A tricycle turns turtle: a

case study in defective

engineering design
J R Spencer
Selwyn College, Cambridge, UK

Roy Stewartson
Technical Consultant, Cardiff, UK
An accident which might have been very serious exposed a dangerous design fault in a tricycle. The
authors describe the complicated legal and extra-legal steps which proved necessary to force the
manufacturer to rectify the problem and carry out a recall. The adequacy of existing protection against
dangerous design faults in consumer goods is discussed.
Keywords: tricycle, engineering design
If a cycle collapses under its rider, he inevitably falls onto
the road, and may well be hit by a passing motor vehicle
before he can get up. It is therefore particularly
important that cycles are properly designed and built.
Fortunately, they usually are. Most of the cycle market is
in the hands of a few large firms, which have adequate
technical engineering knowledge and the facilities to test
their products. The smaller makers, who sometimes lack
either or both of these, usually build machines to a few
basic designs which have stood the test of time over the
last 90 years, and they often buy their high-risk
components from the bigger makers. Where a small firm
builds something unusual, or makes its own vital
components, or both, however, things can go dangerously wrong--as the following story shows.

manufacturers, but some--like the frame and the rear

axle--were made by them, or by subcontractors to their
design. In 1978 they brought out a modified version of
this with two child seats on the back, which they called
the 'Picabac' (Figures 2 and 3).
In June 1980 one of the authors of this paper, J R
Spencer, a Cambridge law lecturer, bought a new
Picabac through Ben Hayward & Son, a Cambridge
retailer of good repute. He and his wife used it

THE ACCIDENT
For the last 50 years, W R Pashley Limited have been
manufacturers of 'specialist' cycles: trade-cycles, unicycles, tandems, etc. In the late 1960s they started making
an adult shopping tricycle called the 'Picador' (Figure 1).
Many of the parts for this were bought from larger

40

.....
FigureI. Pashtey Picador

0142-694X/86/01040-08
$03.00 O 1986 Butterworth& Co (Publishers) Ltd

DESIGN STUDIES

Figure 2. Pashley Picabac

Figure 3. Pashley Picabac in use

extensively for shopping expeditions and for carrying

their two small children to nursery school. Over the next
two years, the machine was ridden an estimated 1,000
miles.
In June 1982, when Mrs. Spencer was riding the
Picabac along a busy main road with their children, aged
now two and four, on the back, the off-side rear wheel
suddenly came off and the machine turned over into the
middle of the road. Luckily they were going slowly,
nothing was coming behind, and they escaped with
minor bruises and shock.
The wheel came off because the rear axle broke where
it entered the off-side hub. The Pashley axle (Figures 4
and 5) consists of a 3/4in diameter solid steel shaft rather
over 27in long, which revolves in ball-bearings located on
the tricycle frame at just trader 19in centres, and is
rotated by a sprocket mounted on a boss welded towards
the centre of the shaft. At each end, the shaft is reduced
in diameter to go through the ball-bearing. To enable the
tricycle to turn corners, it drives on the near-side wheel
only, and whereas the near-side wheel is screwed to the
shaft and lock-nutted in place, the off-side wheel is
mounted loosely on the axle and rotates upon it in a nylon
bush. Where it went into the bush, the axle in question
was further stepped down to lain diameter. It was at this
second step that the axle broke.
On the day the accident happened, Spencer wrote to
Pashley about it, saying in a firm but friendly way that he

suspected the failure was due to metal fatigue, and that

the axle might be under-designed for the loads it had to
carry. Pashley expressed great concern, and asked
Spencer to return the broken axle to their factory for
examination. Content with their reaction so far, he did
so. Fortunately, as it turned out, he took the precaution
of making drawings of the broken parts first, and kept a
portion of the axle for tests on the steel.
Having heard nothing for three months, Spencer
became uneasy, and got his father-in-law (and coauthor), Roy Stewartson FIMechE, who was technical
director of a large steelworks, to study the design and test
the quality of the steel.

