Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Introduction
TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE, Commentaries &
Jurisprudence, Volume 1, hereinafter cited as
Tolentino:
Concepts of Law - The term law may be
understood in 2 concepts: in the general or
abstract sense, and in the specific or material
sense.
In the general sense, law is defined as
the science of moral rules, founded on the
rational nature of man, w/c govern his free
activity, for the realization of the individual &
social ends, of a nature both demandable &
reciprocal. (Sanchez Roman.)
In the specific sense, it is defined as
a rule of conduct, just, obligatory,
promulgated by legitimate authority, & of
common observance & benefit. (ibid.)
Balane:
Characteristics of Law:
1. it is a rule of human conduct;
2. promulgated by competent authority;
3. obligatory and
4. of general observance.
Facts:
RA 7167 was enacted granting
certain tax exemptions. Sec.3 of such law
stated that the law would take effect upon
its approval. The law was approved on
Dec.19, 1991 by the President. It was
published in a newspaper of general
circulation on Jan.14, 1992.
Tolentino:
Civil Code defined.-- A civil code is a
collection of laws w/c regulate the private
relations of the members of civil society,
determining their respective rights &
obligations, w/ reference to persons, things, &
civil acts.
Sources of the Civil Code:
The Civil Code of 1889;
The codes, laws, & judicial decisions, as well
as the works of jurists of other countries,
such as Spain, the various states of the
American Union, etc.;
Doctrines laid down by the SC of the Phils.;
Filipino customs & traditions;
Philippine statutes, such as the Marriage Law,
the Divorce Law, the Code of Civ. Proc. &
the Rules of Court.
The Code Commission itself
Works of jurists & commentators of various
nations (added by Jurado, CIVIL LAW
REVIEWER.)
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
(as amended by EO 200.)
Balane:
The Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950
according to the case of Lara v. del Rosario
(isang letter na lang, ako na to a! Obiter
Master), one year after its publication,
reckoned fr. the date of actual release
BALANE CASE:
KASILAG V. RODRIGUEZ 69 PHIL 217
Held: Gross & inexcusable ignorance of
the law may not be the basis of GF but
excusable ignorance may be such basis (if
it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a
fact that the petitioner is not conversant w/
the laws bec. he is not a lawyer.
In
accepting
the
mortgage
of
the
improvements he proceeded on the wellgrounded belief that he was not violating
the prohibition regarding the alienation of
the land. In taking possession thereof & in
consenting to receive its fruits, he did not
know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the
possession & enjoyment of the fruits are
attributes of the contract of antichresis &
that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by
Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his
ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is
excusable & may be the basis of GF.
Tolentino:
Concept of Retroactive Law.-A
retroactive law is one intended to affect
transactions w/c occurred, or rights w/c
accrued, before it became operative, & w/c
ascribes to them effects not inherent in
their nature, in view of the law in force at
the time of their occurrence.
It is one w/c creates a new
obligation & imposes a new duty, or
attaches a new disability, in respect to
transactions or considerations already
past. (Balane quoting Tolentino.)
Reason for the Article.-- A law that has
not yet become effective cannot be
considered as conclusively known by the
people. To make a law binding even before
it has taken effect may lead to arbitrary
exercise of legislative power.
Exceptions to Rule:
When the law itself so expressly provides.-However, this has two exceptions:
when the retroactivity of a penal statute
will make it an ex post facto law, &
when the retroactive effect of the statute
will constitute an impairment of the
obligation of contract.
4
Tolentino:
Mandatory & Directory Laws.
Directory laws are those provisions w/c are
mere matter of form, or w/c are not
material, do not affect any substantial
right, & do not relate to the essence of
the thing to be done, so that compliance
is a matter of convenience rather than
substance.
Mandatory laws are statutory provisions w/c
relate to matters of substance, affect
Renunciation or Waiver.-Waiver is
defined as the relinquishment of a known
right w/ both knowledge of its existence & an
intention to relinquish it. Voluntary choice is
the essence of waiver.
Balane:
Exceptions to the Rule that Rights can
be waived:
If the waiver is contrary to one of the 5
considerations (law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs);
if the waiver would be prejudicial to a 3rd
party w/ a right recognized by law.
Elements of a Valid Waiver:
Existence of a right;
Knowledge of existence thereof;
An intention to relinquish the right (implied in
this is the capacity to dispose of the
right.) (Balane quoting Herrera v.
Borromeo, 152 S 171.)
Tolentino:
The renunciation must be made in a
clear & unequivocal manner. The formality
required by law for such renunciation, if any,
should be followed; if no particular formality
is required, the renunciation may even be
tacit, provided the intent to renounce can be
clearly established.
Scope of Waiver.-- The doctrine of waiver
is generally applicable to all rights &
privileges to w/c a person is legally entitled,
w/n secured by contract, conferred by
statute, or guaranteed by the Consti.,
provided such rights & privileges rest in the
individual & are intended for his sole benefit.
Waiver of Obligations.-Generally,
obligations cannot be renounced.
But a
person may exempt himself fr. an obligation
w/c is inherent in a right, upon the
renunciation of such right. For example, see
Art. 628.
Renunciation of Real Rights.-- According
to Valverde, while the renunciation of a
personal right requires the consent of the
Art. 7.
Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, & their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse,
or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent w/ the Constitution, the former
shall be void & the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders &
regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
Balane: Leges posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant.
Tolentino:
Reason for the Article.-- Since laws are
promulgated by competent authority of the
State, they can cease to have effect only
through the will of the State.
Repeal of Laws. - 2 kinds of repeal of a
law:
express or declared repeal, contained in a
special provision of a subsequent law, &
implied or tacit repeal, w/c takes place when
the provisions of the subsequent law are
incompatible or inconsistent w/ those of
an earlier law.
Requisites of Implied Repeals:
the laws cover the same subject matter, &
the latter is repugnant to the earlier.
Repeal of Repealing Law.-- When a law
w/c expressly repeals a prior law is itself
repealed, the law first repealed shall not be
revived unless expressly so provided. But if
the prior law was repealed, not expressly but
by implication, the repeal of the repealing law
will revive the prior law, unless the language
of the last law provides otherwise.
Lapse of Laws. There are laws w/c, w/o
any repeal, cease to have effect bec. they
lapse by their own terms, as a (1) law for a
fixed period, or (2) w/o express provision; the
intent of the law may indicate that its
effectivity shall be for a limited period, as the
case of the Emergency Powers Act.
Balane:
Custom can be applied
suppletorily only if custom is not contrary
to any law.
Tolentino: The Courts will not recognize
the force of a custom in opposition to
positive law.
Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a
fact, according to the rules of evidence.
Tolentino:
Requisites of Custom. In order that
custom may have the force of suppletory
rule, it must have the following requisites:
plurality of acts, or various resolutions of a
juridical question raised repeatedly in
life;
uniformity, or identity of the acts or various
solutions to the juridical question;
general practice by the great mass of the
social group;
continued performance of these acts for a
long period of time;
general conviction that the practice
corresponds to a juridical necessity or
that it is obligatory; &
the practice must not be contrary to law,
morals, or public order.
Non-existence of Custom. When the
alleged custom or usage is not known to
those who have the best means of knowing
it, this ignorance is, in some sense, positive
evidence of its non-existence.
BALANE CASE:
YAO KEE V. SY-GONZALES
737
167 SCRA
Baviera:
This article applies only to
legal provisions & not to contracts,
where the parties may stipulate on the
manner of computing years, months &
days.
Tolentino:
Meaning of Week.-- The term week,
when computed according to the calendar,
means a period of 7 days beginning on
Sunday & ending on Saturday, but where the
word is used simply as a measure of duration
of time & w/o reference to the calendar, it
means a period of 7 consecutive days w/o
regard to the day of the week on w/c it
begins.
Meaning of Month.-- There are several
senses in w/c the term month may be
understood. A lunar mo. is composed of 28
days. A calendar mo. as designated in the
calendar, w/o regard to the no. of days it may
contain, etc. The Code, however, does not
use month in either of these senses, but
strictly in a legal sense, as a period
composed of 30 days.
Computation of Time.-- When the act &
the period are contractual, not required by
NAMARCO V. TECSON
(1969)
29 SCRA 70
Facts:
On Oct.14, 1955, the CFI-Mla.
rendered judgment in a civil case, Price
Stabilization Corp. vs. Tecson, et al. Copy
of this decision was served on Oct.21, 1955
upon defendants in said case. On Dec.21,
1965, NAMARCO, as successor to all the
properties, assets, rights, & choses in
action of Price, as pltff in that case &
judgment creditor therein, filed w/ the
same
court,
a
complaint
against
defendants for the revival of the judgment
rendered therein. Def. Tecson moved to
dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of
prescription of action, among others. The
motion was granted by the court. Hence,
the appeal to the CA w/c was certified to
the SC, upon the ground that the only
question raised therein is one of law.
Issue: WON the present action for the
revival of a judgment is barred by the
statute of limitations.
Held: Pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an
action for judgement must be brought w/in
10 yrs fr. the time the judgment sought to
be revived has become final. This in turn,
took place on Dec.21, 1955 or 30 days fr.
notice of the judgment. The issue is thus
confined to the date on w/c the 10 yrs fr.
Dec.21, 1955 expired. Pltff alleges that it
was Dec.21, 1965, but appellee maintains
otherwise. He alleges that when the law
speaks of years, it shall be understood that
years are of 365 days each. And, 1960 &
1964 being leap years, therefore 10 yrs of
365 days each, or an aggregate of 3650
days, fr. Dec.21, 1955, expired on Dec.19,
1965.
The action to enforce a judgment
w/c became final on December 21, 1955
prescribes in 10 years. Since the Civil Code
computes years in terms of 365 days
each, the action has prescribed on
10
76 SCRA 560
QUIZON V. BALTAZAR
(1977)
Art. 14.
Penal laws & those of public
security & safety shall be obligatory upon all
who live or sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject
to
the
principles
of
public
international law & to treaty stipulations.
Tolentino:
Balane:
There are 2 principles involved here:
Territoriality - means that our criminal laws
are enforceable only w/in Phil. territory.
Exception to the territoriality principle is
Art. 2 of RPC.
Generality - means that w/in the Phil.
territory, our criminal laws will apply to
anyone, citizen or alien. Exceptions: (1)
treaty stipulations w/c exempted some
persons w/in the jurisdiction of the Phil.
courts. & (2) ambassadors (consuls are
subject to the jurisdiction of our criminal
courts) (Schneckenburger v. Moran.)
Tolentino:
Applicability of Laws to Aliens. Every
sovereign state has absolute & exclusive
power of government w/in its own territory.
Aliens owe a local & temporary allegiance to
the government of the country where they
Tolentino:
Law on Property. Property is subject to
the laws of the country in w/c it is located;
Savigny bases this principle upon a
voluntary submission to local laws implied
in the holding of property w/in the country.
Real property is governed by lex situs, the
law of the space where the land is situated.
Personal property follows the modern
doctrine mobilia sequuntur personam
(movables follow the owner).
Law on Succession.-- The law governing
succession may be considered fr. the point
of view of (a) the execution of wills, & (b)
the distribution of property. The formalities
of execution of will are generally governed
by the law of the place of execution (Art.
17, par. 1.) But the distribution of the
estate is governed by the law of the nation
of the deceased.
The distribution of the estate may
involve various questions:
The order of succession in cases of
intestacy;
The intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions in case of testate succession;
The extent or amount of property w/c each
heir is entitled to inherit;
The capacity of certain heirs to succeed, &
Questions of preterition, disinheritance, &
collation.
All these matters are governed by
the law of the nation of the decedent,
irrespective of the nature & location of the
properties left by him at the time of his
death.
Applicability of Foreign Law.-The
second par. of this article can be invoked
only when the deceased was vested w/ a
descendible interest in prop. w/in the
jurisdiction of the Phils.
The
intrinsic
validity
of
the
provisions of the will of a foreigner who
dies in the Phils. is to be determined by the
laws of his own state or country, & not by
those of the Phils. Thus, a condition in a
will of a foreigner that his legatee respect
his order that his prop. be distributed
according to the laws of the Phils. instead
of the laws of his own country, was held
illegal & considered as not written.
Balane:
In Art. 16 par. 1 provides that the lex
situs or lex rei sitae governs real or personal
prop. This rule applies even to incorporeal
property. In Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated,
the SC said that Phil. courts have jurisdiction
over shares of stocks located in the Phils.
12
Baviera:
Baviera:
Why was Texas law applied
when there was no proof of Texas law?
Q:
Suppose at the time of the
marriage, both spouses are Filipinos.
Afterwards, one becomes naturalized.
Would Art. 26 par. 2 still be applied?
A: No. This would be a circumvention
of the law. The 2nd paragraph applies
only to mixed marriages fr. the very
beginning
&
not
when
one
subsequently becomes naturalized. It
contemplates a situation where one
party was already a foreigner at the
time of the marriage
This refers to the formal or
extrinsic requirements only, namely:
1. authority of the solemnizing officer
2. valid marriage license
3. marriage ceremony
The national law of the parties
govern the essential or intrinsic
requirements, namely:
1. legal capacity
2. consent
Art. 80, FC.
In the absence of a
contrary
stipulation
in
a
marriage
settlement, the property relations of the
spouses shall be governed by Philippine
laws, regardless of the place of the
celebration of the marriage & their
residence.
This rule shall not apply:
Where both spouses are aliens;
With respect to the extrinsic validity of
contracts affecting property not situated in
the Philippines & executed in the country
where the property is located; &
With respect to the extrinsic validity of
contracts entered into in the Philippines but
affecting property situated in a foreign
country whose laws require different
formalities for their extrinsic validity.
HUMAN RELATIONS
Art. 19.
Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights & in the performance
of his duties, act w/ justice, give everyone
his due, & observe honesty & good faith.
14
GLOBE MCKAY V. CA
(1989)
Art. 23.
Even when an act or event
causing damage to another's property was
not due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for
indemnity if through the act or event he
was benefited.
Art. 24. In all contractual, property or
other relations, when one of the parties is
at a disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap,
the courts must be vigilant for his
protection.
Art. 25. Thoughtless extravagance in
expenses for pleasure or display during a
period of acute public want or emergency
may be stopped by order of the courts at
the instance of any government or private
charitable institution.
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy & peace of
mind of his neighbors & other persons. The
following & similar acts, though they may
not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention & other relief:
Prying into the privacy of another's
residence;
Meddling w/ or disturbing the private
life or family relations of another;
Intriguing to cause another to be
alienated fr. his friends;
Vexing or humiliating another on
account of his religious beliefs, lowly
station in life, place of birth, physical
defect, or other personal condition.
16
Art. 29.
When the accused in a
criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion
of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of
acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt,
the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred fr. the text of the decision whether
or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
MENDOZA
(1961)]
V.
ALCALA
[2
1032
Facts:
Def Mendoza was charged w/
estafa. While the crim case was pending,
plaintiff Alcala filed a civil case based on
the very same receipt upon w/c the crim
axn was predicated.
The crim court
acquitted the def. The civ court ruled
against Mendoza. On appeal, the appellate
court dismissed plaint Alcala on the ground
that when the court makes an express
finding that the facts upon w/c the decision
may be based do not exist, the same is
conclusive & is a bar to the prosecution
based on the same set of facts.
Issue:
WON the def could still be
prosecuted for the collection of the amount
stated in the said receipt in a civil case
after he had been acquitted by the court on
a charge of estafa based on the said
receipt.
17
res
judicata
bars
V.
GEROCHI
[144
326
19
ABELLANA
(1974)]
V.
MARAVE
[57
106
20
ESCUETA
(1974)]
V.
FANDIALAN
[61
278
21
Balane:
Bigamy - Art. 349, RPC. Contracting of
second or subsequent marriage:
before legal dissolution of first marriage
before declaration of presumptive death of
absent spouse.
MERCED V. DIAZ [109 P 156 (1960)]
Facts:
Merced filed a complaint for
annulment of second marriage w/ EC. EC
filed a complaint for bigamy vs. M. LC held
that the judicial declaration of nullity of a
second & bigamous marriage is not
necessary; there is no need in this case to
decide the nullity of the second marriage or
to determine the existence of the grounds for
annulling the same.
Issue: WON an axn to annul the second
marriage is a prejudicial Q in a prosec for
bigamy
Held: YES. The civil case for annulment is a
prejudicial question to be determined before
the criminal case can proceed. Consent is an
essential element of a valid marriage.
Without consent, the marriage is void. But
the question of invalidity cannot ordinarily be
decided in the criminal action for bigamy &
since the prosec for bigamy does not lie
unless the elements of the second marriage
appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision
in a civil axn to the effect that the second
marriage contains all the essentials of
marriage must first be secured.
LANDICHO V. RELOVA [22 S 731 (1968)]
Art. 43.
If there is a doubt, as between
two or more persons who are called to
succeed each other, as to w/c of them died
first, whoever alleges the death of one prior
to the other, shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, it is presumed that they
died at the same time & there shall be no
transmission of rights fr. one to the other.
Tolentino:
This article applies only when the question of
survivorship involves persons "who are
called to succeed each other." Hence, it
cannot apply to other cases w/c do not
involve succession.
When the persons involved would succeed
each other, however, then this article
applies, whether the death be actual or
merely presumed fr. absence or other
circumstances.
Are Rules of Court Repealed?-- There is
every indication that the Code Commission
intended to repeal the presumptions on
survivorship under the Rules of Court, bec.
the presumptions laid down therein are
sometimes absurd & mere guesswork. [I
Tolentino 176]
Compare w/ Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj), (kk)
BALANE CASE:
JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO [93 P 257]
Where there are facts, known or
knowable, fr. w/c a rational conclusion can
be made, the presumption (in the Rules of
Court) does not step in, & the rules of
preponderance of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances
on record fr. w/c reasonable inference of
survivorship bet. AJ & her son can be
drawn?
Is Francisco Lopez'
(the sole
witness) testimony competent & sufficient
for the purpose?
It is our opinion that the testimony
contains facts quite adequate to solve the
problem of survivorship bet. AJ & JN, Jr. &
keep the statutory presumption out of the
case. It is believed that in the light of the
conditions painted by Lopez, a fair &
reasonable inference can be arrived at,
namely: that JN, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother
died before the son can not be ruled out, it
must be noted that this possibility is
entirely speculative & must yield to the
more rational deduction fr. proven facts
that it was the other way around. JN, Jr.,
was killed, while running, in front of, & 15
meters fr. the Club. Still in the prime of life,
30, he must have negotiated that distance
in 5 seconds or less, & so died w/in that
interval fr. the time he dashed out of the
bldg. AJ could have perished w/in those 5
or fewer seconds, but the probabilities that
she did seem very remote.
According to Lopez' testimony, the
collapse of the club occurred about 40
minutes after JN, Jr. died, & it was the
collapse that killed AJ. The CA said that the
interval bet. JN, Jr.'s death & the breaking
down of the edifice was "minutes." Even
so, it was much longer than 5 seconds,
23
Tolentino:
Personality is the quality derived fr. being a
person.
While a person is any being
susceptible
of
rights
&
obligations,
personality is the aptitude of that becoming
the subject, active or passive, of juridical
relations.
Characteristics.-It is not a being, but a quality of certain
beings;
it is not a physical element, but a juridical
concept;
it is not an object of contract, or of
possession, & cannot be impaired by
agreement;
it is a matter of public interest.
CAPACITY
TO
ACT
power to do acts w/
legal effect
acquired & may be
lost
subject
to
restrictions:
minority, etc.
A. ELEMENTS
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, w/c is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person & is lost only
through death. Capacity to act, w/c is the
power to do acts w/ legal effect, is acquired &
may be lost.
Art 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility,
the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality &
civil interdiction are mere restrictions on
capacity to act & do not exempt the
incapacitated person fr. certain obligations,
as when the latter arise fr. his acts or fr.
property relations, such as easements.
Tolentino:
Capacity of Public Interest.-The
capacity or incapacity of persons depends
upon the law & cannot be modified,
extended, or restricted by agreement.
Both JC & CA are not rights, but qualities of
persons; hence, they cannot be alienated
or renounced.
B. RESTRICTIONS
ACT
ON
CAPACITY
TO
1. MINORITY.
Tolentino:
Tolentino:
25
A.
CIVIL ACTS
DELICTS
C.
QUASI-DELICTS
2. INSANITY
OR IMBECILITY.
Tolentino:
Insanity includes the various forms of mental
disease, either inherited or acquired, in
w/c there is a perversion of the mentality,
as when the person is suffering fr.
illusions, hallucinations, or delusions,
unnatural exaltation or depression, or
insane ideas of persecution or power.
An insane person cannot make a valid will or
testament (Art. 798); & he cannot validly
give consent to contracts (Art. 1327, par.
2.)
Imbecility is a defect in the quantity of
mental development. The mental ages
up to the completed eighth year are
included.
A.
CIVIL ACTS
Art 1323. An offer becomes ineffective
upon the death, civil interdiction, insanity, or
insolvency of either party before acceptance
is conveyed.
Art 1327. The ff. cannot give consent to
a K:
1) Unemancipated minors;
2) Insane or demented persons, &
deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
Art 1399. When the defect of the K
consists in the incapacity of one of the
parties, the incapacitated person is not
obliged to make any restitution except insofar
as he has been benefited by the thing or
price received by him.
3. DEAF-MUTISM
Tolentino
can make a valid will, so long as its content
have been communicated or made known
to him in some practicable manner (Art.
807.) But when the deaf-mute does not
know how to read & write, he cannot give
consent to contracts (1327, par. 2, & he
cannot personally accept or repudiate an
inheritance (1048.)
1) Unemancipated minors;
2) Insane or demented persons, &
deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
Art 820. Any person of sound mind & of
the age of 18 yrs or more, & not blind, deaf
or dumb & able to read & write, may be a
witness to the execution of a will
mentioned in 805 of this Code.
4. CIVIL INTERDICTION
Tolentino:
This is an accessory penalty imposed upon
persons who are sentenced to a principal
penalty not lower than reclusion temporal
(Art. 41, RPC.) Art. 34 of the RPC provides:
Art. 34. Civil interdiction shall deprive
the offender during the time of his
sentence of the rights of parental authority,
or guardianship, either as to the person or
property of any ward, of marital authority,
of the right to manage his property, & of
the right to dispose of such property by any
act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Art. 135.
Any of the ff. shall be
considered
suff
cause
for
judicial
separation of property:
1) that the spouse of the petitioner has
been sentenced to a penalty w/c carries w/
it civil interdiction;
xxx
Art 142.
The administration of all
classes of exclusive property of either
spouse may be transferred by the court to
the other spouse:
xxx
3) When one spouse is sentenced to a
penalty w/c carries w/ it civil interdiction;
xxx
5. PRODIGALITY.
R 92 Sec 2. Under this Rule, the
word incompetent includes persons
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals,
deaf & dumb who are unable to read &
write, those who are of unsound mind,
even though they have intervals, &
persons not being of unsound mind, but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind, &
27
7. ALIENAGE
Constitution
Art. XII, Sec. 2. All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum &
other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora & fauna, & other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, & utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control &
supervision of the State. Such activities may
be directly undertaken by the State, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture,
production-sharing agreements w/ Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements
may be for a period of not exceeding twentyfive years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, & under such terms &
conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, beneficial
use may be the measure & limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the
marine wealth in its archipelagic
territorial sea, & exclusive economic
reserve its use & enjoyment to
citizens.
nation's
waters,
zone, &
Filipino
29
Tolentino:
Citizenship may affect the right of persons in
matters where the State may validly
discriminate between aliens & its citizens
for reasons of public policy, w/o doing
violence to the equal protection of the
laws. See constitutional provisions, infra.
Balane:
Incapacitated persons (fr. Tolentino)-They may have obligations arising fr. all
sources, except contracts.
They have
Balane:
There is a lapse in the enumeration. Art.
38
enumerates
6
circumstances
limiting,
modifying
or
restricting
capacity to act whereas Art. 39
enumerates 11. The two articles could
have been merged into one article.
Tolentino:
The enumeration made here is not
exclusive of other circumstances modifying
capacity to act.
Guardianship of Incompetents.-- For
definition of incompetents, see Rule 93,
Sec. 2, ROC, infra.
Even w/o guardianship, persons
under civil interdiction, deaf-mutes who do
not know how to read & write, & those of
unsound mind, are of limited capacity. W/
respect, however, to hospitalized lepers,
prodigals, & those who cannot take care of
themselves & manage their prop., it is the
30
Family
Relations.-Ascendants
&
descendants, brothers & sisters, & collateral
relatives w/in the 4th civil degree (as
cousins), cannot validly marry; their marriage
would be incestuous or against public policy
& void. Husband & wife, during the marriage,
cannot give donations to each other.
ART. 742.
Donations made to
conceived & unborn children may be
accepted by those persons who would
legally represent them if they were already
born.
ART. 1025. In order to be capacitated
to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee
must be living at the moment the
succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper.
A child already conceived at the time of
the death of the decedent is capable of
succeeding provided it be born later under
the conditions prescribed in article 41.
A. NATURAL PERSONS
BALANE/ BAVIERA CASE:
1.
COMMENCEMENT
PERSONALITY
OF
ART. 37.
Juridical capacity, w/c is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person & is lost only
through death. Capacity to act, w/c is the
power to do acts w/ legal effect, is acquired &
may be lost.
ART. 40. Birth determines personality; but
the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it,
provided it be born later w/ the conditions
specified in the following article.
Tolentino:
Personality fr. Birth.-- Birth means the
removal of the fetus fr. the mother's womb.
Conceived Child.-- The personality of the
conceived child has 2 characteristics: (1) it
is essentially limited, bec. it is only for
purposes favorable to the child, & (2) it is
provisional or conditional, bec. it depends
upon the child being born alive later, such
that if it is not born alive, its personality
disappears as if it had never existed.
Period of Conception.-Legally, in a
normal child, the period of conception is the
Tolentino:
Separation from Mother.-This is
produced by the cutting of the umbilical
cord, whether the removal takes place
naturally or by surgical operation.
Alive at Birth.-- The duration of extrauterine life is immaterial; for acquisition of
juridical personality, it is enough that the
child lives even for an instant.
Test of Life.-- The general opinion is that
independent life required for juridical
personality can be shown only by complete
respiration. The cry of the child, although it
is not a necessary sign of life, is evidence
that it has acquired complete respiration.
Another indication of complete respiration
is the floating of the lungs when placed in
water; this means that air has penetrated
into the lungs by breathing.
Viability Not Required.-Viability
means that the child is capable of living, &
this is determined by the extent of the
development of its organs.
Premature Birth.-- In this case, if the
child does not live 24 hours completely
separated fr. the mother's womb, it does
not acquire juridical personality. This is an
absolute requirement for fetuses w/c have
an intrauterine life of less than 7 mos.
(Balane quoting Manresa & JBL.)
"The aborted creature does not
reach the category of a natural person &
consequently
is
not
born
in
the
contemplation of law."
(Geluz v. CA,
supra.)
This is so, even if the child is killed
before the period lapses & it can be proved
that it could have survived that period if it
had not been prevented by the willful act of
another.
On the other hand, juridical
personality is acquired even if the survival
for 24 hours is caused only by medical or
scientific means w/o w/c the child would
have died before the lapse of that period.
Balane:
Outline of Articles 40 & 41
1. For civil personality to be acquired, one
must be born.-- A fetus is born after it is
completely separated fr. the mother's
womb w/c is produced by the cutting of the
32
CONTRACTS
Tolentino:
Natural Death.-- This art. refers to natural
or physical death, bec. this is the only kind of
death recognized by present legislation. The
law does not recognize the so-called "civil
death," known to legislation in the past, by
virtue of w/c a man who was alive was
considered dead for all purposes bec. of a
conviction for crime or of the taking of a
religious profession.
Balane: Physical death & legal death are the
same.
ART. 777. The rights to the succession
are transmitted fr. the moment of death of
the decedent.
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the
property, rights & obligations of a person w/c
are not extinguished by his death.
ART. 1919. Agency is extinguished:
(3) By the death, civil interdiction,
insanity or insolvency of the principal or of his
agent.
xxx
CRIM LIABILITY
B. JURIDICAL PERSONS
ART. 44.
persons:
34
Tolentino:
Concept -- A juridical person is an abstract
being, formed for the realization of collective
purposes to w/c the law has granted capacity
for rights & obligations. The members may
change but the juridical person remains
subsisting w/o alteration. Its personality is
manifested only in the realm of patrimonial
relations; it has no family & personal rights.
Balane:
A juridical person is an organic unit resulting
fr. a group of persons or mass or property to
w/c the State grants or recognizes personality
& capacity to hold patrimonial rights
independent
of
those
of
component
members. (quoting Ruggiero.)
BALANE CASE:
BARLIN V. RAMIREZ [7 P 41]
Facts:
The def., Ramirez, having been
appointed by the pltff parish priest, took
possession of the church on 7/5/01.
He
administered if as such under the orders of
his superiors until 11/14/02. His successor
having been then appointed, the latter made
a demand on this def. for the delivery to him
of the church, convent, & cemetery, & the
sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, &
other prop. of the church. The def., by a
written document of that date, refused to
make such delivery, stating that "the town of
Lagonoy, in conjunction w/ the parish priest
of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/
the Pope at Rome & his representatives in
these Islands, & to join the Filipino Church,
the head of w/c is at Mla.
In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action
against def., alleging in his amended
complaint that the Roman Catholic Church
was the owner of the church bldg., the
convent, cemetery, the books, money, &
other prop. belonging thereto, & asking that it
be restored to the possession thereof & that
the def. render an account of the prop. w/c he
Tolentino:
What Governs Juridical Persons.-- The
State is governed by the provisions of the
Consti; provinces & municipalities are
governed by the Local Gov't Code & the
Revised Admin. Code; & chartered cities,
by their respective charters.
Corporations created by special
charter are governed primarily by such
charter; & those created under general law
are governed by the Corporation Code.
Partnerships & associations must be
governed primarily by their contracts of
association, & only secondarily by law, bec.
partnerships are created by contract, & it is
a fundamental rule that the contract has
the force of law between the contracting
parties.
ART. 46. Juridical persons may acquire
& possess property of all kinds, as well as
incur obligations & bring civil or criminal
actions, in conformity w/ the laws & regulations of their organization.
Tolentino:
Capacity of Juridical Persons.-The
juridical person is not completely at par w/
35
Balane:
Requisites of Domicile: (1) physical
presence; (2) animus manendi (intent to
remain) (Gallego v. Vera, 73 P 453.)
Three kinds of Domicile:
Domicile of Origin.-Domicile of the
parents of a person at the time he was
born
Domicile of Choice.-- Domicile chosen by a
person to change his original domicile.
Aside fr. the 2 requisites mentioned
above, a third requisite must be present
in domicile of choice, animus non
revertendi (intention not to return to
one's old domicile as his permanent
place.)
Domicile by Operation of Law.-- E.g., Art.
69, FC.
Three Rules in Domicile:
A man must have a domicile somewhere.
A domicile once established remains until a
new one is acquired.
A man can have only 1 domicile at a time.
Domicile & Residence. Domicile is not
the same as residence.
Domicile is
residence plus habituality.
36
Tolentino:
FAMILY CODE
NOTE: The FC took effect on August 3, 1988
following its complete publication in the
Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987.
(Arts. 1-54
Outline)
follow
Prof.
Ruben
Balane's
MARRIAGE
A. DEFINITION
Tolentino:
Marriage
a
Social
Institution.-Marriage is a contract only in form, but in
essence it is an institution of public order,
founded on custom & morality. It is a
contract sui generis w/c cannot be
compared to any other contract.
Characteristics:
(1)
It is civil in
character, bec. it is established by the
State independently of its religious aspect;
(2) it is an institution of public order or
policy, governed by rules established by
law w/c cannot be made inoperative by the
stipulation of the parties; (3)
it is an
institution of natural character, bec. one of
its objects is the satisfaction of the intimate
sentiments & needs of human beings for
the organic perpetuation of man.
Balane:
Tolentino:
OF
VALID
Balane:
There are two kinds of requisites, the
essential & the formal.
There are three essential requisites:
legal capacity of the contracting parties,
consent freely given &
difference in sex (other commentators
opine that this third is already included
in legal capacity.)
39
3 formal requisites:
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer,
(2) a valid marriage license &
(3) some form of ceremony.
Distinction.-Absence,
Irregularity of Requisites:
Defect,
1. A. LEGAL CAPACITY
1. B. CONSENT
CONTRACTING PARTIES
OF
40
41
Tolentino:
Ceremony
of
Marriage.-The
requirement of a marriage ceremony
prevents the recognition in the Phils. of
what are known as "common law
marriages." A common law marriage is a
present agreement bet. a man & a woman
w/ capacity to enter into such rel'p, to take
ea. other as H & W, followed by
cohabitation.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35 (2).
xxx
Balane:
42
Art. 8.
The marriage shall be
solemnized publicly in the chambers of the
judge or in open court, in the church,
chapel or temple, or in the office of the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as
the case may be, & not elsewhere, except
in cases of marriages contracted at the
point of death or in remote places in
accordance w/ Article 29 of this Code, or
where both of the parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in w/c case
the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement of that effect.
Sempio-Dy:
This provision is only
directory, not mandatory, so that noncompliance therew/ will not invalidate the
marriage.
SAN GABRIEL V. SAN GABRIEL [56 O.G.
P. 3555 (1960)]
The mere fact that the marriage
took place on a Sunday also would not
necessarily vitiate the marriage on the
ground that it constitutes a violation of the
requirement that the marriage shall be
solemnized publicly in the office of the
judge in open court.
2.b Marriage License
FOR ISSUANCE
A. APPLICATION
B.
PROOF
OF CAPACITY
44
Tolentino:
Documents Required.-- To prove the ages
of the contracting parties, the ff. may be
required by the local civ. registrar:
Original or certified copies of birth
certificates.
In the absence of birth certs., the original or
certified copies of baptismal certs.
In the absence of the above documents, the
party may present his residence cert. or
the affidavit of 2 witnesses.
When Proof of Age Dispensed With:
When the parents of the contracting parties
appear personally bef. the local civ. reg.
& swear to the correctness of their ages;
When the local civ. reg. is convinced, by
merely looking at the parties that they
have the required ages;
When a party has formerly married, but is
widows, or divorced, or the previous
marriage has been invalidated. (see art.
13.)
Art. 27. In case either or both of the
contracting parties are at the point of death,
the marriage may be solemnized w/o the
necessity of a marriage license & shall
remain valid even if the ailing party
subsequently survives.
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is
so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear
personally before the local civil registrar, the
marriage may be solemnized w/o the
necessity of a marriage license.
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the
two preceding articles, the solemnizing
officer shall state in an affidavit executed
before the local civil registrar or any other
person legally authorized to administer oaths
that the marriage was performed in articulo
mortis or that the residence of either party,
specifying the barrio or barangay, is so
located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear
personally before the local civil registrar &
that the officer took the necessary steps to
ascertain the ages & relationship of the
contracting parties & the absence of a legal
impediment to the marriage.
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit
required in the last preceding article,
together w/ a legible copy of the marriage
contract, shall be sent by the person
Tolentino:
This art. intends to facilitate & encourage
the marriage of persons who have been
living together in a state of concubinage for
more than 5 yrs. The publicity & other
attendant inconveniences in securing the
marriage license, might be embarrassing to
such persons & deter them fr. legalizing
their union.
Sempio-Dy: Besides, the marriage of the
parties will result in the legitimization of
natural children born to them during their
cohabitation.
45
Note:
The fact of absence of legal
impediment bet. the parties must be present
at the time of the marriage, not during their
5-yr. cohabitation.
PEOPLE VS. DAVID
FACTS: D & complainant EG applied for a
marriage license & were issued, in lieu of
Prov. Form #95A, an official receipt, for lack
of the regular form. Subsequently, they were
married. EG found out that D was previously
married to LG so she filed a suit for bigamy.
Ds defense was that the 2nd marriage was
void for lack of a valid marriage license
HELD: A mere defect or irregularity in the
issuance of a license does not affect the
validity of the marriage. It is the complete
absence of a license w/c makes such
marriage void.
IN CAB, since the regular
form was not available, the OR issued by the
proper official served as the license itself &
not just a mere evidence of payment. Since
all the req. for the issuance of the license has
been fulfilled, the receipt can be considered a
valid license for all intents & purposes. Thus,
D is guilty of bigamy!
LORIA VS. FELIX
FACTS: F & M had been living together as
Husband & Wife. During the early part of the
liberation, M became seriously ill. The priest,
upon learning that these 2 souls have been
living together w/o the benefit of marriage
asked them to ratify their union accdg to
Catholic rites. The marriage was celebrated
in articulo mortis. M recovered for a while,
but she died a yr. later. The Ps, claiming to
be Ms grandnephews & nieces, demanded
that F deliver the props left by their grant
aunt. F claims his right over the props as Ms
widower.
HELD: F is entitled to the props bec the
marriage was valid.
Ps allege that the
marriage was invalid bec the priest failed to
make & file the affidavit required by Secs. 2021. SC- It was the priests obligation-noncompliance w/ it should bring no serious
consequences to the married pair, specially
where it was caused by the emergency.
The law permits marriages in articulo
mortis w/o marriage license but it requires
the priest to make the affidavit & file it. Such
affidavit contains the date usually required
for the issuance of a Marriage license & it
essential
3.
Legal Capacity (an
requisite.)-- Art. 2 par. 1
Balane:
There is here an absolute
absence of an essential requisite.
AGE.
Tolentino:
Tolentino:
Tolentino:
Age of Consent.-- The age for each party
provided in Art. 5 is generally known as the
"age of consent." for marriage. Eighteen yrs.
is the "age of consent" bec. below this age, a
party to a marriage cannot give a binding
valid consent.
perfect
binding
yrs. of
of legal
Art. 47.
The action for annulment of
marriage must be filed by the following
persons & w/in the periods indicated herein:
Balane:
This kind of marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation for a reasonable period of time
after the minor reaches the age of 21. Here
ratification can set in even before the
prescription sets in.
Art. 39. The action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe. xxx
B.
RELATIONSHIP.
&
c. Prior Marriage.
Balane:
Between
collateral
blood
relatives,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the
fourth civil degree;
Between step-parents & step-children;
Between parents-in-law & children-in-law;
Tolentino:
[F]or purposes of remarriage it would be
necessary to such void M to secure a final
judgement declaring it null & void fr. the
beginning. W/o such final judgment, the
previous void marriage would constitute an
impediment to the remarriage, & a marriage
license may be denied. This article applies
only when a license is to be obtained for a
subsequent marriage.
DOMINGO V. CA [226 SCRA 572 (1993)]
A spouse may petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage for a purpose other
than her remarriage.
Art. 41.
A marriage contracted by any
person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null & void, unless before
the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years & the spouse present had
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only 2 years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, w/o prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
xxx
The trial court granted the
petition. CA affirmed the ruling. Hence this
petition for review.
HELD:
A petition to declare an absent
spouse presumptively dead may not be
granted in the absence of any allegation that
the spouse present will remarry.
There are 4 requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death under Art. 41:
That the absent spouse has been missing for
4 consecutive years, or 2 consecutive yrs.
if the disappearance occurred where
there is a danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Art. 391.
That the spouse present wishes to remarry
That the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absentee is dead.
That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
The Court believes that resp. Nolasco
failed to conduct a search for his missing wife
w/ such diligence as to give rise to a "wellfounded belief" that she is dead. The Court
considers
the
investigation
allegedly
conducted by Nolasco in his attempt to
ascertain the whereabouts of Janet as to
sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or
well-founded belief that she was already
dead.
For instance, when he arrived in
Antique, instead of seeking the help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, he
secured another seaman's contract & went to
London. We do not consider that walking into
a major city w/ a simple hope of somehow
bumping into one particular person there xxx
can be regarded as a reasonable diligent
search. The Court also views Nolasco's claim
that Janet declined to give any info. as to her
personal background even after marrying
Nolasco as too convenient an excuse to
justify his failure to locate her.
BIENVENIDO V. CA
[237 SCRA 676
(1994)]
When a man contracts a subsequent
marriage while the first marriage is
subsisting, the second marriage as a general
rule is void for being bigamous. He who
invokes that the second marriage is voidable
for being an exception under Art. 83 of the
NCC has the burden of proving it.
51
52
Art. 43.
The termination of the
subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall produce the following
effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent
marriage conceived prior to its termination
shall be considered legitimate, & their
custody & support in case of dispute shall be
decided by the court in a proper proceeding;
(2) The absolute community of property
or the conjugal partnership, as the case may
be, shall be dissolved & liquidated, but if
either spouse contracted said marriage in
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of
the
community
property
or
conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are
none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or, in default of children,
the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall
remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked by
operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the
designation of the other spouse who acted in
bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance
policy, even if such designation be stipulated
as irrevocable; &
(5) The spouse who contracted the
subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit fr. the innocent spouse
by testate & intestate succession.
Art. 44.
If both spouses of the
subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
Tolentino:
If the subsequent marriage is not
terminated
by
the
subsequent
reappearance or by judicial declaration, but
by death, do these effects arise?
A:
It is submitted that generally if a
subsequent M is dissolved by the death of
either spouse, the effects of dissolution of
valid M shall arise. The GF or BF of either
spouse can no longer be raised, bec., as in
annullable or voidable M, the M cannot be
questioned except in a direct action for
annulment.
But if both parties acted in BF,
under 44, the M is void ab initio. In such
case, the validity of the M can be attacked
collaterally at any time, & the effects
provided on 44 can be applied even if the
dissolution is by death of one of the
spouses.
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses
may marry again after complying w/ the
requirements of the immediately preceding
Article;
otherwise,
the
subsequent
marriage shall be null & void.
