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October 2001

This document was prepared by Research Planning, Inc. under contract USZA92-98-D0001, DO # 013 for the Commander, United States Army Special Forces Command.
Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
positions of the United States Army Special Forces Command, the Department of
Defense, or the U.S. Government.


Archivist, Office of the Historian, Special Warfare Center and(b)(3), (b)(6)

Director and Curator, JFK Special Warfare Museum; are due special
(b)(3), (b)(6)
thanks for their invaluable contribution to the preparation of this reference book.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1
PURPOSE ....................................................................................................................... 1
SCOPE ............................................................................................................................ 1
SPECIAL FORCES AS ADVISORS AND LIAISONS ................................................ 1
ADVISING FOREIGN COUNTERPARTS .................................................................. 3
USING THIS REFERENCE BOOK .............................................................................. 7
CHAPTER 1 WORKING ACROSS CULTURES ........................................................ 9
THE IMPORTANCE OF CULTURE ............................................................................ 9
A BASELINE DEFINITION OF CULTURE ................................................................ 9
THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE .................................................................................. 10
CULTURE AND THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT ............................................... 11
LEARNED BEHAVIOR AS A COMPONENT OF CULTURE ................................. 13
FIFTY BASIC QUESTIONS ON CULTURE ............................................................. 16
VALUES AND BELIEFS ............................................................................................ 18
LEGAL SYSTEMS AS A PRODUCT OF CULTURE ............................................... 20
RELIGION .................................................................................................................... 24
CULTURAL REGIONS ............................................................................................... 29
CULTURAL INDOCTRINATION .............................................................................. 34
CULTURE SHOCK AND ADAPTATION ................................................................. 38
DEALING WITH STRESS .......................................................................................... 47
CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION ............................................................... 50
NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION ......................................................................... 56
COMMUNICATION WITH ILLITERATES .............................................................. 60
TOPICS TO APPROACH WITH SPECIAL CAUTION ............................................ 61
FINAL TIPS ON COMMUNICATION ....................................................................... 61
CHAPTER 2 DEALING WITH COUNTERPARTS .................................................. 63
POLICY AND RELATIONSHIPS............................................................................... 63
HUMAN RIGHTS AND MISCONDUCT ................................................................... 66
CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS ................................................................................... 67
INITIAL CONTACT WITH HOST NATION FORCES ............................................. 81
EVALUATING HOST NATION FORCES ................................................................. 84
CONTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS ................................................................... 87
CULTURAL AWARENESS IN ACTION .................................................................. 95
INSURGENCY ............................................................................................................. 99
ROLE SHOCK............................................................................................................ 105
ON A POSITIVE NOTE ............................................................................................ 112


AND JOINT ENVIRONMENTS................................................................................. 115
NEGOTIATION ......................................................................................................... 115
CROSS-CULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS ................................................................... 119
THE INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT ................................................................. 132
ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) ..................................................................................... 141
THE JOINT ENVIRONMENT .................................................................................. 162
APPENDIX 1 WORKING WITH U.S. AGENCIES ................................................. 169
CONSIDERATIONS IN INTERAGENCY COORDINATION (FROM JOINT PUB 308) ............................................................................................................................... 169
INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS .............................................................................. 170
DIRECTION AND COORDINATION AGENCIES ................................................. 171
U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ........................................................... 180
APPENDIX 2 EMBASSY ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION ........................... 187
THE AMBASSADOR AND THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION .......................... 187
THE COUNTRY TEAM ............................................................................................ 188
SOF SUPPORT TO U.S. AMBASSADORS ............................................................. 196
APPENDIX 3 LEGAL ISSUES ................................................................................... 201
APPLICABLE BODIES OF LAW ............................................................................. 201
LEGAL AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS .............................................. 202
TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS. ................................................................................... 207
INTERNET RESOURCES ......................................................................................... 213
APPENDIX 4 MEDIA RELATIONS.......................................................................... 215
MEDIA KIT ................................................................................................................ 215
USE OF THE MEDIA ................................................................................................ 215
COMMUNICATING WITH THE PRESS................................................................. 215
PSYOP AND CA FORCES ........................................................................................ 219
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ........................................................................... 219
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ......................................................................... 223
DEFENSE (FID)............................................................................................................ 227
APPENDIX 7 ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE RAPPORT ..................................... 233
DEFINING RAPPORT ............................................................................................... 233
ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE RAPPORT ............................................................... 233

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERPRETERS .............................................................. 237

USE OF INTERPRETERS ......................................................................................... 237
PROBLEMS WITH TRANSLATION ....................................................................... 239
PROBLEMS WITH PRONUNCIATION .................................................................. 240
PROBLEMS WITH WORD CHOICE AND MEANING ......................................... 240
PROBLEMS WITH SLANG, IDIOMATIC EXPRESSIONS ................................... 241
SELECTING AND USING AN INTERPRETER ..................................................... 241
CULTURAL COMPETENCY IN HEALTHCARE .................................................. 247
BELIEFS AND PRACTICES..................................................................................... 248
PATIENT ADHERENCE ........................................................................................... 252
GROUPS ..................................................................................................................... 254

REFERENCES............................................................................................ 283


This Reference book is intended to provide a problem solving ready reference for SF
soldiers assigned as advisors or liaisons. It is a practical aid for use in training for,
planning, and conducting these missions. It provides introductory material and tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP). The Reference book should be used with appropriate
doctrinal and training publications as a tool for professional development and training of
SF soldiers, mission planning, or during mission performance.

This Reference book is limited to basic information and specific techniques useful to SF
soldiers in the roles of advisors or liaisons. It is not a comprehensive reference book or
training guide for any specific doctrinal mission. When applied appropriately, the
information and techniques are applicable to relationships with foreign or U.S.


Special Forces (SF) doctrine does not classify advisor, combat advisory assistance
or cross-cultural liaison as primary missions. Instead, these roles are derivative of, or
have evolved from, the capabilities SF soldiers developed as part of the traditional
primary missions of UW, FID and multilateral DA and SR. All of these primary
doctrinal missions require SF soldiers to function as advisors or liaisons. From the SF
soldiers UW role as a combat advisor to indigenous or surrogate forces; to his role when
supporting FID; to the advisor/liaison functions required for a Special Operations
Command and Control Element (SOCCE) in support of conventional forces; to providing
coalition partners with Special Forces Liaison Elements (SFLEs); the number of
occasions when SF soldiers now perform as advisors and/or in a liaisons has continually
grown and gained visibility.
The success SF has enjoyed as advisors and liaisons is directly attributable to the crosscultural skills demanded by the primary SF missions. The capability of SF soldiers to
perform effectively as advisors and liaison personnel in multinational, joint, interagency,
and interdependent environments represents an increasingly important and unique
contribution. As such, it is likely that SF will act in these roles with increasing
frequency. The following sections provide an overview of the development of SF as
advisors and liaisons through UW, COIN, FID, and Coalition Warfare, describing the
peculiarities of each mission or environment.

Beginning with SFs roots in the OSS Jedburgh Teams of World War II, SF soldiers have
been cast in the role of advisors. Despite the evolution and expansion of the UW
concept, UW is still primarily conducted with, by, and through surrogates. Early UW
focused on guerrillas operating in non-permissive environments. Working with
guerrillas, SF soldiers (and their predecessors) were necessarily without institutional or
positional authority and had extremely limited leverage. They were often required to
establish their credibility and demonstrate that their contribution to the surrogate force
exceeded the risks associated with their presence. Success frequently depended on strong
cross-cultural skills and the skillful use of persuasion to influence outcomes and ensure
personal survival. These vital skills and abilities are alien to the structured and
hierarchical conventional military culture. This ability to assert influence absent
authority continues to distinguish SF advisors and liaison personnel. The evolution of
new strategic scenarios with differing environments and a full menu of surrogates have
not diminished the value of these skills.


During the Cold War, SF used their UW skills from Viet Nam to El Salvador. Their
knowledge of guerrilla warfare was important in creating a preeminent role for SF in
these counterinsurgent operations, but their UW derived advisory skills were equally
important. U.S. doctrine recognizes that long-term victory in an insurgency cannot be
externally imposed but must be accomplished through legitimate indigenous governments
and forces. Although these COIN environments were more permissive than World War II
UW, and the security of the U.S. advisor less dependent on the indigenous force, the
ability to leverage counterpart cooperation was still difficult and of critical importance.
While coercion may cause surrogate forces to perform a specific action, it can never lead
to institutionalization of proper conduct and legitimacy. Lasting, long-term success can
only be achieved through the patient application of influence. Operations in El Salvador
provide an example of SF advisors applying mature COIN doctrine. With minimal
leverage and extremely restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE), SF advisors played a key
role in defeating the communist insurgency working with, by, and through their
Salvadoran military counterparts.


In order to operationalize the understanding that solutions to internal problems must
come from internal institutions, the U.S. developed the concept of FID for support to
nations faced with internal instability. This is an interagency concept that stresses U.S.
support as part of an indigenous program designed to counter the causes of instability
(e.g. lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency). SF soldiers, because of their unique skills
and relatively small footprint, have become the mainstay of U.S. military participation in

FID. This is recognized by the assignment of FID as a primary SF mission. SF soldiers

contribute to a FID effort principally through actions as advisors and trainers and their
ability to function in the interagency. Application of their UW-derived and COIN-honed
cross-cultural communications and advisory skills has elevated SF to a position of
prominence in global U.S. FID efforts. Their unique ability to promote positive
outcomes while serving as advisors has been key to their success.


The Post Cold War era has reduced U.S. reliance on standing alliances. But it has created
a reliance on coalitions. These coalitions present unique challenges in generating unity
of effort and may be characterized by distrust among members. The member nations are
often reluctant to surrender autonomy to a single chain of command. To facilitate
operational integration and enhanced control of these coalitions, Special Forces Liaison
Elements (SFLEs) have been employed with non-U.S. military organizations. These
liaison elements possess the skills to advise and influence coalition units and enhance the
control exercised by the coalition command structure. SFLEs also and facilitate
operational integration of the total force. While technical (e.g. communications) and
tactical (e.g. coordination of air support) capabilities are instrumental to their success,
none of this would have been possible if not for SFs cross-cultural and advisory


The cross-cultural communications capabilities required to perform as an effective
advisor to a foreign counterpart can be described in three levels. The lowest level is
awareness, followed by knowledge. The highest level is reached when these two are
combined with well-trained and refined skills.

Awareness of cultural differences and their impact is the first requirement for successful
work with a counterpart. Simply being sensitive to the fact that differences exist and
carefully observing actions and responses can assist the SF soldier in adjusting his
behavior and modifying his actions to achieve greater influence with his counterpart.
Awareness is the lowest level of cross-cultural capability. It is not region specific, and
can be learned by SF soldiers with relatively little training.

Knowledge of the details and nuances of a specific target culture is the next level of
cross-cultural capability. This second level is attained through a combination of
academic study and immersion. Such knowledge is inherently area specific and does not
transfer from one target area/culture to another. Developing the in-depth area or regional

knowledge necessary for effective cross-cultural communication requires an extensive

and time-consuming training regimen supported by appropriate personnel assignment

The highest level of cross-cultural capability is the combination of awareness, knowledge
and the specific skills fundamental to effective cross-cultural communications. While
some individuals may have greater natural talent for these skills than others, all SF
soldiers require continual training to achieve and retain their full potential as advisors to
foreign counterparts.

Professional Competence. Given the nature of SF missions, professional

competence is critical to personal credibility. Without this credibility, advice is
likely to be disregarded. Demonstrated professional competence in one area leads
to the presumption of competence in other areas, including some that are not
directly related. SF soldiers performing as advisors require at least the following
competencies: technical and tactical expertise, command and staff processes,
theory of conventional and unconventional warfare, soldier skills (marksmanship,
map reading, etc.) and personal fitness. Training programs should stress these
subjects and relate them to the SF soldiers target region and culture.

Language. Language is fundamental to cross-cultural communications. The

greater their proficiency in the local language, the more easily, quickly, and
accurately SF soldiers can communicate. Complete, timely, and accurate
communications are fundamental to mission success. A level of proficiency that
permits the advisor or liaison to understand nuances and inferred or implied
messages vastly enhances cross-communication. Proficiency in the use of an
interpreter can be substituted for language ability, but no matter how skillfully
employed; this always diminishes the capability to effectively and confidently
communicate. Both language proficiency and use of an interpreter require
significant training.

Non-verbal Communication. Deliberate use of non-verbal communication

(gestures, posture, positioning, etc) can be taught. Use of non-verbal
communications together with culture specific knowledge enhances verbal
communication and understanding. Incorrect or improper use of gestures or other
non-verbal signals can inhibit communication, destroy relationships, and even
cause missions to fail. While simple awareness of the impact of non-verbal
communications gives some level of preparation to the SF advisor, detailed
regional and cultural specific training in their use is essential. Since most nonverbal communication occurs spontaneously and subconsciously, repetitive
practical exercises should be integral to any SF training program.

Negotiation. Most advisors and liaisons lack institutional or positional authority.

They must negotiate effectively with their counterparts (often from a position of

extreme weakness) to persuade them to take desired actions. The skill of

negotiation is addressed extensively in Chapter 3.

Interpersonal Skills. Interpersonal skills are effective techniques used to establish

cordial and mutually respectful relationships between two or more people. Such
techniques are employed in face-to-face settings, whether one-on-one or in small
groups. They include tact, tolerance of individual idiosyncrasies or cultural
norms, conversational skills, personal hygiene, and courtesy. Training in
interpersonal skills requires formal instruction but is easily integrated into training
designed to accomplish other objectives.

Observation. Advisors depend on their ability to observe and interpret their

environment, including their counterparts actions and responses. Noting details
of the setting and activities framing an exchange with a counterpart as well as
noting the nuances of his or her response can provide a degree of understanding
that leads to mission success. Recollection of such details and nuances facilitates
post encounter analysis intended to improve comprehension of what has occurred
and to enhance communication and influence during the next exchange. Other
cross-cultural skills such as negotiation also rely heavily on the ability to observe
accurately and comprehensively. Like interpersonal skills, training in the
techniques of effective observation and recollection lends itself to integration into
other training.

Problem Solving. Advisors and liaison personnel must develop and use keen
problem solving skills. Templates or solutions developed in advance are seldom
adequate in these dynamic and unpredictable circumstances. Accepted U.S.
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures must be adapted and articulated in
culturally acceptable and supportable terms. Problem solving skills and
confidence in ones own problem solving abilities improve significantly with

Leadership. Basic leadership skills, properly adapted to the counterparts culture,

are very effective. Emphasis, however, should be on peer leadership techniques.
Leadership techniques based on positional authority or other forms of coercion
are of limited use to advisors and generally have long-term negative effects. SF
soldiers must be trained to employ leadership techniques appropriate to their role
as advisors and to specific regions and cultures.

Instructional Techniques. Advisors and liaisons must be competent in both

formal and informal methods of instruction. Once again, these methods must be
carefully analyzed and adapted based on cultural norms and practices. An
emphasis on informal methods of instruction, particularly those that are (or appear
to be) cooperative and that mutual learning are most effective in cross-cultural

Fitness. Physical skills and personal fitness can be critical to personal and
professional credibility. Fatigue diminishes perceptiveness, impairs thought, and
impedes cross-cultural communication. Physical training programs are readily
adaptable to the requirements of a given target culture and region.

Region Specific Skills. As knowledge of a given culture is developed, certain

activities or capabilities may emerge as critical to cross-cultural communications
and effective counterpart relations. For example, some level of proficiency in a
popular local sport may help establish interpersonal relationships. Soccer is an
example of widely played sport, other examples include horseback or camel
riding, swimming, trapping, or even singing or dancing. Small investments in
skills seemingly unrelated to the military mission can provide high returns in


Military operations are rapidly evolving beyond the categories of joint, interagency, or
multinational toward interdependency. Interdependent operations require near
seamless integration of agencies representing all the elements of U.S. national power
(political, economic, military, and informational). This same degree of integration must
be extended to include external organizations including, but not necessarily limited to,
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), and the
agencies representing the various elements of power in partner states. Special Forces
advisors and liaisons commonly operate in complex joint, multinational, and interagency
environments. They are generally more experienced in integrating the diverse
participants in interdependent operations than are their conventional counterparts. The
negotiating and cross-cultural skills that enhance their performance as advisors are well
suited to the complex interrelationships that characterize such operations. Operating in
the seams between these interdependent actors has uniquely suited SF to enable
interdependent operations. The advisory and liaison skills resident in SF soldiers largely
account for their effectiveness.
The following are considerations for SF soldiers engaged in interdependent operations.
Organizational relationships are often misleading and must be negotiated. The actual
interrelationships between and within organizations seldom follow a line and block
diagram. Instead, they are heavily influenced by circumstances, personalities,
perceptions, and resources. All relationships and lines of authority are subject to
negotiation. SF soldiers must understand that the definition of roles, functions, and
responsibilities is a continuous process. Each statement or action sets precedents for
future interrelationships.
SF soldiers must approach any external organization in the same manner as they would a
foreign counterpart. Every organization has a unique culture. SF soldiers must research

and accommodate organizational differences, biases, and approaches. Even other military
services all have unique perspectives that lead to significant differences in objectives and
approaches to various problems. Other Government Agencies (OGAs) also have distinct
characteristics. These characteristics, if not recognized and accommodated, can create
distrust and friction resulting in disruption and disharmony during critical operations.
For example, the Department of State (DoS) internal organizational process has been
described as a culture of negotiation. This leads to selecting the current situation as a
start point, focusing on the process of negotiation, and leaving the details of an end
state to be determined through the negotiating process. Compare this with the
traditional U.S. military approach of defining an end state and then backward planning,
resourcing and sequencing actions over time to achieve a predetermined objective.
Similarly, each IO or NGO has its own unique culture. Apparent similarities (e.g.
common language, sociological backgrounds, citizenship, etc) can lead one to overlook
the very real differences that can very quickly impede synchronization.
Avoid over compartmentalization. As expressed in the SO Imperatives, Balance
security and synchronization. Avoid initiating distrust by being overly secretive.
Careful risk assessment must be continually conducted to avoid compromise, however
the perception that critical information is shared relatively openly is necessary for
harmonious operations. Non-military agencies often complain that military elements
constantly demand information but provide little.
Perceived commonality of language is often misleading. This can create a situation where
what you think you said (or heard) is not what they think they heard (or said). Each
organization possesses jargon and places its own interpretation on key words or phrases.
Learn these and use them correctly. Body language is equally important. What one
organization perceives as poise and collegiality another may be interpret as slovenliness.
Formalities accepted in one organization as normal courtesy another might view as rigid
and limiting. Dont automatically adapt the other organizations norms, but be cognizant
of the impact those norms have on its members interpretation of your words and actions.
Personal contact is the most effective way to bridge organizational barriers.
Organizational barriers are very real, but the prejudices that arise from them are
exacerbated by misunderstanding and ignorance. It is too easy to attribute negative
attitudes and hostile motives to faceless groups. The SF soldier must employ superior
interpersonal skills and deal directly and closely with individual members of other
organizations. This kind of contact can effectively reinforce commonalities and
diminish the impact of differences. These personal relationships are the key to effective
inter-organizational relationships.


This Reference book contains three chapters and nine appendices. The three chapters
provide SF soldiers with the foundation needed to be effective advisors or liaisons in any
environment or during the conduct of any mission. The first two chapters, Working
Across Cultures and Working With Counterparts, are directed at working with foreign

(surrogate) counterparts. Notice is given, however, to the concept of viewing other (e.g.
members of U.S. government agencies or other Services) as counterparts from distinct
cultures. The principles contained in these chapters are useful in all forms of
interdependent operations. Chapter 3, Negotiations and Interdependence, presents
generic how to negotiate information first. A section follows on cross-cultural
negotiation (in the context of dealing with foreign (surrogate) counterparts). Subsequent
sections facilitate application of generic and cross-cultural negotiating techniques to the
Interagency, IO/NGO, and Joint Service environments.
The nine appendices may be used as stand-alone references and are designed to assist in
dealing with specific issues related the role of an advisor. For example, an SF soldier
preparing to operate in a liaison or advisory capacity that requires interface with a U.S.
embassy could review Appendix 2, Embassy Organization and Functions, to prepare for
his mission. The appendices also contain information to facilitate further research into
the topics covered in this Reference book. For example, Appendix 10, Internet
Resources, provides a list of useful websites that expand on the information in this text.


Purpose: This chapter introduces the concept of culture, its importance and its application
to the advisors mission. It further emphasizes the importance of cultural awareness and
cross-cultural communication skills.

Culture should never be taken for granted or overlooked in pre-mission planning or area
assessment. SF soldiers travel to many countries and experience varied cultures. Prior
knowledge of cultural differences will aid in building effective relationships and prevent
embarrassment, loss of rapport and mission compromise or even failure due to culture


SF teams and advisors often occupy a very sensitive position. The commander is the
direct representative of the U.S. government. In many situations, the commander and his
team must be diplomats as well as military advisors.
Special Forces soldiers need to study cultural issues because of the truth of Special
Operations Imperative #1: Understand the Operational Environment. Special operations
missions require soldiers to deploy OCONUS and operate in foreign countries where they
work with indigenous populations whose language and culture is different from our own.
Special Forces soldiers derive their effectiveness in large part from their ability to
understand and work with foreign counterparts. This ability depends on cultural


Culture is the set of opinions, beliefs, values and customs that defines the identity
of a society. It includes social behavior, language, and religion.

Culture is a learned behavior. Food is a basic need that is not based on culture;
but what we eat, how we cook, how we eat, and when we eat are all learned from
our culture.

Culture is adaptive. The customs that a group develops are based largely on a
particular environment.

Culture is integrated into all facets of an entire society. It is neither a random

jumble of quaint customs nor a laundry list of dos and don'ts that a traveler should

The physical environment and mass media are two of the strongest driving forces
in changing a culture. Opinions change quickly, beliefs more slowly and basic
values even more slowly.

Note: Statements made in subsequent sections about particular groups of people are broad
generalizations. Although these generalizations are believed to be valid, the intention is
not to create stereotypical images of different groups. It is always wise to acknowledge
the uniqueness of individuals and subgroups in analyzing a foreign culture.


There is much disagreement about the concept of "culture" and any definition is part of
an ongoing discussion about what "culture" should mean. However, most analysts agree
that, briefly put, culture consists of the socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts,
institutions, and all other products of human work and thought. Culture is the beliefs,
values, customs, traditions and behaviors that have been passed down through
generations. It conditions the way people think, act, eat, dress and more. It defines a way
of life.
People learn culture. That is probably culture's essential feature. Many qualities of
human life are transmitted genetically -- an infant's desire for food, for example, is
triggered by physiological characteristics determined within the human genetic code. An
adult's specific desire for milk and cereal in the morning, on the other hand, is a learned
(cultural) response to morning hunger. The idea that some foods are breakfast foods
and not appropriate at other meals is a product of culture but can have a strong effect on
individual behavior. Culture, as a body of learned behaviors common to a given human
society, acts like a template, shaping behavior and consciousness within a human society
from generation to generation. All learned behavior is to some degree determined by
culture, including our choice of which behaviors to learn.
The concept of a shaping template and body of learned behaviors can be further broken
down into the following categories, each of which is an important element of cultural

Systems of meaning, of which language is primary.

Ways of organizing society, from kinship groups to states and multi-national


The distinctive techniques practiced by a group and the characteristic products of

these techniques.

Several important principles follow from this concept of culture:

Meaning systems consist of negotiated agreements members of a human society must
agree to relationships between a word, behavior, or other symbol and its corresponding
significance or meaning. To the extent that culture consists of systems of meaning, it
also consists of negotiated agreements and processes of negotiation. Because meaning
systems involve relationships that are not essential and universal (the word "door" has no
essential connection to the physical object, we simply agree to call that object a door
when we speak or write in English), different human societies will inevitably arrive at
different relationships and meanings; this a relativistic way of describing culture.
If the process of learning is an essential characteristic of culture, then teaching also is a
crucial characteristic. The way culture is taught and passed from generation to generation
is an important component of culture.
Because the relationship between what is taught
and what is learned is not absolute (some of what is taught is lost, while new innovations
occur constantly), culture is in a constant state of change. For most of human history,
this change has been quite slow, taking place over a period of many years in a series of
slow-motion accommodations to new circumstances. However, in recent times a number
of rapid cultural changes have been introduced. The attempt to assimilate these rapid
changes often creates stress, tension and sometimes violence.


What does it mean to say that culture is, in part, "a system of meanings" that governs the
way a group of people understands its learned behaviors, its systems of organization and
production, even conditions its reactions to the physical environment?
The environment is the foundation of culture. The Bedouins of the Arabian deserts are a
classic example of how environment shapes culture. In a constant search for water, the
Bedouins have evolved culturally as nomadic herders of camels and goats. The nomadic
nature of their society conditions much of their belief system, their social structure and
even their diet. Arguably it also conditions their concept of war as a series of raids and
skirmishes since a nomadic people cannot sustain positional warfare. The desert people
use camels for almost everything, from transportation, to milk, to food, to beasts of
burden, to wool for clothing, even racing camels for entertainment. In fact, camels are a
unique cultural icon of the desert people.
Why do we say that culture resides in the meaning system and not in the particular set of
opinions, beliefs and values?
The distinction is an important one. Learned culture is like a lens that filters all the
information we receive. Most importantly, it helps us decide which information is
important and what it means. The system of meanings that constitutes a culture can
dramatically influence the way we perceive and make sense of the physical world around
us. Information passes through this lens of culture and is filtered, or interpreted, into a

recognizable pattern that has meaning. Our perspectives in regard to the environment
around us are a good example of this. The same physical object or environmental
element can have widely divergent meanings when perceived through different cultural
filters as a symbol or sign.
The ancient Chinese felt the weather was solely dependent on the behavior of the people.
This led to a belief in harmony with nature, with the balance of rain and sun, yin and
yang. Though thousands of years old, this belief still exists.
Rain: A physical event with diverse cultural meanings.
The way cultural meaning governs a group's understanding of its physical environment
can be illustrated with the example of how the physical event of rain is interpreted in two
different cultural traditions.
In the Judeo-Christian cultural tradition, rain served as tool of God's wrath. Angered by
the behavior of his people, God sent forty days and forty nights of rain; the only survivors
were the favored family of Noah and the pairs of animals that found refuge on the ark.
While in other biblical narratives rain functions as a blessing, this Old Testament story is
one of the best know parts of the Bible and familiar to almost everyone in the Western
world. Consequently, it has been very influential in establishing the place of rain and
storm imagery in the cultural meaning system. One result of this system of meaning is
that rain images like thunder, lightning, wind, and flood tend to symbolize ominous
things like anger, danger, and hardship in cultures that descend from the Judeo-Christian
tradition. Examples of this effect can be found throughout Western legends and
literatures. From Shakespeare's The Tempest to a variety of modern literatures, the
association of rain with danger and calamity has been a consistent theme in the West
European and Euro-American storyteller's imagination. Hence, when weather forecasters
predict rain, they do so apologetically; when we are in the "eye of the storm," we are
surrounded by danger; when we are in "the calm before the storm," something ominous
and bad is about to happen. The physical event of the rainstorm, as perceived through
this particular cultural lens, tends to mean or symbolize something negative.
This is not the case in all cultures. In the Anasazi culture, for example, rain was held to
be sacred. The Anasazi lived in the Four Corners region of the desert southwest, an arid
high-desert environment. Reliant upon the winter snow in the mountains to feed streams
and springs throughout the year, and reliant on spring rain showers to supplement their
strenuous irrigation efforts, the Anasazi culture came to view rain as a gift from the Rain
God. During winter storms, Anasazi spiritual leaders thanked the Rain God for the water
that they knew would accumulate in the mountain snowpack. In the spring and summer,
they prayed and conducted ceremonies to honor the Rain God in hopes of gaining favor
and the precious gift of water. As a result of this system of meaning in which rainfall
symbolized the benevolence and generosity of the natural world, Anasazi legends and the
literature of the cultures that grew out of Anasazi tradition tend to represent rain in a
positive way.


Even today, however, traditional systems of meaning like those of the Anasazi exert
influence over Native Americans, not only in their prayers and literature but also in their
behavior and attitudes toward the earth. These systems of meaning operate as a filter,
giving significance and meaning to group members' perceptions of the physical world
around them.


The baseline definition of culture said that learned behaviors are an essential component
of culture.
Learned behavior in this sense can mean almost anything, from the way we dress to the
way we speak to the food we choose to eat. Whenever we brush our teeth, cross our legs,
send our parents a birthday card, kiss someone, listen to music, or choose a form of
recreation we are practicing learned behaviors that are a part of our culture. These
learned behaviors include all of the following (and many more):

Behavior toward/around specific people: family members, lover/spouse, teachers,


Authority figures (military superiors, police officers, etc.)

Behavior in small social groups

Behavior in large social groups

Eating and food preparation


Behavior involving the home: building, maintenance, cleaning


Culture doesn't just reside in these behaviors. In many cases the behavior tells us less
about a culture than the meaning that is attached to it. For example, some citizens of both
Holland and the U.S. smoke marijuana; however, the significance of that behavior is
much different in Holland, where marijuana is legal, than in the U.S., where it is not.
Some New Yorkers hunt, but the significance of hunting to them is very different than it
is for Eskimo cultures above the Arctic Circle.
The meaning systems that provide the context for learned behaviors overlap broadly with
the meaning systems that constitute a society's values and beliefs. This can be illustrated
by the meanings assigned to various forms of recreation in American society. Recreation

is not only a set of pleasant pastimes but also has meanings and associations attached that
go well beyond the simple activity itself.

Polo: upper-class participants (including royalty), wealthy, primarily male

participants, associated activities include fox hunting.

Skateboarding: blue- or white-collar participants, primarily teen or pre-teen

males, associated activities include hanging out in shopping malls.

Golf: primarily white-collar participants, male and female participants, associated

activities include conducting business while playing.

Bowling: primarily blue-collar participants, male and female participants,

associated activities include gambling, smoking, and drinking beer.

Gymnastics: white-collar or upper-class participants, primarily young female

participants, associations include the young age of the competitors and the
Olympic games.


One characteristic of human societies is that they tend to become increasingly organized.
Small-scale systems, or "micro-systems", of organization include such units as the
family, a system that, arguably, is present even in some non-human societies. Other
micro-systems might include living groups, work teams (e.g. an infantry squad), or
communal groups that share tasks and products among themselves.
As societies become larger and more advanced, large-scale systems, or "macro-systems"
of social organization usually develop.
As larger and larger groups of people cluster into the small, centralized geographic spaces
of cities, the relationship of a person to their neighbor becomes increasingly important.
In order to live harmoniously in proximity, rules governing peoples conduct toward one
another become important. This need, among others, helps to provide support for the
institution of government; even governments that are established by invasion and
conquest can help to meet this need.
The progress of human civilization, regardless of how that progress is defined, depends
crucially upon advancement beyond subsistence-level activity. Such advancement
involves a number of factors: development of agricultural techniques, the improvement of
technology (typically through the development of metallurgy), the ability to record
knowledge in writing, etc. All of these factors benefit from the specialization of human
production, one person can specialize in the spinning of cloth, another can specialize in

making soap, and another can invest the energy and time in becoming literate and
recording important information in writing. Specialization, however, means that most
members of society are producing for other members, rather than simply meeting their
own needs for subsistence, they are creating products to exchange with their peers. This
increased emphasis on exchange typically leads to development of increasingly complex
economic systems; systems governing the way products are exchanged between members
of society.
With specialization and the interdependence it creates, a society incurs the need to
produce specialized skills to meet the needs of the group. If, for example, there is a
tremendous societal need for metal products but too few metal workers to meet that need,
society as a whole suffers. In order to produce the specialized abilities it needs to keep its
interdependent system functional, a human society will usually organize an educational
system of some sort. Organized education is an important aspect of cultural
development, sustainment and reproduction. While the "universal" education systems
found in many countries today are a comparatively recent development, education has
long existed in the form of apprenticeships and other mentoring relationships.
These are a few examples of how human societies organize themselves. These systems
of social organization grow out of the culture of which they are a part, and at the same
time their emergence changes the culture by becoming a part of it. The systems a society
devises (or has imposed on it) to organize itself become a part of the system of cultural
meanings in which they operate. In U.S. culture, the basic governmental premise is that
all people are created equal and can advance according to their own merits. The U.S.
economic system allots a certain value to each person's productive role and so citizens are
to some degree judged by the outward tokens of their advancement and value: material
possessions like houses, cars, clothes, and leisure pursuits. The organizational systems
are, in this sense, inseparable from the cultural meaning systems; one cannot fully
understand one without understanding the other.


As noted earlier, when cultures evolve into civilizations, one of the systems of social
organization that typically develops and grows in complexity is government. Formal
government, or the "state," is most often associated with city civilizations whose
economy developed to the point where many specializations could be supported and
where there existed a level of technology in which metallurgy has been discovered.
As a part of this process of city growth (that in turn results from sustainable agriculture)
and technological development, social hierarchies emerge with identifiable elites; the
complexities of life in the larger community require a state organization. The power of
the elite often finds expression in building projects and monumental architecture.
The full causes of state formation are not entirely understood and probably consist of a
number of factors working together to create a need for more organization for a specific

purpose or purposes. One important factor may be competition among human

communities for space and resources as populations grow in specific regions; the groups,
that organize most effectively to improve their own conditions or to defend themselves,
gain an important advantage over their neighbors. Another factor may be specific
challenges or opportunities in the environment for example, a dry but fertile flood plain
that supports wide-scale food production when irrigated.
How to establish that the rule of the group or individual in power is beneficial, right, and
necessary, or at least unavoidable, is a problem for elites in all societies. Rulers often, for
example, attempt to establish a cultural association between the ruler's position and the
values of the dominant local religion.

Variations in Government
Unlike the federal system of the United States, many countries have only a single central
government and all governmental entities are extensions of it. Generally, such
governments have three levels, a national government, several regional entities (e.g.
states, cantons, districts, sectors or provinces) and a number of municipalities. The
regional and municipal levels have no independent authority and may not, for example,
levy taxes or have budgets. Each level is an administrative extension of the next higher
level. The fact that members of local government are locally elected does not make them
independent of the national central government, which exercises its authority through the
sector or province.
Likewise, military authority may or may not be exercised directly by the central
government. In some cases the mid-level governmental chief or even the senior
municipal authority may have military command authority. In other cases the military is
largely independent of civilian control at any level.


Here are fifty basic questions about a target country and culture. They are not intended to
be an inclusive list. An SF advisor will think of many more as he attempts to answer
these. Nevertheless, when he has the answers to the following fifty, he may consider
himself well beyond the initial stage of cultural awareness.
Go through the list now and write down the answers to as many as you can. Return to the
list periodically both as a guide and as a check on your progress.
1. How many people who are prominent in the affairs (military, politics, athletics,
religion, the arts, etc.) of your host country can you name?

2. Who are the country's national heroes and heroines?

3. Can you recognize the national anthem?
4. Are other languages spoken besides the dominant language? What are the social and
political implications of language usage?
5. What is the predominant religion? Is it a state religion? Have you read any of its
sacred writings?
6. What are the most important religious observances and ceremonies? How regularly
do people participate in them?
7. How do members of the predominant religion feel about other religions?
8. What are the most common forms of marriage ceremonies and celebrations?
9. What is the attitude toward divorce? Extra-marital relations? Plural marriage?
10. What is the attitude toward gambling?
11. What is the attitude toward drinking?
12. Is the price asked for merchandise fixed or are customers expected to bargain? How
is the bargaining conducted?
13. If, as a customer, you touch or handle merchandise for sale, will the storekeeper
think you are knowledgeable, inconsiderate, within your rights, completely outside your
rights? Other?
14. How do people organize their daily activities? What is the normal meal schedule? Is
there a daytime rest period? What is the customary time for visiting friends?
15. What foods are most popular and how are they prepared?
16. What things are taboos in this society?
17. What is the usual dress for women? For men? Are slacks or shorts worn? If so, on
what occasions? Do teenagers wear jeans?
18. Do barbers and hairdressers use techniques similar to those used by hairdressers in
the United States? How much time do you need to allow for an appointment at the barber
or hairdresser?
19. What are the special privileges of age and/or sex?
20. If you are invited to dinner, should you arrive early? On time? Late? If late, how
21. On what occasions would you present (or accept) gifts from people in the country?
What kind of gifts would you exchange?
22. Do some flowers have a particular significance?
23. How do people greet one another? Shake hands? Embrace or kiss? How do they
leave one another? What does any variation from the usual greeting or leave-taking
24. If you were invited to a cocktail party, would you expect to find among the guests:
military people from the local forces? Officers, NCOs or both? Foreign business
people? Men only? Men and women? Local business people? Local politicians?
National politicians? Politicians spouses? Teachers or professors? Bankers? Doctors?
Lawyers? Intellectuals such as writers, composers, poets, philosophers, religious clerics?
Members of the host's family? (Including in-laws?) Movie stars? Ambassadors or
consular officials from other countries?
25. What are the important holidays? How is each observed?
26. What are the favorite leisure and recreational activities of adults? Teenagers?
27. What sports are popular?

28. Is television an important influence? What kinds of television programs are shown?
What social purposes do they serve?
29. What is the normal work schedule? How does it accommodate environmental or
other conditions?
30. How will your financial position and living conditions compare with those of the
majority of people living in this country?
31. What games do children play? Where do children congregate?
32. How are children disciplined at home?
33. Are children usually present at social occasions? At ceremonial occasions? If they
are not present, how are they cared for in the absence of their parents?
34. At what age are children considered adults? How does this society observe childrens
"coming of age? "
35. What kind of local public transportation is available? Do all classes of people use it?
36. Who has the right of way in traffic; vehicles, animals, pedestrians?
37. Is military training compulsory?
38. Are the largest circulation newspapers generally friendly in their attitude toward the
United States? Radio and TV broadcasters?
39. What is the history of the relationships between this country and the United States?
40. How many people have emigrated from this country to the United States? Other
countries? Are many doing so at present?
41. Are there many American expatriates living in this country?
42. What kinds of options do foreigners have in choosing a place to live?
43. What kind of health services are available? Where are they located?
44. What are the common home remedies for minor ailments? Where can medicines be
45. Is education free? Compulsory?
46. In schools, are children segregated by race? By caste? Or class? By sex?
47. What kinds of schools are considered best: public, private, parochial?
48. In schools, how important is learning by rote?
49. How are children disciplined in school?
50. Where are the important universities of the country? If university education is
sought abroad, to what countries and universities do students go?
Adapted from a list developed by Joan Wilson, Foreign Service Institute, U.S.
Department of State.


This section introduces values and beliefs as a basic component of culture and discusses
their significance.


Beliefs can be said to take two forms: values, which are very strong beliefs and not
usually susceptible to change and ordinary opinions or beliefs that are less strong and
usually easier to change.

Values are general moral conclusions about the way life should be lived. They reflect our
strongest, most personal beliefs and are difficult to change. They are drawn in part from
faith, the childhood environment and in part from life experience. They lend shape and
order to our lives, helping us to decide if we've settled on the right actions, words,
behaviors, friends, mates, leaders, religions, and careers.
Opinions are immediate conclusions about some aspect of the environment. They are
usually quite specific and susceptible to change.
Values and opinions are very important because they guide the way we deal with the
world around us. Values are deeply held beliefs about rightness (how things ought to be).
Often they are not articulated and may not even be consciously held but this often makes
them all the stronger. Value systems can also be internally contradictory.
There is also a tendency for cultures to believe that their internal values are universal, that
everybody knows right from wrong. People who do not accept these values are seen as
perverse, evil or deluded.
The SF advisor may be required to work with a counterpart whose value system differs
from his own. Time spent trying to change a counterparts basic values is time wasted
and is very likely to create permanent resentment.
It is important to have some understanding of a counterparts value system. Values are
usually non-negotiable since they are basic rules about what is right and wrong. In
dealing with a counterpart who has a value conflict it is usually best to persuade him or
her that whatever you are advocating is not really in conflict with their values.
Examples of Values: Twenty Basic American Values
Hard Work

Physical Power
Timely Action
Physical Appearance
Preparation for the Future
Pleasant Presentation of Self


The systems of values and opinions that are characteristic of a culture overlap
significantly with the other components of culture. These systems determine the cultural

significance of even a recreational pursuit like bowling (in the learned behavior
component), and how religious belief systems can intertwine with systems of social
organization like political government.
Opinion/value systems overlap so much with these other components of cultural systems
largely because opinions and values play such a pervasive role in culture. In our baseline
definition of culture we suggest that it consists essentially of learned behaviors and the
template-effect by which a growing, changing culture is passed on from generation to
generation. Beliefs affect virtually every learned behavior; the metaphorical template
consists to a significant degree of belief systems. Thus, these systems are a central
component of the larger cultural systems in which they exist.
Belief systems involve stories, or myths, whose interpretation can give people insight into
how they should feel, think, and/or behave. The elaborate polytheistic mythologies of the
ancient Greek and Roman civilizations are a good example of how belief systems can
affect the daily life of a society's members and the role they can play in giving
significance to people's actions. The most prominent systems of beliefs tend to be those
associated with formal religions; however, any system of belief in which the
interpretation of stories affects people's behavior, a system of superstitions, for example,
can be a living, contributing component of a given society's culture.
A value system differentiates right feelings, thoughts and behavior from those considered
wrong. Value systems can and very often do grow out of larger belief systems. For
example, the value system behind American Good Samaritan Law (a law that protects
off-duty medical personnel from being sued for malpractice when they assist someone in
an emergency) is a direct descendant of the Christian belief system, a belief system
whose story of the Good Samaritan gives the law its name. However, other value
systems, those governing incest, for example, appear to exist independently of formal
belief systems.
Religion is a very important source of values and well worthy of study in trying to
understand a foreign value system. Religious myths include an enormous amount of
cultural information for and about the community. Typically, they explain the why life is
the way it is and at the same time suggest the values that the community holds dear. The
values that are most prized within a system of religious beliefs are often most prized by
the cultural system associated with that religion; these values in turn affect the culture's
systems of social organization, their learned behaviors, and their relationship to the
physical environment.


This section explains that legal systems are the product of culture and can vary widely. It
also gives basic information on the most important world legal traditions. It is intended
to make the reader aware that the U.S. legal system and its underlying tradition are not

One of the major influences on a society is its legal tradition. It is often hard for
Americans, who are raised with a vivid awareness of their own adversarial legal system,
to understand that this is a product of our culture and by no means the only, or even the
principal, legal system in the world. Although cultural regions may share a legal system,
as Western Europe and Latin America share the civil law system, the applications can be
quite different.
For example, traditional criminal and civil justice systems in Latin America do not use
adversarial courtroom proceedings to render judgments. Instead, appointed judges act as
prosecutor, defense attorney, judge, and jury. Written testimonials are gathered, the
parties concerned submit other documentary evidence, and the judge, with no imperative
for expeditious processing, eventually renders a decision. As a result, defendants often
languish in jail awaiting trial or judgment unless they can bribe their way out. The
decision making process is usually secretive, and judges may never be held accountable
for their judgments. Indeed, there is often no way to determine how judges arrived at
their verdicts.
It was not until 2001 that the legal system in Bolivia began to take the initial steps toward
implementing such concepts as the full presumption of innocence, public trial by jury, the
hearing of oral evidence in open court and a system of prosecutors that is separate from
the police.


There are three major legal traditions in todays world: civil law, common law, and
Islamic law. A fourth tradition, socialist law, is less widespread.

The civil law system is the dominant legal tradition in Western Europe, Latin
America, and the former French, Belgian, Portuguese, and Spanish colonies in
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. It originated in Roman law, and as such, it is
the oldest of the principal legal traditions.

The common law system dates back to the Norman conquest of England and the
Battle of Hastings in A.D. 1066. Because of the expansion of the British Empire
during the age of colonialism, common law was widely distributed in the United
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the former British colonies in Africa
and Asia.

Islamic law is based on rules Muslims believe Allah (God) gave to Mohammed in
610 AD. Mohammeds statements and actions during his life help explain the
law. Islamic law governs most countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and
Southwest Asia.

A fourth, less pervasive or deeply rooted tradition is that of socialist law. The
socialist law system began at the time of the Russian Revolution in 1917. It is
based on the then existing civil law systems in the USSR and Eastern Europe.
Socialist law governs the republics of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba.

The major differences between the civil law and common law systems are:

The civil law system places a far greater emphasis on the separation of powers
between the legislative and judicial branches of government than does the
common law system. Only the legislature can make law; the judiciary merely
applies it.

Codes in the civil law system are raised to the level of dogma. They are designed
to be complete, coherent, and clear, eliminating any need for judicial

The judges function in the civil law system is a mechanical, perfunctory one. He
is regarded as a super clerk whose only mission is to simply apply the law as
established by the legislature.

The interpretation of statutes is not a function for the civil law judge.
Theoretically, if statutes are complete, coherent, and clear, there should be no
necessity for judicial interpretation. However, this is more of a myth than a

The common law adherence to the doctrines of Equity and Stare Decisions is
rejected by the civil law system. This is so because all law is made by the
legislature, not the judicial branch. To do otherwise would allow the granting of
broad discretionary powers to the judiciary.

The major codes in the civil law system are:

The two most imitated and influential codes in the civil law system are the
Napoleonic Code of 1804 and the German Civil Code of 1900.

The five sub-codes used in the civil law system are the penal code, the civil code,
the commercial code, the code of civil procedure, and the code of criminal

Civil and criminal procedures in the civil law system are distinguished from those in the
common law system as follows:

A typical civil proceeding in the civil law system has three stages: the preliminary
stage, the evidence-taking stage, and the decisional stage.

No right to a jury trial exists in the civil law system for civil actions.

A public prosecutor is present at a civil proceeding as a representative of the

public interest. Punitive damages are not awarded in a civil proceeding. An
appeal includes the right to a reconsideration of the facts as well as the law.

In a criminal proceeding, there are also three stages: the investigative stage, the
examining stage, and the trial.

In a criminal proceeding, the accused is entitled to a presumption of innocence

and a trial by jury.

The jury in the civil law system consists of lay judges or lay assessors who rule on
the guilt or innocence of the accused and, as appropriate, the sentencing of the

The socialist law system:

The essential elements of the socialist law system are political, economic, and

The authority of the working masses must be established in the image of the
socialist party.

Private property is capitalistic and must be abolished; there must be no private


The Marx-Leninist view of world developments and inevitability of revolution

must be accepted.

Islamic law has the following characteristics:

Islamic law is broader than western legal systems. It is a comprehensive code of

public and private behavior known as Sharia.

Islamic law tends to focus on punishment, not rehabilitation like civil and
common law.

There has been little development of Islamic law since the sixteenth century.
However, most Islamic nations use a hybrid system accommodating modern

society while leaving Sharia law pure.

The laws of Allah are unchangeable. They are very conservative and slow to

Judges have broad discretion and are religious scholars.

This section describes the general nature of religions and their importance for the Special
Forces advisor.

Religions play a major role in other cultures.

Analysis of an AOs religions is vital to mission preparation.


Religion is a sub-part of culture. Religion is more than just a belief in a deity. It is a
philosophy and a way of life. It can define who you are, how you view the world around
you and how you interact within it.
At its most basic level, religion is both the individual and communal expression of
contact with a supernatural force(s). While individual practice is important, most
religious people choose to form groups with others of similar beliefs. These groups
exercise an important influence on society. Religions provide some of the answers to the
basic questions that individuals and groups face, such as: Who am I? Why am I here?
and What is the meaning of life? It helps people make sense of the events and issues of
their world. Most religions provide explanations for human suffering, natural disasters,
broken relationships, inequality between mankind, and death. Religions provide a
perspective that describes life beyond the grave or this worlds experience.
In every society, people have searched for "the meaning of life. The attempt to
understand why things happen has been an ongoing epic that has shaped the world's
beliefs and values, and continues to do so today. The ancient civilizations of Greece and
Rome believed in several hundred deities that controlled every aspect of life that led them
to create countless volumes of mythology. Early American Indians had similar beliefs
that spirits enchanted both animate and inanimate objects. The American Indians had a
highly developed and disciplined code of conduct so as not to anger the spirits. This

code profoundly affected their way of life and it would be impossible to understand their
culture without understanding these beliefs.
All societies have some variety of religion, a set of sacred beliefs and rituals that control
the members of that society by providing a common understanding of and basis for moral
codes and right conduct. Things like moral codes dictate correct actions that seem both
natural and right because they are explained and justified by myth, ritual, and the
approval of the other members of the society. Not all religions have a supernatural basis.
Marxism-Leninism is often cited as a secular belief that has all the salient characteristics
of religion including the demand for faith. Likewise, some contemporary forms of
environmentalism are hard to distinguish from very old forms of earth worship, including
the existence of priesthood and the recognition of the Earth as god-like. If a society is
left alone long enough, beliefs and customs become harmonious and interdependent.
These concepts seem to lose their influence as changes become rapid and frequent. One
contemporary social problem is the break-down of common understandings, especially
moral understandings.
In simple agricultural communities, such as those of the aborigines of the northern
Philippines, everyone tends to do part of all the essential things and all tend to have
similar views of life. Anything one man or woman does is much like what another does.
In such societies, every man performs the same rituals for the security of his crops and
for his inner well-being. The ideas of gods and of good and bad conduct are substantially
the same for every person in the community. Therefore, when a student of such a society
gets to know one adult in the community, he knows a lot about all the others.
In complex societies, where the division of labor is high, no one person does more than a
small part of the necessary tasks. The people who participate in this division of labor are
not homogeneous, as is the case in a self-sufficient primitive society. No man
understands it all. The ideas and understandings of any one member, adapted though
they are to their current mode of life, do not have the completeness of interrelationship
that is characteristic of the habits and custom of people in self-sufficient, primitive
Religion is an integral part of culture and therefore good mission preparation and analysis
examines the religions and religious groups of the area of operation for a given mission.
Most of the people in the world practice a religion and many take it very seriously.
Religious beliefs, leaders, and institutions are central elements of many peoples
worldview. It makes sense to assess the impact of religion on the population among
whom we intend to conduct our mission.
There are many world religions. Each is different in its system of beliefs, number of
adherents, sphere of influence, etc. Each of the following six categories or dimensions
is common to most faith traditions.


Doctrine. The systematic collection of teachings of a faith tradition is doctrine.

Doctrine permits religious groups to reference their beliefs and pass them on to others. It
gives a body of teaching that can be communicated to the next generation. The
monotheistic traditions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) have a lot of doctrine. These
traditions are dependent on sacred texts as primary bases of authority. Other belief
systems, such as animism, have little if any formal doctrine.
Myth. In religious studies the term myth does not carry any overtone of untrue or
fairy tale. The term myth is used to describe the narrative stories of a faith tradition
that capture truths of common beliefs among the believers of that faith tradition. Most
religions have myths that explain the essence of their beliefs. While some myths appear
simple and primitivethey are very effective in passing on the primary content of faith
traditions. Stories serve as effective vehicles to remember truths and events.
Ethics. Moral codes and ethics provide faith traditions with justification of their
prohibitions for certain actions or beliefs. All groups need boundaries to govern their
participants and moral codes serve as fences within religions. Ethics are technically
the deliberate justification of how a group labels certain actions as moral or immoral.
Religions provide the basis for the ethics that make certain actions as wrong and others
Ritual. Religions usually have sacred (holy, separate, special) space, time, people,
things, and events in worship. Religions attempt to affect transactions between humans
and the supernatural force(s). Rituals are the evidence of these transactions and contact
between people and the supernatural. They represent the collective and accepted ways to
negotiate all sorts of transactions. They are repeated in sequence and kind for continuity.
Sacred persons and symbols have power and value within faith traditions.
Experience. Individuals and groups report that their religious traditions provide vivid and
lasting experiences with the supernatural force(s). Participants believe with conviction
that they experience the supernatural and also transcend this worlds limitations to
travel to heights of knowledge, bliss, insight, and understanding. Many traditions offer
trance-like escape from this worlds problems to experience a temporary exposure to the
realms beyond this world.
Social. Religions help individuals understand/explain the supernatural. Religious
traditions unite individuals into groups and institutionalize their collective faith in social
formsorganizations, congregations, and hierarchy. As individual or collective
participants, the followers of religious traditions impact society with force.
Individual Impact. Religions impact individuals by helping to answer questions about
identity and purpose: Who am I? Why am I here? What is the meaning of life? These
questions of identity and purpose challenge ones perspective. Religions give ones
worldview a framework to answer these questions and also provide personal moral codes
for behavior. Religions may either provide a sense of hope or resignationbelieving the
world is changing for the better or worse.

Social Impact. Religions help to define community for subgroups of larger societies.
They provide the normative codes of conduct for members of their group. Religions can
legitimize or disqualify leaders of society based on their practices and personal lifestyle.
Religions can collect and maintain the scholarship of a culture. For many ethnic groups,
religions and their institutions provide stability in the midst of social change and shifting
Economic Impact. Religions have much to say about how their adherents use their
resources. Participants are challenged to care for those less fortunate and to support
collective efforts to spread their beliefs. Religions impact taxation, banking, and
employment practices by dictating acceptable and prohibited forms of work, levels of
profit, etc. Religious tenets are considered in the formation of international agreements,
and often influence foreign economic policy.
Military Impact. Religions may describe acceptable military conflicts, military service,
and how to treat non-combatants or enemy prisoners-of-war (EPWs). Religions enable
groups to view their enemies and conflicts as mandated by god(s) or required in their
obedience to god(s). Many conflicts arise when groups are not permitted to practice their
beliefs without restriction. Religions help to define the reasons why and when certain
conflicts are just. So-called Just War theory, for example, arises from Christian
Political Impact. Religions impact society and influence the rise or fall of political
leaders, policies, and issues. Even in the U.S. where the Constitution mandates
separation of church and state, politics and religion do mix, as elsewhere in the world.
They may not mix well, but the impact of religion on politics is evident in every culture.
Societies struggle with the need to permit religious expression without promoting every
religious group as valid. In many countries one may compare the dominant religion with
less influential religious groups within a society. Political elites may practice a religion
different from that followed by most of the population. Leaders often face scrutiny from
religious groups for their beliefs and practices. In some nation-states religious groups
form political parties and are awarded seats of representation in the parliamentary
governmental bodies based on number of adherents.

Special operations soldiers can analyze the religions and religious groups of an area of
operation by remaining objective and keeping an open mind. It is important to draw
from ones experience but not make judgmental conclusions that reveal an attitude of
superiority. SF soldiers can analyze the interaction of religious groups within and
beyond a given culture / society. When this analysis is done properly, they can brief the
commander on the impact of religion on the mission and the forceand sometimes
project how local indigenous groups might receive our forces or policies.


