus left with no other recourse, he suspended operations to minimize losses. He
prayed for the rescission of the contract of services and for petitioner to render an accounting of
his service fees.

289.
Republic vs. Heirs of Spouses Pedro Bautista and Valentina Malabanan, 689 SCRA
349, January 28, 2013

Excerpt : 1. what the trial court did in this case. The CA affirmed the trial courts pronouncement
in toto. Given these facts, the trial court and the CAs identical findings of fact concerning the
issue of just compensation should be accorded the greatest respect, and are binding on the
Court absent proof that they committed error in establishing the facts and in drawing
conclusions from them. There being no showing that the trial court and the CA committed any
error, we thus accord due respect to their findings. Civil Law ; Sales; Market Value; The market
value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by parties willing but not compelled to
enter into a sale.sMoreover, of note are petitioners
Republic v. Heirs of Spouses Pedro Bautista and Valentina Malabanan
G.R. No. 181218
January 28, 2013
Facts: Pedro Bautista and Valentina Malabanan (spouses Bautista) are the registered owners of
a 1,893-square meter parcel of land (the lot) located in Barangay Bulacnin North, Lipa City and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41750.4 Respondents are their children.
Sometime in 2000, herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), acquired by negotiated sale a 36-square meter portion of
the lot for P46,800.00 or at P1,300.00 per square meter for use in the STAR (Southern Tagalog
Arterial Road) Tollway project. The sale was annotated on the title on June 1, 2000.5
Later on, petitioner offered to purchase an additional 1,155 square meters of the lot at P100.00
per square meter, but the spouses Bautista refused to sell. The portion sought to be purchased
was to be used for the Balete-Lipa City Interchange Ramp B, which would serve as a motorists
entry/exit to/from Lipa City.
On July 7, 2004, the petitioner filed a Complaint 6 with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City for
the expropriation of the said 1,155-square meter portion (the subject portion). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2004-0408 and raffled to Branch 12. In its Amended
Complaint,7 petitioner alleged that the zonal valuation of the lot at the time of the filing of the
Complaint as determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) is P100.00 per square
meter,8which is thus the fair value of the property for purposes of expropriation.
During the expropriation proceedings, the spouses Bautista passed away, and were accordingly
substituted by the respondents.

290.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Spouses Jorja Rigor-Soriano and Magin
Soriano, 689 SCRA 586, January 30, 2013
Excerpt : 1. ...Page Edit Line Top G.R. No. 178312. January 30, 2013. [*] LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF SPOUSES JORJA RIGOR-SORIANO and MAGIN
SORIANO,
NAMELY:
MARIVEL
S.
CARANDANG
and
JOSEPH
SORIANO,
respondents. Civil Law ; Compromise Agreements; Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a

compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a

litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial,
if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid
a litigation.sUnder Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the
parties, by
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses Jorja Rigor-Soriano and Magin Soriano
G.R. No. 178312
January 30, 2013
Facts: The respondents are the children of the late Spouses Jorja Rigor-Soriano and Magin
Soriano, the owners of the two parcels of land covered by TCT No. NT 146092 (2839) and TCT
NO. NT-61608, both of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, containing an area of 10.9635
hectares located in Poblacion/Talabutab, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija and 4.1224 hectares
located in Macabucod, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, respectively.
The properties became subject to Operation Land Transfer (OLT) and were valued by the Land
Bank and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) at P10,000.00/hectare. Contending,
however, that such valuation was too low compared to existing valuations of agricultural lands,
the respondents commenced this action for just compensation, claiming that the properties were
irrigated lands that usually yielded 150 cavans per hectare per season at a minimum of two
seasons per year. They asked that a final valuation of the properties be pegged
atP1,800,000.00, based on Administrative Order No. 61, Series of 1992 and Republic Act No.
6657.2
Land Bank disagreed, insisting that Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228
governed the fixing of just compensation for the properties; that the Government, through the
DAR as the lead agency in the implementation of all agrarian laws, had taken the properties in
1972 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, and had since then redistributed the properties to
farmer-beneficiaries; and that in all cases under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive
Order No. 228, its participation was only to pay the landowners accepting the valuations fixed by
the DAR, upon the latters direction and in the amounts the DAR determined. It prayed that the
valuation by the DAR be retained or that a valuation be made judicially.

