Singson vs BPI

FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment had been rendered
sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay a sum of money to
the plaintiff therein. Said judgment became final and executory as only against Ville-Abrille for its failure
to file an appeal. A writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI in which the Singsons had
a current account insofar as Villa-Abrilles credits against the Bank were concerned.
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading the name of the Singson
in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without further reading the body and
informing himself that said garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille &
Co., et al, prepared a letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that
case.
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of B. M. Glass Service
and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then
wrote to Singson that the check was not honored by BPI because his account therein had already been
garnished and that they are now constrained to close his credit account with them.
Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of
Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that
had been inadvertently committed.
Thus this action for damages.
ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiffs claim for damages based
on torts?
HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the
one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in

effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an
airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class
accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover
damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latters part, for, although the relation
between a passenger and a carrier is contractual both in origin and nature the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the
circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank
realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of
nominal damages the amount of which need not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition to
attorneys fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiffs rights.

So Ping Bun v. CA
Facts:
In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co. entered into lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan and Sons, Inc.
involving four (4) premises in Binondo, which the former used to store textiles. The agreements were for
one (1) year, with provisions for month-to-month rental should the lessee continue to occupy the
properties after the term. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved, and the former members formed
Tek Hua Enterprises Corp., herein respondent. So Pek Giok, managing partner of the defunct company,
died in 1986. Petitioner So Ping Bun, his grandson, occupied the warehouse for his own textile business,
Trendsetter Marketing. On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a letter to petitioner,
demanding that the latter vacate the premises. Petitioner refused, and on March 4, 1992, he requested
formal contracts of lease with DCCSI. The contracts were executed. Private respondents moved for the

nullification of the contract and claimed damages. The petition was granted by the trial court, and
eventually by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
(1) Whether So Ping Bun is guilty of tortuous interference of contract

(2) Whether private respondents are entitled to attorneys fees

Held:
(1) Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a
nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other
has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is
substantial, (c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either
intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules. The
elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third
person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or
excuse. Petitioner's Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a
result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter's property right. Clearly, and as correctly
viewed by the appellate court, the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present in the
instant case.
Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole
purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule,
justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actor's motive is to
benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other.

Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer's interest outweigh that
of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is
substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts
in self-protection. Moreover justification for protecting one's financial position should not be made to
depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient
if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. Where
there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct lies in a
proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where
the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said
that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse
to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the
property of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful
motives or malice on him. Petitioner argues that damage is an essential element of tort interference, and
since the trial court and the appellate court ruled that private respondents were not entitled to actual,
moral or exemplary damages, it follows that he ought to be absolved of any liability, including attorney's
fees.
While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing
contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not
transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The
business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice,
however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into
contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the
permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing,
without awarding damages. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused
by petitioner's interference.

(2) Lastly, the recovery of attorney's fees in the concept of actual or compensatory damages, is allowed
under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. One such occasion is when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses
to protect his interest. But we have consistently held that the award of considerable damages should
have clear factual and legal bases. In connection with attorney's fees, the award should be
commensurate to the benefits that would have been derived from a favorable judgment. Settled is the
rule that fairness of the award of damages by the trial court calls for appellate review such that the
award if far too excessive can be reduced. This ruling applies with equal force on the award of attorney's
fees. In a long line of cases we said, "It is not sound policy to place in penalty on the right to litigate. To
compel the defeated party to pay the fees of counsel for his successful opponent would throw wide open
the door of temptation to the opposing party and his counsel to swell the fees to undue proportions."
Considering that the respondent corporation's lease contract, at the time when the cause of action
accrued, ran only on a month-to-month basis whence before it was on a yearly basis, we find even the
reduced amount of attorney's fees ordered by the Court of Appeals still exorbitant in the light of
prevailing jurisprudence. Consequently, the amount of two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) awarded by
respondent appellate court should be reduced to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos as the
reasonable award or attorney's fees in favor of private respondent corporation.