It is suggested that religious area study begin with a review of the history of the
predominant region(s) in the region and the area of operation. Attempt to trace the
growth, influence, and changes that religious groups have made during major periods of
history: pre-20th Century (ancient through colonial era, and rise of Industrial Age); 20th
Century (World War I), Post World War II, recent decades, and finally the present crisis
that calls for an SF mission. Attempt to understand how religious groups have weathered
social movements, world wars, and the post-colonial creation of nation states. It is often
possible to categorize the winners and losers by religious groups, bearing in mind
that religious conflict with a violent dimension is not only virulent but also long lasting.
This historical perspective can help us understand positions taken by religious groups and
leaders involved in the current situation.
The religious area study should include several categories or factors that Special
Operation soldiers may use to compare and study religious groups in the area of
operation. These factors include the following:
Background: Attempt to determine which religion(s) are truly indigenous and those
introduced to the area of operation by peaceful migration of traders, through conflict, or
conquest or intentional missionary efforts.
Leadership: Determine how the leaders of a religious group are selected, trained,
ordained, rewarded and disciplined. Congregations are led by leaders that have been
trained and given a body of tradition to share. The centers of learning, base of support,
and missionary efforts of religious groups provide important clues about their political
and social agendas. Charismatic leaders have caused groups to revolt and act on religious
impulse to conduct acts of terrorism.
Organization: Determine the levels of hierarchy for the religious groups. Establish the
chain-of-command for religious leaders, particularly those involved in negotiations or
making pronouncements. Describe the links between leaders and followers, leaders and
other leaders, and groups and other sub-groups. Are these links formal or informal?
What kind of discipline is imposed on ordinary members of the group? Do cell groups
meet without direction or are meetings controlled and scheduled? Determine the ties
between schools and other centers of learning and religious leaders
Response To Society: Sociologist Max Weber describes two types of responses to society
that religious groups adopt. Some groups may choose to control the society to which
they belong. These responses may include: religious movements; secret societies; social
protest movements; and political parties. The other type of response is characterized as
withdrawal. These responses include: symbolic separation (subculture) and intentional
segregation (commune). A groups theology or beliefs may dictate whether they select
responses that call for active resistance or passive reform.
Obligations: What kind of obligations does the religion place on its adherents? Such
obligations might include compulsory worship, contributions of time or money,


missionary work, dietary rules. Are these rules suspended in times of war or military
Response To Minority Groups: Ted Robert Gurr identifies four major types of societal
responses to minority groups: Containment; Assimilation; Pluralism; and Power Sharing.
These categories describe the varied attempts by those in power to pacify, neutralize, and
divide minority groups within society.
Sites And Shrines: Identify the places of worship, sites of pilgrimage, memorial or
commemoration sites, cemeteries, and other locations of veneration. These buildings,
statues, and other shrines may be listed on a preclusion list for our forces to observe IAW
the Law of Land Warfare. The list also keeps our forces informed of possible locations
of rallies, paths of pilgrimage or migration, and sensitive areas where enemy forces might
attack for maximum psychological effect. Since SF may be the only U.S. forces in the
area, such a listing could be invaluable.
Calendar: Note the normal and regular days of worship or observance. Identify special
holy days of festival, feast or fast, celebration, or service. Note those festival and
observances that spend normal activity. Determine special anniversaries that mark
religious conquest, defeats, or reconciliation between groups and parties. Observe and
respect the different calendars used by different religions (i.e. start times for operations
and negotiations described in several calendar dates).
Tolerance: Determine how tolerant leaders or the group are of other groups that operate
in their base of support; members who exhibit bad behavior; and conversion of members
to other traditions. Describe how difficult it is to join or quit the group. Do the beliefs of
the group reinforce tolerance or exclusion toward those that differ? What is the impact of
individual conversion or initiation on the family unit, especially if others choose not to

This section explains cultural regions and their importance.


The concept of cultural regions is generally accepted. There is, however, some
disagreement about exactly what comprises each region. For present purposes it is
presumed that there are eight cultural regions in the world. Countries and peoples within
each region tend to have similar governments, economics, languages, religions, social
organizations, populations, and resources. The eight regions are:
1. United States and Canada
2. Southwest Asia and North Africa

3. South and Central America including Mexico

4. Africa South of the Sahara
5. Europe including Australia and New Zealand
6. Pacific Rim excluding the Americas
7. Russia and the Independent Republics
8. Oceania (the Pacific islands)
The boundaries of these regions are not permanent or rigid. Although the countries of
Eastern Europe are clearly part of the European cultural region, their long domination by
the USSR gives them some characteristics more typical of Russia and the Independent
Republics. The eight regions listed above are often broken down in turn as sub-regions.
For example, South Americas sub-regions might be classified as Tropical-plantation,
European-commercial, Amerind-subsistence and Mestizo-farming. It is also possible to
have two large, distinct culture groups within one region or even one country. As an
example, South Africa has large populations of both European and sub-Saharan African
culture. The Aboriginal population of Australia is another example. Regions can also
be geographically discontinuous Australia and New Zealand are in the European
cultural region but are located half a world away from Europe. Some members attempt
to separate themselves from their cultural region Brazil is part of the South and Central
American culture region but Portuguese is the dominant language. Despite the cultural
continuities with surrounding nations, Brazilians do not perceive themselves as Hispanics
and may even take offense if addressed in Spanish.
Additionally, all cultural regions have marginalized sub-cultures that are often quite
different and distinct from the majority culture. Montagnards in Southeast Asia are an
example as are American Indians in the United States. Often ignored, or actively
persecuted by the local government, these subgroups may be particularly important to the
Special Forces advisor. Historically, Special Forces personnel have often found
themselves working with the members of such marginalized groups.
All of this is important because humans are social beings, and have throughout history
come together in groups. These groups have developed unique characteristics, and
experience teaches us that the more we understand about other people and places, the
more we can enrich our own culture and the less likely we are to blunder into conflict. As
the world becomes increasingly more accessible, special operations are becoming more
and more dependent on the ability of the special operations soldier to understand the rest
of the world.
The diagrams provided below are simplifications of the Kluckhohn Value Orientations
Method developed by Florence Kluchohn and Fred Strodtbeck of Harvard University,
two pioneers in the field of cultural anthropology. The diagrams are generally referred to

as Kluchohn Models. As presented here, they represent sweeping generalizations about

very large regions; but never the less, they do capture some of the basic cultural
differences and similarities among cultural regions.


Cultural Components Matrix
Human Nature

Relation of Man to
Sense of Time
Social Relationships

Basically Evil
Man Subjugated by
Past Oriented
Being (stress on
who you are)

Beliefs and
Mixture of Good
and Evil
Man in Harmony
with Nature
Present Oriented
Growing (stress on
Group Oriented

Basically Good
Man is the Master
of Nature
Future Oriented
Doing (stress on

The "dimensions" of the standard Kluckhohn Value Orientations Method, with their
respective ranges of included variation, are:
Mastery Over: The individual or group can and should exercise total control over the
forces of nature.
Harmony With: The individual or group can and should exercise partial but not total
control by living in a balance with the natural forces around them.
Subject To: The individual or group cannot and should not exercise control over these
forces but, rather, is subject to the higher power of these forces.
Past: The temporal focus is on the past (the time before now), and in preserving and
maintaining traditional teachings and beliefs.
Present: The temporal focus is on the present (what is now), and in accommodating
changes in beliefs and traditions.
Future: The temporal focus is on the future (the time to come), planning ahead, and
seeking new ways to replace the old.


Doing: The locus of meaning for self-expression is external to the individual, with an
emphasis on activity that is valued by both the self and sanctioned by others in the group.
Being: The locus of meaning for self-expression is internal to the individual, with an
emphasis on activity valued by the self but not necessarily others in the group.
Collaterality: Emphasis is placed on consensus within the laterally extended group.
Lineality: Emphasis is placed on hierarchical principles and deferring to higher authority
or authorities within the group.
Individualism: Emphasis is placed on the individual or individual families within the
group who make decisions independently from the others.


USA/Canadian Culture

Beliefs and

Human Nature

Basically Good But

Man is the Master
of Nature
Future Oriented
Doing (stress on

Relation of Man to
Sense of Time
Social Relationships


Africa South of the Sahara *

Human Nature
Relation of Man to
Sense of Time
Social Relationships

Basically Evil

Beliefs and
Mixture of Good
and Evil

Man Subjugated by
Past Oriented
Being (stress on
who you are)

Strongly Group

* Note that traditional societies tend to fall into two categories with regard to the nature
of man and social relationships.
Southwest Asia and North Africa *
Human Nature
Relation of Man to
Sense of Time
Social Relationships

Neutral &
Man Subjugated by
Past Oriented
Being (stress on
who you are)

Beliefs and

Man in Harmony w/

Moderately Group

* Note that these cultures fall more-or-less equally into two contradictory classifications
with respect to mans relation to nature.

Pacific Rim
Human Nature
Relation of Man to
Sense of Time
Social Relationships

Beliefs and
Mixture of Good
and Evil
Man in Harmony w/
Future Oriented
Being (stress on
who you are)

Group Oriented

Russia and the Independent Republics



Beliefs and
Basically Neutral &

Human Nature
Relation of Man to
Sense of Time
Social Relationships

Man Subjugated by
Present Oriented
Being (stress on
who you are)

South and Central America including Mexico

Beliefs and
Human Nature
Mixture of Good
and Evil
Relation of Man to
Man Subjugated by
Sense of Time
Present Oriented
Growing (stress on
Social Relationships Authoritarian
Weakly Group

Beliefs and

Human Nature
Relation of Man to
Sense of Time
Social Relationships

Basically Good
But Changeable
Man Subjugated by
Present Oriented
Being (stress on
who you are)

This section illustrates the value of cultural orientation and gives suggestions for a
cultural indoctrination program.



The value of cultural indoctrination is best introduced through a sample of quotes from
participants in various operations. They emphasize the need for cultural indoctrination
and sensitivity training in special operations and especially counterpart relations.
"You have to learn about the country's history, the customs, the way of life... things that
make the country tick... then you can deal with them appropriately... effectively negotiate.
You can't go in there and expect them to do things your way, the Army way or the U. N.
way! If you show you understand, respect their way and treat them fairly, they'll be very
easy to, well.... negotiate with. You'll win their trust."
"You need to be able to go somewhat native to be functionally effective in a community.
Understanding the nuance when a Croat calls someone a 'Chetnik or the 'Gariaroh'
[Central America] when he says 'I fight on this volcano till I get my 5 hectares promised
under the land reform program'. You don't have to be sympathetic in terms of being
politically inclined to their view but you have to be able to absorb why they are fighting "
"Many people didn't understand why the Khmer (Cambodians) hated the Vietnamese.
After all, didn't they liberate Cambodia from Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge? The
animosity, the fighting has been going on for centuries... if you don't understand why
there's hatred, this not knowing is a very dangerous thing. When you're helping the
Vietnamese, the Khmer are looking at you and thinking, he's pro-Vietnamese!"
"Honor and 'face' mean everything to these people. The volume and tone of your voice...
you could 'lose face' quickly if you lost your patience with an interpreter or got overly
emotional about anything. The respected Buddhist way was to be calm, gentle, a low
tone in your voice..."
"Knowing when to bow, where to place your hands, the marks of respect... when you
gained the confidence of villagers they would show you the hazardous areas. They would
start sharing information about troops in the area, weapons seen... I felt it was because
they trusted us."
Culture determines our perception of the world around us. The way different
cultures view their surroundings varies from place to place. Some common areas
that have the greatest variation of viewpoints areFamily
Individual versus group
Personal Space

Gender roles

Like members of most cultures, our ideology leads us to see an ideal version of our own
culture rather than the one that really exists. For this reason, there can be a very large gap
between the U.S. culture we perceive and the one that other cultures see.
As a foreigner, we tend to view the host nation culture through the prism of our own
idealized culture. This creates a large gap between the culture we see and the host
nations real culture. There is an even larger gap between the culture we perceive and the
idealized version of the local culture that the local populace sees.


The general 'theme' of this program is to enable the SF soldier to earn the trust of the
local people by demonstrating an understanding and sensitivity towards their culture. A
summary of training recommendations is provided below.
Recommended content for cultural indoctrination:

Comparison of cultural values (American to those of the mission area; social


Local customs and traditions (e.g. greetings; do's and don'ts);

Geopolitical history (pre-colonial to contemporary; the orientation of each

faction/party); and

The role of religion in daily life.

Implications of cultural awareness training:

Gaining acceptance and trust;

Maintaining a neutral perspective (avoid stereotyping; awareness of bias);

Gaining cooperation during investigations and information gathering sessions and

Avoiding embarrassing or potentially dangerous situations.

Training Resources:

Guest speakers native to the country of interest (e.g. Non-Government

Organization (NGO) staff; foreign students, recent immigrants; selected

Others who have worked in and/or studied the mission area (e.g. SF personnel,
diplomats and scholars).

Training format:

A combination of briefings, small group discussions, and question and answer


Handouts to augment speakers but not to replace them; and

Visual media, specifically slides and/or videos of the mission area.

An awareness of the mission area's cultural aspects will significantly enhance the
advisors effectiveness. An extensive study program is the most helpful, but even a
concise program (approximately one day) is worthwhile if it gives good basic coverage of
the target culture. Credible speakers with personal experience in the country of interest
are best. Also, to be most effective, the training process should be dynamic (e.g. small
group work, discussion panel) and move beyond the standard lecture/handout format.
The vast majority of those with operational experience stress the importance of cultural
indoctrination training. Non-military U.S. agencies, such as the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) have developed intercultural effectiveness programs
designed for their personnel working overseas. These can often be tailored for military
and para-military groups. If available, these are an excellent resource for pre-deployment
Note: It is possible to try too hard to absorb everything about a new culture or country,
producing effects similar to culture shock, although the subject individual(s) may have
never left their home station.






















This section discusses the concept of culture shock, its impact, how to recognize it and
the importance of adaptation in dealing with it. Suggestions are provided for training to
minimize culture shock.


The term culture shock was first introduced in 1958 to describe the anxiety experienced
by people in a completely new environment. This term expresses the lack of direction,
the feeling of not knowing what to do or how to do things in a new environment, not
knowing what is appropriate or inappropriate. The feeling of culture shock generally sets
in after the first two weeks of arriving in a new place.
Culture shock occurs because the mind and body have to go through a period of
psychological and physiological adjustment when individuals move from a familiar
environment to an unfamiliar one. The cues received by all of the senses suddenly
change. During the day the foreigner is bombarded with unfamiliar sights, sounds, smells,
tastes, language, gestures, rules, requirements, interactions, demands, systems, and
Even during sleep in a new environment the brain continues to receive sounds that it does
not recognize, the nose continues to detect unfamiliar odors, the food features unfamiliar
chemistry, and even dreams likely contain new and unfamiliar features and characters.
The cumulative effect of all of these stresses is called culture shock, a period of
adjustment that lasts about six months for most people.
Culture shock is a psychological disorientation due to being in a new culture.
Broadly speaking, culture shock comes from:

Living and working for an extended period of time in a different environment.

Having values you held absolute brought into question because of cultural

Being constantly put into situations where you are expected to function with
maximum proficiency but where the rules have not been adequately explained.

Sooner or later individuals have to adapt to the new culture. There are two problems
with this first of all, the spoken rules of a culture (such as favored foods) may not be
simple or pleasant to adopt. However, the second problem, unspoken rules, is even
more difficult. The native members of that culture who know all the rules, especially the
unspoken rules, are generally not capable of articulating them - hence their name.
Sometimes visitors have to be pretty creative to extract basic critical information on why
it is important that things be done a certain way at one time and not at another. Another
problem is that local nationals have culture-based expectations that the foreigner doesn't
know about. These situations can and do crop up everywhere during first few months in
a new country. This is the major source of stress leading to culture shock. It comes from
knowing that there are multiple expectations affecting the individual at every turn without
knowing what those expectations are or how to fulfill them.
As the above suggests, culture shock does not result from a specific event. Rather, it
builds up slowly from a series of small events that are often difficult to identify.
Furthermore, the reactions are emotional and not easily controlled by rational
Some of the differences between life at home and life in a new place are obvious:





Educational system.

Absence of family and close ties.

Other differences are not as obvious:

How people make decisions.

How people spend their leisure time.

How people resolve conflicts.


How people express feelings and emotions, meanings of gestures, facial

expressions and other body language.

These differences cause feelings of uncertainty and anxiety. The body and mind may
react in unusual ways to the stress and confusion of living in a new culture. Some
common reactions include:

Irritability, even anger directed toward ones own group or organization.

Feeling isolated or alone.

Tiring easily.

Changes in normal sleep patterns (too much sleep, insomnia).

Suffering minor but persistent body pains, especially in the head, neck, back and

Hostility and contempt directed toward local people.

Withdrawal (i.e. spending excessive amounts of time reading or listen to music;

avoiding contact with host nationals).

Some people may experience more pronounced physical symptoms of stress, e.g. chronic
headaches or upset stomach.
Although uncomfortable, some degree of culture shock is a normal part of the adjustment


The individual:

Is very positive about the culture.

Is overwhelmed with impressions.

Finds the culture exotic and is fascinated by it.

Is largely passive, doesn't confront the culture.



The individual:

Begins to interact with the culture.

Finds the behavior of the people unusual and unpredictable.

Begins to dislike the culture/reacts negatively to the behavior.

Feels anxiety.

Begins to withdraw.

Begins to criticize the culture/people.


The individual:

Begins to understand more of the behavior of the people.

Feels more comfortable living in/encountering the culture.

Feels somewhat less isolated.

Regains his/her sense of humor.


The individual:

Enjoys being in the culture.

Functions easily in the culture.

Understands culture behavior that differs from his/her own culture.

Adopts appropriate behaviors.



Culture shock is described above in four stages. The first stage, the Enthusiasm/
Excitement stage is the incubation period. In this stage, the new arrival may feel selfconfident and pleasurably challenged. He or she may be pleased by all of the new things
encountered. This is the "honeymoon" period, when everything is new and exciting.
Typically, this will last about two weeks.
In the second or Withdrawal stage a person begins to encounter difficulties and minor
but annoying crises in daily life. It may be difficult to make oneself understood. The
situation encountered may not be as expected. Local nationals prove difficult to deal
with. In this stage, there may be feelings of discontent, impatience, anger, sadness, and
even incompetence. This happens when a person is trying to adapt to a new culture that
is very different. Transition between the old methods and the new is a difficult process
and takes time to complete. During the transition, there can be strong feelings of
The third Re-emergence/Adjustment stage is characterized by gaining some
understanding of the new culture. A new feeling of pleasure and sense of humor may be
experienced. One may start to feel a certain psychological balance. The new arrival may
not feel as lost and starts to have a feeling of direction. The individual is more familiar
with the environment and is better able to get along.
In the fourth stage, Achievement/Enthusiasm the person realizes that the new culture
has good and bad things to offer. This stage is one of integration as the person is
increasingly able to function in the new setting. A sense of accomplishment, a reduction
of routine annoyances and a more solid feeling of belonging accompany this integration.
Some analysts include a fifth stage called the "re-entry shock." This occurs when the
individual returns to the U.S. One may find that things are no longer the same. Things
have changed in the persons absence and many of the adaptations made at such a cost
are not suitable to life in America.
These stages can occur at different times in different people and each person has their
own way of reacting in the stages of culture shock. As a consequence, some stages may
be longer and more difficult than others. Many factors contribute to the duration and
effects of culture shock. For example, the individual's state of mental health, type of
personality, previous experiences, socio-economic conditions, familiarity with the
language, family and/or social support systems, and level of education all contribute to an
individuals particular reaction to culture shock.



Irrational anger
Gastrointestinal upset
Disruption of normal sleep pattern (excessive sleeping, difficulty sleeping)

Culture shock can be described as the physical and emotional discomfort one suffers
when coming to live in another country or a place different from the place of origin.
Often, the American way of life before is not accepted as or considered as normal in the
new place.
The symptoms of cultural shock can appear at different times. Although, one can
experience real pain from culture shock; it is also an opportunity for leaning and
acquiring new perspectives. Culture shock can make one develop a better understanding
of oneself and stimulate personal creativity.
More serious symptoms of acute culture shock mirror those produced by other forms of
stress but are more acute and persistent:

Sadness, loneliness, melancholy.

Preoccupation with health.

Allergy-like symptoms.

Changes in temperament, depression, feeling vulnerable, feeling powerless.

Anger, irritability, resentment, unwillingness to interact with others.

Identifying completely with U.S. culture or idealizing the U.S.

Loss of identity.

Unable to solve simple problems.

Lack of confidence.

Feelings of inadequacy or insecurity.

Developing obsessions such as over-cleanliness.

Longing for family.

Feelings of being lost, overlooked, exploited or abused.


The majority of Special Forces advisors have the training and the ability to confront and
overcome the obstacles of a new environment. One of the most important advantages is
familiarity with the language used in the new area. An ability to communicate in the new
culture, even at a very basic level, goes a long way to reducing and shortening the period
of adjustment.
Some other ways to combat stress produced by culture shock are:

Previous experience in the area.

Develop a portable hobby.

Be patient, the process of adaptation to new situations takes time.

Learn to be constructive. If you have an unfavorable encounter learn from it.

Dont put yourself in that position again.

Don't try too hard. Give yourself a chance to adjust.

Learn to include a regular form of physical activity in your routine. This will help
combat stress in a constructive manner. Exercise, swim, run or whatever is
appropriate to the area.

Relaxation and meditation have proven to be very positive for people who are
passing through periods of stress.

Maintain contact with your teammates. Pay attention to relationships in your

organization. This will give you a feeling of belonging and reduce feelings of
loneliness and alienation. They serve as support in difficult times.

Maintain contact with the new culture.

Improve your grasp of the local language.


If appropriate, volunteer in community activities that allow you to practice the

language and meet more people. This will help you feel less stress about
language and useful at the same time.

Accept the new culture; do not waste time and energy criticizing it. Focus on
getting through the transition. Try to think of one thing each day that is
interesting or likeable about this new environment.

Establish simple goals and continuously evaluate progress.

Find ways to live with the things that arent 100% satisfactory.

Maintain confidence in yourself, your organization and your abilities.

If you feel stressed, look for help.

If you do not like your new surroundings and find a lot to criticize, understand
that there are and there will continue to be uncertainties and confusion. Imagine
how a local resident might react to living in the U.S.

Observe how people in your new environment act in situations that are confusing
to you. Try to understand what they believe and why they behave as they do.
Avoid judging things as either right or wrong; regard them as merely different.

Remember the methods that have been successful in reducing stress in difficult
situations in the past and apply those methods to the present circumstances. For
example, exercise, take a long walk, or write a letter to a close friend or relative.
Try to see the humor in confusing or frustrating situations; laughter is often the
best medicine.

Accept the difficult challenge of learning to live and function in a new cultural
setting. Believe that you can learn the skills to make a satisfactory transition.
Gradually try to apply some of the skills you are learning.

Recognize the advantages of having lived in two different cultures. Meeting

people with different cultural backgrounds can enrich life. Share time with many
different people. Avoid having only American friends but maintain strong
personal ties to the U.S. Think about ways to help local residents learn how
Americans believe and act.

Acknowledge even slight progress in adjusting to the new culture. Recognize

that, like many who have adjusted to difficult and alien environments, you can
and will make a successful adjustment to the new culture.


Research and experience have shown that there are some personal skills and abilities that
greatly enhance the ability to function and adapt in a foreign culture.

Tolerance for Ambiguity.

Realistic Goal and Task Setting.

Open Mindedness.

Ability to Withhold Judgment.





Sense of Humor.

Warmth in Human Relations.



Strong Sense of Self.

Tolerance for Differences.


Ability to Accept and Learn From Failure.

Fortunately, many of these are characteristics already associated with the selection,
training and development of Special Forces soldiers. The most important characteristic
is perhaps a sense of humor. In dealing with foreign cultures there is often much to be
angry, annoyed or discouraged about. The ability to find humor in these things is the
most important means of mitigating them.



"I originally laughed at the idea of stress management... then, dealing with dead bodies,
dealing with people who'd had their heads hacked off with bayonets... breaking the news,
you know one lady - we had to tell her that every male member in her family had been
massacred. She just went completely to pieces in the room with us... l mean we had a
number of very, very, very stressful situations and I don't laugh at stress management
anymore. I think it's like CPR and first aid, you should be regularly updated - attend a
half-day... remember this is what you've got to watch, the people around you, that theyre
not getting the classic symptoms. And if people do, you have to get them the hell out of
there to a sympathetic place where they don't feel degraded or whatever... all the bits that
you've got to's a joke till you've been there."
A thorough discussion of the complex nature of stress associated with special operations
deployments is beyond the scope of this book. Nevertheless, a summary overview of
factors and experiences reported as stressful is provided along with training
recommendations to help address these issues. Discussion will begin by noting those
aspects of Special Forces experience that distinguish it from other extended deployments.


Features that may individually or collectively lead to stress-related problems include:

Working in a potentially dangerous environment where an atmosphere of

underlying tension is common. Sample contributing factors: local people in the
area of operations may have been killed or seriously injured; law, order and
respect for human rights may be minimal; hostile attitudes by local people may

Not being deployed or serving as a formed unit. Some teams deploy out of
country as a small group of individuals from various units. Once in theater
contingents may be further divided and deployed to different regions;

Being immersed in a foreign culture. Adapting to cultural differences exists both

in terms of adjusting to the actual culture of the mission area as well as that of the
varied local nationals one works directly with;

Facing challenging deployment of short duration outside one's normal experience

and terms of reference. The need to adapt and learn quickly is demanded of SF
personnel who are expected to be effective within a short time of arriving in

Psychological first-aid (i.e. personal and group approaches to dealing with mission
stressors) is fundamental to initial adaptation and effective ongoing performance.

Factors and experiences reported stressful by deployed personnel can be categorized

under two main headings:

Acute: being involved with or witnessing unexpected, abnormal situations or

incidents that are outside the realm of one's normal experience;

Chronic: experiencing day-to-day cumulative stressors that may arise from a

range of sources (e.g. environmental; interpersonal relationships).

The following quote gives an example of a situation experienced as highly stressful and
categorized as acute:
"We were to deliver this letter up river which outlined a proposed meeting with the
faction leaders of that region. Because of other problems we had no interpreter. As we
rounded a bend in the zodiac we suddenly came across six bad guys with AK47s, an
RPG and machine gun pointed directly at us. There were no smiling locals this time! We
slowly brought the boat alongside the riverbank to their position; I was bowing with my
hands held high, palms together (position of most respect) and was very scared. You
know, there was this fifteen year old with an AK pointed at my head! I scrambled
through my dictionary to find the words 'please-deliver-letter'..."
Other experiences included within this category involved:

Investigating massacres where women and children had been murdered;

Tending to emergencies and accidents involving serious injuries;

Being exposed to mutilated bodies.

Depending on the individual, a varying range of emotions accompanied these types of

experiences (e.g. anger, frustration, guilt). Although critical incidents of this nature were
not common to all, a number had experienced high stress situations characteristic of the
'acute' stress category.
The second major category referred to as chronic or cumulative stress should not be
overlooked in terms of its potential negative impact on such areas as performance and
"I found the biggest thing you needed was patience. It was very, very frustrating to wait
sometimes weeks for approvals and equipment that you knew was holding up patrols! It
was very slow...the bureaucracy...and then of course, trying to do jobs with other military
people who just didn't seem to care..."


Chronic factors include:

Environmental (e.g. adapting to extreme heat; sickness from food; different

cultural norms):

Restricted authority (e.g. lacking any powers of arrest where laws and
international moratoriums are being blatantly disregarded);

Bureaucratic (e.g. in theater administrative/procurement procedures; lack of

can do attitude among some international staff despite immediacy of problems);

Interpersonal (e.g. working on small, isolated teams with members not considered
team players; serving with those lacking commitment to the mission and/or
respect for the local people).

Special Forces operations carry with them a number of unique potential stressors in
addition to those normally associated with extended operational deployments (e.g.
repeated family separation). Sample quotes serve to illustrate some of these issues:
"We should have had a lot more... I hate to call it stress management; I get images of
listening to mood music. What I'm talking about is having tools for your team to deal
with stress. Team discussions, meetings... to talk about what we're experiencing on
patrols, where the tension's building up - this is what happened today, this is where it got
bad there was some shooting, how did it affect people. Your team needs to know what
it can do."
"I needed to talk to someone who understood what we were doing, what we were going
through. Someone who had been doing the same type of work, same problems... I couldn't
open up to them (personnel attempting to assist)... they'd never seen it, smelt it, felt it!"
(Experience referred to was witnessing the aftermath of a civilian massacre)


Gain awareness of unique potential sources of stress confronting SF personnel

(include mission-specific aspects as available);

Develop knowledge of individual/group signs and symptoms for both chronic

(cumulative) and acute (critical incident) stress;

Gain understanding of individual and team coping strategies and techniques (e.g.
contingency planning; post-patrol team discussions; after-action stress


Increased operational effectiveness due to enhanced potential to cope with various

in-theater stressors;

Individual and group stress-related problems recognized and addressed at an early


Development of healthier and more realistic attitudes towards stress (e.g. acute
stress symptoms are a normal reaction to an abnormal situation);

Enhanced cohesion and morale when the team is viewed and experienced as a
support net by its members.

Training process (format and potential resources):

Panel discussion in which selected personnel recount stressful aspects of previous

deployments and how they were addressed. A panel facilitator with expertise in
stress education can guide the discussion and highlight key teaching points;

Briefings that address each of the three content areas recommended above and
incorporate scenarios typical of the mission;

The inclusion of selected personnel (with relatively recent experience) to

accompany specialists in stress education will contribute to a more credible and
dynamic training process.

This section discusses some of the specifics of cross-cultural communication and gives
suggestions for improvement in this important ability.


Communication is simply the transfer of messages from one person to the next. These
messages are passed along verbally, written, or by signals. The sender encodes the
message and the receiver decodes it. The encoding is based upon the sender's history,
beliefs, values, prejudice, attitude, and preference.
The receiver decodes the message based upon his way of life, membership (rank),
worldview, status, language, social practice, and choice practice. Communication is a
two-way process in which the encoding and decoding process can affect both sending and

Effective communication occurs when the message is perceived and responded to in a

manner that the sender intended. Ineffective communication occurs primarily from ill
chosen words, poor timing, confused mixture of verbal and nonverbal signals, and poor
listening skills.

Differences in various cultures not only determine whom you talk to, but how and
when you talk to them, and often what you will talk about.

Many cultures rely heavily on nonverbal signals to communicate. Posture,

expression, and actions often say more than words or written expression.

Language is the ultimate communication barrier. An advisor should always

study, at a minimum, common phrases in the host nation's language.

There are several topics of conversation that should be avoided whenever

possible--religion, politics, personal questions, and ideology.


The basic elements of cross-cultural communication are very straightforward but they do
require some work on the part of the individuals involved.
Develop a sense of cultural awareness. First of all, be aware that you are from a different
culture. Learn all you can about the culture of the people with whom you need to
communicate. When communicating with people across cultures, you need to give up
ethnocentrism, that is the universal tendency to judge all other groups according to your
own group's standards, behaviors and customs and to see other groups as inferior by
comparison. Because different cultures have different ways of behaving and interpreting
behaviors you must learn to:
Recognize differences. Just because people do things differently does not mean that they
are inefficient or stupid. Being different should not be seen as negative. Show respect
for your counterparts.
Learn to adapt. Be flexible and ready to adapt and adjust your behavior, but do not
overdo your adjustment. Then you risk being perceived as insincere. Try to act in a way
appropriate to the target culture. Be yourself and show sincerity.
Be more tolerant. Because people of different cultures do things differently, you must be
tolerant of deviations from the norms things you may not be accustomed to in your own
culture. Remember that what may be the norm for you may not be the norm for those of
a different culture.



Five key aspects greatly affect communication across cultures:

Level of formality.

Level of directness and explicitness.

Perception of time.

Perception of the individual versus that of the group.

Show of emotion.

Most Asian cultures are on the high end of this continuum. In contrast, the North
American culture is on the low end of this continuum.
To a German, chewing gum while receiving a presentation may indicate that you are not
paying attention, translating into lack of respect and appreciation for the speaker. There
are times when such a behavior may even be construed as rude. That of course may not
be true as the Americans can sometimes be quite casual at work and the display of such
behaviors in the above context does not in any way indicate any lack of attention or good
manners on the part of the audience. However, even though they may be behaving in a
way that is acceptable in the North American culture, that behavior is unacceptable
elsewhere. To avoid such misunderstandings and animosities, it is important for us to
develop an understanding of how things may operate differently in other cultures.
Depending on their home culture, some people may be very direct and explicit in their
communication or very indirect and vague. The level of directness and explicitness
displayed in communication is determined to a large extent by culture.
Most people from the Asian and Middle Eastern cultures place a high reliance on shared
experience, non-verbal cues, and the context in which the communication takes place.
Consequently, they can appear indirect and vague in their verbal communication.
However in some countries, like the United States, Switzerland and Germany, people are
very direct, precise and explicit in their communication because they rely heavily on the
spoken word for meaning. Reliance on context is low; so is reliance on non-verbal cues.
Because of their style of communication, they may be perceived as too direct and overly


The indirectness that characterizes communication in some cultures is often a strategy to

avoid causing another person to lose face. It can be viewed as consideration for another
person's sense of dignity. However, in cultures that are direct and explicit in their
communication, this indirectness may be seen as dishonesty or insincerity, suggesting
that the speaker has something to hide.
In communicating with people from a culture that avoids directness and explicitness, it is
important to exercise extra care in what is said and how it is said so as to avoid
unintentional offense by being too direct. Very careful attention should be given to nonverbal cues, shared experience, and the circumstances within which the communication
takes place. The true or more accurate meanings of messages may actually reside in
some of those factors. On the other hand, when communicating with people from a
culture that is high in directness and explicitness, typical American directness is
It is also important that advisors and liaisons not be easily offended when confronted with
a degree of directness you are not used to. Bear in mind that in some cultures, this
directness is a technique used to achieve clarity. Be objective in listening to what they
say and remember that attacks on ideas are not personal and are not deliberately
embarrassing. Also, remember that in such cultures, reliance on context is low, so be
especially attentive to the spoken word since this is usually the main source of
Cultures also differ in their perception of time. Edward Hall, a prominent researcher in
the field of intercultural communication, coined the terms monochronic-time and
polychronic-time. In monochronic-time cultures (most Western countries), members
place a high emphasis on schedules, precise reckoning of time and promptness. In such
cultures, schedules take precedence over interpersonal relations. Also, because of this
urgency to keep to schedules, members try to get to the point quickly and may appear
rude or brash. In polychronic-time cultures, time is viewed as more fluid and members
do not observe strict schedules. In such cultures, preset schedules are subordinate to
interpersonal relations. Most Western countries are monochronic-time cultures whereas
most Asian countries, and some Latin American and Middle Eastern countries, are
polychronic-time cultures.
Knowing how cultures view time also helps in adapting to a new cultural environment.
As members of a monochronic-time culture; Americans need patience when
communicating with people from a polychronic-time culture for whom punctuality is not
important and in fact may be considered a negative trait.
Cultures can be characterized as either more individualist or collectivist in orientation.
An individualist culture is one in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone

is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family. In a
collectivist culture, people are integrated into strong, cohesive groups, which continue to
protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.
In an individualist culture, the individual is central and independence is highly valued. In
a collectivist culture, an individual is regarded as a part of the group and a high degree of
interdependence prevails among individuals in the same group.
In an individualist culture, a single person can earn credit or blame for the success or
failure of an organizational project. In a collectivist culture, however, credit or blame
goes to the group. In such a culture, individuals do not seek recognition and are
uncomfortable if it is given.
Cultures also differ in their expression of emotion. Members of some cultures tend to be
more expressive with their emotions and show their feelings plainly by laughing,
grimacing and scowling. However, in other cultures, members tend to be more repressive
and do not show their feelings openly but rather keep them carefully controlled and
Obviously, misunderstandings can occur when people from these two cultures are in
contact. People from the more expressive culture may view people from the repressive
culture as cold or unfeeling. On the other hand, people from the repressive culture may
view their more expressive colleagues as immature and eccentric. The advisor or liaison
must avoid snap judgments and display appropriate emotion in the interest of positive
The example below shows a method of analysis that may be employed in preparing for
cross-cultural communication. The example given is American and helps point up
common communication behaviors used by most people, often without being aware of
them. The elements analyzed below are common to all societies and will provide a
useful, basic understanding of some essential aspects of verbal communication.
Self-disclosure is the sharing of personal information and feelings between two or more
people. It is an important part of communication in the United States and is governed by
certain accepted practices. People are careful and somewhat wary about disclosing
information because it can make one sound weak or vulnerable. These are two traits
Americans do not see as desirable.
Usually, disclosure is mutual. People expect that, "If I share personal information or
feelings, you will also." It takes place gradually and the people involved must disclose at

the same rate for both people to be comfortable. Self-disclosure involves a high level of
trust between two people. This is because the particular information being shared is not
available unless the person who holds the information gives it.
It is best not to share personal problems when first meeting a new person or talking to a
casual acquaintance. For example, most Americans feel uncomfortable listening to a
person they do not know well talk about an operation or sickness the person has had
Most Americans do not appreciate intimate disclosures of a sexual nature either.
It is also important to know that, in general, both men and women in the U.S. are more
comfortable disclosing to women. This is not to say that women don't share private talk
with men or men don't disclose to other men. It is just that this society, historically, has
not encouraged men to express their feelings openly. Among men, it may be considered
a weakness to do so.
Preferred Topics of Conversation
This is sometimes referred to as "small talk." Americans prefer to talk about the weather,
sports, jobs, mutual acquaintances, and past experiences, especially ones in common with
their conversation partner. A few topics are almost forbidden. These include personal
income, the price of an item unless it is volunteered, and the age of an older adult.
Favorite Form of Verbal Interaction
In a conversation between Americans, participants take turns speaking frequently and
usually after each has spoken only a few sentences. No one speaks for very long at a
time. Americans also prefer to avoid arguments. If an argument is unavoidable, it is
carried on in a controlled tone and volume as in any other conversation. Ritual
conversations are kept to a minimum, basically "How are you?" "Fine, how are you?"
"Fine." "Nice to meet you." "Hope I see you again."
Depth of Involvement
"Small talk" is preferred. This usually consists of impersonal conversation with few or
no silent breaks. Silence causes the participants to feel uncomfortable.
Manner of Speaking
The American ideal is to be somewhat verbally adept, to speak in moderate tones and to
use few gestures.


Level of Meaning Emphasized

Americans, taught in the scientific method of understanding the world, look for specific
facts and physical or quantifiable evidence to support their viewpoints.
Americans don't normally extend themselves because they fear rejection by others. Many
Americans have also grown up without knowing much about other countries and other
people of the world. This can make them uneasy or defensive when dealing with
foreigners. Despite the fact that Americans seem to back off from others, they do value
those who approach them.
The short attention span of many Americans may also pose a problem. If Americans are
not interested, they just shut off. Another thing to keep in mind is that Americans are
talkers rather than listeners. The best way to get a conversation going is by asking
someone to talk about himself or herself.
The way a person listens is very important to Americans. Americans expect eye contact,
head nods, and verbal interjections like "Uh huh," "Hmmm," "I know," and so on. These
behaviors communicate interest and attention to Americans.
Discussion of in-group cultural rules and behaviors with outsiders is considered taboo
within many cultures. Americans are often made uncomfortable by such discussions
outside a professional setting.
Be aware of different rules for taking turns during conversations. Example: Some
Africans perceive interrupting another to reinforce or disagree with another's point to be
perfectly permissible. Americans may consider this rude.
Cultures may use different standards for loudness, speed of delivery, silence,
attentiveness and time to respond to another's point. Example: Some societies place high
value on contemplation. Therefore, they feel little responsibility to make immediate
responses during conversation.

The preceding sections have discussed primarily verbal communication. However, as
most people understand, gestures, facial expression, touching, eye contact and other nonverbal signals are an important part of human communication. These non-verbal cues
are sometimes referred to as body language.

Body language is unspoken communication through facial expressions, handshakes and
gestures, physical contact and body postures. There are many excellent books on the
subject. But these books usually discuss body language from a particular cultural

departure point. Body language and culture are inseparable and one can only properly
understand that language if one understands the culture from which it originates.
Body language and gestures are a product of custom and are just as important to
communication as spoken or written language. The wrong move, whether a seemingly
innocuous thumb's-up gesture or a two-finger peace sign, can upset a carefully nurtured
The basic survival gesture is the one that is absolutely universal and rarely misunderstood
the smile. But even though it is so ubiquitous, there are some little nuances across the
globe: The Russians are known for not smiling on the streets, the French accuse
Americans of smiling too much, the Japanese do not smile under formal circumstances,
like if they have their picture taken for their driver's license or a Christmas photo; in
Malaysia and Indonesia, they smile or even giggle when they are embarrassed or nervous.
The OK gesture with thumb and first finger is the single best-known gesture in the United
States. But in other cultures it means something entirely different, in the south of France
it means zero or worthless. In Japan, the same gesture is a symbol for a coin or money.
So you could theoretically have a discussion with a Japanese counterpart and make the
OK gesture and say, "OK, let's go ahead with the project. The counterpart could think
you were asking for a bribe. The most notable cases of misunderstanding concerning the
OK sign are Brazil, Germany and Russia, where it refers to the anus or the vagina.
When Richard Nixon visited Brazil in the 1950s, he got off the airplane and raised his
arms, making an OK sign with each hand. In 1991, when George Bush visited Australia,
he did the V for victory sign in the window of his limo, but unfortunately, his hand was
the wrong way around. In all the British Commonwealth countries, this is the bird, it
means "up yours."
Once in the country, become more aware of circumstances around you and what people
are doing, how they call a waiter, how they wave goodbye, watch their posture and their
body language or common gestures, tapping the side of their nose, or flipping the lobe of
their ear.
When Americans want to call a waiter, we put our hand up with just one finger. In Japan
that kind of pointing is frowned upon, but if you do, you point with a closed fist and a
thumb. All over Europe, if you want to beckon someone, you put your hand up and
outward, more horizontally and you make a scratching notion with your fingers, from
straight on to down. A come here gesture in the U.S. is made by sticking the index
finger up and curling it toward us, up and down. In places like Australia, Indonesia and
Mexico, this done only for animals and ladies of the night.
Personal relationships are very important. For most Americans, time is money. We
shake hands say, "How do you do?" and waste little time on pleasantries; we are taught
that it's desirable to act this way. Many counterparts complain that Americans are too
impatient. They want us to sit back and take it easy as they get to know us; they want to

build up a feeling of trust. To them, contact is between people not between governments
or organizations.

The space we maintain around our bodies reflects a desire to control who gets close to us
and under what circumstances. People who violate anothers interpersonal space without
consent are usually perceived as hostile or aggressive. Ideas about appropriate distance
vary from culture to culture and reflect the style and tone of the society at large. The
table below gives an idea of these variations. Although these guidelines are helpful, they
are just that - guidelines. They cannot be applied to all relationships or circumstances,
even within one cultural group. Middle Easterners of the same sex, for example, are
likely to stand close to each other but not members of the opposite sex.
Preferred Interpersonal Distance
Under 18 Inches
Middle Easterners (with same sex only), Mediterranean, and some Hispanic cultures
18 Inches to 3 Feet
Mainstream Americans and western Europeans
3 Feet or More
Asians (Japanese at arms length), many African cultures, Middle Eastern men with
women (they will tend to stand sideways to women)

Few other areas of body language are more sensitive than ideas of how much space
should be kept between parties in a conversation. Fortunately, these are easy to respect
once they are understood. There are, however, some times when ideas of appropriate
space are particularly important. These are the occasions when individuals are in danger
of feeling emotionally or even physically threatened if their physical space is invaded,
such as when an individual is undergoing the stress of a difficult situation or upset and
angry about something.
For SF soldiers in an advisory role, it becomes even more important when administering
or receiving criticism such as a performance review. In these cases, it is especially
important that one individual not stand too close and to avoid standing over the other.
This can make the other person feel threatened and defensive. People who feel defensive
often become nervous or, in some cases aggressive. Most often it leads to difficulty in
expressing themselves on the part of both parties. It can even make it harder for the
parties to hear what each other are saying. This is also apt to make either or both persons
involved resistant to suggestions, corrections or criticism.


As a general rule, touch should be minimized when communicating across cultural lines.
Although some cultures are more liberal in their attitudes toward touching than others,
even the most tactile groups have strict rules of propriety and etiquette. To touch at the
wrong time can risk serious misunderstandings.
In mainstream American culture, touching is, as a general rule, discouraged; native-born
Americans tend to give up touching at an early age and substitute words as the primary
means of communication. Northern Europeans, such as the Germans, Scandinavians, and
British, too, are generally uncomfortable with touch from anyone other than intimate
family members or friends. Asians share a similar feeling and especially prefer not to
be touched on the back, head, and shoulder. This applies particularly to small children.
Personnel dealing with these cultures need, for instance, to resist the urge to tousle the
hair of Asian or Southeast Asian children.
There are rules for touching. Because U.S. society is very aware of the potential for
people to use negative touch to intimidate or threaten, people are careful how they touch.
Researchers classify Americans as low touchers in relation to other people of the world.
However, touch in a multicultural society is very individual. Some Americans never
touch anyone outside their immediate family, even though they may prize such a persons
friendship. Others touch often, usually on the shoulders and arms, but such touches will
not really express a meaning.
In the U.S., touch is used mainly as a greeting or to say goodbye. Americans can give the
feeling of touch (without touching) by allowing others to move in close when talking.
Good friends may exchange hugs, friendly punches, kisses, and may touch frequently
when talking to each other. For acquaintances and superiors, like military superiors or
interviewers, a simple handshake is all that is expected. Some people are high touchers
and give friendly arm, back and shoulder touches even to new acquaintances. Some
people feel free to show in public what might be considered "private" expressions of
affection in another culture. An example might be kissing or other overt displays of
affection in public.

Rules for appropriate eye contact vary among cultures and are an excellent example of
unspoken rules. Few people are even aware such rules exist but act on them just the
same. They have unconsciously absorbed the rules of their culture.
Among majority culture North Americans the rule is to make intermittent eye contact
with the person to whom you are speaking. To make and hold eye contact too long is
considered aggressive and to make it too seldom is to seem uninterested. To consistently
fail to make eye contact can label one as evasive or dishonest. In some African cultures,

however, it is considered impolite to make more than the briefest eye contact. To a North
American, such people seem distracted and not paying attention.
It is not unusual for Americans to use facial expressions to convey doubt, surprise,
distrust, anger, agreement or rejection. Some other cultures are less expressive with their
facial expressions. A Japanese counterparts face may be expressionless, but inside he
may be fuming. Or he may agree with a recommendation, without giving you any sign of
it. His expression might be interpreted as indifference.
Americans usually give firm handshakes. The handshakes from people from other
cultures may be less firm. For instance, Chinese, Japanese, and most Africans use light
handshakes. This does not mean that they are not assertive. It is a cultural trait.
Russians and most Europeans use firm handshakes. Again, this does not necessarily
mean that they are assertive or tough.
In some Eastern European and Pacific Rim countries the preferred personal space
(interpersonal distance) is much less. In some of these cultures a fair degree of touching
takes place during conversation. This may make you feel uncomfortable, especially if
you are not aware of this cultural difference. If you keep your distance, as you would in
America, your counterpart may think you are impersonal. This could hinder you in
building a relationship with him.
Americans use wide hand gestures. In most European and Pacific Rim countries, hand
gestures are kept to a minimum. In Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa it is
common for people to use wide gestures to emphasize their points of view.


Often units involved in both developing and industrialized countries must provide
information to and communicate with large groups of people who are illiterate or semiliterate. In some cases, these are the target audiences with whom the unit will most often
communicate. Haiti is an example. This audience presents a challenge that requires
creative and enhanced communication skills.
There are available channels of communication to be tapped, and others can be created.
Radio--a powerful means to reach non-literate populations--is one of these channels;
others include interpersonal communication, traditional or folk communication, simple
graphics, and printed materials. Here are few thoughts that may assist in dealing with

Determine how these people receive their information. Lack of literacy skills
does not necessarily prevent the flow of information.


Very often, word of mouth is the best way to share information among audiences
for whom written materials are ineffective. Identify the Key Communicators for
your target audience and use them.

In some communities, the most effective communication does not take place
through leadership or formal structure, but through the "grapevine." This poses
even greater challenges. Try to find someone within the community who trusts
your unit and is willing to help.

Do not exclude the use of printed materials. Photo-novels, comic books, and wall
posters using graphics and very few words can convey a message.

Posters for non-literate and partially literate audiences should have as little written
text as possible and should take into account the symbols and imagery most
familiar to the target audience.

Visual communication materials require proper understanding of the subject

matter, learning objectives, and other communication products being used for the
same message. Also, have a thorough knowledge of the target audience.

Before large quantities of any printed visual communication materials are

produced, graphics and artwork should be pre-tested on a sample audience.


Religion. Discussing religion, especially when referring to Islam, can destroy the
communication process. In 1989, the Salman Rushdie affair demonstrated how volatile
religious convictions could be. Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini ordered Rushdie assassinated
because of his novels, which devout Muslims considered as blasphemy.

Politics. Politics is often a tough area to skirt and can end up in heated discussions. If
there is no way out, ensure political discussions are carried out in a diplomatic manner.

Personal questions. It is rude to ask other Americans highly personal questions, so

don't discuss personal questions with members of the local national population.
Sometimes very specific questions can be perceived as rude. In some rural areas in West
Africa where the world is seen in generalities, it is terribly rude to ask specific questions.


Researching a target audience's culture can be an endless activity. Do not get

bogged down on minute details, but understand as much of each aspect of the


culture as possible. If you demonstrate basic knowledge and are willing to listen
and learn, you may achieve a more effective exchange.

Try to consult with individuals who have lived in the host nation and are already
aware of these customs. One hour of question and answers with a native may be
equal to a week of formal language and culture training.

Rehearse face-to-face communication to practice favorable body language while

eliminating unfavorable gestures and posture. Body language is as important as
the verbal message and should appear natural, not labored or uncomfortable.

Remember that wherever you go there is already an American clich preceding

you. Try to understand and discern this clich and you may be able to slowly
improve it.

Be mentally prepared to experience the unknown. America is not the world and
the world is not America.



Purpose: This chapter deals with counterpart relations, the role of the advisor and the
application of cultural awareness to the advisors role.


This section discusses the obligation of SF personnel to support U.S. policies and gives
information on the relationship between U.S. personnel and their counterparts.


The SF advisor has an obligation to support U.S. national policy for the area where he
operates. He is also obliged to support the policies of the HN government unless
otherwise directed by higher authority.
If it is necessary to make a recommendation that might imply criticism of or be contrary
to HN policy, it should be done in private. HN national policies, organization, economy,
customs and education may dictate practices and procedures that seem inefficient or
uneconomical. Avoid criticizing or condemning these practices and procedures until they
are well understood, then make recommendations for change if required.

The SF advisor must adhere to U.S. command policy and guidance. The U.S. chain of
command should be used to obtain and disseminate guidance and assistance.
The SF advisor gives recommendations to surrogate forces, not orders. Only the
counterpart should issue orders.
It is important to remain aware of the activities of other U.S. agencies, HN agencies and
nongovernmental organizations in the area and endeavor to integrate these efforts into
mission planning. The SF advisor must impress upon his counterpart that progress will
be achieved only through an integrated effort.
Advice should first be presented in person. If it is not accepted and the SF advisor feels it
is appropriate to do so, he must report the matter in writing through U.S. military
channels. HN or U.S. policy conflicts at higher levels may prevent the counterpart from
acting on advice provided by the SF advisor. If higher echelons are aware that the
problem stems from policy conflict, they may be able to align the policies.


The use of proper channels should be stressed at all echelons. The SF advisor must keep
the counterpart informed of advice given to his or her subordinates and keep fellow U.S.
personnel informed on advice offered to counterparts.
HN officials should be persuaded to pass information up, down and laterally.
Counterparts that are senior in grade should be treated accordingly.
Take care that the U.S. chain of command does not begin to replace the HN chain of
command. In particular, be certain that the counterpart does not attempt to control his or
her subordinates through the U.S. chain of command.

The SF advisor must understand his status in the HN. This is normally specified in detail
by a status of forces agreement (SOFA) or other agreement between the U.S. and the HN
government. These agreements vary widely and may provide for full diplomatic
immunity or very little. If there is no such agreement, the SF advisor is subject to the full
measure of the local laws, customs and the jurisdiction of local courts. Even where a
SOFA or other agreement exists, he is expected to observe local law regardless of any
immunity he may be granted. The HN government may still be in the process of
developing adequate administrative machinery. The SF advisor should be aware of such
situations and not be overly critical.
The SF advisor must have knowledge of political, social and military organizations and
their interrelationships. In many countries these relationships depend heavily on personal
relationships between individuals. The SF advisor must understand personalities,
political movements and the social forces acting on them.
The SF advisor must remain in close contact with local civilian leaders, military
commanders, and police.

The SF advisor must never attempt to command the counterparts organization. He must
study the counterparts personality and background and make every effort to maintain
friendly relationships.
The SF advisor should make on-the-spot recommendations to his counterpart whenever
The SF advisor may represent his counterpart or defend the counterparts position in
disputes with U.S. agencies. However, this support should be based on sound, reasoned
judgment and not blind loyalty.


The SF advisor must never present suggestions or advice in a condescending manner or

in a way that might be embarrassing to the counterpart. Advice should be given at
appropriate times in appropriate places.
The SF advisor must not present too many subjects at once or prolong unnecessarily the
discussion of any one subject. However, do make sure a subject is discussed until the
counterpart understands. Suggestions and recommendation should be within the
counterparts authority and capability.
The SF advisor must not harass or browbeat the counterpart or any HN representative.
The SF advisor must not accept yes at face value. Yes may merely mean that the
person understands what has been said, not that he or she aggress to carry out a
recommendation. It may also conceal a failure to comprehend. In some cultures it is
simply considered polite to agree with a recommendation and yes does not imply any
intention to comply.
The SF advisor must present recommendations carefully and in detail, supported by
sound reasoning and an explanation of the advantage(s) offered. If at all possible avoid
making recommendations that require an immediate decision. Counterparts must be able
to exercise their prerogatives. They must not be, or appear to be, overly dependent on
U.S. guidance or advice.
The SF advisor must be aware that some U.S. practices are the product of culture and
custom and may not be necessary, appropriate or welcome in the counterparts culture.
The SF advisor must never convey the impression that everything is wrong. A careless
word or negative action can severely impair counterpart relations. Never be reluctant to
criticize when criticism is called for, but criticism should be couched tactfully. An
unwillingness to provide appropriate criticism may leave the impression that the SF
advisor lacks either knowledge or concern. Appropriate, timely and tactful corrections
can engender respect.
Ironic, sarcastic or sardonic comments should be avoided. They may be misunderstood
or resented even if correctly understood. Be aware of tones of voice and body language,
the way something is said or done can negate its positive value.
Be willing to ask for the counterparts advice. In many cases, he or she will be
experienced in areas of concern. This is especially true of cultural issues and local
customs and courtesies.
The SF advisor who tries to oversell himself may arouse suspicion or create expectations
that cannot be met. Do not make promises that cannot or should not be kept. Never, ever
promise something that you cannot personally deliver.


Frequent inspections of all kinds should be encouraged. It may first be necessary to

convince the counterpart of the value of frequent inspections to determine actual
conditions and the overall situation.
Initiative and inventiveness should be demonstrated by the SF advisor and encouraged in
his counterpart. The counterpart should be encouraged to carefully consider orders he
receives and ask for clarification or permission to deviate when the need is obvious. The
counterpart should be encouraged to be receptive to such requests from his or her
The SF advisor should not reject a project simply because it will not be completed within
his tenure. Major events and projects should be documented and fully understood by
successors. Briefings, after action reports, SODARS and other end-of-tour reports and
documents will help inspire a smooth transition and support continuity of effort.
Maintain a filing and suspense system. Secure classified documents.
Specific goals and objectives should be developed as part of the overall program of
assistance. Systematic evaluation will ensure that each project remains on-schedule and
supports continuity of effort.
Participate actively in local military, athletic and social functions. If unable to accept a
social invitation, decline with regrets expressed in accordance with local custom. Invite
counterparts to appropriate social functions. Insure that they are active participants to the
extent possible.
Develop a sense of identity with the counterparts unit or geographic area by spending
maximum time at the scene of activity. Advising surrogates is a 24 hour, 7 day a week

Prisoners of war should be interrogated for tactical information immediately at the lowest
level. SF soldiers must stress to counterparts that the loss of a prisoner for any reason is
a loss of a valuable intelligence source, violates the Geneva Conventions and may result
in reprisals by the adversary.


The SF advisor must stress the consequences of mistreating suspects, prisoners or other
persons taken into custody. These people must be treated in accordance with Article 3
of the Geneva Convention. This means provide care for the sick and wounded, protect
prisoners and detainees of all types from abuse or other harm. Murder, mutilation and
torture are expressly forbidden as is humiliating or degrading treatment. Sentences and
executions may not be carried out unless judgment has been pronounced in the case by a
regularly constituted court. SF soldiers must never be active participants in the conduct
of any such punishment.

U.S. soldiers must not become involved in atrocities and must strongly discourage all
such activity. They must explain to their counterparts that they are obliged to report any

This section outlines the basic operational and intelligence roles functions of SF
personnel acting as advisors. It also gives a list of their basic intelligence and
counterintelligence concerns.


There are six major operational roles that special operations forces may perform when
functioning as an advisor. The objectives, concepts, and modes of performing these roles
are explained in this section.
Most SF soldiers can safely anticipate that they will participate in stability operations.
These are operations through which the armed and paramilitary forces, as part of the
interdepartmental team, support any or all of the internal defense and internal
development campaigns in a given area. The primary operational roles through which
armed/paramilitary forces support internal defense and internal development campaigns
and operations are:


Tactical operations,

Civil affairs operations,

Intelligence operations,

Populace and resources control,

Psychological operations.