Vol 7 No 1 January 1986

THE TECHNICAL REPORT

At each end, the shaft was reduced from 3/4in to 15mm
(0.59in) to fit the bearing bore. Although the ball bearing
standard allows for accommodating a lmm radius at the
step in diameter of the shaft, the step at the change of
diameter was sharp, providing a classic 'notch' effect. On
the sample portion of the broken axle, which included
the unbroken near-side end, the step was also undercut.
Where the further diameter reduction to 1/2in took place
at the off-side end to accommodate the nylon bushes on
which this wheel rotates to permit differential speeds
when rounding bends---the point where the fracture

41

"c

jl

10.75"

67

)
(}
c) (

YB

8.25"

!147!
1.375"

Figure 4. Pashley tricycle axle of original destgn, viewed from rear.

Arrows show load points. A: frame support and ball-bearing; B:
drive sprocket; C: change in diameter to l/2in, where fracture
occurred
occurred--this step was also sharp. (On an identical
complete axle later obtained from Pashleys, photographed in Figure 6, it was undercut as well.)
Each of the three steps corresponds to a support or
load point on the shaft, where maximum bending
moments arise. Owing to the rotation of the shaft, the
loading on it at each of these points is cyclical, the stress
at each point of the circumference going from maximum

Figure 5. Pashley tricycle axle (in position)

42

in one direction, through zero, to maximum in the other

direction. Under such loading, if the stress is high
enough, failure begins at the surface, where rupture of
the material results in a crack. This reduces the effective
area resisting the loading, the stress therefore increases,
and the crack propagates more and more rapidly until
suddenly, and often unexpectedly, a failure occurs. A
sharp change in the cross-section at the point of stress
encourages the formation of the initial crack, and an
undercut provides a ready-made starting point for the
crack. This is called a 'notch' effect.
The resistance to failure under cyclical loading of
various materials has been carefully measured ~. This has
been done by recording the 'endurance limit stress' tor
various numbers of cycles--usually 100,000, one million,
and over 10 million. It has been shown that if a notch is
replaced by even quite a small radius, the endurance
limit for a given number of stress cycles is very
substantially increased, typically by more than double.
Hence standard engineering practice is to provide small
radii at all diameter changes. It is one of the first things
which every apprentice is taught when learning to use a
lathe.
The material of which the Pashley axle was made was
EN1A leaded steel. This is a soft steel with free
machining qualities, but one of the lowest in resistance to
cyclical stress. Under a cyclical stress of 5 tons per square
inch, it will fail after 10 million cycles; under 6 tons per

Figure 6. Off-side end of Pashley tricycleaxle, showing two sharp

turn-downs without radii

DESIGN STUDIES

square inch, after one million cycles; and under 9 tons

per square inch, it will only last 100,000 cycles.
A test with weights and scales showed that when the
Pashley Picabac carried a rider weighing slightly over
101/2 stones and two children each weighing 21/2 stones in
the rear seats, the weight on each rear wheel was nearly 9
stones. A simple stress calculation showed that a 9 stone
weight on the off-side rear wheel imposed a load of 6.3
tons per square inch at the notch where the Spencers'
axle broke. A load of 6 tons per square inch at this point
meant that failure would be anticipated at 1 million
cycles, which, the tricycle having a 20in wheel, represented approximately 1,000 miles of riding, or about two
year's normal use. What had happened was thus exactly
what could be expected to happen.
Unfortunately, roads are not always smooth. Pot-holes
and rough surfaces have to be encountered, which cause
impact stresses much higher than those caused by a
steady load. Thus failure could easily occur in a shorter
period of time.
Good engineering design would allow for 10 million
cycles, and would then apply a factor of safety of, say, 3,
to cover unusual increases of stress from impacts and
rough roads. So a maximum of 2 tons per square inch is
all that would be allowable using this type of steel.
Incorporating a radius at each step, 12.5 tons per square
inch could be withstood up to 10 million cycles.
Therefore, if a factor of safety of 3 was allowed for, a
stress of no more than 4.2 tons per square inch would be
acceptable. So, given the material used, the axle diameter
would have been too small for safety, even if proper
engineering practice had been followed and radii used at
the diameter changes instead of sharp steps.
A final bad feature of the design was the location of
1/2in diameter step on the off-side, so that when the
inevitable failure occured, the riders would be thrown
out into the stream of traffic. Thus when fitted with this
axle the tricycle was not within the usually accepted
safety limits with one rider alone, and with two small
children on the back as well it was highly dangerous.