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, ET AL. vs. NAVIDAD

The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CAG.R. CV No. 60720, entitled
"Marjorie Navidad and
Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et al.," which has modified the decision of 11
August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent Security Agency

(Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable
for damages on account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o'clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad,
then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of
the fare). While
Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard
assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight
started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks.
At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her
children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the
Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed
a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its
answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its security guards.The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin,
instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that
Escartin was negligent in his assigned task.
On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs the following:
"The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are

dismissed for lack of merit. The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise
dismissed."
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated
its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and,
instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a
contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where
passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the
corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was
nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that
Escartin inflicted
fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by
reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the
time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to
present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not
have stopped the train.
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings
of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the
presumption of
negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would insist that
Escartin's assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger
that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate court's
conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA
lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of
the LRTA.

Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage
was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the
premises of the latter,
entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court
had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary
diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the
safety of passengers.
The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers,
provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
in Articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries
to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers.

"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by
a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family
could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission."
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to
provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are
within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. The
statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through
the negligence or willful acts of its employees or b) on account of willful acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers if the
common carrier's employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been
negligent, and
by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or
negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the
injury is due to an
unforseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on
how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to
show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the
general rule that negligence must be proved.

The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of the
common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may
choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm
to undertake the
task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the
provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The
premise, however, for the employer's liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once
such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption
juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and
supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown.
Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier,
on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be
solidary. A contractual
obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in
culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a
liability for
tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted
the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply.
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor
Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is nothing to
link (Prudent) to the

death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not
been duly proven . . . ." This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification in our
own review of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act
or omission, he must also be absolved from liability.
Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation
between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages
are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
by him. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but
only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is
absolved from liability. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 138569, September 11, 2003
MARCH 16, 2014 LEAVE A COMMENT
Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook
only to the depositor or his authorized representative. The tellers know, or should know, that the rules on
savings account provide that any person in possession of the passbook is presumptively its owner.
Facts: Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation while private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company,
CPAs (L.C. Diaz), is a professional partnership engaged in the practice of accounting and which
opened a savings account with Solidbank. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya , filled up a
savings cash deposit slip and a savings checks deposit slip. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C.
Diaz, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with Solidbank and give him the Solidbank passbook.

Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook. The
teller acknowledged receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit
slips. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied
Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the
passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got the passbook. Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz
and reported the incident to Macaraya. The following day,, L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive Officer,
Luis C. Diaz, called up Solidbank to stop any transaction using the same passbook until L.C. Diaz could
open a new account followed by a formal written request later that day. It was also on the same day that
L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before of P300,000 from its savings account.
The withdrawal slip bore the signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and
Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo
received the P300,000.
L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money but to no avail. Hence, L.C. Diaz filed a
Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank with the Regional Trial Court. After trial,
the trial court rendered a decision absolving Solidbank and dismissing the complaint. Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not Solidbank must be held liable for the fraudulent withdrawal on private
respondents account.
Held: Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the
passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative. The tellers know, or should know, that
the rules on savings account provide that any person in possession of the passbook is presumptively its
owner. If the tellers give the passbook to the wrong person, they would be clothing that person
presumptive ownership of the passbook, facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by that person. For failing
to return the passbook to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6
presumptively failed to observe such high degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in
insuring its return to the party authorized to receive the same. However, L.C. Diaz was guilty of

contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the
hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be reduced. Hence, the liability of Solidbank
for actual damages was reduced to only 60%, the remaining 40% was borne by private respondent.
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on
simple loan. There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the
debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the
fiduciary nature of banking. RA 8791 declares that the State recognizes the fiduciary nature of banking
that requires high standards of integrity and performance. This new provision in the general banking
law, introduced in 2000, is a statutory affirmation of Supreme Court decisions holding that the bank is
under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the
fiduciary nature of their relationship.
Article 1173
Negligence conduct that creates undue risk of harm to another. It is the failure to observe that degree
of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby that other person
suffers injury. (Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. v. Borja, G.R. No. 143008, June 10, 2002)
- want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term, and its
application depends upon the situation of the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably impose. Where the danger is great a high degree of care is necessary, and
the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (US v. Juanillo, G.R. No.
7255, Oct. 3, 1912)
Elements:
Reasonable foresight of harm
Failure to take necessary precaution

