1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

2
3

IN THE MATTER OF THE

)
REINSTATEMENT OF ZACHARY B. )
COUGHLIN, BAR NO. 9473
)

Case No. 69723

5
6
7

STATE BAR OF NEVADA'S

10

ANSWERING BRIEF

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

STATE BAR OF NEVADA

R. Kait Flocchini, Asst. Bar Counsel
Nevada Bar No. 9861
9456 Double R. Blvd, Suite B
Reno, Nevada 89521
(775) 329-4100

ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 9473
4487 Los Reyes
Las Vegas, NV 89121

Attorney for Respondent

Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................. iii

I.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ..................... 1

II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................... 1

A. Statement of the Case ..................................................... 1
B. Statement of Facts ......................................................... 2

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................. 9

IV.

ARGUMENT ................................................................. 10

I. THE

NORTHERN

CORRECTLY

FOUND

NEVADA
THAT

DISCIPLINARY
APPELLANT

PANEL

FAILED

TO

10

ESTABLISH THAT HE IS FIT TO RESUME THE PRACTICE OF

11

LAW.

12

A. Defining "Fit to Resume the Practice of Law." ................... 11

13

B. The Panel Appropriately Concluded that Appellant is not

14
15
16
17

fit to resume the Practice of Law ................................... 13

V.

CONCLUSION ........................................... " ..... '" ..... , .... 17

VI.

ATTORNEY'S NRAP 28A CERTIFICATE .............................. 18

VII.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL ................................. 20

18
19
20

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Cited

Page(s)

In re Discipline of Schaefer, 117 Nev. 496, 25 P.3d 191 (1991), opinion

modified on denial of rehearing by 31 P.3d 365 (2001), cert. denied by 534
U.S. 1131, 122 S.Ct. 1072 (2002) ................................................ 9,10

5
6
7

Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision, 129 Nev Adv. Op. 9, 294 P3d. 427
(2013) ................................................................................... 10
In re Complaint of White, 311 Ore. 573, 815 P.2d 1257 (Or. 1991) (Unis, J.
concurring) ......................................................................... 11, 12

In re LaMadrid, 2014 Nev. unpub. LEXIS 1546 (2014) ........................ 11

9
10

Orr Ditch & Water Co. v. Justice Court of Reno Twp., 164 Nev. 138, 178 P.2d
558 (1947) ......................................................................... 12, 13

11

Court Rules
12
Supreme Court Rule 105 ............................................................. 9
13
Supreme Court Rule 116 ............................................................. 9
14
Supreme Court Rule 117 ............................................ 9, 10, 12, 14, 17
15

Secondary Sources
16
Black's Law Dictionary, 573 (5 th ed. 1979) ....................................... 11
17
18
19
20

111

I.

1
2

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Should Appellant be reinstated to the active practice of law pursuant

SCR 117(4)?

4
5

a. Has Appellant established by clear and convincing evidence

that his disability has been removed?

b. Has Appellant established by clear and convincing evidence

that he is fit to resume the practice of law?

II.

10

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

11

A.

Statement of the Case

12

This is a de novo review of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

13

Recommendation filed by the duly designated Formal Hearing Panel ("Panel")

14

of the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board on February 3, 2016 and the

15

corresponding Record on Appeal filed on February 5, 2016.

16

recommended denial of Appellant's request for reinstatement from disability

17

inactive status because he failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence

18

that he was fit to resume the practice of law.

19

III

20

III

The Panel

B. Statement of Facts

On June 18, 2015, this Court issued an order placing Appellant on

Disability Inactive Status. l See Record on Appeal ("ROA") Vol. VIII, Transcript

of Proceedings, dated August 25, 2015 (hereinafter referenced as "Transcript

1"), Exhibit A thereto, pages 1318-1326.

Reinstatement five days later. See id.

Appellant filed a Petition for

A Panel Chair was appointed to oversee the adjudication of Appellant's

Petition for Reinstatement. See ROA Vol. VIII, Transcript 1, Exhibit A thereto,

pages 1458-1459. The Chair instructed the parties to exchange exhibit lists prior

10

to the hearing so that stipulated exhibits could be included in the Hearing Packet.

11

See ROA V, Transcript 1, pages 838-839.

