Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
2d 34
BACKGROUND
2
On September 19, 1980, Oppel and his wife, Robin Oppel, quarreled
concerning the arrangement of the cars in the parking area outside their home.
When Oppel's wife struck him from the rear with a pipe, he responded by
striking her head with a hammer multiple times. He then took a cord from his
workbench, and wrapped it around her neck until she ceased making noises.
With the help of his employee, Oppel buried his wife's body beneath a patio
which was under construction adjacent to their home. On October 16, local
police searched the premises, tore up the patio, and found the remains of Robin
Oppel buried beneath the cement.
5 Court: Have you discussed with your attorney, Mr. Mirto, the crime of murder
The
that has been charged in the indictment against you and your plea of guilty thereto?
6Mr. Oppel: Yes, your Honor.
7The Court: Are you satisfied with your attorney's advice and assistance?
8Mr. Oppel: I am....
9 Court: Do you understand the offense of murder with which you are being
The
charged?
Mr. Oppel: Yes, your Honor.
10
11 Court: I assume your attorney has explained the essential elements of this crime;
The
is that correct?
Mr. Oppel: Yes, your Honor.
12
13 Court: And he has explained to you, I would assume, your guilty plea under the
The
Alford Doctrine; is that correct?
Mr. Oppel: Yes, your Honor.
14
24
The state court judge accepted Oppel's plea, finding that it had been made
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily with a full understanding of the crime
charged, its possible penalties, the consequences of such a plea, and after
adequate advice and assistance of counsel. The court also found that there
existed a factual basis to support the acceptance of the plea.
25
On April 22, 1983, Oppel was sentenced, in accordance with the plea
agreement, to a term of imprisonment of 17 and 1/2 years to life.3 At both the
plea and sentencing proceedings, the State's attorney indicated that the State
had entered plea negotiations due to the existence of conflicting medical
evidence as to Oppel's state of mind at the time he killed his wife, which could
support the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, and
potentially reduce the conviction to one of manslaughter in the first degree. The
possible viability of this defense was acknowledged by the sentencing judge.
26
Oppel did not appeal his sentence, but instead filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the Superior Court for the Judicial District of Tolland at
Rockville. Oppel testified at the state habeas proceeding, but his testimony was
limited solely to the question of whether he had deliberately bypassed state
appellate remedies. Since Oppel did not claim ineffective assistance of counsel
in his state habeas petition, his trial attorney was not called to testify. The state
habeas court found that Oppel did not deliberately bypass state appellate
procedures, but denied his petition on the merits. The Connecticut Supreme
Court affirmed, finding that the record adequately disclosed that Oppel
possessed an " 'understanding of the law in relation to the facts.' " Oppel v.
Lopes, 200 Conn. 553, 559, 512 A.2d 888 (1986) (quoting McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969)).
27
Having exhausted his available state remedies, Oppel filed his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the District of Connecticut,
asserting that his guilty plea was involuntary and unintelligent because the trial
judge failed to inform him that intent to kill is an essential element of the crime
of murder under Connecticut law. The district judge conducted an evidentiary
hearing at which the transcripts of Oppel's plea proceeding and his sentencing
proceeding were admitted. No further evidence was submitted by either party.
28
DISCUSSION
29
Oppel claims in this habeas petition that the plea colloquy in state court was
insufficient to support a finding that his plea was voluntary because the state
judge failed to inform Oppel that intent to kill is an element of the crime of
murder under Connecticut law. Preferring to rest on what he perceives to be a
defective plea colloquy, Oppel has introduced no evidence indicating that he
was, in fact, unaware at the time he tendered his plea that intent to kill is an
element of the crime of murder. Indeed, Oppel does not even make this claim in
his federal habeas petition. Having reviewed the records of the state
proceedings, we conclude that the records support the finding that Oppel's
attorney informed him of the elements of the crime of murder and that his plea
was voluntary.