PASHLEY'S RESPONSE
On 20 September 1982, immediately after receiving these
results, Spencer rang Pashley to tell them. Immediately
afterwards he wrote to them setting out the technical
data, and urging them as strongly as he could to alter the
design at once and to recall existing machines for
modification. He gave them Stewartson's credentials,
and passed on his offer to discuss the matter with them
personally.
On 29 September, Pashley replied to this letter. They
refused to accept Stewartson's criticisms of the design of
the axle:
'According to reports we have received from customers
there are many tricycles in use that have been ridden in
excess of 1,000 hours Is/c]. So far, the very few breakages of
axles we have seen have been in conjunction with badly

Vol 7 No 1 January 1986

buckled wheels showing the tricycle had mounted a high

kerb or has hit another object causing unusual stress.'
However, they added that their original sub-contractor
making the axles had sometimes undercut at the shoulder
in the course of machining the turn-down. Since August
1980, they continued, all their machines had been fitted
with axles turned by a different sub-contractor, and
made of 'non-leaded' steel. So they proposed to recall
machines built before August 1980, and these they would
fit with the post-August-1980 axle. When on 9 October
Spencer enquired about the grade of steel used in the new
axle, and whether it incorporated a radius at the
turn-down where his had snapped, their entire reply was
this:
'We acknowledge receipt of your letter of 9 October and
have noted your observations. As previously advised we
have taken such action as we consider necessary to deal with
the points raised in previous correspondence and are quite
satisfied that the tricycle is perfectly safe for the ordinary use
for which it is intended.'
Spencer's neighbour, Rev. David Rayner, also owned
a Pashley Picabac, which he had bought new in 1981.
Hearing about Spencer's accident and their correspondence with the firm he wrote to Pashley on 16 October
1982 to check that his machine was already fitted with
the allegedly improved type of axle. They assured him
that it was. He decided, however, to have it independently examined and tested---and the tests revealed it to be
identical in every material respect to Spencer's. It was
made of the same EN1 free cutting steel, and the
turn-downs were equally devoid of any radius. On 22
October he sent Pashleys the test results and demanded
an explanation. He is waiting for it still.

WHAT COULD BE DONE NOW?

Spencer, Stewartson and Rayner were now very worried.
They were sure that if nothing more was done, it was
inevitable that some unfortunate child would be killed or
injured. Despite several reported breakages and a
barrage of technical information, Pashley refused to
accept that there was anything seriously the matter, let
alone do anything effective to put it right. What could be
done to avert the danger to users, and force the firm to
face its responsibilities? Several courses of action were
open to them:
(a) The civil law could be invoked against Pashley by
suing the firm for damages. If it could be shown that
Pashley's axle design was negligent which it looked as if
it could then in principle there would be no difficulty in
suing them civilly for compensation for the loss and
damage which the negligence had caused. As a result of
the famous House of Lords decision in Donoghue v.
Stevenson in 1932, it is now very well established that a
manufacturer is liable in the tort of negligence for the
consequences both of careless manufacture and design.
Manufacturers have been held liable for negligence over