U.S./HN or allied assistance includes advice on military organization, training,
operations, doctrine, and materiel. In addition, U.S. assistance may include providing
and controlling U.S. combat support and combat service support for HN military forces.
The objective of this assistance is to increase the capability of HN organizations to
perform their missions and operate efficiently in the given operational environment.
Organizations and individuals possessing greater skill and more materiel resources assist
by imparting their knowledge through assistance efforts. The success of assistance

depends to a large extent on effective interaction between U.S. special advisor s and their
HN counterparts.
The SF leader uses his personnel:

To advise and assist counterpart personnel in the full spectrum of


To advise and assist counterpart personnel in developing unit combat


SF advisors may also assist by serving as liaison between HN and U.S. combat, combat
support and combat service support forces. In this case they must have a working
knowledge of:

The tactical air-ground control system.

Air request nets as integrated with the U.S. and HN Air Force nets.

Capabilities, limitations, and operations of the U.S. and HN Air Force, Army,
Navy, and Marine units.

Organization and procedures pertaining to combined operations.

Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Military Assistance Program

(MAP), and Military Group (MILGP) proficiency-level objectives for type unit

Sector is the largest national subdivision equivalent to states in the USA.
Military Responsibilities
At sector, the SF advisor gives advice to the senior HN official on matters concerning the
employment of the HN military and paramilitary forces under his jurisdiction. Major
responsibilities include: area defense, suppression of insurgency, and procurement and
employment of U.S. support. As the U.S. military representative at sector level the SF
advisor plans for and recommends the allocation of resources provided through the MAP
and other programs. These resources, as well as those provided by USAID, U.S.
Information Service (USIS), and voluntary agencies, often are used in support of military
civic action.

The SF advisor coordinates the sector military civic action program with other agencies
to ensure unity of effort and appropriate use of resources. USAID and USIS funding may
provide materiel assets while local national troops and equipment perform the labor. The
SF advisor may find that subsector or equivalent forces have the capability to conduct
civil affairs and PSYOP, and he should assist his counterpart in planning for the proper
employment of these resources.
Civil Responsibilities
SF advisors at sector level may be the only U.S. representatives and may be required to
advise on civil matters. Close and continuous supervision of all internal development
programs is required. The province or equivalent chief is provided with an administrative
staff to assist in carrying out his duties. It is essential that he be familiar with the
responsibilities, functions, and personnel of the administrative staff. The administrative
staff is a source of information for the SF advisor. As assistance to the HN is increased,
other U.S. personnel may be introduced into the area. At sector level the SF advisor can
expect to find representatives from USAID, USIS, and other governmental and
nongovernmental organizations. Third country nationals, representatives of private
corporations, and local national voluntary organizations may be involved in such tasks as
medical care, industrial and agricultural development, and similar endeavors. There is a
positive requirement for effective coordination, and the SF advisor may find it necessary
to coordinate all activities. If the SF advisor has the authority, he should see that
interagency agreements are established as soon as possible. In the absence of such
authority, he should actively encourage the development of such agreements.
At the sector or equivalent level, the advisor can expect to find certain technical agencies
and services that are extensions of HN national ministries. Their activities and efforts
should be integrated into the overall plan. This requires that the sector-level advisor
maintain close coordination with the USAID representative who normally has
responsibility for advising these agencies.
Subsector is the governmental division below sector equivalent to counties in the USA.
Military Responsibilities
The military duties of the SF advisor at subsector level are similar to those at the sector
level. At this level, he advises the chief of the local national government on the
employment of military and paramilitary forces assigned to the subsector. Coordination
of all military, civilian, and other U. S. government agencies civic action assets assumes
increased importance. The realization of internal defense and internal development goals
will depend largely on the subsection advisor s capabilities. Organization at this level
will vary depending on local requirements. Some considerations influencing the


composition of the team include population, economic development, insurgent activity,

host government presence and capabilities, and security posture and concerns.
Training may not be popular at this level, and the SF advisor may have to be persistent in
developing sound training programs. HN forces may also prefer certain types of training
to the exclusion of others. The SF advisor must create a balanced training program to
address the deficiencies and needs of the HN force rather than its preferences. He must
establish training objectives, and he should stimulate their accomplishment. Priority of
effort should be devoted to those areas that will contribute to maintainable training
standards and combat effectiveness. His counterpart should understand that the training
mission could be accomplished only if the following basic objectives are achieved:

Military discipline.

Health, strength, and endurance.

Technical proficiency.


Tactical proficiency.

Once trained, units must continue operational readiness training. The SF advisor should
encourage his counterpart to program time for operational readiness training in such
subjects as:



Small unit exercises.


Troop information.

Critiques of past operations.

Rehearsals for future operations.

SF advisors must be cognizant of the Battle Rhythm of their counterparts day. Some
countries dedicate certain times of the day for other activities (religious ceremonies, etc).

Advisors should avoid attempting to impose schedules modeled on a U.S. military

training day (e.g. 0600 1700).
The SF advisor should consider the establishment of training centers to fulfill the
requirements for continuous training by rotating all units through these centers in short
Employ mobile training teams (MTT) when new weapons or tactics are introduced.
Where the state of unit training is poor, consider initiating basic training.
The SF advisor should encourage exchange training between U. S. and HN forces and
Concentrate on training unit leaders to train their units. It may be necessary to conduct
separate officer and NCO schools and classes to better prepare them to train and lead
their units.
Estimate the training requirements by observing the unit during training and in combat
operations if possible.
The SF advisor should encourage counterparts to schedule units into major training
centers for training and refitting. If the situation requires, MTTs may be sent to train
units on site.
Assist counterpart in establishing training programs and policies for his units. For
detailed information see appropriate advisor Training Publications, (e.g., STP 711BCHM1-SM-TG Soldier's Manual, Skill Level 1 And Trainer's Guide, CMF 11,
Infantry, 01 March 2000) and Field Manuals (e.g. FM 31-23 Special Forces Mounted
Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 05 May 1999).
SF advisors must guard against the tendency of the counterpart to withdraw units from
scheduled training cycles for less important assignments. This disrupts the effectiveness
of the training effort and erodes the credibility of the training program.
SF advisors must emphasize the need for continuous training.
SF advisors must encourage his counterpart to make maximum use of training
If SF advisors provide military and technical training to paramilitary, police, and other
civilian forces, they must coordinate training operations with other SF and advisory
personnel and with cooperating U.S. agencies that function in the fields of PSYOP,
agricultural improvement, medical service, populace and resources control and similar


SF advisors must train their counterparts to request resources and to approve requests to
use the scarce training resources that he controls. This includes advice on the allocation
of these resources.
SF advisors must instill in their counterparts the desire to use training support resources
such as ammunition, films, and aids.
SF advisors must show HN units how to construct and use field expedient training
devices and facilities.
Encourage counterpart and his staff to visit and actively supervise unit training.
SF advisors must encourage their counterparts to allocate an appropriate amount of time
and effort to intelligence training. This type of training is frequently ignored in nonintelligence units.
Techniques used to enhance training of HN forces include:

Appropriate methods to evaluate training.

An MTT to, for example, demonstrate artillery capabilities and train combat
leaders in observed fire procedures.

Timely post-exercise critiques.

If appropriate, construct a training village with caches and booby-traps.

Reaction ranges, close combat ranges, and infiltration courses to inject realism
into training.

Reiterate previously taught subjects for reemphasis and retention.


Communication. The SF advisor must project and communicate his ideas and intentions
through his counterpart. Programs can be advertised by:

Community meetings.

News media.

Informal lectures.


Image. In many areas, relations between villagers and the government have not always
been satisfactory. The government HN should:

Establish and maintain positive rapport with the people.

Speak their dialect.

Understand their culture.

Be sympathetic to local problems.

Demonstration. The villagers should be shown dynamically how a civic action program
or a particular project is intended to work.
Participation. The villagers should be encouraged to participate voluntarily in projects in
order to:

Instill a feeling of ownership and responsibility.

Teach them how the system functions so that they may maintain it over the long

Traditions. Projects should consider local traditions and customs, but not be stifled by
them. In cases where a project runs counter to these customs and traditions, great care
must be taken to explain the project rationale. If possible, this explanation should come
from respected local figures.
Environment. The environment should be used to advantage. The environmental impact
of every project must be considered.
Timeliness. Major work projects should be initiated during seasonal unemployment, not
during planting or harvesting time. Key holidays and religious observances must also be
Flexibility. Projects should be altered if unforeseen conditions arise. This means that
projects should be planned with this possibility in mind.
Continuity. The local community must have confidence that the government intends to
see the project through. Material support and guidance should be continuous. Delays
must be explained in detail.
Maintenance. The people should be left with the means and know-how to maintain the
project. Repair parts should be available after government teams depart. The integration

of local people into all stages of the project will enhance local ownership and encourage
Motivation. The project should be something that the people themselves want. Benefits
must be readily apparent or convincingly demonstrated. The people may accept a
program because they wish to emulate more successful members of the community.
Groups may strive to improve their status in relation to other groups, clubs, communities,
or families. A project should provide immediate benefits to the majority of the
population. People may tend to accept a project only because it is impressive or reject it
because it is suspect and fearsome.
Culture Factors. Factors inherent in local culture can affect the project. These should be
recognized and turned to advantage. Some cultural traditions are resistant to change and
may work against the project.
Role of the individual. Individuals influence a proposed improvement. For instance,
although women may not traditionally be included in village institutions, a cooperative
endeavor without them may fail because they feel that their interests are being ignored.
Never underestimate the power of segments of the population that may at first seem
without influence.
Kinship. It may be possible to form an institution, such as a cooperative, around a family
Ethnic group. Ethnic minorities may have separate cultures and traditions and
consequently require special attention if they are to be integrated into a larger regional
effort. It may be advisable to assign tasks and functions within the project according to
the existing social structure.
Political group. It may be necessary to work through the existing political structure. The
authority of the legally constituted government must not be undercut; however, the SF
advisor must take into account traditional and respected leaders who may not be part of
the government.
Vested Interests. Individuals will react favorably or unfavorably depending on whether
the project will benefit or hinder their situation.
Religious fraternity. The advisor should consider the ramifications of soliciting aid from
local religious orders or individuals. However, the total impact of such aid must be
carefully accessed what obligations will be incurred, what message will this kind of aid
carry? Endorsement of a particular religion or faction?
Economic pattern. Projects should be planned according to the capability and availability
of local labor.

Beliefs. Religious and supernatural beliefs exert powerful influences and must be taken
into account.
Recreation pattern. Projects must not interfere with cherished local pastimes.
Consumption pattern. Projects must fit reasonably into the local consumption pattern.
Value system. Projects must not transgress traditional beliefs.
Monitorship. Official inspections and progress checks should be made. A responsible
HN official should be designated to assume responsibility. Progress should be analyzed
in the light of such factors as:

Budget limitations.

Time schedules.

Project complexity.

Resources available.


To attain his overall objectives, it may be necessary for the SF advisor to plan and
conduct intelligence training as well as to:

Assist in establishing an operations center to coordinate the intelligence effort.

Maintain liaison with police and intelligence agencies responsible for countersubversion.

Provide intelligence support and force protection information to U. S. personnel

working at other levels.

Establish secure and reliable communications channels.

Prepare daily reports on activity of intelligence interest (include psychological


Assist the counterpart in developing effective techniques and procedures for the
collection and rapid dissemination of intelligence.

Assist the counterpart in establishing an adequate security program to safeguard

against subversion, espionage, and sabotage.

Encourage and assist the counterpart in establishing and maintaining a source

control program.

Assist the counterpart in obtaining and filling intelligence training quotas for
selected, qualified personnel.


The following gives basic guidance on intelligence and counterintelligence matters:
At a minimum the SF advisor should be familiar with the area study and the most recent
area assessment. Compare the two to detect trends or changes.

The local military G2 (S2)/intelligence section and its operating procedures and

Personalities of counterparts and other people with whom business is conducted.

The chain of command and communication channels of the HN unit.

Intelligence projects initiated by predecessors.

Intelligence projects that predecessor believed should have been initiated.

Advisor communication channels.

Reference material available.

Other intelligence agencies.

Prepare and maintain a list of Essential Elements of Information (EEI) (and insurgent
indicators, if appropriate) such as those listed below. Be aware that there may be many
more indicators.
Examples of standing EEI to establish if an insurgency exists include determining

Trained subversive insurgent leaders have been discovered.

There is evidence of an underground insurgent organization.


There are efforts to create or increase civil disturbances and dissension.

There is an insurgent psychological campaign against existing or proposed

government policies and programs.

Attempts are being made to provoke the government into harsh measures (such as
strict PRC).

Assassinations and kidnappings of local political leaders, doctors, or

schoolteachers are taking place.

Guerrilla actions are occurring.

There is an appreciable decline in school attendance.

Typical indicators that provide a guide to the effectiveness of actions taken include:

Amount of area controlled by each faction.



Relative defection rates from both government and insurgent forces.

Labor strike frequency (might be used as a measure of civil unrest since citizens
often use strikes as protests against the government).

Rise or fall in standard of living.

Intelligence flow from the civilian population.

Relative military strengths.

Frequency of insurgent assassination attempts.

Tax receipts.

Indicators of possible insurgent infiltration of village or installation include:

Increase in vendors, workers, and applicants for employment.

Frequent visits of relatives from distant or neighboring communities.


Strangers seeking to join paramilitary forces.

Individuals leaving village on many or regular occasions.

Suspect individuals contacting inhabitants or members of paramilitary forces.

Pilfering of military supplies, including medical supplies.

Indicators of impending attack of village or installation include:

Initiation of propaganda lectures (usually conducted 5-15 km from village or


Probes by insurgent reconnaissance patrols.

Firing on or ambushing local security patrols.

Indication of insurgent force movement or shift of location.

Increasing reconnaissance actions.

Quiet period, threats of attack, and propaganda directed at village.

Kidnapping or murder of officials and civic leaders.

Rumors of an attack.

Indicators of an area being used as an infiltration route include:

Crops grown away from immediate vicinity of village: crops grown in areas not
under friendly control, food caches or way stations in area.

Trails circumventing population centers: unusual amounts of broken branches and

debris; undergrowth beaten down on trails and in fields; signals, trail markers or

Abandoned campsites.

Adequate water supply. Year-round water supply located near trails or cache


Game animals: adequate to support small groups, small animal traps and snares in

New or transient enemy units sighted or reported.

Lack of mantraps, foot traps, and spikes along trails.

Lack of insurgent combat action along route.

Smoke from unidentified sources.

Indicators leading to known or suspected sympathizers and groups include:

Apparent freedom of movement of individuals or entire village population.

No security provided for workers in fields.

No fear of insurgents.

No insurgent action against village or village inhabitants.

Trails leading from village to known or suspected insurgent areas.

Indicators of location of strongholds and rendezvous points include:

Concealment from aerial observation.

Good observation of the surrounding area.

Difficulty of access and ease of defense.

Good routes of withdrawal.

Natural water supply.

Reasonable proximity to settlements and lucrative targets.

The counterintelligence advisor should attempt to secure answers to the following




Is intelligence information disseminated on a need-to-know basis?

Are security precautions observed?

Is access to sensitive areas positively controlled?

Are cryptographic systems available and used in transmitting classified


Do personnel follow proper communications procedures?

Are personnel with access to classified information properly cleared? How

thorough or effective is the investigation?

Are security inspections of installations conducted at regular and irregular


Are periodic security lectures conducted?


Does the counterpart have a covert counterintelligence program?

Does the degree of coverage provide reasonable assurance of gaining knowledge

of insurgent intelligence, subversion, or sabotage within the area?

What means of communication are employed? Do communications media

jeopardize the security of the source?

What is the expected elapsed time from acquisition of information by a source to

receipt of his report? Is source reporting prompt? Does elapsed time allow for
reaction by friendly forces?

How is the reliability of a source determined? Is reliability or lack thereof

considered in evaluating information?

How do counterparts evaluate the accuracy of information received from the


How do counterparts protect operations against:


Double agents (agents working for two or more opposing intelligence

agencies, only one of whom knows of the dual relationship)?

Dual or multiple agents (agents reporting to two or more agencies of the

same government, which may result in false confirmation of information)?

Confusion agents (agents fabricating information to mislead friendly


The SF advisor should assist his counterpart in:

Developing a local intelligence collection program.

Training intelligence personnel in their respective specialties.

Properly utilizing trained intelligence personnel.


This section gives a basic outline for the initial contact between SF elements and a host
nation force and basic considerations for counterinsurgency. It is intended only as an
outline and not a complete checklist although it can serve as the basis for development of
tailored checklists by ODAs and ODBs.
The survey team commander (along with any subordinates that he may specify)
establishes effective initial rapport with the HN unit commander. The team commander:

Conducts introductions in a businesslike, congenial manner using the target

country language.

Briefs the HN commander on the SFOD's survey mission and the restrictions and
limitations imposed on the detachment by the higher U.S. commander, using the
target country language and visual aids translated into the HN language.

Assures the HN commander all survey team members are fully supportive of the
HN's position and they firmly believe a joint SF-HN unit effort will be successful.

Assures the HN commander that his assistance is needed to develop the tentative
objectives for advisory assistance.

Deduces or solicits the HN commander's actual estimate of his unit's capabilities

and perceived advisory assistance and material requirements.


Does not make any promises (or statements that could be construed as promises)
to the HN commander regarding commitments to provide the advisory assistance
or fulfill material requirements.

Explains the survey teams initial plan for establishing counterpart relationships,
obtains approval from the HN commander for the plan, and requests to conduct
the counterpart linkup under the mutual supervision of the HN commander and

Supervises the linkup between survey team members and their HN counterparts to
determine if the HN personnel understand the purpose of the counterpart
relationship and their responsibilities within it.

The survey team members analyze the HN unit's status IAW their functional areas of
responsibility for the purpose of determining the HN requirements for advisory
assistance. They:

Explain the purpose of the analysis to counterparts.

Encourage counterparts to assist in the analysis, the preparation of estimates, and

the briefing of the analysis to the SFOD and HN unit commanders.

Collect sufficient information to confirm the validity of current intelligence and

tentative advisory assistance COAs selected prior to deployment.

Collect and analyze all information relating to force protection.

Prepare written, prioritized estimates for advisory assistance COAs.

Brief, with their counterparts, the estimates to the survey team and HN unit

The SFOD members assist the HN unit to prepare facilities (training, security,
administrative) for the execution of the assistance mission, as necessary.

Inspect, with their counterparts, the HN facilities that will be used during the
assistance mission IAW their functional areas of responsibility and the SFOD

Identify deficiencies in the facilities that will prevent execution of the tentatively
selected advisory assistance COAs.

Prepare written or verbal estimates of COAs that will correct the deficiencies or
negate their effects on the tentatively selected advisory assistance COAs.

Supervise the preparation of the facilities and inform the SFOD commander of the
status of the preparations verses the plans for them.

The survey team commander supervises the processing of the survey results.

Recommends to the HN unit commander the most desirable COAs emphasizing

how they satisfy actual conditions and will achieve the desired advisory assistance

Ensures that his counterpart understands that the desired COAs are still tentative
contingent on the tasking U.S. commander's decision.

Selects the COAs to be recommended to the follow-on SF units, after obtaining

input from the HN unit commander.

Ensures the higher in-country U.S. commander is informed of significant findings

in the team survey for HN assistance.

Ensures that the estimates for recommended advisory assistance COAs are
transmitted to the follow-on SF units IAW the OPORD.

The survey team plans its security IAW the anticipated threat. Adjustments are made as
required by the situation on the ground. The team:

Fortifies its position(s) (quarters, communications, medical, command) IAW the

available means and requirements to maintain low visibility.

Maintains a team internal guard system with a minimum of one SFOD member
awake, aware of the location(s) of all other SFOD members, and ready to react to
an emergency by following the alert plan and starting defensive actions.

Maintains a team internal alert plan that will notify all team members of an

Maintains communications with all subordinate team members deployed outside

of the immediate area controlled by the team's main body.

Establishes plans for immediate team defensive actions in the event of an

insurgent or terrorist attack or a loss of HN rapport with hostile reaction.

Discusses visible team security measures with HN counterparts to ensure their

understanding and to maintain effective rapport.

Encourages the HN unit, through counterparts, to adopt additional security

measures that have been identified as necessary during the analysis of the HN
units status and the inspection of its facilities.

Establishes mutual plans with the HN unit, through counterparts, for defensive
actions in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack.

Rehearses, using briefback as a minimum, team alert and defensive plans.

Encourages the HN unit, through counterparts, to conduct mutual full force

rehearsals of defensive plans; and if unsuccessful, conducts a team internal
rehearsal, using briefback as a minimum, of these plans.

See Also: Appendix 6 on Training Host Nation Forces


This section gives a basic outline for the evaluation of a host nation force. It is intended
only as an outline and not a complete checklist although it can serve as the basis for
development of tailored checklists by ODAs and ODBs.

SFOD staff sections identify additional training objectives or necessary modifications to
HN operating procedures IAW their functional areas of responsibility. They:

Consolidate training reports, AARs, and mission debriefings to produce a list of

deficiencies, avoiding redundancy or closely related items.

Identify HN personnel in key positions who require additional leadership or other

functional duty training.

Review the status of the threat to determine its impact on HN performance.

Brief counterparts on the identified deficiencies and the threat impact to establish
their understanding.

Encourage counterparts to participate in the identification of additional training

objectives or modifications to HN operating procedures.

Analyze the required training objectives or procedures modifications and the

threat status to develop estimates of tentative COAs.

Identify new tasks specified or implied by the higher U.S. commander.


The SFOD staff sections develop a new POI or make the necessary modifications to HN

The SFOD commander selects the most desirable COAs and encourages his
counterpart to approve them.

Develop plans for selected COAs that are based on appropriately modified U.S.
doctrine and contain all necessary annexes, schedules, and lesson outlines.

Develop plans for selected COAs that reflect a logical progression from the
present deficient status to the desired improved status.

Encourage counterparts to become involved in the development of the plans to

improve their self-sufficiency.

Review the plans with their counterparts to ensure they are satisfactory to the
SFOD and the HN unit.

Identify any necessary deviations from the mission guidance issued to the SFOD
by its higher commander.

Identify any necessary additional resources and the supporting section or unit that
can provide them.

Emphasize human rights training.

Emphasize, as appropriate, multi-echelon HN training in the new or revised POI

by planning to teach individual, crew, leader, and collective skills concurrently.

The SFOD prepares to execute the newly developed advisory assistance plans. They:

Inform the higher U.S. commander of the plans and obtain approval for their

Inform the higher U.S. commander of irresolvable HN personnel difficulties.

The SFOD commander orders the execution of the plans after obtaining an
agreement from his counterpart.

Request necessary additional support.

Prepare in-country facilities, as required.


Requests additional language support, as required.

Encourages the participation of counterparts in the preparation o f the plans.

The SFOD coordinating and special staff sections maintain their functional areas'
portions of the SFOD's database (information files).

Maintain database portions IAW the unit SOP

Request information necessary to satisfy CCIR that concern them from applicable

Route information requests IAW the unit SOP through the SFOD S3 to other staff

Route intelligence information requests to the S2.

Identify information received that satisfies CCIR, which concern them.

Modify previously developed estimates and Mans IAW the latest information

Notify other concerned staff sections of modified estimates and plans.

Notify other concerned (higher, lower, or adjacent) staff sections of information,

as it is identified, that satisfies their IR.

Update, through the SFOD S3, the SFOD Commanders Critical Information
Requirements (CCIR) list IAW the latest information available and requirements
for additional CCIR that arise from modified estimates and plans.

The SFOD S2 executes functional duties. He:

Continuously updates the IPB prepared in pre-deployment IAW FM 34-130 and

FM 34-36.

Supervises the dissemination of intelligence and other operationally pertinent

information within the SFOD and, as applicable, to higher, lower, or adjacent
concerned units or agencies.

Monitors the implementation of the SFOD intelligence collection plans to include the
update of the SFOD's PIR/IR, conducting area assessment and coordinating for additional
intelligence support.

The SFOD commander assists the HN unit commander to begin the command and
control process. The SFOD Commander:

Accompanies the HN unit commander when he receives his mission or monitors

the situation to assist him to deduce or anticipate his next mission in the earliest
time possible.

Monitors the HN unit commander's identification of the objective, his higher

commander's intent, and all specified or implied tasks and recommends
improvements or additions, as needed.

Reviews for completeness the HN unit commander's selection of the essential

tasks that must be planned for and recommends improvements or additions.

Reviews the HN unit commander's identified operational constraints and restraints

for completeness and recommends improvements and additions IAW
appropriately adapted U.S. doctrine, the higher U.S. commander's guidance, and
applicable U.S./HN operational agreements.

Reviews the HN unit commander's event time plan and recommends

improvements using the "one-third to two-thirds rule."

Encourages the HN unit commander to brief his staff on the mission and issue his
planning guidance as soon as possible.

Briefs the SFOD staff on the mission and issues his planning guidance ASAP.

The SFOD coordinating and special staff sections assist their HN counterparts to develop
the COIN OPLAN or OPORD IAW their functional areas of responsibility. They:

Review the estimates of tentative COAs developed by their counterparts and

recommend improvements or additional COAs to satisfy the SFOD and HN unit
commander's planning guidance.

Recommend to the SFOD commander the most desirable COAs.

Develop, unilaterally, contingency plans for gaps in HN unit planning if their

counterparts are unreceptive to recommendations for improvements.

Review for completeness the portions of the OPLAN or OPORD prepared by

their counterparts and recommend improvements or additions needed to satisfy
the SFOD and HN unit commanders' planning guidance.

Encourage their counterparts to complete, as quickly as possible, their planning

tasks and to adhere to the event time plan.

Offer additional assistance as the need for it is identified.

Keep the SFOD commander apprised of the status of the planning process.

The SFOD XO advises his HN counterpart in his functional duties. He:

Monitors all HN staff sections and recommends changes in organization and

procedures, as necessary, to improve efficiency.

Assists his counterpart during periods when he is in command of the HN force in

the absence of the commander.

Monitors liaison and coordination with higher HN headquarters and recommends

changes, as necessary, to improve efficiency.

Informs the SFOD commander of any significant problems identified and gives
his recommendations for rectifying them.

Reviews reports on human rights violations and forwards these reports through
the SFOD chain of command.

The SFOD XO also advises his HN counterpart in S1 functional area duties. He:

Monitors the maintenance of HN unit strength and recommends improvements, as


Monitors the processing of HN wounded and KIA and recommends

improvements, as necessary.

Monitors the processing of EPWs and detainees, recommending that they be

handled IAW the 5 Ss (Silence, Search, Segregate, Secure and Safeguard).

Monitors HN unit morale and recommends actions to improve it, as necessary and
IAW HN custom.

Monitors HN unit discipline and maintenance of order and recommends actions to

improve it, as necessary and IAW HN custom.

Informs the SFOD commander of any significant problems identified and gives
his recommendations for rectifying them.

The SFOD S2 advises his HN counterpart in his functional area duties. He:

Monitors the updating of the situation map and recommends actions to keep it
current based on the available intelligence, as necessary.

Monitors the collecting, interpreting, and dissemination of information concerning

the effects of weather, terrain, and the insurgent force on the HN units mission
and recommends improvements in procedure, as necessary.

Monitors command and communications nets.

Manages the submission and receipt of intelligence reports, as necessary, to

ensure that all assets are exploited.

Gives intelligence collection plan instruction/advice to HN counterparts.

Recommends improvements, as necessary, to the HN unit's TOC communications
SOP to ensure that the S2 section receives situation reports from the S3, FDC, and
all unit attachments.

Assists in the evaluating and interpreting intelligence information to determine

insurgent or terrorist probable COAs.

Monitors the dissemination of intelligence information to the HN commander,

staff, higher headquarters, subordinate units and attachments and recommends
improvements, as necessary.

Assists the SFOD S3 and his counterpart in supervising and controlling

reconnaissance and surveillance activities.

Assists in the briefing and debriefing of patrols operating as part of

reconnaissance and surveillance activities.

Assists the SFOD S3 and his counterpart, in the development of plans for
reconnaissance and surveillance activities to ensure the most compete coverage of
the OA.

Assists in the interrogation of EPWs and detainees.

Coordinates with the S3 the adjustment of reconnaissance and surveillance plans

IAW changes in the situation.

Assists in originating tasking requests for intelligence support to ensure all

available assets are exploited.

Monitors procedures used to protect classified and operationally sensitive material

and recommends improvements, as necessary.

Continuously updates the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

prepared during pre-deployment IAW FM 34-130 and FM 34-36.

Informs the SFOD commander of any significant problems identified and his
recommendations for rectifying them.

The SFOD S3 advises his HN counterpart in his functional area duties. He:

Assists in the use of estimates, predictions, and information provided by the S2 in

the preparations of tactical plans.

Monitors the use of communications nets.

Assists in the preparation of all orders and plans.

Assists in the supervision of training and preparations for operations.

Makes recommendations to ensure that operations remain consistent with overall

COIN goals.

Assists in the coordination and implementation of civil affairs tasks assigned to

the HN unit or determined to be desirable.

Informs the SFOD commander of any significant problems identified and his
recommendations for rectifying them.

The SFOD S4 advises his HN counterpart in his functional area duties. He:

Monitors the maintenance of equipment readiness, recommending improvements,

as necessary.

Monitors the support provided in all classes of supply to the HN unit, its
subordinate units, and attachments and recommends improvements, as necessary.

Assists in the supervision of the use of transportation assists.

Informs the SFOD commander of any significant problems identified and his
recommendations for rectifying them.


The SFOD weapons NCO advises the HN unit FSO in his functional area duties. He:

Assists in the planning, coordination, and request of fire support (FS) for the HN
unit and the employment of its FS assets.

Makes recommendations to ensure that FS is employed IAW firepower

restrictions and the principle of minimum essential force.

Monitors communications procedures for requesting fire support and recommends

improvements, as necessary, to improve efficiency.

Assists in the processing of fire support requests to ensure the timeliness and
accuracy of the response.

Informs the SFOD commander of any significant problems identified and gives
his recommendations for rectifying them.

The SFOD commander, and staff members he designates, review the HN unit OPLAN or
OPORD. They:

Recommend improvements to the task organization in order to maximize the

strengths and minimize the weaknesses of the available assets, counter the
anticipated threat, allow for swift transitions in the organization for contingencies,
and maintain a reserve appropriate to the size of the HN force employed.

Recommend improvements to the intelligence portions of the plan or order so that

all relevant sources of information have been exploited and the information has
been analyzed to allow the HN commander to plan actions that seize the initiative.

Recommend improvements to the execution so that the mobility of the HN unit is

employed to achieve all possible tactical advantage, only the minimum firepower
needed will be used to accomplish the given tasks, restrictions on the rules of
engagement are specified, and subunit missions, to include the reserves, are clear.

Recommend improvements to the service and support plans so that only missionessential supplies and equipment will be taken, that soldiers will not be
overburdened at the expense of the mobility, and that resupply and MEDEVAC
will be available as needed.

Recommend improvements to the signal plan so that available communications

assets will be exploited to gain all advantages possible.

Recommend any other improvements needed to ensure the OPLAN or OPORD is

complete, to include human rights considerations, measures or required training.

The SFOD members monitor the dissemination of the HN unit's OPLAN or OPORD and
mission preparations by their counterparts. They:

Are present when the OPLAN or OPORD is issued and recommend additions or
clarifications to the verbal needed for completeness and understanding.

Inspect material preparations to include, as a minimum, weapons and

ammunition, transportation arrangements, and mission-essential supplies and
equipment and recommend actions needed to correct shortcomings IAW the
OPLAN or OPORD or newly identified requirements.

Are present during the mission rehearsals (briefback, reduced force, or full force)
and recommend additions or modifications to the rehearsed execution needed to
cover, as a minimum, actions in the objective area, actions on enemy contact, and
alternate COAs for reasonable contingencies.

Report all identified HN unit planning or preparation deficiencies to the SFOD

commander and, IAW functional areas of responsibility, the applicable SFOD
staff section(s).

The SFOD prepares for participation in the COIN operation. They:

Ensure primary, alternate, and emergency communications between SFOD

elements are established and functioning IAW the resources available.

Disseminate unilateral contingency plans to all SFOD members and rehearse


The SFOD commander discusses the identified planning or preparation

deficiencies with the HN unit commander and attempts to resolve them.

The SFOD commander may withhold specific portions of SFOD assistance that
would place SFOD members at personal risk due to unacceptable conditions
resulting from uncorrected planning or preparation deficiencies.

Submit pre-mission reports to the next higher U.S. commander IAW requirements
in the SFOD OPORD.

The SFOD commander assists the HN unit commander to provide C2 during the
execution of the COIN operation. He:

Monitors the tactical situation and recommends changes to the present COA to
gainfully exploit changes in the situation.

Monitors the location of the HN commander and recommends changes so that he

can provide leadership at critical points and not deprive himself of the ability to
maneuver his force in response to tactical changes.

Monitors the information flow to the HN commander and recommends

improvements needed to make continuous use of intelligence collection assets, to
keep subordinates reporting combat information, to screen the information given
to the HN commander to prevent information overload, and to keep the command
communications channels open for critical information.

Monitors the HN commander's control of the execution and recommends

improvements to focus combat power on the objective, to keep movement
supported by direct and indirect fire, to maintain mutual support between
subordinate elements, to maintain fire control and discipline, and to consolidate
and reorganize during lulls in the battle or after seizing the objective.

Monitors any command succession and assists the new HN unit commander to
smoothly and rapidly take control of the execution of the COIN operation.

The SFOD members assist their counterparts during the execution of the COIN operation.

Monitor staff functions IAW their functional areas of responsibility and

recommend improvements or corrections, as needed.

Monitor the technical or tactical execution of individual tasks and recommend

improvements or corrections, as needed.

Remain continuously aware of the tactical situation.

Execute SFOD unilateral contingency plans as required by the situation.

Note reoccurring or significant problems or events for reference during the end of
mission debriefings and reports.

The SFOD conducts end of COIN mission activities. They:

Participate in HN unit debriefings encouraging the HN unit commander and

important subordinates to realistically appraise the HN units performance and to
modify their techniques, tactics, and procedures to improve future performance.

Conduct a unilateral SFOD debriefing to identify reoccurring or significant

problems for both the HN unit and the SFOD.

Modify the SFOD's mission execution plan to correct identified problems.

Make recommendations for awards for both HN and SFOD personnel as


Document and report to the higher U.S. commander incidents of corruption, gross
inefficiency, violations of human rights, and the actions of HN military or
government officials who habitually hinder operations through incompetence,
self-interest, or suspected sympathy for the insurgents or terrorist. NOTE: This is
very sensitive and must be monitored closely to insure complete security.

The SFOD coordinating and special staff sections maintain their functional areas'
portions of the SFOD's database (information files). They:

Maintain database portions IAW the unit SOP.

Request information necessary to satisfy CCIR that concern them from applicable

Route functional area information requests IAW the unit SOP through the S3 and
other staff sections.

Route intelligence information requests to the S2.

Identify information received that satisfies CCIR, which concern them.

Modify previously developed estimates and plans IAW the latest information

Notify other concerned staff sections of modified estimates and plans.

Notify other concerned (higher, lower, or adjacent) staff sections of information,

as it is identified, that satisfies their intelligence requirements (IR).

Update CCIR through the SFOD S3 IAW the latest information available.
Recommend additional CCIR that may arise from modified estimates and plans.

The SFOD S2 executes functional duties. He:


Continuously updates the COIN IPB prepared in pre-deployment IAW FM 34130 and FM 34-36.

Supervises the dissemination of intelligence and other operationally pertinent

information within the SFOD and, as applicable, to higher, lower, or adjacent
concerned units or agencies.

Monitors the implementation of the SFOD intelligence collection plans to include

the update of the SFOD's PIR/IR, updating the area assessment and coordinating
for additional intelligence support.


The following is excerpted from an After Action Report produced by an SF team working
in Thailand. It is an example of the importance of cultural understanding and crosscultural communication when working with counterparts or local national civilians.


The following is extracted from reporting by the 46th SF Company.
"Do not offend beliefs in ghosts: it is usually easier to let irrational beliefs die naturally
than to attempt to kill them. USAID "Manual For Rural Health Community Workers In
Some medics have had the disconcerting experience of training village health workers for
several weeks, sometimes months (intelligent Individuals whom they thought were
learning and absorbing their lessons) only to find that when a village health worker
becomes ill with a headache or stomach ache himself, he arrives one morning with
suction marks all over his stomach or pinch marks on his forehead. When asked why he
didn't come to the aidman for treatment he states that he believes the old methods work
just as well.
Perhaps he has to show the sorcerer that he is still a loyal villager. It has been
disappointing that no medic thus far debriefed has knowingly met a sorcerer. A number
of aidmen have had the feeling that sorcerers in the villages were working against them
telling villagers not to come to the dispensary. Many patients have come to them with
evidence of having received local treatment. It would seem desirable to work with the
sorcerer or possibly even train him as a village health worker because the villagers will
visit him anyway especially after Special Forces leaves.
Burial customs are important. If a dead body is not treated in the manner that tribal
tradition demands, the dead man's spirit may become a wandering or bad spirit. Customs
usually call for the body to be well clothed and decorated. Food must be placed nearby;

and certain burial rituals must be observed. For this reason, it is very important to
recover the bodies of those KIA and those who are medically evacuated and die
elsewhere. Several teams have had the experience after a native has died in the
dispensary or was thought to have died there (although actually dead on arrival), that it is
only with considerable reluctance that village health workers will remain in the
dispensary after dark and definitely only If an American is present.
How does one change peoples belief? Possibly, what happens over a period of time is,
that as one disease is treated successfully by modern medical methods, local people split
it off from the traditional category of diseases treated by spirit expulsion and begin to
think of it as something different - a disease treated by modern medicine. Gradually,
more and more diseases fall into this category.
You will often find that the more conservative villagers believe that ghosts, not germs,
cause certain diseases. Do not argue with these people directly against ghosts. This
would only offend them, and make them feel uneasy. People who believe in ghosts, just
like people who believe in various religions, often derive feelings of comfort from such
beliefs. If you try to take away this comfort you will certainly meet with resistance.
Instead, You should say something like this: "perhaps ghosts cause some diseases but
won't uncle please consider the possibility that germs are the cause of disease x? Look
here ...., then show the villager a flipchart or other visual aid.
It is not necessary to convince everybody that germs cause disease x. Usually, just
convincing some of the leaders is sufficient to get cooperation from most of the villagers.
Although most villagers will continue to believe in ghosts, they will stop believing that
ghosts cause disease x. Among Thai villagers generally, there is a tendency to see
diseases in two categories: those that are treatable by ghost expulsion, and those that are
treatable by scientific medicine. The history of the spread of scientific medicine in
Thailand shows that, as its effectiveness is proven in curing disease x, rural people
gradually make a psychological shift and begin to define that disease as one of the group
treatable by modern rather than ancient medicine. Then, the same thing will happen in the
case of a second disease, and a third, and a fourth, etc. In the minds of the villagers, both
areas continue to exist, this way it is possible to continue to enjoy a belief in ghosts and at
the same time enjoy the fruits of modern medicine.
Let us look at this matter of local beliefs from one other point of view. Malnutrition is a
serious problem in many areas of the world. This is well documented. It would be a
serious mistake however to view this solely as a problem of nutrition.
A child was prostrate and near death from malnutrition. When asked what was wrong
with her child, her mother responded, She vomits. Further inquiry revealed that the
parents had no concept of nutrition. Related ideas such as balanced diet, fat, protein,
carbohydrates vitamins and minerals did not exist in their minds. Their education does
not provide them with the conceptual framework with which to grasp the idea of
malnutrition. Since they do not understand these concepts they have no feeling of

responsibility for the child's condition. They do not think of themselves and the diet they
provide as in any way related to their childs condition.
A previous team had induced a Seabee civic action team to drill a well and install a hand
pump. They thought this would be particularly useful since in the dry season of the year,
many villagers walked 5 miles to the nearest river for water. In the rainy season, any
pool or rivulet was used. The pump was not working when the team arrived. They
repaired it and the next day it was damaged. They repaired it and it was soon damaged
again. This happened several times and they finally stopped repairing it.
Across the road from the pump was a pagoda. Next to the pagoda was a hand dug well
that villagers sometimes drew water from. When they did, the team later discovered,
they were expected to make a donation to the pagoda. To provide for the monks' welfare
is considered to result in a high degree of merit.
Although the team began to suspect the monks of damaging the pump, they never
conferred with them, to find out how they might integrate this health program with
established religious practices.
This is an outstanding example of failure stemming from lack of consideration for local
authorities, customs, and religious practices.
In all Buddhist parts of Thailand the program should be so designed that the villagers, in
cooperating with the program, will at the same time be gaining merit. This will secure
much more cooperation from the people than a program that offers better health but not
merit. Merit, in the eyes of the people at least has various degrees of strength, that might
be listed, roughly in order of strength, as follows: (1) providing for the priests' welfare at
the Wat (pagoda); (2) providing for the priests welfare away from the Wat; (3) providing
for lay people's welfare at the Wat; (4) providing for lay people's welfare in the realm of
curing, such as at hospitals; (5) providing for lay peoples benefit in the realm of
You should seek to gear your program to the strongest degree of merit possible under the
circumstances. For example, suppose the Wat has no privies. You could appeal to the
villagers to dig the privy pits and build the privy houses for the priests. Perhaps the
government could provide free privy slabs. You should, however, always consider ways
of hitting more than one sanitation bird with one merit stone. The third degree of merit
listed above is that of providing for lay people's welfare at the Wat. On the same day that
privies are built for the priests, separate privies can be built for the lay people to use especially those lay people who come to sleep at the Wat on holy days. And do not
forget the fifth degree of merit that of providing for lay peoples benefit in the realm of
education. Suppose that the school is located on the Wat grounds as is often the case. On
the same day that privies are built for the priests and lay people, privies can be built for
the school children. The worker can appeal to the head priest to ask the people's
cooperation in building privies not only for the priests, but also for lay visitors to the
temple and for the schoolchildren as well. The people see all three operations as

merit-making activities especially because the head priest made the request. All three
types of privies should be built at the same time so as to keep momentum.
The entire building program could be finished in one or two days, if proper preparations
were made in advance. You would also be "making it automatic", in that every villager
would automatically become acquainted with the use of privies: every villager is a Wat
visitor from time to time; most men become priests; and all children attend the school.
When these priests leave the order, and when these schoolchildren grow up, they will
attach a value to using privies and are more likely to build privies for their families".
Here then, are three different ways that local beliefs affect medical training and practices.
Religious beliefs about spirits lead to certain medical practices, scientifically unsound;
ineffective, but widely practiced. The Buddhist emphasis on merit makes introduction of
modern sanitary ideas and methods impossible, unless they are combined with the
religious system. In both cases, lack of education and absence of scientific concepts
precludes improvement in the situation or a sense of social responsibility.
Sanitation, medical practices, and education all interlock. Medical problems in this area
are sociological problems and are probably best approached in this context.


A survey of after action reports over the past forty years indicates the same reasons for
failure of local defense forces, over and over, around the world.

Failure to maintain combat readiness.

Failure to evaluate and act on intelligence.

Lack of vigilance, especially in outposts and times of little enemy activity.

Inadequate barrier systems.

Ambushes, patrols and listening posts were either not established, not maintained
long enough or easily recognizable fixed patterns were established.

Aggressive employment of daylight patrols, night ambushes, listening posts and proper
vigilance by guards will hinder enemy movement and prevent him from getting into the
perimeter of an outpost without detection. Any deficiency in these defenses is an
invitation to enemy attack.
Regardless of the density of protective barriers they are no barriers to a determined
enemy unless they are covered by fire and alarmed with early warning devices (e.g. trip
flares and anti-personnel mines).

The intelligence provided by the local population can be invaluable. Maximum effort
should be made to gain the respect, cooperation and support of the local populace to
encourage them to provide information. This means that the people should identify with
and actively participate in the local government. Failure to develop a mutually
supporting empathy between the population and the soldiers will deprive friendly forces
of much valuable information.


Beyond the quantifiable items on any U.S. checklist, there are certain intangibles that
should never be overlooked. Indeed, they may be more important in the long run than any
specifics. Below are a few questions that may help in planning counterinsurgency


What is the insurgent structure of government in your area, the politico -guerrilla
apparatus? Do you have this on a map overlay, showing traditional local
boundaries that the enemy usually bases his structure on? What is the status of
the insurgent village government? Any recent changes (purges) in his local
leadership? Are you looking at the local insurgents as realistic human beings, so
you can be smarter 'and tougher than they?

Are your plans against this insurgent threat truly realistic? Are you planning
things that not only can be done but stay done? What is needed to have them stay
done? Is this included in your plans?

How do you see your counterpart--as a man or simply as an official? Do you deal
with him as one official to another, as friends bound by adherence to a common
goal, or a combination of the two? Do you do his work for him and make his
leadership weaker, or carefully influence him toward making his organization
really produce?

How does your counterpart stack up in the minds of the people of the area when
compared with his insurgent opposite number? Since the people are the target of
the campaign, what does your answer to this question suggest that you do next?

Do you know whether your counterpart, is reasonably honest or is corrupt? If you

don't know, how can you find out skillfully? If he is corrupt, is there something
you can do constructively, other than reporting to headquarters, to shape him up?

Do you discuss principles of good service to the nation with your counterpart, so
that you and he are aware of the moral strengths required in a campaign against an

enemy whose officials may claim to serve with disciplined honesty? If the
enemy is characterized by corrupt practices do you make your contempt known to
your counterpart(s)?

Do you and your counterpart just talk with other officials or do you talk with the
non-official folks in your area to find out their true feelings?

Do the friendly forces in your area practice courtesy among the people in both
urban and rural settings, at rest stops, along the roads? Does this jibe with your
own ideas of military courtesy? Are there ways you can help improve it?

Are the pay, rations, and allowances of local civil and military personnel enough
to live on or do they have to resort to graft to get by? If something needs
changing, what is it?

Does your plan make use of all resources in your area? Do you know all the local
government leaders in your area? Who are the local leaders outside the
government whom the people respect, the business leaders, the village or
municipality leaders-- are they part of your plan to obtain success?

Does your planning strengthen and encourage the growth of individual

self-reliance? Do the people in the towns, hamlets or villages ever hold town
meetings to decide their own affairs, with a real opportunity to speak frankly and
without fear of reprisals? Do individuals get a chance to work for their own
independence? Do farmers have a way of making more money from crops,
getting credit without usury, a fair deal in getting seeds, fertilizer, and equipment,
and a decent way of marketing what they produce?


This section provides a number of specific points that should be considered when dealing
with foreign counterparts.
Successful advisory efforts rest largely upon human relations. Everyone knows that it is
not always easy to convince people who most need assistance that they will receive any
real benefits from it; therefore it is of first importance that SF soldiers help the rank and
file people working with them see how they can benefit from their joint efforts.
Likewise, it is sometimes difficult for advisors to establish rapport and work effectively
with foreign nationals. The following points are based on first-hand experiences in recent
deployments but they match the experiences of technical cooperation programs abroad,
and, before that, in rural improvement programs in the Southern United States. They are
concrete suggestions dealing with the difficult matter of how the advisor can best use his


The advisor needs to enter the area where he will work under the right sponsorship. This
will include local military authorities, but also the mayor, village head, or some other
recognized local civilian leader. Prior to this, his arrival may need preparation through
the district, sector and/or other appropriate local offices. No amount of clearances from
the distant national or state/province/sector government can compensate for local
explanations of why American Special Forces personnel are in the area. This is
especially true of small and/or isolated communities where it is unusual for a stranger to
appear for even an hour without being acknowledged and accepted by local leaders.
Without explanations from locally respected persons (opinion leaders), the local
population will arrive at its own explanations, often to the detriment of the SF efforts.
One Central American village became convinced, for example, that the Americans were
there to steal children.
If the advisor shows appreciation of host country nationals as individuals, common
ground can usually be found despite culture gaps and language barriers. He can listen
when they talk, and look with interest at what they show him. Initial conversations will
usually center on universal matters such as food, shelter, clothing, health and education.
In time discussion can be naturally brought around to the matter the advisor wants them
to consider. He will be better received if he knows something about earlier host nation
military history, contributions in such matters as agriculture, folk art, religion,
architecture, and so on. Naturally, he will be more effective and appreciated if he can
speak the local language.
Some local practices may seem strange and non-sensible at first but they generally have
good reasons behind them that the advisor can discover with good observation. A
creative imagination helps. Gleaners in the Near East, for example, operate within a folk
framework that gives support to the elderly, somewhat like the American Social Security
program. Food habits, family traditions, folk cures, and festive celebrations nearly always
have a great deal of human experience behind them. The advisor will need to be alert to
the fact that many local military units or villages contain rival sub- groups and factions;
he will need to reckon with these. Factionalism (in its most intense expression, feuds), in
small isolated groups generally, seems to serve to lessen the monotony and boredom of
everyday life.
The lives of traditional peoples anywhere in the world are usually simple and realistic. It
is important to find out what the local people really want most and work with them to get
it. They may want a public school, or a road, when the SF team thinks the village most

needs a well or a clinic. The need the local people feel may often be the best starting
point, regardless of its comparative merits. Then people are more likely to be
appreciative and cooperative, to begin to raise their sights and become interested in
working for other improvements. To service the initial desires of the people, the advisor
may need to call in other personnel with skills needed for the particular project. This can
involve some delay, but this way he gets eventual full cooperation in other projects.
Sometimes the desire to show immediate results causes the advisor to press for a project
despite the desires of the local population. In this case he will at best get only a halfhearted response, and may put American assistance in a bad light locally.
The SF advisor needs to understand such basic cultural matters as the ethnic
background(s) of the people, family relationships, leadership patterns, value systems, and
the technological level of the people as related to ways of making a living. He also needs
some knowledge of local services such as health, education, and communications
(including transportation). Many things will depend upon the advisor 's understanding of
cultural issues-for instance, the extent that locally available physical resources can be
The vast majority of the traditional peoples of South America, Asia and Africa have long
lived in a more or less static situation. This can even affect the local military. Through
experience, they have come to be more fearful of losing status through change than
hopeful of bettering their condition through change. Therefore, a suggested change is
often viewed with fear. Concrete projects that yield easily observed benefits are helpful
in convincing such people that they can improve their situation and make them more
willing to cooperate in other projects.
First changes nearly always come slowly in areas where there have been few in recent
times. It is good to remember that, historically speaking, scientific development in the
West occurred only recently. The advisor should keep in mind that knowledge, whether
technical or otherwise, is cumulative, and that once a small beginning has been made,
greater activity and changes will likely follow. But remember, it is easier to achieve
momentum than it is to maintain it. The important thing is to make a start, within as
promising a framework as possible, and with the support needed to sustain the
momentum achieved.
In some areas, people may have had the experience of various assistance programs that
upset their traditional way of life, but provided no lasting benefit. This can also make
them suspicious of outside assistance.



People everywhere respond best when their local organizations are recognized as
important and useful. A program is unlikely to succeed unless it is carried forward within
the local organizational framework. The recognized local leaders, military and civilian,
must be consulted and encouraged to make such contributions as they can. A wellconceived technical activity will reflect credit on the local leaders associated with it. But
also, attention must often be given to the quiet, behind-the-scenes leaders, no less than to
ranking military officials and the family heads of local groups. The surest way for an
activity to be continued after the SF team leaves is for it to have been launched and
carried forward within the local organizational and leadership framework.
For the advisor to be most effective he must understand not only the local military but
also the local government set-up, and how his activity fits into the overall scheme of
things. There should already be a set of agreements between the military, various local
national agencies and government Ministries, usually through some sort of
interministerial council that provides for coordinated effort in servicing the varied needs
of the local people. The SF leadership should work with appropriate agencies to assist in
getting such agreements made. If such agreements already exist, SF personnel should be
careful to recognize and strengthen them. The work of the advisor in one field is most
meaningful when properly coordinated with the contributions of individuals and agencies
in other fields.
Selected young people in the villages can be trained and used as sub-professional, multipurpose village workers to enable the advisor to make the best use of his time.
Otherwise, the SF soldiers influence is restricted to where he is standing and the
immediate vicinity. Furthermore, the advisors, and especially their leadership, spend
much of their time establishing and maintaining rapport. The gap between the local
population and the SF advisor is usually a formidable one because of the great
educational and cultural differences between them. Often the team works with villagers
who are poor, illiterate, and often have experienced few or no outside contacts. Volunteer
or paid local workers (who serve as liaison between the villagers and the advisors) have
proven of great help in getting the benefits of subject-matter technical activities.
There are young people in the cities and villages of South America, Asia and Africa who
are eager to be trained and used in local developmental activities. The training of a local
worker is two-fold: to teach him (or her) the many simple things he or she can do to help
the villagers help themselves; and to help him or her understand what they cannot do, and
how to call in advisors as needed.



As the local people, on the basis of their own successes from their joint efforts, begin to
have new hope they naturally want a larger hand in matters. The advisor may sometimes
feel they want to assume more responsibility than they are able to carry. These evidences
of growing pains should be appreciated, for they are a necessary part of becoming able to
assume responsibility. They indicate that the local population is beginning to believe
they can do more and more things for themselves. The advisor needs to adjust himself to
these growing desires of the people to help themselves.
The matter of institution building is a challenge to the SF team. They need to help the
local people see how they can build the new (that they want) upon the foundations of the
old (that they already have). From the beginning of a project the team needs to have
envisioned, at least roughly, and to have discussed with local leaders, the various types of
training of local personnel needed, the means by which needed financial support can be
had, and the several progressive transfers of responsibilities that are to be made before
the full operation of the activity can be relinquished. How can the team know the timing
of withdrawal best related to local conditions such as personality characteristics, value
systems, and so on? If operating responsibility is transferred too early there will likely be
some breakage, as it were, usually of material things; it is important to note that the cost
of such breakage can usually be charged more or less to training. If, on the other hand,
the team keeps control too long, the local people who have wanted to take over may
become disillusioned with them or even hate them for not relinquishing control to them
when they thought it should have been turned over to them. This delayed handing over
of responsibility moves the problem out of the material level and into the psychological,
which is the more difficult to cope with. It must be clear to all, that the team has the
challenge of working out with local leaders the timing of the phasing out of each activity
so that changes can be institutionalized.
People who benefit from assistance are seldom in a position to be grateful. Rather, they
are usually aware that they are making headway belatedly, and they may tend to be on the
defensive. In accepting assistance they in a sense admit their own insufficiency. A
person's or community's or a nation's self-esteem is a precious thing. The team therefore
should not expect thanks, but instead approach the people in a spirit of fraternity and
humility, taking satisfaction in such progress as they may make and being quick to see
that the credit rests with them. The team should do its job the best it can and accept work
well done as is its own reward. Insofar as other monuments may be needed, mankind
will, even if a bit belated, erect them in the right places and to the right people.
The full application of the above points rests upon yet another dimension, namely the
need for the SF advisor to achieve a working equality between himself and the people
with whom he is working. One reason this dimension is so difficult to achieve is that the

advisor tends to assume he has achieved it already, when in fact he often has not
adequately identified its components, many of them quite elusive. This final point
warrants some detail:
The relationship between the advisor and his counterpart or local people may seem like
that of teacher and student. In some cultures it may be regarded as that of master and
servant. All of these relationships imply a basic inequality in individual worth. And any
such implication, or inference, negates the rapport needed to accomplish the very end the
advisor seeks, namely the development of that greatest resource of all, the human
The degree of identification between the members of the SF team and the people is a
most important component in the achievement of a working equality between them. In
actuality the SF advisor will be able to accept as equals only those in whom he can see
himself, though under a differing set of life circumstances. He can treat the Bedouin or
fellahin as an equal only when he understands that if he'd been in the same circumstances
all his life he'd be making a living in about the same way, speaking his language,
following his courtship and marriage customs, and responding to about the same set of
fears and hopes. Such identification is not a superficial thing; it is learned through
extended exposure and deep insights. The reverse, too, is important - the advisor helps
the local people realize that they would be about like he is if they'd been in his situation
all their lives; such identification becomes a dynamic change that leads to improvements
in local living conditions. The difference between the advisor and advisee is a product of
circumstances, not a question of individual worth. A really important thing happens
when, through identification, the advisor 'understands' the people with whom he is
working; and when they, looking at him, begin to believe that they can help change their
own situation.
Fortunately, the joint efforts of the advisor and the people in meeting a specific local felt
need provide a basis for effectively working together despite differences in religion and
value systems, despite differences in economic status and social position. This joint
effort provides a framework in which the advisor can make maximum use of his
supportive background (a highly developed country, with a heritage of a successful
revolution, a high value on class mobility, and an interest in helping other people help
themselves). Conversely it reduces the inherent handicap in the marked national
differences in wealth, health, education and technology. In short, the joint effort between
advisor and the local people to effect a desired local improvement -whether of a simple
material type such as a pump or clinic, or a shift toward greater self-direction for the
people in their own affairs -constitutes a working relationship that helps to overcome the
superficial differences among men and so affirms equality, and brotherhood.

