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Roberto Laperal Jr. et.al vs.

Ramon
Katigbak, et.al.
Facts:
1. The Laperals instituted a complaint
against Katigbak and Kalaw seeking the
recovery of P14000 evidenced by various
promissory notes and for the return of
jewelry delivered to Katigbak for sale on
commission.
2. Upon confession of judgment by Katigbak,
the court rendered judgment against him
to pay the Laperals the said sum and
return of jewelry.
3. About a month after the decision was
rendered, Kalaw filed a complaint against
her husband Katigbak for judicial
separation of property and separate
administration
4. Court granted the said complaint.
5. Laperals filed another complaint against
Kalaw and Katigbak seeking the
annulment of the proceedings for the
above complaint, to enforce judgment
secured by the Laperals on the fruits of
Kalaws paraphernal property and to
secure a ruling declaring the real
property as conjugal property of
Katigbak and Kalaw.
6. Court dismissed the complaint and
rendered the property as paraphernal.
a. Ramon and Evelina got married in
1938.
b. The subject property was
registered in the name of Evelina
Katigbak married to Ramon
Katigbak on December6, 1939
only two years after the marriage.
c. Evelina declares that her mother
Pua was the one that had bought
the property for her
Issue: Whether or not the property is
conjugal
Held: NO
Indeed, all properties acquired during the
marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal. The
presumption however is not conclusive but
merely rebuttable. This is a case where the
presumption has been sufficiently and
convincingly proven.
1. The land in question was purchased for
the wife with her own separate funds.
Other than invoking the presumption, the
burden of denying the evidence so
presented was shifted to the appellant.
2. Deed to the disputed land is in the name
of the wife.
3. At the time of its purchase, the property
was already of such substantial value as
admittedly, the husband, by himself could
not have afforded to buy, considering that
singular source of income then was his

P200.00 a month salary from a Manila


Bank.
Mariano Veloso vs. Lucia Martinez,
personally and as administratrix of the
estate of Domingo Franco
Facts:
1. Plaintiff commenced an action to recover
of the defendant the possession of a
certain parcel of land together with the
sum of P125 per month.
2. Defendant answered and filed a
counterclaim for services rendered by the
deceased to the plaintiff and recovery of
certain jewelry alleged to be in the
possession in the plaintiff.
3. The jewels in question before the
possession of the same was given to the
plaintiff, belonged to the defendant
personally and that she had inherited the
same from her mother.
4. Defendant Lucia is the widow of Domingo
Franco and after the death of her husband
she was appointed as the adminsitratrix.
5. A short time before the death of Domingo
he borrowed from plaintiff money and
gave as security the jewelry.
Issue: whether or not jewelry is conjugal
property
Held: NO
6. It was contended that the jewelry was
never delivered to Plaintiff. It was shown
that the key to the box where the jewelry
was kept remained with the deceased.
7. Defendant now denies that she knew that
her husband had pawned her jewels or
that she promised to redeem the same by
paying the amount due.
8. Record shows that the jewels were the
sole and separate property of the wife
acquired from her mother. It is part of her
paraphernal property. As such she
exercised dominion over the same.
9. She had the exclusive control and
management of the same, until and unless
she had delivered it to her husband,
before a notary public, with the intent that
the husband might administer it properly.
(Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof
in the record that she had ever delivered
the same to her husband, in any manner,
or for any purpose.
Amalia Plata vs. Hon. Nicasio Yatco, Sheriff
Machoron and Spouses Cesarea Villanueva
and Gregorio Leano
Facts:
1. Plata purchased a land in 1954.
2. She sold the land to Saldana.

3. Seven months afterwards, September 24,


1958, Saldana resold the same property to
Plata married to Gaudencio Begosa.
4. On the same date, Amalia Plata in
consideration of a loan mortgaged to
Villanueva the identical property and its
improvements of which the mortgagor
declares to be hers as the absolute
owner thereof. The mortgage was also
signed by Gaudencio as co-mortgagor.
5. Plata defaulted. The property was
foreclosed, Villanueva was the highest
bidder.
6. Respondent sued Gaudencio alone for
illegal detainer and an order was obtained
against him.
7. A writ of execution was issued but Plata
resisted all efforts to eject her from the
property
Issue: WoN Plata is bound by the detainer
judgment against Gaudencio Begosa

court for her to do so, because the writ of


execution was not lawful against her .
Luis Lim, administrator vs. Isabel Garcia,
widow of Hilario Lim
Facts:
1. Hilario died interstate some time in 1903,
leaving widow and nine children.
2. The trial court was of opinion that the
entire estate was a conjugal property
except a house and lot and the sum
of 10k which had been brought to the
marriage and which was sold in the
course of the administration of his
estate together with the
improvements
3. Petitioner for the surviving children
contends that none of these properties are
conjugal, because they alleged that Isabel
brought nothing to the marriage.