12

Appellant served a Pre-Hearing Brief on the Panel on August 21,2015. See ROA

13

Vol. I, Pre-hearing Brief, pages 28-43. The morning of the hearing, Appellant

14

attempted to file a Supplemental Pre-Hearing Brief that was 23 pages long and

15

attached approximately 500 pages of exhibits. See ROA Vol. V, Transcript 1,

Instead of providing Exhibits,

16
17

18

The Court Order was based on (i) a SCR 117 Petition, filed by the Northern
Nevada Disciplinary Board Chair, approximately three years earlier on May 31,
2012, and (ii) the September 22, 2014 Court-ordered evaluation by medical
expert Earl Nielsen, PhD.
1

19
20

page 832. The Chair denied Appellant's request to file the Supplemental Pre-

Hearing Brief. See ROA Vol. V, Transcript 1, page 840.

The hearing on Annellant's Petition began on August 25. 2015. At the

hearing Coughlin presented testimony from Dr. Nielsen; Hon. Charles McGee

(retired); his parents, Tim Coughlin and Mary Barker; and his AA sponsor in San

Diego, CA, Miles Warsh. See ROA Vol. V, Transcript 1, pages 849-930.

4"..7

..L.1.

......,

,,-,.

In the hearing, Appellant's witnesses testified that he was early in his

recovery from addictions, but appeared to be making progress. See ROA, Vol.

V, Transcript 1, pages 851 (Judge McGee); 877 (Dr. Nielsen); 906 (Warsh); 916

10

and 918 (Barker); and 925 and 928 (Dr. Coughlin).

11

witnesses were attorneys, save Judge McGee.

12

Appellant's conduct that led to him being placed on disability inactive status

13

included acting "like a jerk" and being "haughty and arrogant" before the lower

14

court judges. See ROA Vol. V, Transcript 1, page 825:17-19. Dr. Nielsen

15

testified that Appellants inadequate method of coping with stressors was the basis

16

of his original finding of disability that impeded Appellant's ability to practice

17

law. See ROA Vol. V, Transcript 1, page 869:9-14. Dr. Nielsen also testified

18

that when Appellant is overly stressed and begins to make poor judgments, he

19

tends to "exacerbate that with a hyperactive display or almost a hypomanic

20

display." See id. at 876:16-19. Finally, Dr. Nielsen testified that Appellant has

None of the testifying

Judge McGee identified that

a "reduced risk of reoccurring conduct," but that he was early in the process of

recovery. See id. at 876:24-877:9. Dr. Nielsen stated that he found evidence of

Appellant's ability to "function with a higher level of character" than he exhibited

in the first evaluation. See id. at 881 :2-7. Based on these observations, Dr.

Nielsen was willing to say that Appellant's request for reinstatement should be

considered, but he also stated that he was not the one to make the final decision.

See id. at 874:4-18 (compare Appellant's assertion that Dr. Nielsen stated

Appellant "is now fit to practice law and [is] no longer disabled.", Petitioner's

Non-objection to Panel's 10116115 Recommendation ("Opening Brief'), 1:19-

10

24).

11

At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the Panel deliberated. It

12

reconvened the Hearing the same day to direct Appellant to submit a plan for

13

potential reinstatement that addressed specific areas of concern to the Panel. See

14

ROA Vo. VI, Transcript 1, page 1009.

15

Appellant that submission of the Plan the next day was not recommended. See

16

ROA, Vol VI, Transcript 1, pages 1013 and 1016. Once Appellant submitted his

17

Plan, the Chair instructed, the Panel would meet to continue deliberations and

18

issue a Recommendation thereafter. ROA, Vol VI, Transcript 1, pages 1009 and

19

1015:23-1017: 15). Appellant argued in the hearing with the Chair's designation

20

of a recess instead of a conclusion to the hearing that day. See id. at 1014-1018.

The Chair specifically instructed

His objection to the recess ended only because his father interjected. See id. at

1019.

The Hearing was held in recess so that the Panel could consider the Plan

See ROA, Vol. 1019:19-20).

that the Panel had requested from Appellant.

Appellant submitted his proposed Plan on August 26, 2015, the day after the

hearing was recessed. 2 See ROA, Vol. V, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law

and Recommendation, filed February 3,2016, page 821. The Panel re-convened

on September 22, 2015 to consider Petitioner's proposal. See id. at 822. The

Panel concluded the Reinstatement Hearing that day. See id. The Panel issued

lOan initial Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation on October

11

26,2015. 3 See ROA, Vol. III, pages 579-596.