331.
Heirs of Fausto C. Ignacio vs. Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company, 689 SCRA
173, January 23, 2013
Excerpt : 1. ...Page Edit Line Top G.R. No. 177783. January 23, 2013. [*] HEIRS OF FAUSTO
C. IGNACIO, namely MARFEL D. IGNACIO-MANALO, MILFA D. IGNACIO-MANALO and
FAUSTINO D. IGNACIO, petitioners, vs. HOME BANKERS SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY,
SPOUSES PHILLIP AND THELMA RODRIGUEZ, CATHERINE, REYNOLD JEANETTE, all
surnamed ZUIGA, respondents. Civil Law ; Contracts; Contracts are perfected by mere
consent, which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and
the cause which are to constitute the contract.Contracts are perfected by mere consent,
which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the
cause which are to constitute the

Heirs of Faustino C. Ignacio v. Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company

G.R. No. 177783
January 23, 2013
Facts: In August 1981, petitioner Fausto C. Ignacio mortgaged two parcels of land to Home
Savings Bank and Trust Company, the predecessor of respondent Home Bankers Savings and
Trust Company, as security for theP500,000.00 loan extended to him by said bank. These
properties which are located in Cabuyao, Laguna are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. (T-40380) T-8595 and (T-45804) T-8350 containing an area of 83,303 square meters and
120,110 square meters, respectively.4
When petitioner defaulted in the payment of his loan obligation, respondent bank proceeded to
foreclose the real estate mortgage. At the foreclosure sale held on January 26, 1983,
respondent bank was the highest bidder for the sum of P764,984.67. On February 8, 1983, the
Certificate of Sale issued to respondent bank was registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Calamba, Laguna. With the failure of petitioner to redeem the foreclosed properties within one
year from such registration, title to the properties were consolidated in favor of respondent bank.
Consequently, TCT Nos. T-8595 and T-8350 were cancelled and TCT Nos. 111058 and 111059
were issued in the name of respondent bank.5
Despite the lapse of the redemption period and consolidation of title in respondent bank,
petitioner offered to repurchase the properties. While the respondent bank considered
petitioner's offer to repurchase, there was no repurchase contract executed. The present
controversy was fuelled by petitioner's stance that a verbal repurchase/compromise agreement
was actually reached and implemented by the parties.
In the meantime, respondent bank made the following dispositions of the foreclosed properties
already titled in its name:
TCT No. 111059 (Subdivided into six lots with individual titles - TCT Nos. 117771, 117772,
117773, 117774, 117775 and 117776)
A. TCT No. 117771 (16,350 sq.ms.) - Sold to Fermin Salvador and Bella Salvador under Deed
of Absolute Sale dated May 23, 1984 for the price of P150,000.00
B. TCT No. 11772 (82,569 sq.ms. subdivided into 2 portions
1) Lot 3-B-1 (35,447 sq.ms.) - Sold to Dr. Oscar Remulla and Natividad Pagtakhan, Dr. Edilberto
Torres and Dra. Rebecca Amores under Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 17, 1985 for the price
ofP150,000.00
2) Lot 3-B-2 covered by separate title TCT No. 124660 (Subdivided into 3 portions Lot 3-B-2-A (15,000 sq.ms.) - Sold to Dr. Myrna del Carmen Reyes under Deed of Absolute Sale
dated March 23, 1987 for the price of P150,000.00
Lot 3-B-2-B (15,000 sq.ms.) - Sold to Dr. Rodito Boquiren under Deed of Absolute Sale dated
March 23, 1987 for the price of P150,000.00
Lot 3-B-2-C (17,122 sq.ms.) covered by TCT No. T-154568 C. TCT No.117773 (17,232 sq.ms.) - Sold to Rizalina Pedrosa under Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 4, 1984 for the price of P150,000.00
The expenses for the subdivision of lots covered by TCT No. 111059 and TCT No. 117772 were
shouldered by petitioner who likewise negotiated the above-mentioned sale transactions. The