This section explains the phenomenon of role shock. Role shock can be a serious and
often unacknowledged problem for SF personnel on overseas deployments, especially in


the common case where they are isolated from most other Americans. It can seriously
affect counterpart relations and mission success.


Simply expressed, role shock is a product of the stresses that result from discrepancies
between what an individual views as his correct role and what he finds his actual role to
be or between the role he expects to play and the role he actually plays. In other cases,
the shock is identified with such role-related conflicts as the tension between trying to do
a job ones self and advising someone else on how to do it.
Unlike culture shock, which is usually of relatively short duration and is followed by
adaptation, role shock tends to increase until about the anticipated mid-point of the tour
and seldom disappears until redeployment. The symptoms of role shock are similar to
those produced by other stressful life events.
Many SF soldiers on deployment become entangled in the complexities of bureaucracy,
both foreign and American, and develop extreme frustration when familiar appearing
things--military organizations, governmental institutions, American-educated nationals,
telephones, or flush toilets--fail to respond in expected and predictable ways. This
continuing frustration can be an important contributor to role shock.
Generally, the SF advisor works directly with one or more counterparts. He is not there
to exercise a technical specialty, but to advise host nationals on how to do it. Frequently,
SF personnel help counterparts design and bring into being an organization, process, or
procedure. Solutions to the attendant organizational political, social, and economic
problems require a thorough understanding of many other variables outside his usual
military skills. In particular it requires knowledge of and skills in the techniques of
advising and facilitating the efforts of others. It takes one talent to come in and put out a
fire, but a different one to build a fire department and a sustainable fire prevention
An SF soldiers role, if effectively executed, is rarely pure. To accomplish the mission he
must be professionally competent, but also a realist, negotiator, fall guy, teacher,
expresser of ideas, defender of the long view, and sometimes an organizer of both aid and
assistance from other agencies. In addition, as an outsider, he needs to represent an
objective view, consider the problem in a total context, and provide experience. His
problems are sometimes made more complex because he must meet a range of
expectations, of his home unit, the host country, the team leader, and often U.S. missions
or agencies. These rarely are totally compatible.
One U.S. government official, closely associated with military assistance programs,
described three types of advisor s: (1) The one who performs at least adequately,
sometimes superbly, but is still basically interested in doing the job for its own sake and
as a demonstration of professional skill; (2) the person who is interested in getting the job
done as quickly and efficiently as possible and minimizes the need to involve or teach

nationals, and (3) the person who is deeply involved but who works himself out of a job
by training counterparts at every step. This government official believed the third type
was the proper role for the advisor in an assistance role.


Most SF soldiers may suffer from some degree of culture shock but can learn to take the
personal, living, and social conditions in stride. The chief problems arise in connection
with their jobs: "role, relationships with colleagues and indigenous peers, personal
achievement, self -development, self-determination, and similar matters related to their
image of themselves as professionals.
Most of the complaints voiced by SF soldiers concern such items as the nature of the
mission, nature of the host government, poor relationships with counterparts, unpleasant
or uncongenial coworkers, and lack of self determination. A significant number of SF
soldiers find that the duties and activities that they engage in during deployments are at
least somewhat different from those expected, being greater in scope, duties, and
responsibilities; involving technical work outside their own specialty, and requiring
administrative rather than military skills.
Personnel tend to distinguish between their professional military role and their actual
work role. They show self-confidence as professionals but have problems in carrying out
their work. They see the work role as the activities carried out during working hours,
whereas their professional role relates only to those activities that require exercise of the
technical skills associated with professional training.
The professional role should not vary much from one country to another, except in some
specialties (such as public administration) that by their very nature depend closely upon
social structure and political processes. To illustrate, an engineer NCO who becomes
involved in advising on the administrative aspects of some project might not consider it
part of his engineering duties --- that is, part of his professional role.
When soldiers were surveyed on this point, they were asked to assess the differences
between expected and actual activities on deployment. About one third indicated they
had experienced sharp differences; another third reported modest differences.
These respondents had manifested a substantial amount of role shock - real stresses had
developed because of the expected and the actual difference between the ideal and the
real. While the SF advisor ideally should limit his activities abroad to imparting
information and giving advice, many assumed a performance role. Some rationalized this
because the doing was more immediate and visible while the stimulating was slower, less
conspicuous, and more difficult. For some advisors, the role challenges are so
overwhelming that they retreat into familiar repetition of the more product-oriented
elements of their role.


As the job of communicating ideas requires a wider range of interpersonal and cultural
sensitivity skills than those normally considered professional, the typical SF advisor finds
that his work role behavior differs from that with which be is familiar.
As with culture shock, an individual that has successfully adapted may find that they
become vulnerable to role shock upon return to the U.S. and their home unit. They have
learned expectations and approaches to working that may be quite inappropriate back in
the U.S.


Men differ in their preferences for and perceptions of the degree of structure in a
professional role. Some regard structure as guiding and facilitating, others perceive it as
limiting. At the same time, the degree of specificity or clarity on technical roles varies
with many factors. Ambiguity and tension also arise to the extent that what a man does
conflicts with what he has trained to do, what others expect of him, or what he wants or
expects to do. Factors independent of individuals tolerance for ambiguity introduce
much of the role confusion. These include the administrative context of the assistance,
host country attitudes and the influence of predecessors and counterparts.
Americans and the host country may spend months negotiating a project. Still the overall
objectives or definition of the mission to be accomplished may be expressed in general
terms. Various interpretations of what is to be accomplished arise as well as different
views as the most appropriate means to reach the goals.
Many months may elapse between the time the project is agreed upon and the first
advisor arrives on the scene, perhaps more than a year later. Meanwhile, major changes
may occur in objectives and in the staffs of the American mission and the host
government. The arriving SF team may find local nationals openly or covertly
disagreeing on what they are supposed to accomplish and how they are to go about it.
Americans may perceive that the host government, or individual nationals, entered into
assistance agreements only in order to get economic aid or to achieve other objectives.
When confronted with such situations, the advisor can be expected to ponder his role,
particularly to the extent that he finds or perceives that the situation lacks the
prerequisites for the kind of assistance he expected to render. He may resist the
compromises in technical approaches or in levels of performance that the situation
demands and direct his talents and energies into activities that to him preserve or
maintain his professional image.
Finally, the SF advisor finds his role expectations and performance being influenced by
his fellow team members, by the actions of his predecessors, and particularly by the
qualifications and activities of his counterpart a unique role relationship.


There is an almost implicit assumption in most technical assistance projects that the SF
advisor will work closely with a host national whom the host government or military
organization designates as a counterpart. As simple as this arrangement appears to be, it
is rarely clear how the role is to be performed in a way that will conform to the
expectations of both the American sponsors and the host government.
Ideally, the counterpart situation provides a working context for the American and can
have a decisive influence in helping him understand and adjust to the new culture. Those
with good working relations with counterparts make better adjustments than those who
have no counterparts or bad relations with their counterpart.
But the situation is fraught with problems. One of these is the attitude and orientation of
the SF soldier. If he sees his job as an adviser and teacher, and performs accordingly, the
counterpart may resist, particularly if he was expecting someone to take over and do all
or part of the job and to at least share in the blame if something goes wrong.
More frequently, advisors assess their counterparts as being technically incompetent,
lacking professional commitment, having other professional interests, and being
unavailable when needed. In some cases, a single specific counterpart is never appointed
at all or until the American has been on the scene for some time.
The apparent success or failure of the SF mission may depend in large part on
relationships with counterparts. At the same time, this is an issue that the American has
little control and for which he often has little preparation.
Despite what some Americans believe, most are used to working in situations that are, by
world standards, rather permissive and relatively non--bureaucratic. Some react violently
when confronted with or obstructed by indigenous bureaucracy, red--tape, administrative
centralization, and cumbersome decision-making in the host governments. This is
especially true in those cultures that place great emphasis on consensus in decisionmaking. Initially, Americans may react against the host nationals, evidencing an inability
to see or understand the bureaucratic structure that is responsible for the nationals'
Other problems arise from the difficulties of communicating upward in a traditionally
authoritarian society, the issue of foreign language and the difficulties of working
through interpreters, failure to identify decision makers and decision-making criteria, and
the different reactions military professionals have to playing the role of a communication


The middleman role is sometimes one of the key contributions an outsider can make. By
being able to move in, around, and out of organizations somewhat independently of the
local hierarchy, protocol, and customs, he can link people and offices that might
otherwise have difficulty in communication. But many dislike this role and deny having
practiced it. They may not be aware of having done it or did not appreciate how
significant this catalytic role could have been.
Another possible source of difficulty is the perceived semi -professional qualification of
host nation personnel and the total organizational environment.
Many frustrations arise from American organizations. Much of the response parallels the
reaction to the indigenous bureaucracy, but it is even more antagonistic. Being on an
overseas deployment seems to make some individuals hypersensitive to difficulties in
organization and administration. Most see organizations and organization charts as
rationally conceived structures and expect them to operate rationally. They frequently
fail to take into account the distances, lead times, diplomatic issues and other problems
involved. Moreover, those who manage these foreign-based bureaucracies frequently are
inexperienced in dealing with the military, either local or U.S.
These issues are complicated by the usual tensions between headquarters and field staffs
and between administrators and technical specialists. Expectations, values, and styles of
behavior differ with each group.
Many local nationals criticize the U.S. mission for exercising too much program guidance
and control, as well as for its general performance, ineffectiveness in achieving goals,
direct interference with the substance of programs, and excessive bureaucracy.
Overall, the organizational complexities that the advisor encounters can be a major factor
in role shock. These complexities include his team members or colleagues, the host
country military and counterparts, the mission and the embassy or consulate. It may also
include NGOs and other volunteer groups and businesses, as well as similar agencies of
other countries and the United Nations.
Additional compounding factors include the subtleties of dealing with sensitive nations,
the conflicts between administrative and professional authority, and the constant
reminders that the SF advisor is an informal ambassador of United States goodwill and
foreign policy.
Few soldiers are aware of the complex factors associated with decision-making in the
host organizations. They often had difficulty identifying the key decision makers and the
criteria used in decisions.
The frustrations and antagonisms generated by these factors neither indict the Special
Forces nor classify advisor s. Rather, this is the phenomenon of role shock, the quite

common response of men of diverse backgrounds and professional skills to strange

worlds of language, customs, patterns of work, organizations, and work-related problems.
Deploying personnel may not be familiar with the full range of tasks and the vast range of
problems typical of underdeveloped areas. They come in eager to contribute their
knowledge and skill, and anxious to make maximum progress in the limited span of their
assignment. In so doing they may fail to recognize that the factors that frustrate them,
such as the lack of professional skills and facilities, are actually their reason for being
An SF deployment usually requires more than mere performance of a professional role; it
usually implies that the advisor is expected to bring about organizational and individual
changes in behavior. This may mean trying to change how nationals conceive and play a
particular professional role, and it also may necessitate modifying the organizational and
political context in which the local national soldier operates. It frequently involves all of
these and more, such as the effective employment of the professional role in stimulating
or implementing broad institutional or national programs of social, economic, political, or
technological development.
Just as development requires an organizational flexibility almost impossible to establish
and maintain, it requires and attracts a diversity of men who differ in abilities,
knowledge, skills, styles of work and social behavior, values, and attitudes.
Analysts identify five types:

Type I, oriented purely on professional skills; mostly abroad for the first-time.

Type II oriented to interpersonal and social approaches in the work role; the
majority with prior overseas experience.

Type III, oriented to the administrative process of technical assistance; these were
first-timers with educational or administration experience

Type IV, oriented more to the job and the bureaucracy than to the problems,
people or administrative processes of assistance; chiefly people with long service.

Type V, chiefly concerned with adventure; all first-timers.

Role shock is least likely for a friendly, secure individual who is not distressed by the
possibility of change, operating in a well- structured situation about which he has been
given adequate information beforehand. But, as thousands of SF soldiers have already
discovered, such situations rarely exist on overseas deployments.


Despite the frustrations and problems of an overseas deployment, most look back on it as
a unique and memorable experience. They count their memories and personal rewards in
terms of personal and professional achievement, travel, adventure, excitement, and
cross-cultural friendships.
Some of the more perceptive look at themselves closely and admit to such personal
dividends as growth in maturity, patience, tolerance, and sell-understanding. Some are
more contented with life and seek to build closer family ties, while others find it easier to
laugh at themselves. Most find it much more difficult to assess how much they really
achieved while abroad; some are dissatisfied with the amount of progress they were able
to make, and a minority feel their talents were not used or were misused. Similarly,
many seem disappointed with the degree to which their overseas experience is
recognized, rewarded, or even drawn upon after their return stateside.
Even so, most advisors express positive attitudes toward assistance and its importance in
the future of the world.
Despite the problem of cross-cultural work with its accompanying culture and role shock,
behavior does change, and, in most cases, in directions that permit both personal and
professional growth in the course of developing other people, institutions, and countries.
Overseas deployments make it possible for soldiers to adjust and learn, to make their
contributions, and to return with new attitudes, points of view, knowledge, and skills.
This is the important dividend, a dividend expressed in the numbers of people who can
not only carry out their professional roles under field conditions but can move effectively
in and out of inter-cultural relationships.


Attitudes, values and beliefs can vary significantly between the various cultural regions.
Nevertheless, small, rural towns and villages in the less developed parts of the world have
some important commonalities such as resistance to change. Experience has shown that
the practices shown below are effective across cultural regions.
1. Become well acquainted with the culture of the people with whom you will work. A
thorough knowledge of their culture is the key that will open the door to success. Read all
available literature on their culture. Expect cultural shifts to occur more rapidly than
described in available literature. There is no substitute for living closely with the people
to absorb their culture.

2. Respect the beliefs and taboos of the local people.

3. Guard the confidence placed in you. Do not divulge intimate secrets.
4. During planning, stay in the background as much as possible. Your role is that of a
5. During execution, do not get so far ahead of the advisees that you will lose them.
6. Be willing to compromise.
7. Keep an open mind and attempt to operate within the cultural pattern as closely as
8. Include casual conversations as one of your advisory tools. Influence can be wielded
effectively outside formal settings. Try to employ examples and short stories that are
relevant to the local culture and point up a lesson.
9. Keep a keen sense of humor. Humor and laughter are wonderful tools for building
rapport if used in culturally correct ways.
10. Be what you are - don't pretend. Otherwise unsophisticated people often have the
knack of looking into your personality.
11. Patience is a golden attribute in working with non-Western people. They may not
have the same "drives" as Western people.
12. Expect counterparts to be long on promises and short on deliveries. They have
warded off the "haves" for centuries by this method.
13. Do not expect to use your Western measuring stick for honesty and morals. The
same values do not apply.
14. Live as close to those with whom you work as possible, but don't "go native." You
are an ambassador for your country and will be evaluated accordingly.
15. Accept each local national as he is and respect him as an individual. Never look
down on a man, but treat him with dignity. In associations with local officers and
officials, even village officials, dignify their positions.
16. Take nothing for granted and be prepared for surprises.
17. Do not identify or align yourself too closely with either the "Haves" or "Have-nots."
To be effective, you must have the respect and confidence of both groups.


18. Do not expect to find U.S. democracy duplicated in an overseas democracy. It has
taken us centuries to develop ours.
19. Beware of offhand remarks made in unguarded moments. A casual comment can
come back to haunt you.
20. The things that don't concern you should be left along. People in developing areas
are often inclined to be superstitious and secretive and will guard these with their lives.
21. Work within a team for maximum training possibilities. Even a lone wolf is much
more productive when he works with the pack.
22. Do not make fun of the actions of your advisees or their people, even off to the side.
Do not stand in groups of SF soldiers going over the day. Avoid laughing out loud while
in a group apart. Save all internal critiques and reviews for a private place where your
team will not be observed or overheard. Only let your hair down in private.



Purpose: This chapter provides basic information on negotiation and cross-cultural
negotiation for use by SF elements. In a sense, almost every negotiation an advisor
engages in will be cross-cultural. Most of this Reference Book deals with cross-cultural
issues between major cultural groups. But, as noted earlier, these major cultures have
sub-cultures. This chapter addresses cross-cultural communications in the usual sense
but also provides information that can form the basis of interagency negotiations. Within
the United States armed forces, each service has its own unique culture. This is equally
true of the various U.S. government agencies an advisor will deal with. It is even truer of
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.

As experienced military leaders, most SF personnel have some experience in mediation,
negotiation and complex problem solving. Each of these functions has been an inherent
part of their supervisory and leadership experience.
Before any negotiation begins, the commander that dispatches an SF advisor or unit into
a situation where negotiation will be required must provide a proper mandate. The senior
advisor or liaison in the deploying unit must know exactly what authority he has been
given to make binding agreements. This mandate must provide clear limits on this
authority. It is not good enough for a commander to say, Do the best you can and dont
get us into trouble.
Commanders must be aware that negotiations will take longer in the foreign country.
The deploying team or individual should tell the commander about the cultural
differences they have discovered that will influence the negotiations. If a commander is
not prepared beforehand, he may put unnecessary pressure on the advisor or liaison
during the negotiations. He will expect results. If the SF negotiator tries to explain the
lack of results while abroad, he might think that the negotiator is merely making excuses.
U.S. negotiators should have written instructions that outline their limits on the various
issues and explain the overall U.S. intent. These instructions, signed by the head of the
responsible U.S. organization or agency (e.g., local U.S. commander or U.S.
Ambassador) should allow the negotiators maximum flexibility. Understanding the
source of authority for all of the other negotiating parties (both friendly and opposition)
helps determine the validity of an agreement and can reduce the potential for follow-on



Common military activities such as investigations may not be thought of as negotiations,
but in a sense they are and can benefit from application of even the most basic
negotiation technique the phased approach.
"I had to play many roles during the investigation at the riverside checkpoint. I started
by greeting them in the traditional manner, all the courtesies; tell them where I'm from.
I'd let them talk and I'd establish who was senior in their group... I stated their
government's policy, they of course denied demanding any money from the boats
downriver. I then let them know I had witnesses... next, that the U.N. Human Rights and
Military Police may have to come - again showing the force behind you... perhaps their
motorcycle might have to be confiscated... in the end I was able to recover all the money
they'd taken."
This is an example of an adaptable, phased approach to investigation, the principles of
which remain consistent from situation to situation. For example, always being courteous
but firm, sensitive to the issue of face saving; and escalating only as required.
An information-gathering example also portrays the phased approach:
"I'd ask how the crops were doing - is there anybody really sick - how do you get
medical help? How do you get your sick people to hospital? After some discussion, I
could move into... do you have any weapons and ammunition to protect yourself... most
had a communal meetinghouse lockup. The headman had the key. Gradually I'd
introduce the question of when was the last time troops or bandits visited your village are you concerned - what do you think? It was mostly conversational, kept relaxed, they
were more receptive to you, it was much easier, and the ceasefire violation stuff would
start to come. You didn't have to come out point-blank."
Negotiating is not easy. It requires the ability to maintain an open mind, the sensitivity to
observe and grasp the situation, and most importantly, the ability to listen with
understanding. Traditional negotiation strategies often leave the participants dissatisfied,
worn out, or alienated, and frequently all three. Many negotiators advocate a strategy
based on a method developed by the Harvard Negotiation Project: Principled Negotiation.
Unlike positional bargaining, the principled negotiation method focuses on basic
interests, mutually satisfying options, and fair standards that typically result in a good
agreement acceptable to all parties.
Four points of principled negotiations:

Separate people from the problem. Attack the problem, not the personality.

Focus on interests; not positions.

Invent options for mutual gain.


Insist on using objective criteria.

This chapter is not intended to make the reader an expert in negotiation techniques,
however, understanding the four points of principled negotiation may assist the novice
negotiator to improve his skills.
Human beings are not machines. They have strong emotions, different perceptions, and
have difficulty communicating with each other. Feelings typically become entangled
with the objective merits of the problem. Negotiators should see themselves as working
side by side, attacking the problem, not each other. This can be very difficult since many
negotiators see the process as a contest of wills. This does not mean that personalities
arent important or that personal relationships cant be leveraged. It does mean that
these considerations should not be the centerpiece of the negotiation process.
Inexperienced negotiators tend to focus on their side's stated positions when the object of
the negotiation is to satisfy their underlying interests. A negotiating position often
obscures the main objective.
Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding. Set aside a designated time to think
up a wide range of possible solutions. They should have mutual gains whenever possible
and where interests conflict, results should be based on fair standards independent of the
will of either side.
Where interests are directly opposed, insist that the result be based on some objective
standard such as previous agreements, market value, expert opinion, custom, or law. By
discussing such criteria, neither party must lose to the other, rather both parties can defer
to a fair solution.


Selection of U.S. Negotiators. The U.S. military is not normally responsible for largescale formal negotiations, but the possibility for these actions exists. On small-scale (e.g.
hostage situations or surrender of small elements) all military members could be
involved. When possible, a negotiator should be fluent in the language of all parties, be
familiar with the cultures of all parties, have experience in political negotiations, and
fully comprehend the total situation. Additionally, negotiators should be honest and


sincere and present the appearance of being in control, yet open to considering other
points of view.
Structure of the Negotiation Facilities. The size, shape, orientation, quality, color, and all
physical aspects of the facilities can have impacts on the negotiations. Unless
specifically desired, all parties should have the same size flags, banners, chairs, tables,
etc., as well as the same number of translators and other support personnel in the actual
negotiation chambers. Should there be more than two negotiation parties, it can be
important to set up the negotiation table with an understanding of links and or conflicts
between each of the parties.
Number of Parties Involved in the Negotiations. The number of parties represented in
the actual negotiations should be held to the absolute minimum; however, all-important
factions must be represented either through direct negotiations or some form of coalition
with other directly involved parties.


Know what you want out of a meeting before you walk into it.

Do not shame anyone.

Be cautious about making promises.

Slow discussions when appropriate.

Be aware and respectful of status and age when talking to people.

Never underestimate the other guy.

Avoid contradicting people.

Understand the cultural implications of a direct "NO."

Stress formality.

End discussions on a positive note.

Know ahead of time what you can concede and what you cannot.


As noted repeatedly, culture affects language, behaviors and the way in that people
handle conflict. In one culture, people may prefer to use a competitive style (win-lose),
while in another culture people may prefer compromise or accommodation (win-win).
Cultural differences may cause a clash between what the parties expect, and what their
families and communities expect. This has an obvious effect on negotiating behavior.
Negotiations among members of the same culture can be stressful, but negotiating with
members of another culture can be far more difficult. However, working with other
cultures is a basic skill for the Special Forces member and an absolute requirement when
acting in an advisory or foreign liaison role. Understanding the factors discussed will
help reduce the difficulty of cross-cultural negotiation.

Most Americans have certain preconceived ideas about people from other cultures.
These perceptions may not be factually based, but they nevertheless exist and they
influence the way they approach negotiations with foreigners.
Similarly, foreign negotiators have certain perceptions about American negotiators.
Again, these perceptions may not be based on fact, but they exist. You need to know
how other cultures perceive American negotiators so that you can adjust your negotiating
style accordingly. Capitalize on the positive perceptions. Try to find ways to neutralize
the negative perceptions they may have of you.
Research has shown that different cultures hold different perceptions of Americans. For
instance, most cultures think that Americans are hard working. The Japanese, however,
dont associate this trait with Americans. The Japanese see Americans as rude, while
most other cultures dont think of Americans in these terms.
Foreign negotiators often think that Americans are culturally insensitive. They think that
Americans are interested only in their own culture, language, methods and customs.
Where do these perceptions come from? Most Americans can only speak English. They
tend to insist on their own customs. These two facts cause foreigners to think that
Americans are not interested in other cultures. U.S. negotiators often do not regard it
necessary to learn any foreign language. If negotiators from other cultures want to deal
with Americans, they must do so in English.
These perceptions can create negative attitudes. The U.S. negotiator must therefore be
aware that foreign negotiators may have negative feelings about them. They must realize
that they must counter these perceptions. It does not mean that U.S. negotiators must
learn the foreign language. It will go a long way to learn a few simple phrases in the
foreign language. Learn the words for hello, please, thank you, Good morning!
Goodbye!, I hope to see you soon, and so on. Also learn how to address people. In

recent years it has become common for strangers in the U.S. to address each other by
their first names. This is not the rule in most cultures. Most prefer to be addressed by
some honorific. It may be regarded as rude by your counterpart, if you address him by
his first name. This is especially true of those who hold important positions, academic
titles or military ranks. In some African societies it is common to address government
officials as chief much as U.S. officials are sometimes addressed as the honorable Ms.
Such and such. Find out the equivalent of military ranks and common titles (Mr., Mrs.,
Colonel, Professor, Doctor. etc.) in the local language. Use titles until your counterpart
invites you to use his first name or another title.
Another way to counteract negative perceptions about American cultural sensitivity is to
have information about you, your organization and your mission translated into the
foreign language. There are excellent software packages to translate important messages
into French, Spanish, German, Italian and various other languages. It is not necessary to
translate all documents into the foreign language. Often a translation of one or two
important documents will do. It will show your opposite number that you appreciate his
language. It will help to overcome negative perceptions he or she may have about your
interest in and knowledge of his culture.

As a member of an individualistic culture the typical American negotiator prefers to
negotiate on his own or to have a very small negotiating team of, at most, two or three
people. If he has a team, he wants to be in control of that team. He is the leader and he
will not allow anyone in his team to do anything without the approval or authority of the
leader. U.S. culture focuses on the individuals performance, initiative and
Most other cultures of the world place less emphasis on the individual and more on the
group. The cultures that are very group conscious include the Latin American countries
of Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Columbia; also cultures in the Pacific Rim,
such as Japan, Malaysia, Hong Kong, China and Taiwan. Most African cultures in
Southern Africa also emphasize group decision-making. Not the individual in the group,
but the group as a whole takes decisions. That explains why negotiations in these
countries usually take long. The whole group must be convinced that a concession is
If you arrive for important negotiations in these countries all by yourself, your
counterparts may get the idea that you are ill prepared and unprofessional. After all, you
do not have experts to advise or support you during the negotiations. In some cultures,
Russia for example, sending a single negotiator or a very small team can be taken to
mean that your side is not serious.
Also, if you try to negotiate on your own with groups of ten or more negotiators facing
you, you will probably come unstuck. You must absorb the pressure from many people.
You must convince the whole group if you intend making a deal with them. It divides

your focus among the team members of the other side, while they can focus on you alone.
This can be a nerve-wracking experience.
Increase the size of your team when you are negotiating with people from these cultures.
Find out in advance how many people your counterpart will include in his team. Increase
the number of your team members. Include experts to help you during the negotiations.
At the other end of the scale, negotiators from Europe, Canada and Caucasian negotiators
in Southern Africa, place more emphasis on individual decision-making. Nevertheless,
their decision-making is still less individualistic than that of U.S. negotiators. When you
are negotiating with people from these cultures, you do not have to adjust your approach
too much. Concentrate on the chief decision maker. You must convince him or her. But
do not entirely overlook the other members in his team. They will still influence him
during private discussions and caucuses.

Americans like punctuality. However, this virtue differs from one culture to the next.
For instance, people from Australia, the Benelux countries, France, Germany,
Switzerland, Sweden, the U.K. and Japan put an even higher value on punctuality.
Afrikaans and English-speaking people in South Africa value punctuality on the same
level as Americans.
Time is relative for people in Mexico and other Latin American countries. Members of
the African culture region cannot understand why others have to conduct all their
activities according to a clock. Appointments often start late, are ignored or are


The pace of negotiations in the United States is faster than in most other cultures.
Consequently, the negotiating process between Americans is much shorter. In the
opening phase of negotiations, the American negotiator does not spend much time on
time on introductions and getting to know his counterpart. He would, for instance, pay
little attention to building rapport or creating a positive and relaxed negotiating climate.
He would not show much interest in finding out the roles of the team members in the
counterparts negotiating team. He would also not spend much time in introducing
himself and the other members of his team. The American negotiator usually gets down
to the task of negotiating very quickly.
This results oriented approach may create the impression with foreign counterparts that
the U.S. negotiator is untrustworthy. He is trying to force a decision at the expense of the
other side. He is likely to exploit the situation and his counterpart. If the U.S.
negotiators behavior creates such a negative perception, the foreign negotiator will try to
avoid making deals with him. The foreign negotiator does not simply want to arrive at a
settlement or conclusion; he wants to build a positive relationship for future negotiations.

In many international negotiations, the opening phase takes much longer than in the
United States. Negotiators from many other cultures spend much more time on
relationship issues and building rapport. In some cultures the opening phase may take
twice the time it would in the United States. If you do not force yourself to slow this
important phase of negotiations you will fail to get vital information from your
counterpart, may create distrust; you will weaken your position to get vital concessions
from him.
The time span of the strengthening phase of negotiations in most other cultures is about
the same as in the United States. However, the time span of the movement phase is much
slower in international negotiations. This means that the American negotiator must force
him to slow the movement phase. You must resist the temptation to start making
concessions early in order to get the negotiation moving or demonstrate willingness to
compromise. You may be making unnecessary concessions, by that weakening your
position. Research findings show that the party who makes the first concession usually
gets the worst part of a deal.
American negotiators generally want to close negotiations much faster than negotiators in
other cultures. They often work under time pressure and they need to produce results
quickly so that they can attend to other tasks. American negotiators tend to spend much
less time on cementing the relationship.
A counterpart may offer to help with travel arrangements as an act of courtesy. Beware,
accepting this offer can reveal valuable information about the time that you have
available for the negotiations. The opposing negotiator may use this information to put
on additional pressure as time draws for your departure. Time is a source of leverage that
can be used against you. You will be in a weak position to discuss important issues.
Negotiators from Canada, the Benelux countries, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom maintain a pace almost similar to what Americans are used to.
The negotiating pace in countries such as Italy, Spain and Australia is somewhat slower
than in the United States. Negotiators of European descent in South Africa also negotiate
at a pace, which is a little slower than the American pace.
French, German, Russian, Latin American, Japanese and other Pacific Rim negotiators
are used to a much slower negotiating pace. Traditionally, African negotiators also use a
much slower negotiating pace. You must significantly slow your own pace when you are
negotiating with people from any of these cultures.


As implied in the preceding discussion, personal relationships have low importance
between American negotiators. They are very competitive during negotiations and are
inclined to stress short-term results. Building long-term relationships occurs after the
successful completion of negotiations.
This trait does not necessarily stand in the way of solid intercultural negotiations.
Negotiators from many other cultures also play down the building of relationships.
Countries in Western Europe vary somewhat in the importance they place on personal
relationships. German and French negotiators are very like Americans in placing little
value on development of longer-term relationships. However, British, Scandinavian and
Swiss negotiators display a slightly larger need to build relationships than other countries
in Western Europe. Spanish and Italian negotiators have an even higher need to establish
good relationships with their negotiating counterparts.
Except for Southern Africa, negotiators from the African cultures often display a high
need to build relationships among themselves, but a low need to do so with negotiators
from non-African cultures.
Most Eastern European cultures place even less emphasis than Americans on personal
relationships for the successful negotiating of a deal. This is unlike the Russian cultural
region, where negotiators display a slightly greater need for personal relationships. Their
need is much the same as that of Americans.
In South American and Middle East cultures, personal relationships rate high among the
needs of negotiators. The same applies to cultures in the Pacific Rim. Friendship opens
the door to a successful negotiation. Negotiators often expect to get together before
negotiations so that they can get to know each another socially.
Even during negotiation, members of these cultures spend a long time on general
conversation before they get down to business. They spend a lot more time on the
opening phase of negotiations than members of most other cultures. In terms of their
culture it is first necessary to know the person with whom they are negotiating. They
have a high need to trust that person before they can start making deals with him. When
negotiating with people from these cultures, plan to engage in some small talk at first.
Avoid subjects such as politics, race, gender issues and religion. These subjects seldom
help to build relationships between strangers. Try discussing their countrys history,
cultural heritage, traditions, beautiful countryside, contribution to the arts, economic
successes and popular sports such as soccer. Asking about local restaurants is usually a
safe neutral topic to begin a conversation. These topics usually allow counterparts to get
acquainted and to break the ice. Be prepared to talk about typical American traditions,
sports and your cultural heritage. Be careful not to go overboard with talk about
America. Many foreigners perceive Americans as pompous and overbearing.


Business, government, and military personnel in Western European countries, especially
the Benelux countries, Germany and France, commonly speak English. However, in
France your counterpart may expect you to speak French or to use an interpreter,
although he may be fully conversant in English. The French do not like to speak English.
They are very proud of their language. They will make you understand that they are
doing you a huge favor to talk with you in English.
Arab cultures, like most, often appreciate the foreigner who takes the trouble to learn a
few simple courtesy words (hello, good-by, please, good morning, etc). However, they
greatly treasure spoken Arabic and often prefer that foreigners who do not speak fluent
Arabic refrain from using more than a few courtesy words. Many Arab business people,
officials and military officers speak at least some English and are often quite fluent.
In some other countries in Western Europe, such as in Spain, Portugal and Italy, people
do not commonly speak English. You will probably need an interpreter during the
negotiations. Your counterpart will also expect you to present him with a detailed written
proposal in the local language.
You will need an interpreter in many countries where English is not a common language.
These countries include Russia, Eastern European countries and China.
English is widely spoken in military, government and business circles in the Pacific Rim
countries and in Latin America. In some Middle East countries, it is mainly the educated
classes who can speak English. In Israel, however, many people can speak English.
English is a common language in Sub-Saharan Africa because of the vast number of
tribal dialects. In South Africa, for example, there are eleven official languages for
various ethnic groups. However, English is the main business language, with Afrikaans
taking second place. English and French are common among the educated in subSaharan Africa with English more common in East Africa. English is an official
language of Kenya. The western portion has more French speakers who often consider
an ability to speak French the mark of an educated person.
In some countries you may be required to produce documents, especially agreements, in
both English and the local language.


The basic elements common to all negotiations must be applied in way that allows for the
differing cultures of the participants.


The opening strategies of negotiators differ from culture to culture. In the U.S.A.
negotiators tend to open with offers or demands that are far away from their final
positions. They leave a healthy margin to bargain. In some countries, negotiators may
use almost the same approach as U.S. negotiators, but in others they may use completely
different strategies.
When negotiating with people from Mexico, Canada, South Africa, Spain and the
Scandinavian countries, expect them to have almost the same opening approach as U.S.
negotiators. They leave themselves with strong margins to enable them to make
concessions during the negotiations. Although they will reluctantly move away from
their opening positions, they tend to make large concessions initially. Later concessions
will be smaller.
Negotiators from Japan, China, Taiwan, Singapore and most other Pacific Rim countries
also tend to open high, but not as high as American or Canadian negotiators. Bear in
mind that negotiators from these countries might not leave themselves as much
bargaining room as would American negotiators.
Negotiators from the Middle East and Russia usually open with high to extremely high
demands. The Russians are especially known to open with extreme demands or offers,
often straining or even exceeding credibility. They leave themselves lots of bargaining
room. You should be aware of this so that you can build enough fat into your own
negotiating range. Dr. Henry Kissinger adapted his negotiating style in this way. In his
negotiations with the U.S.S.R. he also opened with extreme demands and offers. If
agreement must be reached somewhere between the two sides opening positions, it
would not make sense to start with a moderate demand. Rather, the distance between the
opening positions should be increased to leave one with enough bargaining room. During
the negotiating process, one may then also expect much haggling, dickering and
argument. The conflict level may also be high.
African negotiators tend to open with high to extreme demands. This is especially
evident in labor negotiations.
In some other countries, negotiators open with moderate demands or offers that are close
to their Walk Away Positions. You may expect them to move slowly and to make small
concessions. Most countries in Western Europe (excepting Spain and the Scandinavian
countries) fall in this category. Also, negotiators from most Latin American countries,
excluding Mexico, and countries in the Middle East, open with moderate demands.
Although there are cultural differences between Americans and negotiators from other
countries, a general rule is to aim high. High initial positions lower your counterparts
expectations. They convey a silent message that you believe in your case. They also
leave enough bargaining space to make concessions. These positions allow your
counterpart to win concessions from you without materially affecting the final outcome.

This allows him to save face. He can tell his commander or principal that he was
American negotiators tend to be extremely direct. They ask their counterpart direct
questions such as how do you feel about my proposal? American negotiators want a
quick result. They want to get on with the negotiations. They are time driven. This
approach is almost unique in the world outside the American and European cultural
regions and can create difficulties. Negotiators from most other cultures do not
appreciate such directness. They think Americans are pushy and they resent this
Latin American negotiators, also negotiators from Russia, Africa and the Pacific Rim are
less forthright than Americans.
In particular, members of the Pacific Rim cultural region (especially China and Japan)
typically negotiate very indirectly. One usually has to listen between the lines. It is
necessary to interpret the specific message within the general context of the
negotiations. A Japanese negotiator, for example, may agree with you without really
saying yes. Similarly, he may say yes without agreeing with you. When he says yes, it
may simply mean that he understands your message.
African negotiators also express themselves with less forthrightness than Americans,
although not to the same extent as most East Asians.
American negotiators prefer to deal with one issue at a time. They are usually exact with
information to back up proposals. Also they deal directly with differences and they like
to make formal presentations. Detailed discussions of issues are common. U.S.
negotiators try to get through the negotiations as quickly and efficiently as possible.
They are results driven.
The negotiating behavior of people from Europe is much the same as American
negotiators. They candidly express disagreements, but they do it politely. However, most
European opponents are more precise with facts than U.S. negotiators. They expect
greater detail in presentations and will analyze the information very closely. They
appreciate conceptually strong presentations. They are argumentative and like to debate
issues to search for flaws in the logic of the opposing position. If they discover such a
flaw, they will focus on it and fully exploit it. Any hesitation in answering their
questions will probably be taken as a sign of uncertainty, weak preparation,
unprofessional behavior, or worse, as an indication of deceit.
By contrast, African negotiators are less interested in the underlying logic of a position
and more prone to focus on specific facts and the details of propositions with extensive

questioning and debate. This can be a drawn out process and one can expect lengthy
debates. Negotiations are often long, slow and frustrating. Collective decision-making
helps to slow the negotiating process even further. Many caucuses take place and the
negotiators often want to consult people who are affected by the negotiations, but who
are not present. Although they prefer to discuss groups of issues, they are quick to pick
out the good concessions and to continue negotiating the ones they do not like. They will
usually state any disagreements quickly. Sometimes they may disagree so fiercely that it
could be interpreted as rudeness. However, it does not mean that they want to affront you.
It is less a negotiating tactic than a normal means of expression and they may not mean
any harm with it.
Russian and Eastern European negotiators also expect rational presentations and will
ardently argue the reliability of the facts presented. They often want to link issues and
discuss groups of issues instead of one issue at a time. Consequently the American
negotiator must be thoroughly prepared and ready to discuss more than one issue at a
Latin American and Middle East negotiators are notably passionate and argumentative.
Emotions play a significant role during these negotiations. They express themselves
strongly and vividly. They may wave their arms, speak very loudly, vigorously shake
their heads, and throw down their pens to show their astonishment at the opposing sides
positions. A negotiator who does not expect this behavior will feel uncomfortable,
embarrassed and perhaps even ashamed of his proposals. Be prepared to deal with these
emotional displays without allowing them to lead to unnecessary concessions. The best
way to do this is to allow the opponent to wave his arms, to sigh demonstratively and so
on without reacting to it. Do not take it personally. He probably does not intend to
embarrass you or to make you uncomfortable. It is simply part of his culture and it is
best not too pay too much attention to it. The worst thing to do when encountering this
behavior is to start making concessions. That will reward your opponent for his behavior.
Negotiators from the Pacific Rim prefer to have lots of information and facts to help them
decide. They use considerable technical detail to back up their proposals and they will
expect the same of their opponents. Their negotiating style is reserved and they will
quietly and politely disagree with you. Expect the negotiations to be long. Pacific Rim
negotiators (especially Japanese, Chinese, Malaysian and Hong Kong) like to carefully
analyze information. The exception is Singapore where it is customary to negotiate
briskly. Also, the group decision making practiced in most Pacific Rim countries slows
the negotiating process because all the members of the other sides team must agree.
Americans are tough negotiators. They concede points very reluctantly and they save
their concessions until late in the negotiations. When they do concede an issue, the
concession often is the only one they are prepared to make on the issue. In other words,
when they make the concession, they are not likely to make another on the same issue.


This means that they tend to hold out for a long time without making any concession.
When they eventually move, they tend to make the whole concession in one move.
Other cultures may have different concession behaviors. The successful negotiator needs
to know these concession behaviors. If you know what to expect, you can better prepare
to adapt your strategy accordingly.
Negotiators from Europe use a hard line approach similar to Americans.
As noted earlier group consensus is important to African negotiators and they tend to
base their decisions on this consensus. This significantly slows the negotiating process
and leads to an escalating pattern of concession making with the larger concessions made
toward the end.
As noted, negotiators from Russia and Eastern Europe tend to take an even harder line
than Americans or Europeans and also move very slowly. This includes the granting of
any concessions. Russian negotiators customarily have very limited authority and must
regularly report back to their principals. Due to considerable red tape, several negotiating
sessions, with lengthy periods between, may be necessary to complete an agreement.
Negotiators from the Pacific Rim move slowly. Here too, group agreement is important
and decisions are based on group consensus.
In the United States military, business and government organizational power tends to
spread from the top downwards. The most important job in any organization is the most
senior officer who has final decision-making power. However, in the US it is common to
delegate much of this power to subordinates of middle rank. Officers lower down the
line are often involved in key decisions. A middle-ranking officer may have considerable
power to decide everyday issues and he may have full authority to negotiate on certain
In Western Europe organizational the involvement of mid-ranking officers in key
decisions is low. There is no large degree of delegation of powers. In Eastern Europe
power is even more centralized and bureaucratic. This slows the negotiating process and
you might not get to know which person can make decisions. When you are negotiating
in Europe, ensure that your counterpart has the authority to take decisions.
In Latin American countries, the senior officer makes decisions. Middle ranking
negotiators will take their cue from the more senior in the negotiating team. Here you
have to concentrate on convincing the negotiation leaders of the merit of your proposals.
Along the Pacific Rim organizational power tends to be more-or-less evenly distributed
among the various levels of management. Decision-making is based on group consensus.
The leader of the other sides team may not have the authority to make arrangements with

you. He may, however, have the authority to shut the door in your face in other words,
he may have the authority to say No and not Yes.
In African organizations power often follows the hierarchy of the organization. The most
senior officer or manager will make decisions, but he will consult with those lower in
rank. He will however make is own decisions if he believes his view is correct, even in
the face of opposition of lower officers. During negotiations you must consequently
concentrate on the most senior, without ignoring the importance of convincing the group.
No one likes to be embarrassed, but U.S. negotiators have a comparatively low need to
save face during negotiations. Negotiators from cultures such as Latin America, Japan
and other Pacific Rim countries, show a far greater need to save face. In these countries
it can be a major disaster to undermine the respect and value of your opponent in the eyes
of his colleagues. For instance, do not address the person on the other side who speaks
the best English. The more senior person in the other team may take this as an insult. He
will not easily forgive you. Also, do not use curses or vulgar expressions during
negotiations not even in unguarded moments. Do not make criticisms unless it is
absolutely necessary; and then do it in private. But most important of all, prepare to
make concessions that the opponents can take away as wins or gains.
Americans are known for their willingness to approach the courts for legal assistance.
The impact of this phenomenon on negotiations is that foreigners may not trust
Americans who want to create extensively detailed agreements. They may see it as the
American negotiators first step toward taking them to court. After all, they argue, we
want to build a relationship with the person with whom we are negotiating we dont need
a piece of paper. We need to trust the other party.
You consequently must be sensitive about these cultural differences. Look into your
foreign counterparts culture in this respect. You need to balance your counterparts
smaller need for detailed contracts with your need to secure your own interests.
Negotiators from many countries place far less emphasis on detailed agreements than
American negotiators. Some Latin American and Pacific Rim countries, as well as
Middle East countries fall in this category. They want to create relationships, not pieces
of paper. Trust is the corner stone of their negotiations with others. If they do not trust
you, you will have a serious problem in trying to make a deal with them.
The Americans high need for detailed agreements is shared by various other cultures.
Negotiators from the European culture region also have a very high need for detailed
contracts. When you negotiate with these people, you probably will not experience any
problems when you want to draft extensive agreements.


His is also true of many African negotiators. You consequently will not experience
problems on this aspect when you are negotiating with people from these countries.
Be sensitive about these cultural differences. Explore beforehand your foreign
counterparts culture in this respect. You need to balance your counterparts smaller need
for detailed agreements with your need to secure your own interests.

Ordinarily we think of negotiation as an attempt to argue one position against another.
But the SF advisor or liaison may well find himself in a very different form of negotiation
mediating between two opposing parties.
Mediation is a peaceful method for resolving differences and disputes with the help of an
outside intermediary. However, people fail to use mediation for many reasons. It is often
not explained properly. Some people do not understand it. Others mistake it for
arbitration, where someone makes a decision for the parties. Culture affects the way
people view mediation.
As noted repeatedly, culture affects language, behaviors and the way in which people
handle conflict. In one culture, people may prefer to use a competitive style (win-lose),
while in another culture people may prefer compromise or accommodation (win-win).
Cultural differences may cause a clash between what the parties expect, and what their
families and communities expect. In Western society, neutrality of the mediator is
important. In an African society, for instance, this idea of neutrality may clash with what
the community expects of the mediator, namely to give advice or to suggest solutions. If
the mediator does not offer advice, the African parties may feel that the mediator is
ineffective. The Western party may feel that the mediator is doing a great job. If the
mediator does offer advice, the African may feel that the mediator is doing a great job,
but the Western person may feel that the mediator is biased.
What is the meaning of neutrality when the mediator comes from a different background
than the disputants? In South Africa, for example, the mediator may be an Indian and of
the Islam faith. One disputant may be an Afrikaner and of the Christian Protestant faith,
while the other disputant may be a Zulu with strong beliefs in the spirits of his ancestors.
The two disputants may view the mediator and one another with such skepticism that
mediation may not be possible at all. The mediator will have a major task convincing the
disputants of neutrality. He or she must find ways to prove neutrality. An alternative is
to use co-mediators: One Indian, one Afrikaner and one Zulu. But this is seldom
Think of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israelis come from the Jewish faith; the
Palestinians are from the Islamic faith. The American President, who may follow the
Christian faith, may try to act as the mediator. Inevitably, the President must find ways
to get acceptance as a mediator. The late President Hussein had to get off his sick bed to
help President Clinton mediate a Middle East dispute.

Cultural differences may affect communication during mediation. Eye contact during
mediation may be appropriate between disputants of the same culture, but it may be
inappropriate between disputants from other cultures. In some cultures, maintaining eye
contact is a sign of respect; in others it is offensive. This could present problems if the
disputants come from different cultural backgrounds.
Cultural differences may affect decision-making behaviors. The mediator may try to
guide the parties through rational problem-solving stages. This may clash with parties'
cultural decision-making or conflict resolution patterns. That group may use circular
reasoning or passionate discussions.
Cultural differences affect values. Your values affect your desires and needs, while my
values affect mine. Our values may clash, but we may also share values, like the need to
maintain a job, to maintain trust and to protect family bonds.
In cross-cultural conflicts, huge imbalances of power may exist, particularly between
people from majority groups and minority groups. The more powerful party may exert
greater influence because of better negotiation skills or greater resources. To succeed at
mediation, a mediator may try to redistribute the power. When this happens, the more
powerful person could think that the mediator is no longer neutral and may, as a result,
withdraw from the process.
Despite these problems, it is possible to mediate successfully across cultural lines:
Understand that cultural values and biases influence all of us. Realize that cultural
conditioning may cause parties' negative feelings toward one another. Though the
problem-solving approach makes sense to many people, some still shift back to a
confrontational stance in certain situations. Some situations touch a deeper chord within
a negotiator, affecting the persons view of himself or herself as, for example, "someone
who gets things done." The underlying skill required here is the ability to see the conflict
clearly from our own perspective, clearly from the other persons perspective, and from
the point of view of a third party. Often, the negotiator has made a fundamental mistake"
by drawing conclusions about the other persons intentions. For example, if the other
person says something that seems insulting, we conclude that they said it in order to hurt
our feelings.


Approach each conversation as an opportunity to learn about the other persons

point of view. Think, "I wonder why they keep doing that?" instead of "Im sick
of them doing that and Im finally going to tell them so!"

Assume that you dont know what the other persons motivations are, because
chances are, you dont.

Keep facts separate; dont mix them up with feelings.

Discuss your feelings, but without mixing them with intentions or facts. "What
you did made me angry," is better than "Why are you constantly trying to upset

Look for solutions, not blame.

Be honest with yourself about your own motivations and feelings. Ask yourself
why you find this conversation difficult. Is it because of similar situations that
went badly in the past?

Realize difficult conversations are part of life. They arent going to go away, but
they can become easier and more constructive.


The negotiating techniques discussed in the first part of this appendix can also be applied
to relationships between the various U.S. governmental agencies. For the best results,
this section should be read in conjunction with the appendix on working with embassies.
One of the special operations imperatives is facilitate interagency efforts. SF advisors
must constantly strive for unity of effort in the interagency and combined environment,
that is characteristic of advisor missions. The missions conducted by SF are most often
an interagency effort in which the military represents only one aspect (often not the most
important one) of an overall program. In many nations, however, the military is often the
most effective (if not the only functioning) bureaucracy. At the same time, economic
programs administered by USAID, for example, can be the central element of the U.S.
effort in a host nation. It can have a greater impact than any military program. Yet, in
order for AID to implement its programs, the active cooperation of the host nation
military is often required. The SF advisor may be the key link in gaining that
cooperation. The advisor must be cognizant of all programs and agencies that comprise
the U.S. effort. He must also act as a liaison between the surrogate military, U.S.
agencies, and other DOD components to ensure that a synergy of effects is achieved.
Any possible SF contribution may be seriously diminished if the advisors fail to
understand the need to assist and constantly coordinate with other agencies. This is not
always simple or straightforward.
It is clear that America's National Security Strategy requires civil and military agencies to
work together to accomplish cross-agency tasks of unprecedented complexity. Joint Pub
3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, identifies this requirement for interagency
coordination as a function of military operations in both war and MOOTW:
combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs work with U.S. Ambassadors, the DOS,

and other agencies to best integrate the military with the diplomatic, economic, and
informational instruments of national power.
However, this cooperation is not simply a matter for general officers. Interagency
cooperation is important even at the lowest levels. Whether nation-building, providing
assistance to budding democracies, combating transnational crime, countering
asymmetrical threats or supporting humanitarian assistance or peace operations, nearly
every significant security undertaking demands interagency teamwork.
Military forces have long coordinated with the headquarters or operating elements of the
Departments of State (DOS) and Transportation (DOT), the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), and the adjutants general of the states and territories. Though the Department of
Defense (DOD) may have little or no choice regarding the agencies engaged in a
particular operation or control over the individual agency agendas, understanding how
military coordination efforts interface with other organizations toward mission
accomplishment could provide the key to success in joint operations and unified actions.
Each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the
interagency table. In principle, this diversity is the strength of the interagency process,
providing a cross-section of expertise, skills, and abilities. In one coordinated forum, the
process integrates many views, capabilities, and options.
In actual practice, interagency planning and crisis responses are difficult under the best of
circumstances. They become especially so when they require government civilian
agencies to coordinate their activities with the military. There are several reasons for
this. Among the most important reasons are:

Decision making at the lowest levels is frequently thwarted because field

coordinators may not have the authority to speak for their agencies.

Each agency has core values that it will not compromise. These values form the
foundation upon which all other functions of the agency grow. In any interaction,
all participants must be constantly aware that each agency will continuously
cultivate and create external sources of support and will be maneuvering to
protect its core values.

Domestic politics are usually the single most important driver of the various U.S.
Government (USG) agencies agendas, which may or may not coincide with
international security issues. Sometimes, as in the Gulf War, there is some
congruency, but that is not always the case.

There is a tendency to hoard information. Information can reduce uncertainty and

enhance an organizations power. Information is the coin of the realm in
interagency operations, as it gives those who possess it a decided advantage in the
decision-making process.


Private agendas can significantly affect interagency consensus. The goals of an

institution may conflict with the private, usually short-term, agendas of its
members. Because personality plays such a large part in interagency operations,
personal agendas can be significant often even creating an informal hierarchy
of the department or agency.

Each agency, department, and organization has different access and a different
perspective on the international scene. This difference can result in a
dysfunctional approach to security issues.

This section examines interagency relationships and policy making from the standpoint
of the ways that agencies acquire the power they need in order to maintain themselves
and their programs. The officials of each agency (career bureaucrats) naturally and
necessarily take an "agency point of view," seeking to promote their agency's objectives.
Moreover, they have substantial resources -expertise, group support, and presidential and
congressional backing that help them to promote their agency's goals.
The three constitutional branches of government impose a degree of accountability on the
various agencies; but the U.S. system of government features fragmented authority,
freeing agencies from tight control. This is chiefly due to broad tendencies in the
American political system, particularly diversity and the separation of powers.
Federal agencies are subject to control by the president, Congress, and the judiciary, but
these controls place only general limits on the bureaucracy's power. A major reason
agencies are able to achieve power in their own right is that Congress and the president
often resist each other's attempts to control over the bureaucracy.


Agencies of the federal bureaucracy must fight for power in order to conduct their
programs effectively. Elections in the United States do not often provide a clear mandate
for either of the competing party platforms or the president's leadership. Because even
candidates of the same party do not have an agreed on agenda and because the president
and Congress are elected separately, the task of establishing programs and priorities is
dealt with largely after the elections. It involves a process of continuous bargaining and
power wielding. For example, the president will insist that his ideas should take
precedence, but so will Congress. Moreover, conflicting interests will make claims on
both the president and Congress. In short, the American political system does not produce
a government of clear and accepted objectives, but a government in which objectives are
always open to dispute.
If agencies are to operate successfully in this system, they must seek support where they
can find it-if not from the president, then from Congress; if not one interest, then from
another; if not today, then tomorrow. In other words, agencies must play politics.

They must devote themselves to building enough support to permit the effective
administration of their programs. If they do not, their goals will suffer because other
agencies that are willing to play politics will obtain the available funding, attention, and
support. The importance of this principle has increased because of the federal
government never has sufficient funding for all, or even most of, each years proposed
new spending. This fact, combined with the reality that world is a complex and
constantly changing place, requires a substantial reallocation of resources across policy
areas, and thus across federal agencies. Any agency that is content to merely wait while
new priorities for money and policy are determined is virtually certain to lose out.


Agency officials have little choice but to look out for their agency's interest. That
perspective that is called the agency point of view. Many officials are personally
committed to their agency's objectives as a result of having years at work on its
programs. More than 80 percent of all top careerists reach their high-level positions by
rising through the ranks of the same agency. One top bureaucrat said in testifying before
the House Appropriations Committee, "Mr. Chairman, you would not think it proper for
me to be in charge of this work and not be enthusiastic about it.... would you? I have been
in it thirty years, and I believe in it.
Professionalism also cements agency loyalties. As public policymaking become more
complex, scientists, engineers, lawyers, educators, physicians, and professionals have
increasingly filled high-level positions in the bureaucracy. Most of them take jobs in an
agency that has programs consistent with their professional values.

Why is it often so difficult for agencies and other organizations to work together?
Part of the answer is found in the fact that organizations, like nations, can have cultures
that are very different from on another. Even though all parties may agree to the ends
(as they do in the counterdrug war), the ways and the means may differ from agency to
agency. Distinct organizational cultures can inhibit cooperation among agencies.
Commonly an agency employs resources in ways that run counter to other agencies
cultures. What one agency views as by the book, another may see as slow and
bureaucratic; fast and loose to one is flexible and responsive to another.
The UN, international organizations, and nongovernmental and private volunteer
organizations often do not understand the military or military organization; likewise the
military often does not understand them. They often have exaggerated impressions of
military capabilities, and little or no understanding of limitations and restrictions. On the
other hand, the U.S. military personnel do not realize that those organizations do not have
a real chain of command as they are used to. In dealing with NGOs in particular it can
be very hard to know who to listen to. They generally lack one voice that could speak for
all subordinates, sometimes even within a single NGO.