(1) Test of Negligence

Picart v. Smith, 37 PHIL 809 (1918)
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet pater familias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined
by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
WHAT CONSTITUTES CONDUCT OF A PRUDENT MAN:
Must be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case
Smith Bell Shipping v. Borja
Smith Bell requested Customs for inspection on its vessel M/T King Family which was due to arrive
containing 750 metric tons of alkyl benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer. Catalino Borja, Customs
Inspector was then on board the vessel to perform his duties.
At around noon, while M/T King Family was unloading chemicals unto 2 barges owned by respondent
ITTC, a sudden explosion occurred setting the vessels afire. Upon hearing the explosion, Borja who was
at that time inside the cabin preparing reports, went outside to check what had happened, and another
explosion was heard, seeing the fire and fearing his life, jumped overboard to save himself. However,
the water was likewise on fire due mainly to the spilled chemicals. Despite the tremendous heat, he

swam his way for 1 hour until he was rescued by the people living in the squatters area and sent to San
Juan De Dios Hospital.
After weeks of intensive care at the hospital, he was diagnosed as permanently disabled due to the
incident. He made demands against Smith Bell and ITTC for the damages caused by the explosion.
However, both denied liabilities and attributed to each other negligence.
Trial court ruled in favor of Borja and dismissed all counterclaims and such of Smith Bell to ITTC.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner that no physical evidence was shown to prove that the explosion had
originated from its vessel, CA held Smith Bell liable following the findings of the investigation conducted
by the Special Board of Marine Inquiry.
ISSUE: Whether Smith Bell whose cargo on board contained dangerous chemicals is liable.
HELD: Yes.
Smith Bell cannot shift the blame to ITTC, as it stated that all the explosions erupted from outside its
vessel and not aboard. Negligence is conduct that creates undue risk of harm to another. It is the failure
to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby
that other person suffers injury.
Petitioners vessel was carrying chemical cargo -- alkyl benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer.
While knowing that their vessel was carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew
failed to take all the necessary precautions to prevent an accident. Petitioner was, therefore, negligent.
As a result of the fire and the explosion during the unloading of the chemicals from petitioners vessel,
Respondent Borja suffered burns that will permanently disable him Hence, the owner or the person in
possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damage
caused to persons and property by reason of negligence in its management or navigation.
Delsan vs CA
Facts:

Caltex entered into a contract of affreightment with Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., for a period of one year
whereby the said common carrier agreed to transport Caltexs industrial fuel oil from the BatangasBataan Refinery to different parts of the country. Under the contract, petitioner took on board its vessel,
MT Maysun, 2,277.314 kiloliters of industrial fuel oil of Caltex to be delivered to the Caltex Oil Terminal in
Zamboanga City. The shipment was insured with the private respondent, American Home Assurance
Corporation.
On August 14, 1986, MT Maysun set sail from Batangas for Zamboanga City. Unfortunately, the vessel
sank in the early morning of August 16, 1986 near Panay Gulf in the Visayas taking with it the entire
cargo of fuel oil.
The Respondent (insurance) paid the Caltex the amount of P5,096,635.57 representing the amount of
the value of the lost cargo.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the payment made by the private respondent to Caltex for the insured value of the lost
cargo amounted to an admission that the vessel was seaworthy, thus precluding any action for recovery
against the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the non-presentation of the marine insurance policy bars the complaint for recovery of
sum of money for lack of cause of action
Held:
No, under the law, extra ordinary diligence is required by the common carrier in taking good care
of the goods. The common carrier is presumed negligent unless the contrary provides otherwise. The
right of subrogation has its roots in equity. It is designed to promote and to accomplish justice and is the
mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice and good
conscience ought to pay. It is not dependent upon, nor does it grow out of, any privity of contract or upon