43

every conceivable type of product, from collapsing

tombstones to irritant underpants. There are several
reported cases about cycles. In an English case, White v.
John Warwick & Co. (1953), a supplier was successfully
sued over an inadequately fixed saddle, and in Goldsworthy v. Catalina Agencies Ltd. (1982), a case from Canada,
where the law is as in England, a cycle manufacturer was
held liable in damages for a design fault which permitted
the front wheel to fall out when the cycle was in use.
There were, however, obvious disadvantages to a civil
action against Pashleys. In the first place, luckily, no one
had been injured. Thus the only loss which Spencer or
any other owner could claim was the comparatively small
cost of having a sound axle made and fitted, plus
something for loss of use of the machine whilst it was off
the road. The cost of bringing a civil claim looked
disproportionate to the sum of money in dispute.
Furthermore, a civil claim would legally be a matter
between W R Pashley Ltd and the individual bringing it.
It would give no redress to other tricycle owners, and it
would probably not even publicise the danger, since it
would be open to Pashley to stop the case before it came
to trial (and hence to public notice) by paying the sum for
which they were being sued. So it was decided not to
bring a civil action against Pashley.
(b) Spencer could invoke the civil law against Ben
Hayward & Son, the retailer who had sold him the
Picabac. Ben Hayward would unquestionably have been
liable in damages for breach of the obligation to furnish a
product of merchantable quality and reasonably fit for
the buyer's purpose imposed by section 14 of the Sale of
Goods Act 1979. The trade seller's obligations under this
section are strict, and it is no defence to a claim for him to
show that he was not in any way at fault. Suing the
retailer, however, had the same obvious drawbacks as
suing Pashleys in tort for negligence, and additionally,
the retailer was not in the least to blame. Pursuing him
therefore seemed an equally pointless course.
(c) An attempt could be made to invoke the criminal
law against Pashley by prosecuting them for the crime of
public nuisance. The definition of this somewhat vague
offence is 'any act or ommission which adversely affects
the health, safety or comfort of a section of Her Majesty's
subjects.' It was invented by the courts centuries ago to
deal with hazards to public health and safety, and before
Parliament passed legislation like the Public Health Acts,
the Food and Drugs Acts and the Highways Acts, the
crime of public nuisance was the main weapon in the
legal armoury against manufacturers who created needless health hazards. Formerly, one of its main uses was
against factory owners who polluted the air with dangerous fumes. It has also been used against persons who
endanger the highway by digging it up without authority
or by keeping explosives or dangerous apimals within
range of it, and it was formerly used against victuallers
who sold dangerously unwholesome food and drink.
Although it is now largely superseded by specific
statutory controls, the crime of public nuisance still
exists, and its use against a manufacturer for marketing a
vehicle which endangers the safety of its users looked a

44

distinct possibility. A private prosecution could have

been launched, but this, like a civil action for damages,
would have been costly and time-consuming. More
realistically, public nuisance being a criminal matter it
might have been possible to stir up the public authorities
to prosecute for it. This course was attempted. In early
November 1982 a large bundle of papers was sent to the
Director of Public Prosecutions, with an invitation to
prosecute W R Pashley Ltd at public expense. This drew
a rapid reply. The Director of Public Prosecutions
expressed concern, but said that he would require a
report on the matter from the local police before he
would feel able to act. In the event, the matter was
resolved before this was taken further.
(d) The appropriate public authorities could be invited to take legal proceedings against Pashley under
some section of the various pieces of consumer protection
legislation which have made the offence of public
nuisance largely redundant. The difficulty here, however, was to find a piece of consumer protection legislation
which covered the case in hand. Regulations made under
the Consumer Protection Act 1961 make it an offence to
sell dangerous electrical goods, toys, nightdresses, carrycots, and permabulators, but in 1982 there were nonc
about cycles or seats for children carried on them. !This
has since changed as regards bicycles. The Cycles
(Safety) Regulations 1984 now make it an offence to sell
bicycles which do not comply with British Standard
6102. But tricycles, tandems, trade-cycles, and almost
everything else which Pashley makes fall outside these
provisions.) Under the Consumer Safety Act 1978,
however, the Secretary of State has a general power to
make a Prohibition Order forbidding the sale of any
particular kind of dangerous article. A copy of the
documents sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions
was therefore sent to the Department of Consumer
Affairs at the Department of Trade, with an invitation to
the Secretary of State to ban the Pashley Picabac until the
axle was improved. This produced a slow reaction. At
first it only provoked a stream of acknowledgment cards,
as officials presumably passed the file from desk to desk.
(e) The newspapers, radio and television could be
invited to take the matter up, in the hope that the
resulting publicity would at least warn other tricycle
owners of the danger, and might possibly shame Pashley
into doing something about it. This coursc was also
adopted. The correspondence with Pashley, and the
technical report, were sent to a number of newspapers,
the cycling press, and to the Consumers' Association.
Both the Guardian and the Cambridge Evening News took
the case up, and other local papers picked up the story
from the Cambridge Evening News.
(f) The matter could be brought to the attention of
cycle retailers in the hope that they would bring
economic pressure to bear on Pashley by refusing to
stock their products until the axle problem had been
sorted out. This also seemed a possibility, given the
existence of an organization called the Association of
Cycle Traders, to which many cycle retailers belong. The
Secretary of this body was sent copies of the correspond-