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or
of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition & distribution of the properties of
the spouses, & the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes shall be
recorded in the appropriate civil registry &
registries of property; otherwise, the same
shall not affect third persons.
Art. 39. The action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe. xxx
D.
CRIME.
Balane:
Art. 38 (9) used to be Art. 80 (6) of the NCC.
Two changes were made: (1) the killing must
be w/ the intention to marry the other; (2)
conviction is not required, a preponderance
of evidence being sufficient.
Tolentino:
Killing of Spouse.-- It is submitted that a
criminal conviction for the killing is not
necessary to render the marriage void under
the FC. The removal of the requirement by
the FC must be taken as deliberate.
Art. 39. The action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe. xxx
E.
PHYSICAL
CAPABILITY.
(5)
That either party was physically
incapable of consummating the marriage w/
the other, & such incapacity continues &
appears to be incurable;
xxx
Tolentino:
Balane:
Physical Incapacity: Requisites: (1) The
incapacity exists at the time of the
celebration of the M; (2) Such incapacity
must be permanent (it continues to the time
when the case for annulment is being tried) &
incurable ; (3) It must be unknown to the
other contracting party; (4) the other spouse
must not himself/ herself be impotent.
This kind of marriage
ratified by ratification.
cannot be
Tolentino:
54
F.PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
Sempio-Dy:
Provision is Taken fr. Canon Law.-- Par. 3
of Can 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law
provides that:
"Matrimonial Consent
The following are incapable of contracting
marriage:
xxx
3.
Those who, bec. of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
The Committee decided to adopt par.
3 of the New Code of Canon Law as a ground
for the declaration of nullity of marriage for
the following reasons: (1) As a substitute for
divorce; (2) As a solution to the problem of
Church-annulled marriages; (3)
As an
additional remedy to parties who are
imprisoned by a marriage that exists in name
only as they have long separated bec. of the
inability of one of them to perform the
essential obligations of marriage.
Psychological Incapacity Distinguished
fr. Vice of Consent.-Psychological
incapacity is not a question of defective
consent but a question of fulfillment of a valid
consent.
Q:
Why Were No Examples of
Psychological Incapacity Given in this
Article?
A: The Committee did not give any examples
of psychological incapacity for fear that the
giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provisions under the
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Tolentino:
Retroactivity of Art. 36.-- By providing
for a 10-yr prescriptive period for marriages
of this nature solemnized bef. the
effectivity of the FC, the latter has actually
given a retroactive effect to the present
article.
We submit that this is a juridical
mistake. It is like an ex post facto provision
translated into the filed of civil law. It
contravenes the provisions of Art. 255 w/c
allows retroactivity of the FC provisions
only when it does not impair or prejudice
vested or acquired rights.
C. VOID MARRIAGES
Tolentino:
56
SANTOS V. CA
Meaning
of
"psychological
incapacity"
confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders demonstrative of
insensitivity or inability to give meaning &
significance to the marriage.
FACTS:
On 9/20/86, Leouel Santos &
Julia Rosario Bedia exchanged vows bef. a
PI should be characterized by
gravity;
juridical antecedent; &
incurability.
DOMINGO V. CA
FACTS:
Delia Domingo filed a pet.
for decl. of nullity of her marriage w/
Roberto Domingo, on the ground that,
unknown to her, he was previously married
at the time of their marriage. She prays
that their marriage be declared null & void
&, as a consequence, to declare that she is
the exclusive owner of all properties she
acquired during the marriage & to recover
them fr. him.
Roberto moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the marriage
being void ab initio, the petition for decl. of
nullity is unnecessary citing Peo. v. Aragon
& Peo. v. Mendoza. Roberto claims that
decl of nullity is necessary under Art. 40,
FC only for the purpose of remarriage. The
59
HELD:
The Declaration of nullity of a
marriage under Art. 40 may be resorted to
even for a purpose other than remarriage.
GOMEZ V. LIPANA
D. VOIDABLE MARRIAGE
Baviera:
The court should not have
applied Gomez v. Lipana, since there is
no provision in the Civil Code giving
effect to a void marriage in good faith.
1. GROUNDS
ANNULMENT
FOR
61
Concurring (Gatmaitan):
Marriage
license was secured on the same day that
it was applied for. It was therefore void for
lack of the required 10 days of publication.
be
annulled
TOLENTINO :
Party of Unsound Mind. (45.2) -- The
test of unsoundness of mind is WON the
party at the time of the M was capable of
understanding the nature & consequences
of the M. Insanity must exist at the time of
the M, to avoid it.
Somnambulism has the same effect
as insanity. (Sanchez Roman.)
Burden of Proof -- Presumption of the law
is generally in favor of sanity, & he who
alleges the insanity of another has the
burden of proving it. But once general
insanity is proved to exist, it is presumed to
continue; & if a recovery or a lucid interval
is alleged, the burden to prove such
allegation is on the person making it.
Ratification -- Par. 2 gives the right of
action to annul to the insane spouse &
provides for ratification after regaining
reason. No right of action is given to the
sane spouse; this is based on the
assumption that he knew of the insanity of
the other party & is placed in estoppel. But
if he did not know of such insanity at the
time of the M, he is given a right of action
under Art. 47 par. 2, any time before the
death of the insane spouse.
Sexually Transmissible Disease. (45.6)
-- The reason for this cause for A is the
danger to the health of the other spouse &
offspring, giving rise to possibility of
avoidance of sexual relations, & the failure
to attain one of the purpose of M, that is,
the procreation of children & raising of a
family.
Ratification of Voidable Marriage.-The law does not fix a definite period
during w/c this cohabitation should last in
order to constitute ratification. xxx It is
submitted that when the cohabitation has
continued for such a length of time, after
the cause of nullity has ceased to exist, as
to give rise to a reasonable inference that
the party entitled to bring the action for
nullity prefers to continue w/ the M, there is
ratification w/c purges the M of its original
defect.
62
63
FOR
ANNULMENT
or after
BAVIERA:
What in 1988 if wife
discovered husband had a venereal
disease 2 years after the marriage?
A: Apply Art. 47(5)
immediately
after
the
marriage
celebration). Helen was declared in default
when she failed to file a responsive
pleading despite service of summons. CFI
also ordered the fiscal to determine WON
there was collusion, but Tolentino refused
to show his evidences to the fiscal & to
submit to his interrogation.
Issue: WON CFI correctly dismissed the
axn due to the fiscals lack of intervention
Held: Yes. The fiscals investigation is a
prerequisite to annulment where the
defendant defaulted.
Marriage is more
than a mere contract, thus, the prohibition
against annulling a marriage based on a
stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment or by non-appearance of
defendant. When the defendant fails to
appear, the law enjoins the Court to direct
the prosecuting officer to intervene for the
State.
JOCSON VS. ROBLES [22 S 521]
Facts :Gloria Jocson filed an axn for
annulment & for damages on the ground
that her marriage to Robles was bigamous
(she discovered that he had married a
Josefina Fausto 1st). Robles also claimed
that their marriage was invalid bec. he had
been coerced to marry her by her parents
& brothers. He filed a M for summary
judgment supported by affidavits of the
Gloria's father & brothers. Gloria also
submitted the case for judgment on the
pleadings.
The court denied both, &
dismissed the case when both failed to
attend a scheduled hearing..
Issue: WON
correct
denials
&
dismissal
was
65
[73 O.G.
OF
ANNULMENT
67
SALONGA (contd.):
Philippine Law on Substantive Validity.-W/ reference to marriages celebrated abroad,
Phil. law primarily refers to the law of the
place of celebration. xxx The general rule
expressed in the formula "valid where
celebrated, valid everywhere" admits of at
least 2 exceptions: (1) in the case of Filipino
nationals who marry abroad before Phil.
consular or diplomatic officials; (2) in the
saving clause of Art. 26 par. 1.
IV.
LEGAL SEPARATION
BAVIERA:
This resulted fr. the Tripoli
Agreement.
71
Annulment
&
Legal
Separation
Distinguished:
(1)
Annulment (A) is
caused by some circumstance existing at the
time of the M, while the cause of legal
separation (LS) arises after the celebration of
the M; (2) an A of M terminates the marital
bond bet. the parties while LS does not; & (3)
A of M, once final, cannot be set aside so as
to restore the marital relation, while LS may
be terminated & marital relations resumed by
the reconciliation of the parties.
Tolentino:
Divorce & Its Kinds.-Divorce is the
dissolution or partial suspension, by law, of
the marital relation; the dissolution being
termed divorce fr. the bond of matrimony, or
a vinculo matrimonii; the suspension being
known as divorce fr. bed & board, or a mensa
et thoro. The former is sometimes also called
absolute, & the latter relative divorce.
Legal Separation & Separation of
Property.-In the former, there is a
suspension of common marital life, both as to
person & property, while in the latter, only
the property relation is affected, & the
spouses may be actually living together.
Legal Separation & Separation of
Spouses.-- Legal Separation (LS) can be
effected only be decree of the court; but the
spouses may be separated in fact w/o any
judgment of the court. Under the NCC, any
contract for personal separation between
husband & wife shall be void & of no effect.
[Art. 221 (1), NCC.] With the repeal of Art.
221, & the omission fr. the FC of a similar
provision, the rule prior to the NCC is
restored, & such agreements are again valid.
Foreign Divorces.-- A foreign divorce bet.
Filipino citizens, sought & decreed after the
effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to
recognition as valid in the Phils. This is still
the rule under the FC.
A. GROUNDS
BALANE:
This is an exclusive enumeration.
Observe that some grounds would
tend to overlap w/ the grounds for
annulment. In such a case, the aggrieved
party has the option, either to bring an
action for annulment or for LS.
Par. (1).-- TOLENTINO: The violence
must be of a serious degree, but does not
have to amount to an attempt against the
life of the petitioner., w/c is covered by par.
(9). The violence must be repeated, to the
extent that common life w/ def. becomes
extremely difficult for the plaintiff.
It is submitted that the repeated
physical violence or the grossly abusive
language should be committed only by one
spouse & not by both to each other.
Par. (2).-- TOLENTINO: The physical
violence or moral pressure to compel the
plaintiff to change religious or political
affiliation need not be repeated. A single
incident would be enough.
BALANE: The pressure must be undue. It
becomes undue when the other spouse is
deprived of the free exercise of his or her
will.
Par. (3).-- TOLENTINO: If both spouses
agree that the wife or a daughter engage in
prostitution, neither one should be allowed
72
[155
Where
the
prescription.
action
is
barred
by
[109 P 788
Par. (2).-Consent.-TOLENTINO:
Consent is the agreement or conformity in
advance of the commission of the act w/c
would be a ground for LS.
Par. (3).-Connivance.-TOLENTINO:
Connivance is distinguished fr. consent in
that consent is unilateral, or an act of only
one
spouse.
Connivance
implies
agreement, express or implied, by both
spouses to the ground for LS.
Par. (4).-- Recrimination.-- TOLENTINO:
Recrimination is a countercharge in a suit
for LS that the complainant is also guilty of
an offense constituting a ground for LS.
This defense is based on the principle that
a person must come to court w/ clean
hands.
Par. (5).-Effect of Collusion.-TOLENTINO: Collusion is the agreement
bet. husband & wife for one of them to
commit, or to appear to commit or
presented in court as having committed, a
matrimonial offense, or to suppress
evidence of a valid defense, for the
purpose of enabling the other to obtain LS.
B. LIMITATION OF ACTION
Art. 57. In action for legal separation
shall be filed w/in five years fr. the time of
the occurrence of the cause.
TOLENTINO:
Law does not encourage LS, & provides for
prescription of the action even when the
offended party has not had knowledge of
the cause. xxx If plaintiff does not come
to know of the ground for LS, & 5 yrs.
expire fr. the date of its occurrence, he
cannot sue for LS.
BROWN VS. YAMBAO
(1957)]
was
confession
of
[99 P 709
[231 SCRA
SABALONES VS. CA
TOLENTINO:
Effects of Filing Petition:
The spouses can live separately fr. each other
The administration of the common prop.,
whether in absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains, shall be
given by the Court to either of the
spouses or to a third person, as is best for
the interests of the community.
In the absence of a written agreement of the
spouses, the Court shall provide for the
support bet. the spouses & the custody &
support of the common children, taking
into account the welfare of the children &
their choice of the parent w/ whom they
wish to remain.
When the consent of one spouse to any
transaction of the other is required by
law, judicial authorization shall be
necessary, unless such spouse voluntarily
gives such consent.
Alimony "pendente lite."-During the
pendency of the suit for legal separation
upon a complaint filed & admitted, it is the
duty of the court to grant alimony to the wife
& to make provisions for the support of the
children not in the possession of the father.
Should def. appear to have means to pay
alimony & refuses to pay, either an order of
execution may be issued or a penalty for
contempt may be imposed, or both.
Custody of the Children.-While the
action is pending, the custody of the children
[43 S 177
OF
LEGAL
1. EFFECTS
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation
shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live
separately fr. each other, but the marriage
bonds shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the
conjugal partnership shall be dissolved &
liquidated but the offending spouse shall
have no right to any share of the net profits
earned by the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, w/c shall be forfeited
in accordance w/ the provisions of Article
43 (2);
Art. 43. The termination of the
subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:
xxx
(2) The absolute community of property
or the conjugal partnership, as the case
may be, shall be dissolved & liquidated, but
if either spouse contracted said marriage in
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits
of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty spouse
by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
(3) The custody of the minor children
shall be awarded to the innocent spouse,
subject to the provisions of Article 213 of
this Code; &
Art. 213. In case of separation of the
parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all
78
conjugal assets.
v.CA)
BALANE:
There are four (4) other effects
Donation propter nuptias may be revoked by
the innocent spouse. (Art. 64.)
Designation of the guilty spouse in the
insurance policy may be revoked. (id.)
Cessation of the obligation of mutual support.
(Art. 198.)
Wife may continue using the surname before
the decree of legal separation. (Art. 372,
NCC.)
2. RECONCILIATION
TOLENTINO:
Support & Assistance.-- After the decree
of LS, the obligation of mutual support bet.
the spouses ceases; however, the court may
order the guilty spouse to give support to the
innocent spouse. (Art. 198.)
Successional Rights.-- The guilty spouse,
by virtue of the decree of LS becomes
disqualified to succeed the innocent spouse.
She would not even be entitled to the
legitime. xxx But if the will is executed after
the decree, the disposition in favor of the
offender shall be valid.
LEDESMA VS. INTESTATE
PEDROSA
[219 SCRA 806]
(citing Macadangdang
ESTATE
OF
TOLENTINO:
Concept
of
Reconciliation.-Reconciliation is a mutual agreement to
live together again as husband & wife. It
must be voluntary mutual agreement.
It is submitted that the fact of
resuming common life is the essence of
reconciliation & terminates the legal
separation even if the joint manifestation
has not been filed in court.
BALANE:
Contrary view.-- Technically, what will set
aside the decree of LS is the filing of a joint
verified manifestation of reconciliation.
Without that, the court cannot act motu
proprio.
79
not listed or not notified, unless the debtorspouse has sufficient separate properties to
satisfy the creditor's claim.
TOLENTINO:
BALANE:
Effects of Reconciliation:
Custody over the children.-- Joint custody is
restored.
Compulsory & intestate succession is
restored.
Testamentary succession.-There is no
revival. Reconciliation will not necessarily
revive the institution of the guilty spouse
in the will of the innocent spouse.
Donation propter nuptias will remain revoked.
Art. 67. The agreement to revive the
former property regime referred to in the
proceeding Article shall be executed under
oath & shall specify:
(1) The properties to be contributed anew
to the restored regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separated
properties of each spouse; &
(3) The names of all their known
creditors, their addresses & the amounts
owing to each.
The agreement of revival & the motion for
its approval shall be filed w/ the court in the
same proceeding for legal separation, w/
copies of both furnished to the creditors
named therein. After due hearing, the court
shall, in its order, take measures to protect
the interest of creditors & such order shall be
recorded in the proper registries of
properties.
The recording of the order in the registries
of property shall not prejudice any creditor
BALANE:
These are called legal obligations but they
are more of a statement of policy. An
action for specific performance is not
proper to enforce these obligations. The
only possible consequences are found in
Art.100 for ACP & 127 for CPG.
With regard to the mutual obligation of
fidelity, there are consequences both civil
& criminal (adultery or concubinage.).
80
The
however,
assistance
extends to
assistance,
BALANE:
Art. 70 is an implementation of the third duty
of the spouses, that of support. Correlate this
w/ Art. 194.
Where to get the funds? There are three
sources in the order of priority:
1. From the common property
2. From the income or fruits of the separate
property
* Note: Numbers 1 & 2 are different
sources only if the property relationship is
ACP. In CPG, numbers 1 & 2 will be the same.
3. From the separate property themselves.
TOLENTINO:
What Properties Answerable.-- The
order of liability for family support of the
different properties of the marriage is:
first, the community prop., then the income
of the spouses or fruits of their separate
properties,
&
finally,
the
separate
properties of the spouses. The liability of
the spouses for the support of the family
being joint, this may mean that they
contribute equally, regardless of the value
of the respective properties of the spouses.
However, this would not be equitable. The
better rule seems to be that the
contribution should be proportionate to the
properties of the spouses.
Management of Household.-- In view of
the silence of the law on how the
disagreement bet. the spouses in the
management of the household shall be
settled, the custom should be observed, &
the wife's position should be given priority.
Art. 72.
When one of the spouses
neglects his or her duties to the conjugal
union or commits acts w/c tend to bring
danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to
the family, the aggrieved party may apply
to the court for relief.
Tolentino:
What Relief May Be Granted.-- Under the
NCC, when one party applies for relief bec.
of the acts or negligence of the other
spouse, "the court may counsel the
offender to comply w/ his or her duties, &
take such measures as may be proper."
Notw/standing this omission in the FC, we
believe that the court has full freedom to
determine the kind of relief that may be
given. The relief, however, must be lawful.
Art. 73.
Either spouse may exercise
any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity w/o the consent of the
other. The latter may object only on valid,
serious, & moral grounds.
82
TOLENTINO:
Disposition of Products of Activity.-May the husband or wife engaged in a
profession or business freely dispose of the
products of such activity?
A distinction
should be observed.
If the disposition is in the course of
the professional or commercial activity, the
spouse should be free to dispose of the
products of such activity. xxx But if the
funds will be used to buy real estate, then the
spouse should act jointly, if the property
regime of the marriage is absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains,
bec. such funds are common prop. of the
marriage.
B.
OBLIGATION
TOGETHER
TO
LIVE
General
rule:
once
marriage
is
celebrated, there is already a property
regime & this cannot be changed:
Except:
legal separation (ACP/CPG is dissolved)
revival of former property regime upon
reconciliation
petition of one spouse for separation in
case of abandonment or failure to
comply w/ marital obligations
judicial dissolution of regime: joint petition
or petition by one spouse for cause.
(Art 135/136)
Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the
marriage settlements, agree upon the
regime of absolute community, conjugal
partnership of gains, complete separation
of property, or any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when
the regime agreed upon is void, the system
of absolute community of property as
established in this Code shall govern.
Property regimes w/c may govern:
1.Absolute Community of Property
2.Conjugal Partnership of Gains
3.Separattion of Property
4.If that agreed upon is void, or if none
agreed on, then ACP
Art. 76. In order that any modification
in the marriage settlements may be valid,
it must be made before the celebration of
the marriage, subject to the provisions of
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 & 136.
Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in
the preceding Article shall have the
following consequences:
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if
still pending, shall thereby be terminated at
whatever stage; &
(2) The final decree of legal separation
shall be set aside, but the separation of
property & any forfeiture of the share of
the guilty spouse already effected shall
subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive
their former property regime.
84
Tolentino:
Rule:
Whatever regime of property
relation that the spouses may adopt is
unchangeable & cannot be altered, once
the marriage has been celebrated. Spouses
cannot even abandon the agreement made
in the marriage settlement & substitute the
regime of ACP bec. such is only suppletory
in character, to be applied when there is no
agreement in a marriage settlement.
85
Balane:
Formal
requirement
of
a
marriage
settlement:
in writing
in a public or private instrument
to bind third persons, it must be
recorded in the registry of
property.
1. Father
2. Mother
3. Surviving Parent or Guardian
4. Person w/ legal charge of them
Art. 79.
For the validity of any
marriage settlements executed by a person
upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction
has been pronounced or who is subject to
any
other
disability,
it
shall
be
indispensable for the guardian appointed
by a competent court to be made a party
thereto.
Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary
stipulation in a marriage settlements, the
property relations of the spouses shall be
governed by Philippine laws, regardless of
the place of the celebration of the marriage
& their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity
of contracts affecting property not situated
in the Philippines & executed in the country
where the property is located; &;
(LEX SITUS- contract - abroad - property
- abroad)
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity
of contracts entered into in the Philippines
86
Art. 81...Void
Art. 86...revocable
If the marriage is not celebrated,
the DPN should be void.
Donation Propter Nuptias (requisites)
Balane:
Does this article imply that the couple can
validly stipulate that a foreign law shall
govern their relation?
Tolentino:
Tolentino:
B.
CAPACITY
TO
EXECUTE
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT
MINOR
Baviera:
Art. 14 - father, mother, surviving
parent or guardian, or persons having
legal charge of them, in the order
mentioned.
Title IX - Parental authority
CIVIL INTERDICTION
Balane:
This article is inconsistent w/ Art. 86(1)
Suppose that donation propter nuptias
are made but the marriage is not
celebrated...what happens to the donations?
Art. 79.
For the validity of any
marriage settlements executed by a person
upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction
has been pronounced or who is subject to
any
other
disability,
it
shall
be
87
C. FORMALITY
F. DONATIONS BY REASON OF
MARRIAGE
D. CONFLICT OF LAW
NOT
Art. 81.
Everything stipulated in the
settlements or contracts referred to in the
preceding articles in consideration of a future
marriage, including donations between the
prospective spouses made therein, shall be
88
2. FORM
SERRANO V. SOLOMON
Facts: Before the marriage, the future
husband, Melchor Solomon, executed a purported donation propter nuptias w/c provides
that (1) he donates all his properties to his
future children, if any; or (2) if there are none
& he dies before his wife, one-half of his
properties & those acquired during the
marriage shall go to his brothers & sisters; or
(3) if there are no children & his wife dies
before him, one half of all his properties &
those acquired during the marriage shall go
TO THOSE WHO REARED HIS WIFE (plaintiff).
His wife, Alejandra, predeceased him, dying
w/o issue.
Estanislao Serrano, who had
reared Alejandra, filed an action to enforce
the donation. CFI declared the donation null
& void.
Issue: WoN this was a donation proper
nuptias & if so, WoN it was a valid donation
Held: There is no valid donation propter
nuptias. While the donation was made before
the marriage, it was not made in consideration of marriage, bec. marriage was not the
only consideration for the donation since
other conditions were imposed. The marriage
would have to be childless & one of the
spouses would have to die before the other
before the donation would operate. And even
if in consideration of the marriage, it was not
in favor of one or both of the spouses, but IN
FAVOR OF 3rd PERSONS or persons other
than the spouses.
Tolentino:
The principal modifications under the
Family Code of the general rules on
donations are:
Donations propter nuptias do not require
express acceptance by the donee.
If made by minors (below 21), they must
be w/ the consent of those required to give
consent to the marriage.
They cannot exceed 1/5 of the present
property of the donor, when made by the
future spouses to each other.
They can include future property.
They are not revoked by the subsequent
birth or appearance of children.
They are revoked by the non-performance
of the marriage & other causes under Art.
86, FC.
Art. 84.
If the future spouses agree
upon a regime other than the absolute
community of property, they cannot donate
to each other in their marriage settlements
more than one-fifth (1/5) of their present
property. Any excess shall be considered
void.
An
oral
donation
requires
the
simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the
document representing the right donated.
Balane:
This article applies only if the
regime agreed upon is one other than the
ACP. If the regime is ACP, there is really no
sense in making DPN's to each other, bec.
DPN's made between the two become
community property. In a CPG & a regime of
Absolute Separation, DPN's made are not
communalized.
The ordinary limitations to donations apply.
i.e. one cannot donate all of his/her property,
leaving nothing to him/herself.
With regard to future property, a donation
may be made only by will, & only as to the
disposable portion.
3.
DISTINGUISHED
INTER VIVOS
A.
FR.
DONATIONS
Balane:
This article does not refer to
donation propter nuptias.
Tolentino:
The basis of this provision is the
principle of unity of personality of the
spouses during the marriage, & is intended to
avoid possible transfer of property fr. one
spouse to the other due to passion or avarice.
It also applies to the parties in what
are called common law marriages;
otherwise, the condition of those who
NAZARENO V. BIROG
Facts: Juan Abeno was married to Andrea
Rodriguez. They had a daughter, Alberia,
the mother of Bonifacio. When Juan died,
Andrea married Cirilo Braganza. they did
not have any children but their grandson
Bonifacio lived w/ them.
Braganza
executed a deed of donation of a parcel of
land in favor of Bonifacio, who was then a
minor.
Donation was accepted by his
parents.
However, Cirilo remained in
possession of the land, & later sold
different portions to Ariola & Birog.
Bonifacio filed an action to recover said
property.
Issue:
Won Bonifacio has a cause of
action against them
Held.
NONE.
A donation made to a
grandchild of a wife by a previous marriage
falls under the prohibition Article 133 of the
Civil Code (Art. 87, FC). Said prohibition
applies notw/standing the fact that the
provision mentions only legitimate children.
(9 Manresa 236).
MATABUENA V. CERVANTES
Facts: Felix Matabuena & Petronila
Cervantes lived as common law spouses
During said relationship, Matabuena made
a donation inter vivos of a parcel of land in
favor of Cervantes. Six years later, they
were legally married. Matabuena died. His
sister, Cornelia, filed an action to recover
the land, claiming the donation made in
90
REVOCATION
Art. 765.
The donation may also be
revoked at the instance of the donor, by
reason of ingratitude in the following cases:
(1) If the donee should commit some
offense against the person, honor or the
property of the donor, or of his wife or
children under his parental authority;
(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any
criminal offense, or any act involving moral
turpitude, even though he should prove it,
unless the crime or the act has been
committed against the donee himself, his
wife or children under his authority;
SOLIS V. BARROSO
Facts:
Juan Lambino & Maxima Barroso
made a donation propter nuptias of some
lands in favor of their son Alejo Lambino &
Fortunata Solis, in a private document, in
consideration of their marriage. One of the
conditions is that in case of death of one of
EXTENT
OF
PROPERTY DONATED
Baviera:
92
MATEO V. LAGUA
Facts: Souses Cipriano & Alejandra Lagua
donated 2 lots to their son Alejandro in
consideration of the latters marriage to
Bonifacia Mateo. Alejandra later died, &
Bonifacia lived w/ her in-laws, who cultivated
said lots. Bonifacia was given the owners
share of the harvest until 1956. Said lots
were later sold by Cipriano to his younger son
Gervacio. Bonifacia sued the spouses. LC
declared the sale null & void. Cipriano &
Gervacio also filed suit for the annulment of
Balane:
There is ACP when:
-there is no marriage settlement
-there is a marriage settlement & the
parties agree on ACP
-the marriage settlement is void.
Importance: see Art. 92 (1)
Tolentino:
The property regime of the
spouses commences at the precise moment
(not the date) the marriage is celebrated.
Waiver not allowed
Art. 89. No waiver of rights, interests,
shares & effects of the absolute community
of property during the marriage can be made
except in case of judicial separation of
property.
When the waiver takes place upon a
judicial separation of property, or after the
marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the
same shall appear in a public instrument &
shall be recorded as provided in Article 77.
Art. 77. The marriage settlements & any
modification thereof shall be in writing,
signed by the parties & executed before the
celebration of the marriage. They shall not
prejudice third persons unless they are
registered in the local civil registry where the
marriage contract is recorded as well as in
the proper registries of property.
The creditors of the spouse who made
such waiver may petition the court to rescind
the waiver to the extent of the amount
sufficient to cover the amount of their credits.
Tolentino:
The article limits itself to prohibiting the
waiver of the benefits of such community.
Such waiver may be made by a spouse in
favor of a particular person, in w/c case there
is an assignment of rights; or it may be made
in general terms, in w/c case the share
renounced accrues to the other spouse or his
heirs. The renunciation, however, does not
deprive the spouse renouncing of his right to
his separate property or capital, nor does it
relieve him of personal obligations.
Co-ownership
Art. 90. The provisions on co-ownership
shall apply to the absolute community of
property between the spouses in all
matters not provided for in this Chapter.
Tolentino:
The patrimony of either spouse
existing at the time of the marriage is
automatically
converted
into
common property, w/o the necessity
of any juridical act transmitting
ownership of the individual objects.
Exceptions
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded
fr. the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the
marriage by gratuitous title by either
spouse, & the fruits as well as the income
thereof, if any, unless it is expressly
provided by the donor, testator or grantor
that they shall form part of the community
property;
(2) Property, for personal & exclusive
use of either spouse. However, jewelry
shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the
marriage by either spouse who has
legitimate descendants [under CC children
only,
but
JBL
loved
his
grandchildren] by a former marriage, & the
fruits as well as the income, if any, of such
property.
94
Balane:
Suppose A & B married under the Family
Code. A inherited fr. his father before the
marriage & this becomes community
property. If A inherits fr. his mother during the
marriage, this becomes paraphernal property.
The fruits of separate property remain
separate under the ACP but become
community property under the CPG.
The following example illustrates an instance
where the CPG regime is stricter:
A marries B (ACP). They bring nothing
into the marriage. All that they inherit, they
get during the marriage. The property thus
inherited is separate, & the fruits thereof are
likewise separate.
Given the same set of facts, except
that the governing regime is CPG, what the
spouses inherit during the marriage is
separate, but the fruits are communalized. It
is in this sense that the CPG regime is stricter.
Tolentino: The properties mentioned under
this article are known as reserved property.
Absent any agreement excluding certain
properties, all the patrimony of the spouses
are reserved.
Presumption
Art. 93. Property acquired during the
marriage is presumed to belong to the
community, unless it is proved that it is one
of those excluded therefr.
of
the
community of
Balane:
Liabilities of the ACP.
94.1 in case of illegitimate children of
either spouse, the community is only
subsidiarily liable.
94.2 all that is required in this case is a
determination of the purpose of the
obligation contracted
Tolentino:
The ACP is liable for the
support of the spouses, their common
children, & legitimate children of either
spouse in a previous marriage.
95
Art.
96.
The
administration
&
enjoyment of the community property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, w/c must be
availed of w/in five years fr. the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the
common properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance w/c must have
the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However,
the
transaction
shall
be
construed as a continuing offer on the part
of the consenting spouse & the third
person, & may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before
the offer is w/drawn by either or both
offerors.
Baviera:
ratified
weird
Balane:
Ownership, administration, enjoyment &
disposition of Community property-all
joint responsibility & right of both
spouses.
In case of a spouse's
unjustified refusal to give his/her
consent, the other may go to court.
There is no provision on alienation &
encumbrance but it is understood that
the same is included.
Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by
will of his or her interest in the community
property.
Art. 98.
Neither spouse may donate
any community property w/o the consent of
the other. However, either spouse may, w/o
the consent of the other, make moderate
donations fr. the community property for
charity or on occasions of family rejoicing
or family distress.
96
The
absolute
community
97
complete
Balane:
Note that dissolution of the ACP is not
synonymous w/ dissolution of the marriage.
In cases involving 99.2 & 99.4, there is
dissolution of the ACP although the marriage
is not dissolved.
But dissolution of the marriage
automatically results in dissolution of the ACP.
Note that when a marriage is declared
as a nullity, there is no ACP to dissolve. The
dissolution in this case is governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In case of liquidation, the following provisions
apply:
(1) dissolution under 99.1...Art 103 governs
liquidation
(2) dissolution under 99.2...Art 63 & 64 apply
(3) dissolution under 99.3...Art 50-52 apply
(4) dissolution under 99.4...Art 134-137 apply
Effect of separation in fact
Art. 100. The separation in fact between
husband & wife shall not affect the regime of
absolute community except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal
home or refuses to live therein, w/o just
cause, shall not have the right to be
supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to
any transaction of the other is required by
law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in
a summary proceeding;
(added in FC)
(3) In the absence of sufficient community
property, the separate property of both
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
support of the family. The spouse present
shall, upon proper petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authority to
administer or encumber any specific
separate property of the other spouse & use
the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the
latter's share.
Tolentino:
Separation in fact refers to the actual
definite separation of the
persons of
husband & wife, thereby terminating
cohabitation or common life under the
same roof, w/o judicial order. As a rule, the
ACP is not affected by such separation,
except as provided in this article. The
spouse who leaves the conjugal home w/o
justification, & refuses to return thereto,
loses his right to be supported by the other
spouse; but his obligation to support the
other is not extinguished. If there is no
one at fault, the obligation to support each
other & the common children continues.
Art. 101. If a spouse w/o just cause
abandons the other or fails to comply w/
his or her obligations to the family, the
aggrieved spouse may petition the court
for receivership, for judicial separation of
property or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the absolute community,
subject to such precautionary conditions as
the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned
in the preceding paragraph refer to marital,
parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned
the other when he or she has left the
conjugal
dwelling
w/o
intention
of
returning. The spouse who has left the
conjugal dwelling for a period of three
months or has failed w/in the same period
to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed
to have no intention of returning to the
conjugal dwelling.
Tolentino:
Abandonment implies a departure w/ the
avowed intent never to return, followed by
prolonged absence w/o just cause, & w/o in
the meantime providing in the least for
ones family although able to do so. There
must be absolute cessation of marital
relations, duties & rights, w/ the intention
of perpetual separation.
community of
Balane:
Basic steps in liquidation:
1) inventory (Art. 102) -3 sets: community
property
list of separate property of wife
list of separate property of husband
2) payment of community debts - pay out
of community assets first...if not enough,
then pay out of separate property...the
husband & the wife shall be solidarily liable
3) deliver to each spouse his or her
respective share
4) division of the net community assets
-note the special rule w/ regard to the
family home...also take note that even
after death, the family home remains
undivided.
5) delivery of presumptive legitimes
The presumptive legitimes are given in the
following cases:
reappearance of former spouse (102.5;
43.2) w/c terminates the second
marriage
annulment, not the declaration of nullity, of
the marriage
legal separation (102.5;63.2)
other cases of dissolution of the ACP/CPG
Effect of death
Art. 103. Upon the termination of the
marriage by death, the community
property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is
instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the community property either
judicially or extra-judicially w/in one year fr.
the death of the deceased spouse. If upon
the lapse of the said period, no liquidation
is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the community property of the
terminated marriage shall be void.
Balane:
Liquidation of the ACP may be done in the
settlement proceedings of the deceased
spouse's estate. Liquidation in such a case
(death) may likewise be done judicially or
extrajudicially.
The
law
requires
that
liquidation be done w/in one(1) year fr.
death...if
not:
any
disposition
or
encumbrance is VOID (103.2) & the
subsequent marriage shall be made subject
to a mandatory regime of separation of
property...the 2nd marriage shall be valid, but
subject to mandatory absolute separation of
property.
Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the
community properties of two or more
marriages contracted by the same person
before the effectivity of this Code is carried
out simultaneously, the respective capital,
fruits & income of each community shall be
determined upon such proof as may be
considered according to the rules of
evidence.
In case of doubt as to w/c
community the existing properties belong,
the same shall be divided between the
different communities in proportion to the
capital & duration of each.
Balane:
The application of this article is possible only
for marriages contracted before 3 August
1988. e.g., In 1955 A married B. A died.
ACP/CPG was not liquidated. In 1965,
B
remarried to C. 1995 C died. B wants to
liquidate both marriages. He will then have
to apply Art. 104. For property whose origin
he is unsure of, the ratio/proportion;
peso/years formula may be used.
x = no. of years of marriage 1
y = capital of marriage 1
A = duration of marriage 2
B = capital of marriage 2
x = 8 years
y = P2 M
A = 30
B = P3 M
formula:
xy
x value of the property
marriage 1
xy + AB
= share of
AB
x value of the property
marriage 2
xy = AB
= share of
Tolentino:
Balane:
Note that at the start of the
marriage, the common fund is at 0 balance.
ANSALDO V. SHERIFF
Art. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88
& 89 shall also apply to conjugal partnership
of gains.
Art. 88.
The absolute community of
property between spouses shall commence
at the precise moment that the marriage is
celebrated. Any stipulation, express or
implied, for the commencement of the
community regime at any other time shall be
void.
Art. 89. No waiver of rights, interests,
shares & effects of the absolute community
of property, or after the marriage has been
dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear
in a public instrument & shall be recorded as
provided in Article 77. The creditors who
made such waiver may petition the court to
rescind the waiver to the extent of the
amount sufficient to cover the amount of
their credits.
Art. 77. The marriage settlements & any
modification thereof shall be in writing,
signed by the parties & executed before the
celebration of the marriage. They shall not
prejudice third persons unless registered in
the local civil registry where the marriage
OF
EACH
ONG V. CA
Held: The mere use of the surname of the
husband in the tax declaration of the subject
property is not sufficient proof that said
property was acquired during the marriage &
is therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that
the subject parcel of land was declared solely
in the wife's name, although the house built
thereon was declared in the name of the
spouses.
Under such circumstances, the
Court held that the subject lot was the
paraphernal property of the wife & thus liable
for her personal debts.
Art. 111.
A spouse of age may
mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise
dispose of his or her exclusive property,
w/o the consent of the other spouse, &
appear alone in court to litigate w/ regard
to the same.
Art. 112.
The alienation of any
exclusive
property
of
a
spouse
administered by the other automatically
terminates the administration over such
property & the proceeds of the alienation
shall be turned over to the owner-spouse.
Art. 113. Property donated or left by
will to the spouses, jointly & w/ designation
of determinate shares, shall pertain to the
donee-spouse as his or her own exclusive
property, & in the absence of designation,
share & share alike, w/o prejudice to the
right of accretion when proper.
Art. 753. When a donation is made to
several persons jointly, it is understood to
be in equal shares, & there shall be no right
of accretion among them, unless the donor
has otherwise provided.
The preceding paragraph shall not be
applicable to donations made to the
husband & wife jointly, between whom
there shall be a right of accretion, if the
contrary has not been provided by the
donor. (Civil Code.)
103
Art. 117.
The following are conjugal
partnership properties:
CASTILLO V. PASCO
Facts: Marcelo Castillo married Macaria
Pasco, a widow who survived 2 husbands. C
later died & P married a fourth time. During
the marriage of C & P, the spouses
Gonzales sold the litigated fishpond to
them. for P6T, to be paid in 3 installments:
P1T upon execution of the deed; P2T on
1/25/33, & P3T w/in a year after. Upon Cs
death, the loan was still unpaid.
P
consigned P12,300 & P752.43 as down
payment. Petitioner heirs of C claim it
should be considered conjugal property for
having been acquired during the marriage.
CA ruled it was paraphernal as it was
bought w/ the exclusive funds of the wife.
It said wifey was a woman of means, while
C died w/o enough assets to pay his debts.
Issue: to whom does the fishpond belong?
Held: The fishpond is 1/6 paraphernal &
5/6 conjugal. The first P1000 was paid out
of the paraphernal property of the wife. Of
this amount, P600 was a debt owed to the
wife by the vendor. It is presumed that this
105
Notes:
No conjugal partnership as the contract of
carriage is personal to the passenger
spouse
Actual damages are conjugal property bec.
the ticket is presumed to have been
bought using common funds.
What about moral damages? Not conjugal.
Arose out of the personal anguish of the
spouse (of being late for take-off when
he had to take a shit at the beach).
Balane:
Rule: Under 117.1, where conjugal funds
were spent, then the property acquired
belongs to the partnership
Except: 109.3 (pacto de retro acquisition
where the right to redemption belongs to
one spouse)
CHEESMAN V. IAC
Held: Even if the wife used conjugal funds
to purchase the lot in question, petitioner,
who is an alien, cannot recover or hold the
lot so acquired in view of the constitutional
prohibition
against
aliens
acquiring
residential lots other than by hereditary
succession.
He
therefore
had
no
personality to question the subsequent sale
of the same property by his wife on the
theory that in so doing, he is merely
exercising the prerogative of a husband in
respect to conjugal property. To sustain
such a theory would permit indirect
controversion
of
the
constitutional
prohibition.
A.
BOUGHT
ON INSTALLMENTS
Art. 118.
Property bought on
installments paid partly fr. exclusive funds
of either or both spouses & partly fr.
conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or
buyers if full ownership was vested before
the marriage. In either case, any amount
advanced by the partnership or by either or
both spouses shall be reimbursed by the
owner or owners upon liquidation of the
partnership.
e.g.
1985 - A buys property fr. BF payable in
installments...A
pays
installments
w/
exclusive property
1990 - A marries B.
The subsequent
amortizations on the property are then paid
w/ conjugal funds.
Test: when title was vested.
if title was vested before 1990, then the
property is exclusive.
if title was vested only after full payment of
amortizations, then the property is
conjugal.
JOVELLANOS V. CA
Facts:
Daniel married Leonor in 1955.
During this marriage, Daniel entered into a
contract of lease & conditional sale w/
Philam. In 1959, Leonor died. In 1967,
Daniel married Annette. In 1975, the full
amount of the lease was paid. Thus Philam
executed in favor of Daniel
a deed of
absolute sale. Daniel died in 1985. Annette
claims that the property is part of the CPG.
of her marriage to Daniel .
Petitioner
children of the first marriage claim that said
property is CPG of the first marriage.
Issue: WoN the property in dispute belongs
to the 2nd marriage?
Held;
YES..
