REPUBLIC v.

SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 84602; March 19, 1993

FACTS:
Farmers and sympathizers presented their demand for genuine agrarian reform.
The KMP led by Tadeo presented their grievances among which were: (a) awarding free lands
to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortization of land
payments. Members of KMP and MAR encamped for 8 days and 7 nights.
Upon meeting with Minister Alvarez, Tadeo demanded that the maximum
comprehensive land reform program be granted immediately. Alvarez, on his part, can only
promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of President Cory Aquino during
their cabinet meeting.
Next day, Alvarez advised Tadeo et al to wait for the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and just allow the government to implement its comprehension land reform
program. Tadeo countered that he did not believe in the Constitution and that a genuine land
reform cannot be realized under a landlord-controlled Congress. Alvarez suggested a
negotiating panel from both sides to meet the next day. However, Tadeo et al decided to put
matters in their own hands and marched to Malaang to air their demands. He also talked to
the press and TV Media.
In anticipation of such, Task Force Nazareno was deployed at Malaang as well as the
Western Police Districts. Intelligent reports were received that an insurrection was
impending. Upon confrontation, a clash occurred between the marchers and the anti-riot
squad which prompted President Aquino to issue A.O. No. 11, which created the Citizens
Mendiola Commission for purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, death, and
casualties that took place in the vicinity of Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street & Claro M.
Recto Ave., Manila Upon failure to submit findings within the deadline, A.O. No. 13 was
created bug again failed to meet such. A.O. No. 17 was finally issued to submit its findings.
Commission recommended:
1. Criminal prosecution of 4 unidentified, uniformed individuals who fired at the
direction of the marchers;
2. NBI to investigate the identities of those who fired the guns resulting in the death of
victims;
3. Officers of Western Police District and INP Field Force in violatioin of Sec. 13 (4)(g)
of BP 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985);
4. Tadeo: prosecuted for holding rally without permit in violation of Art. 142 of the
Revised Penal Code on Inciting to Sedition
5. Other police officers: Administrative sanctions for failure to make effective use of
their skills and experiences in directing the dispersal of operatives in Mendiola
*Government to compensate for the deceased and wounded victims of Mendiola incident
Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a formal letter of demand for compensation from the
Government notwithstanding such recommendation that no concrete form of compensation
was received by the victims.
Caylao group instituted an action against the Republic, together with military officers
involved, in the trial court.
Solicitor General filed Motion to Dismiss on ground that the suit cannot be sued
without its consent.
According to petitioners, State has waived its immunity from suit and that the
dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and International Law on
Human Rights.

However, Judge Sandoval dismissed such complaint for according to him, there was
no waiver by the State.
Petitioners suppose that the State has impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from
suit. It is their considered view that upon recommendation made by the Commission for
government to indemnify the heirs and victims of the Mendiola incident and by the public
addresses made by President Aquino in the aftermath of the killings, the State has consented
to be sued.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of State Immunity is applicable in the case at bar

HELD:
THIS IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE!
(1) The recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs
of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any
way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. Whatever may be the
findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as causes of action in the event
that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. The Commission is merely a
preliminary venue and whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind
the State immediately, as such recommendation not having become final and
executory.
(2) Whatever acts/utterances President Aquino may have said and done, the same are not
tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The Presidents act of
joining the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was an
admission by the State of any liability. It was an act solidarily by the government with
the people. Mere reliance on such promise that the government would address
grievances of rallyists cannot be inferred that there was an admission by the State of
its liability.
(3) Instances when a suit against the state are proper:
1. When the Republic is sued by name;
2. When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; and
3. When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such
that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government
While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not
pertain to the government. Although the military officers and personnel were
discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased
to be official the moment they exceeded their authority.
The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the
relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative discharge of any obligation, which
belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who
are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of the title of the State and as
its agents and servants. This court has made it quite clear that even a high position in
the government does not confer a license to prosecute or recklessly injure another. The
inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths
that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants
of the lower court.