12

On October 30, 2015, Appellant requested that the State Bar send the

13

Record on Appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court immediately to "make up the 30

14

days just lost to the Panel's taking longer than 30 days from the hearing's

15

conclusion to issue a Recommendation." See ROA, Vol. III, Motion for

16
17
18
19
20

Appellant filed the Petition for Rehearing only two days after the August 25,

2015 hearing date.

3 The Panel's decision was filed two judicial days outside the time period
proscribed by SCR 117. However, SCR 119 provides that the time limitations
in the rules governing disciplinary matters are not jurisdictional. The State Bar
submits that this brief delay is excusable and inconsequential in this matter.
5

Reconsideration, Exhibit 9 thereto, pages 767. This is the first of many times

that Appellant stated that the hearing concluded on the date that he submitted his

Plan, which is directly contradicted by the Hearing Chair's statements on August

25, 2015 and the Panel's findings filed on October 26, 2015.

Nine judicial days later, on November 9, 2015, the State Bar of Nevada

moved for reconsideration of the recommendation because of Appellant's

conduct in filing and serving a Petition for Rehearing and Supplemental Petition

for Rehearing in the underlying Nevada Supreme Court matter on August 27,

2015 and September 21, 2015 respectively. See ROA, Vol. III and IV, Motion

10

for Reconsideration, pages 597-768. Appellant sought to have the Record on

11

Appeal filed despite the State Bar's pending motion because he was concerned

12

about delaying a final order from this Court. See Opposition to Motion for

13

Remand, Exhibit 1. In response, the State Bar asserted that it would file the

14

Record on Appeal within three days of the Panel's determination, whatever it

15

was, after the Motion was considered. See id. Appellant filed his Opposition to

16

the Motion for Reconsideration on November 23,2015. See ROA, Vol. IV and

17

V, pages 769-811. The State Bar filed a Reply on November 30,2015. See ROA,

18

Vol. V, pages 812-817. On December 16, 2015, the Panel Chair granted the

19

Motion for Reconsideration and ordered a limited supplemental hearing be held

20

on January 6,2016. See ROA Vol. VIII, Evidentiary Hearing, dated January 6,

2016 (hereinafter referenced as "Transcript 2"), pages 1465-1532.

At the Januarv 6. 2016 Hearing. Appellant repeatedlv obiected to questions

regarding his conduct leading up to the filing of the documents with the Supreme

Court. See Transcript 2, pages 1480, 1483-1484, 1491-1493. Each time the

objection was overruled. See id. Appellant also attempted to use the attorney-

client privilege to object to a question regarding his personal intention for seeking

a quick filing of the Record on Appeal. See id., at page 1496. Appellant then

testified that a client might want him to strictly interpret rules so as to avoid

10

advocacy by an opposing counsel and that was how he conducted himself in

11

serving the Petition for Rehearing and its Supplement. See id. at pages 1526-

12

1527. Appellant then proceeded to argue to the Panel that he had been denied

13

due process when he was not allowed an audience with the Supreme Court before

14

he was placed on disability inactive status. See id. at pages 1527-1528. But,

15

Appellant testified that he did not expect the Petition to be granted and that he

16

filed it because of his impatience and frustration with the process. See id. at pages

17

1528-1529.

."

__

.L

.JL

..L

."

0.1

....

18

The Panel's new Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

19

Recommendation was filed on February 3,2016. See ROA, Vol. V, pages 818-

20

827. The Panel adopted its previous Findings of Fact and entered additional

findings of fact regarding (i) Appellant's filing of the Petition for Rehearing and

the Supplement thereto, which he stated was done "as a matter of self-respect"

and was intended to immediately leverage what he felt was positive comments

at the hearing, even though he did not anticipate his Petition would be granted;

and (ii) Appellant's service of those documents pursuant to his technical

understanding of the counsel of record in the other appellate matter and his

position that it was appropriate advocacy to comply with the technicalities, but

not the spirit, of the procedural rules. See ROA Vol. V, pages 822- 824.