Under the agreement, the
lessee had only the right of possession over
the prop, as well as the temporary use &
enjoyment of the same. The conditional sale
was thus in the nature of a contract to sell
whereby ownership is not transferred upon
delivery but only upon full payment of the
purchase price. The right of Daniel over the
contract was merely an inchoate & expectant
right. Full ownership was vested only upon
the execution of the absolute deed of sale in
1975.
Historical Background
Balane:
Test is when is payment due.
Suppose:
A lent P1M to B
in the promissory note, it is stipulated that
payment shall be on 100 equal monthly
installments & that interest shall be at
20% p.a.
payments start on Oct 1985
A marries B in August 1986
all installments due before August 1986 are
paraphernal
for installments due after August 1986:
principal is exclusive property
interest during the marriage pertain to
the partnership...already civil fruits.
B. IMPROVEMENTS AT EXPENSE OF
CONJUGAL FUNDS OR THROUGH WORK
OR INDUSTRY OF A SPOUSE
Art.
120.
The
ownership
of
improvements,
whether
for
utility
or
adornment, made on the separate property
of the spouses at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of
either or both spouses shall pertain to the
conjugal partnership, or to the original ownerspouse, subject to the following rules:
When the cost of the improvement made
by the conjugal partnership & any resulting
increase in value are more than the value of
the property at the time of the improvement,
the entire property of one of the spouses
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
VITUG V. MONTEMAYOR [93 P 939
(1953)]
Facts: Clodualdo Vitug begot 3 children
during his first marriage, one of them is
herein Pet., Florencia Vitug. After his first
wife died, Clodualdo married Donata,
herein Respondent. During their marriage,
R inherited land fr. her parents valued at
P9,000 w/c was converted by the joint
industry & efforts of the spouses into a
fishpond & sold at profit (P116,000). The
proceeds of w/c were used to buy 30
parcels of land. The deed of sale & the TCT
were executed in the name of Donata.
When Clodualdo died, R did not include in
the inventory of his property said 30
parcels of land. P opposed, claiming the
lots are conjugal, thus they have a share fr.
their fathers half.
Held: The 30 parcels of land are conjugal.
Upon the failure to prove by concrete
evidence that the conversion of the
agricultural lands were done using the
exclusive funds of R, the PRESUMPTION IS
THAT THE EXPENSE WAS CONJUGAL. Also,
since the conversion was done w/ the
industry & efforts of both spouses & that
the value of the improvements on the
paraphernal property of the wife exceeded
its original value, the entire property
became conjugal property subject to
reimbursement of the value of the
agricultural land at the time of liquidation
of the conjugal partnership. The name in
the deed of sale & the TCT are of no
moment.
108
109
V.
FORTUN
[129
675
BALANE REVIEWER
A. Cases
PADILLA V. PADILLA
The mere construction of a building
fr. common funds does not automatically
convey the ownership of the wife's land
(paraphernal) to the conjugal partnership.
The ownership of the land is retained by
the wife until she is paid the value of the
lot as a result of the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
The partnership
maintains a usufructuary right over the
said property during the marriage & until
liquidation.
PADILLA V. PATERNO
The separate properties in this case
never became conjugal bec. the conjugal
improvements constructed thereon were
destroyed before the value of the
paraphernal
land
on
w/c
these
improvements were erected was paid to
the spouse who owned the paraphernal
land. As held in Padilla v. Padilla, payment
of such value occurs only at final
liquidation.
B. Notes
'Plus
value'
refers
to
what
the
improvement contributes to the increase in
the value of the whole thing.
Suppose:
land P3M
irrigation ditches P2M
but bec. of the irrigation ditches, the value
of the land increases to P4.8M
the plus value in this case is P1.8M
the net value of the improvement is P3.8 M
in this case, the entire property becomes
conjugal.
Under the Family Code, the value to be
paid as reimbursement shall be such value
at the time of improvement...in this sense,
the Family Code departs fr. the Padilla
ruling
Whether or not the FC modifies the
Padilla ruling insofar as it held that
ownership shall vest only after full payment
at the time of liquidation...Balane is unsure.
Art. 120 applies only on the assumption
that the improvement exists at the time of
liquidation...if the property is destroyed
before liquidation, then 120 does not apply.
If prior to dissolution, the property &
the improvement thereon is sold--then the
110
OF
111
CUATICO
(1964)]
V.
MORALES
[61
O.G.
869
proof of any
partnership.
benefit to
the
conjugal
CHARGES
PARTNERSHIP
UPON
CONJUGAL
4. ADMINISTRATION
PARTNERSHIP
OF
CONJUGAL
Art. 124.
The administration &
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, w/c must be availed w/in five
years fr. the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance w/c must have
the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse & the third person, &
may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the
offer is w/drawn by either or both offerors.
Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate
any conjugal partnership property w/o the
consent of the other. However, either
spouse may, w/o the consent of the other,
make moderate donations fr. the conjugal
partnership property for charity or on
occasions of family rejoicing or family
distress.
5. DISSOLUTION
Art. 126. The conjugal partnership
terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal
separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or
decreed void;
(4) In case of judicial separation of
property during the marriage under Articles
134 to 138.
113
During
the
pendency
of
the
proceedings for separation of property, the
absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall pay for the support of the
spouses & their children.
Art. 138. After dissolution of the
absolute community or of the conjugal
partnership, the provisions on complete
separation of property shall apply.
Art. 127. The separation in fact
between husband & wife shall not affect
the regime of conjugal partnership, except
that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal
home or refuses to live therein, w/o just
cause, shall not have the right to be
supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to
any transaction of the other is required by
law, judicial authorization shall be obtained
in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal
partnership property, the separate property
of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for
the support of the family. The spouse
present shall, upon petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authority to
administer or encumber any specific
separate property of the other spouse &
use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy
the latter's share.
Art. 128. If a spouse w/o just cause
abandons the other or fails to comply w/
his or her obligations to the family, the
aggrieved spouse may petition the court
for receivership, for judicial separation of
property, or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership
property, subject to such precautionary
conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned
in the preceding paragraph refer to marital
parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned
the other when he or she has left the
conjugal
dwelling
w/o
intention
of
returning. The spouse who has left the
conjugal dwelling for a period of 3 months
or has failed w/in the same period to give
any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed
114
115
E. SEPARATION
OF
PROPERTY
1. DURING MARRIAGE
Art. 134. In the absence of an express
declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between the spouses
during the marriage shall NOT take place
except by judicial order. Such judicial
during
117
3.
REGIME
PROPERTY
OF
SEPARATION
OF
VII. UNION
W/O MARRIAGE
118
AN INSTITUTION
ART. 162.
The provisions in this
Chapter shall also govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable.
NOTES:
The main change fr. the
provisions of the NCC is that under the FC,
there is de facto or automatic constitution
of the family home
The rationale behind this is to
protect
the
family
fr.
the
tragic
consequence of losing the dwelling to
creditors.
Baviera cases:
MODEQUILLO V. BREVA [185 S 766
(1990)]
FACTS: A judgment was rendered against
Modequillo as a result of w/c certain goods
& chattels belonging to him were levied
upon. M filed a motion to set aside levy of
execution on the ground that the levied
residential land is where the family home is
built. As such, he contended that this land
is exempt fr. execution under Arts. 152 &
153 of the FC.
HELD: Under the Family Code, a family
home is deemed constituted on a house &
lot fr. the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is NO NEED to constitute
the same judicially or extrajudicially as
required in the Civil Code. If the family
actually resides in the premises, it is,
therefore, a family home as contemplated
by law. Thus, the creditors should take the
necessary precautions to protect their
interest before extending credit to the
spouses or head of the family who owns
the home.
Art. 162 FC simply means that all
existing family residences at the time of
the effectivity of the Family Code (AUGUST
3, 1988), are considered family homes &
are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the
Family Code. Art. 162 FC does not state
that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V
have a retroactive effect.
GAYON V. GAYON
122
MAGBALETA V. GONONG
HELD: Where one of the parties to a civil
litigation is not a member of the family while
some of the family members are adverse
parties to the said suit, lack of earnest efforts
to reach a compromise should not be
considered a jurisdictional requisite to the
maintenance of an action.
DE GUZMAN V. GENATO
HELD: Substantial
compliance
of
the
requirement of earnest efforts towards a
compromise is enough. It is not necessary
that the plaintiff should expressly use the
terms of the statute, i.e. "that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made, but
Art. 164.
Children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial
insemination of the wife w/ the sperm of the
husband or that of a donor or both are
likewise legitimate children of the husband &
his wife, provided, that both of them
authorized or ratified such insemination in a
written instrument executed & signed by
them before the birth of the child. The
instrument shall be recorded in the civil
registry together w/ the birth certificate of the
child.
BALANE:
Legitimate - conceived or born during the
marriage; the presumption is always in favor
of legitimacy.
Artificial insemination: 3 ways permissible:
artificial insemination husband (AIH)--using
the sperm of the husband--homologous
artificial
insemination
donor
(AID)
-heterologous
artificial insemination combined (AIC)
Requirements:
authorization/ratification of both spouses;
written instrument;
the document should be executed & signed
before the child's birth;
registration in the Civil Registry is not a
requirement for validity.
Presumption
of
Legitimacy.
The
presumption of legitimacy is an example of a
quasi-conclusive
presumption.
This
presumption may be rebutted only on the
grounds provided in Art. 166.
To impugn legitimacy, show that
during the 1st 120 days of the 300 days
preceding the birth, there was physical
impossibility of access between husband &
wife.
Physical impossibility of access may be
shown by preponderance of evidence:
may show impotence;
that the spouses were living separately &
sexual intercourse was not possible; or
serious illness making sexual intercourse
impossible.
Art. 166.1 has no application when the
conception is by artificial insemination.
HELD:
The boy is presumed to be the
legitimate son of said H & his W, he having
been born w/in 300 days following the
dissolution of the marriage. The presumption
can only be rebutted by proof that it was
physically impossible for the H to have access
to her W during the first 120 days of the 300
days next preceding the birth of the child.
The fact that the wife has committed adultery
cannot overcome this presumption. Although
the H was suffering fr. serious tuberculosis,
yet there is no evidence of impotence nor
does it prevent carnal intercourse.
MACADANGDANG V. CA [100 SCRA 73]
HELD: The child Rolando is presumed to be
the legitimate son of resp. & her spouse. This
presumption becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there was physical
impossibility of access between the spouses
in the first 120 days of the 300 days w/c
preceded the birth of the child.
LIM
VS.
125
BAVIERA:
Under the NCC:
Recognition
Filiation other than legitimate
of
Voluntary Recognition
Putative father acknowledges child as
his in the record of birth under oath &
signed by him.
Acknowledgment is contained in a last
will & testament.
Acknowledges child before a court of
record.
Acknowledgment is contained in an
authentic document, e.g., ITR, SSS
Application.
Compulsory Recognition
To compel the father to acknowledge
the child, e.g., the rapist is compelled
to acknowledge child begotten thru
rape.
Proof: Open & continuous possession
of status as child not secret; known
to the community.
Proof: Where there is cohabitation,
that the conception coincided w/ the
period of cohabitation.
Proof: In an authentic handwriting of
the father handwritten instrument
signed by him.
HOWEVER, the child has to bring
action during lifetime of putative
parent. EXCEPTION: Putative parent
dies during minority of the child.
BALANE:
With regard to open &
continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child...the possession in this
case of such status must not be sporadic or
intermittent possession of such status for
an appreciable time is sufficient...it need
not be for the lifetime of the child.
DIAZ
VS.
BAVIERA:
Unless it falls under the 2
exceptions,
(1) child dies during minority
(2) child is in a state of insanity
the right to file this action is not
transmissible to heirs.
Balane:
The FC rules were meant to
liberalize the rules of the NCC on
illegitimacy...there is no more need for
recognition (w/c was required under the
NCC) proof of illegitimacy is now sufficient.
JAO VS. CA [152 SCRA 359]
HELD: Blood grouping tests are conclusive
as to non-paternity but not as to paternity.
The fact that the blood type of the child is a
possible product of the mother & the
alleged father does not inconclusively
prove that the child is born by such
parents; but if the blood type of the child is
not the possible blood type when the blood
of the mother & the alleged father are
crossmatched, then the child cannot
possibly be that of the alleged father.
127
MENDOZA VS. CA
Baviera Cases:
128
mere
sworn
statement registered w/ the Registry
of Deeds. Exempts only as regards
debts contracted AFTER constitution.
Exceptions: taxes, encumbrances.
X. ADOPTION
129
WHAT IS ADOPTION?
A fiction created by law to give (establish) a
relation of people where none previously
existed.
Art. 183.
A person of age & in
possession of full civil capacity & legal
rights may adopt, provided he is in a
position to support & care for his children,
legitimate or illegitimate, in keeping w/ the
means of the family.
Only minors may be adopted, except in
the cases where the adoption of a person
of majority age is allowed in this Title
In addition, the adopter must be at
least sixteen years older than the person to
be adopted, unless the adopter is the
parent by nature of the adopted, or is the
spouse of the legitimate parent of the
person to be adopted.
130
BALANE:
Suppose a child has been
previously adopted, but is to be adopted now
by the spouse of the previous adopter.
Applying Art. 187.3 literally, the spouse may
not adopt. There is a need to reconcile the
apparent conflict between Art. 185 & Art.
187.3
WHERE FILED
Sec. 1, Rule 99. Venue. A person desiring
to adopt another or have the custody of a
minor shall present his petition to the CFI of
the province, or the municipal or justice of
the peace court of the city or municipality in
w/c he resides.
In the City of Manila, the proceedings
shall be instituted in the JDRC.
PROCEDURE
Sec. 2, Rule 99. Contents of petition. The
petition for adoption shall contain the same
allegations required in a petition for
guardianship, to wit:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The qualifications of the adopter;
(c) That the adopter is not disqualified
by law;
(d) The name, age, & residence of the
person to be adopted & of his relatives or of
the persons who have him under their care;
(e) The probable value & character of
the estate of the person to be adopted.
Sec. 3, Rule 99. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed w/ the petition a written
consent to the adoption signed by the child, if
fourteen years of age or over & not
incompetent, & by the child's spouse, if any,
& by each of its known living parents who is
Art. 189.
Adoption shall have the
following effects:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted child
shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopters & both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights & obligations arising fr. the
relationship of parent & child, including the
right of the adopted to use the surname of
the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the
parents by nature over the adopted shall
terminate & be vested in the adopters,
except that if the adopter is the spouse of
the parent by nature of the adopted,
parental authority over the adopted shall
be exercised jointly by both spouses;
(3) The adopted shall remain an
intestate heir of his parents & other blood
relatives.
BALANE:
This provision is defectively
drafted. It only gives rules w/ regard to
intestate succession...it does not give rules
on legitimes...who are the adopted's
compulsory heirs & how much are their
legitimes.
WHO
MAY
FILE
PETITION
RESCISSION OR REVOCATION?
A
FOR
Grounds:
If the adopted person has attempted
against the life of the adopter;
When the adopted minor has abandoned
the home of the adopter for more than
three (3) years;
When by other acts the adopted person
has repudiated the adoption.
(Sec.
1, Rule 100)
Art. 191. If the adopted is a minor or
otherwise incapacitated, the adoption may
be judicially rescinded upon petition of any
person authorized by the court or proper
government instrumentality acting on his
behalf, on the same grounds prescribed for
loss or suspension of parental authority. If
the adopted is at least eighteen years of
age, he may petition for judicial rescission
of the adoption on the same grounds
prescribed for disinheriting an ascendant.
Art. 192. The adopters may petition
the court for the judicial rescission of the
adoption in any of the following cases:
(1) If the adopted has committed any
act constituting a ground for disinheriting a
descendant; or
(2) When the adopted has abandoned
the home of the adopters during minority
for at least one year, or, by some other
acts, has definitely repudiated the
adoption.
PROCEDURE
Sec. 2, Rule 100. Order to answer. - The
court in w/c the petition is filed shall issue
an order requiring the adverse party to
answer the petition w/in fifteen (15) days fr.
receipt of a copy thereof.
The order & copy of the petition
shall be served on the adverse party in
such manner as the court may direct.
Sec. 3, Rule 99. Judgment. - If upon
trial, on the day set therefor, the court
finds that the allegations of the petition are
true, it shall render judgment ordering the
rescission or revocation of the adoption, w/
or w/o costs, as justice requires.
The adopter
135
XI. SUPPORT
BAVIERA: Judgment of support never
becomes final.
Reason:
always
subject to modification.
RA 6809 Under Art. 2180 of the NCC,
the liability of parents for tortuous
acts of their children BELOW 21 still
exists. (In other words, even if the
age of majority is lowered to 18, for
purposes of Art. 2180, children below
21 are still considered minorsFritzie)
BALANE:
Support of a legitimate child
should come fr. community property...this
article speaks of legitimate descendants
other than legitimate children
Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal
separation or for annulment of marriage, &
for declaration of nullity of marriage, the
spouses & their children shall be supported fr.
Art.
persons
liability
persons
A:
The entitlement for support shall
retroact to 1 April 1996, the date when
extra-judicial demand was made.
Q: Suppose no extra-judicial demand was
made?
A: Then the reckoning date shall be the
date when the suit is filed..(judicial
demand).
Q:
Suppose demand is made but
subsequently the claimant is able to
support himself?
A: Then he is entitled to support during
such time that he was unable to support
himself...even if payment for such support
is made after he had already recovered &
been able to support himself.
Support in arrears...being an ordinary civil
action, may be renounced...however, the
right to receive future support may not be
renounced. Any renunciation that effect
shall be void.
Art. 204. The person obliged to give
support shall have the option to fulfill the
obligation either by paying the allowance
138
Art.
210.
Parental
authority
&
responsibility may not be renounced or
transferred except in the cases authorized by
law.
SANTOS
VS.
EXCONDE V. CAPUNO
[101 P 843]
not liable bec. they are not teachers-incharge, but are merely exercising general
authority, not direct control & influence.
But even the teacher-in-charge is not liable
bec. there is no showing that the teacher
was negligent in enforcing discipline upon
Daffon nor had he waived observance of
school rules & regulations. His absence
when the tragedy happened cannot be
considered against him bec. he was not
supposed or required to report to school on
that day.
So who is liable here? It's
probably the dean of the boys. He had
earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun fr.
one of the students & returned it to the
latter w/o taking disciplinary action or
reporting the matter to higher authorities.
But while he was clearly negligent, it does
not necessarily link him to the shooting
since it was not shown that the gun was
the one used to kill petitioner's son. Who is
really liable here? Nobody, since none of
them was found to have been charged w/
the custody of the offending student, or
has been remiss in the discharge of his
duties. While the court deeply sympathizes
w/ the petitioners, the court cannot extend
material relief as a balm to their grief.
PASCO V. CFI
B. 18 & above
(Art 2180 NCC continues to apply)
applies to academic
institutions.
&
non-academic
parental
authority
subject
to
appropriate defenses provided by law.
the
BALANE:
This
article
refers
to
profectitious property owned by the
parents & given to the child for administration
The child is entitled to reasonable
allowance...not less than what a 3rd person
would get if management was entrusted to
such 3rd person, administration belongs to
the child.
Suspension or Termination of Parental
Authority
TOLENTINO:
RA 6809 provides that its
effectivity on existing wills, bequests,
donations, grants, insurance policies &
similar instruments containing references &
provisions favorable to minors will not
retroact to their prejudice.
Art. 235. (Repealed by RA 6809)
Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate
parental authority over the person & property
of the child who shall then be qualified &
responsible for all acts of civil life, save the
exceptions established by existing laws in
special cases.
Contracting
marriage
shall
parental consent until the age of 21.
require
TOLENTINO:
Requisites of Marriage.-- A marriage of a
person bet. 18 & 21 years will still require
parental consent, w/o w/c the marriage will
be voidable.
This is an anomalous
situation. An emancipated person, who
can enter into any contract & qualified for
all acts of civil life, is still required to have
parental consent for marriage.
The
provisions on marriage should have been
adjusted.
Quasi-delicts of Children.
Art. 2180. xxx The father &, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages
caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority &
live in their company. (Civil Code.)
XIV.
SUMMARY
JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY
LAW
Scope of Application
contract
Baviera Cases:
FLORES V. ESTEBAN [51 O.G. 9, P. 4525
(1955)]
FACTS: Flores (father) filed a petition for
habeas corpus in order to get the custody of
his legitimate son who is living w/ Fs mother
in law. However, it was shown that it was not
the father who was claiming custody but the
paternal grandfather.
HELD: As against the paternal grandparent,
the maternal grandparent may be given
substitute parental authority if it will be for
the best interest & welfare of the child. It
should be considered that the maternal
grandmother is almost a mother to the child
since he was 20 days old, & there exists
mutual love between the grandmother & the
child. This is w/o prejudice to the obligation of
the father to contribute to his maintenance.
LUNA V. IAC [137 S 7 (1985)]
FACTS: Luna is married to Hizon, the latter
having an illegitimate child, Santos. Santos
XVII. FUNERALS
Characteristics of Name.
It is absolute, intended to protect the
individual fr. being confused w/ others;
it is obligatory in certain respects, for
nobody can be w/o a name;
it is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at
least at the start, & may be changed
only for good cause & by judicial
proceedings;
it is outside the commerce of man, &,
therefore, inalienable & intransmissible,
by act inter vivos or mortis causa;
it is imprescriptible.
BALANE:
Surname.-- A surname is that w/c identifies
the family fr. w/c a person belongs & is
passed fr. parent to child.
Basic Principles:
A person's real name is that w/c appears in
the Civil Registry.
If you want to change your real name, you
have
to
go
through
judicial
proceedings, a petition for change of
name.
However, a person can use other names
w/c are authorized by CA 142 as
amended by RA 6085 (re: use of
pseudonym.)
Some guidelines regarding change of
name
In a petition for change of name, courts are
generally strict.
You have to show
sufficient cause;
However, in a petition for injunction or in a
criminal case for violation of CA 142,
courts will generally be more liberal
(Legamia v. IAC, infra. Tolentino v. CA,
infra.) provided it does not cause
confusion, there is no fraud or BF;
In case of adoption where the woman
adopts alone, it is the maiden name
that should be given the child.
(Johnston v. Republic, infra.)
Art. 364.
Legitimate & legitimated
children shall principally use the surname
of the father.
152
TOLENTINO:
This rule applies even when the recognition
was made first by the mother & later by
the father, bec. no distinction is made in
the law.
It applies to all illegitimate
children.
153
TOLENTINO:
Husband's Surname Optional.-- The word
"may" is used, indicating that the use of the
husband's surname by the wife is permissive
rather than obligatory.
Right of Wife not Exclusive.-The wife
cannot claim an exclusive right to use the
husband's surname.
She cannot be
prevented fr. using it; but neither can she
restrain others fr. using it.
TELMO V. REPUBLIC [73 S 29]
HELD: (1) A change of name is a proc. in
rem. Jurisdiction to hear & determine the
petition for change of name is acquired after
due publication of the order containing
certain data, among w/c is the name sought
to be adopted, w/c should be indicated in the
title of the petition
The reason for the rule is that the
ordinary reader "glances fleetingly at the
captions of the published orders or the titles
of the petitions. Only if the caption or the
title strikes him does the reader proceed to
read on. And the probability is great that the
reader does not at all notice the other names
&/or aliases or the applicant if these are
mentioned only in the body of the order or
petition.
Art. 371.
In case of annulment of
marriage, & the wife is the guilty party, she
shall resume her maiden name & surname. If
she is the innocent spouse, she may resume
her maiden name & surname. However, she
may choose to continue employing her
former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise; or
(2) She or the former husband is married
again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been
granted, the wife shall continue using her
name & surname employed before the legal
separation.
TOLENTINO:
Sufficient Cause Necessary.-- Examples of
sufficient causes are:
when the name is ridiculous, or tainted w/
dishonor, or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce;
when the right to a new name is a
consequence of a change of status,
such as when a natural child is
acknowledged or legitimated;
when the change is necessary to avoid
confusion;
having continuously used & been known
since childhood by a Filipino name,
unaware of his alien parentage;
A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of a former alien nationality
w/c unduly hamper social & business
life. (Republic v. Marcos, supra.)
The imposition in a will or donation of the
condition that the beneficiary change
his name is not sufficient cause.
Effect of Change on Children.-- When a
father changes his name, this will not affect
the names of his children. The children
who are of age are independent of the
father, & their names can be changed only
upon their own petition. The names of the
minor children, however, may be changed
on petition of the father, if the same
justification exists w/ respect to them.
For legal purposes, the true or
official name of a person is that w/c is
recorded in the civil register.
155
Art. 377.
Usurpation of a name &
surname may be the object of an action for
damages & other relief.
TOLENTINO:
The usurpation of name implies some
injury to the interests of the owner of the
name.
It consists in the possibility of
confusion of identity, or the appearance of
some family relations between the owner &
the usurper.
Elements of Usurpation.
that there is an actual use of another's
name by the defendant;
that the use is unauthorized; &
the use of another's name is to designate
personality or identity of a person.
Art. 378. The unauthorized or unlawful
use of another person's surname gives a
right of action to the latter.
TOLENTINO
FACTS:
Wong (formerly Alcala, Jr.), a
Muslim Filipino, was adopted by a Chinese
couple. Upon reaching the age of 22, he
filed a petition to change his name fr. Wong
to Alcala.
Reason:
His surname
embarrassed & isolated him fr. his relatives
& friends since his name suggests a
Chinese ancestry.
Baviera cases:
Balane:
Requisites for Provisional
Absence:
Absence for an appreciable period w/c
depends upon the circumstances;
Immediate necessity for his representation
in some specific urgent matter;
Absentee left no agent or the agency has
expired
Art. 382. The appointment referred to in
the preceding article having been made,
the judge shall take the necessary
measures to safeguard the rights &
interests of the absentee & shall specify
the powers, obligations & remuneration of
his representatives, regulating them,
according to the circumstances, by the
rules concerning guardians.
Art. 383. In the appointment of a
representative, the spouse present shall be
preferred when there is no legal separation.
If the absentee left no spouse, or if the
spouse present is a minor, any competent
person may be appointed by the court.
DECLARATION OF ABSENCE
administered
by
a
representative
appointed by the Court (384) ; the spouse
of the absentee is asking for separation of
prop (191, NCC) or his wife is asking the
court that the administration of all classes
of prop. in the marriage be transferred to
her (196, NCC.) The petition to declare the
husband an absentee & the petition to
place the management of the conjugal
properties in the hands of the wife may be
combined & adjudicated in the same
proceedings.
EASTERN SHIPPING V. LUCERO [124 S
425] Facts:
On 2/16/80, the petitioner co.
received 3 radio messages fr. Capt. Lucero
on board M/V Eastern Minicon, the last of
w/c, received at 9:50 P.M. of that day, was
a call for immediate assistance in view of
the existing "danger;" "sea water was
entering the hatch;" the vessel "was listing
50 to 60 degrees port," & they were
"preparing to abandon the ship any time."
After this message, nothing more has been
heard fr. the vessel or its crew until the
present time.
On 7/16/80, Mrs. Lucero filed a
complaint w/ the National Seamen Board
for payment of her accrued monthly
allotment w/c the Co. had stopped since
3/80 & for continued payment of said
allotments until M/V Minicon shall have
returned to the port of Mla.
On 5/19/81, the Board rendered
judgement in favor of Mrs. L & held that the
presumption of death could not be applied
bec. the 4-yr period [Art. 391(1)] had not
yet expired. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed
said decision.
HELD: We are unable to agree w/ the
reasoning of the resp. NLRC.
There is enough evidence to show
the circumstances attending the loss &
disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon
& its crew.
The foregoing facts, quite
logically, are sufficient to lead us to a moral
certainty that the vessel had sunk & that
the persons aboard had perished w/ it.
Upon this premise, the rule on presumption
of death under Art. 391(1) must yield to the
rule of preponderance of evidence. Where
there are facts, known or knowable, fr. w/c
161
PRESUMPTION OF DEATH
Tolentino:
Judicial Declaration Not
Necessary.-- The presumption of death is
created by law, & arises w/o any necessity of
a judicial declaration. The presumption can
be availed of in any action or proc.; but there
can be no independent proceeding for the
162
Tolentino:
Modification under the FC.-- For purposes
of securing a decl of presumptive death
under these circumstances, under the FC for
purposes of remarriage of a spouse present,
an absence of 2 yrs. of the absent spouse
will be enough.
Presumptive Death of Missing Persons.-The persons presumed dead under this
article cannot be considered as merely
absentees; they are more properly called
missing persons. xxx [T]he
presumptive date of death is fixed on the
very day of the occurrence of the event fr.
w/c the death is presumed; & if such date
cannot be fixed, the court determines the
middle of the period in w/c the event could
have happened.
Loss of Vessel or Aeroplane.-These
terms must be understood in their broad
meanings. Vessels will include all watercraft,
& aeroplanes will include all aircraft.
The loss of the vessel must be during
a sea voyage w/c include not only voyages in
the open sea but also passage along the
mouth or river, canals, etc. in the course of
such voyage. However, trips w/c are only
inland waters are not included.
Missing in War.-The term "war" is
construed generally; it is not limited to war as
understood in international law, but includes
all military operations or undertakings in
armed fighting. The presumption in case of
persons missing in war, applies not only to
soldiers, but also to those who are employed
by or render services to the armed forces
(such as nurses, doctors, etc.), those who
render voluntary service (such as guides &
guerrillas), & those who follow or stay w/ the
armed
forces
(such
as
reporters,
photographers, etc.) It is however, necessary
that such disappearance be during military
operations.
In Danger of Death.-- The death should be
considered to have taken place on the day of
the danger. xxx If the danger continues for
several days, xxx the more logical view
seems to be that the period should be
computed fr. the last day of such danger; in
cases of expeditions or similar ventures of
ABSENCE
RIGHTS
UPON
OF
THE
THE
164
XIX. FUNERALS
Tolentino:
Juridical Nature of Corpse.-- The corpse
cannot be the subject of rights, bec. juridical
personality is extinguished by death.
Evidently, it is an object or a thing, but it is
not prop.; it is not susceptible of
appropriation.
Purposes of Legal Protection: (1) to
protect the feelings of those related to the
199.
Whenever two or more
are obliged to give support, the
shall devolve upon the following
in the order herein provided:
Tolentino:
Right to make funeral
arrangements.-- If there are no persons
who are bound to support the deceased, or
if there are but they are w/o means to
defray the funeral expenses, the duty of
burial shall devolve upon the municipal
authorities.
165
Art. 306.
Every funeral shall be in
keeping w/ the social position of the
deceased.
deceased.
In the absence of such
expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation
shall determine the funeral rites. In case of
doubt, the form of the funeral shall be
decided upon by the person obliged to
make arrangements for the same, after
consulting w/ the other members of the
family.
Art. 308. No human remains shall be
retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed
w/o the consent of the persons mentioned
in Art. 199 of the Family Code & 305 (of the
Civil Code.)
Art. 309.
Any person who shows
disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully
interferes w/ a funeral, shall be liable to the
family of the deceased for damages,
material & moral.
Art. 307.
The funeral shall be in
accordance w/ the expressed wishes of the
Art. 310.
The construction of a
tombstone or mausoleum shall be deemed
166
BALANE CASE:
SERMONIA V. CA
HELD: (1) The rule on constructive notice
cannot apply in the crime of bigamy
notw/standing the possibility of its being
more favorable to the accused. As the CA
succinctly explains-xxx [T]he principle of constructive
notice should not be applied in regard to
the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may
be taken of the fact that a bigamous
marriage is generally entered into by the
offender in secrecy fr. the spouse of the
previous subsisting marriage.
Also, a
bigamous marriage is generally entered
into in a place where the offender is not
known to be still a married person, in order
to conceal his legal impediment to contract
another marriage.
xxx [T]he criminal cases cited by
the petitioner wherein constructive notice
was applied involved
land or prop.
disputes & certainly, marriage is not prop.
The non-application to the crime of
bigamy of the prin. of constructive notice is
not contrary to the policy that penal laws
167
BALANE CASES:
BARRETO
MANILA
V.
CIVIL
REGISTRAR
OF
2. BUILDING, PLANTING,
SOWING.
172
173
Held: No.
174
ALLUVION
Tolentino:
takes place when the deposit of sediment
has reached a level higher than the
highest level of water during the year;
must be exclusive work of nature
Requisites:
(1) deposit be gradual & imperceptible
(2) made through the efforts of the current of
the water
(3) land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks of the river
Banks of a River: refer to those lateral
strips or zones of its bed w/c are washed by
the stream only during such high floods as do
not cause inundation or to the point reached
by the river at high tide
Property Reviewer:
deposits made by human intervention are
not included
NB: But if owner constructs
purely defensive purposes
damaging action of the water,
deposits accumulate, the
deemed to be alluvion & will
riparian owner
lose
that
inundated
extraordinary floods.
by
them
in
Tolentino:
only for ponds & lagoons
lagoons: a small lake, ordinarily of fresh
water, & not very deep, fed by floods,
the hollow bed of w/c is bound by
elevations of lands
REPUBLIC VS. CA 131 SCRA 532
Facts: Santos del Rio filed an application
for registration of a parcel of land situated
near the shore of Laguna de Bay. Director
of Lands opposed alleging that since a
portion of the land sought to be registered
is covered w/ water 4-5 months a year, the
same is part of the lake bed of Laguna or is
at least a foreshore land w/c brings it under
Art. 502, a property of public dominion and
hence, not subject of registration.
Issue: WON land should be registered in
favor of Santos del Rio
Held: Under A74 of the Law of Waters of
1866, lake bed is defined as the ground
covered by waters when at their highest
ordinary depth.
Meaning, the highest
depth of the water during the dry season,
such depth being the regular, common,
natural one w/c occurs most of the time of
the year. Although lakes are subject to the
same gravitational forces w/c cause
formation of tides in seas & oceans, such is
not a regular daily occurrence in lakes.
Thus, the alternation of high tides & low
tides could hardly account for the rise in
the water level of Laguna de Bay as
observed 4-5 months a year during the
rainy season. Rather, it is the rains w/c
bring about the inundation of a portion of
the land in question.
Water level w/c
causes the submersion of the land occurs
during a shorter period than the level of
water at w/c the land is completely dry.
The latter thus should be considered its
highest ordinary depth.
Neither can it be foreshore land, w/c
is a strip of land that lies between the high
& low water marks & is alternately wet &
dry according to the flow of the tide. The
submersion in water of a portion of the
176
Property reviewer:
article refers to uprooted trees only;
even if the owner of the land upon w/c
the trees may have been cast
transplants them on his own to
preserve them, former owner still
preserves his ownership w/in 6 months
Property Reviewer:
Avulsion refers to the transfer of a
known portion of land fr. one tenement to
another by the force of the current
General Rule is that original owner
retains title to the land w/c has been
transferred to another tenement, except
when there is abandonment or upon
expiration of two years, whether the failure to
remove be voluntary or involuntary, &
irrespective of the area of the known portion
that has been transferred
be
Held: NO.
There is no accretion. The
requirement that the deposit should be due
to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes those caused
by human intervention. Alluvion must be the
exclusive work of nature. In CAB, evidence
showed that the alleged alluvial deposits
came into being not bec. of the sole effect of
the river current but as a result of the
transfer of the dike towards the river &
encroaching upon it. The land is not even
dry but under two meters of water. What the
respondents claim as accretion is really an
encroachment
of
a
portion
of
the
Meycauayan river by reclamation.
The
reason behind the law giving the riparian
owner the right to any land or aluvion
deposited by a river is to compensate him for
the danger of loss that he suffers bec. of the
location of his land.
Notes: Can a creek left dry be acquired?
NO, creek is actually an arm of a river so part
of the public property w/c can not be
acquired privately
5.ABANDONED RIVER BEDS
Tolentino:
express act by new owners unnecessary;
automatic
must be a natural change in the course of a
stream; if through works constructed by
concessionaires
authorized
by
the
government, concession may grant it to
the former; if no grant, follow article w/o
prejudice to a superior right of 3rd
persons w/ sufficient title
if river bed dries up, continues to be property
of public dominion
Property Reviewer:
Requisites:
it must be sudden so the old river bed can
be identified (unless river disappears &
abandonment applies)
change must be permanent: rules do not
apply to temporary overflowing
Abandonment by the owner of the bed
- change of bed must be natural;
otherwise, becomes the subject of a state
grant
Art. 462. Whenever a river, changing
its course by natural causes, opens a new
bed through a private estate, this bed shall
become of public dominion.
IN
RIVERBEDS
Tolentino:
belong to patrimonial property of the State
w/c may sell them
navigable river: one w/c in its natural state
affords a channel for useful commerce
& not such as is only sufficient to float a
banca or canoe
Art. 465. Islands w/c through successive
accumulation of alluvial deposits are
formed in non-navigable & non-floatable
rivers, belong to the owners of the margins
or banks nearest to each of them, or to the
owners of both margins if the island is in
the middle of the river, in w/c case it shall
be divided longitudinally in halves. If a
single island that formed be more distant
fr. one margin than fr. the other, the owner
of the nearer margin shall be the sole
owner thereof.
Tolentino:
180
on:
JAGUALING VS. COURT OF APPEALS 194
SCRA 607
Facts: Private respondents Eduave, et al are
the owners of land forming part of an island
in a non-navigable river. In 1964, said land
was eroded due to Typhoon Ineng, destroying
the bigger portion & improvements thereon.
Due to the movements of the river deposits
on the land that was not eroded, the area
was increased. Later, Eduave et al allowed
petitioners
to
introduce
improvements
thereon & live there as caretakers.
Petitioners however later denied PRs claim of
ownership so PR filed action to quiet title over
the property. RTC dismissed complaint. CA
reversed, ruling that the island was formed
by the branching off of the Tagalon River &
subsequent thereto, the accumulation of
alluvial deposits. Eduaves were declared as
the lawful & true owner of the land.
TOLENTINO:
cloud on title or matter complained of:
must have a prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy
semblance of title appearing in some legal
form
but w/c is in fact unfounded.
invalidity
or
inoperativeness
of
instrument is
not apparent on its face, &
has to be proved by extrinsic evidence
the
TOLENTINO:
general rule:
in order to
maintain an action to quiet title or remove a
cloud thereon, the plaintiff must have a legal
title to the property in question or some
interest therein
TOLENTINO:
title & liens w/c have lost their force or
failed to enforce them ;
lien, interest, or title w/c has become
barred & unenforceable by reason of
delay & laches or the running of the
statute of limitations;
ex. mortgages w/c are unenforceable by
reason of the expiration of the period of
limitations;
ex. liens acquired by virtue of judgments
or levies of execution w/c have become
barred by limitations or by delay in
enforcing them;
have been held to be removable as clouds.
ART. 479. The plaintiff must return to
the defendant:
all benefits he may have received fr.
the latter, or
reimburse him for expenses that may
have redounded to the plaintiffs benefit.
ART. 480. The principles of the general
law on the quieting of title are hereby
adopted insofar as they are not in conflict
w/ this Code.
TOLENTINO:
In a suit to quiet title, defendant may set
up equitable as well as legal defenses:
acquisition of title by adverse possession
(however, when the property is in the
possession of the plaintiff, action to
quiet title thereto is imprescriptable)
prior adjudication of the question, under
the rule of res judicata
The court will decree such relief as is
necessary to completely & finally
dispose of the controversy.
In order to afford complete relief to the
parties, the court may determine
incidentally the status & ownership of
the legal title to the property, or the
right to the possession thereof.
63.
An action:
for the reformation of an instrument,
to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefr., or
to consolidate ownership under Art. 1607
of the Civil Code,
may be brought under this Rule.
BUCTON V. GABAR
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of
Nicanora has prescribed. No!
HELD:
The real & ultimate basis of
Nicanoras action is their ownership of 1/2
of the lot coupled w/ their possession
thereof, w/c entitles them to a conveyance
of the property.
In Sapto, et. al. vs.
Fabiana, the Court, through J.B.L. Reyes,
explained that under the circumstances, no
enforcement of the contract is needed,
since the delivery of the possession of the
land sold had consummated the sale &
transferred title to the purchaser, & that,
actually, the action for conveyance is one
to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud upon
Nicanoras ownership by the refusal of the
Josefina to recognize the sale made. We
held therein: The prevailing rule is that the
right of a plaintiff to have title to land
quieted, as against one who is asserting
183
GARCIA V.CA
FACTS: In 1918, a deed of sale over 2
parcels of land was executed in favor of 1 st
vendee. The deed w/c itself contains entries
showing that it was annotated on the back of
the OCT was presented for registration. But
for some reason, the deed of sale was not
annotated on the OCT so said title was not
canceled. As a result of registration, TCT was
issued to 1st vendee (but w/o the OCT being
canceled).
Subsequently, 1st vendee
constituted a mortgage on said land & made
transfers.
In 1962, TCT was issued to 2nd vendee
covering the same parcels of land. 2nd vendee
later mortgaged the land & sold a part of it
w/c the 3rd vendee also mortgaged. When
they defaulted, the banks foreclosed the
mortgages. When 1st vendee learned of the
acquisition by 2nd vendee of the land, he
registered an adverse claim over their titles.
1st vendee filed an action to quiet title against
2nd vendee.
JALANDONI V. PNB
FACTS: On March 31, 1959, the CFI of
Manila
rendered
judgment
ordering
Jalandoni to pay PNB. Said order became
final & executory.
On March 9, 1964, w/in 5 years fr. the
entry of judgment, the sheriff levied upon a
lot w/ an area of 17 hectares, covered by a
TCT in the name of Jalandoni. The levy was
annotated on the title as a notice of
embargo. No effort was made to have the
land sold at public auction to satisfy the
judgment against Jalandoni.