Held: NO

Issue: WoN the property is conjugal

The well known presumption that persons openly


living together as husband and wife are legally
married to each other, and that the prior
marriage of Begosa to someone else does not
necessarily exclude the possibility of a valid
subsequent marriage to herein petitioner; still the
respondents Villanueva could not ignore the
paraphernal character of the property in question,
which had been unquestionably acquired by Plata
while still single, as shown by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 25855 of Rizal

Held: NO

The subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso


Saldaa, and the reconveyance of her several
months afterward of the same property, did not
transform it from paraphernal to conjugal
property, there being no proof that the money
paid to Saldaa came from common or conjugal
funds
It is true that Gaudencio Begosa signed the
mortgage as a co-mortgagor; but by itself alone
that circumstance would not suffice to convert
the land into conjugal property, considering that
it was paraphernal in origin.
This is particularly the case where the addition of
Begosa as co-mortgagor was clearly an
afterthought, the text of the deed showing that
Plata was the sole mortgagor.
The illegal detainer judgment against the
husband alone cannot bind nor affect the wife's
possession of her paraphernal, which by law she
holds and administers independently, and which
she may even encumber or alienate without his
knowledge or consent (Civ. Code, Arts. 136. 137,
140). Hence, as she was not made party
defendant in the eviction suit, the petitioner-wife
could validly ignore the judgment of eviction
against her husband, and it was no contempt of

These parcels of land were not acquired by the


appellee by conveyance from her husband, and
that they were in fact conveyed to her by third
parties by way of exchange for certain property
inherited by her from her father's estate during
the coverture, and they are, therefore, her
separate property under the provisions of
paragraph 3 of article 1396, which provides that
property acquired by exchange for other property
belonging separately to one of the married couple
is the separate property of the owner of the
property for which it is exchanged.
Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena vs.CA and
Jesse Lauro Laurena
Facts:
1. Darlene and Jesse were married on 19
December 1983. They have two children
Mark and Michael.
2. On October 1993, petitioner filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage against respondent alleging
psychological incapacity.
3. Petitioner alleged that respondents
psychological incapacity was manifested
by his infidelity, utter neglect of his
familys needs, irresponsibility,
insensitivity, and tendency to lead a
bachelors life.
4. Petitioner further alleged that during their
marriage, she and respondent acquired
properties which were all part of their
conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner
prayed for the dissolution of the CPG,
custody of their children and monthly
support.

a.

duplex house and lot located at


4402 Dayap Street, Palanan, Makati
City;
b. house and lot on Palaspas Street,
Tanauan, Batangas;
c. dealership of Jeddah Caltex Service
Station in Pres. Laurel Highway,
Tanauan, Batangas (Jeddah Caltex
Station);
d. Personal vehicles consisting of a
Mitsubishi Lancer, Safari pick-up, L300 van and L-200 pick-up; and
e. Jeddah Trucking.
5. Respondent denied petitioners
allegations.
6. RTC and CA denied petitioners petition for
declaration of nullity however it granted
the dissolution of the CPG
Issue: WoN the properties are part of CPG
Held: Properties of Respondents parents do
not form part of CPG.

1. Teodora conducted her own logging


business. In furtherance of her business
operation, she secured from Boix a loan.
2. Teodora defaulted. Hence Boix filed a case
against her.
3. Judgment was rendered in favor of Boix
and thus the Sheriff levied and attached a
parcel of land.
4. Said parcel of land was awarded in favor
of Boix pursuant to a writ of execution.
5. Ramon filed a complaint to annul the
auction sale of a parcel of land, allegedly
owned conjugally by him and his former
wife Teodora and thus could not be held
liable for personal debts contracted by the
wife.
Issue: WoN the subject property is conjugal
Held: NO

The ancestral house and lot in Tanauan,


Batangas; the duplex house and lot on
Dayap Street, Makati City; and the
properties acquired through the operations
of the Jeddah Caltex Station and Jeddah
Trucking.