Organizational behavior studies help to answer these questions by modeling general

patterns of behavior and known organizational characteristics that can facilitate or
impede interagency coordination and teamwork. Graham Allison developed three
conceptual models (or view points) that help explain and predict organizational behavior:

Rational Policy Model (Model I). Views organizations as rational entities;

characterized by purposeful "acts" and "choices."

Organizational Process Model (Model II). Views organizational outputs according

to standard patterns of behavior. Acknowledges parochial priorities; fractionated
power, programs, and repertoires; uncertainty avoidance; problem- directed
search; centralized coordination and control; limited flexibility; administrative
feasibility; and sequential attention to goals.

Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III). Considers internal politics and

organizational behavior as a matter of perceptions, interests, and stakes,
motivations, positions, power, and maneuvers of principal and players, from
which outcomes emerge. Leaders of these organizations cannot operate
autonomously. Organizational outputs result from bureaucratic bargaining and
the pulling and hauling of various central players that define the give and take of
politics. Allison's models help explain why agencies may at times appear to be
reluctant to pool their efforts and assets in support of a stated U.S. policy.

From a Model II perspective, it is irrational for an agency to be altruistic at the expense of

turf, longevity, or power. Organizations tend to protect themselves by distributing power
and responsibility for making decisions among various internal mini -bureaucracies.
When standard procedures are not followed and routines break down, bureaucracies are
susceptible to paralysis. Therefore, bureaucracies routinely avoid change and uncertainty.
According to Model III, adaptability to new and changing circumstances rests with the
people who constitute the organizations. Individuals breathe life into the bureaucratic
process. They may enable workarounds to meet a common goal, to enhance their feelings
of power, or to cope when they conclude that the stakes warrant nonstandard behavior.
This realization highlights an area of interagency coordination worth developing: the
pursuit of vetted working relationships and frequent sharing of perspectives.
Knowing how each organization coordinates its activities is also important to interagency
operations. According to organizational theorist James Q. Wilson, "An organization is
not simply, or even principally, a set of boxes, lines, and titles on an organizational
chart." If an interagency coordinating body is to have any hope of succeeding in the
complicated and ever changing game of intervention operations, then it must dedicate
itself to getting beyond organizations as they exist on paper. The values and cultures of
competing agencies need to be dissected, faces and personalities identified, and personal
relationships pursued and maintained. James Colvard believes government organizations
should learn from the better parts of the private sector, namely "a bias toward action,


small staffs, and a high level of delegation that is based on trust." Of course, making
changes to an existing bureaucratic structure comes at a cost, as Wilson reminds us:
If the organization must perform a diverse set of tasks, those tasks that are not part of the
core mission will need special protection. This requires giving autonomy to the
subordinate tasks sub-unit (for example, by providing for them a special organizational
niche) and creating a career track so that talented people performing non-mission tasks
can advance in the agency.

The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of interagency relationships into
which the DoD can enter in support of it mission For the purposes of this chapter the
term "agreement" is used in a generic sense and is intended to mean any of the four types
of legal instruments described below.
It is imperative to recognize that definitive differences exist between Interagency
Agreements, Cooperative Agreements, Memoranda of Agreement, and Memoranda of

Cooperative Agreement. A document describing a relationship between the

federal government and a state or local government or other entity when the
principal purpose is the transfer of money, property, services, or anything of value
to the state or local government or other entity. The purpose is to accomplish a
public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by federal statute in lieu of
acquisition by purchase or lease.

Interagency Agreement. A document describing an agreement between the DoD

and another federal agency for supplies or services provided by the other agency.
These agreements are also used to establish a cooperative or mutual assistance
relationship between two federal parties, and to transfer funds from one agency to

Memorandum of Understanding. A mutual understanding or agreement between

the DoD and a state or local government or other party that is set forth in a written
document in which both are participants. A Memorandum of Understanding does
not obligate funds.

Memorandum of Agreement. A mutually agreed relationship that differs from a

Memorandum of Understanding in that it provides for receipt of funds by the
DoD from a non-federal party.





Operations in foreign areas arise as a result of the United States' external relationships
and how they bear on the national interest. For the Department of Defense, in the
politico-military domain, this involves bilateral and multilateral military relationships,
treaties involving DOD interests, technology transfer, armaments cooperation and
control, and humanitarian assistance and peace operations.
Within a theater, the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning
and implementation of regional military strategies that require interagency coordination.
Coordination between the Department of Defense and other USG agencies may occur
through a country team or within a combatant command. In some operations, a Special
Representative of the President or Special Envoy of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral may be involved. The U.S. interagency structure within foreign countries
involves the Ambassador, country team system (that includes the Defense Attach Office
and the Security Assistance Organization), the American Embassy public affairs officer,
United States Information Service, and geographic combatant commands. These
agencies and relationships are dealt with in more detail in the appendix on working with
Combatant commands can promote interagency coordination and identify mutual
objectives if they: (1) identify all agencies and organizations that are or should be
involved in the operation; (2) establish an interagency hierarchy and define the objectives
of the response effort; (3) define courses of action for both theater military operations and
agency activities; (4) solicit from each agency, department, or organization a clear
understanding of the role that each plays; (5) identify potential obstacles to the collective
effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities; (6) identify the
resources of each participant in order to reduce duplication and increase coherence in the
collective effort; (7) define the desired end state and exit criteria; (8) maximize the
missions assets to support the longer term goals of the enterprise; and (9) establish
interagency assessment teams.

For interagency crisis response for operations within the United States and its territories
(other than for acts of terrorism), the Secretary of the Army is the Department of Defense
Executive Agent for execution and management of military support to civil authorities.
The Secretary of Defense retains the authority to approve the deployment of combatant
command resources and to authorize DOD involvement in operations that may include
the use of lethal force (e.g., civil disturbances). The Secretary of the Army executes and
manages domestic operations through the Director of Military Support and the supported
geographic combatant commander. When the Department of Defense responds to acts of
terrorism, the Secretary of Defense personally oversees the operation. Early in crisis
action planning for operations outside the continental United States and its territories, the
geographic combatant commander communicates with the appropriate Ambassador(s) as
part of crisis assessment. The Ambassador and country team are often aware of factors
and considerations that the geographic combatant commander might apply to develop
courses of action, and they are key to bringing together U.S. national resources within the
host country.


Military operations are based on doctrine that is intended to serve as a guide to
conducting them. In contrast, nongovernmental relief agencies typically lack formal
doctrine, though they may have some written standard operating procedures. The lack of
doctrine is not an impediment to successful cooperation, but it does make anticipating
requirements and coordinating responses more difficult for military staffs.
Some civilian government agencies, such as the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), have established formal doctrinal systems. For instance, field
agents of USAID's Disaster Assistance Response Team use a "Field Officer's Guide".
As military doctrine tells civilians how the military can be expected to operate,
familiarity with civilian "doctrine," whatever its form, can help to synchronize and
support interagency operations.
Although interagency integration problems are outlined in joint military doctrine, most
such documents leave it up to each regional commander-in-chief to decide how best to
focus interagency activities within his region. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military
Operations Other Than War, states that the Department of State will normally take the
lead in coordinating military operations other than war by working through an established
country team under the leadership of a U.S. Ambassador or special Presidential Envoy. It
also states that memoranda of agreement between civilian and military organizations may
improve coordination, as will the establishment of a civil-military operations center. But
the publication lacks definitive guidance for handling interagency problems.
Better interagency doctrine is contained in Joint Pub 3-08, Inter- agency Coordination
During Joint Operations, Vol. I. Few will dispute the importance of civil-military
"melding" yet Joint Pub 3-08 concedes, "The connectivity between NGOs, PVOs, and the
Department of Defense is currently ad hoc, with no statutory linkage. But while their

focus remains grassroots and their connections informal, NGOs and PVOs are major
players at the interagency table. The goal of interagency coordination should be to
enable and bolster the capabilities of all nonmilitary agencies, whether private or
governmental, rather than have the military perform their tasks. In the end, all agencies
will be better served by such integration.
Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) is the latest document advocating improved
planning and coordination practices among U.S. government agencies and international
organizations engaged in complex contingency operations. In particular, the directive
emphasizes the need to create coordination mechanisms at the operational level. The
scope of PDD-56 is limited, however, by defining complex contingency operations as
"peace operations," such as the peace accord implementation in Bosnia; "humanitarian
interventions," such as Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq; and "foreign humanitarian
assistance operations," such as Operation Support Hope in Somalia. This directive has the
potential to influence future U.S. government interagency procedures and joint military
doctrine. Once it is fully implemented, however, it seems reasonable to expect that
interagency coordination procedures described in PDD-56 would be applied to
contingency operations beyond those presently specified in the document." There is no
clear and compelling reason to limit application of the concepts in PDD-56 to those kinds
of operations.

Develop an Understanding of Other Agencies, Departments, and Organizations. Other
Federal agencies and NGOs can see the ends, ways, and means differently than does the
Department of Defense. Interagency participants should understand that agencies are
often guided by their unique cultures. Because they are not part of the government, some
NGOs, for example, may be hostile toward it or unwilling to share its vision or goals.
Establish Unifying Goals. Successful interagency operations require a consensus on a
unifying goal. Reaching consensus on a unifying goal is the most important prerequisite
for successful interagency operations. Consensus is frail and must be constantly nurtured.
This is much more difficult if the goals are not clear or change over time. Because a
common threat brings a coalition together, the differences often revolve around ways and
means. Many of the techniques that have been developed in coalition operations can be
used to facilitate interagency operations. The objective is to ensure that everyone has a
stake in the outcome.
Determine Mutual Needs. After developing an understanding of other agencies,
determine the mutual needs between the Department of Defense and each of the other
agencies. What things are important to both to the Department of Defense and to other
Establish Functional Interdependence. Functional interdependence means that one
organization relies upon another to attain the objective. This interdependence is the
strongest and the most lasting potential bond between agencies, departments, and

organizations. Resource interdependence is based on one organization providing certain

capabilities that another organization lacks. This support includes such resources as
manpower, logistics, training augmentation, communication, and money and establishes a
framework for cooperation.
Consider Long-Term and Short-Term Objectives. Long- and short-term objectives should
be considered separately. Participants should not lose sight of establishing a continuing
relationship in deference to the issue at hand. Dominating on a short time issue can
poison future relationships.
In the final analysis, interagency cooperation comes down to leadership, commitment,
and a capacity to adapt.


IOs and NGOs are very different in means, method, organization and philosophy from
military organizations and most U.S. government agencies. Because of the important
role they play in development and humanitarian assistance it is vital that the advisor have
some understanding of these differences. This section gives basic information on
international organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their
organization, nature and purposes.
Over forty-nine Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) are the real heroes of this
operation. These dedicated relief workers provided food, shelter, agricultural supplies,
education, medicine, water and a whole host of other needs to the Somali people. The
security operations conducted by the ARFOR allowed them to continue their missions
and provide for the Somalis who could not provide for themselves. Many of them had
been working in Somalia long before a military operation was begun and will remain
long after military forces redeploy. After Action Report for Operation Restore Hope
"The diversity of NGOs strains any simple definition. They include many groups and
institutions that are entirely or largely independent of government and that have
primarily humanitarian or cooperative rather than commercial objectives. They are
private agencies in industrial countries that support international development;
indigenous groups organized regionally or nationally; and member-groups in villages.
NGOs include charitable and religious associations that mobilize private funds for
development, distribute food and family planning services and promote community
organization. They also include independent cooperatives, community associations,
water-user societies, women's groups and pastoral associations. Citizen Groups that
raise awareness and influence policy are also NGOs"
World Bank, 2001

NGO: Nongovernmental organization refers to transnational organizations of private

citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social council of the

United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations,

foundations, multinational businesses or simply groups with a common interest in
humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief) [Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task
Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, January 1999]. The term has been expanded
in recent years to include the full range of nongovernmental relief, development and
assistance organization regardless of UN status.
IO: International Organization refers to organizations with global influence, such as the
United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross [Joint Publication 1-02,
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms]. These normally have official status
of some kind with defined privileges and responsibilities under international law.


Remember that the members of IOs and NGOs:

Are just as committed to their cause as you are to yours.

Are extremely unlikely to accept subordinate or junior partner status with military

Have on-ground and in-country experience that may vastly exceed yours.

Are essential in the transition to peace.

Vary widely in willingness to work with the military.

Usually stress impartiality, neutrality, and independence above all else.

Are sometimes suspicious of the purpose of your activities.

May choose to work near you but not with you.

Have no central command. There is no "CINC NGO." They only work for their
organization, but will work out cooperative efforts on ground.



The IO/NGO community can be divided into roughly four components: UN agencies and
other public international organizations, private international organizations, donor
agencies, and individual NGOs.
The UN emergency/management apparatus, reorganized and streamlined in 1992, has
humanitarian, development, political, and security components. On the humanitarian
side, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) is responsible for
mobilizing and coordinating the collective efforts of the international community
(particularly the UN System) to meet human needs in disasters and emergencies and to
facilitate the smooth transition from relief to development. Other UN humanitarian
agencies include the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World
Food Program (WFP). These agencies respond to specific emergencies at the direction of
the Security Council and member countries.
The UN International Childrens Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Health
Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) are the
UNs development organizations, dealing with long-term humanitarian issues, but
generally not relief efforts. All of these programs work both with their own staff and
with individual NGOs that implement UN programs in the field. The UN Department of
Political Affairs (UNDPA) follows political developments worldwide, so as to provide
early warning of impending conflicts and analyze possibilities for preventive action by
the UN. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) was greatly
expanded in 1992 to include monitoring, planning, and support of operations. It also
serves as the Secretary Generals military staff. UNDPKO is responsible for the military,
civilian police, and electoral components of a complex mission.
Other public international organizations in this category include a number of regional
government organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the
Organization of American States (OAS), or sub-regional groups like the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has been active in Liberia. Like
the UN agencies, these international organizations are characterized by their special
status as legal entities under some tenets of international law.
Private international organizations are, in effect, groups of NGOs. They are usually
composed of individual national chapters and include worldwide and regional institutions
involved in humanitarian missions such as the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. These organizations
operate around the world independently of any government, and may also enjoy special
status as legal entities under international law.


Donor agencies are primarily national government funding organizations that provide
official resources for development and relief. They also provide much of the funding for
NGOs. The principal donor agencies represent national governments directly or indirectly
and include the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Canadas
International Development Agency (CIDA), Japans International Cooperation Agency
(JICA), the U.K.s Overseas Development Agency (ODA), and the European Community
Humanitarian Organization (ECHO), that coordinates the efforts of several European
Community government agencies. The World Bank and regional development banks are
also donor agencies responding to the guidance of their multiple members. While the
banks do not play a role in relief efforts, they are increasingly seeking ways to be
responsive during reconstruction.
There are thousands of NGOs operating around the world. Some, like the International
Rescue Committee (IRC), World Vision, Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
(CARE), Christian Childrens Fund, Save the Children, and Catholic Relief Services, are
registered in the United States and conduct their missions overseas. Others, like Oxford
Famine Relief (OXFAM) and Medicin sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders),
operate out of other developed countries and have activities around the world. Still other
NGOs are indigenous to the countries where relief and development needs exist. NGOs
differ in size, resources base, thematic and geographic focus of activities, and access to
and use of technology, among other things. In addition to the national and international
dimensions of NGOs, organizations vary by the size of their resource bases. Some NGOs
are quite large (e.g. CAREs total support and revenue top $450 million), while many
others have operating budgets of less than $10,000. The origin of funding can vary
greatly from NGO to NGO, but is comprised of:

Public Resources--grants and contracts from donor government agencies and

international organizations; and

Private Resources--contributions from individuals, religious groups, communities,

foundations, and businesses, in the form of money or gifts-in-kind.

Most NGOs depend on a combination of public and private funding. However, some
NGOs decline to accept funding from government agencies so as not to be compromised
by specific government policy interests. Like their budgets, NGO personnel rosters vary
according to budgets and mission. Larger NGOs have a greater ability to respond to
unexpected contingencies because of their resource base.
A 1995 UN report on global governance suggested that there are about 29,000
international NGOs. Domestic ones have grown even faster. In Russia, where almost


none existed before the fall of communism, there are at least 65,000. Dozens more are
created daily around the world.
Some NGOs are primarily helpers, distributing relief where it is needed; some are mainly
campaigners, existing to promote issues their members deem important. The general
public tends to see them as uniformly altruistic, idealistic and independent.
This is not always so. A growing share of development spending, emergency relief and
other aid passes through them. USAID terms NGOs "the most important constituency for
the activities of development aid agencies". Much of the food delivered by the World
Food Program, a UN body, is actually distributed by NGOs. Between 1990 and 1994, the
proportion of the European Union's relief aid channeled through NGOs rose from 47% to
67%. The International Red Cross estimates that NGOs now disburse more money than
the World Bank.
Eight major families or federations of international NGOs each control about
$500 million of the estimated $8 billion in worldwide annual relief funding:

World Vision International
Oxfam Federation
Medecins Sans Frontieres
Save the Children Federation
CIDSE (Cooperation internationale pour le development et la solidarite)
APDOV (Association of Protestant Development Organizations in Europe)

By orientation:
Charitable: often involves a top-down effort with little participation by the recipients. It
includes NGOs with activities directed toward meeting the needs of the poor -distribution
of food, clothing or medicine, provision of housing, transport, schools etc. Such NGOs
may also undertake relief activities during a natural or man-made disaster. These types
are often criticized as paternalistic and liable to promote dependence rather than local
development and autonomy.
Service: includes NGOs with activities such as the provision of health, family planning or
education services in which the program is designed by the NGO and people are expected
to participate in its implementation and in receiving the service.


Participatory: characterized by self-help projects where local people are involved,

particularly in the implementation of a project by contributing cash, tools, land, materials,
labor etc. In the classical community development project, participation begins with the
need definition and continues into the planning and implementation stages. Cooperatives
often have a participatory orientation.
Empowering: the aim is to help poor people develop a clearer understanding of the social,
political and economic factors affecting their lives, and to strengthen their awareness of
their own potential power to control their lives. Sometimes, these groups develop
spontaneously around a problem or issues, at other times outside workers from NGOs
facilitate their development. In any case, there is maximum involvement of the people
with NGOs acting as facilitators.
By level of operation:
Community-based Organizations (CBOs) arise out of people's own initiatives. These can
include sports clubs, women's organizations, neighborhood organizations, religious or
educational organizations. There are a large variety of these, some supported by NGOs,
national or international NGOs, or bilateral or international agencies, and others
independent of outside help. Some are devoted to rising the consciousness of the urban
poor or helping them to understand their rights in gaining access to needed services while
others are involved in providing such services.
City or Regional Organizations include organizations such as the Rotary or Lion's Club,
chambers of commerce and industry, coalitions of business, ethnic or educational groups
and associations of community organizations. Some exist for other purposes, and
become involved in helping the poor as one of many activities, while others are created
for the specific purpose of helping the poor.
National NGOs include organizations such as the Red Cross, YMCAs/YWCAs,
professional organizations etc. Some of these have state and city branches and assist
local NGOs.
International NGOs range from secular agencies such as Save the Children, OXFAM,
CARE, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations to religiously motivated groups. Their
activities range from funding local NGOs, institutions and projects, to implementing
projects themselves.



They have the ability to experiment freely with innovative approaches and, if
necessary, to take risks.


They are flexible in adapting to local situations and responding to local needs and
therefore able to develop integrated projects.

They enjoy good rapport with people and can render micro-assistance as they can
identify those who are most in need and tailor assistance to their needs.

They have the ability to communicate at all levels, from the neighborhood to the
top levels of government.

They are able to recruit both experts and highly motivated staff with fewer
restrictions than the government.


Paternalistic attitudes restrict the degree of participation in program/project


Restricted/constrained ways of approach to a problem or area.

Reduced replicability of ideas and programs, due to uniqueness or narrow focus

of the project or selected area, relatively small project coverage, dependence on
outside financial resources.

"Territorial possessiveness" of an area or project reduces cooperation between

agencies, seen as threatening or competitive. Turf battles are common.

These agencies cannot be viewed as one homogeneous group. They represent many
countries and many organizations throughout the world, each with its own agenda and
desired results of assistance. Some are very cooperative and work well with the military.
Some, such as ICRC, will accept military help with great reluctance. Some are often
unwilling to cooperate with the military. Mdecins Sans Frontires/Doctors Without
Borders (MSF) is very active in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief work
worldwide, however it has stated that NGOs cannot maintain their impartiality and
independence of action once they agree to act in coordination with, or effectively under
the coordination of, a military structure.
Some will even continue to pay bribes and extortion fees to bandits while military forces
are in the area to protect them. They look at the long term and say that if they don't pay
the fees now, things will be worse later, when military forces are gone.

NGOs also differ greatly in the services they provide: Some provide bulk food while
others operate feeding kitchens; Some conduct education programs, while others try to
reestablish agriculture and ranching operations in the country; others provide medicine
and medical care, while still others provide water and well operations. Several agencies
operate throughout several countries; some operate only in specific areas of one country,
or in specific towns and villages; some are very localized and exist in only one location.
NGOs cannot be "commanded and controlled, but a spirit of cooperation must exist
between them and military forces. The military finds itself in the unusual role here of
being the service provider. Military forces support and secure NGO operations. Each
will require varying levels of support, based on its needs. Humanitarian agencies are not
looking for someone to do their job or take their place, just an opportunity to do their job
and be protected. The establishment of CMOCs (Civil Military Operations Centers) is a
key step in providing this support.



Haitis Operation Uphold Democracy marked the first time the U.S. Government
organized to develop an interagency political-military plan of operations prior to
undertaking a crisis response. USAIDs Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA), and through it, the NGO community, was brought into the
Governments and the militarys planning process at a relatively early stage.

NGOs complain that U.S. Government or UN objectives are unclear, hampering

planning efforts. Because of domestic political considerations, member states
sometimes prefer that the UN not be too definitive when identifying its objectives.
This lack of clarity, however, complicates the planning process for all involved,
including NGOs.

NGOs are principally concerned about planning for participation in humanitarian

relief aspects of the emergency response, not with military planning. NGOs also
complain that once the military is involved, the potential for disrupting
informalalbeit effective--channels of communication among NGOs in country
is considerable.

Given the independent nature of NGOs and the sheer size of the NGO
community--for example, more than 400 NGOs are operating now in Haiti--there
are just too many moving parts for a closely coordinated effort. Once you start to
try to integrate numerous actors, it gets very complicated. Commanders intent is
critical to military planning. If you cant identify the commander--and you cant
on the NGO side--this will be a problem.

A NATO program seeks to identify "normality indicators" as a guidepost to assess

the effectiveness of NATO initiatives in restoring the peace in Bosnia. NGOs
often feel that such indicators are irrelevant at best and misleading at worst,
particularly as the forces responding to a crisis have a profound impact on local
conditions. Because local procurement contracts tend to inflate normality
indicators, the militarys very presence can skew its own indicators and mask real
development problems. The NGO presence also affects local "normality"
indicators, though perhaps on a different scale.

Many NGOs do not favor the militarys standardized way of approaching a

problem, believing that it diminishes flexibility, which NGOs view as their


Successful resolution of a crisis requires collaboration across the political and

military spectrum. CMOCs have been viewed by both the military and NGO
communities as "helpful in furthering operational level coordination and

Many, perhaps most, NGOs do not understand and are suspicious of the militarys
seemingly endless demands for detailed information on NGO operations. One
NGO field director stated, Even my headquarters in New York doesnt demand
the kind of detailed reporting the military does. Some NGOs are openly
skeptical about the use of such information by the military.


Several training initiatives have helped foster better relations between NGOs and
U.S. Government civilian and military agencies. Both types of organizations
must deal with complications created by personnel changes and the need to keep
training requirements current. The Armys Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft.
Polk, Georgia conducts training exercises in OOTW. As part of this training, the
Center incorporates information about working with the NGO community into its
program. In addition, the Center has included members of the NGO community
in its field exercises.

On the other hand, NGOs have limited budgets and cannot afford to send key
personnel to extended military training exercises.



The vastly different objectives and perspectives the NGO and military/government
communities bring to a crisis are among the most pervasive problems confronting both
communities. The NGO community has usually been involved in relief and development
activities in a given country long before a crisis might develop there. The evolving crisis
prevents the NGOs from carrying out their mission. As the situation deteriorates and
gains international attention, the military commences planning its response. When
political authority determines to deploy military force to stabilize and provide security for
humanitarian operations, it usually provides the armed forces with a limited mission and,
often, limited time frame in which to complete the mission. Once in the field, the
military mission--provide security to the overall operation--and the NGO mission--to
carry out specific relief activities and return to normalcy--may clash. Both communities
have a common goal in their response to the complex humanitarian emergency:
stabilization of the situation and a return to normalcy, but have different perspectives on
how the goal is to be achieved and how long it will take. NGO expectations regarding
the militarys role in providing security for their operations may not be realistic if they do
not fully understand or appreciate the militarys mission, doctrine, or approach to the use
of force.


Many of the larger international NGOs employ former military personnel in field
positions. This can enhance communication between NGOs and the military but
doesnt always.

Another problem within the NGO/military interface involves the degree of

communication. There are situations during which an NGO will be reluctant to
communicate its plans to the military. NGOs Express concern that in the process
of sharing their plans with the military, they would be broadcasting their
intentions to indigenous armed groups.

Communications capability also affects the host government perspective on the

NGO-military interface. Host governments may become suspicious when there is
too much interoperability among the international community or with the military.
NGOs are determined to ensure their neutrality at all times.

In contrast to the militarys high-tech approach, much of the NGO community is

very low-tech. They work in an austere environment often using old, donated
equipment manned by locals.

NGOs and the representatives of international agencies are likely to cause the most
trouble at checkpoints - they may even try to run the checkpoint. Checkpoints should be

designed to prevent this. A common irritation for the NGOs and agency reps is
redundant checkpoints that require them to undergo numerous checks of their vehicle and
belongings. Don't give them any slack, but DON'T SHOOT THEM unless they shoot at
you! If they run the Checkpoint, LET THEM GO unless they present a threat to
checkpoint personnel.
Because of their longstanding relationships NGOs may also be able to provide valuable
information about such subjects as the details of particular area/culture, and the relative
dependability of various (local) groups and individuals.
NGO field staff is often well connected locally. In an emergency, personnel already on
site doing development work may quickly shift their resources to relief work. They then
can be immensely helpful to newcomers, because, by already being in an area, they are
likely to have functioning offices, communications facilities, a set of indigenous staff and
many local contacts that help them understand (and make them able to explain to others)
the local power structure, the shifting allegiances of particular political players, and the
hazards relief workers are likely to encounter (and blunders they are likely to make.)
NGO knowledge of a situation and of a locale can often yield "intelligence." However,
NGOs may be very sensitive about sharing information if it is collected under that label.
They are likely to see their long-term success as dependent upon good will and open
relationships with the indigenous population. This can make them wary of compromising
any trust they have established by telling all to the military, or, perhaps, even being seen
too often with military personnel.
This makes it important that NGOs and the military, each of whom is likely to have
information useful to the other, create a way of sharing information, while at the same
time understanding and respecting the limits each may have (or feel they have) about
"full disclosure."
Additional information about NGO and IO structure, capabilities, and coordination may
be found in Joint Publication 3-08, Volume I and Volume II, Interagency Coordination
During Joint Operations.

This section explains some of the peculiarities of nongovernmental organizations,
especially their attitudes toward governments and the military, and offers information that
may be useful in dealing with these groups. NOTE: This appendix is adapted from
material provided by Prof. Judith H. Stiehm of Florida International University and is
used here by permission.



The ideas of neutrality and advocacy are deeply rooted parts of the NGO culture. Most
relief operations follow a strict policy of political neutrality. They also consider
themselves to be advocates for their clients. Most NGOs (including religious based ones)
take it as their purpose to relieve human suffering regardless of political, ethnic, religious,
or other affiliation. This policy is exemplified by most of the development and relief
NGOs and by NGOs that focus specifically on conflict resolution work. The latter
believe that being able to establish a common ground between antagonists (who can then
resolve their own dispute) depends on their being perceived as having no preference
whatever for any side of a conflict.
When a conflict is well defined and opposing militaries are fighting each other, there is
some clarity about what constitutes neutral behavior.
When civil conflict includes targeting civilian populations, or when a strategy includes
denial of food to a region even if it does not include a physical attack, NGO efforts to
provide relief will not be seen as neutral.
NGOs can even find themselves bringing aid and support to groups who are in desperate
need, but whose politics are well known and abhorrent to the international community.
In both Somalia and Rwanda relief organizations found themselves in a situation where
their relief work among perpetrators of a conflict probably prolonged the conflict.
Some NGOs have faced the neutrality dilemma by acknowledging that in some instances
neutrality may not be possible, and that to pretend that it is may assist oppressors.
One of these is Mercy Corps, which has declared "Mercy Corps will not seek out
occasions for advocacy, but will respond to those circumstances when advocacy is the
only responsible act." Mercy Corps considers its clients the impoverished and the
oppressed. Results, Inc. is another NGO that not only has given up on being neutral, but
also embraces advocacy. Its advocacy is for the alleviation of poverty and it seeks
influence through press conferences, editorials and other lobbying activities.
Human rights NGOs are politically active. They seek to change conditions in the
countries in which they work. Neutrality has never been part of their creed, although their
primary weapon has been that of dispensing information. And it is not just governments
who are their adversary. They may find themselves witnessing to atrocities by both
officials and their antagonists.
Again, NGOs have groups they seek to serve. These are usually clearly defined in their
charters. Advocacy for those groups is assumed even if it is not a part of a charter. But
doing relief work may involve NGOs in politics and may cause them to de facto take
sides. This makes many NGOs uneasy because most do not see themselves as political.
They are interested in relieving suffering, not in seeking power.

If they are seen as political, as choosing sides, NGOs can become targets. This means
that maintaining neutrality is a serious issue for them. Ambiguity and contradiction often
prove hard to avoid.
Responsiveness in crisis is a trademark of humanitarian NGOs. Many of them are
especially prepared to work effectively when rules are unenforceable and authority
nonexistent. This does not mean that they do not make every effort to apply their
experience and best thinking to a crisis. Indeed, the first step in mounting an NGO
operation is to have trained staff make an assessment of the situation.
After the assessment, relief workers go to the field to accomplish a wide variety of tasks
including renting office space, hiring staff, planning projects, locating domestic suppliers,
importing goods (which includes dealing with customs and tax officials) hosting visitors
(including possible donors), working with the media and continuously fact-finding and
reassessing the mission.
Field workers share many of the hardships of local inhabitants. These may include lack
of electricity, lack of hot water, exposure to disease and illness, and even occasional
At the same time, field workers are relatively rich and privileged (they can always leave)
as compared to the local population. In meeting their own needs NGOs can inadvertently
consume the best of what is available in terms of space, workers, even food. NGO
transportation and communication facilities may be better than those of the local
government. This can cause tension. It can also make NGO a target for ordinary crime,
e.g. theft of vehicles or relief supplies.
Security issues for NGOs are magnified when relief efforts are conducted amid armed
conflict. This is a circumstance that often brings military and NGOs into contact. Both
groups need to understand each other and work together. But there are sure to be
difficulties. NGOs may see the military as offering protection, or they may see it as
excessively cautious. NGOs are very concerned that they be perceived as nonthreatening. They may believe association with the military endangers them by removing
the protection vulnerability affords. Some NGO staff and some of the local population
may even see military forces as repressive rather than protective.
Those who work in NGOs (like those who join the military) are not seeking riches. Some
simply want to devote their energy and skills to an organization that by definition does
not make a profit. Some are caught up by the inspiration and ideals of a particular NGO.
Others are committed to a particular field such as human rights and working in an NGO
is just one of several ways they are able to fulfill their purpose.


Compared to most corporate or governmental organizations, NGOs offer employment

that maximizes independence, mobility, flexibility, variety, international travel, and the
challenge of working in other cultures. NGO staff members are attracted by the
challenge of managing programs in developing countries, sometimes in several
The added opportunity to serve one's religion draws some to religious NGOs.
While some staff personnel are certainly motivated by a desire to live their ideals,
working in the field very quickly tempers idealism with reality. Even if field staff
sometimes live better than the people with whom they work, they are likely to have a
great deal of responsibility and to experience significant hardship and sometimes real
danger. This is especially true when the government of an area has collapsed and no one
is able to offer routine security or other essential functions.
Field workers often experience some tension with their headquarters. Field staffs are the
ones with "their ears to the ground." Every field worker has stories to tell about
preposterous directions received from their headquarters. Every field worker also knows
about failed projects based on theory, not practice.
Field staff are likely to have the authority to design or commit to specific projects at least
at the level of providing seed money. If a new project seems to hold promise, the
headquarters staff begins the task of designing a proposal and seeking funds to permit
fuller implementation. New funds may come from the organization's own capital; often,
though, proposals are offered to UN, USAID, the World Bank, ECHO or other agencies.
Transportation in areas served by NGOs is usually arduous and sometimes hazardous.
Delays can last not just hours or days but weeks and even months. There may well be
danger from mines and possibly from bandits or members of the defunct local military.
There may be bureaucratic resistance and refusal to issue travel permits. Sometimes
there is the possibility of being taken hostage.
Its important to hire local staff personnel that are likely to serve as interpreters as well as
providing other needed skills. A mission may also hire local consultants and contractors
for specific tasks. Often local hires will be of high quality. In the midst of a crisis,
professors, lawyers or architects may all be grateful to assist, even in relatively menial
roles (such as a driver).
Local workers may have to get permission to work for a foreign NGO. This can
sometimes create a problem, especially if they leave government work or wish to be
exempt from military service. Sometimes employees remain government employees
while working for an NGO and explicitly or implicitly become informants for that
Staff coming from outside the area may find themselves living in a secure (and usually
small) compound. Even in a semi-stable situation where friendly forces are in place,

NGOs can be caught in awkward situations. When responsibility for operations in a

particular area shifts, for example, from the UN to NATO or from the U.S. to Australia.
The NGO culture is similar to that of some UN agencies, (e.g. UNICEF and UNHCR)
and it is not uncommon for individuals to change jobs while within the relief community.
Many individuals make relief their life's work.
NGO personnel are usually well educated. Permanent staff is likely to have college
degrees, and many of them hold graduate degrees. Some of these will be working in their
field of expertise; for example, an engineer may be designing a warehouse to store food
in a place where temperatures reach 130 degrees Fahrenheit. Other professionals may
find themselves working as administrators, for example, a doctor may be running the
distribution of medical supplies and not be engaged in medical care at all.
Staff for large NGOs needs high levels of administrative and entrepreneurial skills.
Whether for profit or not for profit, a multi-million dollar operation requires decisive
action in difficult situations, skilled financial management, and firm control of a
geographically extended enterprise. In addition, NGO managers must be aggressive
fundraisers, and they must be able to meld together the, energy and commitment of
volunteers and paid staff.
To best assure that the focus remains on those being served, i.e. refugees and human
rights victims, some NGOs refuse all public funding. Others see value in expanding their
resources by accepting government monies, but are uneasy and sometimes reluctant
recipients. They fear distorted priorities as a result of governmental resource allocation
that may be based on economic or political considerations rather than solely on human
Thus they see some donor governments as willing to give food for relief but unwilling to
provide long-term development aid that would make the recipient country self sufficient
in food.
Or they see a government giving assistance to victims of officially sanctioned atrocities
but maintaining normal relations with the offending government--normal relations
including the sale of arms, not just trade and diplomatic recognition.
Again some NGOs have sustained and positive links to their governments, and
individuals may switch employment between the government and those NGO with ease.


Traditionally NGOs have behaved very independently. They have valued taking the
initiative and have not wanted to "waste" resources on coordination with others. This
spirit remains stronger among some NGOs than others.
In recent years some NGOs have become more willing to plan, to coordinate, even to
participate in post-mission evaluations. They may do this with other NGOs, with UN
agencies and sometimes with governments and their militaries. For example, in a recent
annual report, World Concern lists 74 agencies as its "partner." In addition to other
Oxfam affiliates Oxfam America collaborates with local NGOs like the Coalition for
People's Agrarian Reform (in the Philippines) and the Eritrean Relief Association. Helen
Keller International partners with the Aravind Eye Hospital in India and the National
Association for the Welfare of the Blind in Nepal.
When NGOs are called to render relief in an emergency situation they may create a loose
coordinating system by designating (or accepting) one of their number as a lead, or
coordinating NGO. In Sarajevo Catholic Relief Services assumed this role. In Haiti,
Rwanda and Somalia CARE presided.
Sometimes a lead agency will be charged with responsibility for umbrella-grants from the
U.S. government, but usually coordination means only that information is shared. On
occasion tasks may be allocated or joint action will support a particular project, but in
general coordination only means giving and getting information.
NGOs do not have a hierarchical structure. They do not have a chain of command.
People work through persuasion not by giving orders. This style can be time consuming;
it may give the appearance of being irrational or unreasonable; it can look soft--but when
NGOs are operating at their best they are enlisting people; they are enlisting hearts and
minds as well as hands. Management is through engagement, not by business' rewards or
the military's clear directive.


NGOs are generally outside the direct control of U.S. agencies or the U.S. embassy
except when executing a U.S. government contract. Some of these agencies may not
support U.S. goals. An early determination of their position in relation to U.S. policy is
Approximately 400 NGOs capable of conducting some form of humanitarian relief
operation are registered with USAID. USAID publishes a yearly report, titled Voluntary
Foreign Aid Programs, that describes the aims and objectives of the registered
Other U.S. agencies with strong links to NGOs include the Department of Agriculture,
which funded a program to deliver $17 million worth of food to five regions in Russia

and other parts of the former Soviet Union. It contracted the Baptist World Alliance, the
Russian Orthodox Church, the Brother's Brother Foundation and other NGOs to
distribute the food. The U.S. military transported the food.
NGOs have a strong role to play in the UN system. The UN charter specifically states
that the Economic and Social Council can "make suitable arrangements for consultation
with nongovernmental organizations that are concerned with matters within its
The World Health Organization (WHO) conducts much of its work through three-year
renewable contracts with about 180 NGOs including World Vision International, the
Population Council, International Planned Parenthood, Rehabilitation International and
the World Medical Association.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) works with
some 300 NGOs to transport food and supplies to refugees throughout the globe. Indeed,
UNHCR was originally formed (in 1921 by the UN's predecessor the League of Nations)
at the request of NGOs overwhelmed by refugee work.
NGOs work regularly with UNICEF (UN International Children's Emergency Fund); the
Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status (CONGO) exists
precisely for the purpose of smoothing the relationship between the UN and NGOs.
Partners in Action (PARinAC), was also created (by the UN and ICVA, International
Council of Voluntary Agencies) to enhance private agency collaboration with the UN.
While more NGOs may be willing to work with UN agencies than with governments,
some are wary of any political affiliation. For example, they will point out that in the
recent Rwanda genocide the government of Rwanda, which was complicit in the
atrocities, was a member of the UN Security Council that debated what, if any, action
should be taken.
NGOs tend to be decentralized, and initiating. In a complex situation, such an approach
can be a great asset. When things go wrong or something totally unexpected occurs,
NGOs have the ability to respond without consultation up and down a chain, and have a
willingness to experiment can be exceptionally effective. NGOs may provide excellent
service, however discomfiting their style is to those who prefer to be always and fully
NGOs can be very effective:

When speed is essential

When willingness to act is important

When detailed planning is not possible


When an ad hoc strategy is advantageous

There are tens of thousands of NGOs in the world, ranging from those consisting of a
handful of unpaid, part-time volunteers to those with thousands of workers and
multimillion-dollar budgets. The following are drawn from the U.S. Agency for
International Developments List of 380 agencies certified to provide humanitarian relief
under contract for the U.S. government under USAIDs Office of Foreign Disaster
The American Council for Voluntary International Action is a broadly based coalition of
120 American NGOs that work in international development, refugee assistance, public
policy, and education of Americans in third world nations. Since 1984, it has played a
significant role in disaster preparedness and response to disasters. It exists to complement
and enhance the effectiveness of its member organizations and the NGO community as a
whole. This organization is a professional forum for cooperation, joint planning, and
exchange of information when disaster occurs. However, it is not likely that interaction
will occur within the country in need of assistance. The work of the council is executed in
the U.S. and is geared to maintain an effective liaison with Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance. It acts as a coordinator at the staff level in meeting requirements identified by
its members operating within the country in need.
American Friends of Action Internationale Contre La Faim (AIFC) promotes
development efforts and gives emergency assistance in African, Asia, and the Caribbean.
It focuses on primary health care, potable water, environmental sanitation, and
agriculture-based income generation. The most basic commitment is to enhance local
capacities at both the community and central levels.
Catholic Relief Services operates relief, welfare, and self-help programs in 74 countries
to assist refugees, war victims, and other needy people. CRS emphasizes the distribution
of food and clothing and the provision of primary health care. Their capability to provide
technical assistance and social services has steadily increased in recent years.
Cooperative for American Relief Every-where, Inc. (CARE) conducts relief and
development programs in over 40 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin American, and the

Caribbean. Programs are carried out under three-way partnership contracts among CARE,
private or national government agencies, and local communities in the areas of health,
nutrition, acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), population management,
natural resources management, agriculture, small economic activities, and emergency
assistance. CARE gives technical assistance, training, food, other material resources, and
management in combinations appropriate to local needs and priorities. Their particular
strength is in food distribution, emergency transport and general logistics for conflict,
refugee camps, national disaster sites, and areas lacking adequate health care facilities.
Their particular areas of expertise are emergency medicine, vaccinations, and basic
hygiene services.
The International Medical Corps (IMC) gives health care and establishes health-training
programs in developing countries and distressed areas worldwide. They specialize in
areas where few other relief organizations operate. IMCs goal is to promote selfsufficiency through health education and training. Its particular areas of expertise are
immunizations and primary health care.
The International Rescue Committee (IRC) assists refugees and internally displaced
victims of war and civil strife. Services range from emergency relief and assistance
programs to refugee resettlement in the U.S. IRC monitors human service delivery and
refugee processing for U.S. resettlement. IRC can provide emergency medical support,
public health, and small-scale water and sanitation capabilities.
Irish Concern (IC) is one of the foreign NGOs that receive funding from USAID and
OFDA. Its primary area of expertise is supplementary and therapeutic feeding and
Lutheran World Relief, Inc. (LWR) provides financial, material, and personnel support,
usually through counterpart church-related agencies, in the areas of disaster relief,
refugee assistance, and social and economic development. LWR is also competent in the
provision of health care.

International Organization Web Sites: Index Page (
provides links to International Organizations by Name (alphabetically), by Subject Areas
and by Regional Groupings. It includes lists of IGOs and a list of frequently asked

Foreign Affairs Online ( gives links to IOs

and NGOs.
InterAction ( is a voluntary coalition of more than 165 U.S.based relief, development, environmental and refugee agencies working in more than 100
countries around the world. An excellent site for information on U.S. NGOs.
U.S. Institute for Peace ( /) gives links to IGOs and
NGOs. Includes links to the foreign ministries of over 90 countries.


SF soldiers are often assigned duties that enable or facilitate interdependent operations
through interface with Joint or Service elements. These soldiers are, in effect, acting as
liaisons or advisors (usually as staff augmentation, SOCCEs, or other capacities that
tend to minimize the fact that they are actually acting as advisors) to Service component
or Joint commanders and staffs. SF soldiers assigned such duties should approach their
counterparts in much the same manner as they would a foreign counterpart. The degree
to which they are able to influence the actions of the headquarters they are attached to
will be based to a large extent on a process of negotiation. SF soldiers acting in such
capacities should:

Study and analyze the organization with which they are working.

Determine the culture(s) of that organization.

Apply the principles and techniques of cross-cultural communications and

negotiation described throughout this book and chapter.

In this context the culture(s) of the supported headquarters will either be a Joint or
Service component culture. Subcultures even exist within Service components.
Examples include the Armys branches, Naval qualifications (air, surface warfare,
submarine warfare, etc), or Air Force tactical, strategic, missile, and airlift (among
others) organizations.
A thorough analysis of Joint, Service component, and Service component subcultures is
beyond the scope of this publication. Review of Joint Publications and instruction/
training programs, Service doctrine and training literature/programs, and other available
source material is fundamental to gaining a full appreciation of Joint and Service cultures
and subcultures. An example of other available source material is Carl H. Builders
book, initiated as a RAND Corporation Research Study and later published as a book
through The John Hopkins University Press, titled The Masks of War. The sections
below serve to illustrate cultural differences and serve as a point of departure for further

study and education. Included material related to Service cultures draws heavily on,
although some aspects may not be coincidental or supported by, Builders book.
The generalizations of Joint and Service culture are only guidelines. They must be
adapted to individuals and specific units. The key to effectively operating in the joint
arena is to consider Joint and Service component elements and personnel as counterparts.
This demands awareness that they are from distinct cultures, knowledge of the particular
culture represented, and application of the cross-cultural and negotiating skills described
throughout this Reference book.

Because of assignment practices and limited joint education opportunities, there is no
distinct joint culture. Instead, there is an amalgamation of service component cultures
functioning at the joint level. Furthermore, the relative importance of each service
culture within this mix varies widely over time and both between and within individual
headquarters. Relative dominance by one or another service culture within a given
headquarters follows functional or organizational lines and varies when missions and
environments change. Dominance may even vary between phases or aspects of
operations. SF soldiers enabling interdependent operations must observe and analyze
joint headquarters to determine which cultures are dominant under what circumstances.
This analysis then becomes the basis for cross-cultural communications with, and
influencing of, participating joint organizations.
Relative dominance by a component service culture results from several factors.
Carefully analyzing these factors, while observing and analyzing the actions and
responses of the target headquarters, can assist the SF soldier in determining the key
aspects of the dominant service culture. These factors include:

Background and service affiliation of the unit commander.

Type of unit.

Background and service affiliation of key staff personnel.

Nature of the mission or task.

Origin and type of subordinate operational units.

Origin and type of subordinate support units.

Service expertise associated with a function or aspect of the mission.

Applicable Joint or Service doctrine.



As previously stated, each Service has its own culture and subcultures. Detailed
knowledge of the characteristics of each is the product of research, study, and experience.
Care should be taken to avoid undue reliance on each Services self image. A Services
true culture may or may not be reflected in its own understanding of its culture.
Nonetheless, Service documents (and doctrine in particular) are an excellent start point
for research.
Because SF operations are normally conducted in Joint environments, the SF soldier
requires a thorough understanding of the other Services. A good rule of thumb for an SF
soldiers professional development is to study two services in addition to his own (the
Army). Some methods and resources for developing such understanding include:

Professional reading. Books, Joint Force Quarterly magazine, etc.

Doctrinal reading. Includes both Service and Joint Publications.

Subscriptions to Service specific professional journals.

Joint assignments.

Other Service correspondence courses.

The Joint Electronic Library.

JFCOMs Joint Warfighting Concepts.

The following characteristics generally describe the Army culture:

Egalitarianism. The Army tends to distrust and discourage elites. This presents a
challenge to SF soldiers who must always reinforce that SF is indeed part of the
Army. Subcultures within the Army, while present, tend to be less distinct than
in the other Services.

Selfless service to the nation. The Army, more so than the other services, deeply
feels its attachment to the people of the country. This may be attributed to the
relative importance of individual soldiers drawn from the citizenry to this Service.


This reliance tends to lead the Army to view itself as a humble servant of the

A human focus. Often expressed in terms of equipping the man rather than
manning the equipment, this focus contrasts with a greater systems focus in the
other services (the United States Marine Corps (USMC) is the exception here).

A view of warfare as an Art versus a Science. Despite a brief flirtation with

battle calculus, the Army remains adverse to reliance on mathematical models
and other purely quantitative tools to predict outcomes or evaluate combat
capability. This flows naturally from its human focus.

Acceptance of joint and interdependent operations. The Army has long accepted
the necessity of joint operations. Reliance on the other services for deployment,
logistics, and other support may contribute to this attitude.

The following characteristics generally describe the Navy culture:

Adherence to tradition. The Navy is perhaps the most traditional of the Services
and the most resistant to change. The SF soldier should exercise caution when
introducing concepts outside normal Naval doctrine. Every attempt should be
made to articulate ideas and concepts in a manner consistent with existing Naval

Independence of command. The Navy tends to vest more discretionary authority

in the captains of its vessels than other services grant to their subordinate
commanders. Naval units and personnel tend be less accustomed to and resent
external scrutiny more than other services. SF soldiers should be sensitive to this
characteristic and stress their role as an enabler, avoiding the appearance of being
present to provide oversight of Special Operations.

Inflexibility with respect to requirements. The Navy is relatively consistent in its

evaluation of requirements in terms of numbers and types of vessels, fleet
readiness requirements, and operational requirements. This consistency is
somewhat independent of changing conditions, mission requirements, or threats.
SF soldiers interfacing with Naval elements should carefully consider positions
that imply possible changes to structure, operational tempo or procedures, or
capabilities. Naval personnel are far more likely to respond favorably to
requirements that can be supported within existing procedures and than those
requiring innovation or change.


The Navy is scrupulously rank and specialty conscious. Directly opposite the
Armys egalitarianism, the Navy maintains and fosters distinctions between
specialties. Rank separation is significantly more pronounced than in the other
services. SF soldiers, accustomed to relative informality should take care not to
inadvertently give a false impression of irreverence for military structure and
deference to rank. The authority of Naval counterparts may also derive in part
from a relative, but undocumented, ranking of specialties (aviation versus surface
warfare versus subsurface warfare versus mine warfare, etc).

The Navy is resistant to Jointness. For a variety of reasons, the Navy generally
resists dependence on other services, strongly fighting to maintain and control
organic assets and capabilities ranging from air support to nuclear deterrence to
ground maneuver forces (USMC). Suggestions that highlight Naval dependence
are less likely to be favorably received than those articulated to create an
appearance of Naval independence incidentally supported by other service


The following characteristics generally describe the Air Force culture:

The AF is technology oriented. The AF tends to view warfare as dominated by

technology. Applications of technology are viewed as providing answers to most,
if not all, problems associated with warfare (if not national security). The AF is
generally more inclined to depend on the capability of specific systems than on
numbers. This reliance on high cost, low-density equipment has obvious
implications for risk acceptance. Currently this is tempered by the clear
technological superiority of U.S. aircraft that mitigates risk from larger numbers
of less capable aircraft belonging to potential adversaries.

Pilots dominate the AF. While approaching the Army in its egalitarian views
within the ranks of pilots or internal to the ranks of non- pilot rated specialists,
there is a clear distinction in favor of pilots over non-pilots. The AF is far more
likely to be supportive of initiatives involving flyers and flying than in those
leveraging other capabilities. Pilots are far more likely than non-pilots to have
ultimate decision-making authority.

The AF is cautious of being relegated to a supporting role in joint

operations/organizations. The newest of the services, AF units and personnel
often act in ways that reinforce the Services legitimacy and independence.
Concepts articulated to support this independence are far more likely to be
accepted than those that show the AF in a supporting role.


The AF is target oriented. The AF conducts tactical targeting on an operational

scale more efficiently and effectively than any other service. The systems/
platform orientation of the AF lends itself to complex systems matching
appropriate platforms to targets. It is almost a presumption of AF planners that
destruction of adequate numbers of appropriately selected targets will achieve
operational and strategic objectives. Human dimensions of warfare are (excepting
those that relate to human-machine/pilot-aircraft interface) are generally
subordinated to quantifiable target destruction. Speed and precision are valued far
more highly than persistence and endurance.

The AF sees itself as the new combat arm of decision. This distinction, long
claimed by the Armys Armor branch, is essential to understanding AF culture.
Airpower is viewed within the AF as decisive, independent of the other services.
The AF views Rapid Decisive Operations as an AF centered endeavor supported
by the other services.

The USMC is unique in that it is, in effect, the Navys Army. It does, however, possess a
culture independent of, but related to, the Navy. Some aspects of the USMC culture

Elitism. The USMC considers itself to be superior, both individually and

institutionally, to the other services and the Army in particular. The USMC is
reluctant to concede that there is any elite force with capabilities beyond those of
the Corps. SF soldiers working with USMC elements should be aware that the
Marines are likely to genuinely feel that the SF and SOF communities possess no
capability not resident in the Corps.

The USMC is a contingency force. Marines consider themselves an elite force

designed to conduct rapid and violent operations. Long-term actions are viewed
as resource draining and are generally ceded to the Army. Stressing the long-term
commitment associated with many SF missions is far more likely to generate
cooperation with Marine elements than is an attempt to articulate unique
capabilities not resident in the Corps.

The USMC considers USMC/Navy operations as their joint context. Given Naval
and Marine air assets, Marine ground capability, and Naval maritime capabilities,
the USMC is reluctant to integrate beyond the fleet. Marine air assets are only
ceded to the control of a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) under
duress. While other Service support is generally accepted, USMC generally
attempts to insist on operational concepts supportable within organic assets of the
combined Navy fleet and the fleet Marine force.



Purpose: This appendix gives more detailed information on individual U.S. agencies and
should be read in conjunction with the material on the interagency environment in
Chapter 3. This appendix also discusses U.S. foreign assistance programs and the role
they play in advisor missions. It stresses the special qualities required of U.S. military
personnel assigned foreign assistance and security assistance responsibilities.
Military commanders must understand the political ramifications and complexity of
military activities in special operations. For Special Forces advisors this will often
include working with and for other agencies of the United States government.


Each agency has its own agenda. Regardless of that agenda, domestic U.S. politics will
always be the single most important consideration. In addition, individuals from agencies
often have their own personal agendas, even some that conflict with their own agency or
U.S. policy. This makes achieving unity of effort in a peacetime environment very

Each agency has its own separate set of approaches to a problem or situation, its own
resources, restrictions on their employment, and its own core values. Many of these are
spelled out for each agency or group in Jt. Pub 3-08 volume II. It is important that
members of the military also consciously recognize their own characteristics, particularly
as others see them. This understanding is a critical foundation for communication,
interaction, and decision-making.

Most agencies routinize (Jt Pub 3-08 term) their operations. This makes crisis
management very difficult and also may hamper even planning of peacetime activities.
Authority for decision-making is usually not delegated to lower levels. This often makes
Washington, D.C., rather than the U.S. embassy or the unified command, the site of many
decisions. Under these conditions, developing a set of common objectives for peacetime
activities and then unifying their efforts become major challenges.


Because of personal agendas, differences between agencies, and potential organizational
frictions, establishing and strengthening personal relationships have great significance.
Such relationships may be vital to gaining information, cooperation, and overcoming

Advisory operations are likely to require a high degree of coordination with agencies of
the U.S. Government including the Department of State, USAID, and others. Interagency
operations facilitate the implementation of all elements of national power and as a vital
link uniting Department of Defense (DOD) and other governmental departments and
agencies. Interagency operations are critical to achieving strategic end states of special
operations. Interagency operations facilitate unity and consistency of effort, maximize
use of national resources, and reinforce primacy of the political element. A joint
headquarters conducts interagency coordination and planning. For certain missions, the
joint headquarters may delegate authority to the component for direct coordination with
other agencies.
In all cases, the component must ensure appropriate authority exists for direct
coordination. Components may, in certain special missions, work directly with or for
another government agency. In such cases, direct coordination is authorized and
command arrangements are specified based on the situation.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the joint staff coordinate interagency
operations at the strategic level. This coordination establishes the framework for
coordination by commanders at the operational and tactical levels. In some casessuch
as peacekeeping and complex contingenciesDepartment of State (DOS) is the lead
agency and DOD gives support. In others, DOD is the lead agency.
The combatant commander is the central point for plans and implementing theater and
regional strategies that require interagency coordination. The combatant commander
may establish an advisory committee to link his theater strategy to national policy goals
and the objectives of DOS and concerned ambassadors. Military personnel may
coordinate with other U.S. Government agencies while operating directly under an
ambassador's authority, while working for a security assistance organization, or while
assigned to a regional combatant commander. Coordination between DOD and other U.S.
Government agencies may occur in a country team or within a combatant command.
Military personnel working in interagency organizations must ensure that the ambassador
and combatant commander know and approve all programs. Legitimizing authorities
determine specific command relationships for each operation. This command
arrangement must clearly establish responsibility for the planning and execution of each
phase of the operation.