On April 22, 1974, or more than ten
years after the levy was made, Jalandoni
filed w/ the CFI in a land registration
proceeding, a petition for the cancellation
of the levy on the ground of prescription.
The petition was opposed by the bank.
The lower court asked Jalandoni to ask
the Manila court to quash the writ of
execution on the ground of prescription &
thereafter to refile the petition w/ the lower
court.
for
TOLENTINO:
alterations
have a more permanent result &
relate to the substance or form of
the thing
query: can a mere majority of the coowners lease real or immovable property
for any length of time?
answer: special powers are required for
leases of real property by an administrator
in the following cases:
when the lease is to be recorded in
the Registry of Property
Art. 1648. Every lease of real property
may be recorded in the Registry of
Property. Unless a lease is recorded, it shall
not be binding upon 3rd persons.
Art. 1647. If a lease is to be recorded in
the Registry of Property, the following
persons cannot constitute the same w/o
proper authority: . . . the manager w/o
special
power.
(the lease ceases to be an act of
administration when it is to be recorded in
the Registry of Property)
Art. 1878 provides that a special power of
attorney shall be necessary to lease any
real property to another person for more
than one year.
Thus, in these two cases, a mere majority
of the co-owners cannot constitute the
lease
Who may manage the property?
The
management of community property lies,
in the first place, in the co-owners
themselves.
In this management, the majority of
interests control, & their decisions are
binding upon the minority. However, in
making decisions, the majority should
186
TOLENTINO:
The mere fact that the partition of the
property may affect the usefulness or
value of the whole is not a valid excuse
for a refusal to have it partitioned
among the co-owners. Such result is a
necessary incident of co-ownership.
Action for partition is imprescriptable, as
long as the co-ownership is recognized.
Gen. Rule: possession by one co-owner
will not be regarded as adverse to the
other co-owners, but in fact as
beneficial to all. Exception: If co-owner
holds the property in exclusive adverse
possession, asserting sole & exclusive
ownership, for the required prescriptive
period, he can acquire sole title to it as
against the co-owners.
It must be
shown by clear & convincing evidence
that he has repudiated the coownership, & that the other co-owners
have been apprised of his claim, before
the prescriptive period begins to run.
Exceptions: Partition can not be asked in
the following cases:
When the co-owners have agreed to
continue in the co-ownership for the
period permitted by law (period of
indivision cannot be more than ten
years; this period may be extended by
the co-owners, provided that each
extension does not exceed ten years;
where parties stipulate a definite period
of indivision exceeding the maximum
period allowed by law, the stipulation
would be void only as to the period
beyond such maximum)
When the co-ownership is imposed as a
condition in a donation or a will
When the partition will render the thing
unserviceable for the use & the purpose
for w/c it is intended, the co-ownership
may be terminated in accordance w/
Art. 498 (sale of the thing & distribution
of its proceeds)
187
SINGSON V. VELOSO
FACTS:
The co-heirs, inherited a parcel of
land. Due to transfers among themselves.
One co-owner became majority owner. She
was also administratrix.
Later, she built
thereon a building & leased it. She credited
the co-ownership w/ rentals for the use of the
land. The rentals of the building, however,
she appropriated for herself since, she claims
that she alone defrayed the expenses for the
building.
The other co-heirs claim that
majority co-owner should account for all the
rentals including that of the building.
HELD:
The construction of the building is a
definite alteration & should therefore have
the unanimous consent of all co-owners,
otherwise Art 491 would be violated . Even
assuming that it was a mere act of
administration & that as majority owner her
decision prevails, there is a requirement that
before such a decision is made, there should
be notice to the minority co-owners so that
they can be heard. The majority would be
justified in proceeding w/o consultation only
when the urgency of the case & the difficulty
of meeting w/ them render impracticable the
giving of such notice. In this case, the other
co-owners were never given notice. Also, the
term administration & better enjoyment of
property contemplates acts or decisions for
the common benefit of all the co-owners &
not the benefit of only one or some of them.
The construction of the building is for
the account & benefit of the co-ownership.
The majority co-owner should account to the
other co-owners for their shares in the rentals
of said building, deducting the cost of
construction.
BAVIERA NOTES: The co-owners should
share in the rentals but w/ the
obligation to pay their share of the
costs of the building.
VI. POSSESSION
A. RIGHT
TO FRUITS
V. WATERS
188
pure luxury or
mere pleasure
shall not be refunded to the possessor
in bad faith; but he may remove the
objects for w/c such expenses have been
incurred, provided that the:
thing suffers no injury thereby & that
the
lawful possessor does not prefer to
retain them by paying the value they may
have at the time he enters into possession.
TOLENTINO:
A possessor in bad faith has no right to
receive any fruits.
Those already
gathered & existing will have to be
returned; w/ respect to those lost,
consumed, or w/c could have been
received, he must pay the value. The
ungathered fruits will go to the lawful
possessor or owner.
The amount of the fruits that could have
been received is determined by the
personal circumstances of the lawful
possessor better facilities, resources,
industry, or skill.
The possessor in bad faith is entitled to
reimbursement for necessary expenses,
but he has no right of retention. As to
useful expenses, he has no right to
reimbursement, bec. the law says he is
entitled only to necessary expenses.
ART. 1123. Civil interruption is produced
by judicial summons to the possessor.
ART. 449. He who builds, plants or sows
in bad faith on the land of another, loses
what is built, planted or sown w/o right to
indemnity.
189
WARD V. DELFIN
FACTS:
Several days before the
occupation, owner brought his car to a friend
for safekeeping. During the occupation, car
owner, being an American, was interned in
UST.
In the meantime, one Major Orais,
succeeded in pressuring his wife to sign a
deed of sale of the car in his favor for P500 in
Mickey mouse money. After liberation, car
owner brought an action to recover said
properly fr. a Bautista to whom the car was
sold by Orais.
Bautista contends that
assuming arguendo that Maj. Orais obtained
the car against the wifes consent & that the
execution of the Deed of Sale was obtained
through improper pressure & compulsion, he
is, nonetheless a purchaser & consequently,
a possessor in good faith. He may be ordered
to return the car to the owner; but he must
be reimbursed necessary expenses (for repair
& improvement) he incurred; & he is entitled
to retain the car until payment. LC ordered
Bautista to pay P2,200 as value of the car &
P300 for damages.
Car owner appeals
alleging that he is entitled to the earnings of
the car while in possession of Bautista who
used it in transporting passengers.
ISSUE: What are the rights & obligations of
Bautista?
HELD: Bautista bought the car fr. the wife in
whose name the car was registered. There
was no evidence that he acted in bad faith.
Thus, since he was a bona fide possessor of
said car, he could therefore lawfully dedicate
it to business & reap its proceeds pursuant to
Art. 544, CC. The car owner has no right to
the earnings of such car while in the good
faith possession of Bautista.
BAVIERA NOTES:
Income fr. the car
lawfully belongs to the possessor in
good faith (PGF). From the time that
PGF was informed of the car owners
adverse claim, he became a PBF. He
was not ordered to account for the
proceeds of the car fr. the time he
became a PBF bec. he also made repair
& improvements in the car. SET-OFF.
MARFORI V. VELASCO
FACTS: Owner of the land filed an action
against the possessors of her land, claiming
BAVIERA NOTES:
Fruits harvested
during possession in bad faith must
be accounted for, minus necessary
expenses during possession in good
faith & possession in bad faith.
B.
RIGHT
IMPROVEMENTS;
DETERIORATION
TO
EXPENSES
RISK
&
OF
193
1. COMPARE
A.
USUFRUCT
W/
FLOREZA V EVANGELISTA
TOLENTINO:
TOLENTINO:
Defect
or
deteriorations
requiring
extraordinary repairs are of two kinds:
Those
caused
by
EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES, whether or not they are
necessary for the preservation of the
thing
Those caused by the NATURAL USE of the
thing, but are not necessary for its
preservation.
GENERAL
RULE:
The
expenses
for
extraordinary repairs are borne by the owner
Reason for the rule: The law does not
impose such repairs as an obli of the owner.
The usufructuary is not bound to make such
repairs if the owner chooses not to make
them.
If the need for repairs is urgent (those that
are required for preservation), the law
requires the usufructuary to give notice
thereof to the owner
If the owner does not make the extraordinary
repairs w/c are necessary for preservation,
the usufructuary may make them & he shall
be entitled to indemnity.
Also, the usufructuary is entitled to recover fr.
the owner the increase in the value w/c the
tenement acquired by reason of such works.
Art. 595. The owner may construct any
works & make any improvements of w/c the
immovable in usufruct is susceptible, or make
new plantings thereon if it be rural, provided
that such acts do not cause a diminution in
the value of the usufruct or prejudice the
right of the usufructuary.
TOLENTINO:
Any advantage or increase in the use of
enjoyment of the thing due to the
improvements or plantings introduced
by the owner will inure to the benefit of
the usufructuary.
But the usufructuary is not bound to pay
interest on the investment of the
owner, bec. the improvements have
been made voluntarily by the latter.
Art. 596. The payment of annual
charges & taxes & of those considered as a
lien on the fruits, shall be at the expense of
the usufructuary for all the time that the
usufruct lasts.
TOLENTINO:
Annual charges & taxes are considered by
Manresa as always chargeable against
the usufructuary bec. they are
considered by the law as imposed upon
the fruits.
The more logical view, however, seems to
be that of Sanchez Roman, who
believes that such annual charges &
taxes are to be paid by the
usufructuary only when they can be
considered as a lien on the fruits.
The annual charges & taxes for w/c the
usufructuary is liable cannot include
those levied upon the tenement itself,
but only those levied upon the persons
in possession or enjoyment thereof.
Art. 597. The taxes w/c, during the
usufruct, may be imposed directly on the
capital, shall be at the expense of the
owner.
If the latter has paid them, the
usufructuary shall pay him the proper
interest on the sums w/c may have been
paid in the character, &, if the said sums
have been advanced by the usufructuary,
he shall recover the amount thereof at the
termination of the usufruct.
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make
on the property held in usufruct such useful
improvements or expenses for mere
pleasure as he may deem proper, provided
he does not alter its form or substance; but
he shall have no right to be indemnified
therefor. He may, however, remove such
improvements, should it be possible to do
so w/o damage to the property.
195
TOLENTINO:
Whenever the usufructuary can remove the
improvements w/o injury to the prop. in
usufruct, he has a right to do so, & the
owner cannot prevent him fr. doing so
even upon payment of their value.
But
the
owner
cannot
compel
the
usufructuary
to
remove
the
improvements if he does not wish to
exercise it.
In the exercise of the right granted by this
article, the usufructuary may demolish or
destroy the improvement, such as a
building, provided he leaves the land as it
was before the construction of such
improvement.
The right of the usufructuary to remove
improvements can be enforced only
against the owner, but not against a
purchaser in GF to whom a clean title has
been issued.
Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the
improvements he may have made on the
property against any damage to the same.
TOLENTINO:
This article refers to compensation of values,
& not of rights & obligations. It is
necessary that the improvements should
have increased the value of the prop. &
that the damages are imputable to the
usufructuary.
The increase in value & the amount of
damages are set off against each other; if
the damages exceed the increase in
value, the difference should be paid by
the usufructuary as indemnity.
B.
LEASE
PARAS:
( 4A, i have no Baviera nor Tolentino notes
so Im putting in Peters favorite
commentator instead)
The first paragraph of the article is
intended to prevent the unjust
enrichment of the lessor. The lessor is
bound to pay only 1/2 of the value of
the improvements at the end of the
lease bec. the lessee has already
enjoyed the same.
Good Faith as used in Art. 1678 is NOT
the GF defined in the law of possession.
It refers to a case where the lessee
introduces
improvements
not
calculated to harm or destroy the
property leased.
Rule if the lessor refuses to reimburse: If
the lessee demands for reimbursement
for half the value & the lessor refuses,
the
lessee
CANNOT
insist
on
reimbursement.
BUT the lessee may remove the
improvements even if the leased
premises may suffer some damage.
C.
COMMODATUM
MORTGAGE
VENDEE
RETRO
Art. 1616.
The vendor cannot avail
himself of the right of repurchase w/o
197
CALAGAN V. CFI
FACTS: Calagan sold a portion of their lot to
Sandoval w/c was annotated on the title of C.
C offered to repurchase the land sold to w/c S
agreed on the condition that C reimburse the
value of the house S constructed on the Land.
HELD: As the Public Land Act does not
provide for the terms & conditions of
repurchase, resort may be had to Art 1616 of
the CC w/c states that a vendor a retro
cannot avail himself of the rt. of repurchase
w/o returning to the vendee the price of the
sale, the expenses of the contract & other
legitimate payments & the necessary &
useful expenses made on the thing sold. And
Art. 1616 should be construed w/ Art. 546 &
547, considering the purpose of the law on
homesteads is to conserve the ownership in
the hands of the homesteader & his family &
inasmuch as a vendee a retro is in good faith.
Applying said articles, the homesteader
desiring to repurchase should be given the
option to require the vendee a retro to
remove the useful improvements on the land
subject of the sale, w/c option is not granted
the vendor a retro in Art. 1616. To allow a
vendee a retro of a homestead, however, the
rt. of retention until payment of useful
expenses is made by the redemptioner would
be to render nugatory the right of repurchase
granted by law to a homesteader. Since C is
not opting to refund the expenses incurred by
S, S may remove her house, w/c can be done
w/o damaging the land.
A. LOST MOVABLE
DE GARCIA V. CA
1. DISTINGUISHED
Baviera:
Provision applies to movable property;
even if the goods were bought in a
private sale, not necessary that he
bought it in a merchant sale.
Where the seller has a voidable title to
the goods, but his title has not been
avoided at the time of the sale, he can
transfer valid title to an innocent
purchaser for value. What constitutes
voidable title must necessarily be
governed by the general principles of
contract. So long as the goods are still
in the possession of the buyer, they are
still recoverable by the vendor in action
for annulment.
But once transfer is
made to an innocent purchaser for
value before the annulment of the
contract, then valid title vests on the
buyer.
This is so as said innocent
purchaser must not be punished for
entering into a contract w/c he did not
think was not valid.
TO
RECOVER
Building only
-usufruct on bldg.
ends & may
use
remaining
materials
Entitled to use of
land bec. Although
no usufruct onland, it
cant be denied that
the user of the bldg.
also uses the land
201
GABOYA V. CUI
Fact: In a deed of sale over 3 parcels of
land, Don Mariano retained for himself the
usufruct over said property to last during his
lifetime. however, he granted the buyers, his
children Mercedes & Antonio, the right to
construct & improve a building thereon as
long as such will not impair his right to enjoy
the fruits & rents. By virtue of a loan, the 2
children constructed a commercial building
thereon. Later, a complaint was filed by Don
Marianos guardian in his behalf to claim the
rentals over the building w/c he claims was
unlawfully retained by the children for
themselves.
Issue: WoN the usufruct of Don Mariano
extended to the rentals of the building
subsequently constructed on the vacant lots?
Held: NO. The terms of the deed state that
the reserved usufruct in favor of the vendor,
Don Mariano, was limited to the rentals of the
land alone. Had it been intended to include
the rentals over the building, then such would
have been clearly expressed.
That the
enjoyment of the rents over the building
subsequently
erected
passed
to
the
usufructuary inasmuch as the building was an
accession to the land as per Art. 571 is
untenable.
Industrial accession by
edification on the land is limited either to
buildings erected on the land of another or
buildings constructed by the owner of the
land w/ materials owned by another.
Recourse to the rules of accession are totally
CHAPTER VIII
EASEMENTS
A.
KINDS
202
Art. 614.
Servitudes may also be
established for the benefit of a community, or
of one or more persons to whom the
encumbered estate does not belong.
Art. 615. Easements may be continuous
or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent.
Continuous easements are those the use
of w/c is or may be incessant w/o the
intervention of any act of man.
A.
MODES
EASEMENTS
OF
ACQUIRING
Art. 620.
Continuous & apparent
easements are acquired either by virtue of
a title or by prescription of ten years.
Art. 621.
In order to acquire by
prescription the easements referred to in
the preceding article, the time of
possession shall be computed thus: in
positive easements, fr. the day on w/c the
owner of the dominant estate, or the
person who may have made use of the
easement, commenced to exercise it upon
the servient estate; & in negative
easements, fr. the day on w/c the owner of
the dominant estate forbade by an
instrument acknowledged before a notary
public, the owner of the servient estate, fr.
executing an act w/c would be lawful w/o
the easement.
Art. 622.
Continuous nonapparent
easements, & discontinuous ones, whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by
title.
Art. 623. The absence of a document
or proof showing the origin of an easement
203
BAVIERA:
ART. 624.
Requirements (for
easement to continuously exist)
the
Tolentino:
When does 624 apply?
Owner alienates one tenement & keeps the
other
Owner alienates both to two different persons
at the same time
When the tenement is owned in common &
there is partition.
While the law declares the easement is to
continue (even if the easement is not
expressed in the title or the apparent signs
thereof are not made to disappear) the
easement actually arises for the first time
only upon alienation of either estate,
inasmuch as before that time there is no
easement to speak of, there being but one
owner of both estates.
Art. 625. Upon the establishment of an
easement, all the right necessary for its use
are considered granted.
Tolentino:
Easement established in a
general way w/o any specific purpose, it can
be used for all the needs of the dominant
estate & may be adopted to any new
modification
in
the
tenement
itself.
(Easement of view for a house generally
established can still be so used even if the
house was transformed into a commercial
establishment.)
Easement is established for a particular
purpose, the general rule is that the
easement cannot be used for a different
purpose. (Easement for water for irrigation
cannot be used to supply a factory) But if the
change of use does not make the easement
205
MODES
OF
EXTINGUISHMENT.
Tolentino:
MERGER:
In order for merger to
extinguish easement, it is not necessary
that the merger be w/ respect to the entire
tenement, but only w/ respect to the
portion that is affected by the servitude, or
the part for the benefit of w/c it was
established.
Merger/consolidation must be ABSOLUTE,
PERFECT, AND DEFINITE & w/ respect to
the full ownership.
If dominant estate buys servient estate,
easement is extinguished. But if he
sells servient estate again, easement is
not reestablished.
If merger is rescinded or nullified for
inherent reasons, the easement is reestablished.
NON-USER:
It is a means of extinguishing servitudes
that has been in use & later
abandoned.
It does not apply to
servitudes w/c have not been in use.
It must be due to VOLUNTARY ABSTENTION
by the dominant owner, & NOT to
fortuitous event, bec. the basis of this
cause
is
a
PRESUMPTIVE
RENUNCIATION.
If the dominant estate is co-owned, use by
one co-owner inures to the benefit of
other co-owners & preserves the
easement.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF USE
The impossibility only suspends the
servitude, until such time when it can
be used again.
Impossibility arises fr. the condition of the
tenements.
RENUNCIATION
It must be EXPRESS.
But Manresa & Sanchez Roman says that it
can be tacit if there are acts w/c clearly
reveal it.
But remember, renunciation of a real right
must be made in a public instrument
(Art. 1358).
Hence, the renunciation must be SPECIFIC,
CLEAR & EXPRESS
BENEDICTO VS. CA
FACTS:
Hendrick sold a portion of
her property to Recto.
Said properties
206
Baviera:
Registration
did
not
extinguish the aqueduct bec. after
such registration, the owner of the
servient estate allowed the use of the
aqueduct for 26 years more.
D.
LEGAL EASEMENTS
Tolentino:
The first is considered a
positive easement while the second is
regarded as a negative.
Art. 669. When the distances in art.
670 are not observed, the owner of a wall
w/c is not a party wall, adjoining a
207
LEGAL EASEMENTS
Tolentino:
Multi-story building: openings
may be made in every story
Baviera:
How long before A (opening of 30 sq. cm w/
iron grating) can acquire an easement of
light & view? 10 years
If the servient estate in the above question
has been vacant for 20 years? 10 year
prescriptive period.
Subdivision had no access to the highway. A
asked B who owned an adjoining lot to
provide him w/ right of way. However,
there is a vacant lot w/c is an alternative
route? A cannot have a right of way when
there is an alternative route
Art. 670.
No windows, apertures,
balconies, or other similar projections w/c
afford a direct view upon or towards an
adjoining land or tenement can be made, w/o
leaving a distance of 2 meters between the
wall in w/c they are made & such contiguous
property.
Neither can side or oblique views upon or
towards such conterminous property be had,
unless there be a distance of 60 centimeters.
The
non-observance
of
these
distances does not give rise to prescription
Art. 671. The distances referred to in the
preceding article shall be measured in cases
of direct views fr. the outer line of the wall
when the openings do not project, form the
outer line of the latter when they do, & in
NOTES:
If
ART. 670.
No windows, apertures,
balconies, or other similar projections w/c
afford a direct view upon or towards an
adjoining land or tenement can be made, w/o
leaving a distance of two meters between the
wall in w/c they are made & such contiguous
property.
Neither can side or oblique views
upon or towards such coterminous property
be had, unless there be a distance of sixty
centimeters.
The
non-observance
of
these
distances does not give rise to prescription.
ART. 671. The distances referred to in the
preceding article shall be measured in cases
of direct views fr. the outer line of the wall
when the openings do not project, fr. the
outer line of the latter when they do, & in
cases of oblique views fr. the dividing line
between the two properties.
ART. 672. The provisions of Article 670
are not applicable to buildings separated by a
public way or alley, w/c is not less than three
meters wide, subject to special regulations &
local ordinances.
ART. 673. Whenever by any title a right
has been acquired to have direct views,
balconies or belvederes overlooking an
adjoining property, the owner of the servient
estate cannot build thereon at less than
distance of three meters to be measured in
the manner provided in Article 671. Any
stipulation permitting distances as than those
prescribed in Article 679 is void.
NOTES:
Regular windows can be opened provided
proper distances are followed.
Proper distances:
Direct view (face to face) 2 meter distance
between the wall having the windows &
the boundary line.
Side or oblique view 60 cms. between the
boundary lines & nearest edge of the
window.
Permissible to build even up to the boundary
line provided no regular windows are opened
(restricted windows allowed).
209
C.
VOLUNTARY EASEMENTS
IX.
MODES
OWNERSHIP
OF
ACQUIRING
A.
ORIGINAL MODES
1. OCCUPATION
210
Art.
117, FC.
The ff. are conjugal
partnership properties: x x x
(4) The share of either spouse in the
hidden treasure w/c the law awards to the
finder or owner of the property where the
treasure is found;
1. INTELLECTUAL CREATION
2. PRESCRIPTION
DERIVATIVE MODES
1. DONATION
1. REMUNERATIVE
Art. 734. The donation is perfected fr. the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance
of the donee.
Art. 746.
Acceptance must be made
during the lifetime of the donor & of the
donee.
A.
KINDS
Issue:
WON donation was inter
vivos (valid) or mortis causa (invalid)?
Held: It was a valid donation inter
vivos. It is the time of effectivity w/c
distinguishes a donation inter vivos fr. a
donation mortis causa. And the effectivity
is determined by the time when the full or
naked ownership of the donated properties
is transmitted to the donees.
If the
donation is made in contemplation of the
donors death, that full ownership shall
pass to the donee only bec. of the donors
death, then it is at that time that the
donation takes effect, & is mortis causa w/c
should be in a will & testament. But if the
donation takes effect during the donors
lifetime or independently of the donors
death, that full ownership shall pass to the
donee during the donors lifetime, not bec.
of the death but bec. of the deed of
donation, then it is inter vivos.
In Cab, it is inter vivos bec. it took
effect during the lifetime of the donors as
shown in #1. It is also shown by the
acceptance in #2 as a donation mortis
causa is never accepted by the donee
during
the lifetime of the donor.
Furthermore, #s 3 & 4 granting limited
right to dispose implies that ownership had
passed by donation w/c was already
effective during the donors lifetime.
Finally, #5 refers to beneficial ownership,
not naked title donors reserved to
themselves the management & fruits of the
lots.
3. MORTIS CAUSA
ALEJANDRO V. GERALDEZ
Facts:
The deed of donation of lots
contained the following
That it was made in consideration of the love
& affection of the donors (spouses Diaz &
Mendoza) for the donees (their children) as
well as the services rendered by the donee to
the donors in the past;
That the donees accept the donation;
That the donees would answer for sickness &
burial of the donors;
That the donees may not sell the parcels of
land while the donors are alive unless
proceeds are made to answer for said
expenses; &
That while the donors are alive, they continue
w/ the administration & ownership of the
property. LC held this was a void donation
mortis causa.
the
onerous
donation
be
HELD:
YES.
A
donation
made
in
consideration of services to be rendered is
one w/ onerous cause & the revocation of an
accepted donation needs judicial sanction to
be effective. But the donation may not only
be revoked for the causes stated above.
Onerous donations are governed by the rules
governing contracts, under w/c the parties
may establish clauses & conditions they may
deem advisable provided they are not
contrary to law, morals & public policy & w/c
shall be binding between them. Thus, they
may demand for annulment of the contract in
case of non-compliance by the other party of
the conditions.
TOLENTINO :
214
BAVIERA:
Why is there a need
express acceptance? Why cant it
presumed?
Because one cannot
forced to accept anothers act
liberality. It is a matter of pride.
for
be
be
of
TOLENTINO :
Deed of Donation - The transfer of real
property must be expressed in a public
document, otherwise the donation will be an
absolute nullity, i.e., Art. 1357 cannot apply.
The donee cant bring an axn to compel the
donor to execute a public instrument of
donation bec. Art. 1357 applies only to
contracts w/c validly exist, not where the
form is required to make it valid. Onerous
donations, however, are governed by the
rules on contracts so in their case a public
instrument isnt necessary.
D. LIMITATIONS
TOLENTINO :
Art. 739. The ff. donations shall be void:
Those made between persons who were
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time
of the donation;
Those made bet. persons found guilty of
the same criminal offense, in consideration
thereof;
Those made to a public officer or his wife,
descendants & ascendants, by reason of his
office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action
for declaration of nullity may be brought by
the spouse of the donor or donee; & the guilt
of the donor & donee may be proved by
preponderance of evidence in the same
action.
TOLENTINO
D between Paramours - When the Ds
purpose is to initiate, continue, resume or
compensate illicit relations bet. paramours, it
TOLENTINO :
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend
all the present property of the donor, or part
thereof, provided he reserves, in full
ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for
the support of himself, & of all relatives who,
at the time of the acceptance of the
donations, are by law entitled to be
supported by the donor.
Without such
reservation, the donation shall be reduced on
petition of any person affected.
TOLENTINO :
This applies to all donations except D mortis
causa, D propter nuptias, & onerous Ds.
In condl or modal Ds, there may be
sufficient left for the donors subsistence.
D of donors present property w/o reservation
of an amount sufficient for his
subsistence isnt void but is susceptible
to reduction. It is voidable w/ respect to
the amount needed for the support of
the donor or his dependent relatives.
Art. 751. Donations cannot comprehend
future property.
By future property is understood anything
w/c the donor cannot dispose of at the time
of the donation.
TOLENTINO :
Future prop. includes all property that
belongs to others when the D is made,
although it may or may not later belong to
the donor. It cannot be donated bec. it isnt
his property & therefore he cant dispose of it
at the time of the D. But 1) properties to w/c
the donor has a right, even if their delivery is
fixed at a future date, & 2) properties w/c will
become his upon the happening of a
suspensive condn are not future properties.
The donor can donate such rights as he has
to these properties at the time of the D. Ex.
Properties of an existing inheritance are not
future properties of the heirs after the
predecessors death; heirs accrued right to
the properties at the moment of death.
Art. 752.
The provisions of Art. 750
notw/standing, no person may give or
217
46
Facts:
De Luna donated a lot to the
Luzonian Colleges (in Luzon?). The same was
embodied in a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos,
subject to certain conditions, & to automatic
219
Tolentino:
revocation.
Contemplates
only
partial
Art. 762.
Upon the revocation or
reduction of the
donation by the birth,
appearance or adoption of a child, the
property affected shall be returned, or its
value if the donee has sold the same.
If the property is mortgaged, the
donor may redeem the mortgage, by paying
the amount guaranteed, w/ a right to recover
the same fr. the donee.
When the property cannot be
returned, it shall be estimated at what it was
worth at the time of the donation.
Art. 763. The action for revocation or
reduction on the grounds set forth in article
760 shall prescribe after four years fr. the
birth of the first child, or fr. his legitimation,
recognition or adoption or fr. the judicial
declaration of filiation or fr. the time
220
Tolentino:
This applies to all donations
except donations mortis causa, donations
propter nuptias & onerous donations.
This enumeration is restrictive.
Art. 766.
Although the donation is
revoked
on
account
of
ingratitude,
nevertheless, the alienations & mortgages
effected before the notation of the complaint
for revocation in the Registry of Property shall
subsist.
Later ones shall be void.
Art. 767. In the case referred to in the
first paragraph of the preceding article, the
donor shall have a right to demand fr. the
donee the value of the property alienated w/c
he cannot recover fr. third persons or the sum
for w/c the same has been mortgaged.
The value of said property shall be fixed
as of the time of the donation.
Art. 768. When the donation is revoked
for any of the causes stated in Art. 760 or by
reason of ingratitude or when it is reduced
bec. it is inofficious, the donee shall not
return the fruits except fr. the filing of the
complaint.
If the revocation is based upon noncompliance w/ any of the conditions imposed
in the donation, the donee shall return not
only the property but also the fruits thereof
w/c he may have received after having failed
to fulfill the condition.
Art. 769. The action granted to the donor
by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced
in advance. This action prescribes w/in one
year, to be counted fr. the time the donor had
knowledge of the fact & it was possible for
him to bring the action.
Art. 770.
This action shall not
transmitted to the heirs of the donor, if
latter did not institute the same although
could have done so, & even if he should
before the expiration of 1 year.
be
the
he
die
Neither
can this action be brought
against the heir of the donee unless upon the
latters death the complaint has been filed.
SUCCESSION
I. Wills
Balane:
Formal Validity
Time criterion.-- law at the time of execution;
subsequent
laws
cannot
apply
retroactively.
Place criterion.-- Under Art 815-817, five (5)
choices are available to the testator:
Citizenship
Residence
Domicile
Execution
Philippines
2. Intrinsic Validity
Time.-- time of death bec. of Art. 777
Place.-- Law of citizenship of decedent.
Art. 17.
The forms & solemnities of
contracts, wills, & other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country
in w/c they are executed.
When the acts referred to are
executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established
Baviera:
The reason for the law
governing form is that one cannot
foresee what the law will be in the
future. The law cannot invalidate what
was valid when executed & vice- versa.
2. Exceptions
a. Wills made by aliens abroad
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if
made w/ the formalities prescribed by the law
of the place in w/c he resides, or according to
the formalities observed in his country, or in
conformity w/ those w/c this Code prescribes.
Balane:
Four combinations as to situation:
a. Filipino makes a will here
b. Filipino makes a will abroad.
c. Foreigner makes a will here.
d. Foreigner makes a will abroad.
What law governs the validity of will?
Intrinsic.-the national law of the
testator
Time.-- At the time of death.
Place.-- the same for Filipinos & aliens.
The same rule wherever you make
your will. You have five (5) choices-the law of
1. The testator's citizenship
2. Testator's domicile
3. Place of execution
4. Testator's residence
5. Philippines.
c. Joint Wills
Balane:
223
VITUG VS. CA
e. Holographic Wills
Balane:
225
II. Dated
(1) Roxas v. de Jesus. (Balane case) -- On the
will, the date was written as "Feb./ 61." Is it
valid? Yes.
General rule: Day, month & year must be
indicated.
Exception: When there is no appearance of
fraud, bad faith, undue influence, & pressure
& the authenticity of the will is established, &
the only issue is whether or not "Feb./61" is
valid, then it should be allowed under the
principle of substantial compliance.
(2) Labrador v. CA (Balane case) -- In this
case , the date was indicated in the body of
the will as part of the narration. Is this valid?
Yes. It is not necessary that the will be
separate fr. the body. In fact, it can be
anywhere in the will as long as the date
appears in the will.
Bar Question
Q: A Filipino went abroad & acquired US
citizenship. She then made a will giving all
her properties to her paramour.
A:
US laws will govern
ESTATE OF CHRISTENSEN
AZNAR VS. GARCIA)
Signature
Commentators have said that the signature
must consist of the testator's writing his
name down. The reason for this is since he is
able to write his will, then he is literate
enough to write his name.
(A.K.A.
226
HELD:
Texas law will apply since the
decedent is both a citizen & a domiciliary of
said state. Unless there is a Texas conflicts
rule applying lex rei sitae (law of the place
where the properties are situated), renvoi
will not apply in this case.
Art. 16 & Art 1039 render applicable
the national law of the decedent in
intestate & testamentary succession w/
regard to:
order of succession
amount of successional rights
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will
capacity to succeed
In the case of Miciano vs. Brimo, the SC
held that a provision in a foreigners will to
apply Phil law & not the national law of the
decedent is illegal & void.
PCIB VS. ESCOLIN
FACTS:
Charles Hodges & his wife
Linnie Jane provided mutually in their
respective wills that : I give, devise,
bequeath all of my estate to my beloved
spouse during his/her natural lifetime,
subject to the condition that upon the
death of whoever of them survived the
other, the remainder of what he or she
would inherit fr. the other is given, devised,
& bequeathed to the brothers & sisters of
the latter.
Linnie died first & Charles became
the Executor of her estate. However, he
made no liquidation of Linnies estate.
When Charles died, Magno was appointed
Administratrix of Linnies estate. PCIB was
declared spl. Administrator of Charles
estate.
PCIB claims that the Hodges
spouses were both residents of the Phils &
that the estate left by Linnie could not have
been more than 1/2 of her share of the
conjugal partnership, the other half being
the legitime of Mr. Hodges (1/4 of the
conjugal partnership) notw/standing that
she is a Texas national.
Magno claims that Art. 16 of the
NCC, the applicable law is Texas law under
w/c there is no system of legitime, hence,
the estate of Linnie cannot be less than her
share or 1/2 of the conjugal partnership)
227
Texas,
HELD:
The Court regrets, however,
that it cannot decide as neither the evidence
submitted by the parties nor their discussion
provide a clear & reliable proof of what in fact
is the possibly applicable law of Texas.
Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may
not be taken judicial notice of & have to be
proven like any other fact in dispute between
the parties in any proceeding, w/ the rare
exception in instances when the said laws are
already w/in the actual knowledge of the
court, such as when they are well & generally
known or they have been actually ruled upon
in other cases before it & none of the parties
concerned do not claim otherwise. Case
remanded to lower court to determine Texas
law.
BUT NO! Whatever be the provisions
actually of the laws of Texas applicable
hereto, the estate of Linnie is at least 1/2 of
the conjugal estate of the spouses. The
existence & effects of foreign laws being
questions of fact, & it being the position now
of PCIB that the estate of Linnie pursuant to
the laws of Texas, should only be 1/2 of the
conjugal estate, such contention constitutes
an admission of fact, & consequently, it
would be in estoppel in any further
proceedings in these cases to claim that said
estate could be less, irrespective of what
might be proved later to be actually the
provisions of the applicable laws of Texas.
AJERO VS. CA
FACTS:
The holographic will of Annie
Sand was submitted for probate.
Ajero
opposed on the ground that one of the
dispositions in the will (house & lot) was
invalid bec. the decedent was not the sole
owner thereof.
ISSUE: Can court pass upon substantial
validity of a will in a probate proceeding? Yes,
in certain cases.
HELD: In a petition to admit a holographic
will, the only issues to be resolved are:
WON the instrument submitted is, indeed,
the decedents last will & testament
WON said will was executed w/ the formalities
prescribed by law
C. Kinds
1. Holographic
Art. 810. A person may execute a
holographic will w/c must be entirely
written, dated, & signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to no other
form, & may be made in or out of the
Philippines, & need not be witnessed.
Baviera:
Why should holographic wills be
dated? To know whether the testator
is of disposing mind at the time of the
execution thereof. Without the date,
the will is void.
But in one case, the SC said that the
date stated in the body of the will is
valid.
Balane: Requirements:
1. In writing but no specific form is required.
It could be in a marble glass or on a wall, so
long as there was testamentary capacity.
2. Written in a language or dialect known to
the testator.
Suroza v. Honrado (Balane case) -- The issue
here is whether the will, w/c was written in
English is valid. The SC ruled that it is not.
The testatrix does not know English, being an
Igorot & an illiterate. Obviously, the will is
void, bec. of non-compliance w/ Art. 804. In a
will, can you conclude that it is void where in
the attestation clause, it was stated that the
will was read & translated to Filipino? The
law does not require translation nor
interpretation of the language to the testator
but that he himself personally understands
the said language.
Balane:
Requirements in the Probate of Holographic
Wills:
1. Documentary Requirement
Bar Questions:
Q:
Wife executes a HW w/c the husband
forged. The will was admitted in probate. Is
the admission a bar to criminal liability?
A:
NO
Q:
How does one prove the existence of
a lost will (HW)?
A:
Witnesses who will testify that they
saw the will after the testators death. After
w/c, present secondary evidence (copy of the
HW)
Q:
J executed a notarial will instituting A
as his sole heir. After a fight, J executed a HW
instituting B instead of A as his sole heir. J
accidentally destroyed the HW.
A:
Can no longer probate the HW. You
only have the testimony of witnesses w/c is
not allowed.
ESTATE OF ESGUERRA
YAP)
FACTS:
When decedent Felicidad Yap
died,
Fausto Gan initiated probate
proceedings alleging that there was a
holographic will executed by the decedent.
The surviving spouse asserted that his wife
did not leave any will.
Fausto tried to
establish the due execution & contents of the
will by the testimonies of witnesses.
ISSUE: Can HW be proved w/ witnesses
only? No
HELD:
Due execution & the contents
of a lost or destroyed holographic will cannot
be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses
who have seen & read such will.
As
compared to notarial wills, HW no witnesses
are needed provided however that the will is
entirely written, dated & signed by the hand
of the testator. In HW, the witnesses so
presented do not need to have seen the
execution of the HW. The loss of the HW will
entail the loss of the only medium of proof. If
a notarial will was lost, the subscribing
witnesses are available to authenticate.
Moreover, in the case of a lost HW the
witnesses would testify as to their opinion of
the handwriting w/c they allegedly saw, an
opinion w/c cannot be tested in court nor
directly contradicted by the oppositors bec.
the handwriting itself is not at hand.
RODELAS VS. ARANZA
FACTS:
Marcela Rodelas sought the
probate of the holographic will of Ricardo
Bonilla. Aranza opposed by saying that the
petitioner should have presented the
holographic will itself & not a copy thereof.
ISSUE: Can HW be proved w/ a copy
thereof? Yes
HELD: If the HW has been lost or destroyed
& no other copy is available, the will cannot
be probated bec. the best & only evidence
is the handwriting of the testator in said
will.
It is necessary that there be a
comparison between sample handwritten
statements of the testator & the will. BUT
a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the HW
may be allowed bec. comparison can be
made w/ the standard writings of the
testator.(This was based on a footnote in
Gan vs. Yap, supra. Perhaps it may be
proved by a photographic or photostatic
copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon
copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby
the
authenticity
of
the
handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited & tested before the probate
court.)
Art. 805.
Every will, other than a
holographic will, must be subscribed at the
end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person
in his presence, & by his express direction, &
attested & subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator & of one another.
The testator or the person requested by
him to write his name & the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each & every page thereof, except
the last, on the left margin, & all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of
pages used upon w/c the will is written, &
Balane:
Fourth Paragraph.-- Know the language
1. Body of the will.-- testator
2. Attestation clause
a. Testator.-- No.
b. witnesses.-- No. Only required
to know the contents thereof.
Discrepancies
Par. 1.-- No mention that the testator signs
in the presence of witnesses & yet par.
3 states this.
Par. 2.-- No statement that the testator &
the witnesses must sign every page in
one another's presence & yet that is
required to be stated in the attestation
clause.
Par. 3.-- In case of agent, all it requires is
that the agent signed by his direction &
not in his presence, but that is required
in par. 1.
Requisites for an ordinary attested
will (notarized will.).-Purpose of
requisites:
judgment call of Code
Commission; balancing of 2 policies.-- (1)
to encourage a person to make a will; (2)
to make sure that the will is testament of
the testator to minimize fraud.
Signed by the testator or his
agent in his presence & by
his express direction at the
end
thereof
&
in
the
presence of the witnesses.
Subscribe.-- literally means "to write one's
name."
Sign means "to put a
distinctive mark" (this is the better
term to use.)
Signing.-- by writing his own name; a
person may sign in other ways
Purpose.-- to authenticate the will
Where should the testator sign? At the end
of the will. There are 2 kinds of ends:
231
This is not
Questions.
Q1: Can a witness be an agent who will
sign for the testator?
A1:
(a) Yes. There is no prohibition.
No.
The testator must sign before 3
witnesses.
He cannot sign before
himself.
To be safe, do not let this happen.
As the lawyer, be sure you have
at least 3 witnesses.
Q2:
Is there any particular order of
signing?
A2: No. As long as the signing is done on
one occasion or one continuing transaction.
Yes. If the signing is not done on one
occasion or transaction. In such a case,
there is nothing that the witness is
attesting to.
Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith,
forgery, or fraud, or undue & improper
pressure
&
influence,
defects
&
imperfections in the form of attestation or
in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is proved that the
will was in fact executed & attested in
substantial
compliance
w/
all
the
requirements of article 805.
Balane:
This is a liberalization rule, an
attempt to liberalize Articles 804 to 808.
Substantial compliance w/ Articles 805 &
806 will validate the will despite some
defects in the attestation clause.