Petitioner relied heavily on the fact that since the


surname Ong was carried by Teodora in the Tax
Declaration of the subject property, it indicates
that the subject property was acquired during the
marriage and therefore conjugal.

As early as 15 July 1978, respondents parents


already executed a General Power of Attorney23 in
favor of respondent covering all their properties
and businesses. Several Special Powers of
Attorney were also executed by respondents
parents in favor of respondent.

The mere use of the surname of the husband in


the tax declaration of the subject property is not
sufficient proof that said property was acquired
during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It
is undisputed that the subject parcel was
declared solely in the wife's name, but the house
built thereon was declared in the name of the
spouses.

On 14 April 1987, respondents parents executed


a Deed of Absolute Sale24 covering two parcels of
land located in Tanauan, Batangas the transfer
was merely an accommodation so that petitioner,
who was then working at the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP), could acquire a loan from BSP at a
lower rate25 using the properties as collateral.
The loan proceeds were used as additional capital
for the Jeddah Caltex Station. The Lease
Contract26 on the Jeddah Caltex Station was
signed by respondent as attorney-in-fact of his
mother Juanita Laurena, leaving no doubt that it
was the business of respondents parents. Jeddah
Trucking was established from the proceeds and
income of the Jeddah Caltex Station.
Respondent testified that he received a series of
promotions during their marriage "until we can
afford to buy that duplex [on] Dayap."28 Hence,
the duplex house on Dayap Street, Makati City
should be included in the conjugal partnership of
gains.

Alejandra Palanca vs. Smith Bell and Co.


and Emilio Boncan
Facts:
1. Smith Bell and Co. obtained judgment
against Boncan for a sum of money
2. Later it obtained an execution which was
levied upon the property in question,
house constructed using the money
borrowed by husband.
3. After the said execution was levied upon
the property, Boncan filed an action
against Smith asking the court to declare
her to be the exclusive owner of the house
with the right to the possession and the
said attachment be dissolved.
Issue: WoN the property in question is an
exclusive property of Alejandra thus not
subject to the execution

Ramon C. Ong vs. Court of Appeals

Held: NO

Facts:

Alejandra was the owner of a certain property.


Such property was given by Emilio with the
consent of Alejandra as a guaranty for the

payment of a loan against International Banking


Corporation

The spouses had in fact been separated when the

With the money borrowed, Emilio constructed a


house in question and later conveyed the house
to Alejandra and as guaranty for the payment of
the debt to the International Banking.

The husband had nothing to do with the business

The money borrowed by Emilio upon the


credit of the property of his wife became
conjugal property and when the same was
reinvested in the construction of a house,
the house became conjugal property.
Spouses Ricky Wong vs. IAC

January 1964. They had 3 children


however, even during the early years of
their marriage, the spouses had been
most of the time living separately.
During the marriage or on about January
1971, the husband bought a parcel of land
in Angeles from his father using the
money borrowed from an officemate.
3. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered
an agreement with Anita Chan where the
latter consigned the former pieces of
jewelry valued at P321,830.95.
Katrina failed to return the same within
the 20 day period thus Anita demanded
payment of their value. Katrina issued in
September 1972, check of P55,000 which
was dishonored due to lack of funds.
5.

enter into such.


The properties in Angeles were acquired
during the marriage with unclear proof
where the husband obtained the money to
repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to
belong in the conjugal partnership in the
absence of proof that they are exclusive
property of the husband and even though
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership

1. Romario Henson married Katrina on

4.

transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to

they had been living separately.

FACTS:

2.

wife entered into the business deal with Anita.

The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong

only when she purchases things necessary


for support of the family.
The writ of execution cannot be issued against
Romarico and the execution of judgments
extends only over properties belonging to the
judgment debtor. The conjugal properties
cannot answer for Katrinas obligations as
she exclusively incurred the latter without
the consent of her husband nor they did
redound to the benefit of the family. There
was also no evidence submitted that the
administration of the partnership had been
transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said
obligations were incurred. In as much as the
decision was void only in so far as Romarico and
the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong
may still execute the debt against Katrina,
personally and exclusively.

filed action for collection of the sum of


Romarico. The reply with counterclaim

Clara Torela and Silveriana Torela vs.