The Panel found that there was clear and convincing evidence that

10

Respondent's disability has been abated, but that the symptoms that resulted in

11

him being placed on disability inactive status might return if there is not a

12

comprehensive plan which (i) keeps stress minimal and personal triggers

13

reduced, and (ii) offers significant structure and support. See ROA Vol V, pages

14

824:4-825:6. The Panel also concluded that Appellant's actions, and intentions,

15

in filing and serving the Petition for Rehearing, and the Supplement thereto,

16

showed that his is "not yet prepared to maintain the high standard of integrity

17

necessary for our profession." See id. at pages 825:7-25. The Panel revoked its

18

October 26,2015 recommendation and recommended that Petitioner remain on

19

disability inactive status because he had not sufficiently demonstrated that he is

20

fit to resume the practice of law. See id. at pages 825-826.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule ("SCR") 117, the filing of a record

regarding a petition for reinstatement obliges the Supreme Court to determine if

the attorney's disability has been removed and if the attorney is fit to resume the

practice law.

Disciplinary Board to consider the attorney's request for reinstatement and to

make a recommendation to the Nevada Supreme Court regarding the attorney's

request. This hearing procedure is substantially similar to the procedure for

10

disciplinary matters, as set forth in SCR 105 and SCR 116. Therefore, the State

11

Bar urges that, similar to matters governed by SCR 105 and SCRl16, the

12

Supreme Court's review of the petition for reinstatement should be interpreted

13

as de novo and that the Panel's recommendation is persuasive. See e.g. In re

14

Schaefer, 117 Nev. 496, 515, 25 P.3d 191,204, modified by 31 P.3d 365 (2001),

15

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1131 (2002).

SCR 117 also requires a panel of the respective Nevada

16

The petitioning attorney bears the burden of proof in establishing that

17

reinstatement is warranted. See Rule 117(5), Nevada Supreme Court Rules

18

("SCR") (Lexis 2016). That burden of proof requires the establishment of clear

19

and convincing evidence. SCR 117(4). This Court has described clear and

20

convincing evidence as "evidence which need not possess such a degree of force

as to be irresistible, but there must be evidence of tangible facts from which a

legitimate inference ... may be drawn." Schaefer, 117 Nev. at 515,25 P.3d at 204.

This Court has further held that it will uphold factual findings "as long as they

are not clearly erroneous and are supported by substantial evidence." Sowers v

Forest Hills Subdivision, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 9, 294 P.3d 427,432 (2013).

IV.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE NORTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY PANEL

CORRECTLY FOUND THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO
ESTABLISH THAT HE IS FIT TO RESUME THE
PRACTICE OF LAW.

10

Appellant has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that

11

he is fit to resume the practice of law. The Panel correctly found that (i)

12

Appellant's conduct in filing the Petition for Rehearing, and supplement thereto,

13

after the Panel's acceptance of evidence regarding his reinstatement request, (ii)

14

Appellant's reasons for filing the Petition for Rehearing documents, and (iii)

15

Appellant's service of those documents and reasons for serving them as he did,

16

were sufficient reason to conclude that Appellant is not fit to resume the practice

17

of law.

18

III

19

III

20

III

10

A. Defining "Fit to Resume the Practice of Law."

Whether Appellant should be reinstated necessarily turns on how the

r --- - - -

on how to interpret this phrase. "The concepts of 'fitness to practice law' and

'good moral character' are phrases that defy precise definition." See In re

Complaint of White, 311 Ore. 573, 601, 815 P.2d 1257 (Or. 1991) (Vnis, J.,

concurring). Nonetheless, an interpretation is needed.

nhrase "fit
to resume the nractice of law" is internreted. There is little Quidance
"
..L

........,

Appellant has argued that "fitness to practice" requires only "an analysis

of whether attorney has professional competence, requisite legal skills and

10

knowledge necessary to practice law." See Opening Brief at 21:1-8. Appellant

11

relies on this Court's order in In Re LaMadrid, Case No. 61137 to support his

12

contention. This reliance is misplaced. In In re LaMadrid, the Court was unable

13

to evaluate whether LaMadrid was fit to practice law because she refused to

14

participate in the proceeding; there was no finding of fitness in that matter.

15

Appellant also relies on out-of-state disciplinary cases in which "fitness to

16

practice" is distinguished from rehabilitation.

17

Black's Law Dictionary defines "fit" as "suitable or appropriate.

18

Conformable to a duty. Adapted to, designed, prepared." BLACK'S LAW

19

DICTIONARY 573 (5th ed. 1979). The concurring Oregon Justice in In re

20

III

11

1
2
3
4

White stated, the phrase "fitness to practice law"

obviously includes more than technical legal skills. It
encompasses respect for the legal process and 'good moral
character,' which is defined as 'those qualities of truth-speaking, of
a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility.' (citing In re Taylor, 293
Ore. 285, 288 n 2,647 P2d 462 (1982) (quoting Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247, 77 S Ct 752, 1 LEd 2d 796
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).