properties covered by TCT Nos. T-117774 to 117776 are still registered in the name of
respondent bank.6
In a letter addressed to respondent bank dated July 25, 1989, petitioner expressed his
willingness to pay the amount of P600,000.00 in full, as balance of the repurchase price, and
requested respondent bank to release to him the remaining parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. 111058 and T-154658 ("subject properties"). 7 Respondent bank however, turned down his
request. This prompted petitioner to cause the annotation of an adverse claim on the said titles
on September 18, 1989.8
Prior to the annotation of the adverse claim, on August 24, 1989, the property covered by TCT
No. 154658 was sold by respondent bank to respondent spouses Phillip and Thelma Rodriguez,
without informing the petitioner. On October 6, 1989, again without petitioner's knowledge,
respondent bank sold the property covered by TCT No T-111058 to respondents Phillip and
Thelma Rodriguez, Catherine M. Zuiga, Reynold M. Zuiga and Jeannette M. Zuiga.9
On December 27, 1989, petitioner filed an action for specific performance and damages in the
RTC against the respondent bank. As principal relief, petitioner sought in his original complaint
the reconveyance of the subject properties after his payment of P600,000.00.10 Respondent
bank filed its Answer denying the allegations of petitioner and asserting that it was merely
exercising its right as owner of the subject properties when the same were sold to third parties.
For failure of respondent bank to appear during the pre-trial conference, it was declared as in
default and petitioner was allowed to present his evidence ex parte on the same date
(September 3, 1990). Petitioner simultaneously filed an "Ex-Parte Consignation" tendering the
amount of P235,000.00 as balance of the repurchase price.11 On September 7, 1990, the trial
court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. Said decision, as well as the order of default,
were subsequently set aside by the trial court upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration by
the respondent bank.12
In its Order dated November 19, 1990, the trial court granted the motion for intervention filed by
respondents Phillip and Thelma Rodriguez, Catherine Zuiga, Reynold Zuiga and Jeannette
Zuiga. Said intervenors asserted their status as innocent purchasers for value who had no
notice or knowledge of the claim or interest of petitioner when they bought the properties
already registered in the name of respondent bank. Aside from a counterclaim for damages
against the petitioner, intervenors also prayed that in the event respondent bank is ordered to
reconvey the properties, respondent bank should be adjudged liable to the intervenors and
return all amounts paid to it.13
On July 8, 1991, petitioner amended his complaint to include as alternative relief under the
prayer for reconveyance the payment by respondent bank of the prevailing market value of the
subject properties "less whatever remaining obligation due the bank by reason of the mortgage
under the terms of the compromise agreement.1

332.
Abbas vs. Abbas, 689 SCRA 646, January 30, 2013

Abbas v. Abbas
G.R. No. 183896
January 30, 2013
Facts: The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged
the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive
Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the
annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967,
issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is
this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in
Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He
arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the
afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate,
Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was
going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but
was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told
him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a
copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. 5 The
Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to
the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA
MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS
GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents
it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and
2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get
certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No.
9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the
numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was
issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite,
certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the
same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty.
Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines. 12 He testified
that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the
bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty.
Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since
1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements. 15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty.
Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the
marriage contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it
was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage
contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and
Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo. 18 He testified that he requested a certain
Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license
and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993. 19 He further testified that he did not know where
the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993,
signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by
the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law,
and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She
testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the
marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to
their house with the application for marriage license. 23 Three days later, the same person went
back to their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who
then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all
of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was
obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against
Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated
January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one
of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was
seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and
(c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in
securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to
their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days
returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After
Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to
Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January
9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that
she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who
celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31