Looking at Art. 809, you get the
impression of utmost liberalization. We can
not determine how liberal we can be or can
we go. This article does not give a clear
rule. JBL Reyes & Tolentino suggest that
you make a distinction.
Guide: If the defect is something that can
be remedied by the visual examination of
the will itself, liberalize. If not, then you
have to be strict.
Illustration: If in an attestation clause, the
number of pages used was not stated, then
you can liberalize bec. by examining the
will itself, you can detect the defect. This is
bec. the pagination of statement in the
attestation clause is merely a double
check.
If the attestation clause failed to
state that "the testator signed in the
presence of witnesses," & this can not be
233
Balane:
A. Clarification:
"Whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator." This does not
cover all the possibilities. What about
235
Illustrations:
E. Criticism
Held:
There was preterition for the will
completely omits the parents of Rosario.
Entire will & not just the institution of the
heir was void. Reduction of the inheritance
of the universal heir & not the annulment
of the entire bequest will result in complete
abrogation of Arts. 814 & 815 of the New
Civil Code. Considering in this case that
the will before us solely provides for the
institution of petitioner as universal heir, &
nothing more, the result is the same. The
entire will is null.
BALANAY VS. MARTINEZ
Facts: Felix Balanay Jr. filed a petition for
the probate of his mothers notarial will.
Felix Sr. & Avelina (kapatid ni Felix Jr.)
opposed the probate.
Later, Felix Sr.
w/drew his opposition & signed an
instrument where he manifested that out of
respect for his wifes will, he waived &
renounced his hereditary rights in her
estate in favor of their 6 children. He
likewise signified his conformity to the
partition scheme.
Held: The will therefore may be probated.
The renunciation of Felix Sr.s hereditary
rights in favor of their 6 children does not
have the effect of preteriting him. It is the
preterition of compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death
of the testator, w/c shall annul the
institution of the heir.
In the CAB,
preterited heir is the surviving spouse who
even signified his conformity to the wills
provisions & renounced his hereditary
rights.
While he can renounce his
testamentary share, his legitime must be
respected.
SOLANO VS. CA
237
Balane:
Art.
918.
Disinheritance w/o a
specification of the cause, or for a cause the
truth of w/c, if contradicted, is not proved, or
w/c is not one of those set forth in this Code,
shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as
it may prejudice the person disinherited; but
the devises & legacies & other testamentary
dispositions shall be valid to such extent as
will not impair the legitime.
Distinguished fr. Art. 906.
Art. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom
the testator has left by any title less than the
legitime belonging to him may demand that
the same be fully satisfied.
IN RE ESTATE OF CHRISTENSEN
Facts: When Edward died, he left a will
wherein he gave bequeathed P3,600 to Maria
Helen & the remainder of his estate to Lucy.
Later, it was judicially declared the Maria
Helen was Edwards daughter.
Held: There was no preterition. Preterition
is the omission of the heir in the will, either
by not naming him at all or, while mentioning
Kind of
Heir
Compulsory
Voluntar
y
Intestate
Pre
decea
se
TN
Rep
TN
No
Rep
TN
Rep
Incapaci
ty
Renunciat
ion
TN
Rep
TN
No Rep
TN
No Rep
TN
No Rep
TN
Rep
TN
No Rep
Legend:
TN-- Transmits Nothing
Rep.-- There is Representation
No
rep.-There
is
representation.
no
Observations:
There is no transmission of any right fr. an
heir to his own heirs for any of the
three cases (P, I & R.) There is no
exception.
For voluntary, there is no representation,
no matter what the reason for
disqualification is
For
renunciation,
there
is
no
representation, no matter what kind of
heir.
Balane:
Four Elements of a Fideicommissary
Substitution:
There must be a first heir or fiduciary.
For the substitution to operate, the
first heir receives property, either upon the
death of the testator or upon the fulfillment
of any suspensive condition imposed by the
will. As distinguished fr. a simple substitution
where the second heir receives property only
upon default of the first heir. First heir does
not receive the property.
An absolute obligation is imposed upon the
fiduciary to preserve & to transmit to a
second heir the property at a given time.
Essence of a fideicommissary substitution-dual obligation.
"Given time."-- Provided by the testator; if
not, then it is understood that the period
is the lifetime of the fiduciary.
Scaevola.-- Characterized the situation as a
legacy or devise of the residue.
There is a second heir who must be one
degree fr. the first heir.
"One generation." Does it refer to the degree
of relationship or number of substitution?
It refers to the degree of relationship. See
Palacios v. Ramirez.
However,
fideicommissary
substitutions are also limited to one
transmission. Upon the lapse of time for the
first heir, he transmits the property to the
second heir.
They cannot be any more
fideicommissary substitution coming fr. the
same testator. In other words, there can only
be one fideicommissary transmission such
that after the first, there can be no second
fideicommissary substitution.
The first & second heir must both be living &
qualified at the time of the death of the
testator.
Balane:
In fact, no testamentary
disposition can burden the legitime bec.
legitime is transmitted by operation of law
upon the death of the testator.
Art. 865.
Every fideicommissary
substitution must be expressly made in
order that it may be valid.
The fiduciary shall be obliged to deliver
the inheritance to the second heir, w/o
other deductions than those w/c arise fr.
legitimate
expenses,
credits
&
improvements, save in the case where the
testator has provided otherwise.
Balane:
There are 2 ways of making a
fideicommissary substitution:
By naming it.-- "I institute A to 1/2 of my
estate, & by way of fideicommissary
substitution, I institute B as his
substitute."
By imposing upon the fiduciary the
obligation to preserve & transmit.-- "I
institute A to 1/2 of my estate & impose
upon him the obligation to preserve &
to transmit the same to B upon his
return."
Art. 866. The second heir shall acquire
a right to the succession fr. the time of the
239
Balane:
Reasons why they will not take effect:
Relate to Art. 865, par. 1. It will not take
effect as a fideicommissary substitution
but may take effect as something else.
This is not a fideicommissary but a prohibited
institution.
Perpetual prohibition will freeze the property
w/c is against public policy.
Temporary prohibition is allowed but cannot
go beyond the limit in Art. 863-- limit is
the death of the fiduciary. Cannot prohibit
alienation beyond the death of the
fiduciary. When the property goes to the
second heir, there is no more prohibition.
Commentators say that it refers to
Art. 870 rather than Art. 863. They contend
that the limit is 20 yrs. In such a case, the
contention is valid if you do not make it
applicable to substitutions.
Q: If you prohibit for 30 yrs., what will
happen?
A: There are 2 answers.
Balane:
The
nullity
of
the
fideicommissary
substitution will not affect validity of
institution of the first heir.
E.g., "I hereby institute A to 1/3 of
my estate under obligation to preserve & to
transmit the same to B upon his death."
If institution of B is invalid, what will
happen to the institution of A? Valid.
Institution of A is valid w/o substitution.
240
Art.
857.
Substitution
is the
appointment of another heir so that he
may enter into the inheritance in default of
the heir originally instituted.
Art. 858 Substitution of heir may be:
Simple or common;
Brief or compendious;
Reciprocal; or
Fideicommissary.
Held:
The substitution
here is a
substitucion vulgar.
The substitution
provided is not expressly made to be of the
fideicommissary kind. Nor does it contain a
clear statement to the effect that
Consolacion, during her lifetime, shall only
enjoy the usufructuary rights over the
property bequeathed to her, naked
ownership thereof being vested in the
brothers of the testatrix. It merely provides
that upon Cs death whether this happens
before or after that of the testatrix her
share shall belong to the brothers of the
testatrix.
Distinguished
fr.
resolutory
conditional substitution
Balane:
There is compulsion on the part of the
testator to reserve that part of the
estate w/c corresponds to the legitime.
The law sets a fractional portion of the
estate aside for the compulsory heirs.
The law does not specify w/c prop. to
reserve but only sets aside a fractional
portion of the estate.
There is no obligation on the compulsory
heirs to accept.
Balane:
There are Five (5) kinds of Compulsory
heirs:
Legitimate children & descendants
Legitimate parents & ascendants
Widow or widower
Acknowledged natural children, & natural
children by legal fiction
Other illegitimate children
Under the Family Code, there is no
more distinction between acknowledged
natural children & illegitimate children. They
are all considered as illegitimate.
Three Kinds of Relationship
Compulsory Heirs:
Among
to
children
903.
exclude
Different
SS -- 1/4
4 illeg. children -- 1/2 of the share of a leg.
child =
1/8 each
2 leg. children -- 1/2 shared equally =
1/4 each
If it exceeds the estate, ratably diminish
the legitime of the illeg. children = 1/16
1 adopted child -- \
1 leg. child ------- /
SS -- 1/4
1/2 shared
equally
SS -- 1/4
Illeg. parents -- none
1 adopted child -- 1/2
SS alone -- 1/2 except if the marriage is in
articulo mortis, in w/c case the share is 1/3
a. Marriage is in articulo mortis
b. Dies w/in 3 months
c. Not lived together for 5 years
244
Balane:
If there are legitimate children, they will get
collective legitime of 1/2 of the estate. It
does not say how they will divide the
legitime. Commentators agree that they
will divide the 1/2 equally regardless of
age, sex, marriage of origin (whether 1st,
2nd, etc.)
Why descendants? Rule: Nearer excludes
more remote.
245
Balane:
Articles 889 & 890 -- Legitimate parents or
ascendants alone -- 1/2 of the estate.
A. Three rules:
1. Nearer excludes the more remote.
No representation in the ascending line.
Illustration:
A1
A2
\ /
A
\
\
\ /
B
/
/
B1
B2
X
If X dies, the legitime will be shared by the
parents A & B bec. the nearer excludes the
more remote.
If A predeceases X, B gets all. A1 & A2 will
get nothing bec. there is no right of
representation in the ascending line.
2. Division by (between the) lines
-- 1/2 of legitime each to maternal &
paternal (assuming that the nearest
relatives in both sides are of the same
degree.)
Illustration (see illustration above.)
a. If both parents predecease X, the
nearest
ascendants
would
be
the
grandparents. Division by line will apply.
The estate will be divided equally bet. the
maternal & paternal lines (1/4 of estate
each.) Legitimes: A1 = 1/8, A2 = 1/8, B1
= 1/8, B2 = 1/8
b. If A1 predeceases X, there will
still be equal division by lines. Both lines
get 1/4 of the estate each. Legitimes: A2
= 1/4, B1 = 1/8, B2 = 1/8.
NOTE: If one of the parents, either
A or B, is alive, division by line will not
apply. Rule 1 would apply where the nearer
would exclude the more remote.
The
parent would exclude the grandparent.
3. Equal division w/in the line.
B. How far up do you go? As far as
possible as long as all lower ascendants are
dead. The law does not limit but nature
does.
Art. 892. If only one legitimate child or
descendant of the deceased survives, the
widow or widower shall be entitled to onefourth of the hereditary estate. In case of a
legal separation, the surviving spouse may
inherit if it was the deceased who had
given cause for the same.
If there are two or more legitimate
children or descendants, the surviving
spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal
to the legitime of each of the legitimate
children or descendants.
In both cases, the legitime of the
surviving spouse shall be taken fr. the
246
--
Balane:
Combination:
Legitimate parents or
ascendants -- 1/2 (divide according to Art.
889 & 890.)
Spouse -- 1/4
Free portion -- 1/4
Art. 894. If the testator leaves
illegitimate children, the surviving spouse
shall be entitled to one-third of the
hereditary estate of the deceased & the
illegitimate children to another third. The
remaining third shall be at the free disposal
of the testator.
2. If B renounces
A = 1/4
C = 1/4
Y = 1/4
3. If A, B & C predecease
1 & 2 = 1/12 each --- representation
1 & 2 = 1/12 each
3, 4 & 5 = 1/18 each
6 & 7 = 1/12 each
Y
= 1/6
According to commentaries: Y's share
is based on what the children would have
received if they were alive.
= ?
Balane:
This is one of the exceptions to the basic
rule of 1/2.
1. If B predeceases X
A = 1/6
B's children = 1/18 per child
C = 1/6
Y = 1/6
If A, B & C renounce
--- no representation
legitime of 1/2 is divided equally
between the 9 grandchildren
Balane:
1. Legitime of illeg. children affected by the
Family Code.
a. If before -- 10 : 5 : 4
b. If after -- 2 : 1
2. Combination:
Leg. children -- 1/2 collectively
Illeg. children -- 1/2 of the share of a leg.
child each
SS -- share is equal to that of 1 leg. child.
3. Illustration:
X---------Y
/ |
A B C D
After the Family Code:
a. A=
B=
Y=
C= 1/8
D= 1/8
b. If there is a third illegitimate child, E
A=1/4
B=1/4 Legitime exceeds estate
Y=1/4
C=1/8 reduced proportionately
D=1/8 reduced proportionately
E=1/8 reduced proportionately
C=1/12
D=1/12
E=1/12
Art. 896. Illegitimate children who may
survive w/ legitimate parents or ascendants
of the deceased shall be entitled to onefourth of the hereditary estate to be taken fr.
the portion at the free disposal of the
testator.
Balane:
Leg. parents -- 1/2 divided according to Art.
889 & 890
Art. 898.
If the widow or widower
survives
w/
legitimate
children
or
descendants, & w/ illegitimate children
other than acknowledged natural, or
natural children by legal fiction, the share
of the surviving spouse shall be the same
as that provided in the preceding article.
Balane: This is the same as Art. 895. The
FC has simplified this.
250
SUMAYA V. IAC
Facts:
Raul
Balantakbo
(prepositus)
inherited 2 sets of properties fr. 2 different
ascendant
1/3 interest in a parcel of land fr. his
father, Jose, Sr.; &
1/7 interest in 10 parcels of land fr. his
maternal grandmama, Luisa Bautista.
Raul died intestate w/o issue, his sole heir
being his mother Consuelo (reservista).
She sold the first set of properties to
Sumaya who sold it to Villa Honorio Devt
Corp. (VHDC) who transferred its rights to
Agro-Indusl Coconut Coop., Inc. (ACCI).
Documents evidencing this was registered
& the corresponding TCTs were issued.
Consuelo sold the 2nd set of
properties to VHDC w/c transferred the
same to ACCI w/c is presently in
possession.
TCTs do not contain any
annotation of the properties reservable
character.
Consuelo died. The brothers in full
blood of Raul & his nephews & nieces (by
his brother Jose, Jr.) claimed the properties
as theirs since the same are reservable.
Issues:
Is Sumaya an innocent purchaser
value? No.
Is annotation necessary? Yes.
for
253
1MS
\
3R
/ \
\
/
\
\ /
\
2P
4R
REQUISITES
Chua v. CFI -The property was acquired by a person fr.
an ascendant of fr. a brother or sister
by gratuitous title.
Said person died w/o legitimate issue.
The property is inherited by another
ascendant by operation of law.
There are relatives w/in the third degree
belonging to the line fr. w/c said
property came.
Comments:
1. "descendant" -- applies only if one got it
fr. an ascendant; but what if one got it fr. a
brother; it should have been "by a person
or individual"
2. Individual died w/o legitimate issue.
254
1MS
\
A \
means
legal
or
3R
/ \
/
\ C
\
/
\
2P
4R
1. A = 1MS -- 2P
MS -- either only an:
(1)
ascendant
\
-- of 2P
(2)
brother or sister /
MS to P -- by gratuitous title -- either:
(1) donation
(2) succession
Chua vs. CFI.-As long as the
transmission to the heir is free fr. any
condition imposed by the deceased himself &
the property is given out of pure generosity,
it is gratuitous. Even if the Court ordered the
heirs to pay Standard Oil, it is still gratuitous.
If the expense or charge is just incidental, it is
still considered gratuitous.
E.g., "I give you my house provided
you pay the mortgage."
This is still
gratuitous but you subtract the value of what
you paid.
2. B = 2P -- 3R
Operation of law:
(a) compulsory succession
(b) intestate succession
Cannot be by:
(a) testate succession
(b) donation
Reserva troncal commences at this point.
3. C = 3R -- 4R
This is a consequence of reserva troncal
This occurs when the reservista dies
Reserva troncal ends here.
NATURE
1. Of right of the reservista over the
reserved property.
Edroso v. Sablan.-Reservista's right over the property is
that of ownership
PARTIES.
A. Four Parties.
1. Mediate Source.-- Either an ascendant or
a brother or sister of the prepositus.
a. If ascendant, there is no problem.
You know fr. what line the property came fr..
b. If brother or sister & full or half
blood.
(i) If half blood, no problem.
You know what line the property came
fr..
(ii) If full blood, there is a
problem. How will you what line it
came fr.?
JBL Reyes.-- Reserva troncal applies
only to half blood brothers & sisters. You
cannot determine the line if it is of full blood.
Manresa.-- It should apply regardless
of whether it is of full or half blood. The law
does not distinguish.
What line do you apply it to? You
cannot apply it to either line as long as it is
w/in the third degree. Why? The purpose of
the law is not only to bring back the property
to the line (curative) but also to prevent it fr.
leaving the family.
E.g. A----------B
/
\
X
Y
Y to X. A is dead. X dies, so
the property goes to B. B remarries. The
property is lost.
view.
class?
by
Summary:
LC whole
LP excluded
LC
ILC of each LC
LC
S same as each LC
LC
ILC of each LC
S same as each LC
260
LP
S
LP
ILC
S
ILC
S
S
B, S, N
Collaterals whole
State whole
CORPUS V. ADMIN
Facts:
Teodoro
Yangco
was
the
acknowledged natural son of Rafael &
Ramona Arguelles, who was the widow of
Tomas Corpus (Tomas I).
Teodoro died
leaving a will. He had no forced heirs, & his
nearest relatives were
A half-brother;
A half-sister;
The children of half-brother, Pablo; &
Juanita, daughter of half-brother, Jose.
Petitioner in this case is Tomas Corpus (Tomas
II), son of Juanita.
The heirs of Teodoro entered into a
compromise agreement & the estate was
partitioned accordingly. 2 years later, Tomas
II as the sole heir of Juanita filed an action to
recover her supposed share in the intestate
estate of Teodoro Yangco. TC dismissed.
Issues:
Is Juanita a legal heir of Teodoro Yangco? No.
Does Tomas II have COA? No.
BICOMONG V. ALMANZA
Facts: Simeon Bagsic in his first marriage
had 3 children Perpetua, Igmedia &
Ignacio. All three are dead & the present
action was filed by their respective children
(nephews & nieces of the half-blood).
261
DIAZ V. IAC
Facts: Simona Pamuti died & her niece
Felisa Pamuti Jardin was declared by the
CFI to be sole heir. Felisa was likewise
allowed to intervene in the intestate
estates of Pascual (Simonas husband) &
Pablo (Simonas son) Santero, both
predeceased Simona. However, Pablo had
6 illegitimate children; 4 w/ Diaz & 2 w/
Pacursa. Diaz & Pacursa moved to exclude
Felisa fr. taking part in the settlement of
the said estates. The CFI reversed its
decision & held instead that Felisa is not an
heir of Simona.
IAC reversed this &
declared Felisa sole heir of Simona.
Issues: Can Pablos illegitimate children
inherit fr. Simona by right of representation
of their father her legitimate son? No.
Who are Simonas legal heirs? Felisa is
the sole heir.
Held: Art. 992 absolutely prohibits a
succession
ab
intestado
between
illegitimate child & the legitimate children
& relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural
tie of blood, but this is not recognized by
the law for the purpose of Art. 992.
Between the legitimate & illegitimate
family there is a presumed antagonism,
thus the law seeks to avoid further grounds
for resentment. In CAB, the illegitimate
children of Pablo cannot represent their
father in the succession of the latter to the
intestate estate of his legitimate mother,
Simona bec. of the barrier of Art. 992.
Note however, that while 992
prevents the illegitimate issue of a
legitimate child fr. representing him in
262
only
his
legitimate
descendants
may
exercise
right
of
representation.
of the father or
child shall be
surviving spouse,
entire estate.
263
DELA PUERTA V. CA
Facts: Dominga Revuelta died & in her will
she left her properties to her 3 children
Alfredo, Vicente & Isabel. Isabel was given
the free portion in addition to her legitime &
was appointed executrix.
Probate was
opposed by the brothers on the ground that
some of the properties listed in the inventory
of their mothers estate actually belonged to
them exclusively.
Alfredo died leaving
Vicente as the lone oppositor to the probate.
Vicente filed petition to adopt
Carmelita granted but appealed by Isabel.
Pending the same Vicente died; Isabel moved
for dismissal.
Carmelita was allowed to intervene, she filed
a motion for payment of a monthly allowance
as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente.
She presented evidence to prove the same
probate court granted her motion.
CA
affirmed.
Issue: Can Carmelita claim
successional rights to the
Dominga? No.
support &
estate of
Held:
Vicente did not predecease his
mother, Dominga. Representation can take
place only in the ff.: When
the person represented dies ahead of the
testator;
person
represented
is
incapable
of
succeeding the testator; &
person represented is disinherited by the
testator.
In all these cases there is a vacancy in the
inheritance
and
the
law
call
the
descendants/children
of
the
person
represented to succeed by
right of
representation. There is representation only
when relatives of a deceased person try to
succeed him in his rights w/c he would have
had if he were still living.
Not having
predeceased Dominga, Vicente had the right
to inherit directly, no representation.
Carmelita is a spurious child. As a
spurious child she is barred fr. inheriting fr.
Dominga bec. of Art. 992 w/c is a barrier
between legitimate & illegitimate families.
Even as an adopted child she is still barred as
there is no natural kindred ties between
Carmelita & Dominga.
Carmelita had
IX. Collation
Balane:
Second
(Articles 909, 910.)
sense,
imputation.
Balane:
Second sense, imputation.
Illustration:
/
\
A
B
|
/ \
a1 b1 b2
In 1995, X donated to a1. In 2001, X dies
while A is still alive. Will A impute the
donation to a1? No. a1 is considered a
stranger bec. he is not a compulsory heir.
Impute vs. the free portion.
Balane:
Balane:
Illustration:
/
\
A
B
/ \
b1 b2
B predeceased X.
1. In 1988, X donated to B P70,000.
2. In 2001, X donated to b1 & b2 P50,000
What will b1 & b2 impute when X dies?
Par. 1.-- 1988 donation.-- Yes bec. B would
have imputed it (if he) were he alive.
Par. 2.-- 2001 donation.-- Yes. This is not
logical bec. b1 & b2 inherit by representation.
The general rule is that only persons who
receive the donation are bound to impute it.
Art. 1065. Parents are not obliged to
bring to collation in the inheritance of the
ascendants any property w/c may have been
donated by the latter to their children.
|
A' ----A
Two cases:
X donates to A' only, imputed to the free
portion.
X donates to both A & A', impute 1/2 to
legitime of A & 1/2 to the free portion.
Rule: Donation given to the spouse will
not be imputed to the legitime of the
descendant spouse bec. the spouse is
considered a stranger.
Art. 1067. Expenses for support,
education, medical, attendance, even in
extraordinary
illness,
apprenticeship,
ordinary equipment, or customary gifts are
not subject to collation.
Balane:
First sense, computation.
265
Balane:
Second sense, imputation.
This qualifies Art. 1067.
General rule:
Imputed versus the free
portion.
Exceptions:
When parents provide otherwise
When it impairs the legitimes of other
compulsory heirs.
But if you lived away fr. home, deduct the
living expenses fr. what would be imputed
against your legitime.
This is inconsistent bec. this is included in
support under the Family Code.
Art. 1069. Any sums paid by a parent in
satisfaction of the debts of his children,
election expenses, fines, & similar expenses
shall be brought to collation.
portion
legitime.
Balane:
Par. 1.-First & second
computation & imputation.
senses,
Balane:
Balane:
First & second
imputation.
senses,
computation
&
Balane:
Balane:
Second sense, imputation.
In
partition, there should be among heirs of the
same class, as much as possible, equality not
only as to value but also as to kind & nature.
This is subject, of course, to a contrary
agreement of the heirs concerned.
Art. 1074. Should the provisions of the
preceding article be impracticable, if the
property donated was immovable, the coheirs shall be entitled to receive its
equivalent in cash or securities, at the rate of
quotation; & should there be neither cash nor
marketable securities in the estate, so much
of the other property as may be necessary
shall be sold at public auction.
If the property donated was movable, the
co-heirs shall only have a right to select an
equivalent of other personal property of the
inheritance at its just price.
267
Balane:
Third sense, return, on the assumption that
the donation is totally inofficious.
Par. 1.-- The donee, being the rightful owner,
has to be reimbursed the necessary
expenses. How much? It depends on how
much is collated. (same as Art. 1075.)
Par. 2.-- Useful expenses.-- Apply the same
rules as in necessary expenses.
Par. 3.-- Ornamental expenses.-- No right to
reimbursement but has the right to remove.
These are incidental obligations
arising fr. collation in the third sense.
Art. 1077. Should any question arise
among the co-heirs upon the obligation to
bring to collation or as to the things w/c are
subject to collation, the distribution of the
estate shall not be interrupted for this reason,
provided adequate security is given.
Art. 51.
xxx The delivery of the
presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall
in no way prejudice the ultimate successional
rights of the children accruing upon the death
of either or both of the parents; but the value
of the properties already received under the
decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall
be considered as advances on their legitime.
(Family Code, par. 3 thereof.)
Art. 227.
If the parents entrust the
management or administration of any of their
properties to an unemancipated child, the net
proceeds of such property shall belong to the
owner. The child shall be given a reasonable
monthly allowance in an amount not less
than that w/c the owner would have paid if
the administrator were a stranger, unless the
owner, grants the entire proceeds to the
child. In any case, the proceeds thus given in
whole or in part shall not be charged to the
child's legitime. (Family Code.)
ADAN V. CASILI
Facts:
Felix Adan commenced an action
against his sister Victoria & her husband to
secure judicial partition of the estate left by
their deceased mother consisting of 6 lots, 2
of w/c were discarded, thus there are only 4
remaining amounting to P2,783.55.
268
DE ROMA V. CA
Facts: Candelaria de Roma had 2 legally
adopted daughters -- Buhay & Rosalinda.
She died intestate.
Admin proceedings
were instituted by the guardian of
Rosalinda.
Buhay
was
appointed
administratrix & filed an inventory.
Rosalinda opposed bec. certain properties
earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay
were not included, including 7 parcels of
land & its fruits. Buhay claimed that the
donor prohibited collation of the said
parcels in the deed of donation. TC ruled in
favor of Buhay. CA reversed.
Issue: Are donated properties subject to
collation? Yes.
Held: Nothing in the provisions of the
deed of sale expressly prohibits the
collation of the donated properties.
It
merely described the donations as
irrevocable. Anything less than express
prohibition will NOT suffice under the clear
language of Art. 1062. Implied prohibition
merits little consideration as imputation is
not in question. Sole issue is whether or
not there is express prohibition.
X. PARTITION OF THE ESTATE
Balane:
Definition.-- "Separate, divide & assign."
1. Ways to go about partition.
Extrajudicially.-- Decedent dies intestate &
there are no debts.
All the heirs agree among themselves.-Upon agreement, partition is already
valid.
If registered property is included, publish
the partition in a public document
Go to the Register of Deeds to have titles
transferred
Judicial
269
Settlement proceeding
Ordinary action on co-ownership
2. General Procedure
If w/ a will, it must first be probated. After
probate, the heirs can choose between:
Extrajudicial
Judicial.-- Judge will divide but will first give
the heirs a chance to submit their own
partition.
If the heirs do not agree on the partition , the
judge will appoint a commissioner.
Commissioner will submit a project of
partition to the judge. This project of
partition, however, is not binding on the
judge.
The judge will issue an order of partition.
Property will be adjudicated among the heirs
accordingly.
Art. 1080.
Should a person make a
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or
by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her
family, desires to keep any agricultural,
industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact,
may avail himself of the right granted him in
this article, by ordering that the legitime of
the other children to whom the property is
not assigned, be paid in cash.
Balane:
Par. 1.-- Person can make partition. How?
1. By will-- making two things:
Testamentary disposition.-- State what value
the person will get.
Partition.-- State specific property the heir
will get or what comprises the value.
E.g., X has no compulsory heirs. He
states in his will "I give to A 1/3 of my estate.
To comprise A's share, I would like her to get
my house in Alabang."
The testator is allowed to do so even if
he has compulsory heirs. The partition is
valid as long as the items given do not impair
the legitime.
Act inter vivos, e.g., private writing not a will.
Rule under the OCC -- to do this, there has to
be a prior existing will. Why? If no prior
existing will, you are giving the person power
Balane:
The right of redemption given to the co-heir
provided the co-heir/ vendor sold his
undivided share or a portion thereof in the
estate.
Article 1620 on legal redemption & Art. 1088
are the same. The only difference is in the
application.
1. Art. 1620 applies to specific property
2. Art. 1088 applies to hereditary mass
B.
How will the right of redemption be
exercised?
If only one will redeem, he will pay the
purchase price.
If more than one will redeem, they will pay
purchase price proportionally to their share in
the property.
Note: Share must have been sold to a
stranger. If sold to a co-heir, the right of
redemption does not exist.
Why?
The
purpose is to keep the proprietary mass w/in
the co-owners.
.
DOROMAL V. CA
Facts: Horilleno siblings Luis, Soledad, Fe,
Rosita, Carlos, Antonio & Esperanza coowned Lot 3504.
Esperanza died & is
survived by her daughter Filomena. All the
owners except Filomena decided to sell their
6/7 portion over the lot in favor of the
Doromal spouses. The co-owners executed a
power of attorney in favor of their niece Mary,
except Filomena. A draft of the power of
attorney was sent to Filomena stating that
the selling price was P4.00 per sq. meter.
Filomena was not agreeable & refused to
sign. However, Carlos had already accepted
fr. the Doromal spouses P5,000.
The
remaining co-owners went ahead w/ the sale
of their 6/7 portion for P30,000. A TCT was
271
Chapter Two
PRESCRIPTION OF OWNERSHIP AND
OTHER REAL RIGHTS
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of
dominion & other real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession of things in good faith
& w/o just title for the time fixed by law.
Art. 1118. Possession has to be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful &
uninterrupted.
Art. 1119. Acts of possessory character
executed in virtue of license or by mere
tolerance of the owner shall not be
available for the purpose of possession.
Art. 1120. Possession is uninterrupted
for the purposes of prescription, naturally
or civilly.
Art. 1121. Possession is naturally
interrupted when through any cause it
should cease for more than one year.
The old possession is not revived if a
new possession should be exercised by the
same adverse claimant.
Art. 1122. If the natural interruption is
for only one year or less, the time elapsed
shall be counted in favor of the
prescription.
Art. 1123. Civil interruption is produced
by judicial summons to the possessor.
Chapter Three
PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS
prescription of
fulfillment of
a
judgment
the judgment
BAVIERA NOTES:
1. Acquisitive Prescription:
278
BAVIERA:
Why
can
AP
not
be
affirmatively alleged? Because it is a
MATTER OF EVIDENCE. Only ultimate
facts need be alleged.
THE
Art.
279
OVERSEAS
BANK
DEC.28, 1979
VS.
GERALDEZ
Facts:
Rs owed P Bank money. As Rs
defaulted in their payment, P made several
extra-judicial demands, the last being in
August 1976. Later, it commenced this action
for recovery of the debt. Barred on the
ground of prescription (allegedly Ps COA
accrued February 1965 & action was brought
only in October 1975) Lower court held that
the 6 extra judicial demands merely tolled
the running of the prescriptive period for a
total of 6 days ( 1 day per demand ).
HELD: NO.
DISMISSED. Ps are mere
squatters on the lot & w/o any legal right to
be protected by declaratory relief or by a
writ of prohibition. Their occupation of the
land by mere tolerance can by no means
give rise to a right that the law should
protect in their favor as against the true
local owners.
LEDESMA VS. CA, 224 S 175
FACTS: In 1980, action was brought by PR
bank against P to enforce the terms of a
1974 trust agreement. Dismissed for failure
to serve summons. In 1988, PR filed
another action based on the same c/a. P
filed MTD on the ground of prescription.
Denied & for PR. CA AFFIRMED. SC
AFFIRMED. Hence, this MFR.
MARCH 30,
FACTS:
Masigla was in possession of
Lot 897. In 1987, his son entered the
adjoining lot owned by P & prohibited her fr.
cultivating the land. P thus filed a criminal
action against the son. In the process, she
discovered that Lot 897 was registered in the
name of her grandfather. She secured
partition fr. all the heirs & was able to register
the land in her name. The heirs of Arcilla,
represented by Masigla, thus filed an action
for reconveyance alleging that their father
bought the lot fr. Ps grandfather & they had
been in possession of the same since 1927.
For P. CA reversed.
Section 1.
When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of
civil liability arising fr. the offense charged
is impliedly instituted w/ the criminal
action, unless the offended party expressly
waives the civil action or reserves his right
to institute it separately.
GARRIDO V. ENRIQUEZ
ESPIRITU V. CFI
FACTS:
Javier received fr. Garrido two
pieces of jewelry. Javier failed to return these
jewelry or to pay the agreed value in spite of
repeated demands. She charged w/ estafa.
Javier wrote to Garrido, requesting him to
allow her to pay in installments. Garrido
agreed & the case was provisionally
dismissed.
Javier failed to pay the
installments. Garrido moved to set aside the
order of provisional dismissal. to revive the
case. CFI granted the motion. Garrido filed a
separate civil action for recovery of the
jewelrys value. Javier alleges that the action
has prescribed. Javier was acquitted in the
criminal case. However, he was adjudged
liable in the civil case.
FACTS:
Espiritu in her complaint
alleged that defendant Topacio verbally
sold to her 2 parcels of land & that delivery
was made to her but no deed of sale was
executed. Espiritu claimed that despite
repeated demands, defendant sellers failed
w/o just cause to comply w/ the execution
of the deed of sale. Defendant denied that
it was a contract of sale & alleged it was
only an antichresis & that the action has
prescribed. Espiritu claims her action is
imprescriptible since it is an action to
compel compliance to a promise to
execute the necessary public document of
sale of real estate.
ISSUE:
WON
prescribed. NO.
Garridos
COA
has
ISSUE:
WON
prescribed. YES.
the
action
has
SOLIDARIOS V. ALAMPAY
FACTS:
The Solidario spouses filed
on Nov. 29, 1972 a complaint against Ong
for reformation of a deed of absolute sale
(executed on Dec. 24, 1964) into a contract
of mortgage & for the return of the land to
them upon payment of the loan.
HELD: The action has not yet prescribed.
The applicable period is that relating to
actions based upon a written contract & for
reformation thereof, w/c is 10 years. Only
less than 8 years has elapsed fr. the
execution of the deed of sale up to the
filing of this action.
Special cases
JALANDONI V. PNB
TORREDA V. BONCAROS
FACTS:
Defendants Visayan Sawmill &
Ang Tay are the proprietors & operator of a
cargo truck. It was being driven by Tionson
when its protruding lumber cargo struck &
killed Torreda, a passenger in another truck.
A criminal complaint was filed against the
driver of both trucks. The criminal case has
been pending for 9 years bec. Tionson went
abroad to hide. The widow of Torreda filed a
notice manifesting her reservation of her
right to file a separate civil action against the
driver & employer (defendants in this case).
Defendants filed a MTD on the ground
of lack of cause of action, & later a
Supplemental MTD on the ground that the
action based on culpa aquiliana had
prescribed.
HELD: Suit by the widow not barred.
Regardless of the criminal case, the
case of quasi-delict could have been filed
separately, since this kind of action is entirely
independent of the criminal responsibility of
the offender.
or
not
the
action
has
OBLIGATIONS
Requisites of an object:
It must be licit.
It must be possible.
It must be determinate or determinable.
It must have pecuniary value so that if not
performed it is converted into damages.
Balane:
Balane:
Definition. A better definition would be,
An obligation is a juridical relation
(bec. there are 2 parties) whereby a person
should engage or refrain fr. engaging in a
certain activity for the satisfaction of the
private interests of another, who in case of
non-fulfillment of such duty may obtain fr.
the patrimony of the former through proper
judicial proceedings the very prestation due
or in default thereof, the economic
equivalent (damages) that it represents.
(Diaz Piero.)
Characteristics of an Obligation:
It represents an exclusively private interest
It creates ties that are by nature transitory
It involves the power to make the juridical tie
effective in case of non-fulfillment through an
economic equivalent obtained fr. the debtor's
patrimony.
Essential Elements of an Obligation:
Active Subject.-- This refers to the creditor or
the obligee. Strictly speaking the two are not
the same. A creditor generally used in an
law; &
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by
(5) Quasi-delicts
Balane:
Law as a source of obligation.-- I am
under the impression that all obligations are
derived fr. law. It is my opinion that there is
an overlap in the enumeration bec. all
obligations arise fr. law. So, what is the idea
of enumerating law as only one of the
sources of an obligation as if it is only one of
them when the four find their sources in law?
Is it true that law is the only source of
obligation? Yes & No. Yes, law is the only
source of obligation if you talk of it in the
ultimate sense. No, if you are talking of law
as a proximate source. In this case, there are
five sources of obligations. Law is both the
ultimate & a proximate source of obligations.
Sources of Obligations according to
Sanchez Roman.-- Law & Acts. The latter
are further classified, as follows: (1) licit acts
created by concurrence of wills (contracts);
(2) licit acts either voluntary or involuntary
w/o concurrence of wills (quasi-contract); (3)
illicit acts of civil character w/c are not
punishable, voluntary or involuntary (torts &
all damages arising fr. delay); (4) illicit acts
w/c are voluntary & are punishable by law
(crimes.)
SAGRADA ORDEN VS. NACOCO
503]
[91 P
trustee of the former owner, the pltffappellee herein, but a trustee of the US
Govt., in its own right, to the exclusion of,
& against the claim or title of, the enemy
owner.
From Aug. 1946, when def.appellant took possession, to the date of
the judgment on 2/28/48, the APA had the
absolute control of the prop. as trustee of
the US Govt., w/ power to dispose of it by
sale or otherwise, as though it were the
absolute owner. Therefore, even if def.
were liable to the APA for rentals, these
would not accrue to the benefit of the pltff.,
the old owner, but the US Govt.
Balane:
Is the enumeration in Art. 1157
exclusive or merely illustrative? The sense
that the case of Sagrada Orden tells us is
that the enumeration is exclusive.
In
resolving the issue of whether the def.
should be liable to pay rentals, the SC used
the process of exclusion. For there to be an
obligation to pay rentals, that obligation
must arise fr. either of the five (5) sources
of obligations. If it does not, then there is
no obligation. The clear implication of this
ruling is that, these five (5) are the only
sources of obligations.
The problem w/ Art. 1157 is that it
might not cover all situations.
For
example: Carale uses Dove as his soap.
He then hears an advertisement fr. Proctor
& Gamble that it is offering a nice tumbler
for those who can collect 30 wrappers of
Tide before Feb. 29, 1996. So, Carale
stopped using Dove & started using Tide.
He was able to consume all 30 wrappers on
Feb. 29, 1996. He then went to Proctor &
Gamble (P & G) to exchange the 30 Tide
wrappers for a tumbler. But P & G told
Carale that their tumblers run out of stock.
Carale contracted a skin allergy as a result
of using Tide in taking a bath.
The
question is:
Does P & G have any
obligation to Carale. If we look at Art.
1157, this situation does not fall in any of
the five sources. So, we know have a
problem. The German Civil Code (BGB)
covers this situation. The BGB has a sixth
source of obligation, the Auslobung, w/c
means a unilateral offer. Art. 657 of the
BGB provides:
Art. 657. Binding promise. A person
who, by public notice, announces a reward
for the performance of an act, in particular
for the production of a result, is bound to
pay a reward to any person who has
performed the act, even if he did not act w/
a view to the reward.
286
Note:
We now have a DTI regulation
covering this situation.
This is an
administrative regulation w/c has the force of
law. But it would have been better to have
placed this rule in a law rather than in a mere
administrative regulation.
Articles 1158 - 1162 specify the general
principles regarding the sources of obligation
enumerated in Art. 1157.
Art. 1158. Obligations derived fr. law are
not
presumed.
Only
those
expressly
determined in this Code or in special laws are
demandable, & shall be regulated by the
precepts of the law w/c established them; &
as to what has not been foreseen, by the
provisions of this Book.
Balane:
Art. 1159. Obligations arising fr. contracts
have the force of law between the
contracting parties & should be complied w/
in good faith.
COMMANDO
Art. 1160. Obligations derived fr. quasicontracts shall be subject to the provisions of
Chapter 1, Title XVIII of this Book.
Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising fr.
criminal offenses shall be governed by the
287
Benefits Conferred
Voluntarily
Preservation of Property
or Business
(1) Negotiorum Gestio
2.
Benefits
Conferred
Involuntarily
Art. 2159.
Whoever in bad faith
accepts an undue payment, shall pay legal
interest if a sum of money is involved, or
shall be liable for fruits received or w/c
should have been received if the thing
produces fruits.
He shall furthermore be answerable
for any loss or impairment of the thing fr.
any cause, & for damages to the person
who delivered the thing, until it is
recovered.
Art. 2160. He who in good faith accepts
an undue payment of thing certain &
determinate shall only be responsible for
the impairment or loss of the same or its
accessories & accessions insofar as he has
thereby been benefited. If he has alienated
it, he shall return the price or assign the
action to collect the sum.
Art.
2161.
As
regards
the
reimbursement
for
improvements
&
expenses incurred by him who unduly
received the thing, the provisions of Title V
of Book II shall govern.
Art. 2162. He shall be exempt fr. the
obligation to restore who, believing in good
faith that the payment was being made of
a legitimate & subsisting claim, destroyed
the document, or allowed the action to prescribe, or gave up the pledges, or canceled
the guaranties for his right. He who paid
unduly may proceed only against the true
debtor or the guarantors w/ regard to
whom the action is still effective.