DESIGN STUDIES

ence, the technical reports, and a covering letter pointing

out that members of the Association would be liable
under the Sale of Goods Act if a serious accident
happened to one of their customers as a result of the axle
defect. The Secretary of the organisation expressed
concern, and immediately took the matter up by writing
to Pashley and asking for an explanation.

statutory authority to compel a manufacturer to do either

of these things, but manufacturers usually do what the
VSD requires, either because they wish to do so, or
because they know that refusal could ultimately result in
prosecution under consumer protection legislation, or
successful civil claims. The VSD very promptly moved
in on W R Pashley Ltd and began to ask questions.
Under the combined assault of the VSD and the BBC,
Pashley staged a rapid retreat.

THE EFFECT OF PRESSURE

Facing awkward questions from the Association of Cycle
Traders and various newspapers, surprisingly Pashley at
first still refused to do anything more, and retreated to a
new defensive position. Sticking to their original theory
about 'undercutting' by their original subcontractor,
they then tried to attack Stewartson's technical report.
The Picabac, they said, was only intended to carry up to
a 12 stone rider and two children of no more than two
stone each, and this, they claimed, was their recommended maximum load. Stewartson's calculations were
done on the basis of loads in excess of this, and were
therefore worthless. The conclusion--which they left to
be implied was that the accident to the Spencer's
Picabac might be due to gross overloading.
But this was a very feeble explanation. First, according
to Stewartson's calculations the axle was highly unsafe
even at what Pashley now claimed was the recommended
maximum load. Secondly, the machine looked easily
capable of carrying loads considerably in excess of this,
and was therefore likely in practice to be so used. And
thirdly, far from warning people not to use the machine
in excess of their now recommended maximum load,
Pashley had up to now been encouraging users to load it
more heavily. Indeed, on 11 October 1982--four months
after the Spencer's accident and nearly three weeks after
receiving Stewartson's technical report--the firm had
written to a Mr. Wheatcroft assuring him that his
Picabac was safe for a 15 stone rider and five stone of
children: four stones more than they now said the
machine was designed to carry. All this was pointed out
to the firm, without apparent effect.
Then two things happened in quick succession. The
first was that the BBC 'Checkpoint' programme decided
to investigate. Having bought from Pashley's shop in
Stratford-upon-Avon a brand new Picabac axle, tested it,
and found it to be identical to both Rayner's axle and
Spencer's axle which broke, the BBC broadcast on 2
December 1982 a twenty minute exposure of the whole
affair, incorporating for good measure an account of the
accident from the lips of four-year-old Charlotte Spencer,
the elder of the children involved.
The second was that the Department of Consumer
Affairs finally transferred the file to the Ministry of
Transport, where it ended up in the Vehicle Safety
Division (VSD). This is a civil service department with a
staff of engineers experienced in investigating dangerous
defects in vehicles. These it brings to the attention of the
makers, pressing them to modify designs, and if necessary to carry out recalls as well. Surprisingly, it has no