Felimon Torela et.al.

filed was only in behalf of Katrina.

Facts:

money against Katrina and her husband

6. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then


a writ of execution was thereafter issued
upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the
name of Romarico Henson married to
Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at
public auction to Juanito Santos and the
other two with Leonardo Joson. A month
before such redemption, Romarico filed an
action for annulment of the decision
including the writ and levy of execution.
ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the
knowledge of the husband can be satisfied
through the conjugal property.
HELD: NO

1. Felimon married to Graciana is the owner


of a certain parcel of land.
2. On March 5, 1958, Felimon filed a Motion
Ex-parte praying that the court order the
Register of deeds to change his civil status
from Felimon married to Graciana to
Felimon married Marciana
3. Finding no opposition thereto with the
conformity of Clara daughter of Felimon
and Graciana, granted the motion.
4. Felimon executed a deed of sale whereby
he sold a lot to Mahilum. He stated in the
said deed of sale that he was a widower
by first marriage and now married to
Marciana and that he is a registered
owner.

5. Petitioner now wants to declare the said


land in question as conjugal property thus
they are entitled to the share of the said
land as compulsory heirs
Issue: WoN the parcel of land is a conjugal
property of Feliciano and their deceased
mother
Held: NO
Felimon and Graciana were married in 1915. The
land in question was decreed in the name of
Felimon married to Graciana.
According to Art. 1401 of the Civil Code the ff
properties belong to the conjugal partnership:
1. Acquired for a valuable expense of a
common fund
2. Obtained by industry, wages or work of
the spouses or either
3. Fruit, income or interest collected or
accrued during the marriage derived from
the partnership property or which belongs
separately to either of the spouse
Felimon contested that he inherited it from his
property. As a matter of fact at the time of his
marriage with his first wife, Graciana Gallego, a
portion of said land had already been cultivated
by him. Asked what was the condition of the land
in 1915 (the date of his first marriage), he
answered: "Only a portion of the lot was plowed
by me." (t.s.n., p. 18.)
As it was inherited by Felimon from his parents
and brought to the marriage with his first wife,
the same is deemed his separate property (Art,
1396, Old Civil Code). For these reasons,
defendant Felimon Torela had lawfully disposed of
his property to the exclusion of his children by his
first marriage.
Court of Appeals failed to take into account
Article 1407 of the Spanish Civil Code, which now
correspond to Article 160 of the New Civil Code,
and which reads as follows:
Art. 1407, All property of the
spouses shall be deemed
partnership property in the
absence of proof that it belongs
exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.
While it is true that all property of the
marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as
above stated, nonetheless the party who
invokes the presumption must first prove
that the property was acquired during the
marriage. This proof is a conditionsine qua
non for the application of the presumption.

In the instant case there is nothing in the record


to show that the lot in question was acquired
during the marriage of Felimon Torela and
Graciana Gallego.
In fact, one of the petitioners herein, Clara
Torela, gave her conformity to her father's
Ex-Parte Motion of March 5, 1958, wherein
it was recited, inter alia, that Felimon Torela
had acquired the property by way of
inheritance prior to his marriage to his first
wife, Graciana Gallego.
Epifania Magallon vs. Hon. Rosalina
Montejo, Concepcion Lacerna et.al
Facts:
1. Respondents instituted a case against
Martin Lacerna to compel partition of a
parcel of land to which Martin had
perfected a claim by homestead.
2. Respondents claiming to the common
children of Martin and his wife, Eustaqia,
who died in 1953, asserted a right to of
the land as their mothers share in her
conjugal partnership with Martin.
3. Defendant denied marriage to Eustaqia
although he admitted living with her
without benefit of marriage.
4. Trial Court found that Martin was indeed
married to Eustaqia and the respondents
were their children.
5. The Trial Court further found that Martin
had begun working the homestead, and
his right to a patent to the land accrued,
during his coverture with Eustaquia. On
the basis of these findings, the plaintiffs
were declared entitled to the half of the
land claimed by them.
6. It appears that at the time the case was
brought no certificate of title has been
issued to Martin although he had complied
with the requirements necessary to the
grant.
7. The OCT was only issued while Lacernas
appeal was pending in the IAC. It states on
its face that it is issued in the name of
" ... MARTIN LACERNA, Filipino, of legal
age, married to Epifania Magallon ... ," the
latter being the present petitioner.
8. IAC ruled in favor of respondents thus a
writ of execution was issued.
Issue: WoN the property is owned by Martin
and Petitioner?
Held: NO
The land in question, which rightfully pertained to
the conjugal partnership of Martin Lacerna and