Art. 2163. It is presumed that there
was a mistake in the payment if something
w/c had never been due or had already
been paid was delivered; but he fr. whom
the return is claimed may prove that the
delivery was made out of liberality or for
any other just cause.
(1)Distinguished
Obligations
fr.
Natural
Art. 1423.
Obligations are civil or
natural. Civil obligations give a right of
action to compel their performance.
Natural obligations, not being based on
positive law but on equity & natural law, do
not grant a right of action to enforce their
291
Performance of
Obligations imposed by law in
the interest of the public
(1) Support
an
292
(4)
Health
or
regulation re: property
safety
B. Quasi-delicts
LASALA V. VELEZ
Facts:
Velez owns a lot.
When the
Japanese forces invaded the Philippines, he
was forced to turn it over to the Japs.
294
Baviera:
There was no legal or
contractual obligation on the part of
Velez to supply water to Lasala fr. the
well.
TACTACQUIN V. PALILEO
Facts: Tactaquin died when he was run over
by a car driven by Palileo. A criminal case for
reckless imprudence was filed against Palileo.
During the arraignment, Palileo pleaded
guilty & he was sentenced forthw/ to suffer
imprisonment & to pay 4,000 as damages.
The private prosecutor made an oral
reservation to file a separate civil action for
damages. Consequently, the civil case was
filed. Palileo filed a MtD on the ground that
the civil action is barred
by the final
judgment in the criminal case.
Issue: WON the civil action is barred?
Held: No. There was a timely reservation
made by the private prosecutor on behalf of
the complainant. As a result thereof, the civil
liability was automatically taken out of the
crim. case & was not before the court. The
decision of the lower court sentencing Palileo
to pay damages is therefore a nullity.
SINGSON V. BPI
Facts: Singson, Lobregat & Villa-Abrille were
adjudged liable to pay Phil. Milling Corp the
sum of 105, 539.
Singson & Lobregat
appealed the judgment, Villa Abrille did not.
As a consequence, a writ of garnishment was
served upon BPI in w/c the Singsons had a
current account insofar as Villa-Abrilles
account was concerned. However, there was
a misunderstanding & Singsons account was
also garnished. As a result thereof, checks
issued by Singson bounced.
The bank
officials, upon realizing their error made
efforts to rectify the situation.
Singson,
however filed an action based on QD against
BPI. the CFI dismissed the action on the
ground that Singson cannot recover damages
based on QD as the rel. between him & the
bank is contractual in nature.
Issue: WON a n action based on QD will
prosper against BPI?
Held: Yes.
The existence of a contract
between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by one against the other
& the consequent recovery of damages
therefor. The act that breaks the contract
may also constitute a tort.
Baviera: The damages in this case was
awarded based on QD bec. the act
complained of did not relate to the
performance
of
BPIs
contractual
obligation w/ Singson.
Q: When is the wrongful dishonoring of
a check a contractual negligence?
A: In case of mistake in the recording of
funds, for example. In such a case,
there would not be available the
defense of diligence of GFF as the
action is not based on QD.
MALIPOL V. TAN
Facts: Malipol died when he was hit by
tanker driven by Labsan & owned by Tan.
An action for damages was field against
Labsan. The TC ordered Labsan to pay
damages to Malipols heirs & made Tan
subsidiarily liable.
Issue: WON an action based on QD makes
the ER only subs. liable?
Held: NO. The allegation in the complaint
against Labsan reveals that it is an action
based on Art. 2180 of the CC, QD. The
liability therefor of the ER is not merely
subsidiary but primary & direct giving him
only a right to reimbursement form the
employee.
Baviera:
If there is contractual
negligence, there is no more need to
sue the employee.
To determine what kind of
action
is
brought
against
the
employer, look at the allegations in
the complaint.
MARCIA V. CA
Facts:
VLI Liner bus driven by Paje
collided w/ a jeep driven by Marcia
resulting in the death of the latter. Both
civil & criminal cases were filed against VLI
& Paje. However, Paje was eventually
acquitted by the CA in the criminal case
stating that: criminal negligence
is
wanting, that Paje was not even guilty of
civil negligence. Paje & VLI then moved
to dismiss the civil case invoking the CA
decision in the crim. case.
Issue: WON the CA decision bars the sep.
civil axn for damages?
Held: YES. An acquittal based on the
finding that the facts upon w/c civil liability
did not exist bars the filling of an
independent civil action if it is based on
crime.
No sep. civil axn. may be field by
Marcia under Art. 33 as it is not one of the
3 crimes enumerated thereunder. In the
action field by Marcia, the allegation was
that the act was committed as a result of
296
FERNANDO V. CA
Facts: 5 men died when they suffocated
while cleaning a septic tank of a Public
Market in Davao. The heirs sued the City
Government basing their claim on the alleged
negligence of the city for neglecting the
cleaning of the tank for 19 years & for not
putting up signs near & around the area. It
appears, however, that the deceased cleaned
the tank w/o authority fr. the government.
Issue: WON the city government is liable for
damages?
Held: No. The city is not guilty of negligence,
they cannot not be held liable for damages.
The putting up of signs in the area is not one
of the reqts for construction of public
utilities, septic tanks not being nuisances per
se.
The deaths of the 5 men occurred
through their own negligence. They were
engaged in the business of cleaning septic
tanks, they are charged w/ the knowledge of
knowing the risks attendant to such business.
To be entitled to damages for an injury
resulting fr. the negligence of another, a
claimant must establish the relation between
the omission & the damage. It must be
proved that the negligence was the
immediate & proximate cause of his injury.
MMTC V. CA
Facts: Custodia died when the passenger
jeep, (driven by Calebag) she was riding
collided w/ an MMTC bus driven by Leonardo.
An action for damages was field by
LIBI V. IAC
Facts: Julie Gotiong ( 18 yrs. old ) &
Wendell Libi (18 yrs. old) were sweethearts.
When they broke up, Wendell apparently
did not take news lightly, he threatened
Julie. Finally, the couple was found dead.
Wendell shot Julie, then himself using a gun
owned by his father. Julies Parents filed an
action for damages against Wendells
parents ( Libi) under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code.
Issue: WON the parents of Wendell are
liable under Art. 2180? If so, WON such
liability is vicarious or primary?
297
C. Law
E. Delict
PEOPLE VS. SENDAYDIEGO
20, 1978
JANUARY
Facts:
Defendant Sendaydiego, the
provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in
conspiracy w/ co-defs. Samson (EE of a
lumber & hardware store) & Quirimit
(provincial auditor), were charged w/
several counts of malversation through
falsification. It seems that 6 provincial
vouchers were forged to embezzle P57,000
fr. the road & bridge fund.
The LC
acquitted
Quirimit,
but
convicted
Sendaydiego & Samson. Both appealed to
this court. PENDING APPEAL, Sendaydiego
died. This appeal as to his criminal liability
was dismissed, death having extinguished
the same. But his civil liability remained.
Issue: WON the case on appeal when
Sendaydiego died survived the latter wrt to
civil liability.
Held: YES. Lower Court affirmed.
Baviera:
When the source of the
obligation is Law, there is no need for
an act or omission for the obligation to
arise.
D. Contracts
Baviera: The terms of the contract
cannot
be
against
mandatory
&
prohibitive laws. And if the contract is
valid, it shall have the force of law
between the contracting parties.
115
Balane Provisions:
200
301
CHAPTER 2.-OBLIGATIONS
Balane:
Three types of obligations.-(1)
obligation to give; (2) obligation to do; &
(3) obligation not to do.
I. Obligation to give
A. Specific thing
B. Generic thing
II. To do
III.
Not to do (this includes all
negative obligations like obligation not to
give.)
Kinds of performance.-- (1) specific
performance (performance by the debtor
himself); (2)
substitute performance
(performance at the expense of the
debtor); (3) equivalent performance (grant
of damages.)
Articles 1163 - 1166 cover obligation to
give.
Three Accessory Obligations:
1. Art. 1163.-- To take care of the thing w/
the diligence of a good father of a family
until actual delivery.
2. Art. 1164.-- To deliver the fruits to the
creditor (fruits produced after obligation to
deliver arises.)
3. Art. 1166.-- To deliver accessions &
accessories.
Art. 1163. Every person obliged to give
something is also obliged to take care of it
w/ the proper diligence of a good father of
a family, unless the law or the stipulation of
the parties requires another standard of
care.
Art. 1164. The creditor has a right to
the fruits of the thing fr. the time the
obligation to deliver arises. However, he
shall have no real right over it until the
same has been delivered to him.
Balane:
From the time the obligation
arises, the creditor has a personal right
against the debtor as to the fruits. But he
has no real right over them until actual
delivery.
Real right is a right w/c is
enforceable against the whole world. He
has only the personal right against the
debtor w/ regard to the undelivered fruits.
This is bec. of the principle Non nudis
pactis, sed traditione, dominia rerum
transferentur."
(It is not by mere
agreement, but by delivery, is ownership
transferred.) Personal right arises fr. the
time the obligation to deliver arises
302
Art. 1166.
The obligation to give a
determinate thing includes that of delivering
its accessions & accessories, even though
they may not have been mentioned.
Balane:
When does delay set in?-the following manner:
Delay sets in
Exceptions:
304
BALANE CASES:
ARRIETA VS. NARIC [10 S 79]
One who assumes a contractual obligation &
fails to perform the same on account of his
inability to meet certain bank requirements
w/c inability he knew & was aware of when
he entered into the contract, should be held
liable in damages for breach of contract.
Under Art. 1170, not only debtors guilty of
fraud, negligence or default but also every
debtor, in general, who fails the performance
of his obligation is bound to indemnify for the
losses & damages caused thereby.
Meaning of phrase "in any manner
contravene the tenor" of the obligation.-- The
phrase includes any illicit task w/c impairs the
strict & faithful fulfillment of the obligation, or
every kind of defective performance.
Balane: This phrase is a catch-all provision.
At worst, it is a superfluity. At best, there is a
safety net just in case there is a culpable
irregularity of performance w/c is not covered
by fraud, negligence or delay. In this case,
the SC was apparently not sure as to what
category the breach fell. This phrase is not
really an independent ground.
TELEFAST VS. CASTRO [158 s 445] - In
the case at bar, petitioner & private
respondent Sofia C. Crouch entered into a
contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner
undertook to send said private respondent's
message overseas by telegram.
This,
petitioner did not do, despite performance by
said pvt. resp. of her obligation by paying the
required charges. Petitioner was therefore
guilty of contravening its obligation to said
private respondent & is thus liable for
damages.
NPC VS. CA [161 S 334] - NPC cannot
escape liability bec. its negligence was the
proximate cause of the loss & damage even
though the typhoon was an act of God.-- It is
clear fr. the appellate court's decision that
based on its findings of fact & that of the trial
court's, petitioner NPC was undoubtedly
negligent bec. it opened the spillway gates of
BALANE CASE:
Balane:
METROBANK VS. CA [237 S 761] - As
borne out by the records, the dishonoring of
the resp.'s checks committed through
negligence by the petitioner bank on 4/6/82
There are
NOTES:
Q: Why are the innkeepers held liable
under Art. 2000?
A: Because travelers are constrained to
rely on their VIGILANCE.
BALANE CASE:
JIMENEZ VS. CITY OF MANILA [150 S 510]
- City of Mla. failed to exercise the diligence
of a good father of a family w/c is a defense
in quasi-delict.-- As a defense against liability
on the basis of quasi-delict, one must have
exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family. There is no argument that it is the
duty of the City of Mla. to exercise reasonable
care to keep the public market reasonably
safe for people frequenting the place for their
marketing needs. While it may be conceded
that the fulfillment of such duties is
extremely difficult during storms & floods, it
must, however, be admitted that ordinary
precautions could have been taken during
good weather to minimize the dangers to life
& limb under those difficult circumstances.
For instance, the drainage hole could have
been placed under the stalls instead of on the
passage ways. Even more important is the
fact, that the City should have seen to it that
the openings were covered.
Sadly, the
evidence indicates that long before petitioner
fell into the opening, it was already
uncovered, & 5 mos. after the incident
happened, the opening was still uncovered.
Moreover, while there are findings that during
floods the vendors remove the iron grills to
hasten the flow of water, there is no showing
that such practice has ever been prohibited,
much less penalized by the City of Mla.
Neither was it shown that any sign had been
placed thereabouts to warn passers-by of the
impending danger.
Extraordinary diligence required
B. Common Carriers
A. Innkeeper
307
Art. 1174.
Except in cases expressly
specified by law, or when it otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of
the obligation requires the assumption of risk,
no person shall be responsible for those
events w/c could not be foreseen, or w/c
,though foreseen, were inevitable.
Balane:
General Rule:
The happening of a
fortuitous event exonerates the debtor fr.
liability.
Extraordinary
fortuitous
events
are
understood to be: fire, war, pestilence,
unusual flood, locusts, earthquake, or others
w/c are uncommon, & w/c the contracting
parties could not have reasonably foreseen.
Exceptions:
When the law so specifies.-- e.g., if the
debtor is already in delay (Art. 1165,
par. 3.)
When the parties so agree
When the nature of the obligation requires
the assumption of risk, e.g., an
insurance contract.
308
BALANE CASES:
NAKPIL & SONS VS. CA [144 S 596] Requisites for exemption fr. liability due to an
"act of God."-- To exempt the obligor fr.
liability under Art. 1174, for a breach of an
obligation due to an "act of God," the
following must concur:
the cause of the breach of the obligation
must be independent of the will of the
debtor;
the event must be either unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event must be such
as to render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner;
&
the debtor must be fee fr. any participation
in, or aggravation of the injury to the
creditor.
Balane: Some of the elements were present
in this case. What was absent was the last
element.
NAKPIL & SONS VS. CA [160 S 334] "One who negligently creates a dangerous
condition cannot escape liability for the
natural & probable consequences thereof,
although the act of a third person, or an act
of God for w/c he is not responsible,
intervenes to precipitate the loss." (citing
Tucker v. Milan, 49 OG 4379, 4380.)
QUISUMBING VS. CA [189 S 605] - PAL's
failure to take certain steps that a certain
passenger in hindsight believes should have
been taken is not the negligence or
misconduct w/c mingles w/ force majeure as
an active & cooperative cause.-- A careful
analysis of the record in relation to the
memoranda & other pleadings of the parties,
convinces this Court of the correctness of the
essential conclusion of both the trial &
appellate courts that the evidence does
indeed fail to prove any want of diligence on
the part of PAL, or that, more specifically, it
had failed to comply w/ applicable
regulations, or universally accepted &
observed procedures to preclude hijacking; &
that the particular acts singled out by the
petitioners as supposedly demonstrative of
negligence were, in the light of the
circumstances of the case, not in truth
negligent acts "sufficient to overcome the
force majeure nature of the armed robbery."
The Court quite agrees, too, w/ the Appellate
Tribunal's wry observation that PAL's failure to
take certain steps that a passenger in
hindsight believes should have been taken is
not the negligence or misconduct w/c
mingles w/ force majeure as an active &
cooperative cause."
BACHELOR EXPRESS VS. CA [188 S 216] The running amuck of the passenger was the
proximate cause of the incident as it
NOTES:
Q: What if a depositor was in the premises of
the bank & was robbed of his money w/c he
was about to deposit?
A: Bank cannot be held liable for fortuitous
event (robbery) esp in CAB where the money
has not yet been actually deposited.
Art. 1979 provides for instances wherein
depositary is still liable even in cases of
fortuitous event.
Q: What kind of diligence is required of a
depositary?
A: Ordinary Diligence.
*Safety Deposit Box: If the jewelry inside a
SDB was stolen, rules on deposit will not
Negotiorum Gestio
310
Lessee
Independent Contractor
Common Carrier
Art. 1763.
A common carrier
responsible for injuries suffered by
passenger on account of the willful acts
negligence of other passengers or
is
a
or
of
strangers,
if
the
common
carrier's
employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could
have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.
2. Mora or default
a. Mora solvendi
- delay on the part of debtor to fulfill his
obligation to give or to do.
Art. 1165. xxx. If the obligor delays,
or has promised to deliver the same thing
to two or more persons who do not have
the same interest, he shall be responsible
for any fortuitous event until he has
effected the delivery.
Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or
to do something incur in delay fr. the time
the obligee judicially or extrajudicially
demands fr. them the fulfillment of their
obligation.
However, the demand by the creditor
shall not be necessary in order that delay
may exist:
(1) When the obligation or the law
expressly so declare;
(2) When fr. the nature & the
circumstances of the obligation it appears
that the designation of the time when the
thing is to be delivered or the service is to
be rendered was a controlling motive for
the establishment of the contract;
(3) When demand would be useless, as
when the obligor has rendered it beyond
his power to perform.
In reciprocal obligations, neither party
incurs in delay if the other does not comply
or is not ready to comply in a proper
manner w/ what is incumbent upon him.
From the moment one of the parties fulfills
his obligation, delay by the other begins.
(Compensatio Morae)
Art. 552. Xxx A possessor in bad faith
shall be liable for deterioration or loss in
every case, even if caused by a fortuitous
event.
311
b. Mora accipiendi
- delay on the part of the creditor to accept
performance of the obligation.
Art. 1718.
The contractor who has
undertaken to put only his work or skill,
cannot claim any compensation if the work
should be destroyed before its delivery,
unless there has been delay in receiving it, or
if the destruction was caused by the poor
quality of the material, provided this fact was
communicated in due time to the owner. If
the material is lost through a fortuitous
event, the contract is extinguished.
Art. 1504. Unless otherwise agreed, the
goods remain at the seller's risk until the
ownership therein is transferred to the buyer,
but when the ownership therein is transferred
to the buyer the goods are at the buyer's risk
whether actual delivery has been made or
not, except that:
(1) Where delivery of the goods has been
made to the buyer or to a bailee for the
buyer, in pursuance of the contract & the
ownership in the goods has been retained by
the seller merely to secure performance by
the buyer of his obligations under the
contract, the goods are at the buyer's risk fr.
the time of such delivery;
(2) Where actual delivery has been
delayed through the fault of either the buyer
or seller the goods are at the risk of the party
in fault.
Issues:
WON MMC liable for rent during Jap pd.
(NO.)
WON MMC was in default in payment of
rent, & therefore liable for destruction
of the bldgs. (NO.)
Held: Under the first par. of A1560, lessor
does not answer for a mere act of trespass
as disting. fr. trespass under color of title in
w/c lessor bears liability. In CAB, ouster of
the Jap forces belongs to the 2nd class of
disturbances--under color of title, & thus,
the lessor-pltffs. bear the burden.
For
under the generally accepted prin of IL, a
belligerent occupant may legitimately billet
or qtr. its troops in privately owned land or
bldgs. for the duration of the occupation.
The
lessors
insistence
upon
collecting Jap occupation rentals was
unwarranted in law. Hence, their refusal to
accept the current rental w/o qualification
placed them in default (mora accipiendi) w/
the result that thereafter, they had to bear
all supervening risks of accidental injury or
destruction of the leased premises. While
not expressly stated by the Code of 1889,
this result is clearly inferable fr. the nature
& effects of mora & Arts. 1185, 1452(3) &
1589. That the lessee did not consign
rentals in court did not render debtor liable
for default nor answerable for fortuitous
event.
3. Express agreement
56
4. Aleatory Contract
accion
subrogatoria,
wherein
the
creditor is subrogated in the rights of
the debtor.
Accion pauliana (Articles 1387-89).-- This
is the right of creditors to set aside
fraudulent transfers w/c the debtor
made so much of it as is necessary to
pay the debts.
Tolentino:
CHAPTER 3.-OBLIGATIONS
Section 1.-Obligations
DIFFERENT KINDS OF
Pure
&
Conditional
Balane:
Art. 1176. The receipt of the principal by
the creditor w/o reservation w/ respect to the
interest shall give rise to the presumption
that said interest has been paid.
Balane:
Against what
performance?
can
the
obligee
demand
Classification of Obligations:
BALANE CASE:
PAY V. PALANCA [57 SCRA 618] - From the
manner in w/c the P/N was executed, it would
appear that petitioner was hopeful that the
satisfaction of his credit could be realized
either through the debtor sued receiving cash
payment fr. the estate of the late Carlos
Palanca presumptively as one of the heirs, or,
as expressed therein, "upon demand." There
is nothing in the record that would indicate
whether or not the first alternative was
fulfilled.
What is undeniable is that on
8/26/67, more than 15 yrs. after the
execution of the P/N on 1/30/52, this petition
was filed.
The defense interposed was
prescription. Its merit is rather obvious. Art.
1179, par. 1 says so. xxx
The obligation being due & demandable, it
would appear that the filing of the suit after
15 yrs. was much too late.
B. Conditional Obligations
Art. 1193.
Obligations for whose
fulfillment a day certain has been fixed,
shall be demandable only when that day
comes.
Obligations w/ a resolutory period take
effect at once, but terminate upon arrival of
the day certain.
A day certain is understood to be that
w/c must necessarily come, although it
may not be known when.
If the uncertainty consists in whether
the day will come or not, the obligation is
conditional, & it shall be regulated by the
rules of the preceding Section.
Balane:
A term is a future and certain
event upon w/c the demandability (or
extinguishment) of an obligation depends.
A term or period is an interval of
time, w/c, exerting an influence on an
obligation as a consequence of a juridical
act, either suspends its demandability or
produces its extinguishment. (Manresa.)
A term can either be:
1. suspensive condition (ex die -- fr. the
day) or one the arrival of w/c will make the
obligation demandable
314
Balane:
This article refers to suspensive condition.
This article sets forth the rule of retroactivity
in an obligation to give. This rule is logical
but impractical. Many modern Civil Codes
have discarded it.
No Retroactivity as to the Fruits.-Notice that there is no retroactivity w/ respect
to the fruits. The fruits are deemed to cancel
out each other. If only one of the thing
produces fruits, there is no obligation to
deliver the fruits.
(ii) Condition subsequent
(Resolutory Condition)
65 SCRA 207
CA for
Balane:
This refers to a suspensive condition.
There are
conditions:
classes
of
impossible
A:
Bec. in a donation as well as in a
testamentary disposition, the causa or
consideration is the liberality of the donor or
testator, as the case may be. Even if you
take away the impossible condition, there is
still a reason for the disposition to exist-liberality. They (donation & testamentary
disposition) have both their underpinnings,
liberality.
Art. 1186.
The condition shall be
deemed
fulfilled
when
the
obligor
voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.
BALANE CASES:
C. Obligations w/ a period
1. Kinds
Art. 1193.
Obligations for whose
fulfillment a day certain has been fixed,
shall be demandable only when that day
comes.
Obligations w/ a resolutory period
take effect at once, but terminate upon
arrival of the day certain.
A day certain is understood to be
that w/c must necessarily come, although it
may not be known when.
If the uncertainty consists in
whether the day will come or not, the
obligation is conditional, & it shall be
regulated by the rules of the preceding
Section.
Tolentino:
Concept of Term.-- A term or period is a
space of time w/c, exerting an influence on
obligations as a consequence of a juridical
act, suspends their demandability or
determines
their
extinguishment.
(Manresa.)
Distinguished fr. Condition:
As to fulfillment.-A condition is an
uncertain event, while a term is an
event that must necessarily come,
whether on a date known before hand
or at a time w/c cannot be
predetermined.
As to influence on the obligation.-- While a
condition gives rise to an obligation or
extinguishes one already existing, a
period has no effect upon the existence
of
obligations,
but
only
their
demandability or performance. Bec. of
this difference, a period does not carry
w/ it, except when there is a special
agreement, any retroactive effect.
318
Balane:
Mistaken Premature Delivery.-- This
article assumes 2 things: (1) the delivery
was by mistake; (2)
the mistake was
discovered bef. the term arrives.
Both the things & the fruits can be
recovered.
If the term has already arrived, the
question is moot & academic. But can he
recover the fruits produced during the
meantime? It depends on what school of
thought you follow:
According to one school of thought, the
debtor is entitled to the fruits produced
in the meantime (Tolentino.)
According to another school of thought, all
the fruits received during the pendency
of the term belong to the creditor
(Caguioa.)
Balane:
319
cannot be
premature
Balane:
General rule: If a period is attached in an
obligation, the presumption is that it is for the
benefit of both parties. The consequence is
that the creditor cannot compel the
performance before the arrival of the term;
the debtor cannot compel acceptance bef.
the arrival of the term.
If the term is for the benefit of the
creditor.-The creditor can demand
performance anytime; but the debtor cannot
insist on payment bef. the period.
If the term is for the benefit of the
debtor.-The creditor cannot demand
performance anytime; but the debtor can
insist on performance anytime.
Illustrations: "I promise to pay w/in 60
days." This is a term for the benefit of the
debtor.
"I promise to pay Clara the sum of
P100,000 on or before Oct. 31, 1996." This is
a term for the benefit of the debtor.
3. When no period is fixed
Balane:
Cases where the Courts may fix a
period.-1. Art. 1197, par. 1
Exceptions:
BALANE CASES:
CHAVEZ V. GONZALES [32 SCRA 547] Where obligation does not fix a period; When
fixing a period is mere formality.-- Where the
def. virtually admitted non-performance by
returning the typewriter he was obliged to
repair in a non-working condition, w/ essential
parts, missing, he cannot invoke Art. 1197 of
the NCC. The time for compliance having
evidently expired, & there being a breach of
contract
by non-performance,
it was
academic for the pltff. to have first petitioned
the court to fix a period for the performance
of the contract before filing his complaint in
this case. The fixing of a period would thus
321
Baviera Cases:
CPU V. CA
Facts: Lopez executed a deed of donation of
a parcel of land in favor of Central Phil. Univ.
A TCT was issued in CPUs name w/ the
annotation that the land shall be utilized by
CPU exclusively for the establishment & use
of a medical college. The heirs of Lopez filed
an action for the annulment of the donation
& reconveyance alleging that CPU did not
comply w/ the conditions. CPU alleged that
the action had prescribed.
Held: The SC allowed the revocation of the
donation.
It held that the donation was
onerous. The action has not prescribed. The
condition imposed upon the donor depended
upon the exclusive will of the donee as to
when this condition shall be fulfilled. The
absolute acceptance & acknowledgment of
the obligation to build the buildings were
sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations
fr. barring the action of the heirs.
The starting point in counting the
prescriptive period begins w/ the expiration of
a reasonable period & opportunity for
petitioner to fulfill what has been charged
upon it by the donor. In this case, more than
50 years has elapsed. There is no more need
to fix the duration of the term when such
would be a mere technicality & formality.
Notes:
Q: Why has the action not prescribed?
A: Because before an action to revoke the
donation can be filed, there must first be an
action to fix the period. Since it is moot to fix
the period in the CPU case due to the lapse of
50 years (w/c is more than a reasonable
period) the donation should be revoked.
ARANETA INC. V. PSED CO.
Facts: JMT & Co. is the owner if Sta. Mesa
Hts. Subdivision.
Through GAI, it sold a
portion thereof to PSED.
The buyers
stipulated in the contract that the buyer will
7. Acceleration clause
Balane: In number one, factual insolvency is
enough. A judicial declaration of insolvency
is not required.
DAGUHOY ENTERPRISES V. PONCE
Facts: Domingo was Chairman & Manager of
Daguhoy Enterprises. His wife borrowed P5T
fr. Daguhoy payable w/in 6 years.
As
security, she executed two deeds of
mortgage over a parcel of land. Domingo &
his wife presented the mortgage deeds for
registration, but the Register of Deeds
refused due to defects therein.
Without
curing the defects, the spouses mortgaged
the same parcel to RFC to secure another
loan.
A stockholder of Daguhoy sued
Domingo for an accounting & collection of the
debt. Domingo claims that the loan was not
yet due.
Held:
Under Article 1198, the debtor
loses the benefit of the period by reason of
her failure to give the security in the form of
the two deeds of mortgage & register them.
The obligation then became pure & w/o any
condition. Consequently, the loan became
due & immediately demandable.
Obligations according to plurality of
objects:
A. Simple
B. Multiple
Conjunctive where the debtor must
perform more than one prestation
Alternative Obligations where the debtor
must perform any of the prestations
Facultative where only one thing is due but
the debtor has reserved the right to
substitute it w/ another (IV Tolentino)
(Art. 1206.)
D. Alternative Obligations
Tolentino:
The
characteristic
of
alternative obligations is that, several
objects being due, the fulfillment of one is
sufficient xxx.
Art. 1200. The right of choice belongs
to the debtor, unless it has been expressly
granted to the creditor.
The debtor shall have no right to
choose
those
prestations
w/c
are
impossible, unlawful or w/c could not have
been the object of the obligation.
Balane:
To whom does the right of choice belong?
General rule: To the debtor (Art. 1200.)
Exception: When expressly granted to the
creditor
There is a third possibility where
the choice may be made by a third person
upon agreement of the parties.
Q: What is the technical term of the act of
making a choice in alternative obligations?
A: Concentration.
Art. 1201. The choice shall produce no
effect except fr. the time it has been
communicated.
323
Balane:
Requirement
of
Communication
of
choice.-If the choice belongs to the
creditor, of course, he has to communicate
his choice to the debtor. The debtor is not a
prophet.
Q: If the choice belongs to the debtor, why
require communication before performance if
the choice belongs to him anyway?
A: To give the creditor an opportunity to
consent to the choice or impugn it. (Ong v.
Sempio-Dy, 46 P 592.)
BUT how can the creditor impugn it if
the choice belongs to the debtor. The better
reason would be to give the creditor a chance
to prepare for the performance.
Articles 1202 to 1205 talk of the loss of
some of the prestations before performance.
1. If the choice is debtor's
a. When only one prestation is left
(whether or not the rest of the prestations
have been lost through fortuitous event or
through the fault of the debtor), the debtor
may perform the one that is left.-- Art. 1202.
the
d.
If some are lost through the
creditor's fault, the creditor may choose fr.
the remainder.
Balane:
Facultative obligations always
involve choice by the debtor.
Tolentino:
Distinguished fr. Alternative.-As to contents of the obligation:
In the
alternative, there are various prestations
all of w/c constitute parts of the
obligation; while in facultative, only the
principal
prestation
constitutes
the
obligation, the accessory being only a
means to facilitate payment.
Balane:
Joint Obligation.-- A joint obligation is
one in w/c each of the debtors is liable only
for a proportionate part of the debt or each
creditor is entitled only to a proportionate
part of the credit.
In joint obligations, there are as
many obligations as there are debtors
multiplied by the number of creditors.
There are three kinds of joint
obligations: (1) Active joint where the
obligation is joint on the creditor's side; (2)
Passive joint where the obligation is joint
on the debtor's side; & (3) Multiple Joint
where there are multiple parties on each
side of a joint obligation.
Tolentino:
The joint obligation has been variously
termed mancomunada or mancomunada
simple or pro rata.
The phrase "We
promise to pay," used by 2 or more signers,
creates a pro rata liability.
325
2. Indivisible Obligations
3. Solidary obligations
Balane:
Solidary Obligations.-A solidary
obligation is one in w/c the debtor is liable
for the entire obligation or each creditor is
entitled to demand the whole obligation.
There is only one obligation is a solidary
obligation.
There are three kinds of solidarity:
(1) Active solidary where there are several
creditors w/ one debtor in a solidary
obligation; (2)
Passive solidarity where
there is one creditor w/ several debtors
solidary bound; (3) Mixed Solidarity where
there are several creditors & several
debtors in a solidary obligation.
Tolentino:
Solidary obligations may also be
referred to as mancomunada solidaria or
joint & several or in solidum. It has also
been held that the terms "juntos o
separadamente" in a promissory note
creates a solidary responsibility; that where
there are no words used to indicate the
character of a liability, the phrase "I
promise to pay," followed by the signatures
of 2 or more persons, gives rise to an
individual or solidary responsibility. The
words "individually & collectively" also
create a solidary liability.
So does an
agreement to be "individually liable" or
"individually & jointly liable."
a. Active Solidarity
Art. 1211.
Solidarity may exist
although the creditors & the debtors may
not be bound in the same manner & by the
same periods & conditions.
Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or
more creditors or of two or more debtors in
326
Balane:
When is an obligation w/ several parties on
either side Joint or Solidary?
The
presumption is that an obligation is joint bec.
a joint obligation is less onerous that a
solidary one.
There is solidary obligation only in
three cases:
(1)
when the obligation
expressly so states; or (2) when the law or
the (3) nature of the obligation requires
solidarity.
Characteristics of Active Solidarity:
Since it is a reciprocal agency, the death of a
solidary creditor does not transmit the
solidarity to each of his heirs but to all of
them taken together. (IV Tolentino);
Each creditor represents others in the act of
requiring payment, & in all other acts w/c
tend to secure the credit or make it more
advantageous. Hence, if he receives only
a partial payment, he must divide it
among the other creditors.
He can
interrupt the period of prescription or
render the debtor in default, for the
benefit of all other creditors;
A credit once paid is shared equally among
the creditors unless a different intention
appears;
Debtor may pay any of the creditors but if
any demand, judicial or extrajudicial is
made on him, he must pay only to one
demanding payment (Art. 1214);
One creditor does not represent the others in
such acts as novation (even if the credit
becomes
more
advantageous),
compensation & remission.
In these
cases, even if the debtor is released, the
other creditors can still enforce their
rights against the creditor who made the
novation, compensation or remission;
BALANE CASES:
327
Balane:
There is an apparent conflict bet. Art. 1212 &
1215.
Art. 1212 states that the agency
extends only to things w/c will benefit all cocreditors. But not anything w/c is prejudicial
to the latter. In Art. 1215, he can do an acts
prejudicial to the other creditors, like
remission for instance.
Art. 1213.
A solidary creditor cannot
assign his rights w/o the consent of the
others.
Art. 1214. The debtor may pay any one
of the solidary creditors; but if any demand,
judicial or extrajudicial, has been made by
one of them, payment should be made to
him.
Balane:
General Rule.-- A debtor may pay any of the
solidary creditors.
Exception.-- If demand is made by one
creditor upon the debtor, in w/c case the
latter must pay the demanding creditor only.
Cases:
Debtor upon whom demand was made pays
to a creditor other than the one who
made the demand in violation of Art.
1214.-- This is considered payment to a
third person (Art. 1241, par. 2) & the
debtor can still be made to pay the debt.
The only concession given to the debtor is
that he is allowed to deduct the share of
the receiving creditor fr. the total amount
due even if he paid the entire amount due
to that creditor.
Creditor A makes demand on debtor Y. Does
it mean that he cannot pay the share
pertaining to creditor B? According to
commentators he can.
But this is
dangerous bec. there may already be an
agreement on the part of the creditors.
There are three creditors -- A, B & C & there
are three debtors -- X, Y & Z. A makes a
demand on Y. X pays B. This is not
covered by Art. 1214.
Art. 1215.
Novation, compensation,
confusion or remission of the debt, made by
any of the solidary creditors or w/ any of the
solidary debtors, shall extinguish the
Baviera:
Principals
are always liable
solidarily; Agents are not liable solidarily
unless expressly stipulated
b. Passive Solidarity
BALANE CASES:
PNB V. INDEPENDENT PLANTERS [122
SCRA 113] - If one of the alleged solidary
debtor dies during the pendency of the
collection case, the court where said case
is pending retains jurisdiction to continue
hearing the charge as against the surviving
defendants.-- It is crystal clear that Art.
1216 is the applicable provision in this
matter. Said provision gives the creditor
the right to proceed against anyone of the
solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The choice is undoubtedly
left to the solidary creditor to determine
against whom he will enforce collection. In
case of the death of the solidary debtors,
he (the creditor) may, if he so chooses,
329
Balane:
Effect of Remission.-- Problem: Solidary
debtors W, X, Y & Z are indebted to A for
P12,000. A remits the share of Y (P3,000.)
Q: Can Y be sued?
A: Yes, for the P9,000 (P12,000 less P3,000
share of Y.)
Q: Supposing X is insolvent?
A:
Y can still be made to contribute.
Remission will benefit Y only in so far as his
share is concerned. His liability in case of
insolvency of one co-creditor is not
affected.
Q: Can A demand the P9,000 fr. Y.
A: Yes. But he can recover the same fr. W,
X & Z.
Art. 1220. The remission of the whole
obligation, obtained by one of the solidary
debtors,
does
not
entitle
him
to
reimbursement fr. his co-debtors.
Art. 1221. If the thing has been lost or
if the prestation has become impossible
w/o the fault of the solidary debtors, the
obligation shall be extinguished.
If there was fault on the part of any one
of them, all shall be responsible to the
creditor, for the price & the payment of
damages & interest, w/o prejudice to their
action against the guilty or negligent
debtor.
If through a fortuitous event, the thing
is lost or the performance has become
impossible after one of the solidary debtors
has incurred in delay through the judicial or
extrajudicial demand upon him by the
creditor, the provisions of the preceding
paragraph shall apply.
Art. 1895. If solidarity has been agreed
upon, each of the agents is responsible for
the non-fulfillment of the agency, & for the
fault or negligence of his fellow agents,
except in the latter case when the fellow
330
Balane:
Three Defenses in Passive Solidarity:
Those derived fr. the nature of the obligation
is a total defense, e.g., prescription,
illegality of obligation.
Those defenses personal to the debtordefendant, e.g., insanity. If it involves
vitiation of consent, total defense. If it
involves a special term or a condition, a
partial defense.
Those defenses personal to other debtors,
e.g., partial defense, is a defense as to
the share corresponding to other
debtors.)
BALANE CASE:
UNIVERSAL MOTORS V. CA [205 S 448] When the obligation of the other solidary
debtors is so dependent on that of their cosolidary debtor, the release of the one who
appealed, provided it be not on grounds
personal to such appealing private resp.
operates as well as to the others who did not
appeal. It is for this reason, that a decision or
judgment in favor of the private resp. who
appealed can be invoked as res judicata by
the other private respondents.
xxx
It is obvious that the resp. court
committed no error in ruling that its decision
inures to the benefit of all the private resps.
regardless of the fact that only one appealed.
It is erroneous to rule that the decision of the
trial court could be reversed as to the
appealing private resp. & continue in force
against the other pvt. resps. The latter could
not remain bound after the former had been
released; although the other pvt. resps had
not joined in the appeal, the decision
rendered by the resp. court inured to their
benefit.
Art. 1215.
Novation, compensation,
confusion or remission of the debt, made
by any of the solidary creditors or w/ any of
the solidary debtors, shall extinguish the
obligation, w/o prejudice to the provisions
of article 1219.
The creditor who may have executed
any of these acts, as well as he who
collects the debt, shall be liable to the
others for the share in the obligation
corresponding to them.
Art. 1219. The remission made by the
creditor of the share w/c affects one of the
solidary debtors does not release the latter
fr. his responsibility towards the co-debtors,
in case the debt had been totally paid by
anyone of them before the remission was
effected.
PNB V. DE LA ASUNCION
Facts:
PNB granted in favor of
respondent Fabar Inc. various credit
accommodations & advances. These are
secured by the joint & several signatures of
Jose Barredo, Carmen Borromeo, Tomas
Borromeo & Manuel Barredo. For failure of
respondents to pay their obligations
despite demands, PNB instituted a case for
collection against all private respondents.
Manuel Barredo died. Respondent Court
dismissed the entire case reasoning that
the suit was for a money claim w/c does
not survive the death of defendant.
Held: The dismissal should only be against
the deceased defendant Manuel Barredo.
The lower court erred in dismissing the
case against all the defendants. A creditor
in a solidary obligation has the option
whether to file or not to file a claim against
the estate of the solidary debtor. The NCC
expressly allows the creditor to proceed
against any one of the solidary debtors or
some or all of them simultaneously.
Art. 1216 of the NCC gives the
creditor the right to proceed against
anyone of the solidary debtors or some or
all of them simultaneously. The creditor,
may, if he so chooses, proceed against the
surviving solidary debtors w/o necessity of
filing a claim in the estate of the deceased
331
debtor/s.
For to require the creditor to
proceed against the estate, making it a
condition precedent for any collection action
against the surviving debtors to prosper (if
the Rules of Court were applied literally),
would deprive him of his substantive rights
under Art. 1216.
Defenses Available
INCHAUSTI V. YULO
FACTS:
Teodoro Yulo borrowed money
fr. Inchausti.
Teodoro died.
His child
Gregorio, in representation of the latters 4
brothers & 1 sister executed a document
admitting
their
solidarily
indebtedness
amounting to P 253, 445.42. However, one
of his brothers did not ratify the agreement.
Two brothers & the
sister of Gregorio
executed another instrument w/ Inchausti
providing that the debt is reduced for them to
P 225,000 (plus extension of the term of
payment). Inchausti sued Gregorio alone for
the debt.
Divisible
obligation
is
one
susceptible of partial performance.
An
indivisible obligation is one that must be
performed in one act.
HELD:
The debtors having obligated
themselves in solidum, the creditor can bring
the action in toto against any one of them.
General
rule:
Obligation
is
indivisible w/c means that it has to be
performed in one act singly. Why? Bec.
the law provides so: Unless there is an
express stipulation to that effect, the
creditor cannot be compelled partially to
receive the prestations in w/c the obligation
consists.
Neither may the debtor be
required to make partial payments. xxx
(Art. 1248, par. 1.)
Three Exceptions
Indivisibility:
to
the
Rule
on
(Art. 1248,
332
Indivisible Obligations
333
BALANE CASES:
BACHRACH V. ESPIRITU [52 P 346] - Art.
1152 of the OCC permits the agreement upon
a penalty apart fr. the interest. Should there
be such an agreement, the penalty xxx does
not include the interest, & as such the two
are different & distinct things w/c may be
demanded separately. The penalty is not to
be
added
to the
interest for
the
determination of whether the interest
exceeds the rate fixed by law, since said rate
was fixed only for the interest.