Vol 7 No 1 January 1986

THE RECALL
Pashley now revealed the fact that since the Spencer
accident the axle had actually been redesigned. The firm
was now building machines with a larger diameter bush
in the off-side rear hub, which enabled them to use an
axle which entered the hub without being turned down
the second time from 15mm to 1~2in, and eliminated the
weakest point of the design, where Spencer's axle had
broken. The day after the Checkpoint programme,
Pashley announced that it would offer all existing Picabac
owners a new axle of the improved design, together with
the necessary new offside rear wheel, to be fitted free of
charge. Spencer and Rayner each received their new axle
and wheel a few days later, and were temporarily restored
to the ranks of satisfied customers.
This should have been the end of the story. Unfortunately it was not. The new axle was examined and tested,
both by Stewartson and the VSD. Like its predecessor, it
turned out to be made of only EN1A leaded free-cutting
mild steel. And although it eliminated the sharp shoulder
which was the immediate cause of accidents, like its
predecessor it still incorporated two equally sharp
turn-downs where the axle was reduced from 3/4in to
15mm to pass through the ball bearings in which it was
mounted in the frame. Stewartson calculated that
although the new axle was very much safer than its
predecessor, it still carried some risk of fatigue failure
after a long period of heavy use. After considering the
matter, however, and holding discussions with Pashley,
the VSD officials decided that it was in order for Pashley
to issue and use the new axle, provided they were careful
to warn owners that it was not meant to carry more than a
twelve-stone rider, with two children in the seats no
heavier than two stones each. And Pashley meanwhile
announced a further modification of the axle design.
From March 1983, they proposed at last to fit axles made
of EN8 toughened steel, and incorporating a radius at
each turn-down.

AFTERMATH
Issuing existing Picabac owners with the thicker EN1A
axle and a weight-limit may have been just about
adequate from the safety point of view. It was bad news,
however, to many owners who had bought their Picabacs
in ignorance of any weight restriction. One, Mrs.
Virginia Day, of Nailsea, pointed out to the firm that as

45

the average child of two-and-a-half already weighs more

than two stones, her machine was useless to her from the
day she bought it, and equally useless even with the
improved EN1A axle. To this, Pashley--apparently
forgetting the strictures of the VSD--replied that in fact
the Picabac was really safe for two children of 31/2 stones
each. After further pressing Pashley, and sending their
replies to the VSD, in July 1983 she eventually persuaded them to send her one of the new EN8 axles.
Spencer and Rayner were less persistent. Their confidence in the Pashley Picabac being completely shaken,
both got rid of their machines.
There also remained the question of the Pashley
Picador, the original solo model, which had used the
same axle as the one which failed on the Picabac.
Stewartson's calculations suggested that there was a
significant risk of dangerous failure here as well,
although the risk was less serious than with the Picabac
on account of the Picador's lighter and less vulnerable
load. Pashley were explicitly warned of this by Spencer in
his letter of 20 September 1982, and the same point was
made to the officials of the VSD. Unfortunately,
however, the matter of the Picador was lost sight of in the
ensuing publicity campaign and recall, which was limited
to the child-carrying Picabac.
Subsequent events seem to bear out Stewartson's fears:
the authors have already head of two similar accidents
involving the Pashley Picador. Mrs. Hilary Footitt,
whose Pashley Picador is shown in Figure 1, escaped
without injury when she lost her offside rear wheel in a
quiet back-street in Cambridge. Philip Watson, also of
Cambridge, was less fortunate. He had bought a Pashley
Picador from Halfords in April 1981, and heard about
Pashley's axle problems as a result of the publicity
campaign over the Picabac. Having already gone over the
handlebars when the frame collapsed under him as a
result of a weld failure, Watson was sufficiently worried
to enquire of Pashley through Halfords whether his axle
was safe. He was assured in writing that his axle was
entirely safe. Several months later, in October 1983, he
lost his off-side wheel as he was negotiating a busy
roundabout, was struck by a following car and suffered a
broken rib. His wheel came off because his axle, like the
Spencers', had broken. In his case, however, it broke at
the bearing, where the ball-race developing a fault had
cut a notch in the mild steel shaft. Following his
accident, Pashley and Halfords both at first denied all
liability. However, after further press publicity and
under threats of legal action Pashley handed the matter
over to its insurers, and eventually Watson's claim was
settled for substantial damages, together with a refurbished tricycle.