In addition to extensive U.S. Government agency coordination, commanders must also

fully integrate operations into local efforts when appropriate. Such integration requires
close coordination with local government agencies and bureaus, local military,
paramilitary, or police forces, and multinational partners. A structure such as a mixed
military working group comprised of senior officials of the military and other agencies
may assist such an effort and include belligerent parties as appropriate.
The tasks that Special Forces units and individuals execute often evolve from foreign
assistance programs. The activities within these programs range from disaster relief
measures to economic and military assistance. It is important, therefore, to have an
overview of U.S. foreign assistance organizations and collective security agencies and
their responsibilities.


Aside from the DOD, the principal agencies that direct and coordinate U.S. foreign
assistance programs are:

The Department of State.

The National Security Council.

The Central Intelligence Agency.

The United States Information Agency.

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

The President has assigned the Secretary of State the authority and responsibility for the
direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S. interdepartmental activities overseas.
This includes continuous supervision and direction of the overall foreign assistance
program. Elements responsible for security assistance functions are discussed under
"Security Assistance Agencies" below.
The Inspector General of Foreign Assistance is responsible to the Secretary in matters
relating to the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance programs, Peace Corps programs,
and Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) activities. The Inspector General's office inspects
these programs, makes recommendations to the head of the agency concerned, and
reviews any subsequent changes.
Five assistant secretaries direct the geographic bureaus responsible for U.S. foreign
affairs regional activities. They advise the Secretary of State on the formulation of U.S.

policies toward the countries within their jurisdictions. They direct, coordinate, and
supervise interdepartmental and interagency matters for these regions.
Country directors within each of the bureaus set policy guidelines for their assigned
countries and coordinate outside their bureau for country-related issues. Country
directors are the focal point for serving the needs of U.S. diplomatic missions. They
work closely with Department of State representatives overseas to administer and
implement foreign assistance programs.


Congress created the National Security Council (NSC) in 1947 as a mechanism to advise
the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies
relating to national security. Additional purposes of the NSC include making
recommendations to the President on the basis of:

Assessment and appraisal of the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United
States in relation to its actual and potential military power.

Consideration of all government policies concerned with national security.

Congress subsequently amended the National Security Act of 1947 by directing the
President to establish the Board for Low Intensity Conflict within the NSC. Composed
of representatives from key U.S. government agencies, the board considers, formulates,
recommends, and orchestrates U.S. policy and strategy on behalf of the President.


The CIA coordinates the intelligence activities of other U.S. departments and agencies in
the interest of both collective and national security. The CIA:

Advises the NSC on matters concerning intelligence activities of all governmental

departments and agencies that concern national security.

Recommends policy to the NSC to coordinate national security-related

intelligence activities of governmental departments and agencies.

Correlates and evaluates intelligence related to national security, and

appropriately disseminates it within the government.

Conducts special activities approved by the President. Executive Order No.

12333 (4 December 1981) directs that in peacetime, no U.S. agency except the
CIA may conduct any special activity unless the President determines through a
finding that another agency is more likely to achieve the objective. The armed
forces may conduct these activities without a presidential determination only

when war has been declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report
from the President to the Congress in compliance with the War Powers Resolution

Performs additional services when directed by the President.


The USIA supports U.S. foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes in other
nations. It also advises the President, his representatives abroad, and various departments
and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S.
policies, programs, and official statements. The USIA uses various media and methods
to encourage constructive public support abroad for policy objectives, and to report the
facts concerning hostile attempts to distort or frustrate U.S. policies.


The United States Agency For International Development manages U.S. developmental,
humanitarian, and civic assistance activities. It supervises and gives general direction on
all nonmilitary assistance programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public
Law 480, and similar legislation. The USAID plans and implements overseas programs
to improve economic and social conditions.
The USAID administers humanitarian and civic assistance programs in conjunction with
the Department of Agriculture. Under arrangements made with USAID, U.S. affiliates of
international voluntary agencies conduct most of the food programs under Public Law
480. Although USAID is concerned primarily with developmental assistance and
humanitarian and civic assistance, some of the programs it administers are security
related. The USAID representative in the host nation fully coordinates these programs
with the DOD representative.


The chief agencies involved in U.S. security assistance activities are:

The Department of State.

The Department of Defense.

The U.S. diplomatic mission.


The Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology
coordinates policy, plans, and program of all departments and agencies involved in
security assistance activities, including NSC, DOD, Department of State, USAID, CIA,
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Management and Budget, and the
Department of Treasury. Representatives of these agencies bring issues concerning
security assistance to the attention of the primary decision makers. The Under Secretary
of State, in agreement with the above-mentioned departments and agencies, makes
decisions concerning funding levels for military assistance and military-related economic
support. Coordination encourages mutually supporting programs and increases the
efficiency of the security assistance program. Although subordinate to the deputy
secretary of state, he has direct access to the secretary of state for security assistance
matters. The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs also advises the secretary of state on
issues and policy problems relating to defense and foreign policy. U.S. diplomatic
missions in allied and friendly countries develop and implement U.S. collective security
programs. The diplomatic chief leads the mission. He normally is a U.S. ambassador
and works under policy guidance and instructions from the Secretary of State.
The DOD assists selected countries in maintaining their internal security. The DOD aims
to help these nations achieve proper balance in their military capabilities to meet external
and internal threats.
The Department of Defense exercises its security assistance functions through the
following staff organizations:

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Service component commands.

Security assistance organizations.

Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) augmentation forces.

Unified commands.

Military departments.

Joint Chiefs of Staff.


The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy serves as the principal adviser and assistant to
the Secretary of Defense for all matters concerned with the integration of DOD plans and
policies into overall national security objectives. He exercises direction, authority, and
control over the Defense Security Assistance Agency. The DSAA is a DOD agency. The

Administers and supervises security assistance planning and programs.

Formulates and executes security assistance programs in coordination with other

governmental agencies.

Conducts international logistics and sales negotiations with foreign countries.

Manages the credit financing program.

Serves as the DOD focal point for liaison with U.S. industry concerning security
assistance activities.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff play a key role in the U.S. security assistance effort. They assist
in this effort through the joint planning process. Key JCS plans are the joint strategic
planning document (with its supporting analysis), the, joint strategic capabilities plan, the
joint security assistance memorandum, and the joint intelligence estimate for planning.
In addition, the JCS continually review current and ongoing programs for specific
countries and regions to ensure compatibility with U.S. global security interests.
All military-related security assistance guidance, plans, and programs formulated at the
national level are referred to the JCS for review. The JCS ensure that directives and
communications pertaining to military assistance do not inadvertently circumvent or
ignore force objectives, strategic concepts, and military plans. The JCS also fully
coordinate program recommendations from Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs,
also sometimes used for Security Assistance Officer) and unified commands to ensure
consistency with U.S. global security plans.
The under secretary of state for security assistance, science, and technology chairs an
interagency review committee, the Arms Transfer Management Group, which manages
and coordinates security assistance matters. It includes representatives from agencies
throughout the executive branch who deal in security assistance matters. It includes
representatives from the NSC, DOD, JCS, Department of State, USAID, CIA, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency Office of Management and Budget, and the
Department of the Treasury. These representatives bring issues concerning security
assistance to the attention of primary decision makers. The group coordinates military
assistance and military related supporting assistance. This coordination encourages
mutually supporting programs and increases their efficiency.


The CINC appoints a contact officer to represent his interests in each country. The
contact officer works with both the diplomatic mission and the host nation military
The role of the CINC is critical. He advises the JCS on significant events in his AO. His
perspective is both regional, and country-specific. He focuses on the operational level of
conflict. He identifies and applies necessary resources to achieve U.S. strategic and
foreign policy goals in his region. When employed properly and in a timely fashion,
these resources minimize the likelihood of U.S. combat involvement.
The service component commands participate in the security assistance planning process,
especially in training matters. They have a large role in executing and managing all
relevant programs.
The SAO manages DOD security assistance functions in a friendly or allied country. It
oversees all foreign-based DOD elements in that country with security assistance
SAO is a generic term for military assistance offices and may actually be known
in-country by any number of names according to the number of people assigned, to the
functions performed, or to the desires of the host nation. Typical SAO designations
include "joint U.S. military advisory group" and "joint U.S. military group," "U.S.
military training mission," "defense field office," or "office of defense cooperation." In
countries where the U.S. has no SAO, another member of the mission has the
responsibilities for security assistance; for example, the defense attach or a Foreign
Service officer.
The SAO is a joint organization. Its chief is essentially responsible to three authorities:
the ambassador (who heads up the country team and controls all U.S. civilian and
military personnel in country), the CINC of the unified command, and the director of the
DSAA. The ambassador has operational control of the SAO for all matters affecting his
diplomatic mission, including security assistance programs. Unified CINCs, on the other
hand, command and supervise SAOs within their operational theaters in matters that are
not the ambassador's responsibility.
The United States tailors each SAO to the needs of its host nation; for this reason, there is
no typical or standard SAO organization. However, a large SAO normally has Army,
Navy, and Air Force sections. Each of these is responsible for accomplishing its service
portion of security assistance activities. A small SAO has divisions by function but no
separate service sections.
The primary functions of security assistance personnel are logistics management, fiscal
management, and contract administration of country security assistance programs.
Security assistance personnel:

Maintain liaison with host government defense establishments.


Operate with the host nation's military, primarily at the national level, to interpret
U.S. policies, to resolve problems in materiel delivery, and to obtain technical
assistance for defective materiel.

Provide host governments with information necessary to make decisions

concerning the acquisition and use of defense articles and services. (These
services include training under the auspices of U.S. security assistance programs.)

Obtain information to evaluate the host-nation military's capability to employ and

maintain the equipment requested.

Process security assistance proposals of foreign governments.

Maintain a continuing dialogue with host nation defense officials on military

matters such as the threat and host nation military capabilities.

The SAO can provide limited advisory and training assistance from its own resources.
This assistance can, however, be expanded when the SAO is augmented by survey teams,
MTTs, TAFTs, TATs, and other such teams and organizations placed under the direction
and supervision of the local chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. SF advisors will meet
and work with other Service advisors and trainers.
An MTT gives the host nation a self-training capability in a particular skill and is a
typical form of SF deployment. It trains selected host nation personnel who then
constitute an instructional base for continuing the training.
The programmed length of deployment of an MTT is for less than a six-month period.
The MTT capabilities are mission-specific. Under most circumstances, the MTT
operates directly under the control of an SAO. A specific command and control element
accompanies the MTT when the mission requires it.
Documents describing SAO responsibilities and functions include DOD Directive 5132.3
and DOD Manual 5105.38. The directive gives broad guidance on the functions and
responsibilities of the SAO. It constitutes the basic TOR for all DOD organizations
assigned security assistance responsibilities. The manual sets forth responsibilities,
policies, and procedures governing the administration of security assistance programs. It
is the basic program management manual. DOD Directive 2055.3 prescribes
requirements for the selection and training of security assistance personnel.
In addition to using these basic references, the chief, SAO, may draft supplemental
instructions for a specific country. He coordinates them with the chief of mission,
submits them to the unified commander and JCS for comment, and sends them to the
DOD for approval.

Thus framed, these TOR provide guidance regarding the SAO's mission, command
relationships, organization, administration, logistical support, and functions. The SAO
may modify them as the requirements change.
Foreign internal defense augmentation forces (FIDAF) can augment SAOs. They support
operations in situations that range from conditions short of open hostility to general war.
They are strategically located and vary in size and capabilities according to theater
requirements. U.S. military services may assign forces to the FIDAF from those already
within the region, or from forces based in the United States.
The FIDAF consists of a headquarters element that may be joint or single service, as
required. It also may include CA, PSYOP, combat, CS, and CSS elements tailored to
requirements. Though limited in depth and sustainability, elements of the FIDAF can
provide the government a wide range of advice and assistance on counterinsurgency
activities and techniques.
The FIDAF headquarters element includes a CMO officer, who has staff responsibility
for CA and PSYOP. The following are special staff element members--the surgeon, staff
judge advocate, chemical officer, communications and electronics officer, engineer,
public affairs officer, comptroller, and chaplain. Combat, CS, and CSS elements also
provide special staff officers when they are assigned or attached to the FIDAF.
The CA unit of the FIDAF gives assistance and advice to U.S. and host-nation officials,
agencies, and military forces to strengthen the host nation's developmental posture. The
CA unit reflects the requirements of the FIDAF.
The PSYOP unit gives training, advice, and operational assistance to other FIDAF
elements and the host nation's military forces to strengthen the host nation's PSYOP
programs. It also assists a SAO or U.S. civil agency in the host nation. The specific
requirements of the assistance operation determine the organization and numbers of
The combat, CS, and CSS elements provide the remaining expertise and experience to
advise, train, and assist the host nation's military combat units and staffs within the
context of security assistance requirements. When specifically empowered by competent
authority, CS elements may include military police sections.
Deployment considerations for the FIDAF rest on the concept of employing MTTs and
small detachments to fulfill specific mission requests in a designated time period. Visits
to the host nation by FIDAF representatives before deployment are beneficial; the
representatives should request them whenever possible. Visiting personnel gather
information concerning the anticipated mission, organization, concept of operations,
control, and logistical support, including personal services available in the host nation.
They do this to prepare the force adequately and to ensure its success upon arrival in


In most cases, the resources available to the SAO through U.S. military or civilian
agencies may be adequate to support small elements of the FIDAF with the
administrative, legal, and health services they need; this requires proper coordination.
Many of these services may draw on embassy assets and will require a Department of
State support agreement.
Transportation and maintenance requirements also are important in planning. Using
in-country transportation and other resources is preferable to establishing additional U.S.
support activities for short-term operations. After-action reports of prior MTT missions
can assist other teams in the same area.
The flexibility of organization and the wide range of skills available in the FIDAF
provide the CINC with forces to augment the capability of the SAO temporarily in a
country faced with an externally supported insurgency. The FIDAF can repeatedly
deploy its personnel into a country for short periods, providing advice, assistance, and
continuity to specific, monitored programs. The CINC may locate the nucleus of the
FIDAF out of country where administration, logistics, and planning and operations can
support in-country efforts.
The role of the military departments resembles that of the regional component
commands. The departments play an even larger role in the planning phase and in the
execution of materiel-related programs. They develop, negotiate, and execute
agreements. They provide advice on matters such as costs, availability, and lead-time on
military equipment and training. In this way, they ensure delivery of materiel and
services. The departments also provide necessary resources and administrative support to
move assets to recipients.
The U.S. diplomatic mission to a host nation includes representatives of all U.S.
departments and agencies physically present in the country. The President gives the chief
of the diplomatic mission, normally an ambassador, immediate "direction and control"
over U.S. in-country government personnel. This does not include personnel in another
mission or those assigned to an international agency or to a unified CINC, including their
subordinate elements. The in-country SAO is an exception to this latter rule.
The chief of mission ensures that all in-country activities best serve U.S. interests as well
as regional and international objectives. He promotes positive program direction by
seeing that all activities are necessary, are efficiently and economically administered, and
are effectively interrelated. The chief of missions program direction may be found in an
embassys Country Plan. This is a must read document.
The heart of the U.S. mission is the country team. The country team concept promotes
the process of in-country, interdepartmental coordination among key members of the U.S.
diplomatic mission. This concept of embassy management developed in the early 1950s.
In 1974, the term received its first official mention in Public Law 93-475.

The composition of a country team varies widely, depending on the desires of the chief of
mission, on the in-country situation, and on the number and levels of U.S. departments
and agencies present. The principal military members of the country team are the
defense attach and the chief of the SAO. Although a U.S. area military commander (the
CINC or his subordinate) is not a member of the diplomatic mission, he often participates
in meetings of the country team.
The team coordinates many activities under the CINC's control because of their political
and military implications. This coordination ensures continuity of effort and eliminates
politically counterproductive initiatives.
A fuller description of U.S. embassies and diplomatic missions can be found in Appendix
2, Embassy Organization and Function.


The majority of U.S. programs for developing nations are economic, political, and
humanitarian in nature. Some foreign assistance, however, does take the form of selected
military programs. How developing nations resolve their social, economic, political, and
military problems influences the prospects for a stable world order. Ultimately, how the
problems are resolved impacts--for good or ill--on the security and economic well-being
of the United States.
The presence of a U.S. military organization does not determine the level or scope of
foreign assistance to individual countries. Nevertheless, the programs discussed below
provide the mechanisms through which the United States may render foreign assistance.


Selected nations receive U.S. developmental assistance primarily for economic and social
reasons. This assistance can result in improved security, and direct and immediate relief
of human suffering. Humanitarian and civic assistance helps a nation's development as
much as assistance in security matters. Developmental assistance programs are
administered by USAID.
The progressive goals of developmental assistance are fundamentally long-term; they are
achieved slowly. Developmental assistance can:

Support political, economic, and social progress.

Increase agricultural and industrial production.

Educate and train people.

Help prevent population growth from outrunning economic growth.


Build lasting institutions.

Reduce economic disparities.

Promote wider distribution of the benefits of economic progress.

In this context, the United States can assist developing nations through developmental
loans and technical assistance. Planners use these tools separately or in combinations.

Developmental loans finance the purchase of a wide range of commodities and related
technical services that developing countries need for schools, clinics, irrigation works,
and roads. The U.S. government may make these loans or private banks may make them,
with or without government guarantee. Developing countries repay the loans with
interest. Interest rates charged to the borrowing country are lower than commercial rates;
the United States often approves long-term credit agreements.

Technical assistance primarily affects people-their skills, their productivity, and the
institutions they build and administer. It allows the people of developing countries to
generate what they need for economic and social growth and modernization.
Self-sustaining growth depends on the effective use of natural resources, capital facilities,
and labor. Technical assistance speeds up the process by which people gain an education,
learn skills, and develop positive attitudes so they can more effectively help themselves.


Humanitarian and civic assistance is another component of U.S. foreign assistance. It
basically consists of welfare and emergency relief.

The largest part of welfare support is in food programs for mothers and children. It also
gives nutritional supplement programs for schools.

Disaster and emergency relief and refugee assistance make up the second largest category
in this group. These programs have helped in emergency situations overseas ranging
from natural disasters to war.


Elements of the DOD may participate in these programs on a case-by-case basis, in

support of the responsible agency. Additionally, Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Chapter 2)
allows the DOD to conduct humanitarian and civic assistance activities along with
military operations--in certain narrowly defined circumstances with prior approval of the
Secretary of State.


U.S. security assistance includes programs that assist friendly foreign countries to
establish and maintain an adequate defense posture. The programs also help them to
improve internal security and resist external aggression.
The basis for such assistance lies in the strategy of collective security, a national security
policy that recognizes that the security and economic well-being of friendly foreign
countries are essential to U.S. security. Security assistance programs aid collective
security. They help allied and friendly nations to resist aggression and contribute to
national and regional stability.
Narrowly defined, security assistance is activity pursuant to a body of laws that
authorizes and controls the entire process; for example, the Foreign Assistance Act and
the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and related amendments. Considered more
properly as a strategic element, security assistance is a primary tool of U.S. foreign
policy. It has application across the spectrum of international competition. It is a bridge
that links collective security with U.S. friends and allies in times of peace and in times of
Operationally, security assistance is the principal U.S. military instrument for most forms
of support to friends and allies. However, its budgetary process in the narrow definition
makes it largely a long-range preventive tool rather than a short-range reactive tool. The
security assistance budget is a part of the Department of State (Program 150) foreign
assistance budget. The budget planning cycle takes about two years to respond to new
program requirements. Moreover, the general budgetary climate in which it evolves tends
to be extremely limited. Due to these constraints the United States must usually engage
in long-range programs of mutual defense planning with a friend or ally. Specific
security assistance initiatives are especially effective in cases where the friend or ally
already has a sound financial program for its own defense.
There are limited, special emergency authorities in the Foreign Assistance Act and the
AECA that the President may use in a crisis to speed up the budgetary process.
Nevertheless, he uses them rarely and for relatively low levels of U.S. government


Security assistance includes selling or granting defense articles and services, training, and
economic support in the form of loans or grants to offset the costs of maintaining armed
forces. Specifically, security assistance gives allied and friendly military forces the
equipment, spare parts, supporting materiel, and services that enhance their capability to
deter aggression and to maintain internal security. It can provide training assistance to

Improve effectiveness.

Promote proper usage and maintenance of equipment.

Establish a sound base for the nation's training activities.

Standardize procedures that enhance combined military operations.

Promote friendship and goodwill toward the United States.

The United States will provide security assistance if threatened nations:

Assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for their own

Devote a fair share of other resources to the defense effort and use resources

Assume increasingly greater responsibility for their own defense; for

fundamental, related decisions and for necessary resources.

Learn to identify the total costs of their forces. This understanding allows them to
make informed choices in allocating limited resources. The economic
consequences of military spending by supported nations should not impede their
economic development.

Grant aid terminates as soon as possible. Use of available credit programs makes
transition to aid on a sales basis easier. Grant aid and credit resources focus on capital
investment needs, with the receiving country assuming operating and maintenance costs.
Development of assistance and self-help goals should reflect the current threats, risks,
costs, resource constraints, and manpower limitations. This provides a realistic basis for
the allocation of security-oriented resources. The economic consequences of military
spending by supported nations will not impede their economic development.

When the United States gives security assistance to a host nation, a primary concern is
the host nation's ability to plan and manage its defense resources by and for itself. Host
nation military organizations may never develop this ability if they continue to request
help when they no longer need it; that is, in areas where they have already achieved
The United States conducts five major security assistance programs, all of which fall
under the control of the Department of State. The DOD administers two: International
Military Education and Training (IMET), and foreign military financing (FMF), both
cash and credit. The Department of State and USAID administer the remaining three
programs: Economic Support Fund (ESF), peacekeeping operations, and commercial
export sales.
The IMET program provides instruction and training to foreign military and qualifying
civilian personnel either in the United States or overseas on a grant-aid basis. It improves
the ability of friendly foreign countries to use their own resources and to operate and
maintain equipment acquired from the United States.
IMET helps countries develop greater self-reliance and improves their training
capabilities. The training promotes rapport between the armed forces of foreign nations
and U.S. armed forces. It fosters a better understanding of the United States including its
people, its political system, its institutions, and the policies and objectives by which it
pursues world peace and human rights. IMET encompasses

The formal and informal instruction of foreign students in the United States.

Training at civilian institutions.

Technical education and training aids.

Informational publications.

Assistance to foreign military elements by MTTs or technical field training

service personnel.

Orientation tours of U.S. military installations.

The FMF program enables foreign governments and international organizations to

purchase defense articles, services, and training through DOD with their own financial
resources. The program also includes supply and support arrangements that provide
materiel, supply, and maintenance support to foreign customers for their U.S.-made
military purchases. Foreign military construction sales involve the sale of design and
construction services to eligible purchasers.

The Special Defense Acquisition Fund enhances the U.S. government's ability to meet
urgent foreign needs for military equipment, while minimizing adverse impacts on U.S.
readiness. It finances the acquisition of defense articles and services in anticipation of
authorized FMS cash or loan purchases. While the fund is limited in scope, it can shorten
the lead-time of selected items; for example, infantry equipment and tactical radios. The
DSAA manages this fund.
Under normal procedures prescribed by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), payment
for FMS must be in advance of equipment delivery or performance of services. The
President may defer the repayment date until 60 days after delivery (without interest
being charged to the foreign country). He even may extend the deadline to 120 days after
delivery provided he requests a special appropriation from Congress. These authorities
are used only in rare circumstances.
The FMS financing program gives credit and loan guarantees to eligible foreign
governments for the purchase of defense articles, services, and training. The United
States recognizes the advantages in encouraging foreign governments to use direct credit
or guaranteed loans to meet their defense needs. It makes an effort to obtain loans at less
than market interest rates for countries that cannot afford the market rates.
The United States evaluates all FMS activities in the context of their impact on social and
economic development programs in recipient countries and for their impact on regional
arms races. In accordance with its policies, the United States approves sales to countries
or international organizations to improve internal security, self-defense, or civic action, or
to improve regional collective security agreements. It is U.S. policy not to sell materials
and services to governments that deny fundamental rights or social progress to their
people. The President may waive these restrictions in extreme circumstances when this is
necessary for U.S. security.
The ESF program promotes economic or political stability in areas where the United
States has special security interests; for example, when the United States determines that
economic assistance is useful in securing peace or averting economic or political crises.
The ESF enables recipient nations to devote more of their own resources to security
purposes than would otherwise be possible without serious economic or political
The ESF gives economic aid in the form of loans or grants for a variety of economic
purposes including balance of payment support, economic infrastructure projects, and
health, education, agriculture, and family planning needs. ESF funds cannot be used to
purchase military hardware or military training. When recipient nations attain reasonable
political and economic stability, the United States shifts from the ESF to normal
developmental assistance programs.
The peacekeeping program provides that portion of security assistance devoted to
peacekeeping operations. This assistance includes participation in the multinational

forces and observers in the Sinai, in the U.S. contribution to the United Nations forces in
Cyprus, and in other programs designed specifically for peacekeeping.
U.S. industry makes direct AECA-licensed commercial export sales to a foreign buyer.
The Defense Trade Center, Department of State, establishes the U.S. governmental
control procedures.
Although it is not commonly listed as one of the seven major security assistance
programs, the antiterrorism assistance program strengthens the bilateral relationship
between the United States and participating countries and fosters a cooperative
relationship among foreign civilian law enforcement agencies. The Department of State
administers this program.
Military advisory and other security assistance personnel need a wide array of skills to
handle the diverse activities encompassed in security assistance and FID operations.
They need a broad educational foundation to have a better appreciation of the social
systems of developing nations. Language training is essential.
A proper advisor-client relationship depends on successful intercultural communications.
Advisors frequently work with counterparts from their respective cultural, educational,
and military backgrounds.
An effective advisor understands his counterpart's sociological, psychological, and
political make-up. Accomplishment of the advisory mission often depends more upon
positive personal relationships between U.S. advisors and host nation counterparts than
upon formal agreements. Host nation leaders may not desire the assistance offered.
Indeed, they may tolerate it only to obtain materiel and training assistance. Even when
they accept U.S. advice, host nation military leader may not immediately act upon it
because of internal constraints and restrictions.
The U.S. military advisor works in support of an overall U.S. national effort. He
frequently collaborates in-country with civilian members of other U.S. country team
agencies. Many of their activities cross mutual jurisdictional boundaries. He must know
the functions, responsibilities, and capabilities of the other team agencies. The specific
relationship with nonmilitary country team members depends largely on the desires of the
chief of the diplomatic mission. He must read and understand the intent of the respective
embassy or mission Country Plan to understand the larger intent of the Chief of Mission.



Purpose: This appendix gives basic information on the role of the U.S. diplomatic
mission (generally referred to as the U.S. embassy), its organization and function.
Because Special Forces personnel will often work closely with the U.S. diplomatic
mission in a host nation, it is important that they possess a basic understanding of how
such missions operate.

All U.S. embassies are unique to some degree. They vary widely in size and in the scope
of their activities. However, there are a number of commonalities that can help in
understanding embassy operations.


The permanent U.S. diplomatic mission to a HN is usually called an embassy and
includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies physically present in the
country. The president appoints and is personally represented by an ambassador who is
the head of the embassy. Ambassador is a rank in the U.S. Foreign Service. The job title
of an ambassador in charge of an embassy is chief of mission or COM. Ambassadorial
authority extends to all elements of the mission and all official USG activities and
establishments within the HN. The President gives the chief of mission, direction and
control over all U.S. in-country government personnel. However, this authority does not
extend to personnel in other missions or those assigned to either an international agency
or to a geographic combatant commander. This last point is the topic of endless
discussion since; in some circumstances, an ambassador will have control of CINCs
personnel in country. He or she can, for example, sometimes have persons declared PNG
(persona non grata) and excluded from the country. Although the diplomatic mission is
outside the geographic combatant commanders responsibility, close coordination with
each mission in the commanders AOR is essential.
U.S. federal employees detailed to an international organization are nearly always
exempted from routine supervision by the U.S. embassy, however they still remain under
the authority of the COM. For military purposes, the Ambassador usually accomplishes
supervision either through the assigned Security Assistance Organization (SAO) or
through the Country Team. There is a close coordinating relationship between the
Ambassador, the represented USG agencies, and the combatant commander.
Section 136 of the FY 1988/89 Foreign Relations Authorization Act amended the Foreign
Service Act to exclude non-executive branch employees (e.g. Judicial or Legislative
branch employees), from COM authority. However, any such persons working in an
embassy are usually the subjects of a memorandum of understanding placing them under
COM authority except for purely operational matters.


An example of ambassadorial power.

The position and authority of the ambassador varies between peacetime and crisis.
During peacetime, or after a return to relatively peaceful conditions, the ambassador
usually wields considerable control of military activities. An example of that power was
demonstrated in the post-conflict period following Operation Just Cause:
In March 1990, this part of the MSG [Military Support Group] was composed of 48
specialists from the 8th Battalion of the 4th PSYOPS Group. On 7 June 1991, it was
ordered to depart from Panama. Why was the PSYOPS Support Element (PSE) the first
part of the MSG to stand down, and why so early? The specific reasons are difficult to
ascertain. What is clear is that the ambassador wanted it out of the country as quickly as
possible. The embassy simply chose to exercise its authority and that was the end of
it. Richard H. Shultz, In the Aftermath of War, U.S. Support for Reconstruction and
Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause.
At the end of this appendix is the text of Authorities and Responsibilities of Chiefs of
Missions, the presidential letter used to outline the authority granted to the Ambassador
to execute his or her duties.


In many ways, the Country Team is a microcosm of what it representsan assortment of
entrenched Washington bureaucratic institutions steeped in the art of turf warfare. Selfinterest has been known to surface. What tends to prevail in the end, though, is a
conviction among the Teams members that they are in fact a team, the Ambassador is
the coach calling the plays, and it is their duty to run in the same direction as their
teammates. They may seek adjustment at the margins, but they remain on the team and on
the field. Executing U.S. Foreign Policy Through the Country Team Concept, LTC
Barry K. Simmons, USAF

The Country Team is the central group responsible for in-country, interdepartmental
coordination among key members of the U.S. diplomatic Mission or Embassy that work
directly with the HN government. It commonly meets at least once a week, usually
under the direction of either the Ambassador or the Deputy Chief of Mission.
Its purpose is to unify the coordination and implementation of U.S. national policy within
each foreign country under direction of the Ambassador. The Country Team advises the
Ambassador on matters of interest to the United States and reviews current developments
in the country.
One important purpose of the Country Team focus is to direct attention toward
identification of potential sources of conflict and threats to U.S. interests in a country and
to improve problems by introducing programs designed to assist the economy, enhance
medical care, and improve the infrastructure of the country.

The composition of a country team is whatever the ambassador desires and may change
from time to time. Sub-groups of the country team may also be created to deal with
special issues such as counternarcotics. However, the following is typical of most
country teams.


Deputy Chief Of Mission

Political Counselor

Chief of Station

Director U.S. Agency For International Development

Consular Office Director

U.S. Information Services Director

Agricultural Attach

Economic Counselor

Administrative Counselor

Defense Attach

Chief, Security Assistance Organization

Director Peace Corps

Other Agency Representatives as desired by the ambassador (E.g. Legal Attach

((FBI representative)), Civil Air Attach, etc.)

Other Personnel: Individuals such as members of a technical assistance team may

also be invited to some or all country team meetings.

The DOS developed this concept of embassy management in the early 1950s, although it
wasnt until 1974 that the term "Country Team" received its first official mention in
Public Law 93-475. The composition of a Country Team varies widely, depending on the
desires of the chief of mission, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of U.S.
departments and agencies present. The principal military members of the Country Team
are the Defense Attach and the chief of the SAO. Although the U.S. area military

commander (the combatant commander or a subordinate) is not a member of the

diplomatic mission, the commander may participate or be represented in meetings and
coordination conducted by the Country Team.
The country team is often less than adequate for every need. In some cases it may not
exist (e.g., Cuba), it may be inoperative due to damage or casualties from natural or
manmade disaster, or it may simply be weak or inadequately trained in crisis
management. The relationship with military chains of command is frequently ad hoc.
The United States country team is the senior, in-country, United States coordinating and
supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and
composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency,
as desired by the Chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (Joint Pub 1-02, Department of
Defense Directory of Military and Associated Terms.)
It includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies present in the country.
The U.S. Ambassador, synonymous with chief of mission, represents the President but
takes policy guidance from the SECSTATE through regional bureaus. The Ambassador is
responsible for all U.S. activities within the country to which the United States is
accredited, and interprets U.S. policies and strategy regarding the nation. The
composition of the country team varies widely depending on specific U.S. national
interests in the country, the desires of the chief of mission, the situation within the
country, and the number and level of presence of U.S. agencies. Agencies represented on
the country team can include U.S. Agency for International Development; Department of
Defense, through the Defense Attach and Security Assistance Organization; U.S.
Information Agency, through the local U.S. Information Service office; U.S. Customs
Service; Peace Corps representatives; U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of
Investigation through the Legal Attach; et al. The country team facilitates interagency
action on recommendations from the field and implements effective execution of U.S.
programs and policies. JP 3- 08 v I Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations
Vol I, 9 October 1996
The following discussion gives an outline of typical Country Team representatives and
explains the military elements.
The U.S. DOS is generally represented on the Country Team by the following:

Deputy chief of mission (DCM). The DCM is the senior diplomatic official in the
Embassy below the rank of Ambassador. The DCM has the diplomatic title of
Minister, Minister-Counselor, or Counselor (depending upon the size of the
mission) and is usually a career Foreign Service Officer. The DCMs principal
responsibility is to coordinate the embassy staff and help ensure that all U.S. incountry activities best serve U.S. interests. He or she is the second in command,

serves as executive officer and chief of staff, and directs the mission in the
Ambassadors absence (then called the Charge DAffairs).

The Political Counselor (or Political Officer). He or she directs the political
section and is often third in command of the mission. The political section may
also contain a political and/or military officer to assist in the coordination of
military activities. . The Political Officer reports on political developments,
negotiates with the host government, and represents views and policies of the
USG. The Political Officer maintains regular contact with host government
officials, political and labor leaders, and other influential citizens of the host
country, as well as other countries diplomats. The Political Officer is a major
contributor to the overall intelligence picture.

Chief of Station (COS). As the senior intelligence adviser to the Ambassador, the
COS is an excellent source of information on the country and the current
situation. For most purposes, he or she is the chief U.S. intelligence official in the

Administration Officer. The Administration Officer is responsible for various

activities at the Embassy compound. This may include security at small posts;
running the commissary, motor pool, and maintenance activities; and handling
monetary aspects of embassy business, including foreign service national payroll,
cash collection, and the budget. At a small post with no security officer assigned,
the Administration Officer assumes the functions of the post security officer and
has operational control of the Marine security guard (MSG) detachment.

General Services Officer (GSO). The GSO works for the Administration Officer
and is responsible for buildings, grounds, construction, vehicles, and maintenance.

Commercial and/or Economic Officer. The Commercial and/or Economic Officer

analyzes, reports on, and advises superiors, DOS, and DOD personnel on
economic matters in the host country. Economic officers also negotiate with the
host government on trade and financial issues.

Consular Officer. The Consular Officers major role is to screen, process, and
grant U.S. passports and visas. Other responsibilities the Consular Officer may be
assigned include attending to the welfare of U.S. citizens and administrative tasks
such as maintaining a census of U.S. nationals within the host country. The
Consular Officer provides the requisite number of personnel needed to screen
documents of all potential evacuees during a NEO and gives instructions to any
Evacuation Control Center (ECC) personnel needed to staff processing stations.

Regional Security Officer (RSO). The RSO is a DOS security officer responsible
for the security functions of all U.S. Embassies and consulates in a given country
or group of adjacent countries. The RSO gives direction to the MSG detachment
via the detachment commander. The RSO oversees the following personnel:

Post Security Officer (PSO). Posts with no RSO have a PSO. The PSO has
general security duties at a specific embassy (or consulate) and is usually the
Administration Officer.

Mobile Security Division (MSD). The MSD consists of DOS employees of

the Diplomatic Security Service who respond to crises in foreign countries.
The MSD is trained to respond to increased threats or critical security needs at
an embassy, provide additional security, and provide immediate response to a
security-related incident.

United States Marine Corps Security Guard Detachment. An MSG

detachment will have a minimum of six Marines. The maximum number is
dictated by need. The Marine Detachment Commander is normally
responsible to the RSO or PSO for internal security, protection of classified
material, and U.S. personnel. Administration control of detachment Marines is
through the Regional Marine Officer (RMO). The RMO is the company
commander of the MSGs within a specific geographic region.

The Commercial Attach. Commercial Attach is trained by the Department of

Commerce and promotes U.S. commercial interests.

Regional Medical Officer. The Regional Medical Officer is qualified for general
practice and is trained to set up triage, trauma, and mass casualty operations. The
Regional Medical Officer can also advise on indigenous diseases and proper
prophylactic procedures for U.S. forces operating in that area.


Operating overseas as the U.S. Information Service (USIS), the agency helps to achieve
U.S. foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes overseas. The agency
advises U.S. departments outside the continental United States (CONUS) on the possible
impact of policy, programs, and official statements on foreign opinion. It certifies
journalists within the HN and works with the local, national, and international media to
get media coverage in the United States and elsewhere about the HN government and its
efforts. USIS is interested in the impact of U.S. activities on local attitudes and can aid
U.S. military forces by fostering popular support for their missions in the HN and the
region. It uses a proactive approach to communication to encourage constructive public
support abroad for U.S. policy objectives and to unmask and counter hostile attempts to
distort or frustrate U.S. policies. The PAO and Information Officer may represent the
U.S. Information Agency in an embassy.

The PAO is the ranking USIA officer in country. He is responsible for

implementing the U.S. information program throughout the HN. The PAO is the
Ambassadors adviser concerning public affairs (PA), the director of the United

States Information Service (USIS) in country, and overseer of U.S. Cultural

Center operations. During an emergency, the PAO will be responsible for all press
releases and inquiries for information directed to the Embassy. The PAO usually
speaks at press conferences that the Ambassador cannot attend.

The Information Officer is responsible for relations with the press and media.


The in-country director of USAID represents the Agency for International Development.
USAID is a quasi-independent agency that funds developmental projects representing the
nationwide efforts of the Country Team. Administratively, it functions within the DOS
under the Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency. USAID carries
out economic assistance programs to help people of developing countries advance their
productive capacities, improve their quality of life, promote economic and political
stability, and assist in providing the HN with supplies and equipment to construct needed
projects. USAID maintains liaison with all charitable organizations capable of conducting
humanitarian assistance (HA). The agency can respond to virtually any disaster abroad,
with emphasis on humanitarian relief in the form of equipment and funds. USAID
publishes a yearly report titled Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs that describes the aims
and objectives of registered Non-Governmental Organizations. It should be part of the
advisors library.
The principal representative of the Peace Corps is the Peace Corps Director. Although
the Peace Corps is not considered an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, the Peace Corps
country director and staff (if present) are U.S. officials and part of the U.S. mission.
However, they remain substantially separate from the routine operations of the embassy.
COMs generally provide the Peace Corps with as much autonomy and flexibility as
possible in its operations.
The following may represent other USG departments, agencies, and interests.

Treasury Attach

Agricultural Attach

Labor Attach

Civil Air Attach


Science Attach

Drug Enforcement Administration Representative, often referred to as the DEA

Country Attach. Each embassy that has a DEA office is authorized at least two
DEA agents.

Department of Defense organization and representation within the diplomatic mission
and country team can range from as little as a part-time envoy to a full complement of
Service attaches or a major SAO. In nations with active FID programs, there is likely to
be a larger military presence with most of these resources centered in the SAO.
The U.S. Defense Representative (USDR)
The USDR in foreign countries is an additional duty title assigned to a military officer
serving in a specifically designated position. In most cases, this duty title is assigned to
the senior military officer assigned to permanent duty and responsibility in the country,
normally either the Defense Attach (DATT) or the security assistance officer (SAO). He
or she is the in country representative of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the geographic combatant commander, to provide
coordination of administrative, security, and logistic matters to USG officials for all DOD
noncombatant command elements in the foreign country in which the USDR is assigned.
The USDR is the Ambassadors liaison for all matters relating to administrative and
security coordination for all DOD personnel and organizations in the HN that are not
assigned to, attached to, nor under the command of a combatant commander. The USDR
is designated by the USDP, with the concurrences of the CJCS and the appropriate
combatant commander with area responsibility for the country to which the USDR is
assigned. The position is advisory only; thus the USDR has neither command nor tasking
authority. The USDR will normally. The appointment of the Defense Attach (DATT) or
the SA officer as the USDR does not change either the scope of their primary
responsibilities or their accountability to established rating officials.
The Defense Attach (DATT)
The DATT is normally the senior Service attach assigned to the embassy. The DATT
and other Service attaches comprise the U.S. Defense Attach Office (USDAO) and serve
as valuable liaisons to their HN counterparts. USDAOs are operated by Defense
Intelligence Agency. The attaches also serve the Ambassador and coordinate with and
represent their respective Military Departments on Service matters. The attaches
exchange information with the combatant commanders staff on HN military, social,
economic, and political conditions. The DAO consists of one or more Defense Attaches
and support personnel. Its mission is to observe and report on the military and politicomilitary situation in country. DAO personnel are active duty military attached to the
Embassy in a diplomatic status representing the Department of Defense. They may

facilitate access to the daily embassy situation report (SITREP) and other written
intelligence-related information. All military personnel, even those not assigned to the
Embassy or under direct control of the Ambassador, should normally coordinate their
activities through the DAO. The DAO duties also include continuing dialogue with HN
defense officials on military matters related to threat assessments, military intelligence,
and in-country military capabilities. In many countries, the functions of an SAO are
carried out within the USDAO under the direction of the DATT.
The Security Assistance Organization (SAO)
Not all embassies have an SAO; rather, some may have a Defense Attach Office (DAO)
or no military personnel at all. In many countries, security assistance functions are
performed within the DAO, and the DATT may also serve as the SAO. When the SAO
consists of a single representative, he or she is referred to as the Security Assistance
Officer rather the Organization.. The term "U.S. military assistance advisory groups"
at one time identified all Armed Forces organizations with SA responsibilities
permanently assigned to U.S. diplomatic missions. However, this and other similar terms
may be replaced by the generic term security assistance organization or SAO. The
specific title of the SAO may vary depending on the HN where it is located. However,
these differences reflect nothing more than the political climate within the HN. The SAO
reports to the U.S. Ambassador and assists HN security forces by planning and
administering military aspects of the SA program. SA offices also help U.S. Country
Teams communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budget officials within the USG.
Some countries will have Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) officers working for the
DAO. PEP officers serve as advisers and participants in Host Nation units. PEP officers
are excellent contacts for SF advisors.
The SAO is essentially a management organization that helps assess the HN needs and
articulate them through the instruments described above. In addition, the SAO provides
oversight of training and assistance teams temporarily assigned to assist the HN. The
SAO is limited by law from giving direct training assistance that is normally provided
through special teams and organizations assigned to perform limited tasks for specific
periods. These include technical assistance field teams (TAFTs), MTTs, technical
assistance teams (TATs), language training detachments, weapon system logistics offices,
quality assurance teams (QATs), as well as site survey and defense requirement survey
The foreign internal defense augmentation force (FIDAF) is a composite organization
that may be established to augment the SAO when needed. When constituted, the FIDAF
operates under a U.S. combatant command or a subordinate JTF. FIDAFs FID mission
is to assist SAOs.


The organization of a typical SAO:



o Programs & Training Branch
o Logistics Branch

o Programs & Training Branch
o Logistics Branch


o Programs & Training Branch
o Logistics Branch


An ambassador may initiate requests for SOF or an embassys country team may do so
with ambassadorial approval. The specific request may originate with the ambassador,
defense attach, or military assistance group commander but in no case will it occur
without the active consent of the ambassador concerned. The requests are passed to the
geographic combatant commander for determination of the appropriate response.
If the forces are available in theater from theater-assigned forces, and there are no
restrictions on their employment (e.g., counterdrug operations), the request can be
approved by the theater SOC commander. If there are insufficient forces available in
theater, the geographic combatant commander will request that the Secretary of Defense
approve a deployment order for USSOCOM forces through the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Staff will ensure that the proper interagency coordination is
completed. Once the request has been approved (following coordination by all concerned
State Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM, and the geographic
combatant commander in whose theater the deployment will take place), specific SOF
units or individuals are deployed.

With few exceptions, SOF deployed to support ambassadors or country teams will be
under the OPCON of the geographic combatant commander upon entering the
theater. The geographic combatant commander will normally exercise OPCON through
the U.S. military assistance advisory group commander or the chief of the in-country
security assistance organization, who keeps the ambassador informed of plans and
activities during the deployment. Under no circumstances will SOF operate in a
geographic combatant commanders area of responsibility, or in an ambassadors
country, without their prior notification and approval.
Each U.S. Presidential normally provides a letter to all ambassadors and other Chiefs of
Mission informing them of his policy toward their duties and responsibilities. The Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for providing this information to combatant
commanders and the Chiefs of the Military Services.
President Clinton provided such a letter on 16 September 1994. Together with National
Security Decision Directive 38, Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and Their Constituent
Posts (which gives the COM authority over their permanent staff), this letter gives the
COM authority over essentially all executive branch employees.
The text of the Presidents letter follows:
Dear Mr. (Madam) Ambassador:
As my representative, you, with the Secretary of State, assist me in the implementation of
my responsibilities for the conduct of our in (country) / at (international organization). I
charge you to exercise full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision
of all executive branch offices in and personnel in (country)/ at (international
organization) except for personnel under the command of a U.S. area military
commander, under another chief of mission in (country) or on the staff of an international
organization. This encompasses all American and foreign national personnel, in all
employment categories, whether direct hire or contract, full-time or part-time, permanent
or temporary
All executive branch personnel under your authority must keep you fully informed at all
times of their current and planned activities so that you can effectively carry out your
responsibility for U.S. government programs and operations. You have the right to see all
communications to or from Mission elements however transmitted, except those
specifically exempted by law or Executive decision.


As Commander in Chief, I retain authority over U.S. Armed Forces. On my behalf you
have responsibility for the direction, coordination, supervision and safety, including
security from terrorism of all Department of Defense personnel on official duty in
(country)/ at (international organization), except those personnel under the command of a
U.S. area military commander. You and such commanders must keep each other
currently informed and cooperate on all matters of mutual interest. You should report
any differences that cannot be resolved in the field to the Secretary of State; area military
commanders should report to the Secretary of Defense.
Every executive branch agency under your authority, including the Department of State,
must obtain your approval to charge the size, composition or mandate of its staff. Use
this authority to shape your Mission in ways that directly serve American interests and
values. I ask that you review regularly programs, personnel and funding levels, and
ensure that all agencies attached to your mission do likewise. Functions that can be
performed by personnel based in the United States or at regional offices overseas should
not be performed at post [the embassy]. In your review, seek guidance from the
Secretary of State, who has the responsibility for establishing appropriate staffing levels.
Given the restrictive resource environment in which we operate, I urge you to cooperate
in every way you can with any downsizing efforts undertaken by other departments and
agencies. If an Agency head disagrees with your regarding staffing so he or she may
inform the Secretary of State, to whom I have delegated responsibility for resolving such
issues. In the event the Secretary is unable to resolve the dispute, the Secretary and the
respective agency head will present their respective views to me through My Assistant
for National Security Affairs, for decision. In such instances both the Secretary and I will
uphold the party arguing for the best use of increasingly scarce resources
The Secretary of State is my principal foreign policy advisor. Under my direction, she is,
to the fullest extent provided by the law, responsible for the overall coordination and
supervision of U S Government activities abroad. The only authorized channel for
instructions to you is through her or from me. There are only two exceptions: (1) if I
personally instruct you to use a private channel; or (2) if the Secretary abstracts you to
use a non-State channel. The Secretary and I will look to you for your expert guidance
and frank counsel. You should seek the same from your own staff.
I urge you foster a climate of openness, as debate and dissent serve a vital role in policymaking. Ultimately there can be only one U.S. policy, which I expect you and all
members of your mission to follow and articulate. But by having a frank internal debate,
we are better able to speak to others with one voice regarding U.S. foreign policy.
The Secretary of State and, by extension, chiefs of mission abroad, most protect all U.S.
Government personnel on official duty abroad (other than those personnel under the
command of a U.S. area military commander) and their accompanying dependents. I
expect you to take direct responsibility for the security of your Mission. I also expect
you to support strongly appropriate counterintelligence and counterterrorism activities
that enhance security both locally and in the broader international context.


You should cooperate fully with personnel of the U.S. legislative and judicial branches in
(country)/at (international organization) so that U.S. foreign policy goals are advanced,
security maintained and executive, legislative and judicial responsibilities are carried out.
As Chief of Mission you are not only my representative in (country/international
organization) but also a servant of the people of our great Nation. This is both a high
honor and a great responsibility. I expect you to discharge this trust with professional
excellence and the highest standards of ethical conduct and diplomatic discretion. I ask
you to ensure your staff similarly adheres to the same strict standards and maintains our
shared commitment to equal opportunity. I urge you in particular to see that
discrimination or harassment of any kind find no acceptance at your Mission, just as they
have no place in American society.
Always keep in mind that, for the Government and people of (country)/the Secretariat
and other representatives to (international organization), you and your Mission
symbolize the United States of America and its values. Never forget the solemn duty that
we, as public servants, owe to the citizens of America: the active protection and
promotion of their well-being, safety and ideals. There is no better definition of
American national interest and no loftier objective for our efforts.
Bill Clinton


U.S. State Department ( :Official site with links and
information on all embassies, consulates, missions and other State Department related
activities (e.g. USAID) worldwide.
U.S. State Department (
Provides information on key officers at U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide
including addresses and contact information. Note: this site is not regularly updated.
U.S. State Department (
Directory (including Internet links) for U.S. embassies and consulates, U.S. Information
Service worldwide and other U.S. government offices.
U.S. State Department (
Addresses and contact information (including e-mail) for major embassies.
Privately owned website (
Gives Internet links to U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide.
U.S. State Department (


The U.S. DoS Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) and Handbooks. Chiefly information on
the bureaucratic workings of U.S. embassies (e.g. Chapter 9 of the FAM deals with how
visas are processed).
Electronic Embassy ( gives links to all of the foreign embassies
in Washington D.C
See Also Appendix 10: Internet Resources And References



Purpose: This appendix gives basic information on the legal basis for special operations
and treaties and other laws and regulations pertinent to SF elements.
The legal basis for the conduct of special operations, including advisory and liaison
activities, is found in Title 10 (Armed Forces), and Title 32 (National Guard) of the
United States Code (USC) 10. It states that in addition to fighting and winning
Americas wars the Army also has other important purposes.
Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and
its Major Components, also specifies that DOD maintain forces to uphold and advance
the national policies and interests of the United States and safeguard its internal security.
Special operations are an integral part of the military contribution to those objectives.


Three bodies of law are relevant to the conduct of U.S. military operations in peace and
conflict: international law, U.S. law, and host nation law. In addition to this appendix,
specific legal guidelines for operations can be found in FM 27-100, Legal Support to

International law will affect nearly many special operations. International law consists
chiefly of international agreements, often in the form of treaties, and customary
international law, including the agreements and customary law that constitute the law of
war. International agreements prescribe the rights, duties, powers and privileges of
nations relative to particular undertakings. International law affects U.S. special
operations in such matters as:

The entry of U.S. forces into a foreign country.

The status of U.S. personnel in a foreign country.

Construction and operation of U.S. bases and other facilities.

Aircraft overflight and landing rights.

Processing of claims for damage to people and property.

The special operations planner must understand that all aspects of operations carried out
in a foreign country will be governed by specific agreements or by international law.

Operations in peace or conflict must conform to U.S. law, whether in the form of a
statute, executive order, regulation or other directive from a branch or agency of the
federal government. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) applies questions of
military justice. The Federal Acquisition Regulation and various statutes govern the
acquisition of supplies and services for U.S. firms. The Foreign Assistance Act and the
Arms Export Control Act pertain to assistance given to a country. Various statutes,
Executive Order 12333, and DOD and service regulations govern intelligence activities.
The Case Act and implementing directives govern the negotiation and conclusion of
international agreements. The SJA must be an active advisor and participate in every
stage of the operation from the initial planning through redeployment.


Whether at the national or local level, all laws of the host nation apply to U.S. forces in
that country unless an international agreement provides otherwise. The types of laws that
may inhibit U.S. operations are in the fields of immigration, labor, currency exchange,
procurement of goods and services, customs, taxes, licenses and criminal and civil
liability. These areas are normally covered by a status of forces agreement (SOFA)
before an operation begins. The planner must understand the law in order to access its
affect on the operation. Assistance of this kind may be available from the
command/group judge advocate or the local U.S. diplomatic mission. If local law hinders
an operation, the commander must notify the U.S. diplomatic mission concerned and ask
that a solution be negotiated.


The following considerations illustrate the legal complexities encountered in special
operations. They provide a starting point for planning and conducting legal operations in
peace and conflict.


The "Posse Comitatus Act" is the popular name for the statute (Title 18, U.S. Code
(USC) section 1385) that makes it a crime to use the Army to enforce civil law. It is the
keystone of a legal philosophy that emphasizes the distinction between the military
mission and that of civilian law enforcement. There are a number of exceptions to the
statute that, with proper authorization, allow military support to civilian law enforcement.
The Staff Advocate (SJA) must review operations to ensure that they comply with the
Under most circumstances, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits direct assistance such as:

Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel aircraft, or other similar activity.


A search or seizure.

An arrest, apprehension, "stop and frisk," or similar activity.

Use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of Individuals, or as

undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.

The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to:

Members of the National Guard when not in federal service.

Members of a reserve component when not on active duty or active duty for

DOD civilians, unless under the direct command and control of an active duty

An advisor when off duty and acting only in a private capacity.

Soldiers taking action for the primary purpose of furthering a military or foreign
affairs function of the U.S., for example, enforcing military justice, maintaining
law and order on military installations, or protecting classified materials.

Under its inherent authority, the United States Government is responsible for preserving
public order and carrying out governmental operations within its territorial limits, by
force, if necessary. Under the Constitution, the two following exceptions allow the use of
the military to execute or enforce the law.
When Necessary to Protect Civilian Property and Functions. A sudden and unexpected
civil disturbance, disaster or calamity may seriously endanger life and property and
disrupt normal governmental functions to such an extent that local authorities cannot
control the situation. At such times, the federal government may use military force to
prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property and to restore government functions
and public order. This exception has rarely been used.
When Necessary to Protect Federal Property and Functions. The federal government may
use military force to protect federal property and federal government functions when
local authorities cannot or decline to provide adequate protection.


Other statutory exceptions (10 USC 371-380) allow military personnel to provide limited
support to civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) indirectly. Under these laws, the
military may share certain information and provide equipment, facilities, and other
services to LEAs. The annual DOD Authorization Act also contains exceptions
concerning military support to civilian authorities fighting illegal drugs. DOD policies for
providing support to civilian LEAs, including personnel and equipment, are contained in
DOD Directive 5525.5. AR 500-51 contains related U.S. Army policies. Examples of
support that does not violate The Posse Comitatus Act follow:

Loan of equipment and training to operate or repair the equipment.

Certain customs and other laws, The Controlled Substances Act and The
Immigration and Nationality Act, permit direct operation of this equipment.

Civilian LEAs' use of installation research facilities.

This statute (Title 31, USC, section 1535) requires that other federal agencies reimburse
the Department of Defense for services or support provided. Reimbursement for DOD
support provided to LEAs is not required when that support is in the normal course of
military training and operations, results in benefit to the Department of Defense that is
substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be obtained from military
operations or training, or is provided under the authority of section 1004, National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended.


Title 32 is the "National Guard" section of the USC. Section 112. Drug Interdiction and
Counterdrug Activities," describes the mechanism by which the Secretary of Defense
may provide funds to state governments (including the District of Columbia,
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and U.S. territories) for CD operations by the National
Guard when not in federal service. The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to troops
when not in federal service. Unlike Title 10, this title does not specify how the National
Guard may be employed. Each state determines its own employment laws. Nevertheless,
under National Guard regulations, members of the National Guard generally may not
participate directly in law enforcement activities. In some cases, however, National
Guardsmen may conduct limited law enforcement activities, such as searches of shipping
containers for illegal drugs, if their state law authorizes it. For these reasons, section 112
requires that the plans be submitted by the state governors to the Secretary of Defense
specify how National Guard personnel will be used when providing support to LEAs.