ROBES-FRANCISCO V. CFI [86 S 59] Petitioner contends that the deed of absolute
sale executed bet. the parties stipulates that
should the vendor fail to issue the transfer
cert. of title w/in 6 mos. fr. the date of full
payment, it shall refund to the vendee the
total amount paid for w/ interest at the rate
of 4% p.a., hence, the vendee is bound by
the terms of the provision & cannot recover
more than what is agreed upon. xxx
HELD: The foregoing argument of petitioner
is totally devoid of merit. We would agree w/
petitioner if the clause in question were to be
considered as a penal clause. Nevertheless,
for very obvious reasons, said clause does
not convey any penalty, for even w/o it,
pursuant to Art. 2209 of the NCC, the vendee
would be entitled to recover the amount paid
by her w/ legal rate of interest w/c is even
more than the 4% provided for in the clause.
Baviera:
Courts enforce
according to their terms
contracts
Art. 1229.
The judge shall equitably
reduce the penalty when the principal
obligation has been partly or irregularly
complied w/ by the debtor. Even if there has
been no performance, the penalty may also
be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable.
Art. 1230. The nullity of the penal clause
does not carry w/ it that of the principal
obligation.
The nullity of the principal obligation
carrier w/ it that of the penal clause.
1. Distinguished fr.
alternative obligations
2. Distinguished fr.
facultative obligations
336
V. Extinguishment of Obligations
Balane:
Art. 1231 gives us ten modes of
extinguishing an obligation.
One of the
modes mentioned is rescission. But it does
not tell us whether this is rescission under
Art. 1191 (resolution) or rescission under Art.
1380, et. seq. If it means both, then we have
eleven modes of extinguishing an obligation
under Art. 1231. (Similar to Tolentinos)
This enumeration is not exclusive.
Other modes of extinguishing an obligation
are the following:
Death, particularly where the obligation is
purely personal, e.g., death of one
partner dissolves the partnership.
Renunciation by the creditor
Compromise
Arrival of resolutory term
Mutual desistance or mutuo disenso (Saura v.
DBP.)
In some cases, unilateral w/drawal, e.g., in
partnership, any partner can w/draw any
time fr. the partnership.
In some cases, change of civil status, e.g., if
marriage is annulled, it extinguishes
obligations like the obligation to give
support, among others.
Unforeseen events (rebus sic stantibus) (Art.
1267.)
Want of interest
Illustration: Carale owns a restaurant. He
hires Molina as a chef. In the contract of
employment, there was a stipulation that if
Molina resigns fr. Carale's restaurant, he
cannot
seek employment fr.
another
restaurant for a period of five years.
Subsequently, Molina resigns fr. Carale's
restaurant & wants to apply to Mildo's House
of Chicken. In this case, Molina cannot work
of
Payment
or
II.
III.
to
the
requirement
of
(ii) Novation
In both cases, there is a voluntary change
in the object.
2. Integrity.-There must be delivery of the entire
prestation due.
(Art. 1233.)
The
exceptions to the requirement of integrity
are:
In case of substantial performance in good
faith (Art. 1234.) This is an equity rule.
In case of waiver of obligee/ creditor (Art.
1235.)
In case of application of payments if
several debts are equally onerous (Art.
1254, par. 2.)
3. Indivisibility.-This means that the obligor must perform
the prestation in one act & not in parts.
(Art. 1248.) There are several exceptions
to this requirement:
In case or express stipulation. (Art. 1248.)
In case of prestations w/c necessarily entail
partial performance. (Art. 1225, par. 2)
If the debt is liquidated in part &
unliquidated in part. (Art. 1248.)
In case of joint divisible obligations (Art.
1208.)
In solidary obligations when the debtors
are bound under different terms &
conditions. (Art. 1211.)
In compensation when a balance is left.
(Art. 1290.)
If the work is to be delivered partially, the
price or compensation for each part
having been fixed. (Art. 1720.)
In case of several guarantors who demand
the right of division. (Art. 2065.)
In case of impossibility or extreme difficulty
of single performance.
II. With respect to the parties
There are two parties involved:
1. Payor/ obligor/ debtor
2. Payee/ obligee/ creditor
Requirements:
1. Art. 1226 - 1238. Who should the payor
be:
a. Without need of the creditor's
consent
The debtor himself
His heirs or assigns
His agent
Anyone interested in the fulfillment of the
obligation, e.g., a guarantor
338
b.
c.
person:
(Art.
Balane:
Payment
or
Performance
are
used
interchangeably. But technically, payment
is used in obligations to give whereas
performance is used in obligations to do.
Payment/ performance is the paradigmatic
mode of extinguishment of an obligation. It
is the only normal way of extinguishing an
obligation.
Art. 1233.
A debt shall not be
understood to have been paid unless the
thing or service in w/c the obligation
consists has been completely delivered or
rendered, as the case may be.
Art. 1234. If the obligation has been
substantially performed in good faith, the
obligor may recover as though there had
been a strict & complete fulfillment, less
damages suffered by the obligee.
BALANE CASES:
LEGARDA HERMANOS V. SALDANA [55
S 324] - The Court's doctrine in J.M.
Tuason v. Javier is fully applicable to the
present case.
J.M. TUASON V. JAVIER [31 S 829] - In
the interest of justice & equity, court may
grant the vendee a new term where he
substantially performed in good faith
according to Art. 1234, regardless of Art.
1592 of the same Code.
PRESBITERO V. CA [217 S 372] - Under
Art. 1234, if the obligation has been
substantially performed in GF, the obligor
(private resp. Leonardo Canoso) may
recover as though there had been a strict &
complete fulfillment, less damages suffered
by the obligee (Presbitero.)
Moreover,
when the obligee accepts the performance
as what happened in this case, knowing its
incompleteness or irregularity, & w/o
expressing any protest or objection, the
obligation is deemed fully complied w/.
TAYAG V. CA [219 S 480] - Both the trial
court & the appellate courts were correct in
sustaining the claim of pvt resps. anchored
on estoppel or waiver by acceptance of
delayed payments under Art. 1235
considering that the heirs of Juan Galicia,
Sr. accommodated pvt. resp. by accepting
the latter's delayed payments not only
beyond the grace periods but also during
the pendency of the case for specific
performance. Indeed, the right to rescind
is not absolute & will not be granted where
there has been substantial compliance by
partial payments. By & large, petitioners'
actuation is susceptible of but one
339
BALANE CASES:
AZCONA V. JAMANDRE [151 S 317] - xxx
If the petitioner is fussy enough to invoke it
now, it stands to reason that he would have
fussed it too in the receipt he willingly signed
after accepting, w/o reservation & apparently
w/o protest only P7,000.
Art. 1235 is
applicable.
Petitioner says that he could not demand
payment of the balance of P200 on 10/26/60,
date of receipt bec. the rental for the crop
year 1961-1962 was due on or before
1/30/61. But this would not have prevented
him fr. reserving in the receipt his right to
collect the balance when it fell due.
Moreover, there is evidence in the record that
when the due date arrived, he made any
demand, written or verbal, for the payment of
that amount.
PAGSIBIGAN V. CA [221 S 202] - We hold
that the payment amounting to P8,500 for
the balance of P3,558.20 as of 8/26/78 plus
the P1,000 it was asked to pay on 4/24/84
would at the very least constitute substantial
performance. xxx Petitioner in this case has
the right to move for the cancellation of the
mortgage & the release of the mortgaged
prop., upon payment of the balance of the
loan. xxx
Thus, aside fr. the fact that the resp. bank
was estopped fr. enforcing its right to
foreclose by virtue of its acceptance of the
delayed payments for a period of more than
six years, the application of such payment to
the interest & the principal during the first
three payments constitutes a virtual waiver
of the acceleration clause provided in the
contract. We cannot sustain the legality of
the foreclosure under the peculiar facts of
this case, bec. there is substantial
performance of the obligation on the part of
petitioner. xxx
1. To whom payment should be
made
BALANE CASES:
ARANAS V. TUTAAN
[127 S 828] Payment by judgment debtor to the wrong
party does not extinguish judgment debt.-The burden of recovering the supposed
payments of the cash dividends made by
UTEX to the wrong parties Castaneda &
Manuel squarely falls upon itself by its own
action & cannot be passed by it to
petitioners as innocent parties.
It is
elementary that payment made by a
judgment debtor to a wrong party cannot
extinguish the judgment obligation of such
debtor to its creditor. xxx
PAL V. CA [181 S 557] - A payment in
order to be effective to discharge an
obligation must be made to the proper
parties.-- In general, a payment, in order
to be effective to discharge an obligation,
must be made to the proper person. Thus,
payment must be made to the obligee
himself or to an agent having authority,
express or implied, to receive the particular
payment.
Payment made to one having
apparent authority to receive the money
will, as a rule, be treated as though actual
authority had been given for its receipt.
Likewise, if payment is made to one who by
law is authorized to act for the creditor, it
will work a discharge.
The receipt of
money due on a judgment by an officer
authorized by law to accept it will,
therefore satisfy the debt.
xxx The theory is where a payment is
made to a person authorized & recognized
by the creditor, the payment to such a
person so authorized is deemed payment
to the creditor. xxx
Unless authorized by law or by consent of
the obligee, a public officer has no
authority to accept anything other than
money in payment of an obligation under a
judgment being executed.-- In the absence
of an agreement, either express or implied,
payment means the discharge of a debt or
obligation in money & unless the parties so
agree, a debtor has no rights, except at his
own peril, to substitute something in lieu of
cash as medium of payment of his debt.
Consequently, Unless authorized by law or
by consent of the obligee, a public officer
has no authority to accept anything other
than money in payment of an obligation
under a judgment being executed. Strictly
speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of
the petitioner's checks, in the case at bar,
340
Baviera:
Pais
Credits
&
Other
Art. 1626.
The debtor who, before
having knowledge of the assignment, pays
his creditor shall be released fr. the
obligation.
2. Who shall make payment
Art. 1236. The creditor is not bound to
accept payment or performance by a third
person who has no interest in the
fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is
a stipulation to the contrary.
Whoever pays for another may demand
fr. the debtor what he has paid, except that
if he paid w/o the knowledge or against the
will of the debtor, he can recover only
insofar as the payment has been beneficial
to the debtor.
Art. 1237. Whoever pays on behalf of
the debtor w/o the knowledge or against
the will of the latter, cannot compel the
creditor to subrogate him in his rights, such
as those arising fr. a mortgage, guaranty,
or penalty.
Tolentino:
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third
person who does not intend to be
341
Art. 1243.
Payment made to the
creditor by the debtor after the latter has
been judicially ordered to retain the debt
shall not be valid.
Tolentino:
Pmt to Cr after the credit has been
attached ir garnished is void as to the
party who obtained the attachmt or
garnishmt, to the extent of the amt of
jmt in his favor
Dr can therefor be made to pay again to
the party who secured the attachtmt or
garnishmt, but he can recover the same
to the extent what he has pd to his Cr
Art. 1244. The debtor of a thing cannot
compel the creditor to receive a different
one, although the latter may be of the
same value as, or more valuable than that
w/c is due.
In obligations to do or not to do, an act
or forbearance cannot be substituted by
another act or forbearance against the
obligee's will.
Tolentino:
Defects of the thing delivered may be
waived by the Cr, if he expressly so
declares, or if, w/ knowledge thereof, he
accepts the thing w/o protest or disposes of
it or consumes it
342
BALANE CASES:
FILINVEST V. PHIL. ACETYLENE [111 S
421] - We find appellant's contention devoid
of persuasive force. The mere return of the
mortgaged motor vehicle by the mortgagor,
the herein appellant, to the mortgagee, the
herein appellee, does not constitute dation in
payment in the absence, express or implied
of the true intention of the parties.
Dacion en pago, according to Manresa, is the
transmission of the ownership of a thing by
the debtor to the creditor as an accepted
equivalent of the performance of an
obligation. In dacion en pago, as a special
mode of payment, the debtor offers another
thing to the creditor who accepts it as
equivalent of payment of an outstanding
debt.
Dacion en pago in the nature of sale.-- The
undertaking really partakes in one sense of
the nature of sale, that is, the creditor is
really buying the thing or property of the
debtor, payment for w/c is to be charged
against the debtor's debt.
As such, the
essential elements of a contract of sale,
namely, consent, object certain, & cause or
consideration must be present.
Dacion en pago in its modern concept.-- In
its modern concept, what actually takes place
in dacion en pago is an objective novation of
the obligation where the thing offered as an
accepted equivalent of the performance of an
obligation is considered as the object of the
contract of sale, while the debt is considered
as the purchase price. In any case, common
consent is an essential prerequisite, be it sale
or novation, to have the effect of totally
extinguishing the debt or obligation.
CITIZENS SURETY V. CA [162 S 738] There is no dation in payment when there is
no obligation to be extinguished.-The
transaction could not be dation in payment.
xxx [W]hen the deed of assignment was
executed on 12/4/59, the obligation of the
assignor to refund the assignee h ad not yet
arisen.
In other words, there was no
obligation yet on the part of the petitioner,
Citizens' to pay Singer Sewing Machine Co.
There was nothing to be extinguished on that
date, hence, there could not have been a
dation in payment.
Tolentino:
Cr or Dr may waive the benefit of this Art.
Cr may require a thing of inferior qlty & Dr
may deliver a thing of superior qlty,
unless the price to be pd in the latter
case is dependent upon the qlty
Art. 1247.
Unless it is otherwise
stipulated, the extrajudicial expenses
required by the payment shall be for the
account of the debtor.
With regard to
judicial costs, the Rules of Court shall
govern.
Art. 1248. Unless there is an express
stipulation to that effect, the creditor
cannot be compelled partially to receive
the prestations in w/c the obligation
consists.
Neither may the debtor be
required to make partial payments.
However, when the debt is in
liquidated & in part unliquidated,
creditor may demand & the debtor
effect the payment of the former
waiting for the liquidation of the latter.
part
the
may
w/o
BALANE CASE:
NASSER V. CUEVAS [188 S 812] - There
is nothing in the cited proviso to justify the
reading that the petitioner would give to it.
The par. in w/c it is found does no more
than establish "on all the properties of the
Estate, real & personal, herein adjudicated
& other properties not yet adjudicated, a
charging lien xxx to secure the payment of
(Canlas') attorney's fees;" this, w/ the
express agreement of all the signatories.
The proviso that "upon full payment of the
corresponding liability of a party the lien on
his/her share is extinguished," evidently
contemplates the probability that the heirs
obliged to pay Canlas' fees would pay at
different times, & denotes nothing more
than that if one of the obligors separately
343
TIBAJA V. CA
Facts: Tan obtained a jmt v. the Tibaja
spouses for pmt of sum of money. To prevent
execn of garnished funds deposited w/ RTC in
connxn w/ another case, the Tibajas delivered
to the sheriff the total money jmt partly in
cash & a greater part in a Cashiers Check,
w/c Tan refused to accept.
Issue: WON there is valid tender of pmt
Held: Under Sec. 63 of RA 265, checks
representing deposit money do not have
legal tender power & their acceptance in the
pmt of debts, public or private, is at the
option of the Cr, provided that a check w/c
has been cleared & credited to the account of
the Cr shall be equiv to a delivery to Cr of
cash. In PAL v. CA & RC Bishop of Mla v. IAC, a
check, WON Mgrs or ord, is not legal tender
& an offer of a check in pmt of a debt is not a
valid tender of pmt & may be refused receipt
by the Cr.
BALANE CASES:
KALALO V. LUZ [34 S 337] - Under RA 529,
if the obligation was incurred prior to the
345
1.
2.
3.
4.
Balane Discussion:
1. Dacion en pago
Art. 1245. Dation in payment, whereby
property is alienated to the creditor in
satisfaction of a debt in money, shall be
governed by the law of sales.
Balane:
Dacion en pago (In Roman law, called "datio
in solutum", in French, "dation en paiement,"
in Spanish, "dacion en pago.") Dation in
payment is possible only if there is a debt in
money.
Instead of money, a thing is
delivered in satisfaction of the debt in money.
Dation in payment is governed by the law on
sales bec. it is as if the creditor is now the
vendee, & the debtor becomes now the
vendor.
Dation en pago is explained in the case of
Filinvest v. Phil Acetylene, supra.
There are two ways at looking at dacion en
pago:
Classical way where dacion en pago is
treated as a sale.
Modern concept w/c treats dacion en pago as
a novation.
Castan has another view-- Both are
wrong. A dacion en pago is not a sale bec.
there is no intention to enter into a contract
of sale. It is not also a novation bec. in
novation, the old obligation is extinguished &
a new obligation takes its place. But here,
the old obligation is extinguished.
What
takes its place? Nothing. So what is it? It is
a special form of payment w/c resembles a
sale.
There are two more things to
remember in the cases of Filinvest v. Phil.
Acetylene, supra. & Lopez v. CA, 114 SCRA
671:
Dacion en pago can take place only if both
parties consent.
To what extent is the obligation extinguished?
Up to the value of the thing given (the
thing must be appraised) unless the
parties agree on a total extinguishment.
(Lopez. v. CA, supra.)
2. Application of Payment
Balane:
Application of payment (Imputacion
in Spanish) is the designation of a debt w/c
is being paid by the debtor who has several
obligations of the same kind in favor of the
creditor to whom the payment is made
(quoting Tolentino.)
Rules where the amount sent by the debtor
to the creditor is less than all that is due.
First rule: Apply in accordance w/ the
agreement.
Second rule:
Debtor may apply the
amount (an obvious limitation bec. of the
principles of indivisibility & integrity) where
there would be partial payment.
Third rule:
application.
Creditor
can
make
the
Tolentino:
Nec that obligs must all be due
Only in case of mutual agreement, or upon
consent of the party in whose favor the
term was est, that pmts may be applied
to obligs w/c have not yet matured
Art. 1253. If the debt produces interest,
payment of the principal shall not be deemed
to have been made until the interests have
been covered.
Art. 1254. When the payment cannot be
applied in accordance w/ the preceding rules,
or if application can not be inferred fr. other
circumstances, the debt w/c is most onerous
to the debtor, among those due, shall be
deemed to have been satisfied.
If the debts due are of the same nature &
burden, the payment shall be applied to all of
them proportionately.
Traders for
the remaining balance of
P12,464. Traders paid P10,000 & in turn
sought reimb fr. Dy, et. al.
Issue: WON Dy, et. al. has any liability
Held: The remittance by Dy shld have
been applied to his oblig Ked fr. Aug 51 &
Aug 52, when the surety + bond was
issued. Hence, Traders & Dy, et. al. did not
incur any liab in favor of the Co. The 1st
reason is that, in the absence of express
stip, a guaranty or suretyship operates
prospectively & not retro; that is to say, it
secures only debts Ked after the guaranty
takes effect. The 2nd reason is that any
partial pmts made by the Dr shld be
imputed or applied to debts that were
guaranteed, since they are regarded as
more onerous debts, fr. Drs standpt. (A
1254). Debts covered by a guaranty are
deemed more onerous to the Dr than the
simple obligs coz in their case, the Dr may
be subjected to axn not only by the Cr, but
also by the guarantor, & this even b4 the
guaranteed debt is pd by the guarantor (A
2071); hence pmt of the guaranteed debt
relieves the Dr fr. liab to the Cr, as well as
to the guarantor, while pmt of the
unsecured debt only discharges him fr.
possible axn by only one party, the
unsecured Cr.
REPARATIONS COMM. V. UNIV. DEEP
Facts: Univ. Deep (UD) was awarded 6
trawl boats by Rep. Comm.(RC). The boats
were delivered in twos. For all deliveries,
UD & Mla Surety (MS), to guarantee faithful
compliance, executed a performance bond
of P53,643 in favor of RC. When UD failed
to pay, RC filed a suit v. UD & MS. TC
ordered UD & MS to pay jointly & severally.
MS now claims that the TC erred in not
applying the amt of P10,000 pd as
downpmt by UD to RC to the guaranteed
indebtedness, so that the oblig of MS will
only be P43,643. ( Full purchase price was
P53,643)
Issue: WON downpmt as application to
MS oblig is proper
Held: No. The rules contained in A 125254 apply to a person owing several debts of
the same kind to a single Cr. They cannot
be made applicable to a person whose
oblig as a mere surety is both contingent &
348
Tolentino:
Tender of pmt b4 consign is required by
the present Art only in case where the
Cr refuses to accept it w/o just cause
Effect on INTEREST: When tender made in
form that Cr cld have immdtly realized
pmt, followed by a prompt attempt of
Dr to make consignn., the accrual of
interest will be suspended fr. the date
of such tender. But when tender is not
accompanied by means of pmt, & the
Dr did not take any immdte step to
349
Tolentino:
Notice: The reqmt is fulfilled by the service
of summons upon the Def together w/ copy
of complaint
Art.
1259.
The
expenses
of
consignation, when properly made, shall be
charged against the creditor.
Tolentino:
Effects of Consignation:
Dr is released in the same manner as if he
had performed the oblig
Accrual of INTEREST is suspended
Deterioration or loss of thing or amt
consigned w/o fault of Dr must be borne
by Cr
Any increment ir increase in value of thing
inures to the benefit of Cr
SC: When money is deposited in ct under the
provs of the law on cons, it is in custodia
legis & therefore exempt fr. Attachmt &
execution (Manejero v. Lampa)
Art. 1261. If, the consignation having
been made, the creditor should authorize the
debtor to w/draw the same, he shall lose
every preference w/c he may have over the
thing. The co-debtors, guarantors & sureties
shall be released.
Baviera:
Q: When is there a need to tender pmt?
A: (a) upon demand & (b) when due
Q: There are 2 or more claims. What will Cr
do after consignation?
A: File INTERPLEADER.
Q: Why tender first?
A: Coz no need to consign if Cr accept pmt.
We can only know this through tender.
Q: B4 & after consignn, there is a need to
notify the Cr. Why?
A: So that the Cr can get the money fr. the
Clerk of ct & avoid costs of litigation.
Q: D consigns. Hearing. B4 the ct cld
approve, the City Hall burned + money. Shld
D pay again?
A: No. When money is consigned, it is no
longer generic. It becomes specific. Cr bears
the loss bec. although it was due to a
fortuitous event, there was delay on his part
when he refused to accept pmt.
Balane:
Art. 1262 is the same as fortuitous event in
Art. 1174. The effect is the same: The
obligation is extinguished if the obligation is
to deliver a determinate thing.
If the
obligation is t deliver a generic thing, the
obligation is not extinguished.
Genus
nunquam perit ("Genus never perishes." This
is the general rule. But what is not covered
by this rule is an obligation to deliver a
limited generic (something in bet. specific &
generic thing), e.g., "For P3,000, I promise to
deliver to you one of my watches." This
obligation does not really fall under either
Art. 1262 or Art. 1263. But this obligation
really falls under Art. 1262. In this case, the
obligation may be extinguished by the loss of
all the things through fortuitous event.
Art. 1263. In an obligation to deliver a
generic thing, the loss or destruction of
anything of the same kind does not
extinguish the obligation.
Art. 1264. The courts shall determine,
whether, under the circumstances, the partial
loss of the object of the obligation is so
important as to extinguish the obligation.
Art. 1265. Whenever the thing is lost in
the possession of the debtor, it shall be
presumed that the loss was due to his fault,
unless there is proof to the contrary, & w/o
prejudice to the provisions of article 1165.
This presumption does not apply in case of
earthquake, flood, storm, or other natural
calamity.
Art. 1165. When what is to be delivered
is a determinate thing, the creditor, in
addition to the right granted him by article
1170, may compel the debtor to make the
delivery.
If the thing is indeterminate or generic, he
may ask that the obligation be complied w/ at
the expense of the debtor.
If the obligor delays, or has promised to
deliver the same thing to two or more
persons who do not have the same interest,
he shall be responsible for any fortuitous
event until he has effected the delivery.
Art. 1170.
Those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty
of fraud, negligence, or delay, & those who
in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof are liable for damages.
Art. 1266. The debtor in obligations to
do shall also be released when the
prestation becomes legally or physically
impossible w/o the fault of the obligor.
Balane:
Objective & Subjective Impossibility.-In objective impossibility, the act cannot be
done by anyone. The effect of objective
impossibility is to extinguish the obligation.
In subjective impossibility, the obligation
becomes impossible only w/ respect to the
obligor. There are 3 views as to the effect
of a subjective impossibility: (1) One view
holds
that
the
obligation
is
not
extinguished.
The obligor should ask
another to do the obligation. (2) Another
view holds that the obligation is
extinguished. (3) A third view distinguishes
one prestation w/c is very personal & one
w/c are not personal such that subjective
impossibility is a cause for extinguishes a
very personal obligation but not an
obligation w/c is not very personal.
BALANE CASES:
PEOPLE V. FRANKLIN [39 S 363] Appellant now contends that the lower
court should have released it fr. all liability
under the bail bond posted by it bec. its
failure to produce & surrender the accused
was due to the negligence of the Phil. Govt
itself in issuing a passport to said accused,
thereby enabling her to leave the country.
In support of this contention, the provisions
of Art. 1266 are invoked.
HELD: Art. 1266, NCC does not apply to a
surety upon a bail bond.-- Art. 1266 does
not apply to a surety upon a bail bond, as
said Art. speaks of a relation bet. a debtor
& creditor, w/c does not exist in the case of
a surety upon a bail bond, on one hand, &
the State, on the other. For while sureties
upon a bail bond (or recognizance) can
discharge themselves fr. liability by
surrendering their principal, sureties on
ordinary bonds or commercial contracts, as
a general rule, can only be released by
payment of the debt or performance of the
act stipulated.
IMMACULATA V. NAVARRO [160 S 211]
- We hereby grant said alternative cause of
352
action or prayer.
While the sale was
originally executed something in Dec. 1969, it
was only on Feb. 3, 1974 when, as prayed for
by prvt. res, & as ordered by the court a quo,
a deed of conveyance was formally executed.
Since the offer to redeem was made on
3/24/75, this was clearly w/in the 5-yr. period
of legal redemption allowed by the Public
Land Act.
PNCC V. NLRC [193 S 401] - An obligor
shall be released fr. his obligation when the
prestation has become legally or physically
impossible w/o fault on his part..-- Petitioner
cannot be held liable for breach of contract
for three reasons. xxx The second reason is
found in the rule that an obligor shall be
released fr. his obligation when the prestation
has become legally or physically impossible
w/o fault on his part.
The supervening
impossibility of performance, based upon
some factor independent of the will of the
obligor, releases the obligor fr. his obligation
after restitution of what he may have
received, if any, in advance fr. the other
contracting party; the obligor incurs no
liability for damages for his inability to
perform.
Art. 1267. When the service has become
so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties, the obligor may
also be released therefr., in whole or in part.
Balane:
Rebus sic stantibus.-Literally means
"things as they stand." It is short for clausula
rebus sic stantibus ("agreement of things as
they stand.")
This is a principle of
international law w/c holds that when 2
countries enter into a treaty, they enter
taking into account the circumstances at the
time it was entered into & should the
circumstances change as to make the
fulfillment of the treaty very difficult, one
may ask for a termination of the treaty. This
principle of international law has spilled over
into Civil law.
This doctrine is also called the
doctrine of extreme difficulty & frustration of
commercial object.
OCCENA V. JABSON
[73 S 637]
Respondent's complaint seeks not release fr.
the subdivision contract but that the court
"render judgement modifying the terms &
conditions of the contract... by fixing the
proper shares that should pertain to the
herein parties out of the gross proceeds fr.
the sales of subdivided lots of subject
subdivision." Art. 1267 does not grant the
courts this authority to remake, modify, or
revise the contract or to fix the division of
shares bet. the parties as contractually
stipulated w/ the force of law bet. the parties,
so as to substitute its own terms for those
covenanted by the parties themselves.
Tolentino:
When Dr tenders pmt & Cr
refuses to accept w/o just cause, Dr W/ 2
alternatives: (1) to consign or (2) to just
keep the thing in his possn, w/ the oblig to
use due diligence, subj to the gen rules of
obligs, but no longer to the spec liab under
Article 1268
D. Condonation or
Remission
Balane:
354
1. Modes of Condonation
a. By Will
b. By Agreement
Art. 746.
Acceptance must be made
during the lifetime of the donor & of the
donee.
2. Presumption of
Condonation
355
Art. 1271.
The delivery of a private
document, evidencing a credit, made
voluntarily by the creditor to the debtor,
implies the renunciation of the action w/c the
former had against the latter.
If in order to nullify this waiver it
should be claimed to be inofficious, the
debtor & his heirs may uphold it by providing
that the delivery of the document was made
in virtue of payment of the debt.
BALANE CASE:
TRANS-PACIFIC V. CA [234 S 494] - It may
not be amiss to add that Art. 1271 raises a
presumption, not of payment, but of the
renunciation of the credit where more
convincing evidence would be required than
what normally would be called for to prove
payment.
The rationale for allowing the
presumption of renunciation in the delivery of
a private instrument is that, unlike that of a
public instrument, there could be just one
copy of the evidence of credit. Where several
originals are made out of a private document,
the intendment of the law would thus be to
refer to the delivery only of the original rather
than to the original duplicate of w/c the
debtor would normally retain a copy. It would
thus be absurd if Art. 1271 were to be applied
differently.
Art. 1272.
Whenever the private
document in w/c the debt appears is found in
the possession of the debtor, it shall be
presumed that the creditor delivered it
voluntarily, unless the contrary is proved.
Rule 131, Sec. 5 (b), (j), (k), Rules of
Court.
Rule 131, Sec. 5.
Disputable
presumptions.-- The following presumptions
are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted & overcome by other evidence:
xxx
(b) That an unlawful act was done w/ an
unlawful intent;
xxx
(j) That a person found in possession of
a thing taken in the doing of a wrongful act
is the taker & doer of the whole act;
otherwise, that things w/c a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership
over, are owned by him;
(k) That a person in possession of an
order on himself for the payment of money,
or the delivery of anything, has paid the
money or delivered the thing accordingly;
xxx
Under the 1985 Rules of Court, as
amended
Rule 131, Sec. 3.
Disputable
presumptions.-The
following
presumptions
are
satisfactory
if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted &
overcome by other evidence:
xxx
(c) That a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act;
xxx
(f) That money paid by one to another
was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to
another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to
the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had
been paid when a receipt for the later ones
is produced;
(k) That a person in possession of an
order on himself for the payment of they
money, or the delivery of anything, has
paid the money or delivered the thing
accordingly;
xxx
VELASCO V. MASA
Facts: Velasco filed a complaint for the
recovery of a sum of money he gave to
Masa as a loan, as contained in a private
doc. V claims that while he was imprisoned
during the Jap occupation, M coerced &
tricked Vs wife into surrendering the doc to
M. V filed a crim case b4 v. M w/c was
dismissed for lack of juris. M contends that
doc was voluntarily delivered to him
through Osmena. TC dismissed the axn.
Issue: WON there was condonation
356
Held: Yes.
No satisfactory proof as to
allegation of coercion & trickery on Vs wife.
It is an unquestionable fact that the instru
proving the debt now claimed passed to the
possession of the Dr. For this reason, unless
the contrary is proven, it must be presumed
that in accdance w/ the provisions of the law,
that delivery was voluntarily made. This fact
implies a renunciation of the axn w/c Cr had
for the recovery of his credit. It shld be noted
that the doc is of a private nature, the only
case subj to the provs of Articles 1187 to
1189 OCC, so that a tacit renunciation of the
debt may be presumed, in the absence of
proof that the doc was delivered for some
other reason than the gratuitous waiver of
the debt & the complete extinction of the
oblig to pay.
Balane:
The accesory obligation of
pledged is extinguished bec. pledge is a
possessory lien. The presumption in this
case is that the pledgee has surrendered
the thing pledged to the pledgor. This is
not a conclusive presumption according to
Art. 2110, par. 2.
Art. 2093. In addition to the requisites
prescribed in article 2085, it is necessary,
in order to constitute the contract of
pledge, that the thing pledged be placed in
the possession of the creditor, or of a third
person by common agreement.
Art. 2105. The debtor cannot ask for
the return of the thing pledged against the
will of the creditor, unless & until he has
paid the debt & its interest, w/ expenses in
a proper case.
Art. 1273.
The renunciation of the
principal debt shall extinguish the accessory
obligations; but the waiver of the latter shall
leave the former in force.
Art. 2076. The obligation of the guarantor
is extinguished at the same time as that of
the debtor, & for the same causes as all other
obligations.
Art. 2080. The guarantors, even though
they be solidary, are released fr. their
obligation whenever by some act of the
creditor they cannot be subrogated to the
rights, mortgages, & preferences of the latter.
E. Confusion or Merger of
Rights
Art.
1275.
The
obligation
is
extinguished fr. the time the characters of
creditor & debtor are merged in the same
person.
Balane:
Confusion is the meeting in one person of
the qualities of the creditor & debtor w/
respect to the same obligation.
&
Art. 1274.
It is presumed that the
accessory obligation of pledge has been
remitted when the thing pledged, after its
delivery to the creditor, is found in the
possession of the debtor, or of a third person
who owns the thing.
(Provisions
Mortgage)
Common
to
Pledge
1. Principal Parties
Art. 1276. Merger w/c takes place in the
person of the principal debtor or creditor
benefits the guarantors. Confusion w/c takes
place in the person of any of the latter does
not extinguish the obligation.
Tolentino:
Extinguishment of the principal oblig through
confusion releases the guarantors, whose
oblig is merely accessory
When merger takes place in the person of the
guarantor, oblig is NOT extinguished.
2. Among guarantors
(Effects of Guaranty as Between CoGuarantors)
3. Joint Obligations
Art. 1277. Confusion does not extinguish
a joint obligation except as regards the share
corresponding to the creditor or debtor in
whom the two characters concur.
4. Solidary Obligations
Art. 1215.
Novation, compensation,
confusion or remission of the debt, made by
any of the solidary creditors or w/ any of the
solidary debtors, shall extinguish the
5. Indivisible Obligations
Art. 1209. If the division is impossible,
the right of the creditors may be prejudiced
only by their collective acts, & the debt can
be enforced only by proceeding against all
the debtors. If one of the latter should be
insolvent, the others shall not be liable for
his share.
358
F. Compensation
Balane:
Definition
of
Compensation.-Compensation is a mode of extinguishing, to
the concurrent amount, the obligations of
those persons who in their own right are
reciprocally debtors & creditors of each other.
(Castan.)
Perhaps,
next
to
payment,
compensation is the most common mode of
extinguishing an obligation.
Distinguished fr. Confusion.-In
compensation, there are 2 parties & 2 debts,
whereas in confusion, there are 2 debts &
only 1 party.
Art. 1278. Compensation shall take place
when two persons, in their own right, are
creditors & debtors of each other.
1. Different Kinds of
Compensation:
BALANE CASES:
PNB V. ONG ACERO [148 S 166] - There is
no compensation where the parties are not
creditors & debtors of each other.-- The
insuperable obstacle to the success of PNB's
cause is the factual finding of the IAC that it
has not proven by competent evidence that it
is a creditor of ISABEL. The only evidence
presented by PNB towards this end consists
of 2 documents marked in its behalf. But as
the IAC has cogently observed, these
documents do not prove any indebtedness of
ISABELA to PNB. All they do prove is that a
letter of credit might have been opened for
ISABELA by PNB, but not that the credit was
ever availed of [by ISABELA's foreign
correspondent (MAN)], or that the goods
thereby covered were in fact shipped, &
received by ISABELA.
FRANCIA V. IAC [162 S 753] - [T]here can
be no off-setting of taxes against the claims
that the taxpayer may have against the govt.
A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the
Balane:
Art. 1288.
Neither shall there be
compensation if one of the debts consists
in civil liability arising fr. a penal offense.
BALANE CASES:
REPUBLIC V. DE LOS ANGELES [98 S
103] - Compensation of debts arising
even w/o proof of liquidation of claim,
where the claim is undisputed.-- Proof of
the liquidation of a claim, in order that
there be compensation of debts, is proper if
such claim is disputed. But, if the claim is
undisputed, as in the case at bar, the
statement is sufficient & no other proof
may be required. xxx
SOLINAP V. DEL ROSARIO [123 S 640] Petitioner contends that respondent judge
gravely abused her discretion in not
declaring the mutual obligations of the
parties extinguished to the extent of their
respective amounts. He relies on Art. 1278
to the effect that compensation shall take
place when 2 persons, in their own right,
are creditors & debtors of each other. The
argument fails to consider Art. 1279 w/c
provides that compensation can take place
only if both obligations are liquidated. In
the case at bar, the petitioner's claim
against the resp. Luteros is still pending
determination by the court. While it is not
for Us to pass upon the merits of the pltff's
cause of action in that case, it appears that
the claim asserted therein is disputed by
the Luteros on both factual & legal
grounds.
More,
the
counterclaim
360
BALANE CASE:
MINDANAO PORTLAND CEMENT V. CA
[120 S 930] - Automatic compensation,
requisites of, present; Extinguishment of
two debts arising fr. final & executory
judgments due to compensation by
operation of law.-- It is clear fr. the record
that both corporations, petitioner Mindanao
Portland Cement Corp. (appellant) & resp.
Pacweld Steel Corp. (appellee), were
creditors & debtors of each other, their
debts to each other consisting in final &
executory judgements of the CFI in 2
separate cases, ordering the payment to
each other of the sum of P10T by way of
attorney's fees.
The 2 obligations,
therefore, respectively offset each other,
compensation having taken effect by
operation of law & extinguished both debts
to the concurrent amount of P10T,
pursuant to the provisions of Art. 1278,
1279 & 1290, since all the requisites
provided in Art. 1279 for automatic
compensation "even though the creditors &
debtors
are
not
aware
of
the
compensation" were duly present.
Art. 1289.
If a person should have
against him several debts w/c are susceptible
of compensation, the rules on the application
of payments shall apply to the order of the
compensation.
Art. 1290.
When all the requisites
mentioned in article 1279 are present,
compensation takes effect by operation of
law, & extinguishes
both debts to the
concurrent amount, even though the
creditors & debtors are not aware of the
compensation.
Balane:
The depositary cannot set up
compensation w/ respect to the things
deposited to him. But the depositor can set
up the compensation.
Art. 1288.
Neither shall there be
compensation if one of the debts consists in
civil liability arising fr. a penal offense.
ICB V. IAC
GAN V. CA
Facts: In a 61 civil case between P & PR
(Lessor & Tenant, resp), PR was awarded
P500 attys fees. In 63, P notified PR that he
was increasing the rents & at the same time
demanded that PR pay all his back rentals
amting to P4, 320. In the meantime, PR was
able to obtain a WOE on the jmt for attys
fees. P pleaded comp. CA held that attys
fees cannot be subj to legal comp, it being a
trust fund for the benefit of the lawyer.
Issue: WON there can be comp
Held: No. CA erred. Accdg to CA, the reqs of
legal comp, namely that the parties must be
Crs & Drs of each other in their own rt & that
each one of them must be bound principally
& at the same time be a principal Cr of the
other , are not present in the instant case
since the real Cr w/ respect to the P500 was
PRs lawyer. Wrong! The award for attys fees
is made in favor of the litigant, not his
counsel, & is justified by way of indemnity for
damages recoverable by the former in cases
enumerated in A 2208 CC. It is the litigant,
not his counsel, who is the jmt Cr & who may
properly enforce the jmt by execn. Such
credit therefore may properly be the subj of
legal comp. Quite obviously it wld be unjust
to compel P to pay his debt of P500 when
admittedly his Cr (PR) is indebted to him for
more than P4,000.
the
not
the
the
PEREZ V. CA
Facts: Congeneric (CG) issued 2 PNs to
Mojica (M), to mature on Aug 6 & 13, 74
resp. Mever Films (MF) borrowed fr. CG
P500 T & issued a PN for such to mature on
Aug 5, 74. CG received fr. Perez (P) P200
T, so the Co. issued to her a confirmation
sale, & assigned to her all its interests in
the PN made by MF. On Aug 5 MF paid the
Co.
w/c the Co. in turn paid to P.
Meanwhile, when the 2 PNs issued to M
matured, instead of paying M the whole
oblig, the Co., paid only the interest therein
& the principal oblig were rolled over to
mature on Oct. 4 & 11. M assigned these 2
PNs to MF. Thus, MF surrendered these 2
PNs to CG in pmt of his remaining loan &
asked the Co. to compute the remaining
balance. On Oct 7, MF was served w/
garnishment by the Sheriff in 2 collxn cases
filed by CGs Crs. MF, believing that his
debt was only P79 T, tendered the same
amt to the Sheriff. P. on the basis of the
assignment made in her favor by CG, sued
MF for the recovery of P100 T. TC ruled for
P. CA reversed.
Issue: WON MF can claim comp
Held: No. Perez can collect the portion of
the PN assigned to her by CG. No comp
bec the PNs assigned to MF by M were not
yet due & demandable since the maturity
dates were rolled over to Oct 4 & 11. The
inevitable result of such was that the 2
PNs were not yet due & demandable as of
the date of their assignment by M to NF on
Sept 9 nor on Oct 9 when MF surrendered
364
G. Novation
TOLENTINOs NOTES:
Concept of Novation.-- Novation is the
extinguishment of an obligation by the
substitution or change of the obligation by
a subsequent one w/c extinguishes or
modifies the first, either by changing the
object of principal conditions, or by
substituting the person of the debtor, or by
subrogating a third person in the rights of
the creditor. (Manresa.)
Novation is the most unusual mode of
extinguishing an obligation. It is the only
mode
whereby
an
obligation
is
extinguished & a new obligation is created
to take its place. The other modes of
extinguishing an obligation are absolute in
the sense that the extinguishment of the
obligation is total (w/ the exception of
compromise.) Novation, on the other hand,
is a relative mode of extinguishing an
obligation.