written assignment of claim. It accrues simply upon payment by the insurance company of the
insurance claim.
The presentation in evidence of the marine insurance policy is not indispensable in this case before the
insurer may recover from the common carrier the insured value of the lost cargo in the exercise of its
subrogatory right. The subrogation receipt, by itself, is sufficient to establish not only the relationship of
herein private respondent as insurer and Caltex, as the assured shipper of the lost cargo of industrial
fuel oil, but also the amount paid to settle the insurance claim. The right of subrogation accrues simply
upon payment by the insurance company of the insurance claim.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, RODRIGO ARNAIZ, REGINA LATAGAN, RICARDO GENERALAO and PAMPANGA
SUGAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., CORPORATION, respondents.
Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. (PASUDECO) transports sugarcane from Mabalacat and
Magalang, Pampanga. When the Mount Pinatubo eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national bridges
along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul via Magalang, Pampanga, it requested permission from the
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks to enter and pass through the North Luzon Expressway
(NLEX) via Dau-Sta. Ines from Mabalacat, and via Angeles from Magalang, and exit at San Fernando
going to its milling factory.[2] The TRB furnished the Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC) (the franchisee that operates and maintains the toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll
Expressways) with a copy of the said request for it to comment thereon.[3]
On November 5, 1991, TRB and PASUDECO entered into a Memorandum of Agreement[4] (MOA),
where the latter was allowed to enter and pass through the NLEX on the following terms and conditions:
1. PASUDECO trucks should move in convoy;
2. Said trucks will stay on the right lane;

3. A vehicle with blinking lights should be assigned at the rear end of the convoy with a sign which
should read as follows: Caution: CONVOY AHEAD!!!;
4. Tollway safety measures should be properly observed;
5. Accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any activity related to this approval shall be the
responsibility of PASUDECO;
6. PASUDECO shall be responsible in towing their stalled trucks immediately to avoid any inconvenience
to the other motorists;
7. This request will be in force only while the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang
Maragul via Magalang remain impassable.
PASUDECO furnished the PNCC with a copy of the MOA.[5] In a Letter[6] dated October 22, 1992, the
PNCC informed PASUDECO that it interposed no objection to the MOA.
At around 2:30 a.m. on January 23, 1993, Alex Sendin, the PNCC security supervisor, and his coemployees Eduardo Ducusin and Vicente Pascual were patrolling Km. 72 going north of the NLEX. They
saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle portion of the north and southbound lanes of the road.[7] They
placed lit cans with diesel oil in the north and southbound lanes, including lane dividers with reflectorized
markings, to warn motorists of the obstruction. Sendin, Ducusin and Pascual proceeded to the
PASUDECO office, believing that the pile of sugarcane belonged to it since it was the only milling
company in the area. They requested for a payloader or grader to clear the area. However, Engineer
Oscar Mallari, PASUDECOs equipment supervisor and transportation superintendent, told them that no
equipment operator was available as it was still very early.[8] Nonetheless, Mallari told them that he
would send someone to clear the affected area. Thereafter, Sendin and company went back to Km. 72
and manned the traffic. At around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived, and started clearing the
highway of the sugarcane. They stacked the sugarcane at the side of the road. The men left the area at
around 5:40 a.m., leaving a few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. As the bulk of the
sugarcanes had been piled and transferred along the roadside, Sendin thought there was no longer a
need to man the traffic. As dawn was already approaching, Sendin and company removed the lighted

cans and lane dividers.[9] Sendin went to his office in Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan, and made the
necessary report.[10]
At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, a certified mechanic and marketing manager of JETTY Marketing,
Inc.,[11] was driving his two-door Toyota Corolla with plate number FAG 961 along the NLEX at about 65
kilometers per hour.[12] He was with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend Ricardo Generalao; they
were on their way to Baguio to attend their grandmothers first death anniversary.[13] As the vehicle ran
over the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle several times. The accident threw
the car about fifteen paces away from the scattered sugarcane.
Police Investigator Demetrio Arcilla investigated the matter and saw black and white sugarcanes on the
road, on both lanes, which appeared to be flattened.[14]
On March 4, 1993, Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a complaint[15] for damages against
PASUDECO and PNCC in the RTC of Manila, Branch 16. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9364803. They alleged, inter alia, that through its negligence, PNCC failed to keep and maintain the NLEX
safe for motorists when it allowed PASUDECO trucks with uncovered and unsecured sugarcane to pass
through it; that PASUDECO negligently spilled sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed to put up
emergency devices to sufficiently warn approaching motorists of the existence of such spillage; and that
the combined gross negligence of PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and proximate cause of the
injuries sustained by Latagan and the damage to Arnaizs car. They prayed, thus:
The petitioner is the grantee of a franchise, giving it the right, privilege and authority to construct,
operate and maintain toll facilities covering the expressways, collectively known as the NLEX.[30]
Concomitant thereto is its right to collect toll fees for the use of the said expressways and its obligation
to keep it safe for motorists.
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence
of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause

and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
[31] Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would do.[32] It also refers to the conduct which creates undue risk of
harm to another, the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the
circumstance justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury.[33] The Court declared the test by
which to determine the existence of negligence in Picart v. Smith,[34] viz:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined
by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results
to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take
precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.

Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.[35]
In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the
NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed even as
flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground.[36] The highway was still wet from the juice and sap
of the flattened sugarcanes.[37] The petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition of the
highway would endanger motorists passing by at night or in the wee hours of the morning.
The petitioner cannot escape liability under the MOA between PASUDECO and TRB, since respondent
Latagan was not a party thereto. We agree with the following ruling of the CA:
Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC, in charge of
the maintenance of the expressway, has been negligent in the performance of its duties. The obligation
of PNCC should not be relegated to, by virtue of a private agreement, to other parties.
PNCC declared the area free from obstruction since there were no piles of sugarcane, but evidence
shows there were still pieces of sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists. There must be an
observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. There should
have been sufficient warning devices considering that there were scattered sugarcane stalks still left
along the tollway.
The records show, and as admitted by the parties, that Arnaizs car ran over scattered sugarcanes spilled
from a hauler truck.[38]
Moreover, the MOA refers to accidents or damages to the toll facilities. It does not cover damages to
property or injuries caused to motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the MOA.

PASUDECOs negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of

PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts which
were the direct and proximate cause of Latagans injuries. As such, PASUDECO and PNCC are
jointly and severally liable.
According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in
combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible
for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the
same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor. ...
In Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court declared that the liability of joint
tortfeasors is joint and solidary, to wit:
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole
cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other
than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to
produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of
them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such
cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors
that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful
acts of the other concurrent tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and
each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed
to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and
that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be

a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is
responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them
are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two
or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination with the direct and proximate cause
of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to
the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence
resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily
liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and VIRGILIO J. BORJA,

- versus COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), CORAZON C. AMORES, MA. EMILIE A. MOJICA, CECILE C.
SISON, DINO C. AMORES, LARISA C. AMORES, ARMAND JINO C. AMORES and JOHN C. AMORES,
The factual antecedents are as follows:
In the early afternoon of April 27, 1992, Jose Amores (Amores) was traversing the railroad tracks in
Kahilum II Street, Pandacan, Manila. Before crossing the railroad track, he stopped for a while then
proceeded accordingly.[3] Unfortunately, just as Amores was at the intersection, a Philippine National
Railways (PNR) train with locomotive number T-517 turned up and collided with the car.[4]
At the time of the mishap, there was neither a signal nor a crossing bar at the intersection to
warn motorists of an approaching train. Aside from the railroad track, the only visible warning sign at
that time was the defective standard signboard STOP, LOOK and LISTEN wherein the sign Listen was
lacking while that of Look was bent.[5] No whistle blow from the train was likewise heard before it finally