UNITED STATES v. GUINTO

G.R. No. 76607; February 26, 1990

FACTS:
The following are consolidated cases because they all involve the doctrine of state
immunity. The United States was not impleaded in the complaint but has moved to dismiss
on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.
(1) US v. GUINTO
Private respondents: Valencia, Tanglao, and del Pilar were among those who
participated in the bidding conducted by the US Air Force for contracts of barber
services in Clark Air Base. The bidding was won by Dizon over the objection of
private respondents who claimed that he made a bid for four facilities, including the
Civil Engineering area, which was not included in the invitation to bid. They then
filed a complaint to compel Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and individual
petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon and to conduct a rebidding for the
barbershop concessions. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
action was in effect a suit against the US, which had not waived its non-suability.
They further allege that individual defendants, as official employees of the US Air
Force, were also immune from suit. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
(2) US v. RODRIGO
Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force
Recreation Center in Baguio City. It was said that Genove poured urine into the soup
stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club
manager, suspended him. Consequently, the Board unanimously found him guilty and
recommended his dismissal. Defendants with the US moved to dismiss complaint
alleging that Lamachia, as officer of the US Air Force stationed at Baguio, was
immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity. They argued that
the suit was in effect against the US which has not given its consent to sue.
(3) US v. CEBALLOS
Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O Donnell, was arrested
following a buy-bust operation. An information for violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act) was filed against him which resulted to his dismissal from employment.
Defendants alleged that they only had done their duty in the enforcement of the laws
of the Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to RP-US Military Bases
Agreement. Motion to withdraw the answer and dismiss the complaint was filed
subsequently. The ground invoked was that the defendants were acting in their
official capacity when they did the acts complained of and that the complaint against
them was in effect a suit against the US without its consent.
(4) US v. VERGARA
Complaint for damages were filed by private respondents against herein petitioners
(except US) for the injuries they sustained. There was a conflict of factual allegations.
According to plaintiffs, they sustained injuries for the defendants unleashed dogs on
them which bit several part of their bodies. Defendants claimed, on the other hand,
that plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten because they resisted arrest.
After the incident, defendants stressed that the dogs were called off and plaintiffs
were immediately taken to the medical center for treatment of their wounds. In a
motion to dismiss complaint, US & defendants argued that the suit was against the

US which has not given its consent to be sued. Defendants were immune from suit
under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their
official functions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for
acts done by them in the performance of their official duties

HELD:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even
without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the
majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the society of nations. All
states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the
doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the State without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by
them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials
will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be
regarded as against the state although it has no been formally impleaded. When the
government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the United
States of America a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines.
Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country
merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their
official functions.
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed
to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary
or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental
capacity that no such waiver may be implied.
(1) In US v. Guinto, the court finds the barber shops subject to the concessions granted
by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons.
They are not agencies of the US Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a
matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the
grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shape but
also shampoo, massage, and other similar indulges for a fee. No less significantly, all
barbershop concessionaires are required to remit to the US government fixed
commissions. This being the case, petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the
complaint filed by the private respondents. The contracts in question, being decidedly
commercial, the conclusion reached at US v. Ruiz cannot be applied.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in US v.
Rodrigo, except for the paucity of record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in
the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available. This means that as same
as in US v. Vergara, respondent court should receive evidence first if plaintiffs are
entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court
below for further proceedings.

(2) In US v. Rodrigo, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake
of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its
proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit as a commercial and not a
governmental activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity
because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its
proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
Despite these considerations, the complaint was still dismissed. While suable, the
petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot
be allowed on the strength of the evidence before the Court, which needs to be further
examined. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of
Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly in terminating Genoves employment
for his unbelievably nauseating act.
(3) In US v. Ceballos, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their
official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified
against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the US, they
cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not
given their consent to be sued.
(4) In US v. Vergara, the constradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer
study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the
defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their
authority when the incident occurred. The needed inquiry must first be made by the
lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.

MERRITT v. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

G.R. No. L-11154; March 21, 1916

FACTS:
The facts of the case took place in 1910s. Merritt was a contractor who was excellent
at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was
bumped by an ambulance of the General Hospital, a government hospital, without any
sound of whistle/horn. By reason of the resulting collision, Merritt was severely injured.
According to various merchants, prior to his accident, his mental and physical condition was
excellent. After the incident, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation.
He had lost his agility, energy, and ability he had constantly displayed. He could not now
earn even half of the income he had secured for his work. As a consequence, he had to
dissolve the partnership he had with Wilson, an engineer for he was incapacitated from
making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and mental faculties.
Driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent.
SC is of the opinion that:
1. P5,000.00 awarded for permanent injuries was not wrong; however
2. P18,075.00 should be awarded in addition instead of P2,666.00 for the amount
allowed for loss of wages during the time he was incapacitated. The mere fact that he
remained in the hospital on 2 months + 21 days while the remainder of the six months
was spent in his home would not prevent recovery for the whole time.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later
authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act No. 2457 enacted by the
Legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and authorizing the Attorney-General to Appear in said Suit).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government is legally liable for the damages.

HELD:
No. BY consenting to be sued, a State simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff or create any cause of action in his favour or extend
its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the Court, subject to its rights to
interpose any lawful defense.
It follows therefrom that the State, by virtue of such provisions of law is not responsible for
the damages suffered by private individuals in consequences of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their offices, because neither fault
nor negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of
public service and in the appointment of its agents.
The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent duly empowered by a definite
order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives
rise to a claim, so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent
thereof, he executes the trust confided in him. In the case at bar, the ambulance chauffer was
neither a special agent nor a government officer acting as a special agent, within the meaning
of paragraph 3, Art. 1903, hence, there can be no liability from the government.

REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 90478; November 21, 1991

FACTS:
Private respondents Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago together with Ferdinand and
Imelda Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria Tantoco, and Tantoco-Pineda are defendants in Civil Case No.
0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The
complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order
No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.
Tantoco and Santiago filed with Santiganbayan interrogatories (amended
interrogatories) which questioned among others: what properties PCGG claims it has right to
recover from being ill-gottten wealth, specific acts allegedly committed by Ferdinand in
pursuit of accumulating ill-gotten wealth, the alleged plan to conceal the assets of the
Marcoses, as well as Tourist Duty Free Shops on plaintiffs theory that said corporation,
including all assets, are beneficially owned by them, and that Tantoco and Santiago are their
dummies. Motion for production and inspection of documents were also filed.
The Sandiganbayan, after hearing, promulgated two (2) resolutions. First, denying
motion for reconsideration filed by PCGG to not allow the production and inspection of
documents and the second, reiterating by implication the permission to serve the amended
interrogatories on the plaintiff, PCGG.
In PCGGs petition for certiorari, it contends that said orders should be nullified
because they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PCGGs postulation that none of its members may be required to testing
or produce evidence in any judicial proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance, is binding upon the doctrine of state immunity from suit

HELD:
No. It has no application to a judicial proceeding it has itself initiated. As just suggested, the
act of bringing suit must entail a waiver of the exemption from giving evidence; by bringing
suit it brings itself within the operation and scope of all the rules governing civil actions,
including the rights and duties under the rules of discovery. Otherwise, the absurd would
have to be conceded, that while the parties it has impleaded as defendants may be required
to "disgorge all the facts" within their knowledge and in their possession, it may not itself be
subject to a like compulsion.
The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued
without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its
sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary
litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while
assuming to represent or act for the State. The suggestion that the State makes no implied
waiver of immunity by filing suit except when in so doing it acts in or in matters concerning,
its proprietary or non-governmental capacity, is unacceptable; it attempts a distinction
without support in principle or precedent.

The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in
its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to
private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against the private parties,
the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The
latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and
other defenses he might have against the state.
It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises
its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis. Yet, even in that
area, it has been held that where private property has been taken in expropriation without
just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the
State against an action for payment by the owner.

UNITED STATES v. RUIZ

G.R. No. L-11154; May 22, 1985

FACTS:
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one
of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US.
Sometime in May 1972, the US invited the submission of the bids for the following
projects:
1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the US Naval Station, Subic Bay
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline and shoreline revetment, NAVBASE
Subic and repair to Leyte Wharf approach
De Guzman & Co. responded to the invitation and submitted bids and subsequently
received from the US two (2) telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the
name of its bonding company in which they complied. However, in June 1972, they received
a letter stating that their company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat
landings of the US Naval Station. The letter further stated that the projects had been
awarded to third parties. A complaint was filed to defendants to allow plaintiff to perform
the work on the projects and in the event that specific performance was no longer possible,
defendants should pay for damages. Company also asked for writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
Defendants questioned the jurisdiction of this Court over the subject matter of the
complaint for such being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of US, a
foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suits for the causes
of action assessed in the complaint.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and issued the writ of
preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the US Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercised governmental
functions to be able to invoke state immunity

HELD:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law
are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of
states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
State immunity now extends only to governmental acts of the State.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out
of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual
and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function
of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial
or business purposes. Therefore, courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the case.

REPUBLIC v. VILLASOR
G.R. No. L-30671; November 28, 1973

FACTS:
Judge Villasor issued an order declaring the finality of a decision in an arbitration
case involving the Republic of the Philippines (specifically, AFP), a certain Gavino Uchuan,
and two (2) corporations (P.J. Kiena Co., Ltd. and International Construction Corporation).
The said case was decided against the AFP. As a result, AFP was directed to pay Uchuan
and the two companies an amount of P1,712,396.40 as arbitration award. It must be noted
that the funds of the AFP are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment
of pensions of retirees, payment and allowances of military and civilian personnel, and for
maintenance and operations of the AFP.
Republic is now challenging the validity of Judge Villasors said order on the ground
that the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of
discretion.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Judge Villasor acted in excess of his jurisdiction
(2) Whether or not a judgment against the State can be enforced by execution

HELD:
(1) YES. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic
concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit
unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the
classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends."
(2) NO. Judgment against the State cannot be enforced by execution. As stated in
Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, state gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special laws is limited only up to the completion
of proceedings anterior to the state of execution and that the power of the Courts
ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and property may not
be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments for
obvious considerations of public policy. Public funds cannot be the subject of
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted
and the state liability adjudged.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.