See also Statewide Griev. Comm. V. Ganim, 311 Conn. 430, 454 (2014) (finding
7
"Good moral character is comprised of, the qualities of honesty, fairness, candor
8

and trustworthiness, and respect for and obedience to the law.") (citations
9

omitted) see also ROA Vol. V, Transcript 1, page 86-87 (Chair identified that

10
Panel's consideration of 'fitness to practice' includes character.)
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

The language of SCR 117(4) separates out "fitness" from the removal of
the disability. An attorney's disability could be mental in nature, much like
Appellant's disability. It defeats the purpose of having two separate and distinct
requirements in SCR 117 (4) if abatement of a mental disability also satisfies the
requirement of fitness.

See Orr Ditch & Water Co. v. Justice Court of Reno

Twp., 64 Nev. 138, 153, 178 P.2d 558 (1947) ("that construction which will
leave every word operative will be favored over one which leaves some word or
provision meaningless because of inconsistency.") (citations omitted).

20

12

In addition, the language of SCR 117 (4) separately calls out that the attorney

may be required to establish competence and learning in the law. If the rule was

meant to limit "fit to resume practice" to lust being "competent" and "learned in

the law", then there would be no need for both phrases~ the rules would simply

state that the attorney was required to establish the narrower qualifications of

"competence and learning in the law." The two phrases must be treated as

separate operative conditions. See id.

..L

oJ

......

.&.

Appellant's narrow interpretation of the phrase should not be used. This

9
Court should interpret "fit to resume the practice of law" to mean that one
10
exhibits the qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, granite discretion,
11
observance of fiduciary responsibility, and respect for and obedience to the law.
12
13
14

B. The Panel Appropriately Concluded that Appellant is Not Fit to

Resume the Practice of Law.

15

Appellant's conduct in the Reinstatement matter evidences a less-than-

16

high sense of honor, less-than granite discretion and a lack of respect for, and

17

obedience to, the law.

18

Appellant's conduct in the August 25, 2016 Hearing evidences a lack of

19
respect for and obedience to the law. Appellant ignored the Chair's instructions
20
to exchange Exhibits and instead filed a Pre-Hearing Brief. See ROA Vol. V,

13

Transcript 1, pages 838-839. Then the morning of the hearing, he attempted to

2
file a Supplemental Pre-Hearing Brief with 500 pages of exhibits. See id. at
3
pages 832. The document was not admitted by the Chair, but Appellant was
4
allowed to seek admission of all of the exhibits independently.

At the

5
conclusion of the hearing, Appellant argued with the Chair regarding the recess

6
of the Hearing. See generally ROA Vol. V, Transcript 1, pages 1009-1019.
7

Appellant also ignored the Chair's strong recommendation that he not submit
8

the requested Reinstatement Plan the day after the hearing. See id.
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Appellant's conduct regarding the Petition for Rehearing filings

evidences a lack of respect and obedience to the law. Appellant attempted to
leverage the Panel's preliminary comments with this Court. See ROA Vol VII,

Transcript 2, pages 1527:11-1528:6. He also chose to file those documents

because he was impatient and frustrated. See id. at pages 1529:23-1530: 1. In
the Petition, Appellant argues that this Court denied him due process before
placing him on disability inactive status because he was not allowed to
personally appear before the Court to argue his position. See ROA Vol. IV,

Motion for Reconsideration, Exhibit 1 thereto, pages 604-658. Appellant's

argument ignores that this Court considered the hundreds of pages that he
submitted in opposition to the SCR 117 Petition and that this Court sought an

14

outside objective expert opinion regarding his ability to competently practice

law before issuing its order. See ROA, Vol III, Transcript 1, Exhibit 15 and

Exhibit A thereto, pages 1197-1297 and 1327-1433, respectively. Appellant's

argument also fails to show (i) respect for the difficult decision that Court made

and (ii) appropriate discretion in how to best proceed to attempt to be reinstated

to active status.

7
Appellant's conduct at the January 6, 2016 hearing evidences a lack of

8
fitness to practice. He showed disrespect for the Chair's decision and a lack of

9
discretion when he made same evidentiary objection three times despite the
10
Chair's repeated denial of the objection. See ROA Vol VIII, Transcript 2, pages
11

1480, 1483-1484, 1491-1493. Appellant also showed a less-than-high sense of

12
honor and poor discretion when he stated that technical adherence to rules was
13
appropriate advocacy even when the conduct did not comply with the spirit of
14
the applicable rules. See id. at pages 1526-1527.
15
16
17
18
19
20

After the Panel issued its second Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Recommendation, Appellant continued to show poor discretion and lack of
respect for and obedience to the law.