These are Acts passed each year to authorize or appropriate funds to the Department of
Defense. These Acts often contains provisions relating to the CD effort. For example, the
FY1989 National Defense Authorization Act tasked the Department of Defense to be the
single lead agency of the federal government for the detection and monitoring (D&M) of
illegal drug shipments into the United States. The FY 1990-91 National Defense
Authorization Act tasked the Department of Defense to create an integrated command,
control, communications, and technical Intelligence network linking the military and the
various civilian LEAs. The first of these provisions was subsequently incorporated into
permanent law (10 USC, section 124).

The proper expenditure of funds for operations is very important. Failure to correctly
apply fiscal principles to federal activities can lead to the unauthorized expenditure of
funds and potential criminal or administrative sanctions against those responsible. The
principles are complex and applying common sense rules cannot necessarily provide the
answers. Funds appropriated must be used for the purpose for which they were
appropriated. Additionally, funds may also have specific limitations as to activities for
which they can be used. After-the-fact audits by the General Accounting Office (GAO)
and other agencies are common.

Executive Order (EO) 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," regulates the use of
national intelligence assets. DOD Directive 5240.1, "DOD Intelligence Activities," and
DOD Regulation 5240. 1 -R, "Procedures Governing the Actions of DOD Intelligence
Components That Affect United States Persons," implement for the Department of
Defense the provisions of EO 12333, and set forth the conditions under which the
Department of Defense can collect information on U.S. citizens. Within the limits of the
law, the Department of Defense may collect information on U.S. persons reasonably
believed to be engaged in international illegal drug activities. The complexities of these
provisions require full legal review of all intelligence activities in addition to prescribed
intelligence oversight.

A number of international agreements affect special operations. These include SOFAs,
multilateral conventions, and bilateral agreements. Ad hoc agreements can also be
prepared for specific operations with appropriate delegated authority, in accordance with
DOD Directive 5530.3 and Army regulations. SOFAs establish the legal status of military
personnel in foreign countries Criminal and civil jurisdiction, taxation, and claims for
damages and injuries are a few of the issues normally covered in a SOFA. In the absence
of a SOFA, conventions, agreements or some other form of arrangement with a host
nation, DOD personnel in. foreign countries have the legal status of tourists and are
subject to all the laws and judicial processes of that nation.


The Stafford Act, 42 USC 121(and following sections), as amended, is the statutory
authority for federal domestic disaster assistance. It empowers the President to establish a
program for disaster preparedness and response, which he delegates to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. The Stafford Act gives procedures for declaring an
emergency or a major disaster, as well as the type and amount of federal assistance
available. The act authorizes the President to provide DOD assets for relief once he
formally declares an emergency or a major disaster. He may also provide DOD assets for
emergency work on a limited basis before the declaration. Department of Defense policy
for providing domestic disaster assistance is contained in DOD Directive 3025. 1,
Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). Army policy is found in AR 500-60.


Public Law 93-148, the War Powers Resolution (WPR) of November 1973, requires the
President to consult with and report to Congress when introducing U.S. armed forces:

Into hostilities;

Into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by

the circumstances;

Into foreign territories when equipped for combat (except for supply, repair,
replacement, and training); and

In numbers that substantially increase the number of U.S. forces equipped for
combat in a foreign country.

Of particular interest to Special Forces personnel, the resolution also applies to the
"assignment of members of such armed forces to command; coordinate, participate in the
movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign
country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an
imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities."
Procedures have been established for the legal advisor to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS), to review all force deployment actions routed through the JCS to which the
WPR may apply: The chairman's legal advisor subsequently reports to the DOD general
counsel concerning the WPR's applicability. If the DoD general counsel determines that
the situation merits further interagency discussion, he consults with the Department of
State's legal advisor, and perhaps with the attorney general. This process is intended to
provide the President with advice concerning the Congressional consultation and
reporting requirements mandated by the WPR.

Commanders and planners of special operations should be aware that the advisory and
training commitment of U.S. military personnel might require review for applicability of
the WPR. Advisory duties, especially in an insurgency or counterinsurgency, may
require consultation and reporting under the WPR.
If found to be applicable, the WPR gives Congress the power to require the withdrawal of
U.S. forces within 60 days of the reporting date or 90 days when the President deems it
military necessary, unless Congress legislates otherwise.

Activities of U.S. military personnel serving in foreign countries occasionally result in
personal Injuries, deaths, and property damage. Also, U.S. armed forces personnel may
be injured and their property, or that of the U.S. government, may be damaged, lost, or
destroyed. Claims against the United States that arise in foreign countries are adjudicated
under a variety of statutes and international agreements. Generally, however, claims are
not payable if the injury or damage occurs as a result of combat activities of the U.S.
armed forces. Planning for special operations may require efforts to have the DOD
general counsel designate single-service claims responsibility for the operation if it is to
take place in a country not already assigned to a single service for claims purposes.
Additionally, every effort must be made to ensure that U.S. personnel do not leave the
impression with potential claimants that their claims are payable. Only properly
constituted claims commissions may make these determinations.


Executive Order 11850 limits the employment and use of chemical herbicides and riot
control agents. The Secretary of Defense is tasked with taking all necessary measures to
ensure that neither chemical herbicides nor riot control agents are employed without prior
Presidential approval. Detailed guidance is in Annex F to the Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan. Commanders should consult their SJA on implementing this executive order on a
case-by-case basis.



Article 3, Geneva Convention IV, Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in

Time of War (1949). The article refers to the humanitarian protections due to
civilians in a war theater.

Article 3 and 4, Geneva Convention III, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of

War (1949). The article deals with the entitlement to POW status or specific
information treatment when irregular forces are not involved in an international
armed conflict.


FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (June 1956). Paragraph 61 gives a

definition of who is entitled to POW status. Chapter 5 generally applies to the
protection of civilians.

Article 1 (4), Protocol 1 (1977) to Geneva Convention 1949. This paragraph

refers to the development of an "internationally significant war of national
liberation" and its status as an international armed conflict.

DA Pamphlet 27-24, Selected International Agreements. Chapter 2 presents the

hard copy of various Status of Forces Agreements, which an operative should
have available.

DA Pamphlet 27-1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare, December 1956.

DA Pamphlet 27-161-2, International Law, Volume II, October 1962.

International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (PL
94-329, 30 June 1976). Describes the prohibitions against U.S. Personnel
Performing Defense Services of a Combatant Nature.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 87-95, Part 111, Section 660.

U.S. Code Title 10 - Armed Forces.

Provided below are those portions of Title 10 most likely to be of interest in

connection with this reference book
U.S. Code as of 23 January 2000
Subtitle A - General Military Law
119. Special access programs: congressional oversight
124. Detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs:
Department of Defense to be lead agency.
128. Physical protection of special nuclear material: limitation on dissemination of
unclassified information.
130. Authority to withhold from public disclosure certain technical data

136. Assistant Secretaries of Defense

167. Unified combatant command for special operations forces
191. Secretary of Defense: authority to provide for common performance of supply
or service activities
192. Defense Agencies and Department of Defense Field Activities: oversight by the
Secretary of Defense
193. Combat support agencies: oversight
194. Limitations on personnel
201. Consultation regarding appointment of certain intelligence officials
202. Unauthorized use of Defense Intelligence Agency name, initials, or seal
371. Use of information collected during military operations
380. Enhancement of cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials.
421. Funds for foreign cryptologic support
422. Counterintelligence official reception and representation expenses
423. Authority to use proceeds from counterintelligence operations of the military
424. Disclosure of organizational and personnel information: exemption for Defense
Intelligence Agency


431. Authority to engage in commercial activities as security for intelligence
collection activities
432. Use, disposition, and auditing of funds
433. Relationship with other Federal laws
434. Funds for foreign cryptologic support
435. Limitations
436. Regulations
437. Congressional oversight
881. Article 81. Conspiracy
894. Article 94. Mutiny or sedition
904. Article 104. Aiding the enemy
906a. Article 106. Spies
906a. Article 106a. Espionage
907. Article 107. False official statements
1489. Death gratuity: members and employees dying outside the United States while
assigned to intelligence duties
1590. Management of civilian intelligence personnel of the military departments
1593. Uniform allowance: civilian employees
1596. Foreign language proficiency: special pay
1601. Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service
1602. Defense Intelligence Agency merit pay system
1603. Limit on pay
1604. Civilian personnel management
1605. Benefits for certain employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency
1606. Uniform allowance: civilian employees
1607. Renumbered 424
1608. Financial assistance to certain employees in acquisition of critical skills

2161. Defense Intelligence School: Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence

2315. Law inapplicable to the procurement of automatic data processing equipment
and services for certain defense purposes
2410i. Prohibition on contracting with entities that comply with the secondary Arab
boycott of Israel
2537 Improved national defense control of technology diversions overseas
2547. Excess non-lethal supplies: humanitarian relief
2607. Acceptance of gifts for the Defense Intelligence College
2608. Acceptance of contributions for defense programs, projects, and activities
2642. Reimbursement rate for airlift services provided to Central Intelligence
2662. Real property transactions: reports to congressional committees
2680. Leases: land for special operations activities
2682. Facilities for defense agencies
2692. Storage and disposal of non-defense toxic and hazardous materials
2791. Establishment and duties
2792. Maps, charts, and books
2793. Pilot charts

2794. Prices of maps, charts, and navigational publications

2795. Exchange of mapping, charting, and geodetic data with foreign countries and
international organizations
2796. Maps, charts, and geodetic data: public availability; exceptions
Subtitle B - Army
U.S. Code as of 23 January 2000
Chapter 301. Definitions
Chapter 303. Department of the Army
Chapter 305. The Army Staff
Chapter 307. The Army
Chapter 331. Strength
Chapter 333. Enlistments
Chapter 335. Appointments in the Regular Army
Chapter 339. Temporary Appointments
Chapter 341. Active Duty
Chapter 343. Special Appointments, Assignments, Details, and Duties
Chapter 345. Rank and Command
Chapter 349. Miscellaneous Prohibitions and Penalties
Chapter 353. Miscellaneous Rights and Benefits
Chapter 355. Hospitalization
Chapter 357. Decorations and Awards
Chapter 367. Retirement for Length of Service
Chapter 369. Retired Grade
Chapter 371. Computation of Retired Pay
Chapter 373. Civilian Employees
Chapter 401. Training Generally
Chapter 407. Schools and Camps
Chapter 433. Procurement
Chapter 435. Issue of Serviceable Material to Armed Forces
Chapter 437. Utilities and Services
Chapter 439. Sale of Serviceable Material
Chapter 441. Issue of Serviceable Material Other Than to Armed Forces

Chapter 443. Disposal of Obsolete or Surplus Material

Chapter 445. Disposition of Effects of Deceased Persons; Captured Flags
Chapter 447. Transportation
Chapter 449. Real Property
Chapter 451. Military Claims
Chapter 453. Accountability and Responsibility

American Society of International Law
( provides journal articles on subjects
of international legal interest. Not easy to use in most cases.
Global Legal Information Network (
maintains and provides a database of laws, regulations, and other complementary legal
sources. This database contains: (1) full texts of the documents in the official language of
the country of origin; (2) summaries or abstracts in English; and (3) thesauri in English
and in as many official languages as are represented in the database. The summaries or
abstracts are linked electronically to the corresponding full texts.
Human and Constitutional Rights ( gives links to IGOs and
NGOs concerned with international legal issues, esp. human rights.



Purpose: This appendix gives basic information on media relations for SF elements
operating without a PAO.

It is recommended that advisors and deployed detachments maintain some references at
the ready for hasty media encounters, USASOC PAO Press Guidance, U.S. National
Objectives, Statement of U.S. policy in the AO, Team Operations Journal, Statement of
ROE and other items as applicable.


Advisory and liaison missions are sometimes conducted under public scrutiny. Normally
media contacts are handled by the appropriate PAO, however, in special operations,
especially SF deployments, this is usually impossible. Unfortunately silence is not often
a solution. Refusal to speak with accredited members of the local national press simply
creates the impression that you are engaged in some sinister or clandestine enterprise.
When information is withheld, journalists fall back on speculation. Such speculation,
although usually inaccurate, is often near enough to the truth to be accepted by large
sections of the public and even by governments. Partisan sources may find it
advantageous to leak part of a story to the press to build up public support for their
position. On occasion, such activities can grow into a fully orchestrated press campaign.
With satellites and modern communications technology, the media are able to distribute
reports and photographs faster than the information can be released by the chain of
command. Incidents, sometimes fabricated or slanted toward a partisan viewpoint, are
aired in living rooms of the countries participating in the dispute on the same day.
Furthermore, the media provide a powerful and far-reaching opportunity to communicate
with critical audiences. Many audiences in an area of operations may not have direct
access to radios or televisions, but they may have indirect access from third parties. It is
to the advantage of the mission to prepare for dealing with the media.


Below are some suggestions on how to convey a positive impression with the press
and/or enhance the military/press relationship.
Whenever possible, press contacts should be conducted in conjunction with appropriate
local national officials.

Maintain a list of trusted reporters and editors that cover the operations in the teams AO.
Keep them informed of significant activities.
Try to answer media inquiries promptly, accurately, and courteously. If the answer is not
known, attempt to find out and get back to the reporter, or refer the reporter to another
appropriate source. This may establish the team as helpful information sources and
develop a relationship for future balanced coverage.
Reporters work by deadlines. Find out what they are and use them to advantage.
Stress the human aspects of a story; the impact of opposing operations on people that
readers/viewers/listeners can identify with, needs of the unfortunate, and the fact SF
soldiers are working to meet those needs.
If security permits, encourage the media to see what SF soldiers are doing and to talk to
them about their jobs. Identify a location in advance for the press to take still photos and
When dealing with reporters or editors who appear skeptical or hostile, avoid reacting
emotionally. Discuss issues calmly; use facts to back up statements. A spokesman must
never lose his temper or act defensively. Keep the focus on the mission.

When an advisor is interviewed, what he says or does can impact the mission.
Consistency with national policy, professionalism and clear communications are
imperative to a successful interview with the press. Here are a few suggestions for those
who find themselves in that situation:

Know and follow the policies of the U.S. Embassy and the Regional CINC with
regard to media interviews.

Maintain a general attitude that is friendly, yet professional.

Use language that is clear and easy to understand. Try not to use military jargon
or terminology that others can misinterpret.

Remain positive. Greet the interviewer and welcome questions. This will be
difficult under stressful or tragic conditions, but a calm, mature appearance will
earn respect from audiences.

Prepare carefully. Never walk into an interview unprepared. Make sure that the
facts supporting your position are up to date and come to mind easily.

Be familiar with PAO guidance.


Anticipate questions that may be asked and think about various responses.
Rehearse on location if possible. If time permits, role-play the tough questions.

Know the interviewer. What organization does he or she represent? What view
does their organization possess or try to defend? Do they have an agenda? How
have they previously conducted a similar interviewed? Who else have they
recently interviewed?

Do not always talk from the point of view of U.S. interests. Refer to the interests
of the local nationals or other beneficiaries of the mission.

Try to answer only one question at a time. Finish the first answer before going to
another question if two or more questions are asked at the same time.

Never speculate. Don't guess about what a situation might be, its probable cause,
or probable guilty parties. Give only factual information that you can verify.

Be careful in quoting statistics. They are often easy to dispute or re-interpret to

your disadvantage.

If a question contains incorrect information or inflammatory language, do not

repeat the question or react in the same manner. Repeating an inflammatory
question can end up as a misquote.

Always tell the truth, no matter how unpleasant. If unsure of something admit it.
Its better to admit ignorance than to mistakenly lie. If you cannot discuss
something due to Service regulations or simple lack of knowledge, be honest and
say so.

Never exaggerate or make claims that can't be backed up.

Avoid all off-the-record discussions. There is no such thing as off-the-record.

Do not make any statement unless you want it quoted.

Avoid saying "No comment." It sounds as if there is something to hide.

Resist temptation to attack other groups or organizations. If questioned about

another agencies activities, refer the questioner to that agency for comment. Do
not speak for another organization. It is best they speak for themselves.

Remind reporters not to photograph recognizable dead Americans or local

national soldiers, charts, maps, supply depots, or electronic warfare assets.

Remind reporters that their personal security is not a primary military concern.

Don't be afraid to call reporters by their name.



Even though the Public Affairs Office (PAO) normally conducts press contacts, it is
unlikely that a deployed team will have a PAO representative. Occasions may arise when
the local national press will want to question SF soldiers. If conducted properly, these
interviews can assist in the mission, and may even improve morale. Here are some
thoughts to keep in mind.

Provide team members with a simple theme to convey to the press should they be

If there is time, soldiers and leaders should be rehearsed in front of video cameras
in mock interviews to practice communication of the theme.

If you select soldiers to be interviewed, do not insist that they must be people who
feel comfortable talking in front of the media. Shyness is a normal trait that may
add a human touch to a sensitive situation.

Identify team spokesmen ahead of time. Keep them informed.

If you feel that the media has reported or quoted your unit in an inaccurate and damaging
manner, you must decide what to do about it. Asking for a correction may do more harm
than good. Before you seek a clarification or retraction, consider your answers to these

Is it important enough to correct, or is it a detail that in the long term is not really

How damaging is the charge, criticism, or error? Will a correction simply give
greater visibility to an unfavorable point of view?

Is a correction worth a restatement of the entire problem, including the error, to

new audiences who did not read it the first time? Is it possible to target only the
audience originally exposed to the story?

Can significant gain result from pointing it out?

Often, the best course is to take no action at all. Today's news--even errors--will be
replaced by a new story tomorrow and there may be no point in keeping negative
information alive.


Purpose: This appendix provides a basic outline for the integration of civil-military
operations and psychological operations as part of an advisory effort. It is intended only
as an outline and not a complete checklist although it can serve as the basis for
development of tailored checklists by ODAs and ODBs.


Although designated as SOF, PSYOP and CA C2 relationships are structured to support
both SO and conventional forces.
The broad range of PSYOP activities, conducted across the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels with the requirement to fully integrate with interagency activities as well as
with conventional forces mandates that PSYOP relationships be distinct from other SO
forces. The focus of PSYOP is broader than just those activities conducted by the theater
SOC, and its C2 must be such that it allows for direct access to the JFC and full
integration at all levels. C2 of PSYOP forces is normally executed by the establishment
of a joint psychological operations task force directly under the JFC (for further
discussion of C2 for PSYOP forces, see Joint Pub 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological

When the SFOD has received a mission and has begun planning and preparation, it may
be provided with the CA area study. If Civil Affairs and/or Civil Military Operations
(CMO) are a significant part of the mission, CA personnel may be attached to the SFOD.
If no CA personnel are attached to the SFOD, the SFOD Warrant Officer prepares, trains
and supervises detachment personnel in Civil-Military Operations.
The SFOD should establish contact and attempt to coordinate with appropriate
nonmilitary agencies of the HN and U.S. mission, consider synchronization of its military
operations with the programs of these agencies, and advises supported HN forces on
integrating CMO into their military operations.
The WO supervises the analysis of the mission to determine CMO requirements.

Determines the political, economic, social, and cultural factors that influence
SFOD operations in the OA.


Determines the security needs of the SFOD and of the local population in the OA.

Requests and reviews the internal development objectives, policies, plans and
programs of the HN and U.S. mission from the next higher HQs.

Includes CA estimate in the military decision-making process.

Requests any CA support it determines is required to conduct the mission.

The SFOD coordinates its operations with appropriate HN, U.S. mission, and
international agencies.

Defines CA mission and/or CMO tasks.

Requests and reviews USAID 1- and 5-year plans.

Requests information on other CA activities within the OA by other agencies

from the SFOD's next higher headquarters (MILGP, FOB etc., as defined in

Conducts a post-infiltration area assessment to validate and update CMO related

information in the area study. Incorporates changes and additions in the update
area assessment and modifies plans and operations to account for these changes.

The SFOD gives civil assistance to HN government agencies.

Conducts CMO based on CA annex to the operation order.

Supervises attached or assigned CA personnel.

Directs and supports assigned or attached CA units of detachment to company


The SFOD establishes contact with local governments within the OA and advises HN
forces to do the same.

Takes actions intended to establish and maintain favorable relationships with the
local population and the U.S. recognized government.

Uses civil communication available in the operational area to disseminate civil



The SFOD advises and assists HN forces in planning and implementing a civil defense

Analyzes the civil defense structure to ensure that it meets identified security

Assesses civil defense planning for the presence and effectiveness of emergency
welfare services and emergency food, water, sanitation, and medical supplies.

Coordinates civil defense activities of fire, police, and rescue personnel with those
of the military to achieve unity of effort.

Identifies civilian evacuation plans and assesses their adequacy.

The SFOD advises and assists HN forces supporting displaced person operations.

Advises the HN to estimate the number of displaced civilians, their points of

origin, and their anticipated direction of movement. Assists in the estimation

Advises and assists in the planning of movement control measures, emergency

and evacuation of dislocated civilians.

Assists in coordinating with military forces for transportation, military police

support, military intelligence screening/interrogation, and medical activities, as

Advises and assists in establishing and supervising the operation of temporary or

semi-permanent camps for displaced civilians.

Advises and assists in the resettlement or return of displaced civilians to their

homes in accordance with U.S. policy and HN policy and objectives.

Advises and assists HN and U.S. agencies on camps and relief measures for
displaced civilians.

Monitors the conduct of movement plans for displaced of civilians. Advises, as

SFOD feels is required.

SFOD advises and assists HN forces and agencies planning and implementing PRC

Identifies PRC requirements.


Assists in planning and coordinating PRC measures that meet these requirements.

Integrates PRC measures with PSYOP to obtain popular acceptance and support
of the measures.

Gives advice and assistance indirectly to minimize direct U.S. involvement and
emphasize low-visibility U.S. support of a HN program.

Evaluates adequacy of PRC programs. Recommends improvements as required.

SFOD identifies and acquires HN resources to assist the SFOD in mission execution.

Determines the political organizations and key leaders existing in the OA and
surrounding country to facilitate gaining civilian cooperation.

Obtains civilian support required and appropriate to the missions.

SFOD advises and assists the HN to minimize civilian interference with tactical

Anticipates civilian reactions to planned military operations and plans to

accommodate that reaction.

Advises and assists the HN to provide aid that will improve conditions for
civilians who are destitute and reduce theft and destruction of both military and
indigenous property to maximum extent consistent with available resources.
Determines methods and techniques of operation that will be most acceptable to
the populace and still allow for the accomplishment of the SFOD mission. Plans
operations to use these techniques.

Identifies military COAs that will avoid civilian population centers and rural
activities whenever feasible.

Coordinates PRC measures to remove civilians from probable baffle areas with
HN military and civil authorities.

SFOD meets its legal and moral obligations to the local populace and the families of
supporting HN forces.

Observes laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement.

Reports human rights violations by HN forces or insurgent forces to higher


Acts promptly to prevent/stop human rights violations within capabilities.

Establishes medical treatment programs, on space available basis, within


Gives emergency disaster relief in a life-threatening situation within capabilities.

SFOD advises and assists in protecting cultural properties in the OA.

Locates and identifies religious buildings, shrines, and consecrated places and
recommends ROE that protect them during military operations.

Respects the same ROE.

SFOD WO coordinates and integrates CMO with PSYOP

Advises and assists the HN to ensure the populace are informed of tactical
victories and U.S./HN civic action efforts in their benefit. Coordinates available
U.S. support to HN forces to accomplish this.

Advises HN to reduce PRC when the enemies of the people are denied support
and supplies.

See FM 100-25, FM 31-20, and FM 41-10.

SFOD WO supervises the analysis of the mission and determines PSYOP requirements.

Assesses the psychological impact of the SFOD's presence, activities, and

operations in the OA.

Reviews OPLAN/OPORD to ensure they support U.S. and HN psychological


SFOD WO coordinates the analysis of each of the detachments official duties to

determine its psychological effects.


Considers the psychological impact on the populace of SFOD participation in

events such as military ceremonies, religious services, and social events when
deciding whether or not to participate.

Determines the psychological effects of training during periods of national

holidays or religious holidays. Schedules IAW this determination.

SFOD members conduct themselves in a manner that takes into account local customs
and traditions as well as DA standards of conduct.

SFOD commander ensures that all detachment members respect HN and local
customs, courtesies, and taboos and conduct themselves in a correct and
professional manner.

SFOD commander emphasizes that as members of an SFOD and representatives

of the U.S. to the HN, any action taken by an American, good or bad, on or off
duty, will have a psychological impact on the mission and monitors and corrects

SFOD integrates planned PSYOP activities into each SFOD operation to establish a
favorable U.S. image in the HN and further accomplishment of the SFOD mission.

Coordinates with trained PSYOP asset to capitalize on positive mission successes.

Facilitates the use of HN and commercial media assets that influence the OA by
providing advice and coordinating with involved U.S. agencies.

Emphasizes U.S. support of HN programs, not U.S. unilateral operations in all

PSYOP products and on all operations.

Incorporates PSYOP activities that portray a positive U.S. and HN image in each
SFOD activity.

SFOD advises and assists HN forces in gaining or retaining the support of the local
populace, discrediting the insurgents, and isolating the insurgents from the populace.

Influences the HN forces through advice and example to conduct themselves in

accordance with acceptable military norms, ethics and professionalism, to include
the law of land warfare principles of leadership from FM 22-100 and standards of
conduct in AR 600-50.


Trains HN leadership in the advantages and techniques of maximizing public

opinion in favor of the HN/SFOD mission and to the discredit of the insurgents.

Coordinates for close and continuous PSYOP support to maximize the effect of
CA operations. This includes advising the HN to utilize its own resources in the
same manner.

Integrates PSYOP capabilities into population resource control measures to

disseminate information and explains the rationale for the program.

The SFOD applies the area assessment to mission execution.

Reports critical information immediately to the concerned organic, higher, lower,

or adjacent concerned staff section.

Uses the current area assessment to revise previously planned COAs or when
developing new plans.

SEE FM 100-25, FM 31-20, and FM 33-1.



Purpose: This appendix gives a basic outline for the training host nation forces for foreign
internal defense. It is intended only as an outline and not a complete checklist although it
can serve as the basis for development of tailored checklists by ODAs and ODBs.

The SFOD executes the POI.

Adheres to the training schedule consistent with cooperation from the HN forces
and changes in the METT-T.

Encourages, through counterparts, HN unit commanders to ensure all their

personnel receive training as scheduled.

Rehearses all classes with counterparts and (as necessary) with interpreters.

Ensures all training objectives satisfy actual HN training needs as identified

during the analysis of the HN units status unless ordered to do otherwise by the
higher U.S. commander.

Ensures all training objectives are structured IAW applicable U.S. military
doctrine unless specific modifications to doctrine are made to meet an identified
in-country need.

Implements, when possible or IAW the POI multi-echelon training by teaching

individual, crew, leader, and collective skills concurrently. TRAINING NOTE: A
technique that may be used to achieve multiechelon HN training is "combat
rehearsals." These are the repeated practice of plans made for the HN forces to
execute their primary missions (such as village defense). Full force, reduced
force, and briefback rehearsals of these missions are used as vehicles to train the
required component individual crew, leader, and collective skills concurrently.

The SFOD presents the instruction.

Adheres to the lesson outlines consistent with the cooperation from the HN forces
and changes in the METT-T.

States clearly the task, conditions, and standards to be achieved during each
lesson at the beginning of the training (to include training exercises) ensuring the


HN students understand them (emphasize human rights in appropriate period of


Demonstrates the execution or shows the desired end result to clearly illustrate the

Stresses the execution of the task as a step-by-step process, when possible.

Monitors the HN students' progress during practice correcting mistakes as they

are observed.

States, as a minimum, all warning and safety instructions in the HN language as

applicable and without the use of an interpreter.

Monitors periodically, as a minimum, using a HN language-qualified SFOD

member, instruction given through HN interpreters to ensure accurate translations.

The SFOD tests the HN students after training them consistent with their cooperation.

Administers tests after each lesson.

Uses tests that accurately measure the ability of the HN students to perform the
task to standards.

Identifies through testing deficiencies in student performance.

Gives remedial training to and retests students with deficient performance.

Gives test results to the SFOD and HN unit staff section(s) responsible for the
maintenance of training records.

Designated SFOD staff section(s) maintains written administrative training records.

Encourages HN counterparts to assist.

Records all HN personnel and units who receive training and identifies the type of
training they receive.

Organizes records to identify training deficiencies and overall level of HN


Identifies specific HN personnel or units who demonstrate noteworthy (good or

bad) performance.

Identifies to the SFOD and HN unit commanders the noted training deficiencies,
noteworthy performances, and needed additional or remedial training.

Forwards, periodically, copies of training records to the next higher U.S.


The SFOD coordinating and special staff sections maintain their functional areas'
portions of the SFOD's database (information files).

Maintain database portions IAW the unit SOP

Request information necessary to satisfy CCIR that concern them from applicable

Route functional area information requests IAW the unit SOP through the SFOD
S3 to other staff sections.

Route intelligence information requests to the S2.

Identify information received that satisfies CCIR that concern them.

Modify previously developed estimates and Mans IAW the latest information

Notify other concerned staff sections of modified estimates and plans.

Notify other concerned (higher, lower, or adjacent) staff sections of information,

as it is identified, that satisfies their IR.

Update, through the SFOD S3, the SFOD's CCIR list IAW the latest information
available and requirements for additional WR that arise from modified estimates
and plans.

The SFOD S2 executes functional duties.

Continuously updates the IPB prepared in pre-deployment IAW FM 34-130 and

FM 34-36.

Supervises the dissemination of intelligence and other operationally pertinent

information within the SFOD and, as applicable, to higher, lower, or adjacent
concerned units or agencies.


Monitors the implementation of the SFOD intelligence collection plans to include

the update of the SFOD's CCIR list, conducting area assessment and coordinating
for additional intelligence support.

The SFOD conducts AARs after all collective HN unit training events.

Develops discussion outline to guide the AAR.

Reviews the training objectives with the concerned HN unit commander by

asking leading questions, surfacing important tactical lessons, exploring alternate
COAs, keeping to teaching points, and making the AAR positive.

Encourages the concerned HN unit commander to review the training event with
his entire unit (or key subordinate leaders, as applicable) by stressing how he will
strengthen his chain of command and put focus on himself as the primary trainer
of his unit.

Stresses to the HN unit commander the importance of discussing in his review not
only what happened, but also why it happened; the important tactical lessons
learned; alternate COAs that could have been taken; and important teaching

Does not criticize or embarrass the HN unit commander.

Monitors the HN unit commanders review of the training with his unit to ensure
the focus is on the training objectives and the lessons learned.

Prepares a report of the evaluation of the HN unit and forwards it to the staff
section maintaining the administrative training records.

The SFOD ensures the security of the training sites.

Analyses the threat to determine its capabilities to attack or collect intelligence on

the HN unit's training at each site.

Prepares estimates of COAs that would deny the training site(s) to the insurgents
or terrorist.

Recommends to the HN unit commander that he order the adoption of the most
desirable COA stressing how it best satisfies the identified need.

Ensures before each training session, using as a minimum, briefback rehearsal,

that all personnel both U.S. and HN at the training site(s) understand the

defensive actions to be taken in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack and

any OPSEC measures to be executed.



Purpose: This appendix provides the SF advisor a brief overview of some considerations
for establishing and maintaining effective rapport with counterpart(s).

Strictly speaking, rapport is any relationship between people, although it is usually
thought of in terms of mutual trust, understanding, and respect. When we describe it, we
often use "good rapport" to mean a relationship founded on mutual trust, understanding,
and respect. We usually say "bad rapport' when we describe a relationship characterized
by personal dislike, animosity, and other forms of friction. RAPPORT Literally a
relationship (good, bad, or indifferent). It has the connotation within SF of a relationship
founded on mutual trust or affinity.
However desirable a relationship based on the "good" qualities may be, we should first
think of rapport in terms of being effective or not effective.


The need to establish rapport with our HN counterparts is the result of the SFOD being in
a unique military position. That position is one where the SFOD has no authoritarian
control over the actions of its HN counterparts. This lack of authority means that the
traditional (the U.S. Army doctrinal) view of military leadership must be slightly
modified to increase the emphasis on its personal relationship aspects and de-emphasize
its authoritarian aspects.
For SF soldiers to execute their mission they must establish effective rapport through the
development of a personal relationship with their counterpart. That is, they must
establish rapport that allows them to motivate their counterparts to achieve the desired
goals despite their lack of authority.
Before they can establish effective rapport, they must arm themselves with the necessary
knowledge. First, they must study FM 22-100, Military Leadership. It will provide them
with the basic leadership knowledge needed to understand human nature and motivation.
To this, they must add information about the culture and society to which their potential
counterpart belongs. This information should be gained through thorough area study,
operational area study, and other research.
The measure of how effective their rapport is will be whether they can motivate their
counterpart to take the desired action. For SF, the basic techniques of motivation,
without the exercise of authority, are advising, setting the example, and compromising.


Advising the counterpart to select a particular course of action is only effective if

the counterpart perceives that the SF advisor is professionally competent enough
to give sound advice. If the counterpart does not believe the proposed solution to
a problem is realistic, he will question the SF soldier's competence. The SF
advisor must take pains to explain to his counterpart that what he is advising the
counterpart to do is realistic and will be effective.

Setting the example for the counterpart in the desired behavior must be a
continuous effort to avoid the appearance of a "do as I say, not as I do" attitude.
In setting the example, the SF advisor should make every effort to explain to his
counterpart that what he is doing is the most effective form of behavior for the
situation. This fact is especially true when the SF soldier's behavior or its purpose
is not readily understandable by his counterpart. In following this guidance, the
SF advisor will also reinforce his apparent competence.

When seeking a compromise with the HN counterpart in the desired COA or form
of behavior, the SF advisor can put his counterpart into a position where he has a
personal stake in successful execution. In some cultures, seeking a compromise
may also be desirable to allow the counterpart to save face. In certain situations
the counterpart, because of practical experience, may have a better solution to the
problem at hand. However, in seeking a compromise the SF advisor must be
aware of the possibility of lowering his appearance of competence. Adopting a
"one professional to another" attitude may help to lessen this possibility.
However, in the process of settling differences, two major areas of concern must
never be compromised for the sake of maintaining rapport. First, and foremost, is
force security. Second are human rights issues.

SF advisors should endure conditions similar to those of their advisees. Shared

hardships facilitate building rapport.

The SF advisor must also be careful not to unintentionally force his counterpart into
action. He must be aware of the possibility that as an American advisor he might have a
privileged status in the HN. His mere presence may garner personal benefits for his
counterpart through the counterpart's position of having a one-on-one association with an
American. Conversely, the SF advisor may make the counterpart so afraid of offending
him that he complies with every suggestion.
In the final analysis, the most effective rapport is usually "good-rapport." The SF advisor
will establish long-lasting, effective, "good" rapport if he can convey to his counterpart
that he is

Sincerely interested in him, his nation, and its cause.


Not going to belittle his counterpart and his efforts or take over from him but is
here help him because he believes his goals are just, fair, and deserving of



Purpose: This appendix provides basic information for SF elements working with
translators or interpreters.


"We were checking on the condition of a group of elderly people in a Croat village and I
was in the background letting the new team leader take charge. I listened to him talking
to the interpreter, who didn't think I could hear. He asked the people if they'd had any
problems, had they been harassed recently. They said they had, a group of soldiers from
a local unit had been around stealing and threatening to kill them if they reported
anything. And then the interpreter said to the team leader 'no, ... these people have had
no problems.'
You have to realize you're completely at the mercy of the interpreters if you don't
possess some understanding of the language, completely at the mercy of people who may
be discussing arresting you or taking you hostage and you can't even have that prickle in
the back of your neck that you're in danger."

Since the world abounds in languages and dialects and because it is often impossible to
predict well in advance where a Special Forces advisor may be sent, he may lack the
linguistic ability to communicate effectively. The use of interpreters must be considered
an unsatisfactory substitute for direct communication, but their use may be necessary. It
may also be legally required, Article 17 of the Geneva Conventions Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 (GPW), requires that the questioning
of enemy prisoners of war (EPW) shall be carried out in a language that they understand.
The use of interpreters is a poor substitute for direct communication, but they may be
necessary. These individuals may be the only link between yourself and your counterpart
or other important local nationals. It will be a challenge to maximize an interpreter's
strength and anticipate his or her weaknesses. The following apply to use of interpreters.

Consideration should be given to the advantages of using interpreters of the same

ethnic background as the target audience.

Allow additional time for interpreters when planning communication. A 10minute conversation may take up to 30 minutes depending on the interpreter's

Interpreters are usually contracted civilians. They may not be accustomed to

military methods, hardships, discipline, and courtesies.

Try to use two-man interpreter teams. Fatigue comes quick, and one may assist
what the other missed or forgot.

Do not organize interpreters into "interpreter pools." This detracts from the ability
react quickly to unexpected situations.

Keep OPSEC in mind. It is safe to assume that your interpreter's first loyalty is to
his or her country, not to the U.S.

Prepare the interpreter for technical terms. The interpreter must know your
subject area and translate your "meaning" as well as your "words."

Establish rapport with the interpreter. Without a cooperative, supportive

interpreter the mission could be in serious jeopardy. The difficulty of establishing
rapport stems most of the time from the lack of personal contact with the

Find out about the interpreter's background. Show a genuine concern for his
family, aspiration, career, education, and so on.

Interpreters may not be completely trained. Periodic testing and evaluation should
be conducted. Interpreters should have prior security screening.

Many interpreters may attempt to "save face" by purposely concealing their lack
of understanding.

Instruct the interpreter to mirror your tone and personality of speech.

Instruct the interpreter not to interject his own questions or personality.

While communicating, avoid such phrases as "Tell him that..." and "I would like
to have you say..."

Do not look at the interpreter during discussion. Remain focused on the person
with whom you are talking.

Break thoughts into small logical, translatable segments.

Avoid idioms, jokes, military jargon and slang.

Control the interpreter. Inform him or her to never ask questions of their own, and
never paraphrase the interviewer's question or the source's answers.

The interpreter should never hold back information given by the source, because
it may adversely affect the conversation.

Control of the interpreter is increased if he knows that he is periodically tested for

accuracy, loyalty, and honesty.

The interviewer, in turn, never bullies, criticizes, or admonishes his interpreter in the
presence of the source. Criticism is made in private to avoid lowering the prestige of the
interpreter, and thereby impairing his effectiveness.
The use of interpreters and translators seems very straightforward. Simply speak in
English and the interpreter repeats it in the appropriate language. But translation from
one language to another is not something to be taken lightly. Obviously the medium of
language is vital to communication across cultures. Language is so much a part of culture
and for most of us is the main medium we use to transmit messages. Because of its
central importance, factors pertaining to language can also be the source of many
misunderstandings in intercultural communication.
Translators, and especially interpreters, are seldom native speakers of both languages.
Normally, they are native speakers of one and have academic training and experience
with the other. This means that they have a good command of the formal language when
used in grammatically correct ways by a speaker with an accent they are familiar with.
Because of this there can be several problems associated with translation: problems with
pronunciation, word choice and meaning, and the difficulties raised by jargon, slang and
idiomatic expressions. Awareness of these potential problems should help make the use
language more effective for communication across cultures.


In communicating with people of a different culture, it is always good to be able to use a
few words or phrases in their language to establish affinity. It is even better to have
sufficient command of the language to be able to insure the interpreter or translator is not
straying from the desired message.
There is a strong tendency to translate messages literally or word for word from the
speakers language to the target language. Sometimes this technique works very well. At
other times, it can lead to embarrassing situations.
A famous example is provided by President John F. Kennedy speech at the Berlin Wall,
Germany, in 1963. The President had wanted to say, "I am a Berliner" in German and
came up with what seemed to be a word-for-word translation "Ich bin ein Berliner".
However, in German language, words for those types of affiliation are not preceded by
articles so he should have said "Ich bin Berliner". What he actually said was "I am a
jelly doughnut".

The second example involves Pepsi-Cola at the time it was attempting to enter the huge
Chinese market. Its well-known slogan "Come Alive with Pepsi" was translated into
Chinese and the equivalent meaning of that translated slogan in English was "Pepsi
brings back your dead ancestors".


Misunderstandings in intercultural communication can arise even when two cultures use
the same language. The English language is an example.
Even though English is used widely throughout the world, regional differences exist in
pronunciation. This can make it difficult for speakers of English from two different
countries to understand one another.
English is one of the official languages of Singapore. It is often used as a lingua franca
for communication among various language sub-groups on the island (e.g. Malay and
Chinese). For this reason it is often used by government officials, businessmen and
military officers to communicate with their countrymen. But when communicating with
an English-speaking foreigner, it is not unusual for the foreigner to have difficulty
understanding. This is because of the difference in pronunciation. To American or
British English-speakers, Singaporeans do not make a clear distinction made between
words that have similar beginning and ending sounds like "tree" and "three" and "pen"
and "pan". It is easy to imagine how these pronunciation differences can lead to
misunderstandings despite sharing a common language.
In communicating across cultures, it is important to be especially careful with
pronunciation in order to achieve mutual understanding.


Problems may also arise with the use of ambiguous words and unfamiliar words.

It is not uncommon for the same word to have different interpretations in different
cultures. Take the word "family" as an example. In most parts of Asia "family" refers to
parents, siblings, grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, and so on. But to an American or
European "family" refers to the immediate family that consisting of only the husband and
wife or parents and siblings. So, if two colleagues, an Asian and an American, were to
carry on a conversation about their families, they may think that they are talking about
the same thing but actually they are not.


The use of unfamiliar words can sometimes lead to expensive mistakes. One example
involves a discussion between an American businessman and a Japanese customer. The
American concluded the discussion by saying "Well then, our thinking is in parallel."
They bid goodbye, but weeks and then months passed with no further word from the
customer. Finally, frustrated, the American phoned and inquired what had happened.
"Well," the Japanese replied, "you used a word I didn't understand. Parallel. I looked it
up in my dictionary and it said parallel means 'two lines that never touch'". The Japanese
had concluded that the American thought their positions were irreconcilable.
In order to avoid miscommunications like this, there are simple measures to achieve
greater clarity in meaning. For a start, choose words carefully, making sure that they are
not ambiguous in meaning and are sufficiently common to be easily understood.
Qualifications and definitions should be provided for terms that are likely to cause
misunderstandings. Finally, never assume that the message has been correctly
understood. Ask for feedback to ensure that the audience has clearly understood the
message as intended.


Next, cultures may develop their own slang and idiomatic expressions that may be
foreign to other cultures using the same language. This is illustrated by an ad for
Electrolux vacuum cleaners that worked very well in Europe but was unusable in
America. The slogan in the ad read, "Nothing sucks like the Electrolux." For an
American audience, the phrase, "something sucks", means that that something is bad,
ineffective or otherwise undesirable. The slang expression "it sucks" has very negative
connotations in the States. However, in Europe and many other parts of the world, the
word "sucks" has a literal interpretation and the slogan is perfectly all right.
Idiomatic expressions can be especially confusing for anyone who isn't a native speaker
of English and who isn't very proficient with the language. The phrase "You're pulling
my leg" is a common idiomatic expression for "you're joking." However, an interpreter
who is not familiar with this expression would really be puzzled because obviously he
had not touched the speaker, let alone pulled their leg!


Select an interpreter appropriate to your mission. The primary language capability to
seek in an interpreter is that he be a native speaker. His speech, background, and
mannerisms should be completely acceptable to the interviewees so that no attention is
given to the way he talks, only to what he says.


More often than not, an interpreter is limited in his effectiveness if his social standing is
considerably lower than that of his audience. This may include significant differences in
military rank or membership in an ethnic or religious minority group.
If the audience consists of officers, it is better to have an officer or civilian act as an

On the other hand, if you are working with enlisted personnel, an officer
interpreter might intimidate them and stifle participation and interaction. An
enlisted interpreter might be the best choice here.

The factors of gender, age, and race, are potentially troublesome and can seriously
affect your mission. Since differences from country to country vary greatly,
check with the in-country briefing teams for specific taboos or favorable
characteristics. In certain cultures, the status of females in the society is such that
they should not be used as interpreters with male sources.

Evaluate the selected interpreter for reliability. The security implications are clear. Be
very cautious in how you explain concepts to give him a greater depth of
understanding. Certain tactical situations may require the use of uncleared indigenous
personnel as field expedient interpreters. Commanders should be aware of the
increased security risk involved in using such personnel and carefully weigh the risk
versus the potential gain. Some interpreters, for political or personal reasons, may have
ulterior motives or a hidden agenda when they apply for the interpreting job. Beware
of the potential interpreter who arrives late for the interview. Some cultures operate on a
rubber clock where time is relatively unimportant.
Other factors:

Intelligence. Your interpreter should be quick, alert, and responsible to changing

conditions and situations.

English fluency. As long as your interpreter understands you and you understand
him, his command of English is satisfactory.

Technical ability. It will be very helpful if your interpreter has had technical
training or experience in your subject area since he must translate your meaning
as well as your words.

The interpreter must be honest and free from unfavorable notoriety among the
local inhabitants. His reputation or standing in the community should be such that
people of higher rank and standing will not intimidate him.


Remember to choose more than one interpreter. If several qualified interpreters are
available, select at least two. The exhausting nature of the job makes a half-day of active
interpreting about the maximum for peak efficiency.
Establish rapport with your interpreter. Without a cooperative, supportive interpreter
your mission is in serious jeopardy.

Mutual respect and understanding are essential to effective interpreter teamwork.

Rapport must be established early in the relationship and maintained throughout

the joint interpreter effort. The difficulty of establishing rapport stems most of the
time from the lack of personal contact.

Find out about your interpreters background. Show a genuine concern for his
family, aspiration, career, education, and so on. Most cultures place a greater
emphasis than ours on family over career, so start with his home life. It is of
prime importance to him as well as being neutral territory.

Brief the interpreter on the mission. The SF advisor will be responsible for properly
orienting the interpreters as to the nature of his duties, the standards of conduct expected,
the techniques of interview to be employed, and any other requirements that the SF
advisor considers necessary.

Train the interpreter on skills of interviewing, if necessary.

Many interpreters, because of cultural differences, may attempt to save face by

purposely concealing their lack of understanding.

Give special attention to the development of language proficiency in the technical

fields that the interpreter will need to understand.

Stress to him his importance as that vital communications link between you and
the interviewees. The accuracy of translation should be emphasized.

Periodic testing and evaluation of the interpreter should be conducted; in some cultures
this is best done without the interpreters knowledge since that culture may regard some
forms of evaluation as insulting.

Plan and prepare. Select an appropriate site. Arrange the physical setup to fit your

Instruct interpreter to mirror your tone and personality of speech.


Instruct interpreter to inform you if he noticed any inconsistencies or peculiarities

from sources.

Conduct the interview. While conducting the interview speak slowly, paying attention to

Speak directly to person being interviewed, not translator.

Avoid such phrases as Tell him that.... and I would like to have you say...

Break thoughts into small logical, translatable segments.

Pay attention to body language, attitude, and behavior of the subject.

Control the interpreters, if applicable. Make certain that the interpreter performs his
duties correctly and that he does not usurp the prerogatives of the interviewer.

The interpreter never asks questions of his own. He never paraphrases the
interviewers questions or the sources answers.

The interpreter never intimidates or berates the source or engages in any behavior
that will lower the prestige of the interviewer or adversely affect the interview.

The interpreter never holds back information given by the source, because it may
adversely affect the interpreter or someone known to him.

The interviewer, in turn, never bullies, criticizes, or admonishes his interpreter in

the presence of the source. Criticism is made in private to avoid lowering the
prestige of the interpreter, and thereby impairing his effectiveness.

Control of the interpreter is increased if he knows that he is periodically tested for

accuracy, loyalty, and honesty.


Speak slowly and clearly, ensuring accurate pronunciation.

Use simple, frequently used words.

Be very careful with translation.


Avoid slang, colloquialisms and idiomatic expressions.

Make one point at a time.

Adapt tone of voice, style and behavior to what is culturally acceptable to your

Watch the interpreter and the audience for misunderstanding and be ready to
provide feedback.

Always rehearse ahead of time with the same interpreter who will be present for
the actual presentation.

Interpreting can be very strenuous. Rotate interpreters if possible.



Purpose: This appendix provides additional information specific to Special Forces
medical officers and sergeants working with foreign personnel. It is intended to be used
as a supplement to the material contained in the body and appendices of this reference
book. This material contained was drawn primarily from the U.S. Department of Heath
and Human services, Heath Resources and Services Administration, Bureau of Primary
Care WEB site The authors of this reference book
have freely adapted the material to apply to SF personnel acting in the role of advisors.
SF medical personnel are encouraged to visit and review the WEB site itself.


The U.S. Department of Heath and Human Services Bureau of Primary Care defines
heath-related cultural competence as:
Cultural competence is a set of attitudes, skills, behaviors, and policies that enable
organizations and staffs to work effectively in cross-cultural situations. It reflects the
ability to acquire and use knowledge of health-related beliefs, attitudes, practices and
communications patterns of clients and their families to improve services, strengthen
programs, increase community participation among diverse population groups.
Cultural competence also focuses its attention on population specific issues including:

Health- related beliefs and cultural values (the socioeconomic


Disease prevalence (the epidemiological perspective),

And treatment efficacy (the outcome perspective).1

The cross-cultural skills that support health-related cultural competence may be key to
any advisory effort. Medical capabilities are often lacking in surrogate and counterpart

Cross T, Bazron, B., Dennis, K., and Isaacs, M. Toward a Culturally Competent System
of Care, Volume 1. Washington, DCF; Georgetown University. 1989. Lavizzo-Mourney
R., Mackenzie, E. Cultural Competence: Essential Measurements of Quality for
Managed Care Organizations. Annals of Internal Medicine, 124: 919-921. 1996 as cited
in Cultural Competence: A Journey, Bureau of Primary Health Care. Health Resources
and Services Administration US Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.

forces and indigenous populations. Providing such capabilities can be instrumental in

establishing effective rapport (see Appendix 7, Establishing Rapport). Such efforts are
not, however, without risk. Culturally insensitive health care practices can easily offend
and estrange the patient population and alienate displaced indigenous health care
Health-related cultural competence in the context of this reference book may be described
as six domains:
Values and attitudes: promoting mutual respecta patient (or counterpart) centered
perspectiveacceptance of beliefs that may influence a patients response to health,
illness, disease and death.
Communications styles: awarenessknowledgealternatives to written communications
(e.g. prescriptions, patient instructions, etc).
Community/counterpart participation: continuous, active involvement by community
leaders, members, and indigenous providersinvolved participants are invested
participants and outcomes improve.
Materials, and resources: culturally and linguistically friendly (see Appendix 5, Civil
Military and Psychological Operations)literacy sensitive materialsmaterials
congruent with the language and culture
Population based clinical practice: culturally skilled clinicians avoid misapplication of
scientific knowledgeavoid stereotyping while appreciating the importance of culture
(medical treatment is largely an individual process and great diversity may exist internal
to a culture)know the target culturepractice culturally appropriate intervention skills
and strategies.
Training and professional development: SF advisors providing health care and training
must undergo culturally specific heath care trainingunits and individuals should take
advantage of frequent deployments to develop appropriate methods and approaches.

In addition to maintaining cultural awareness and applying cross-cultural skills, SF

advisors involved in health care must remain cognizant that their role is to enhance the
indigenous capability to provide self-care to the maximum extent possible.


SF advisors involved in health care must be aware of, and sensitive to, common beliefs
and practices within the target culture (see Cultural Awareness in Action, Team Medics
in Thailand, Chapter 2, pages 95 98). Of particular importance are folk or traditional
medicine practices that may impact on U.S. provided care. SF advisors must be

respectful and tolerant of such practices regardless of their views on the efficacy of such
Time spent trying to disabuse clients of traditional views is time wasted and likely to
create distrust. Trust is essential to the two-way communications between the patient and
provider with respect to causes and treatment of illnesses.
A useful mnemonic device for SF advisors providing care or advice to population groups
with a strong belief in traditional or folk medicine is the keyword ETHNIC.2

Explanation: What do you think may be the reason you have this problem?
What do friends, family, and others say about your symptoms? Do you know
anyone else who has had or who now has this kind of problem? Have you heard
about/read about/ seen it on TV/radio/newspaper? (If patients cannot offer an
explanation, ask what most concerns them about their problem.)

Treatments: What kinds of medicines, home remedies, or other treatments have

you tried for this illness? Is there anything you eat, drink, or do (or avoid) on a
regular basis to stay healthy? Tell me about it. What kind of treatment are you
seeking from me?

Healers: Have you sought any advice from alternate (indigenous) or folk healers,
friends, or other people for help with your problems?

Negotiate: (See Chapter 3) Try to find options that will be mutually acceptable
to you and your patient and that incorporate the patients beliefs, rather than
contradicting them.

Intervention: Determine an intervention with your patient that may incorporate

alternate treatments, spirituality, and healers as well as other cultural practices
(e.g. foods eaten or avoided in general and/or when sick).

Collaboration: Collaborate with the patient, family members, other health care
team members, healers, and community resources. Consider collaboration with
indigenous health care providers if at all feasible and not detrimental to the
health of the patient.

Adapted from Levin, S.J., R.C. Like, and J.E. Gottlieb. 2000. Appendix: Useful
Clinical Interviewing Mnemonics. Patient Care Special Issue, Caring for diverse
Populations: Breaking Down Barriers, May 15, 2000, p. 189.


Appendix 8 treats the subject of using an interpreter in detail. The following information
represents additional considerations for health care providers. As always, use of an
interpreter is a poor but often necessary substitute for linguistic skill.

Make a diligent effort to find professionally trained, qualified interpreters.

The technical nature of medical communications coupled with the need for
extreme precision in describing symptoms and treatments makes qualified
interpreters of great importance. Truly qualified medical interpreters possess
knowledge of medical terminology as well as standard linguistic and interpreting
skills. Their knowledge may include familiarity with anatomy and physiology,
medical terms, diseases, treatment procedures, and the beliefs and practices of the
patients culture.

Dont depend on children or other relatives and friends, or nonmedical staff

to interpret. The high level of skill required for medical interpretation makes use
of these persons inadvisable. The situation, however, may permit no alternative.
If this is the case, extreme care must be taken to verify communications to the
extent feasible. If you must use other than professional interpreters:
o Ensure the interpreter understands his or her role before you begin.
o Use the simplest vocabulary that will express your meaning.
o Speak in short simple sentences.
o Check to see if the message is understood.

Dont ask or say anything you dont want the patient to hear. Expect
everything you or the patient says to be interpreted.

Avoid jargon and technical terms. Avoid idioms, medical specific terminology,
or cultural references that may be difficult to interpret. Some medical terms,
concepts, and phrases may be easy for an interpreter to understand, but extremely
difficult to translate.

Expect the interpreter to interrupt for clarification. The precision demanded

of the medical interpreter requires that he completely understand what is being
communicated. This may require a more interactive role on the part of the
interpreter than is the norm for other situations.

Expect the interpreter to take notes if things get complicated. The difficulties
of this type of communication may require note taking as an aid to memory and

Dealing with the personality and the culture of the patient is your job, not the
interpreters. Avoid the temptation to rely on the interpreter for the nonmedical
aspects of the care giver/patient relationship.

Facial expressions and gestures may be misleading. Differing cultures may

signal or conceal pain, relief or other reactions in unfamiliar manners.

Remember that cultural differences are a two way street. If you are having
difficulty understanding your patient, he is likely having equal difficulty grasping
your advice and direction.

The following mnemonic TRANSLATE3 may be useful for medical personnel working
with an interpreter:

T: Trust: How will trust be developed in the patient-clinician-interpreter triadic

relationship? In relationships with the patients family and other health care

R: Roles: What role(s) will the interpreter play in the clinical care process (e.g.
language translator, culture broker/informant, culture broker/interpreter of
biomedical culture, advocate)?

A: Advocacy: Consider how advocacy and support for the patient-familycentered care will occur? How will power and loyalty issues be handled?

N: Nonjudgmental Attitude: How can a nonjudgmental attitude be maintained

during health care encounters? How will personal beliefs, values, opinions, biases,
and stereotypes be dealt with?

