Chapter

7 Case Digests

Garcia vs. Executive Secretary

211 SCRA 219 Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No.
438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges
imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional
duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the
board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products
imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty
to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5%
duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at
9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and
478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue
bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenuegenerating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

imposts . . . . In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which

authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

US vs. Ang Tang Ho

43 Phil. 1 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and
approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding
of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances,
authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this
Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was
published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice
should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta
of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount
was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the
6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the
said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that
there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of

appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within
the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does
not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to
be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide
definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could
be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others
without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to
matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The
law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the
judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so
that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program
of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the
President subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may
impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or

HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he
committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex
post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a
violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the
law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.

Chapter 7 Case Digests

which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the

ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
-
-

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and the HONG KONG &
SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION (HSBC) v. JOSE VERA, Judge ad
interim of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG (65 Phil 56)
November 16, 1937
FACTS:
-
The criminal case, People v. Cu Unjieng was filed in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) in Manila, with HSBC intervening in the case as
private prosecutor.
-
The CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months
of prision correccional to eight years of prison mayor. (Jan. 8, 1934)
-
Upon appeal, it was modified to an indeterminate penalty of from
five years and six months of prison correccional to seven years, six
months and twenty-seven days of prison mayor, but affirmed the
judgments in all other respects.
-
Cu Unjieng filed a Motion for Reconsideration and four successive
motions for new trial which were all denied on December 17, 1935.
Final judgment was entered on Dec. 18, 1935. He filed for certiorari
to the Supreme Court but got denied on Nov 1936. The SC
subsequently denied Cu Unjiengs petition for leave to file a second
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial, then remanded
the case to the court of origin for execution of judgment.
-
Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the trial court,
under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine
Legislature. He states he is innocent of the crime; he has no
criminal record; and that he would observe good conduct in the
future.
-
CFI Manila Judge Jose Vera set the petition for hearing for probation
on April 5, 1937.
-
HSBC questioned the authority of Vera to hold such hearings and
assailed the constitutionality of the Probation Act since it violates

the equal protection of laws and gives unlawful and improper

delegation to provincial boards.
Section 11 of Art 4221 states that the act shall only be applied in
those provinces wherein the probationary officer is granted salary
not lower than provincial fiscals by respective provincial boards.
The City Fiscal of Manila files a supplementary petition affirming
issues raised by HSBC, arguing that probation is a form of reprieve,
hence Act 4221 bypasses this exclusive power of the Chief
Executive.
Hence this petition in the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality of Act 4221 has been properly
raised in these proceedings;
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not Act 4221 is constitutional based
on these three grounds:
a. It encroaches upon the pardoning power of the executive
b. It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
c. It denies the equal protection of the laws
HELD/RATIO:
1. Yes. Constitutional questions will not be determined by the courts
unless properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is
necessary to a determination of the case, lis mota. Constitutionality
issues may be raised in prohibition and certiorari proceedings, as
they may also be raised in mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus proceedings. The general rule states that constitutionality
should be raised in the earliest possible opportunity (during
proceedings in initial/inferior courts). It may be said that the state
can challenge the validity of its own laws, as in this case. The wellsettled rule is that the person impugning validity must have
personal and substantial interest in the case (i.e. he has sustained,
or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement). If Act
4221 is unconstitutional, the People of the Philippines have
substantial interest in having it set aside.
2.

a.

b.

No. There exists a distinction between pardon and

probation. Pardoning power is solely within the power of
the Executive. Probation has an effect of temporary
suspension, and the probationer is still not exempt from
the entire punishment which the law inflicts upon him as he
remains to be in legal custody for the time being.
Yes. The Probation Act does not lay down any definite
standards by which the administrative boards may be

Chapter 7 Case Digests

c.

guided in the exercise of discretionary powers, hence they

have the power to determine for themselves, whether or
not to apply the law or not. This therefore becomes a
surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards. It is
unconstitutional.
Yes. Due to the unwarranted delegation of legislative
power, some provinces may choose to adopt the law or
not, thus denying the equal protection of laws. It is
unconstitutional.

People vs. Vera

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of Legislative
Powers]
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He
filed a motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were
denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review,
which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by CuUnjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the
court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the
application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended
denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for
hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu
Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it
has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private
prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative
power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution).

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for

themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not
at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely
placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not
wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline
to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of
the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent
entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through
appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than
those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the
various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into
provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces
and this is the actual situation now appropriate the necessary fund for
the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be
illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can
there be a probation officer without the probation system.
Araneta vs. Dinglasan
Facts:
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order
62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge
Rafael Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking
to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He
averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671
which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal
by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls
exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing

funds [from 49-50] pursuant to EO 225.

RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper
and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and
is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
"This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates
not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation
officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to
the direction of the Probation Office."

L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating

funds to hold the national elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE
OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES
AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers
Act, is already inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had
likewise ceased.

Chapter 7 Case Digests

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president,
became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session
on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of
Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of
expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of
the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may consider
general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate.
Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of
adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, unless sooner
amended or repealed by the National Assembly. Even if war continues to
rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the
EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
Araneta v Dinglasan
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
Tuason, J.:
Facts:
1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue
of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state of
emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate
rules and regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix
the duration of its effectivity.
2.
EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings.
The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in the CFI for violation of the
provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.
3.
EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma.
Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar
Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of
shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground
that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO.
4.
EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the
Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for
other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a taxpayer, elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ
of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing the
funds by virtue of this EO.
5.
Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in
connection with the national elections in 1949. was questioned by Antonio

Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent

"the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that
amount or any part of it."
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect
YES.
1. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became
inoperative when Congress met during the opening of the regular
session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
issued without authority of law . The session of the Congress is the
point of expiration of the Act and not the first special session after
it.
Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot
rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225
and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation
of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second
appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore
declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed
and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This
is based on the language of Act 671 that the National Assembly restricted
the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature
was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes
brought on by the war.