Eustaquia Pichan, the plaintiff's mother, and


should have been titled in the names of said
spouses, was, through fraud or mistaken,
registered in the names of Martin Lacerna and
petitioner herein, Epifania Magallon In such a
situation, the property should be regarded
as impressed with an implied, or a
constructive, trust for the party rightfully
entitled thereto.
the petitioner herein, as the trustee of a
constructive trust, has an obligation to convey to
the private respondents that part of the land in
question to which she now claims an ostensible
title, said portion rightfully pertaining to the
respondents' deceased mother as her share in
the conjugal partnership with Martin Lacerna.
The phrase "married to Epifania Magallon
written after the name of Martin Lacerna in
said certificate of title is merely descriptive
of the civil status of Martin Lacerna, the
registered owner, and does not necessarily
prove that the land is "conjugal" property of
Lacerna and petitioner
Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption
established in Article 160 of the Civil Code that
property acquired during the marriage belongs to
the conjugal partnership, there being no proof of
her alleged marriage to Martin Lacerna except
that which arises by implication from the
aforestated entry in the certificate of title and for
the far more compelling reason that the
homestead claim on the land was shown to have
been perfected during Martin Lacerna's marriage
to Eustaquia Pichan, mother of the private
respondents.

Titan Construction Corporation vs. Manuel


David and Martha David
Facts:
1. Manuel and Martha were married in March
25, 1957.
2. In 1970, spouses acquired a lot located at
White Plains which was registered in the
name of Martha David married to Manuel
David.
3. In 1976, spouses separated de facto and
no longer communicated with each other.
4. In March 1995, Manuel discovered that
Martha had previously sold the property to
Titan through a deed of sale.
5. Manuel filed a complaint for annulment of
contract and reconveyance against Titan.
He alleged that the sale executed b y
Martha in favor of titan was without his
knowledge and consent and therefore
void.

6. Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good


faith and for value because it relied on the
SPA signed by Manuel which authorized
Martha to dispose of the property on
behalf of the spouses.
7. Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious
and the signature purporting to be his was
a forgery. Hence Martha has no authority
to sell it.
Issue: WoN the property is conjugal thus
Martha doesnt have the authority to sell it
without the consent of Manuel
Held: YES
The property is part of the spouses conjugal
partnership.
Article 160. All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.
Manuel was not required to prove that the
property was acquired with funds of the
partnership. Rather, the presumption
applies even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not
appear.23 Here, we find that Titan failed to
overturn the presumption that the property,
purchased during the spouses marriage,
was part of the conjugal partnership.
In the absence of Manuels consent, the Deed of
Sale is void.
Since the property was undoubtedly part of
the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan
required the consent of both spouses.
Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly
provides that "the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership".
Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code
ordains that "(t)he wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husbands
consent, except in cases provided by law".
Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code
requires that any disposition or
encumbrance of conjugal property must
have the written consent of the other
spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void.
The Special Power of Attorney purportedly signed
by Manuel is spurious and void.
Titan is not a buyer in good faith. Because at the
face of the TCT it can be inferred that the said
property is owned by Martha married to Manuel,
thus it may deemed to be a conjugal property.
Evangeline Imani vs Metrobank
Facts:

1. Envangeline signed a continuing


suretyship agreement in favor of
Metrobank with Cesar Dazo et. al as her
co-sureties.
2. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay
Metrobank whatever indebtedness CP
Dazo Tannery Inc. (CPDTI)
3. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its
loans.
4. Metrobank filed a collection suit against
CPDTI and its sureties, including herein
petitioner.
5. Trial court ruled in favor of Metrobank. It
also issued a writ of execution.
6. The sheriff levied on a property registered
in the name of Petitioner. Public auction
was executed and the property was
awarded to Metrobank.
7. Metrobank filed a manifestation and
motion praying that spouses Imani be
directed to surrender the owners copy of
TCT for cancellation.
8. Petitioner opposed and filed a comment
with urgent motion to cancel and nullify
the levy on execution, the auction sale
and certificate of salve over TCT. She
argued that the subject property belongs
to the conjugal partnership as such it
cannot be held answerable for the
liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank.
Issue: WoN the property is conjugal
Held: NO
Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed
to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to
apply, the party who invokes it must first prove
that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non to the
operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership.31 Thus, the time when the
property was acquired is material.
To support her assertion that the property
belongs to the conjugal partnership, petitioner
submitted the Affidavit35 of Crisanto Origen,
attesting that petitioner and her husband were
the vendees of the subject property, and the
photocopies of the checks36 allegedly issued by
Sina Imani as payment for the subject property.
Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit can
hardly be considered sufficient evidence to prove
her claim that the property is conjugal. As
correctly pointed out by Metrobank, the said
Affidavit has no evidentiary weight because
Crisanto Origen was not presented in the RTC to
affirm the veracity of his Affidavit

The fact that the land was registered in the


name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to
Sina Imani is no proof that the property was
acquired during the spouses coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof
are two different acts. It is well settled that
registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing.
Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to
substantiate her claim that the property belongs
to the conjugal partnership. Thus, it cannot be
rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling
without valid basis.
Thomas Cheesman vs IAC and Estelita
Padilla
Facts:
1.

Cheesman files to the court for the


annulment for lack of his consent the
sale by his wife Criselda of a residential lot
and building to Estelita.

2. Thomas and Criselda were married on


December 4, 1970 but have been
separated since February 15, 1981.
3. On June 4, 1974, a deed of sale and
transfer was executed by Armando
conveying a parcel of unregistered land
and house in favor of Criselda married to
Thomas. Thomas although aware of the
deed did not object to the transfer being
made only to his wife.
4. Thereafter, with knowledge and without
protest of Thomas, tax declarations for the
property was issued in the name only of
Criselda and she assumed exclusive
management and administration of the
property.
5. The action instituted by Thomas resulted
in a judgment declaring void ab nitio the
sale executed by Criselda in favor of
Estelita.
6. Judgment was however set aside as
regards Estelita on a petition for relief
grounds on FAMEN which had seriously
impaired her right.
Issue: WoN the property is conjugal
Held: NO
assuming that it was his intention that the lot in
question be purchased by him and his wife, he
acquired no right whatever over the property by
virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void.
he had and has no capacity or personality to
question the subsequent sale of the same

property by his wife on the theory that in so doing


he is merely exercising the prerogative of a
husband in respect of conjugal property.
(1) that the property in question was bought
during the existence of the marriage between the
plaintiff and the defendant Criselda P. Cheesman;
(2) that the property bought during the marriage
was registered in the name of Criselda Cheesman
and that the Deed of Sale and Transfer of
Possessory Rights executed by the former ownervendor Armando Altares in favor of Criselda
Cheesman made no mention of the plaintiff;
the exercise by Criselda of exclusive acts of
dominion with the knowledge of her
husband "had led . . . Estelita Padilla to
believe that the properties were the
exclusive properties of Criselda Cheesman
and on the faith of such a belief she bought
the properties from her and for value," and
therefore, Thomas Cheesman was, under
Article 1473 of the Civil Code, estopped to
impugn the transfer to Estelita Padilla.
Funds used by Criselda Cheesman was money
she had earned and saved prior to her marriage
to Thomas Cheesman,His wife had used her
own money to purchase the property
cannot, and will not, at this stage of the
proceedings be reviewed and overturned.
But even if it were a fact that said wife had used
conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the
considerations just set out militate, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and
holding the property so acquired or any part
thereof.
Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith,
both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court
having found that Cheesman's own conduct had
led her to believe the property to be exclusive
property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by
her without his consent or intervention. An
innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the
protection of the law in her purchase, particularly
as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to
the property denied him by both letter and spirit
of the Constitution itself.
Procopio Villanueva, Nicolas Retuya et.al vs.
CA and Heirs of Eusebia Retuya
Facts:
1. Eusebia is the legal wife of Nicolas having
been married to the latter on October 7,
1926.
2. Out of the said marriage they begot 5
children. During their marriage they
acquired real properties and all
improvements.