S: Setting: Where and how will medical interpretation occur during healthcare
encounters (e.g. use of salaried interpreters, contract interpreters, volunteers,
AT&T Language Line)?

L: Language: What language(s) will be used? What methods of communication

will be employed? How will linguistic appropriateness and competence be

A: Accuracy: How will knowledge and information be exchanged in an

accurate, thorough, and complete manner during health care encounters?

Adapted from Like, R.C., R.P. Stiener, and A.J. Rubel. 1996. Recommended Core
Curriculum Guidelines on Culturally Sensitive and Competent Healthcare. Family
Medicine 28: 291-8.

T: Time: How will time be appropriately managed during health care


E: Ethical Issues: How will potential ethical conflicts be handled during health
care encounters? How will confidentiality of clinical information be maintained?


See the section on nonverbal communication in Chapter 1 for a generic discussion of
nonverbal communications in cross-cultural situations.
Some nonverbal communications tips specific to health care providers include:

Follow the patients lead. For example, if the patient moves closer or touches you
in a casual manner, you may do the same.

Use hand and arm gestures with great caution. Gestures can mean very different
things in different cultures.

Be careful in interpreting facial expressions. They may lead you to misinterpret

the patients feelings or to over or under estimate the patients level of pain. This
is also true of the presence or the absence of crying and other expressions of pain,
which are closely tied to the persons culture.

Dont force a patient to make eye contact with you. He/she may be treating you
with greater respect by not making eye contact.

Obtaining patient adherence to treatment can present exceptional challenges in crosscultural encounters. The patient may simply be unable to understand or adhere to
treatment regimes. He may also be unwilling to adopt certain behaviors or perform
specific actions due to cultural norms. Key to attaining patient adherence is effective twoway communication and adaptation of intervention to the patients cultural situation and
requirements. The following four activities can contribute greatly to improving
communication and achieving higher levels of patient adherence.

Ask nonjudgmental questions. Try to elicit and understand the patients

perspective and cultural context. Explore his/her conceptions of causes and
possible treatments.

Listen carefully. Be patient and permit the patient to fully explain him/herself.
Rephrase the patients comments to verify understanding.

Set realistic goals for behavior change. Patient adherence is unlikely if prescribed
treatment is not consistent with the patients cultural customs, values, and
environment. Dietary changes may be among the most difficult to effect. Working
with patients to set obtainable goals will produce more positive results than
prescribing ideal goals which will likely be abandoned.

Solving problems together. Involve the patient in determining the best treatment.
Avoid lecturing and directive approaches that may result in the patient dismissing
your advice altogether.

A useful mnemonic for improving patient adherence to therapeutic regimes in crosscultural encounters is ADHERENCE.4

A: Acknowledge the need for treatment with the patient, and ask about previous
treatments utilized. Together determine mutual goals and desired outcomes.

D: Discuss potential treatment strategies and options, as well as the consequences

of non-treatment with the patient (consider issues such as treatment effectiveness,
prognosis, use of complementary/alternative medicine, off-label uses, prescription
plans, formularies, etc.).

H: Handle any questions or concerns the patient may have about treatment (e.g.
fears or worries, side effects, costs, dosage, frequency, timing, sequence, duration
of treatment, drug or food interactions, proper storage techniques).

E: Evaluate the patients functional health literacy and understanding of the

purpose/rationale for treatment, and assess barriers and facilitators to adherence
(e.g., environmental, economic, occupational, and socio-cultural factors, family
situation and supports).

R: Recommend/Review the therapeutic regimen with the patient.

E: Empower by eliciting the patients commitment and willingness to followthrough with the therapeutic regimen.

Adapted from Like, 1998.



Different racial and ethnic groups may have different physiological reactions to some
standardized treatments. Foe specific information on reactions to standardized treatment
among different racial and ethnic groups visit or refer
to the May 15, 2000 issue of Patient Care, entitled Caring for Diverse Populations.
Specific examples include the different rates at which certain ethnic groups metabolize
some psychotropic drugs, the relatively high rate at which Chinese eliminate beta blocker
from their bodies, and marked variations in side effects between groups. SF advisors in
cross-cultural medical situation must be aware of and accommodate these differences.



Purpose: This appendix provides a list of some related resources available on the
Internet/Worldwide Web (WWW).

Note: This list is by no means exhaustive. It should be noted that Internet/WWW links
are perishable and may or may not be maintained over time. These sites may have been
changed, moved or closed since they were first found. In addition, some sites may block
access from government users. These sites are provided only for purposes of
information. Many of these sites include direct or indirect links to products, services or
vendors. No U.S. Government endorsement of these products, services or vendors is
implied. Most, although not all, of the links provided below were confirmed as active
during the months of July and August 2001.
The Internet is a tremendous asset to the special operations soldier preparing for or
conducting an advisory or liaison missions. However, be advised that not all websites are
equally easy to use. In some cases considerable patience may be required to find
particular items of information.


Encyclopedia Britannica ( a general-purpose reference
source, the site features a search engine that identifies websites by subject, a dictionary
and a thesaurus.
Biography ( offers biographies of 200,000 leaders and other
prominent people.
Internet Public Library ( gives a variety
of links to reference sources such as almanacs, dictionaries, encyclopedias and the like.
Library of Congress (HTTP:// includes the full text of the ninety-one
current country handbooks, gives tools for researchers including on-line databases and
numerous links to other research materials. Also full text of Congressional legislation
including pending bills.



(DoD publications can be found here)

U.S. State Department Background Notes provide basic information on a country's

leaders, politics, economy, and relations with the U.S. on the Department's web site
at or
The single most comprehensive available source of information on all aspects of foreign
nations is the CIA World Factbook at
factbook/index.html. This publication gives an outline map and brief overviews of basic
country information including the government, geography, economy and people of every
country in the world. Updated annually.
United States Government Information Locator
The Government Information Locator Service (GILS) ( has
been created to identify, locate, and describe publicly available Federal information
resources, including electronic information resources. GILS records identify public
information resources within the Federal Government, describe the information available
in these resources, and assist in obtaining the information. Not all agencies have
mounted their GILS records on the GPO Access server and some are not easily
accessible. Because not all agencies have provided information on location of their GILS
records at this time, this cannot be considered a comprehensive database. This resource is
still in the process of development.


Department of State (DoS)
The site map and directory with links for all DoS on-line resources is at:
The State Department Guide to Information and Services can be found at
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, contains annual Patterns of Global
Terrorism reports, policy statements, travel warnings and an archive of past articles.
Tends to be general, country or regional level information. Offers further information
through email or by contacting the Office of Public Affairs, Room 2507, Department of
State, 2201 C Street NW, Washington, DC 20520
Alternate sources for "Patterns of Global Terrorism" Reports for 1993, 1995, 1996, and
1997. Issued annually.
U.S. Embassies and Other Diplomatic Missions site provides links to U.S. embassy and
mission websites around the world. These sites are useful chiefly for basic information

on the embassy or mission, often with contact numbers and addresses. They vary greatly
in quality and timeliness. Some sites are bilingual.
The State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs issues Travel Warnings, Consular
Information Sheets, and other publications related to travel. Consular Information Sheets
exist for all countries and include information on health conditions, areas of instability,
crime and security information, political disturbances, and the addresses of U.S.
embassies and consulates in the country. This information, plus international security
information from the Overseas Security Advisory Council and the State Department's
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, can be directly accessed on the web at
Consular Travel Warnings, Information Sheets and Public Warnings contains safety
and security information and information on terrorist threats and criminal activity in
specific countries.
In addition, the Consular Affairs Bureau provides fax-on-demand: Dial 202-647-3000
from your fax machine. The system will then give further instructions.
State Department Information Archive only somewhat useful. Recommend that other
sources be trued first.
Department of State Foreign Affairs Network. DOSFAN gives timely, global access to
official U.S. foreign policy information. Updated daily, DOSFAN includes Background
Notes; daily press briefings; Country Commercial Guides; directories of key officers of
Foreign Service posts; etc. DOSFAN's World Wide Web site is at
U.S. State Dept. Bureau of Diplomatic Security - Gives information on terrorists actively
sought by the U.S. government.
U.S. Information Service terrorism site for the most part this contains news releases and
mirrors or links to much of the information on the other State Department pages.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) The Foreign Broadcast Information
Service is a U.S. government monitoring and translation service operated by the CIA and
covering 3,000 foreign broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, periodicals
and government statements.
World News Connection (WNC) is provided by the National Technical Information
Service, U.S. Department of Commerce. It includes full texts of speeches, editorial
comment in non-English newspapers, conference proceedings, television and radio
broadcasts, periodicals, and nonclassified technical reports. New information is generally

available within two to three days of original publication or broadcast. It is available (by
subscription) on the Internet at and is widely used by scholars,
journalists and policy analysts. Cost is from $780 per year to $12,000 depending on the
exact service desired.
Index to State Department Websites -
Emergency information concerning Americans traveling abroad may be obtained from
the Office of Overseas Citizens Services at (202) 647-5225. For after-hours emergencies,
Sundays and holidays, call 202-647-4000.
U.S. Department of Defense
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) (http://www.dtic.mol/) - DTIC provides a
wide variety of materials on military-related subjects. Public STINET gives you access to
all unclassified, unlimited citations to documents added into DTIC from late December
1974 to the present. The DTIC Force Protection Links page gives links to State
Department Travel Advisories, DoS Foreign Affairs Manual Chapter 12 Diplomatic
Security (PDF), Overseas Security Advisory Council International Policy Institute for
Counterterrorism (ICT), Joint Visual Information Services Distribution Agency
(JVISDA), Nuclear Control Institute on Nuclear Terrorism, Centers for Disease Control
and Amnesty International human rights information.
Secure STINET provides more information as well as additional services: language
translator, access to the British Librarys inside web, Canada Institute for Scientific and
Technical Informations CISTI Source and PROQUESTs Research Library.

Hoover Institute Foreign Governments & Organizations
( gives links to nearly all foreign
governments, embassies & consulates on the Internet.
Canadian Government:
All Canadian official websites are provided in English and French.
The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Travel
Information & Advisory Reports
Travel information and advisories from the Canadian government similar to U.S. State
Dept but offers current information by contacting DFAIT (1-800-267-6788 or 613-9446788/ Fax: 1-800-575-2500 or 613-944-2500. Available in English and French.


Canadian Security Intelligence Service gives contact information for regional offices
(within Canada) and general information on Canadas security programs. Headquarters is
located in Ottawa, CSIS P.O.Box 9732 Postal Station T Ottawa, Ontario K1G 4G4 (613)

The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (

Gives studies on Canadian foreign, defense and military issues and policy.
Box 2321, 2300 Yonge St., Suite #402
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4P 1E4 Tel. 416.322.8128 Fax. 416.322.8129
Great Britain and the UK:
The Foreign & Commonwealth Office is the British Government department responsible
for embassies, overseas relations and foreign affairs (equivalent to the U.S. State
Information here is often more detailed and more current than that found on the
equivalent U.S. State Department sites. An excellent feature is the ability to personalize
the website to receive email notification of changes to any, or all of FCO's Travel Advice
King Charles Street, London SW1A 2AH, Tel: 020 7270 1500
Consular Division - General: 020 7238 4586, Travel Advice: 020 7238 4503/4
Travel advice and threat information provided by the Travel Advice Unit, Consular
Division Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1 Palace Street, London SW1E 5HE. Tel:
020 7238 4503/4504. Fax: 020 7238 4545

Note: All UN sites are available in French and English. Many are also available in
Spanish, Arabic and Chinese and occasionally other languages as well.
Secretary General Documents ( selected documents
issued by the Secretary-General. Reports of the Secretary-General are normally issued as
documents of the organs to which they are submitted. Check under the General
Assembly, Security Council and Economic and Social Council for other reports issued by
the Secretary-General.


Security Council Resolutions ( gives full-text searching of

all UNSCR resolutions since 1974.
Food and Agriculture Organization ( FAO collects, analyses,
interprets and disseminates information relating to nutrition, food, agriculture, forestry
and fisheries. Available in Spanish, Arabic and Chinese.
World Health Organization ( gives access to various
information materials, the WHO Library, Publications Catalogue and Multimedia
resources. Individual publications include the Weekly Epidemiological Record and the
World Health Report. Available in Spanish.
Bulletin of the World Health Organization ( primarily
devoted to research and worldwide/regional health issues, it also contains country and
region specific information on health threats. Available in Spanish, has a good search
The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
( The ICJ sits
at The Hague, in the Netherlands, acts as a world court. It decides in accordance with
international law disputes of a legal nature submitted to it by States, in addition certain
international organs and agencies are entitled to call upon it for advisory opinions.
Website allows research on foreign and international law.
United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF) ( The UN
organization for childrens issues, website outlines UNICEF programs.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
( The main objective of UNESCO
is to contribute to peace and security in the world by promoting collaboration among
nations through education, science, culture and communication. Website contains
information on UNESCO development activities since 1996. In French, Spanish,
Arabic and Chinese. Not a very useful site.
United Nations General Assembly ( Documents:
Resolutions, Verbatim Records, GA Documents and other UN Documentation.
Allows search of all UN documents.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ( the United
Nations refugee organization is mandated by the United Nations to lead and coordinate
international action for the worldwide protection of refugees and the resolution of refugee
problems. Website provides basic information about UNHCR and refugees.



Foreign Policy ( This is a website maintained by the journal
Foreign Policy.
It gives information on current news, global issues and background on various countries
gleaned largely from the CIA World Fact Book. The site includes a variety of links to
subjects related to foreign policy: Global Reference Guides, International &
Intergovernmental Organizations, Media Resources, Multinational & International
Corporations, Regional Sources, NGOs and University Programs, among others.
As of 01 Aug 01, the website was constructing an archives section and search engine.
Atlapedia Online ( contains full color physical and political
maps as well as key facts and statistics on countries of the world.
Appears to be a digest of the CIA World Fact Book.
The Economist ( is especially useful in that it presents world
events and current issues from a European rather than a U.S. point of view. Includes
background profiles, forecasts and statistics from the Economist Intelligence Unit, market
and currency updates, newswires and links, city guide and country briefings,
Note: User must subscribe the Economist magazine or the Economist on-line service to
use this site. 2001 cost of the hard-copy publication is U.S.$115 annually.
The civilian Granite Island Group website at
provides links to aen enormous array of intelligence, counterintelligence and security
related WebPages including government, military and industrial pages., Ltd.
Extensive archive on issues related to information warfare. Notable for data on
information warfare threats to CONUS and the UK, some information on threats in other
727-556-0833 Fax: 727-556-0834

Federation of American Scientists (FAS), generally well maintained website with useful
information on military and related topics as well as numerous other subjects.
Includes, for example:
CIA material.
FBI reports.

DoD Directives
Other reports, information and links to related sites.
ABC News Dangerous Places
Not a comprehensive site by any means, it presents information derived from the Fielding
site (see Fielding's Black Flag Adventure Forum) on a few of the worlds less attractive
tourist destinations: the Solomon Islands, Pakistan, Afghanistan, East Africa and Sudan.
Fielding's Black Flag Adventure Forum
This site is readable and well organized. It gives somewhat spotty but occasionally very
good coverage of the dangerous areas of 35 countries (including the United States).
Information is often very brief and elementary and sometimes more than two years old
but in other cases includes recent data not available elsewhere. It includes criminal,
terrorist, medical and other information in an interesting and readable format. The page
on Colombia, for example, identifies the following specific danger areas and gives a few
lines of information about each of them:
Cali and Valle de Cauca Department
Cali-Buenaventura Highway
Colombia East of the Andes
North Coast/Barranquilla/Isla San Andres
Other Guerrilla Areas
Santa Marta
The Darien
The Upper Magdalena
Valle Department
Basic maps are also provided. The same publisher also offers a written guide called
Worlds Most Dangerous Places, updated annually. The current edition is March 2000,
ISBN 1-56952-183-2, price $21.95.


The World Bank ( consists of five organizations: the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development
Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment


Guarantee Agency, and the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes. Includes a directory of countries and regions.
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Trade Data Bank (NTDB). Gives banking and
trade-related information. A CD-ROM is also available. The NTDB
maintains a help-line at (202) 482-1986 for more information.
Current currency conversion rates for 164 currencies are available at FXConverter (Foreign Exchange Currency
Converter) is a multi-lingual Currency Converter with up to date exchange rates provided
from leading market data contributors and claims to be filtered for validity.

University of Texas maintains an internet maps library with a variety of maps.
CIA World Factbook includes a simple outline map of each of the worlds countries and
territories showing principal features.
Maps are also provided by Albania to Zambia:
Photography from orbit, see:

Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Addressing Racial and Ethnic Disparities
in Health Care. Fact Sheet, AHRQ Publication No. 00-PO41. Rockville, MD: February
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Office of Health Care Information.
Barriers to Quality Cancer Care Persist. Research Activities, No. 235, March 2000.
This is the Web site of the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services
(ACCESS) located in Dearborn, Michigan. The ACCESS Family Counseling,
Community Mental Health Center is a community based, non-profit service that
addresses the emotional, behavioral, substance abuse, and mental health problems and
needs, primarily of the Arab American and Chaldean community in Southeast Michigan.
This Web site of the American Medical Student Association has a discussion of diversity
in medicine. Click on the Diversity in Medicine link on the Web sites front page to
reach the diversity discussion and resources, including a slide show that outlines current

health disparities, an exercise to encourage discussion about similarities and differences

within communities, cultural competency case studies, and links to Internet resources.
This is the link to the Bureau of Primary Health Care Quality Center Site. Click on
Quality and Culture on the left hand side to reach some helpful resources and links
including Cultural Competence: A Journey (This is a 20 page publication on what
selected community health centers in the U.S. are doing to enhance their cultural and
linguistic competence).
This Web site of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provides statistical
information and guidance on developing culturally competent HIV prevention programs.
This is the Web site of the National Prevention Information Network (NPIN), a project of
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that is a reference, referral and
distribution services for information on HIV, STDs and TB Prevention.
The Center for Cross-Cultural Health. Six Steps I Can Take toward Cultural
Competence. Minneapolis, MN.
The Collaborative Family Healthcare Coalition was founded in 1993 to bring together the
diverse professionals (physicians, nurses, psychologists, social workers, researchers,
educators, etc.) working in health care settings. The Coalition functions as a
communication network and information clearinghouse. The Web site has information on
joining the Coalition. Members have access to the quarterly newsletter, a member
database, and articles from the publication Families, Systems & Health on the Web site.
This Web site hosts an online magazine providing resources for physicians and
consumers on promoting minority health through culturally relevant care. The site
features sections with news, features, information about major health problems faced by
minority populations, and a practitioners corner.
This is the Web site of the Center for Cross-Cultural Health in Minneapolis, MN. The
Center is a valuable resource with regards to disseminating information related to crosscultural education.
This section of the Center for Cross-Cultural Healths Web site provides a Cultural
competency training for health care providers. The Center is located in Minneapolis,


This link leads directly to the Tools section of this information-rich Community
Toolbox Web site. Click on the Search link in the left-hand column to pull up the
search function. A cultural competence search brings up a wealth of links, including
Multicultural Collaboration and Building Relationships with People from Different
Cultures. Each link provides an introduction to the topic, examples, links to related
topics, tools and checklists, and ready-to-use overheads summarizing the major points in
the section.
This section of the National Cancer Institutes Web site provides a list of Internet
resources on culture including cultural competency, organizations, reports, journals and
This section of the Indiana Prevention Resource Centers Web site provides information
on how culture plays a complex role in the development of alcohol, tobacco, and other
drug use.
This section of the Diversity RX Web site provides short descriptions of other
organizations who are doing similar work in cultural competence and their web links.
This Web site is sponsored by The National Conferences of State Legislatures, Resources
for Cross Cultural Health Care, and the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and promotes
language and cultural competence to improve the quality of health care for minority,
immigrant, and ethnically diverse communities.
This section of the Diversity Rx Web site (Resources for Cross Cultural Health Care,
Silver Spring, MD) has an extensive list of medical interpretation resources and
references, last updated August 6, 2000.
This is the Web site of the Maternal and Child Health AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE
National Center for Cultural Competence of the National Center for Child Health and
Mental Health Policy in Georgetown Universitys Child Development Center.
Service learning is gaining recognition and support as a core component of health
professional education. This month we explore the rationale and role for service-learning
in the health professions, and the outcomes that it fosters.

The California HealthCare Foundation, through a grant to the Center, is launching CHCF
Future Health Care Leaders - a two-year fellowship program designed to prepare
physicians and other health care providers to be the agents of change in the California
health care system.
"The Practice of Medicine in California: A Profile of the Physician Workforce", the first
of two reports that examine the practice of medicine in California, has been released by
the California Workforce Initiative.
This section of Georgetown's Child Development Center provides a policy brief on"
Linguistic Competence in Primary Health Care Delivery Systems: Implications for Policy
This is the Web site of the Maternal and Child Health AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE
National Center for Cultural Competence of the National Center for Child Health and
Mental Health Policy in Georgetown Universitys Child Development Center.
This minority-owned, e-commerce and communications company provides health
information, products, and services for ethnically diverse communities and the health
professionals that serve them. The company publishes five publications on health care,
career development, and cultural and social issues and provides career services for
minority students and alumni.
The non-profit organization Institute for Family-Centered Care serves as a resource for
family members and members of the health care field. The Web site provides information
on family-centered care, the Institutes publications and videos, upcoming staff
presentations, and policy and research initiatives.
This section of Georgetowns Child Development Center provides a policy brief on
Cultural Competence in Primary Health Care: Partnerships for a Research Agenda:
Eliminating Health Disparity: A Mandate for a New Research Agenda and presents a
cultural competence continuum.
This is the Web site of MultiLingual Health Education Net that among other services,
provides a database of multilingual materials from a variety of national agencies and
tools to assess the translated materials.


This Web site contains policy guidelines from the Office for Civil Rights (OCR). See the
document Policy Guidance: Title VI Prohibition against National Origin Discrimination
As It Affects Persons with Limited English Proficiency August 30, 2000.
This EthnoMed site describes language, religion, special issues, and local resources for
major refugee and immigrant groups that have settled in central Seattle. Information is
included on Vietnamese, Cambodian, Hmong, Mien, Laotian, Cham, Eritrean, Ethiopian,
Tigrean, Oromo, and Somalian refugee and immigrant groups.
This section of the National Health Law Program Web site provides resources on
immigrant health, linguistic/cultural access and minority health and Web links to other
Web sites on similar issues.
This Web site contains policy guidelines from the Office for Civil Rights (OCR). See the
document Policy Guidance: Title VI Prohibition against National Origin Discrimination
As It Affects Persons with Limited English Proficiency August 30, 2000.
This section of the Department of Health & Human Services Foreign Language Web
Sites, includes Strategic Plan to Improve Access to HHS Programs and Activities by
Limited English Proficient (LEP) Persons.
This Web site of the National Hispanic Medical Association (NHMA); provides
information on NHMA conferences, links to other Hispanic medical sites, a list of
Spanish-language patient education resources, and descriptions of NHMA community
support efforts.
This is a Web site of the University of Washington Health Sciences Library and the
Harborview Medical Center's Community House Calls Program.
This section of the Immigration and Naturalization Services Web site provides
information on the services provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to
applicants, petitioners, authorized representatives, community-based organizations, and
the general public.
This company provides training and resources in cultural competence and health care.
The Web site provides a feature article and a Tip of the Month for treating patients of
other cultures. The News and Events section lists upcoming conferences and new


publications in the field of cultural competence.
This is the Web site of the Kaiser Family Foundation that through policy research and
analysis, and media and public education activities, seeks to improve health access and
outcomes of many racial and ethnic minority Americans.
This section of the Indiana Universitys Web site is entitled Transcultural and
Multicultural Health Links, which has a comprehensive list of links, with brief
descriptions, under four major headings: General Resources, Religious Groups, Ethnic
Groups, and Special Populations. Under Ethnic Groups, there are links for African
American, Hispanic, Native American, Hmong, Thai, Indian, Chinese, Tibetan, and many
other groups.
The New York Task Force on Immigrant Health was established in 1990 to facilitate the
delivery of epidemiologically informed and culturally and linguistically sensitive health
services for immigrant and refugee populations. The Task Force is a network of health
care providers, health care administrators, social scientists, researchers, and community
advocates. Its membership also includes community-based organizations and multiple
municipal and voluntary hospitals.
This article on Medscapes Web site is an interview with George D. Lundberg, MD,
Editor in Chief of Medscape and CBSHealthWatch who provided his thoughts on the
inferior medical care provided to African Americans in the United States. Subscription is
required, but free of charge.
These two Web sites are part of The African American Male Health Initiative of the
Michigan Department of Community Health. This initiative is sponsored by MDCH to
reach out to African American communities throughout the state to combat the causes of
premature death. The efforts Statewide Steering Committee is composed of African
American men and women from communities across Michigan and represent community
service providers, community organizations, businesses, and public health and higher
education institutions, among others. and
The National Clearinghouse for Bilingual Education (NCBE) is funded by the U.S.
Department of Education's Office of Bilingual Education and Minority Languages
Affairs (OBEMLA) to collect, analyze, and disseminate information relating to the
effective education of linguistically and culturally diverse learners in the U.S. The
National Clearinghouse for Bilingual Education Site contains information that enables


you to exchange ideas, get the latest news, and search for information.
The National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM) at the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) is dedicated to exploring complementary and
alternative healing practices in the context of rigorous science; training CAM researchers;
and disseminating authoritative information. The site has sections for consumers and
practitioners as well as investigators.
The Web site of the U.S. National Library of Medicine (NLM) has links to health
information resources, a section entitled library services, information on NLMs
research programs, and NLM news and general information. NLM has the worlds largest
medical library and is the creator of the online information resource MEDLINE. is dedicated to bringing non-profit and selected for-profit
manufacturers together with non-profit organizations in a common place for the mutual
benefit of the people they serve. The PRODUCTS section offers a variety of services and
products from manufacturers that range from bedding supplies to work boots and
This Web site of the National Pharmaceutical Council is supported by 27 of the nation's
major research-based pharmaceutical companies. This section, entitled Differing Ethnic
and Racial Responses to Therapy, contains links to several NPC publications that
provide detailed and overview information on differences in response to medications
among different ethnic and racial minority groups and a monograph on cultural diversity
and pharmaceutical care.
The mission of the Office of Minority Health, created by the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services in 1985, is to improve the health of racial and ethnic populations
through the development of effective health policies and programs that help to eliminate
disparities in health. The OMH Web site has information on minority health issues,
funding opportunities, conferences, legislative action in Congress, publications, and links
to useful minority health information.
This section of the Office of Minority Health Resource Center, of the Health Resources
and Services Administration (HRSA) Web site provides a document on Assuring
Cultural Competence in Health Care: Recommendations for National Standards and an
Outcomes-Focused Research Agenda. Contains recommendations from the Office of
Minority Health for national standards and an outcomes-focused research agenda on
culturally competent health care.

The Web site of Patient Care provides on-line access to past issues of this magazine for
primary care physicians, and it contains information of interest to anyone interested in
health care news. The theme of the May 15 issue, which served as an important source
for this section, was caring for diverse populations. It can be accessed through the sites
search function. Issue articles focus on preventing amputation in diabetes, diabetes and
CVD interventions, asthma management, and intelligent prescribing in diverse
populations, among others.
This is the Web site of the Minority Health Network (MHNet), a world wide web based
information source for individuals interested in the health of minority groups.
This section of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Web site provides a
recording of a plenary session, "Eliminating Health Disparities," coordinated by the
Office of Minority Health held on January 27, 2000. The panelists discussed ways to
improve the health of racial and ethnic minority populations through the development of
effective health policies and programs that help to eliminate health disparities and gaps.
This is the Web site of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and its
Initiative to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health and it provides information
on the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services initiative to eliminate racial and
ethnic disparities in health.
This section of the Baylor College of Medicines Web site has a Hispanic Health Course
with an excellent module entitled Folk Medicine in Hispanics in the Southwestern
United States. The modules objectives are to understand the origins and applications
of Hispanic folk medicine, identify common Hispanic folk illnesses and their remedies,
and incorporate the knowledge of Hispanic folk medicine beliefs into development of
effective patient management and counseling plans.
This section of the U.S. Department of States Web site, the U.S. Bureau of Population,
Refugees and Migration provides statistics about refugee and immigrant arrivals from
different countries around the world.
The philosophy of the Multicultural Training and Research Institute of Temple
University values culture and diversity as sources of strength for individuals, families,
and social groups and as a catalyst for community enrichment, empowerment, and
positive social change. The institute has a network of multicultural and multi-disciplinary
experts from the fields of anthropology, social work, education, psychology, health care,
and the arts, among others. The Institute works with schools and corporations, develops


multicultural demonstration projects, and provides a resource clearinghouse.
This is the site of the Center for Healthy Families and Cultural Diversity of the UMDNJRobert Wood Johnson Medical Schools Department of Family Medicine. The Centers
mission is to work in partnership with federal, state, and local organizations to facilitate
the provision of high quality, culturally-responsive health care through education and
training, curricular innovations for health care professionals, technical assistance and
consultation, research and evaluation, and dissemination of diversity information.
This section of the Cross Cultural Health Care Programs Web site describes the
Interpreter Services Program at Pacific Medical Clinics in Seattle, WA.
This is the Web site of the Cross-Cultural Health Care Program at Pacific Medical Clinics
in Seattle, WA.
This is the Web site of the Center for the Study of Race and Ethnicity at the University of
Wisconsin, Madison, School of Medicine. The Center was established to develop
educational programs, research initiatives, and outreach activities focusing on the role of
race and ethnicity in shaping the expectations, beliefs, and attitudes of physicians and
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provide a wide variety of medical
information including updates on current health emergencies on their international travel
web page located at
It includes health information on specific destinations, information on outbreaks of
concern to international travelers and links to reference materials including useful
resources such as the CDC book Health Information for International Travel (the Yellow
Book), the "Blue Sheet", and links to other related sites.
A hotline at 877-FYI-TRIP (877-394-8747) and a web site at
index.htm provide current health advisories, immunization recommendations or
requirements, and advice on food and drinking water safety for regions and countries.
Bulletin of the World Health Organization: primarily devoted to research and
worldwide/regional health issues, it also contains country and region specific information
on health threats.
The Pan American Health Organization (Regional Office for the Americas of the

World Health Organization) gives a useful web page for health-related information
involving South and Central America at This includes country
health information and a small number of technical and policy publications. This is not
always and easy site to use and some information may require considerable searching.
Available in English and Spanish.
The Armed forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) is a field production activity of
the Defense Intelligence Agency and the sole Department of Defense producer of medical
intelligence. AFMIC maintains extensive data bases, monitors foreign research,
development, production and transnational flow of medical materiel for military interest,
gives intelligence liaison services to key customers, conducts in-house and mobile
training including a medical intelligence fellowship program, serves on numerous
intelligence committees and working groups, and trains military reservists for
mobilization assignments. These intelligence products provide direct support to U.S.
military customers for operational planning; development of policy, doctrine, and training
priorities; and medical research and development.
AFSMIC states that they plan to have some information available on the Internet but as
of August 2001 were unable to provide a date when that might be accomplished.
The U.S. DoD plan for Addressing Emerging Infectious Disease Threats can be found

Foreign newspapers are probably the most current and complete (despite notable gaps)
sources of information on events and conditions in foreign countries. There are an
estimated 10,000 newspapers and news magazines available on the Internet, many of
which are foreign periodicals. They can provide excellent foreign language practice and
many even include English language editions.
The Newspapers, USA and World Wide web page (,
for example, gives links to newspapers from the UK, Norway, Germany, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, the Caribbean, Australia, New Zealand, Tasmania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Greece,
Africa, Ireland, Belgium, France, Japan, Korea, China, Nova Scotia, Sicily, India,
Switzerland, Hawaii, and the Netherlands. Also Argentina, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Rep., Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El
Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela and others.
OnLine ( gives numerous
links to foreign periodicals, organized by region. Regions covered are: United States of
America, South America, Asia Pacific, South East Asia, Canada, Central America,


Africa, United Kingdom, Asia, West Indies, Europe, Middle East and the South Pacific.
Most are in English.
The web page ( gives links to
magazines and newspapers from around the world, broken down by region. The Africa
region, for example, includes newspapers from Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, nearly all in
MediaLink ( gives links to magazines and newspapers
from around the world, broken down by region. The Oceania region includes, for
example: American Samoa (1), Australia (170), Cook Islands (2), Fiji (5), Fr. Polynesia
(2), Guam (3), Kiribati (1), Micronesia (1), New Caledonia (2), New Zealand (34), Niue
(1), Northern Marianas (3) Papua New Guinea (4), Pitcairn (1), Samoa (4), Solomon
Islands (2), Tonga (2), Vanuatu (2). Most are in English.
Prominent Regional Newspapers
Africa Today ( current business news and analysis of economic
and business related issues. Offices are in Capetown, South Africa.
Al Jarida Al Maghribia ( (in Arabic and English) Strongly
oriented toward Morocco and North Africa. Also considers itself a journal of the
Maghreb culture. Offices in Rabat, Morocco.
Agos ( current news and analysis of special interest to Turkish
audiences (in English and Turkish). Offices are in Istanbul, Turkey
Asahi Shimbun ( current news and analysis centered on Asia and
Japan (in Japanese). Offices are in Tokyo, Japan.
Bahrain Tribune ( current news and analysis
centered the Middle East and the Arab World. Offices are in Bahrain.
Bangkok Post ( current news and analysis centered on the
Far East and Southeast Asia. Offices are in Bangkok, Thailand.
Berliner Morgenpost ( world news and analysis
from a European perspective (in German). Offices are in Berlin Germany.
Die Welt Online ( world news and analysis from a European
perspective (in German). Offices are in Berlin Germany.
El Nacional ( news and analysis concentrating on South
America. Offices are Caracas, Venezuela.


El Pais ( news and analysis concentrating on Hispanic interests

worldwide with emphasis on Europe (in Spanish). Offices are in Madrid, Spain.
Federal News Service (Russian Federation) ( FNS Moscow
provides verbatim text in English of important speeches, press conferences and
interviews with Russian political and economic leaders, the Russian legislature and
others. Notable for speed of production, items are often posted the same day given.
The Guardian Online ( world news and analysis from a
European perspective. Offices are in London, England. Highly regarded for its analysis
of trend and current events.
Izvestia ( well-known Russian news service (in Russian). Offices
are in Moscow, Russia. Often considered an outlet for official Russian government
The Japan Digest ( edited in Washington by journalists and
based on vernacular Japanese dailies, weeklies and monthlies, supplemented by spot
news reports. Offices are in Washington, DC. An especially good source on Japanese
The Japan Times Online ( Well-respected Japanese weekly.
Good for cultural information. Offices are in Tokyo, Japan.
The Jerusalem Post ( Israeli perspective on current events
concerning the Middle East and the Arab World. Offices in Jerusalem, Israel.
Le Monde ( world news and analysis from a continental
European perspective (in French). Offices are in Paris, France.
Le Monde Diplomatique ( more in-depth reports and
analysis of international events as they affect France and continental Europe (in French).
Offices are in Paris, France.
NIE world news and analysis from an Eastern European
perspective (in Polish and English). Offices are in Warsaw, Poland.
New Presence ( world news and analysis
from a Central European perspective. Offices are in Prague, Czech Republic.
Pan-African News Agency ( posts more than 500 new stories daily
from over 80 African media organizations. Also available in French.
The Times of India ( news and
analysis of events in Southwest Asia but mainly internal Indian issues. Offices are in
New Delhi, India.


Foreign language radio and television broadcasts are available on the Internet and can
provide a useful source of very current information on the situation in their countries.
Like newspapers, they are also an excellent opportunity to gain and maintain improved
language skills.
For example, The Thai Radio/TV Website lists the following: TV Channel 5 (website)
or (Live) Note: Need credit card TV Channel 7 (website) or (Live) and TV Channel
9 (website) or (Live) (Note: need either Realplayer or Netshow to watch these, both
programs are available without cost on the net.)
Thai FM Radio Stations:
Radio No Problem FM 88.00 MHz
Radio Z FM 88.50 MHZ
Radio Morning News (Recorded)
Radio Nation FM 90.50 MHz
Radio News Room (Recorded)
Radio Hot Wave FM 91.50 MHz
Radio Thailand FM 92.50 MHz
Radio Vote Satellite FM 93.50
Army Radio FM 94.00 MHz
Radio Luktung FM 95.00 MHz
Sport Radio FM 99.00 MHz
Today Top News FM 100.50 MHz
Radio Green Wave FM 106.50
Thai AM Radio Stations: Kasetsart University AM 1107
CNN World News at gives worldwide daily news coverage,
generally broken down by topic (e.g. law, medicine) and region and by countries within a
region. This site also includes a translation utility that gives rough translations of single
words and common phrases from English into any of ten languages including Chinese (2
forms, traditional and simplified), Japanese, Arabic and Korean. These translations
should be used with caution since they are often excessively literal.
CNN web sites are also available in:

General Information on Terrorism:

ICT The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism

ICT - At the Interdisciplinary Center Herzlia, P.O.Box 167, Herzlia, 46150, Israel, Fax:
Extensive database of articles on terrorism with concentration on India and the Middle
East, contains text of laws, treaties and other documents relating to terrorist activity.
Special note: includes articles dealing with non-conventional terrorism. Presumably
reflects Israeli government opinion.
International Policy Center for Counterterrorism (ICT)
Numerous articles on terrorism and related threats. Makes an effort to remain timely.
International Policy Center for Counterterrorism, ICT - At the Interdisciplinary Center
Herzlia, P.O.Box 167, Herzlia, 46150, Israel
Fax: 972-9-9513073
Terrorism Research Center
Includes links, archives and profiles of terrorist organizations. Terrorist profiles taken
from U.S. Department of State, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator
for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism [Washington, D.C.].
Terrorism Research Center is an independent institute dedicated to the research of
terrorism, information warfare, and other issues related to low-intensity political violence
and gray-area phenomena.

Centre for the study of terrorism and political violence:
Terrorism and political violence home page:
The Sinn Fein Information Page:
Irish Republican Army (IRA):
Ulster Unionist Party- Home Page:
Ulster Democratic Party:
The Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Struggle in Turkey, DHKP/C, and Communism:
RAND Home Page
Kroll Associates:
The Counter Terrorism Page:
Counter Terrorism Home Page:
PCP Web Page:
Stormfront White Nationalist Resource Page:
Hatewatch: A Guide to Hate Groups on the Internet:
Profiles Threat Counter Measures Group:
Bahrain Freedom Movement:
Committee Against Corruption in Saudi Arabia:
Committee for the Defense of the Legitimate Rights (CDLR):
Emergency Response Institute (ERRI) Terrorism and CT Home Page:
Fed Emergency Management Administrations Fact Sheet on Terrorism:
Israel INTERNET Terrorism Hotline:
Library of Congress Search Engine: Terrorism:
MILNET: Terrorism:
Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia: group from
Muslim Student Association Islamic Server:
Muslim Brotherhood Movement:
Society and Culture: Crimes: Terrorism:
Taliban Militia:
Terrorist profiles:
Terrorist Use of Chemical Weapons:
Van Impe Intelligence Briefing:
Arm the Spirit:
Fourth World Documentation Project:
Islamic Association for Palestine: http//


Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP):

Free Burma Organization:
Burma Web:
Free Tibet Site:
International Tibet Independence Movement:
Free Eastern Turkestan Homepage:
Kashmiri Separatists:
World Kashmir Freedom Movement:
Sikh Separatists: http://www.khalistan .net/welcome.htm
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE):
New Peoples Army:
LTTE Eelam News Page:
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA):
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN):
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG):
Zapatista Unofficial Homepage (EZLN):
Official EZLN Homepage:
Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR):
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA):

TRANSLATION at offers free, downloadable
translation software capable of rough translations of single words and common phrases
from English into any of ten languages: French, German, Spanish, Netherlands, Chinese
(2 forms, traditional and simplified), Arabic, Korean, Portuguese, Japanese and Italian.
These translations should be used with caution since they are often excessively literal.
Short on military vocabulary.
Free at will translate material that
you type into any of the standard European languages. Fast and reasonably accurate but
short on military vocabulary.
Babel Fish gives translation at The AltaVista
Translation box (also called Babel Fish) enables you to translate short passages to and
from English to a number of languages and to and from several specific pairs of
languages (for example, German to French, French to German). You can also translate
Web sites. Short on military vocabulary.



A large number of weather and climate sites are available including some provided by
foreign countries.
The National Climactic Data Center website is maintained by the National Ocean and
Atmospheric Agency based on information received over the past 100 or more years from
8000 reporting stations around the world including very remote areas such as Antarctica.
It is a good source for climate data not found elsewhere such as Sub-Saharan Africa. The
site is located at http://www., however it is not necessarily organized for
ease of use.
Data at the Climactic Data Center includes: Global Historical Climate Network (GHCN)
dataset (a comprehensive global baseline observations of temperature, precipitation, and
pressure. The Comprehensive Ocean-Atmosphere Dataset (COADS) dataset (data
products from meteorological surface observations from ships and buoys around the
world). The Comprehensive Aerological Reference Dataset (CARDS) dataset (data
products from radiosonde and rawinsonde flights for the global atmosphere for the period
1948-1995, including station history information). at claims over 85,000 records of world
climate data (historical weather averages) from a wide range of sources. However, the
data is accessed by place names and those names are usually in the language of the
country in which they are located (e.g. Venice is listed as Venezia).
World Meteorological Organization ( the World
Meteorological Organization coordinates global scientific activity in such areas as
weather prediction to air pollution research, climate change related activities, ozone layer
depletion studies and tropical storm forecasting. Claims to provide up-to-the-minute
worldwide weather information. The most useful feature is the International Weather
web page that gives links to the meteorological services of 95 countries.
Contact: (41 22) 730-8216 or World Weather Watch Department WMO/OMM, Case
Postale No. 2300, CH-1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland
USA TODAY Weather at is an excellent,
comprehensive site, providing better information for probable locations of SOF
deployment than most weather sites. As an example, in South America, weather is
available for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Curacao, Ecuador, French
Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad, Uruguay and Venezuela. The
Bolivia page, for example, then gives weather reports/forecasts for twenty-four cities
throughout Bolivia.
The Weather Channel at: has daily weather reports and
forecasts for most regions of the world and principal cities as well as regional satellite
weather maps.
Jeppesen Weather Service at is a fee-based full
service, comprehensive weather provider of worldwide aviation weather, high resolution,

full-color weather maps, text weather briefings, radar images, and worldwide satellite
pictures. For an additional fee custom-tailored services can also be provided. Jeppesen
claims this service can be provided worldwide via standard communications lines to
any laptop computer with the appropriate software.
The University of Hawaii Worldwide Tracking Service at offers worldwide tracking of tropical storms
with primary emphasis on the Pacific Ocean and PACRIM including the following
NE Pacific Tracking
NW Pacific Asia Tracking
SE Pacific Tracking
SW Pacific Asia Tracking
North Indian Tracking
South Indian Tracking
The Searchbeat Weather Cube at gives
worldwide information on severe weather.


A wide variety of archival materials were used in the preparation of this reference book.
Unfortunately, many of these were fragmentary, unattributed and not possible to
reference. Selected materials consulted are listed below.
Civil Affairs
JP 3- 57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, 21 June 1995.
U.S. Army 96th Civil Affairs Bn (Airborne), Soldiers Reference CD, 7 Feb 2000.
U.S. Army 96th Civil Affairs Bn (Airborne), Leaders Reference Book, 1 Jan 2000.
U.S. Army ARTEP 41-701-10-MTP, Mission Training Plan for a Civil Affairs Team, Sep
U.S. Army FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations 14 Feb 2000.
U.S. Army Special Forces, USSF Civic Action, Det. C-1, 5th SFG (A), 1965.
Counterpart Relations
U.S. Army FM 31-73, Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations, October 1967.
Byrnes, Francis C. Role Shock Annals American Academy of Political and Social
Science, Philadelphia, PA, November, 1966.
Cross-cultural Communication
Axtell, Roger E. Gestures: The Dos and Taboos of Body Language Around the World.
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1991.
Kroemer, Alfred J. and Stewart, Edward C. Cross Cultural Problems of U.S. Army
Personnel in Laos Research Memorandum, Human Resources Research Office, George
Washington University, September 1964.
U.S. Naval Amphibious School, Profile of Cross-Cultural Readiness, undated, found
Civil Affairs materials, archives, Office of the USASOC Historian, Special Operations
Academic Facility, FT Bragg, NC, March, 2001.
U.S. Air Force Handbook for Cross-Cultural Communications 1992.

U.S. Army JFKSWCS Lesson No. 7670 Cross Cultural Communication June 1998.
Cultural Issues, General
After Action Report Psa-Binh Long Province undated, unattributed, found in
USMACV materials, archives, Office of the USASOC Historian, Special Operations
Academic Facility, FT Bragg, NC, April, 2001.
Community Development Service, Remote Areas Development Manual, 1964 undated,
unattributed, found in CORDS materials, archives, Office of the USASOC Historian,
Special Operations Academic Facility, FT Bragg, NC, May, 2001.
Keyes, Annie L., How Changes Occur in Human Behavior, Group Process and the Role
of the Advisor, undated, found in CORDS materials, archives, Office of the USASOC
Historian, Special Operations Academic Facility, FT Bragg, NC, June, 2001.
Koch, Jeanette, The Development of Democratic Institutions at the Village Level in
South Vietnam Thesis, George Washington University, September 1970.
Lau, Alan W. et. al. The Effectiveness of Intercultural Relations Training for Advisors,
Naval Personnel and Training Research Laboratory, San Diego CA, June 1970.
U.S. Information Agency The Peasant: His Value System, Research and Reference
Service, document R-138-65, 1965.
Foreign Internal Defense
FM 31-20-3 Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For Special
Forces, 20 Sep 1994.
JP 3- 07.1 JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense, 26 June 1996.
U.S. Army ARTEP 31-807-33-MTP Foreign Internal Defense 20 Dec 1990.
U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam Lessons Learned No 81: RF/PF
9 July 1970
Insurgencies and Guerrilla Warfare
DA Pam 550-104, "Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in
Insurgencies," 1966.
U.S. Army FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, August 1986.
U.S. Army FM 31-15, Operations Against Irregular Forces, May 1961.

U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Counterinsurgency Planning Guide, ST 31-176,

JP 3-08 Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I 9 October 1996.
Downs, Anthony Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).
Giddings, Thomas, Donald Hurley and Scott Moore Interagency Operations Centers,
Parameters, Winter 1998-99, pp. 99-111.
Halperin, Morton H. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution 1974.
Harasch, Robert The Institutional Imperative (New York: Charterhouse Books, 1973).
Niskanen, William A. Jr. Bureaucracy and Representation (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton,
Heclo, Hugh A Government of Strangers (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
Kaufman, Herbert The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureaucrats (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution), 1981.
Lassim, Kenneth Private Lives of Public Servants (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press), 1978.
Wildavsky, Aaron The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown), 1964.
Mosher, Frederick C. Democracy and the Public Service, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford
University), 1982.
Shultz Richard H., In the Aftermath of War, U.S. Support for Reconstruction and NationBuilding in Panama Following Just Cause (Washington DC: National Defense
University Press) 1992.
Simmons, Barry K. (LTC USAF) Executing U.S. Foreign Policy Through the Country
Team Concept, Air Force Law Review, Vol 37, 1994, pages 121-136.



American Board of Internal Medicine. 1998a. "Cultural Competence: Addressing a

Multicultural Society: The ABIM Report 1997-1998." Philadelphia: American Board of
Internal Medicine.
American Medical Association. 1999. Cultural Competence Compendium. Chicago, IL.
American Medical Association's Cultural Compendium. 1999. Product Number
OP209199/ Phone # 1-800-621-8335.
Andrews/Boyle Transcultural Nursing Assessment Guide. 1997. Adapted for direct use
with patients by Patricia Ohmans. In Caring across Cultures: The Providers Guide to
Cross-Cultural Health Care. The Center for Cross-Cultural Health. St. Paul, MN:
Stanton Publication Services, Inc.
Andrulis, D. "The Cultural Competence Self Assessment Protocol for Health Care
Organizations and Systems." National Public Health and Hospital Institute/New York
Academy of Medicine and Harvard Medical School/Beth Israel-Deaconess Hospital, with
support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
Baker, D. W., R. Hayes, and J. P. Fortier. 1998. "Interpreter Use and Satisfaction with
Interpersonal Aspects of Care for Spanish-Speaking Patients." Medical Care
Bayer, A.H., Brisbane, F.L. & Ramirez, A. Advanced Methodological Issues in
Culturally Competent Evaluation for Substance Abuse Prevention, Rockville, MD: U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 1996.
Betancourt, J. R., and R. C. Like. 2000. "Editorial: A New Framework of Care." Patient
Care Special Issue, Caring for Diverse Populations: Breaking Down Barriers, May 15,
2000, pp. 10-12.
Betancourt, J. R., Like, R. C., and Gottlieb, B. R., eds. 2000."Caring for Diverse
Populations: Breaking Down Barriers." Patient Care Special Issue, May 15, 2000.
Brach, C., and I. Fraser. 2000. "Can Cultural Competency Reduce Racial and Ethnic
Health Disparities?: A Review and Conceptual Model." Medical Care Research and
Review 57, Suppl. 1, Nov. 2000, pp. 181-217.
Brisbane F. L. Cultural Competence for Health Care Professionals Working with African
American Communities: Theory and Practice, Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, 1998.


Campinha-Bacote, J. 1999. "A Model and Instrument for Addressing Cultural

Competence in Health Care." Journal of Transcultural Nursing 38(5):203-7.
Campinha-Bacote, J. 1998. The Process of Cultural Competence in the Delivery of
Healthcare Services. Cincinnati, OH: Transcultural C.A.R.E., Associates.
Campinha-Bacote, J., ed. 2000. Readings and Resources in Transcultural Healthcare and
Mental Health. 13th ed. Cincinnati, OH: Transcultural C.A.R.E., Associates.
Carillo, J.E., A. R. Green, and J. R. Betancourt. 1999. "Cross-Cultural Primary Care: A
Patient-Based Approach." Annals of Internal Medicine 130(10):829-34.
Commonwealth Fund. 1995. National Comparative Survey of Minority Health Care.
New York: Commonwealth Fund.
Downing, Bruce T. 1997. In Caring across Cultures: The Providers Guide to CrossCultural Health Care. The Center for Cross-Cultural Health. St. Paul, MN: Stanton
Publication Services, Inc., p. 5.
Kaiser Family Foundation. 1999. Race, Ethnicity and Medical Care: A Survey of Public
Perceptions and Experiences. Menlo Park, CA: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation.
Kleinman, A. 1980. Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.
Kleinman, A., L. Eisenberg, and B. Good. 1978. Culture, Illness, and Care: Clinical
Lessons from Anthropologic and Cross-cultural Research. Annals of Internal Medicine
Lannin, D. R., H. F. Mathews, J. Mitchell, M. S. Swanson, F. H. Swanson, and M. S.
1998. "Influence of Socioeconomic and Cultural Factors on Racial Differences in LateStage Presentation of Breast Cancer." Journal of the American Medical Association
Langton, P. The Challenge of Participatory Research: Preventing Alcohol-Related
Problems in Ethnic Communities , Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 1995.
Lavizzo-Mourey, R., and E. R. Mackenzie. 1996. "Cultural Competence: Essential
Measurements of Quality for Managed Care Organizations." Annals of Internal Medicine
124(10), pp. 919-21.


Leininger, M. 1995. Transcultural Nursing: Theories, Concepts, and Practices. New

York: John Wiley & Sons.
Levin, S. J., R. C. Like, and J. E. Gottlieb. 2000. "Appendix: Useful Clinical Interviewing
Mnemonics." Patient Care Special Issue, "Caring for Diverse Populations: Breaking
Down Barriers," May 15, 2000, p. 189.
Like, R. C., R. P. Steiner, and A. J. Rubel. 1996. "Recommended Core Curriculum
Guidelines on Culturally Sensitive and Competent Health Care." Family Medicine
Massachusetts Medical Interpreters Association and Educational Development Center,
Inc. 1995. Medical Interpreting Standards of Practice, October 1995, p. 3.
Mokuau, N. Responding to Pacific Islanders: Culturally Competent Perspectives for
Substance Abuse Prevention, Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 1999.
Morales, L. S., W. E. Cunningham, J. A. Brown, H. Liu, and R. D. Hays. 1999. "Are
Latinos Less Satisfied with Communication by Health Care Providers?" Journal of
General Internal Medicine 14(7):409-17.
National Alliance for Hispanic Health, Quality Health Services for Hispanics: The
Cultural Competency Component, Department of Health and Human Services, Health
Resources and Services Administration, Office of Minority Health & Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration, DHHS Publication No. 99-21, 2000.
National Alliance for Hispanic Health. Quality Services for Hispanics: the Cultural
Competency Component, Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2000.
Orlandi, M.A., Weston, R. & Epstein, L.G. Cultural Competence for Evaluators Working
with Ethnic/Racial Communities: A Guide for Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Prevention
Practitioners, Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1992.
Philleo, J. & Brisbane, F. Cultural Competence Issues for Social Workers Working in
Ethnic/Racial Communities, Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 1996.(reissued by NASW Press as Cultural Competence in Substance Abuse
Prevention, 1997).
Physicians Desk Reference for Herbal Medicines. 2000. 2d ed. Montvale, NJ: Medical
Economics Data.
Schulman, K. A., J. A. Berlin, W. Harless, J. F. Kerner, S. Sistrunk, B. J. Gersh, R. Dube,
C. K. Taleghani, J. E. Burke, S. Williams, J. M. Eisenberg, and J. J. Escarce. 1999. "The


Effect of Race and Sex on Physicians Recommendations for Cardiac Catheterization."

The New England Journal of Medicine 340(8):618-26.
Senge, P., A. Kleiner, C. Roberts, R. B. Ross, and B. J. Smith. 1994. The Fifth Discipline
Field Book: Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning Organization. New York:
Senge, P. M., A. Kleiner, C. Roberts, R. B. Ross, B. J. Smith. 1994. "How to Listen in
Skillful Discussion (or Any Time)."In The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook: Strategies and
Tools for Building a Learning Organization. New York: Doubleday. p. 391.
Szapocznik, J. A Hispanic/Latino Approach to Substance Abuse Prevention, Rockville,
MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1994.
Tervalon, M., and J. Murray-Garcia. 1998. "Cultural Humility versus Cultural
Competence: A Critical Distinction in Defining Physician Training Outcomes in
Multicultural Education." Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved

Yee, B.W.K., Mokuau, N. & Kim S. Developing Cultural Competence in Asian American
and Pacific Islander Communities: Opportunities in Primary Health Care and Substance
Abuse Prevention, Health Care and Community Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse
Prevention Evaluation Strategies for Asians and Pacific Islanders. Rockville, MD: U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 1999.
Dawson, Roger Secrets of Power Negotiating (Franklin Lakes NJ: Career Press) 2001.
Hindle, Tim Negotiating Skills (New York: DK Publishing), 1998.
Nongovernmental Organizations and Intergovernmental Organizations
Aall, Pamela, Daniel Milterberger and Thomas G. Weiss Guide to IGOs and NGOs and
the Military in Peace and Relief Operations (Washington,DC: U.S. Institute of Peace
Press), 2000.
Psychological Operations
FM 3-05.30 Psychological Operations, 19 Jun 2000.
U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, VC Efforts to Gain Popular Support,
SRAP1170, MACV-J2, 1970. Found in USMACV materials, archives, Office of the
USASOC Historian, Special Operations Academic Facility, FT Bragg, NC, May, 2001.


Special Operations, General

JP 3-05 Joint Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 April 1998.
JP 3- 05.3 Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures, 25 August 1993.
JP 3- 07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 16 June 1995.
U.S. Army FM 33-1
U.S. Army FM 100-25

Psychological Operations, 31 Jul 1987.

Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, 10 Aug 1999.

U.S. Army ARTEP 31-807-34-MTP 20 Dec 1990.

U.S. Army, FC 31-3 Special Forces Planning.
Builder, Carl, The Masks of War, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press) 1989.
JP 3- 08 v I Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I, 9 October 1996.
JP 3- 08 v II Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol II, 9 October 1996.
U.S. Army ARTEP 31-807-32-MTP Direct Action 23 Oct 1989.