bumped the car of Amores.[6] After impact, the car was dragged about ten (10) meters beyond the
center of the crossing.[7] Amores died as a consequence thereof.
The only issue to be resolved in the present case is whether the appellate court was correct in ascribing
negligence on the part of the petitioners. It was ascertained beyond quandary that the proximate cause
of the collision is the negligence and imprudence of the petitioner PNR and its locomotive driver, Borja,
in operating the passenger train.
As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant provision is Article 2176 of the New Civil Code,
which states that:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the case and we find no cogent reason to reverse the
appellate courts decision. Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.[15] Using the aforementioned philosophy, it may be
reliably concluded that there is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care and vigilance is
calibrated; it is dependent upon the circumstances in which a person finds himself. All that the law
requires is that it is perpetually compelling upon a person to use that care and diligence expected of
sensible men under comparable circumstances.[16]
We hold that the petitioners were negligent when the collision took place. The transcript of stenographic
notes reveals that the train was running at a fast speed because notwithstanding the application of the
ordinary and emergency brakes, the train still dragged the car some distance away from the point of
impact. Evidence likewise unveils the inadequate precautions taken by petitioner PNR to forewarn the
public of the impending danger. Aside from not having any crossing bar, no flagman or guard to man the

intersection at all times was posted on the day of the incident. A reliable signaling device in good
condition, not just a dilapidated Stop, Look and Listen signage because of many years of neglect, is
needed to give notice to the public. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to use
reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an
indication of negligence.
Sofia Guillang represented by Susan Guillang-Cabatbat, et al. vs. Rodolfo Bedania, et al.,
On 25 October 1994, at about 5:45 in the afternoon, petitioner Genaro M. Guillang (Genaro) was driving
his brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan with conduction sticker no. 54-DFT (car) along Emilio Aguinaldo
Highway (highway) in Cavite. Genaro, Antero Guillang (Antero), Felipe Jurilla, Jose Dignadice
(Dignadice), and Alvin Llanillo (Llanillo) had all just left from Golden City, Dasmarias, Cavite, and were
on their way to Manila. At the other side of the highway, respondent Rodolfo A. Bedania (Bedania) was
driving a ten-wheeler Isuzu cargo truck with plate no. CAC-923 (truck) towards Tagaytay City. The truck
was owned by respondent Rodolfo de Silva (de Silva).
Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course, Bedania negotiated a U-turn. When
the truck entered the opposite lane of the highway, Genaros car hit the right portion of the truck. The
truck dragged Genaros car some five meters to the right of the road.
As a consequence, all the passengers of the car were rushed to the De La Salle University Medical
Center in Dasmarias, Cavite for treatment. Because of severe injuries, Antero was later transferred to
the Philippine General Hospital. However, on 3 November 1994, Antero died due to the injuries he
sustained from the collision. The car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor damage
Ruling:
On the Presumption of Negligence and Proximate Cause

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. In Picart v. Smith,[25] we held that the test of negligence is whether the defendant
in doing the alleged negligent act used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would
have used in the same situation.
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Genaro was negligent is not supported by the evidence on
record. In ruling that Genaro was negligent, the Court of Appeals gave weight and credence to Videnas
testimony. However, we find that Videnas testimony was inconsistent with the police records and report
that he made on the day of the collision. First, Videna testified that the car was running fast and overtook
another vehicle that already gave way to the truck.[26] But this was not indicated in either the report or
the police records. Moreover, if the car was speeding, there should have been skid marks on the road
when Genaro stepped on the brakes to avoid the collision. But the sketch of the accident showed no
skid marks made by the car.[27] Second, Videna testified that the petitioners came from a drinking spree
because he was able to smell liquor.[28] But in the report,[29] Videna indicated that the condition of
Genaro was normal. Videna did not indicate in the report that Genaro had been drinking liquor or that
Genaro was obviously drunk. Third, Videna testified that when he arrived at the scene, Bedania was
inside his truck.[30] This contradicts the police records where Videna stated that after the collision
Bedania escaped and abandoned the victims.[31] The police records also showed that Bedania was
arrested by the police at his barracks in Anabu, Imus, Cavite and was turned over to the police only on
26 October 1994.[32]
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a
vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
In this case, the report[33] showed that the truck, while making the U-turn, failed to signal, a violation of
traffic rules. The police records also stated that, after the collision, Bedania escaped and abandoned the
petitioners and his truck.[34] This is another violation of a traffic regulation.[35] Therefore, the
presumption arises that Bedania was negligent at the time of the mishap.