CONCLUSIONS
This story contains a lesson for everyone who is
interested in consumer safety and industrial design. It
shows how easy it is for a manufacturer to produce a
consumer item which is highly dangerous, and how

46

difficult it can be to make him do anything about

it----even where a group as vulnerable and emotive as
young children are put at risk.
A problem of this sort can occur with any manufacturer. It is particularly likely to happen, however, if the
manufacturer is too small to employ his own team of
qualified design experts. Such problems are therefore
likely to occur with increasing frequency in future,
because it is the small firm which modern economic
trends are encouraging. In the old industrial heartlands
of Scotland, the North East, the Midlands and Wales one
sees the empty sites of once great enterprises which each
once employed many thousands of workers, in shipyards,
steelworks, locomotive and rolling stock factories, coal
mines, textile and even automotive plants. In their place
small factories are being erected, which employ handfuls
of people, often with advanced computer controlled
equipment which requires little manual effort and
attention. The abandoned large enterprises had, and
could support, large design operations with staffs of
qualified engineers. Can the small units which are
replacing them support such activities? There is clearly
an increasing danger that basic design may be skimped or
overlooked, or that ignorance may lead to the use of
incorrect materials.

What is to be done about this?

The lawyer's solution is to impose civil and criminal
liability on those who manufacture dangerous consumer
items. Such liability already exists, and lawyers in
general advocate extending it. For example, the Royal
Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for
Person Injury (The Pearson Commission) recommended
in 1978 that the manufacturer's civil liability, which at
present only arises where he was negligent, be extended
to any case where a dangerous item was manufactured,
even without negligence. And year by year, fresh
regulations are made under various pieces of consumer
safety legislation, prohibiting on pain of fines the sale of
yet more dangerous items. The drawback to this
approach, however, is that it always involves bolting the
stable door after the horse has gone. No civil liability
arises until after someone has been hurt. The sale of a
dangerous product is usually banned only after some
accident has brought the danger to public notice. Clearly
prevention would be better than cure.
The bureaucrat's solution is to lay down design codes
in advance, and to pass laws requiring manufacturers to
conform to them. To some limited extent this already
happens. For example, the British Standards Institution
lays down standards, and then--as with two-wheel pedal
cycles--laws are sometimes made requiring manufacturers to comply with them. As a means of countering faulty
design, this approach is obviously better than the
lawyer's approach, because it is cheaper in terms of life
and limb. However, in the nature of things it can hardly
cover all possible cases. The number of consumer items
is vast and always changing. It is hard to imagine that

DESIGN STUDIES

British Standards could ever be made for the entire range

of possibly dangerous consumer items at present in
existence, and impossible, of course, for them to be made
for objects not yet invented.
What is really needed, surely, is some means of
encouraging or persuading manufacturers without specialist design staff to seek expert help. The engineering
profession has a responsibility to ensure that designs are
adequately monitored. The recently set up Engineering
Council, which incorporates all the professional institutions covering the whole spectrum of engineering disciplines, is dedicated to improving standards and the status
of engineering. Can they not establish a recognised code
of good engineering practice, which will encourage the
approval and signing off of all engineering drawings by
an engineer of adequate responsibility - not necessarily a
chartered engineer, but a registered grade of engineer of
competent ability for the design concerned? For manufacturers without specialist design staff, consultants are

Vol 7 No 1 January 1986

not in short supply, and for those who do not know

where to look, the Design Council runs a free sponsored
consultancy service, through which an expert may be
found. As this story shows, the fees payable to a
consultant are likely in the end to be far cheaper for the
small manufacturer than the consequences of failing to
use one: like having to change a design, to write off
finished items held in stock, to recall items sold, to pay
extensive damages to injured persons - and last but not
least, to endure the bad publicity which all this brings
about.

REFERENCES
1 Woolman, J and Mottram, R A The Mechanical and
Physical Properties of the British Standard EN Steels,
Permagon Press, Oxford (1964)

47