[ARAGON, ZAINALI JOY D.

FSUUCOLLEGE OF LAW]
1.) CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 2, Art. XII 1987 Constitution
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. XXX
Cases:
LEE HONG HOK vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972
Facts: Petitioners in this appeal by certiorari would have The Court reverse a decision of
respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower court judgment dismissing their complaint
to have the Torrens Title of respondent Aniano David declared null and void. The
decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the lower court makes clear
that there is no legal justification for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to
the disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials.
According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano
David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual
issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any
opposition or adverse claim thereto.
In this case the land in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public
character thereof for having been formed by reclamation.
Issue: WON the petitioners can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued
pursuant to a void patent.
Held: No. Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of
title issued pursuant to a void patent (Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157; Director of Lands
vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1959) xxx The fact that the grant
was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the
law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the
government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a
question between the grantee and the government.
Xxx
The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced in the
concept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or
acquire property under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to
lands held by the State in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition,
except as limited by the Constitution.
Exception to Regalian Doctrine
CARIO vs. INSULAR GOVERNMENT
41 Phil 935

[ARAGON, ZAINALI JOY D.

FSUUCOLLEGE OF LAW]
Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had
held the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs.
There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The
government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish
Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles.
Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.
Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian
Doctrine.
Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land.
The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:
It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership,
it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest,
and never to have been public land.
There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of
possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any
grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.
OH CHO vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS
G.R. No. L-48321
August 31, 1946
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in
the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot,
and on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the
application for registration on January 17, 1940.
The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the
lower court, committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the
applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be
applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A.
No. 141).
Issue: WON the applicant has title to the lot
WON the applicant is entitled to register the subject lot.
Held:
On the First Issue: The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be
confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his
predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant, under the laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in
the Philippines, or by possessory information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act
496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
2

[ARAGON, ZAINALI JOY D.

FSUUCOLLEGE OF LAW]
grant below to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should
have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest. (Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The
applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his
first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.
As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled
to decree or registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of
the public domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).
As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the
Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature
or classifications of the sought to be registered.
It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant
immediate predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of
the lot had they applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it,
the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be
deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act
for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the condition
precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the
registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894.
This the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have
any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant.
The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that
of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its
registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.
On the Second Issue: The applicant is disqualified. It is urged that the sale of the lot to
the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a suit between vendor and
vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be necessary, if the
court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case where the vendors
do not even object to the application filed by the vendee.
Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without
costs.

Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for
a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease
not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by
purchase, homestead, or grant.
3

[ARAGON, ZAINALI JOY D.

FSUUCOLLEGE OF LAW]

Cases:
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1984)
G.R. No. L-58867 June 22, 1984
Facts: Land situated in Obando, Bulacan. On May 10, 1976, the Valerianos claimed that
they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for partly through: inheritance in
1918; and purchase in May 2, 1958
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is
within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March
1, 1927; and that areas within the unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and
do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.
Land was found to be an Unclassified Region of Obando, Bulacan per BF LC Map No.
637, certified March 1, 1927. However, on-the-spot inspection conducted by a
representative of this Office, disclosed that the same was devoid of any forest growth and
forms part of a well-developed and 100 percent producing fishponds. 2 houses of light
materials were erected within the area for the caretakers temporary dwelling.
CA Affirmed RTC: in favor of the Valerianos
Issues: WON the Courts can reclassify public land.
WON the Valerianos are entitled to judicial confirmation of title.
Held: On the first issue: No. In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the
subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and
jurisdiction
The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department
of the Government and not of the Courts.
In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
On the second issue: No. All lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.
If the land is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be
beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens System
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants may have
had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of
properties around it, does not automatically render the property as alienable and
disposable.

[ARAGON, ZAINALI JOY D.

FSUUCOLLEGE OF LAW]
Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property from its present classification. In
fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled lands around the subject
property, petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to the matter of
classification of the land in question.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC (1986)

146 SCRA 509 December 29, 1986
Facts: The Director of Lands appealed the judgement of the Intermediate Appellate Court
which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela ordering the
registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land
measuring 481,390 sqm., acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
indigenous Dumagat Tribe and owners of the lots-in-question from time immemorial, on
October 29, 1962. This was accordingly only registered on July 17, 1982 long after the
aegis of the 1973 Constitution.
Issues: WON the ruling in the case, Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome (114 SRC 799) should
be overturned in light of jurisprudence.
WON the conversion of the land in question is recognized.
WON the provision barring private companies and associations from purchasing
public alienable lands in 1973 Constitution is applicable retroactively.
Held: On the first issue: In light of the jurisprudence traced from Carino v. Insular
Govt, to Susi v. Razon, to Herico v. Dar, the court overturned the decision on Meralco v.
Castro-Bartolome, stating that a possession is said to be prescriptively acquired by the
operation of the Public Lands Act, upon conclusively presumed fulfillment of all the
necessary conditions for a Government Grant. Thus, the land in question effectively
ceased to be of the public domain and was therefore classified as private property at the
moment of the sale through the continuous and unchallenged possession of the bona fide
right to ownership from Meralcos predecessors-interest. There being no law prohibiting
the sale of private lands to privately held corporations, the court thus overturned the
decision.
On the second issue: Referring to the ruling in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, the land
held by the Infiels since time immemorial was effectively deemed as private land, by the
operation of the law, ipso jure. Thus, at the moment of the sale, ACME Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., Etc. therefore, purchased private property. There being no ruling in the
1935 Constitution prohibiting this sale, this was held to be valid.
On the third issue: Acme had already obtained vested rights under the 1935
Constitution when it purchased the land from the Infiels. The provision in the 1973
Constitution prohibiting the purchase of alienable public lands by private corporations or
associations cannot be retroactively applied.