The evidence presented in this case also does not support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that
the truck had already executed the U-turn before the impact occurred. If the truck had fully made the Uturn, it should have been hit on its rear.[36] If the truck had already negotiated even half of the turn and
is almost on the other side of the highway, then the truck should have been hit in the middle portion of
the trailer or cargo compartment. But the evidence clearly shows, and the Court of Appeals even
declared, that the car hit the trucks gas tank, located at the trucks right middle portion, which disproves
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the truck had already executed the U-turn when it was hit by
the car.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that the point of impact was on the lane where the car was cruising.
Therefore, the car had every right to be on that road and the car had the right of way over the truck that
was making a U-turn. Clearly, the truck encroached upon the cars lane when it suddenly made the Uturn.
The Court of Appeals also concluded that Bedania made the U-turn at an intersection. Again, this is not
supported by the evidence on record. The police sketch[37] does not indicate an intersection and only
shows that there was a road leading to the Orchard Golf Course near the place of the collision.
Furthermore, U-turns are generally not advisable particularly on major streets.[38] Contrary to Videnas
testimony, it is not normal for a truck to make a U-turn on a highway. We agree with the trial court that if
Bedania wanted to change direction, he should seek an intersection where it is safer to maneuver the
truck. Bedania should have also turned on his signal lights and made sure that the highway was clear of
vehicles from the opposite direction before executing the U-turn.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that it was not yet dark when the collision occurred is also not
supported by the evidence on record. The report stated that the daylight condition at the time of the
collision was darkness.[39]
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the sheer size of the truck does not make it
improbable for the truck to execute a sudden U-turn. The trial courts decision did not state that the truck

was traveling at a fast speed when it made the U-turn. The trial court said the truck made a sudden Uturn, meaning the U-turn was made unexpectedly and with no warning, as shown by the fact that the
trucks signal lights were not turned on.
Clearly, Bedanias negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which claimed the life of Antero
and injured the petitioners. Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.[40] The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Bedania for if the U-turn
was executed with the proper precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened. The
sudden U-turn of the truck without signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania
failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The trucks sudden U-turn triggered a series of events that led to
the collision and, ultimately, to the death of Antero and the injuries of petitioners.
We agree with the trial court that de Silva, as Bedanias employer, is also liable for the damages suffered
by petitioners. De Silva failed to prove that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employees.
Article 2179
LAMBERT S. RAMOS, - versus C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION, G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009
FACTS: On or about 10:40 oclock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon
City, a vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan bearing Plate Number XDN 210
(owned by C.O.L. Realty Corporation and driven by Aquilino Larin) and a Ford Expedition bearing Plate
Number LSR 917 (owned by Lambert Ramos and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo). A passenger of the
sedan, one Estela Maliwat sustained injuries, she was immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment.
C.O.L. Realty averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a speed of five to
ten kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan

Avenue when (Ramos) Ford Expedition violently rammed against the cars right rear door and fender.
Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to indict
Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the
hospitalization of Estela in the aggregate amount of P103,989.60. The demand fell on deaf ears
prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City. Ramos denied liability for damages insisting that it was
the negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realtys) driver, which was the proximate cause of the accident.
Ramos asserted the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the
concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection. The MeTC
rendered the Decision dated 1 March 2006 exculpating (Ramos) from liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramos is solidarily liable for the negligence of Rodel Ilustrisimo.
HELD: YES, What is clear to Us is that Aquilino recklessly ignored these barricades and drove through it.
Without doubt, his negligence is established by the fact that he violated a traffic regulation. However, it
also declared Ramos liable vicariously for Rodels contributory negligence in driving the Ford Expedition
at high speed along a busy intersection. We cannot exculpate Rodel from liability. Having thus settled
the contributory negligence of Rodel, this created a presumption of negligence on the part of Ramos. For
the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his employee, an employer must rebut
the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his
employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family. Ramos driver was
texting with his cellphone while running at a high speed and that the latter did not slow down albeit he
knew that Katipunan Avenue was then undergoing repairs and that the road was barricaded with
barriers. As the employer of Rodel, Ramos is solidarily liable for the quasidelict committed by the former.
** This finds support in Article 2185 of the Civil Code: Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation. Accordingly, there ought to be no question on (C.O.L. Realtys)
negligence which resulted in the vehicular mishap.