G. R. No.

138570 October 10, 2000 Bayan vs Zamora Case Digest by Justine Mae Sal
es
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others
, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to
a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13,
1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectivel
y signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. Pres.
Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the sena
te approved it by (2/3) votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constituti
on is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII. Following the argument of the
petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or fa
cilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are su
fficiently met: a) it must be a treaty, b) it must be duly concurred in by the s
enate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held fo
r that purpose if so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by the othe
r contracting state. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Artic
le VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and e
ffective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
senate.
Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, A
rticle XVIII of the Constitution?
Held:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving fore
ign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a
certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Ar
ticle VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purp
ose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence
of the senate. The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permane
nt. We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or
facilities to be stationed or placed

permanently in the Philippines. It is inconsequential whether the United States

treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law,
an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Visiting
Forces Agreement, for which Senate concurrence was sought and received on May 2
7, 1999, is the subject of a number of Constitutional challenges. Issue 1: Do th
e Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislato
rs to question the constitutionality of the VFA? Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. ha
ve no standing. A party bringing a suit challenging the Constitutionality of a l
aw must show not only that the law is invalid, but that he has sustained or is i
n immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforceme
nt, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners h
ave failed to show that they are in any danger of direct injury as a result of t
he VFA. As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the ex
ercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayers suit refers to a
case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. Before he can invoke the power of judicial r
eview, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a d
irect injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contrac
t. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all memb
ers of the public. Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are i
nvolved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that p
ublic funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers,
have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA. Similarly, the petiti
oner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the requisite locus stand
i to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person
or to the institution to which they belong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP l
acks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution
from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence the p
resent action. Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the cons
titutional significance of the issues raised, the Court may brush aside the proc
edural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions. Issue 2: Is the VFA govern
ed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution? Secti
on 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the pre
sence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. The Constitution contains t
wo provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or internation
al agreements. Section 21, Article VII reads: [n]o treaty or international agreem
ent shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of a
ll the Members of the Senate. Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:[a]fter the expi
ration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troo
ps, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by
a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for tha
t purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. Section 21,
Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in whic
h case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the S
enate is required to make the

treaty valid and binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down the genera
l rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or par
ticular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be
valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provis
ion that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military base
s, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrenc
e of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the cons
titutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines
. Sec 25 further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may b
e allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held
for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other
contracting state. On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the trea
tment of US troops visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to g
overn such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the U
S and RP government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel a
nd aircraft, import and export of equipment, materials and supplies. Undoubtedly
, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving fo
reign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. T
o a certain extent, however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find
applicability with regard to determining the number of votes required to obtain
the valid concurrence of the Senate. It is specious to argue that Section 25, A
rticle XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that th
ere is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military bas
e. The Constitution makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find no
thing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to
be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is m
ade by law; the Court should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argumen
t that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military ba
ses, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The pros
cription covers foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Stated differently,
this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without a
ny foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and indepe
ndent subjects, such that three different situations are contemplated a military
treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troo
ps, or (c) foreign facilities any of the three standing alone places it under th
e coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIIIs requisite
s satisfied to make the VFA effective? Section 25, Article XVIII disallows forei
gn military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following co
nditions are sufficiently met: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty mus
t be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c)
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as t
o the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurren
ce handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the Cons
titution, as there were at least 16 Senators that concurred. As to condition (c)
, the Court held that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contr
acting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the U
S to submit the VFA to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitutio
n, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle t
hat the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning ex
cept where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus att
ached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have
in common use. The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hu
bbard, has stated that the US has fully committed to living up to the terms of t
he VFA. For as long as the US accepts or

acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its tr
eaty obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the Constitutio
n. Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, an
d the concurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expr
ession of our nations consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant du
ty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratificat
ion is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the stat
e, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may
provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. In
our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as com
monly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to gi
ving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. With the r
atification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, unde
r principles of international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by the term
s of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II declares that the P
hilippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, f
reedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.