A. Standard of Review.
30
31
Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d) a federal habeas court must defer to the state
31
court's factual findings where the material facts are adequately developed after
a full and fair hearing unless the federal court concludes that the record as a
whole does not fairly support the state court's determination. 28 U.S.C. Secs.
2254(d)(2), (3) and (8). However, the federal habeas court must defer only on
questions of "historical" fact and the inferences to be drawn therefrom;
questions of law and mixed questions of fact and law are subject to plenary
federal review. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 431-32, 103 S.Ct.
843, 849-50, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983); Matusiak v. Kelly, 786 F.2d 536, 543 (2d
Cir.1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 805, 107 S.Ct. 248, 93 L.Ed.2d 172 (1986).
B. The Merits.
32
33
34
The preferred practice is for the trial judge to articulate during the plea
colloquy the elements of the crime charged, how these elements apply to the
defendant, and the consequences of the guilty plea. In this instance, the state
judge failed to inform Oppel during the plea proceeding that intent to kill is an
element of the crime of murder under Connecticut law. However, the Supreme
Court has held that "even without such an express representation, it may be
appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the
nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is
being asked to admit." Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. at 647, 96 S.Ct. at 2258.
Thus, under Henderson v. Morgan it is normally presumed that the defendant is
informed by his attorney of the charges against him and the elements of those
charges. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 852 (under
Henderson respondent presumed to have been informed by his lawyers or at
pre-sentencing proceedings of charges on which he was indicted).
35
Where the state court conducts an evidentiary hearing and makes a factual
35
36
Having examined the records of the state court proceedings, and mindful that
Oppel has introduced no evidence indicating that he was unaware of the
elements of the crime of murder at the time he tendered his plea, we conclude
that it is appropriate to presume that Oppel's attorney informed him of the
elements of the crime prior to the time he tendered his plea. See Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 442 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. at 855 n. 2 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Henderson v. Morgan presumption applies "[i]n the absence of proof to the
contrary"). The indictment clearly charged that Oppel strangled his wife with
the intent to kill her. Although the indictment was not read aloud at the plea
proceeding, it is fair to presume that the indictment was either read at the time
of the arraignment or read and discussed by Oppel and his attorney some time
thereafter. Moreover, while the body of Robin Oppel was found in October,
1980, and Oppel was apparently charged shortly thereafter, he did not tender his
plea until March, 1983--almost 2 and 1/2 years later. Once again, it is fair to
presume that during this lengthy period of time Oppel's attorney at some point
informed him of the elements of the crime of murder. Most significantly, Oppel
responded affirmatively when the judge asked him at the plea proceeding
whether his attorney had informed him of the elements of the crime. When
asked whether his attorney had discussed the Alford doctrine with him, Oppel
replied, "Thoroughly, your Honor." Oppel's attorney did not contradict either of
these responses.
37
Wainwright, 710 F.2d 743 (11th Cir.1983) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 984, 104 S.Ct.
430, 78 L.Ed.2d 363 (1983) (writ denied where petitioner acknowledged that he
had discussed with attorney both his plea and negotiated sentence form which
acknowledged that petitioner was advised of the nature of the charges against
him); cf. Berry v. Mintzes, 726 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, Berry v.
Foltz, 467 U.S. 1245, 104 S.Ct. 3520, 82 L.Ed.2d 828 (1984) (plea found
voluntary without presumption where petitioner and defense counsel
represented on record that they had discussed entry of the guilty plea). Thus,
we find the record supports the conclusion that Oppel was informed by his
attorney of the elements of the crime to which he pled guilty, and that his plea
was voluntary.
38
Reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition. Mandate shall
issue forthwith.
The Honorable Michael A. Telesca of the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York, sitting by designation
The Alford doctrine permits the trial court to accept a guilty plea from a
defendant who maintains his innocence where the court finds that there is a
strong factual basis to support the crime charged, the plea of guilty is the result
of an intelligent conclusion that the defendant's interests require entry of the
guilty plea, and there is a benefit conferred on the defendant by virtue of the
plea. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38, 91 S.Ct. at 167