3. Nicolas is also a co-owner of a parcel of


land which he inherited from his parents
as well as the purchasers of hereditary
shares.
4. In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his
family and cohabited with Pacita wherein
Procopio is their illegitimate son.
5. Nicolas then was the only person who
received the income of the properties.
Pacita from the time she lived in
concubinage with Nicolas, has no
occupation and had no properties of her
own.
6. Nicolas suffered stroke and cannot talk
and walk anymore.
7. Natividad knew of Nicolas physical
condition visited him at the hospital. From
the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the
present, Procopio, the illegitimate son was
the one who receives the income from the
said properties.
8. Natividad went to Procopio to discuss
about the properties. And the latter replied
that it is not yet time to talk about the
said matter.
9. Eusebia filed a complaint against her
husband Nicolas, Pacita and Procopio. She
sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and
Pacita several properties claiming that
said properties are conjugal properties
with Nicolas.
10. Eusebia died in 1996.
Issue: WoN the subject properties are
conjugal
Held: YES
Petitioners claim that the subject properties[16] are
exclusive properties of Nicolas except for Lot No.
152, which they claim is Pacitas exclusive
property.
The Family Code provisions on conjugal
partnerships govern the property relations
between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were
married before the effectivity of Family Code.[17]
Article 105[18] of the Family Code explicitly
mandates that the Family Code shall apply to
conjugal partnerships established before the
Family Code without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired under the Civil Code or other
laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the
properties are acquired during the
marriage, the presumption is that they are
conjugal.
The burden of proof is on the party claiming that
they are not conjugal.[20] This is counter-balanced
by the requirement that the properties must

first be proven to have been acquired


during the marriage before they are
presumed conjugal.
1. subject properties were in fact acquired
during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia. The tax declarations[23] covering
the subject properties, along with the
unrebutted testimony of Eusebias
witnesses, establish this fact.
a. Moreover, on whether Lot No. 152
is conjugal or not, the answer
came from petitioners themselves.
Nicolas and Eusebia were
married on 7 October 1926.
Nicolas and Pacita started
cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died
on 23 November 1996. Pacita and
Nicolas were married on 16
December 1996. Petitioners
themselves admit that Lot No.
152 was purchased on 4
October 1957.[25] The date of
acquisition of Lot No. 152 is
clearly during the marriage of
Nicolas and Eusebia.
b. Since the subject properties,
including Lot No. 152, were
acquired during the marriage of
Nicolas and Eusebia, the
presumption under Article 116
of the Family Code is that all
these are conjugal properties
of Nicolas and Eusebia. The
burden is on petitioners to
prove that the subject
properties are not conjugal. The
presumption in Article 116, which
subsists unless the contrary is
proved, stands as an obstacle to
any claim the petitioners may
have. The burden of proving that a
property is exclusive property of a

spouse rests on the party asserting


it and the evidence required must
be clear and convincing.
[26]
Petitioners failed to meet this
standard.
2. Since the subject properties, including Lot
No. 152, were acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the
presumption under Article 116 of the
Family Code is that all these are conjugal
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The
burden is on petitioners to prove that the
subject properties are not conjugal. The
presumption in Article 116, which subsists
unless the contrary is proved, stands as
an obstacle to any claim the petitioners
may have. The burden of proving that a
property is exclusive property of a spouse
rests on the party asserting it and the
evidence required must be clear and
convincing.[26] Petitioners failed to meet
this standard.

3. The cohabitation of a spouse with another


person, even for a long period, does not
sever the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage.[33]Otherwise, the law would be
giving a stamp of approval to an act that
is both illegal and immoral. What
petitioners fail to grasp is that Nicolas and
Pacitas cohabitation cannot work to the
detriment of Eusebia, the legal spouse.
The marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia
continued to exist regardless of the
fact that Nicolas was already living
with Pacita. Hence, all property
acquired from 7 October 1926, the
date of Nicolas and Eusebias
marriage, until 23 November 1996,
the date of Eusebias death, are still
presumed conjugal. Petitioners have
neither claimed nor proved that any of the
subject properties was acquired outside or
beyond this period.