First he attempted to re-argue the

evidentiary objection that was denied three times already at the January 6, 2016
hearing. To wit, Appellant argued a lack of notice of the topics explored at that

15

hearing in (i) his Motion for Reconsideration (which was not considered by the

Panel Chair), (ii) his Motion for Remand filed with this Court, and (iii) his

Opening Brief. Appellant also refused to accept that the Panel reconsidered its

original recommendation and issued a new recommendation when he filed is

"Non-objection to the Panel's 10/16/15 Recommendation." This refusal shows

poor discretion and a lack of respect for the Panel. It also creates unnecessary

confusion in this proceeding.

In addition, Appellant uses three pages of his Opening Brief to argue why
9
the Panel's second Recommendation is void and applied the wrong standard for
10
analyzing his fitness to practice law instead of explaining why its conclusions of
11

law should not be adopted and its recommendation approved. Appellant uses
12
six pages to argue why the proceedings that he initiated did not afford him
13
sufficient due process. This is disrespectful to the authority of the Panel and
14
shows a lack of ability to discern what the real issues are in a proceeding.
15

16
17
18

19
20

Finally, Appellant continues to assert the position that the Reinstatement

Hearing concluded earlier than it did. This is despite the fact that when the
hearing concluded is irrelevant at this point in the matter. Appellant has not
shown (i) that he can accept, and respect, the conclusions of a Court if they are
contrary to his position or (ii) that he can exercise discretion and fairness in his

16

advocacy. Without these characteristics, Appellant is not yet fit to resume the

practice of law.

V.

CONCLUSION

Dr. Nielsen opined that Appellant is capable of standing on his own two

feet, and thus, his disability can be deemed to be removed. But standing on two

feet is not enough for one to be fit to resume the practice of law. One must have

a high sense of honor, have respect for the law, be obedient to the law, and

conduct oneself with honesty, fairness and trustworthiness. Appellant's conduct

lOin the reinstatement matter and in the underlying SCR 117 Petition matter
11

evidences that he is not yet prepared to embody those principles. The Panel

12

correctly found that Appellant is not yet fit to resume the practice of law. This

13

Court should accept and adopt its recommendation that Appellant not be

14

reinstated to active status.

15
16

Respectfully submitted this 28th day of July, 2016.

STATEBAROFNEVADA

17
18
19
20

B y: -L..~:....L---..IL.
R. Kait locchini, Assistant Bar Counsel
Nev. Bar No. 9861
9456 Double R. Blvd, Suite B
Reno, Nevada 89521
Attorney for State Bar of Nevada

17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1.

I hereby certify that this brief complied with the formatting

requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5)

and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because this brief has been

prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Word 2010 in Times New

Roman 14 point font size.

2.

I further certify that this brief complies with the page or type volume

limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted

by NRAP 32(a)(7), it is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or

10

more and contains 3,684 words.

11

3.

Finally, I hereby certify that I have read the foregoing Answering

12

Brief of the State Bar of Nevada, and to the best of my knowledge, information

13

and belief, this brief is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I

14

further certify this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate

15

Procedure, including the requirement of NRAP 28( e), which requires every

16

assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by

17

appropriate references to the record on appeal. I understand that I may be

18

III

19

III

20

18

subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity

with the requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

3
4
5

6
7
8
9

DATED

day of July, 2016.

STATE BAR OF NEVADA

STANLEY HUNTERTON, BAR COUNSEL

BY:~~

R. Kait locchmi, Asst. Bar Counsel

Nevada Bar No. 9861
9456 Double R. Blvd, Suite B
Reno, Nevada 89521
(775) 329-4100

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing ANSWERING BRIEF was placed in a sealed envelope and sent by

U.S. regular mail in Reno, Nevada, postage fully prepaid thereon for first class

mail, addressed to:

6
7

Zach Coughlin
4487 Los Reyes
Las Vegas NV 89121

And was served via e-mail to-zachcoughlin@hotmail.com

Dated

this~ of July 2016.

10
11
12

Lau Peters, an employee of the

State Bar of Nevada

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

20