Classification of Novation:
Subjective (Personal) or novation by a
change of subject
Active subjective or a change of creditor;
also known as subrogation.
Passive subjective or a change of debtor
365
TOLENTINO:
Novation is NEVER presumed.
It must be established that the old & the new
contracts are
incompatible in all points,
or that the will to novate appear by express
agreement of the parties
or in acts of equivalent import.
IMPLIED NOVATION. There is no specific
form required for an implied novation. All that
is required is INCOMPATIBILITY between the
original & the subsequent contracts.
A mere extension of the term of payment
does not result in novation, for the period
affects only the performance, not the creation
of the obligation
BAVIERA CASES:
[164 S
VS.
TROPICAL
BAVIERA CASE:
2. Modes
Art. 1281. Compensation may be total or
partial. When the two debts are of the same
amount, there is a total compensation.
(Classmates, I think there was a typo error
in Maam Bubbles outline. I think this should
have been Art. 1291, reproduced below)
Art. 1291. Obligations may be modified
by:
a. Substitution of debtor--
369
BALANE CASE:
LAND BANK V. CA
[181 S 610]
Art. 1300.
Subrogation of a third
person in the rights of the creditor is either
legal or conventional. The former is not
presumed, except in cases expressly
mentioned in this Code; the latter must be
clearly established in or order that it may
take effect.
Legal (Art. 1302)-- In all cases of Art. 1302,
subrogation takes place by operation of
law.
Art. 1302. It is presumed that there is
legal subrogation:
370
Credits
&
Other
2 Effect
Art. 1304. A creditor, to whom partial
payment has been made, may exercise his
right for the remainder, & he shall be
preferred to the person who has been
subrogated in his place in virtue of the partial
payment of the same credit.
Art. 1303. Subrogation transfers to the
person subrogated the credit w/ all the rights
thereto appertaining, either against the
debtor or against third persons, be they
guarantors or possessors of mortgages,
subject to stipulation in a conventional
subrogation.
BALANE CASE:
RODRIGUEZ V. REYES
Balane:
Passive Subjective Novation-- Articles 1293
& 1295
Art. 1293 talks of expromission (not
upon the old debtor's initiative. It could be
upon the initiative of the creditor or of the
new debtor.)
Art. 1295 talks of delegacion
(change at the old debtor's initiative.)
In expromission, the change in the
person of the debtor is not upon the
initiative of the old debtor, whether or not
he gave his consent. As soon as a new
debtor & creditor agree, novation takes
place.
In both cases, the intent of the
parties must be to release the old debtor.
What is the difference in effect
between expromission & delegacion?
In expromission, the release of the old
debtor is absolute (even if it turns out
that the new debtor is insolvent.)
In delegacion, the release of the old debtor
is not absolute. He may be held liable
372
(1)
if the new debtor was already
insolvent at the time of the delegacion; &
(2) such insolvency was either known to
the old debtor or of public knowledge.
Cases of expromission are quite rare.
Effect of Novation
A. General Rule
Tolentino
Balane:
Effect of novation as to accessory
obligations.-- Accessory obligations may
subsist only insofar as they may benefit third
persons who did not give their consent, e.g.,
stipulation pour atrui
General rule: In a novation, the accesory
obligation is extinguished.
Exception: In an active subjective novation,
the guarantors, pledgors, mortgagors are not
released.
Look
at
Art.
1303,
accessory
obligations are not extinguished. So there is
a conflict. How do you resolve? According to
commentators, Art. 1303 is an exception to
Art. 1296.
Art. 1297. If the new obligation is void,
the original one shall subsist, unless the
parties intended that the former relation
should be extinguished in any event.
Art. 1298. The novation is void if the
original obligation was void, except when
annulment may be claimed only by the
debtor, or when ratification validates acts w/c
are voidable.
Art. 1299. If the original obligation was
subject to a suspensive or resolutory
condition, the new obligation shall be under
the same condition, unless it is otherwise
stipulated.
are
CONTRACTS
I. Form of Contracts
374
Tolentino:
If the donation of an immov was not made in
a public instrument, the donee cannot
bring an action to compel the donor to
execute a public instrument of donation
under Art. 1357.
Art. 1357 applies only to Ks w/c validly exist,
& cannot be held applicable to a case
where the form is required in order to
make it valid
A public instrument is not necessary in cases
of onerous donations bec. they are
governed by the rules on contracts.
Title to immov prop. does not pass fr. the
donor to the donee until & unless:
it has been accepted in a public instrument--whether in the deed of donation itself or
on a separate public instrument. Solemn
words of acceptance are not necessary.
The donor was duly notified thereof--Necessary that formal notice is given to the
donor & the fact that due notice has been
given must be noted in the instruments
containing the offer to donate & that showing
the acceptance. Then & only then is the
donation perfected
The acceptance must be made during the life
of the donor; if not made before the donors
death, it is w/o effect.
In so far as the donor is concerned, the
donation is not accepted unless he/she is
notified of such acceptance.
Art. 748. x x x
If the value of the personal property
donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the
donation & the acceptance shall be made in
writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void.
Tolentino:
A donation of personal prop. exceeding P5
thou in value must ALWAYS be made in
writing, & accepted also in writing.
The document of donation & the
acceptance need not be public
instruments but may simply be private
documents.
When the value does not exceed P5 thou,
a donation may be mare orally or in
writing.
If donation is made orally, there must be
simultaneous delivery.
If there is no simultaneous delivery, the
donation is void unless made in writing.
BUT in this case, the law does not
require that that when the donation is
made in writing, the acceptance should
also be in writing.
Art. 1773. A contract of partnership is
void, whenever immovable property is
contributed thereto, if an inventory of said
property is not made, signed by the
parties, & attached to the public
instrument.
Art. 1984. The depositary cannot
demand that the depositor proves his
ownership of the thing deposited.
Nevertheless, should he discover that
the thing has been stolen & who its true
owner is, he must advise the latter of the
deposit.
If the owner, in spite of such
information, does not claim it w/in the
period of one month, the depositary shall
be relieved of all responsibility by returning
the thing deposited to the depositor.
If the depositary has reasonable
grounds to believe that the thing has not
been lawfully acquired by the depositor,
the former may return the same.
Art. 2134. The amount of the principal
& of the interest shall be specified in
writing;
otherwise,
the
contract
of
antichresis shall be void.
Art. 83---Family Code
These donations are governed by the
rules on ordinary donations established in
Title III of Book III of the Civil Code, insofar
as they are not modified by the following
articles.
375
BAVIERA:
*** When the law states in writing,
this need not be a public document.
***It is sufficient that it was SIGNED by
the party sought to be charged
BAVIERA:
*** rationale of this: bec. of memory
lapse
Tolentino:
The time begins fr. the day the K is entered
into, & not fr. the time that performance
of it is entered upon
It must appear that the parties intended
when they made the K that it should not
be performed w/in a year.
Where no time is fixed by the parties for
performance, & there is nothing in the
agreement itself to show that it cannot be
performed w/in a year according to its
terms & the understanding of the parties,
the agreement is NOT w/in the SOF.
BAVIERA:
***Examples of this are guaranty &
surety contracts
Tolentino:
This has been defined as an undertaking by
a person, not before liable, for the
purpose of securing or performing the
same duty for w/c the original debtor
continues to be liable.
The test as to whether a promise is w/in
the statute has been said to lie in the
answer to the question whether the
promise is an original or a collateral
one:
PROMISE
IS
ORIGINAL
OR
INDEPENDENT
If
the
promisor
becomes primarily
liable
for
the
payment of a debt,
the promise is not
w/in the statute
PROMISE
COLLATERAL
IS
If the promise is
collateral
to
the
agreement
of
another
&
the
promisor
becomes
thereby merely a
surety, the promise
falls w/in the SOF &
hence, it should be
in writing
(c)
An
agreement
made
in
consideration of marriage, other than a
mutual promise to marry;
BAVIERA:
*** Examples of this would be a
marriage
settlement,
donation
propter nuptias
***A
mutual
promise
to
marry,
whether
or
not
in
writing,
is
unenforceable bec. it is a personal
act.
Tolentino:
When the marriage is a mere incident, &
not the end to be attained by the
agreement, the contract is not in
consideration of marriage, & oral
evidence can prove the agreement
376
Tolentino:
The requirement of a written instrument or a
memo for sales of personal prop. for a
price not less than P500, covers both
TANGIBLE & INTANGIBLE personal prop.
To bring a sales transaction w/in the
operation of the SOF, the price of the
prop. sold must be at least P500.
A K for the sale of goods, chattels or things in
action is removed fr. the operation of the
SOF where the buyer ACCEPTS &
RECEIVES part of such goods & chattels.
Neither will the SOF apply where there has
been part payment of the purchase price.
Evidence to prove an oral K of sale of real
estate must be disregarded if timely
objections are made to its introduction.
A consummated sale of real prop. is not
covered by the SOF (OO na...OO na...)
BAVIERA:
Q: What is the ratio for the SOF?
A: To prevent fraud. The problem w/ oral
contracts is that they are easy to fabricate
& perjure the witnesses.
Q: An oral contract for the lease of property
for 2 years. What is the status of the K?
A:
Enforceable
for
the
1st
year,
unenforceable for the 2nd year
Q: An oral K for the sale of land. The buyer
suffered damages when the seller refused
to comply w/ his promise even if the buyer
offered to pay. B consigned the payment.
So whats up?
A: Acceptance of benefits (even if it was
just an earnest money) takes it away w/in
the ambit of the Statute of Frauds. To allow
a K w/c has been partially performed to
become unenforceable would be to allow a
party to perpetrate fraud.
Q: When is there a waiver of the SOF?
A: In the ff. instances:
When there has been acceptance of
benefits
When there is failure to object to the
introduction of oral evidence
Q: Seller has advertised a specific object
for sale. A buyer comes to buy (sus...eh
ano pa nga bang ginagawa ng buyer?).
Seller says Bukas ka na lang bumalik, alas
7:00 na eh! To show good faith, buyer
deposits P500.00 as earnest money. Is the
sale enforceable even if theres no
compliance w/ the SOF?
A: OO naman.
Tolentino
Ration of the SOF: Oral contracts lead to
fraud in the fulfillment of obligations, or to
false testimony.
SOF applies only to EXECUTORY & not to
completed or executed Ks.
Tolentino:
The representations are limited to those w/c
operate to induce the person to whom they
are made to enter into contractual relations
w/ the third person, but not to those
representations tending to induce action for
the benefit of the person making them.
377
BAVIERA:
***This provision is not very clear as to
the meaning of parol. Strictly, parol
evidence rule presupposes a written
agreement. It is much better to make it
unenforceable.
ART. 1357.
If the law requires a
document or other special form, as in the
acts & contracts enumerated in the ff.
article, the contracting parties may compel
each other to observe that form once the
contract has been perfected. This right
may be exercised simultaneously w/ the
action upon the contract.
379
CUI
V.
(1961)]
ARELLANO
V.
Tolentino:
Gen. Rule: rts. & obs. under a K are
transmitted to the heirs of the parties.
380
Badges
of
fraud,
&
Art.
1387:
Presumptions.
May be rebutted by
satisfactory & convincing evidence.
Art. 1388:
Cr. With axn only v.
subsequence transferees only when an axn
st
lies v. 1 transferee. If 1st Tfee in GF, no
liability. If 1st Tfee in BF, the rescissible
char. Of 2nd alienation depends upon how
2nd Tfee acquired the thing.
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obs. Is
implied in reciprocal ones, in case on of the
obligors should not comply w/ what is
incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between
the fulfillment & the rescission of the ds.,
w/ the payment of damages in either case.
He may also seek rescission, even after he
has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should
become impossible.
The ct. shall decree the rescission
claimed, unless there be just cause
authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be w/o prejudice
to the rts of third persons who have
acquired the thing, in accordance w/ Arts.
1385 & 1388 & the Mortgage Law.
Art. 1192. In case both parties have
committed a breach of the obligation, the
liability of the 1st infractor shall be equally
tempered bye the cts. If it cannot be det.
Which of the parties 1st violated the K, the
same shall be deemed extinguished, &
each shall bear his own damages.
Tolentino:
Similarities between Rsn under Art. 1191 &
Art. 1380+: (1) both presuppose Ks validly
entered into & existing, & (2) both require
mutual restitution when declared proper.
Differences: (1) Rsn under 1191 may be
demanded only by party to the K, under
1380+ by 3P prejudiced by the K; (2) Rsn
under 1191 may be denied when there is
sufficient reason to justify extension of time
to perform, under 1380+ such reason does
NOT affect rt. To ask for Rsn; (3) Non-perf.
382
384
BAVIERA NOTES:
Q: Authority to sell oral but sale is in writing
A: Void.
Q: Authority to sell in writing but sale of land
is not
A: Unenforceable under Statute of Frauds.
Q:
Why should loan be in writing for
antichresis to be in writing?
A: Antichresis takes a long time. Loan is valid
if not in writing but antichresis not
Donation propter nuptias: rules on ordinary
donations would apply.
Q: Buyer & seller orally agreed for Seller to
sell land. Buyer sold palay & w/ the money
fr. this sale Buyer gave to Seller. Seller
refused.
note or memorandum
evidence of the agreement used to show the
intention of the parties
may consist of any kind of writing, fr. a
solemn deed to a mere hasty note or
memorandum in books & papers, may be in
ink or in pencil, typed or printed
meets requirements of Statute of Frauds if it
contains:
names of the parties
terms & conditions of the agreement
a description of the subject matter sufficient
to render it capable of identification
date & place of the making of the agreement
signature of the party assuming the
obligation
Where there is a sale of a number of
articles w/c separately do not have a price of
P500 each but w/c in their aggregate have a
total price exceeding P500, the operation of
the SOF depends upon whether there is a
single inseparable contract or a several one.
If the contract is entire or inseparable, SOF
applies. If separable, then each article is
taken separately, & the application of the
SOF depends upon its price.
oral evidence to prove a consummated
sale of real property - allowed by the Statute
of Frauds
representation as to credit of a third
person - limited to those w/c operate to
induce the person to whom they are made to
enter into contractual relations w/ the 3rd
person, but NOT to those representations
tending to induce action for the benefit of the
person making them.
An oral contract for a supplemental lease
of property for a period longer than 1 year also w/in SOF. An agreement to enter into an
agreement is also w/in the SOF & the promise
is not enforceable unless the statute is
satisfied.
Defense of the Statute of Frauds
personal to the party to the agreement
like minority, fraud, mistake, & similar
defenses w/c may be asserted or waived by
the party affected
cannot be set up by strangers to the
agreement
Art. 1414.
When money is paid or
property delivered for an illegal purpose, the
contract may be repudiated by one of the
parties before the purpose has been
accomplished, or before any damage has
been caused to a third person. In such case,
the courts may, if the public interest will thus
be subserved, allow the party repudiating the
contract to recover the money or property.
JULY 31,
UNITED
GENERAL
INDUSTRIES
PALER 112 SCRA 404
V.
389
DIZON V. GABORRO
FACTS:
Dizon is the owner of 3 parcels of
land, w/c were subject to a 1st mortgage lien
in favor of DBP & a 2 nd mortgage lien in favor
Issue: Whether
constituted?
BAVIERA:
This does not come squarely
under an innominate contract that is
analogous to a contract of antichresis.
It simply is a usufruct in return for the
assumption of the mortgage.
TRUSTS
I. EXPRESS TRUSTS
Art.1444.
No particular words are
required for the creation of an express trust,
it being sufficient that a trust is clearly
intended.
Art.1445. No trust shall fail bec. the
trustee appointed declines the designation,
unless the contrary should appear in the
instrument constituting the trust.
Art.1446. Acceptance by the beneficiary
is necessary. Nevertheless, if the trust
imposes no onerous condition upon the
beneficiary,
his
acceptance
shall
be
presumed, if there is no proof to the contrary.
JULIO V. DALANDAN
Facts: Victoriana had a daughter, herein Pf.
It appeared that Victoriana owned a parcel of
riceland w/c was posted as security by
Clemente for an obligation. Since Clemente
failed to fulfill said obligation, the riceland
was foreclosed. Because of this, Clemente
executed a document wherein he promised Pf
that he would replace the land foreclosed w/
another w/c consists of 4 hectares. But he
expressed that Pf
should not evict his
or
not
trust
was
CUAYCONG V. CUAYCONG
Facts:
Hacienda Bacayan was owned
by the CPG of Eduardo & his wife. E's desire
was to divide said hacienda among his bros.
& sisters. He asked them to pay his wife's
share but they were unable to do so through
stealth & strategy, herein Ds were able to
buy the hacienda. So what H did was to tell
the Ds to hold in the trust what might belong
to his bros. & sisters as a result of the
Issue: Whether or
constructive trust?
there
is
SPECIAL CONTRACTS
SALES
Notes:
According to the SC, the 2nd & 3rd paragraphs
of Art. 1544 do not apply to unregistered
land.
The title referred to in the 3rd paragraph
does not refer to ownership bec. ownership
only passes upon delivery; this refers to the
oldest document.
CARBONELL VS. CA
Facts: Carbonell, Poncio, & Infante were
neighbors in San Juan. Both Carbonell &
Infante offered to buy Poncios lot. Poncio
offered it to Carbonell & the latter accepted.
However, when the day of the signing of the
deed of sale arrived, Poncio informed
Carbonell that he is no longer selling the land
to her since Infante gave a better offer.
Carbonell registered her adverse claim, so
that when a TCT was issued to Infante,
Carbonells adverse claim was annotated
thereon. Carbonell then filed this case for the
annulment of the sale to Infante.
Issue: Who has better right to the land?
Held: Carbonell has the better right. To
merit the protection of Art. 1544, it is
essential that the buyer of the realty must act
in good faith in registering his deed of sale.
Here, when Carbonell bought the lot fr.
Poncio, she was in good faith, & this good
faith subsisted when she recorded her
adverse claim prior to Infantes registration.
Munoz-Palma, dissenting: When Carbonell
registered her adverse claim, she had already
been told about the sale to Infante & had
seen the wall that Infante built, & she had no
registerable document of sale at the time.
Note: Baviera disagreed w/ the majority
decision in this case.
BERICO VS. CA
Facts: In 1961, delos Santos sold a parcel of
land to PRs Flores & Bareja. In 1963, delos
Santos sold the same parcel of land to
petitioner Berico, who was aware of the prior
sale to PRs. Despite such knowledge, Berico
caused the registration of the deeds of sale in
his favor in 1968. It was only in 1978 that
PRs tried to register their deeds of sale. They
case not
recovery
sale of
personal
the CM.
property
Q: Why?
A: Bec. it was NOT the chattel mortgage
that was foreclosed. The extrajudicial
foreclosure of the REM is equivalent to a
specific performance & therefore, what you
will do is to file an action for specific
performance.
1324
This is the GENERAL
RULE
on
CONTRACTS:
If
ACCEPTED,
the
agreement becomes
BINDING
(WON
there
is
a
consideration other
than the purchase
price)
CIFRA V. CA
FACTS: P (Cifra) entered into an agmt w/
PR (Chua), for the sale of a real prop for 1.1
M. It is stipulated in the ADDENDUM that in
case the buyer fails to purchase the prop
after the seller formally notifies him of the
surrender of the premises by the tenant, in
addition to the forfeiture of the earnest
money, the buyer must pay the seller 20T
plus atty.s. fees & cost. On the other
hand, if the sellers do not make good their
promise to sell the prop, the seller binds
himself to return the earnest money & in
addition, to pay the buyer 20T, plus atty.'s
fees & cost.
The Chuas were not able to free the
prop fr. its tenants so they did not want to
push through w/ the sale. P filed an action
for specific performance.
HELD: The K is clear & should be applied
as it is. Under the addendum to the K, both
parties are given the freedom to back out
of the transaction provided that, in the
401
Baviera:
In an equitable mortgage, the property must
still first be foreclosed before ownership
passes to the seller. Distinguished fr. a pacto
de retro sale, where ownership already
passes to the buyer upon perfection of the
contract, but if the right to redeem is
exercised, then ownership reverts to the
seller.
Paras:
402
Baviera:
An agreement to repurchase becomes
an option to buy when entered into after the
time to redeem stipulated in a pacto de retro
sale had already expired, bec. then the
vendee a retro became absolute owner of the
thing sold, & the subsequent grant of the
right to repurchase is a new agreement. But
where the period to repurchase has not
expired, & another agreement is entered into
granting the vendor a retro the right to
repurchase the object of the contract at any
time, the subsequent agreement is not a
promise to sell but is an extension of the
period to redeem, w/c cannot exceed 10
years.
Reason for the 10-year limitation: A
pacto de retro is a suspension of title, & it is
against public interest to permit such
uncertainty to continue for a long time.
Counting of 4-year period: From the
execution of the contract. But if the right is
suspended by agreement that it shall be
exercised only after a certain time or
condition arises, then the period shall be
counted only fr. the time such right could be
exercised, but not exceeding 10 years fr.
execution.
Not sufficient that a vendor a retro manifests
his desire to redeem.
This must be
accompanied by an actual or simultaneous
Baviera:
Nos. 1-3 are voidable contracts; nos. 4-6
are void contracts.
The reason why those enumerated under
Art. 1491 have relative incapacity to
enter into a contract of sale is that they
possess a fiduciary relationship w/ the
owner of the properties mentioned,
such that the law prevents them fr.
being tempted to take advantage of
their positions. the prohibition rests on
the fact that greed might get the better
of loyalty. The law does not trust human
nature to resist the temptations likely to
arise out of the antagonism between
the interest of the seller & the buyer.
An agent who has renounced the agency &
is a judgment creditor of his principal
may acquire the latters property in a
public sale.
The prohibition against lawyers is intended
to curtail any undue influence the
lawyer may have over his client on
account
of
their
confidential
association.
Such sales are void &
cannot be ratified. Public interest &
public policy remain paramount & do
not permit compromise & ratification.
When is a thing deemed to be the subject
of litigation?
Not only if there is some contest or
litigation in court, but also fr. the
moment it becomes subject to judicial
action.
Contingent fee- not contrary to law as it will
encourage the lawyer to work harder to
win the case in order to earn the said
fee.
thus, it is to the clients
advantage. But the court may reduce
the fee is found to be unconscionable.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. ABABA
Facts:
Atty. Fernandez represented
Abarquez in a civil case filed by the latter
against his sister w/ regards ownership of a
parcel of land. They agreed that in case A
wins, he will give to F 1/2 of what he may
recover in the action. A WoN, but he
refused to comply w/ his obligation under
the agreement. When F learned of As
plans to sell the property to Larrazabal, he
filed an affidavit of adverse claim w/ the
Register of Deeds, such that when the
property was sold, & a TCT issued to L,
there appeared an annotation of Fs
attorneys lien. L filed a petition for the
cancellation of the annotation in the TCT. F
opposed. LC ruled for F.
Issue: WoN the contract for a contingent
fee is prohibited under Art. 1491, NCC, &
404
TOLENTS:
Scope of legal redemption. LR is a
right created & regulated by law by reason
of public interest, w/c is not opposed to,
but rather is in harmony w/ the interest of
private parties.
It is applicable to all transactions w/c result
in the transmission of ownership, whose
special nature does not bar subrogation,
w/c is the essence of legal redemption, but
not to barter or acquisition by hereditary
title.
A person cannot exercise the right of legal
redemption if he is not in a condition to
take the place of the vendee. The vendee
may have assumed some purely personal
obligations w/c the redemptioner cannot
perform; hence, subrogation cannot take
place. In such cases, however, the court
should carefully determine whether such
obligations are merely a subterfuge to
avoid redemption.
Distinguished fr. Pre-emption. Preemption is the power to acquire a thing for
the same price in preference over any
other buyer. It is exercised before the
stipulated sale is consummated by the
vendor, who must communicate the
proposed sale to possible redemptioners so
that they can exercise the right of pre405
TOLENTS:
Compared w/ Art. 1088. Art. 1088 applies
where a co-heir sells his share to a stranger
before partition or distribution or before the
determination of the portion to w/c each heir
is entitled. Once the portion corresponding to
each heir has been fixed, the co-heirs turn
into co-owners & their right of legal
redemption is governed by this art. & Art.
1624.
Object of redemption the word thing is
used in its generic sense, therefore, it
includes not only objects, whether movable
or immovable, but also all rights w/c are
susceptible of appropriation.
Who may Redeem. The right of LR given in
this art. is applicable to all who subsequently
acquire their respective shares while the
community subsists. The purpose of the law
in establishing the right of LR bet. the coowners is to reduce the no. of participants
until the community is done away w/, being a
hindrance
to
the
devt.
&
better
administration of the property, & this reason
exists while the community subsists & the
participants continue to be so whether they
be the orig co-owners or their successors.
One co-owner cannot exercise the
right of redemption alone, bec. the right
belongs to all the other co-owners in
common.
The privilege granted by this art. can
only be exercised when the purchaser is a
STRANGER to the co-ownership.
TOLENTS:
The intention of the law is to protect
agriculture, by the union of small
agricultural lands & those adjoining
under one single owner for their better
exploitation.
Redemption can be exercised only if the
land sold is one hectare or less in area.
Where several distinct & separate
pieces of land are sold to a stranger,
the fact that their total area is greater
than one hectare will not prevent
redemption, if each piece sought to be
redeemed does not exceed one hectare
in area.
LR can only be enforced vs. a stranger who
buys the property sought to be
redeemed, & not vs. another adjacent
owner who has the same interest.
Transfer by Vendee. If after a co-owner
has instituted an action to compel
redemption,
another
co-owner
voluntarily buys the land, this will not
bar the action w/c can be exercised vs.
the subsequent transferee.
The repurchase of the land by the orig
vendor cannot defeat the right of LR, &
any subsequent act of the buyer &
seller cannot prejudice the prospective
redemptioner.
Burden of Proving Existence of
Brooks, Ravines, Roads, etc. The
406
TOLENTS:
Requisites:
The piece of urban land is so small that it
cannot be used for any practical purpose w/in
a reasonable time;
Such small urban land was bought merely for
speculation.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption
or redemption shall not be exercised except
w/in thirty days fr. the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the
case may be. The deed of sale shall not be
recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by the affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners
excludes that of adjoining owners.
TOLENTS:
This art. does not provide a period of
prescription. It creates a right, & fixes the
period for the exercise of that right. The
pd. is not prescriptive, but is more a
requisite or condition precedent to the
exercise of the right of LR.
If such person has offered to redeem the
property w/in the period fixed, he has
complied w/ the condition fixed by law &
Facts: Jose v. Ramirez (JVR) was a coowner of a house & lot issued in the name
of the ff.: Marie Garnier Vda. De Ramirez,
1/6; JVR, 1/6; Jose E. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita de
Ramirez, 1/6; & Jose Ma. Ramirez, 1/6. JVR
died.
In his last will & testament, he
bequeathed 1/3 of the free portion to
plaintiff Butte. Estate proceedings were
still pending at the time the SC rendered
this decision. BPI was appointed judicial
administrator.
409
Requirements:
for all transactions or contracts involving
the sale or financing of real estate on
installment payments
includes
residential
condominium
apartments except industrial lots, commercial
buildings & sales to tenants under RA 3843,
as amended by RA 6389
buyer has paid at least two years of
installments
Notes:
Rights:
to pay w/o additional interests the unpaid
installments due w/in the grace period of one
month for every year of installment
payments made, w/c right could be exercised
only once in every five years of the life of the
contract & its extensions
if contract is canceled, the seller shall
return to the buyer the value of the payments
to the property equivalent to fifty percent of
the total payments made &, after five years
of installments, an additional five percent
every year but not to exceed 90% of the total
payments made
cancellation of contract must be made
thirty days after buyer receives notice of
cancellation or demand for rescission of the
Notes:
applies only to contracts of absolute sale
where ownership has already transferred
mere default leads to uncertainty as to
ownership, thus there is a need either for
410
411
complaint
answered.
concerning
the
same
is
LEASE
Payments of rent in advance by the sublessee shall be deemed not to have been
made, so far as the lessors claim is
concerned,
unless said payments were
effected in virtue of the custom of the place.
Art. 1653. The provisions governing
warranty, contained in the Title on Sales,
shall be applicable to the contract of lease.
In the cases where the return of the price
is required, reduction shall be made in
proportion to the time during w/c the lessee
enjoyed the thing.
BAVIERA NOTES:
Rent Control Law prohibits sublease
NCC - unless prohibited, sublease is
allowed.
EQUITABLE
MORTGAGE
lot should first be
foreclosed
before
ownership
transferred
excess
in
the
foreclosure sale is
returned to borrower
Kinds of leases
of things - movable or immovables
of work or contract of labor
of services
household services (Arts 1689-1699)
contract for a piece of work (Arts. 17131731)
lease of service of common carriers (Arts.
1732-1763)
consumable things - cannot be the
subject of a lease UNLESS: only for display
or advertising & if it is merely an accessory
to a leased industrial establishment (e.g.,
coal in factory)
Special characteristics of lease of things:
essential purpose is to transmit the use &
enjoyment of the thing
consensual - perfected by mere consent
onerous
price fixed in relation to period of use or
enjoyment
temporary
Distinctions:
LEASE
only
use
&
enjoyment of thing
are transferred
only
for
a
determinate period
price may not only
consist of money
SALE
ownership
transferred
permanently
price generally only
money or equivalent
LEASE
generally a personal
right (real right only
by exception)
may be constituted
by person not the
owner
may be limited to
particular uses in
the contract
must
be
for
a
determinate period
USUFRUCT
always a real right
constituted only by
the owner
includes all possible
ways of using &
enjoying
the
property
may be for an
indeterminate
period of time
LEASE
onerous
involve usage
property
COMMODATUM
gratuitous
also involve usage
of property
of
mistagged his luggage resulting to its nonarrival in Manila. Later, it was found that it
ended in Iligan City.
ISSUE: WON PALs liability should be limited
to the amount stated in the conditions of
carriage printed in small letters at the back of
the plane ticket (P100).
HELD. NO. PALs liability should be P373
based on evidence. Following Art. 1750, a
common carriers liability may be limited to a
fixed amount. However, the contract must
be reasonable & just under the circumstances
& has been fairly & freely entered upon by
the parties.
In the CAB, it could not be said that S
was aware of said conditions w/c are printed
at the back of the ticket in letters so small.
PAL has admitted that the passengers do not
sign the ticket.
Further, in the case of Ysmael v.
Barreto, the court held that the carrier cannot
limit its liability for injury to or loss of goods
shipped where such injury or loss was caused
by its own negligence. REASON: The natural
effect of a limitation of liability against
negligence is to induce want of care on the
part of the carrier in the performance of its
duty.
MARANAN V. PEREZ
FACTS: Corrachea, a passenger of a taxicab
owned & operated by Perez, was stabbed to
death by the driver Valenzuela. The latter
was convicted of homicide. Maranan, the
mother of the deceased filed an action for
damages against P.
P contended that it
should be absolved fr. liability based on the
doctrine laid down in Gillaco v. MRR -- that
the Er is under no absolute liability for
assaults of its Ees upon passengers.
HELD: P liable. Gillaco case different. In the
Gillaco case, the guard who killed the
passenger was not in his supposed duty post.
Furthermore, the incident happened at least
2 hours before the EE was to start his duty.
In the CAB, the killing was perpetrated
by the very driver of the cab transporting the
passenger in whose hands the carrier had
entrusted the duty to execute the contract of
carriage. It took place in the course of duty
of the Ee. Furthermore, the Gillaco case was
418
CO.
VS.
FACTS:
Samar imported equipment
& loaded the same on one of the ships
owned by Lloyd. Upon arrival in Manila,
the
aforementioned
importation
was
unloaded & delivered in good order &
condition to the bonded warehouse of
AMCYL. However, the goods were never
delivered to Samar. It filed a claim against
Lloyd & its agent Sharp & Co. It was
stipulated in the Bill of Lading that the
delivery of the goods to the warehouse was
part of Lloyds duty to transship the goods
fr. Manila to Davao.
ISSUE: WON Lloyd liable? NO
HELD:
Pursuant to the Bill of Lading,
Lloyds responsibility as a common carrier
ceased the moment the goods were
unloaded in Manila & in the manner of
transshipment, it acted merely as an agent
of Samar. Under 1736, the carrier may be
relieved of the responsibility for the loss or
damage to the goods upon actual or
constructive delivery of the same by the
carrier to the consignee, or to the person
who has a right to receive them.
Two
undertakings
appeared
embodied in the Bill. The first is for the
transport of goods fr. Bremen, Germany to
Manila. The second, the transshipment of
the same fr. Manila to Davao, w/ Lloyd
acting as agent of Samar. At the hiatus
between these two undertakings of Lloyd
w/c is the moment when the subject goods
are discharged in Manila, its personality
changes fr. carrier to agent of the
consignee.
Thus the character of its
possession changed fr. possession in its
own name as carrier into possession in the
name of the consignee. Such being the
case, there was actual delivery of the
goods fr. Lloyd as carrier to the same Lloyd
421
Art. 28(1).
A complaint could be
instituted only in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties, before:
The court of the domicile of the carrier;
The court of its principal place of
business;
The court where it has a place of business
through w/c the contract has been made; or
The court of the place of destination.
PAN AM V. RAPADAS
Facts: Rapadas was en route fr. Guam to
Manila. Pan Am Airlines handcarry control
agent ordered him to check in his attach
case. Rapada tried to get out of doing so but
was constrained to do so eventually. It was
his brother that checked in the luggage w/o
declaring its contents nor their value. When
he arrived in Mania he was handed back all
his luggage except the attach case. He filed
an action for damages of $42,403.90
representing the value of the contents. Pan
Am contended that the claim was subject to
Notice Of Baggage Liability Limitations
attached to the plane ticket & thus its liability
is limited to $180 as R did not declare a
higher valuation.
Issue: Is a passenger bound by the terms of
a ticket declaring that the limitations of
liability set forth set forth in the Warsaw
Convention as amended by the Hague
Protocol shall apply in case of loss, damage
or destruction to registered luggage of a
passenger?
Held: There is no dispute that there was a
notice on the ticket stating the applicability of
the Warsaw Convention in case of death/
injury to a passenger; loss, damage or
destruction of luggage. Such is sufficient
notice. While contracts of adhesion are not
entirely prohibited, neither is blind reliance
on them encouraged. Passengers are not
always bound by the stipulated amounts on a
ticket or printed elsewhere. The reasons
exercise
the
extraordinary
explicitly required by law.
diligence
TOLENTINO:
This relates exclusively to the settlement of
partnership affairs among the partners
BAVIERA :
The theory behind irrevocable
agency (when appointment is made in the
articles) is that the partner concerned
would not have joined the partnership were
425
TOLENTINO:
This refers to joint management.
The obligation to secure the consent of the
other partner rests on the partner
entering into the contract, not on the
3rd person bec. the 3rd person can
presume that the consent was given
unless the contrary has been previously
manifested to him. Even if made w/o
consent, if the 3rd person acted in good
faith & the transaction concerns
matters w/in the business of the
partnership, the contract cannot be
annulled.
The requirement of previous approval
refers to the execution of formal
contracts in writing, not to routine
transactions bec. they come w/in the
scope of the general authority of the
manager of a business.
Art. 1803.
When the manner of
management has not been agreed upon,
the ff. rules shall be observed :
All of the partners shall be considered
agents & whatever any one of them may
do alone shall bind the partnership, w/o
prejudice to the provisions of Art. 1801
None of the partners may, w/o the
consent of the others, make any important
alteration in the immovable property of the
partnership even if it may be useful to the
partnership. But if the refusal of consent
by the other parties is manifestly
prejudicial
to
the
interest
of
the
426
BAVIERA:
This applies only
partnerships contractual obligations.
to
BAVIERA:
Why make the liability of
partners only pro-rata & subsidiary for
contractual obligations when they are
mutual agents of each other?
TOLENTINO: The principle of agency that
one who accepts / retains benefits of the
unauthorized acts of his agents, w/
knowledge of material facts surrounding
the transaction, will be deemed to have
ratified those acts, is equally applicable to
a question of ratification of a partners
unauthorized acts.
Art. 1819. Where title to real property
is in the partnership name, any partner
may convey title to such property by a
conveyance executed in the partnership
name; but the partnership may recover
such property unless the partners act
binds the partnership under the provisions
of Art. 1818 par. 1, or unless such property
has been conveyed by the grantee or a
person claiming through such grantee to a
holder for value w/o knowledge that the
partner, in making the conveyance, has
exceeded his authority.
427
TOLENTINO:
When notice is given to the partner while
he is a partner, the effect is the same as if
notice was had by all the partners.
Where the partner acting in the particular
matter acquired knowledge before he
became a partner, & the knowledge is then
present in his mind, the partnership should
be charge w/ knowledge.
Art. 1822. Where, by any wrongful act
or omission of any partner acting in the
ordinary course of the business of the
partnership or w/ the authority of his copartners, loss or injury is caused to any
person, not being a partner in the
partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the
partnership is liable therefor to the same
extent as the partner so acting or omitting
to act.
TOLENTINO:
The right to mortgage is
included in the right to convey under this
article.
TOLENTINO:
Art.
1820.
An admission
or
representation
made
by any
partner
concerning partnership affairs w/in the scope
of his authority in accordance w/ this Title is
evidence against the partnership.
BAVIERA:
Under Arts. 1822 (on tort
liability) & 1823 (liability for breach),
the liability is solidary. This is absurd.
Why make the liability for these cases
larger than that for contractual breach?
Q: Can 2 corporations create a partnership?
A: No. Corps. can go into joint ventures, but
not partnerships bec. partnerships require
mutual agency.
TOLENTINO:
All partners are liable jointly &
severally for everything chargeable to the
partnership by reason of a partners wrongful
act or breach of trust wherein a third person
is adversely affected.
While the liability of partners are
merely join in transactions entered into by
the partnership, the partners are liable to 3rd
persons solidarily for the whole obligation if
the case involves loss or injury caused to any
person not a partner, & misapplication of a
3rd persons money or property received by a
partner or the partnership. This is bec. the
law protect 3rd persons who in good faith
relied upon the authority, real or apparent, of
a partner.
ISLAND SALES INC. VS.
UNITED
PIONEERS
GEN. CONSTRUCTION CO.
(65 S 554)
Facts: UPGC,
a
registered
general
partnership, purchased fr. ISI a motor vehicle.
UPGC executed a promissory note for P9,440,
payable in 12 mo. installments, w/ the
condition that failure to pay of the
installments would render the whole unpaid
balance immediately demandable.
UPGC
having failed to pay, ISI sued UPGC, & the
co.s general partners: Daco, Guizona, Sim,
Lumauig & Palisoc. Later, on ISIs motion, the
complaint was dismissed against Lumauig
alone.
Baviera:
A partner can w/draw
anytime fr. the partnership but he
must first notify the managing
partner.
Notice of the dissolution
must be given to third persons who
are distinguished as to whether they
have
been
creditors
of
the
partnership or not.
Those
dealing
w/
the
partnership for the first time are not
entitled to notice of the dissolution as
they are duty bound to inquire as top
the authority of the partner, that is
WON he can bind the partnership.
However, no notice is required when
the 3rd person dealing w/ a judicially
declared insolvent partner acting in
the usual way.
430
AGENCY
432
DE LEON:
KINDS OF PRINCIPAL:
1. Disclosed Principal - if at the time of the
transaction contracted by the agent, the
other party thereto has known that the agent
is acting for a principal & of a principals
identity. This is the usual type of agency.
2. Partially Disclosed Principal - if the other
party knows or has reason to know that the
agent is or may be acting for a principal but
is unaware of the principals identity. The
partially disclosed principal may enforce
against the third person the contract of the
agent like any disclosed principal. Similarly,
the third person has a right of action against
the principal.
3. Undisclosed Principal - if the party has
no notice of the fact that the agent is acting
as such for a principal.
Art. 1883 speaks of a case where the agent
(a) being authorized to act on behalf of the
principal, (b) acts instead on his own name:
GENERAL RULE: The agent is the one directly
liable to the person w/ whom he had
contracted as if the transaction were his own.
Reason for the Rule:
There is no
representation of the principal when the
agent acts in his own name. In effect, the
contractual relation is only between the
agent & the 3rd person.
Therefore, the
principal cannot have a right of action against
the third person nor vice-versa.
EXCEPTION:
When the contract involves
things belonging to the principal.
Baviera:
If the agency falls under
these articles, then it falls under the
category of contract as the same is
bilateral.
As a general rule, the
agency is constituted for the benefit
of the principal so he has the power
to revoke the same although he must
give notice to third persons.
PEREZ V. PNB
FACTS: On August 29, 1939, Vicente Perez
mortgaged Lot No. 286-E of the Kabankalan
Cadastre to the appellant Philippine National
Bank, Bacolod Branch, in order to secure
payment of a loan of P2,500. On October 7,
1942, Vicente Perez, mortgagor, died
intestate, survived by his widow & children
(appellees herein). At that time, there was an
outstanding balance of P1,917.00, &
corresponding interest, on the mortgage
indebtedness.
On October 18, 1956, the widow of
Perez instituted Special Proceedings No. 512
of the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Negros for the settlement of the estate of
Vicente Perez. The widow was appointed
Administratrix & notice to creditors was duly
published. The Bank did not file a claim. The
project of partition was submitted on July 18,
1956; it was approved & the properties
distributed accordingly. Special Proceedings
No. 512 was then closed.
On January 2, 1963, the Bank,
pursuant to authority granted it in the
mortgage deed, caused the mortgaged
properties to be extrajudicially foreclosed.
The Provincial Sheriff accordingly sold Lot No.
286-E at auction, & it was purchased by the
Bank. In the ordinary course after the lapse of
the year of redemption, Certificate of Title No.
PHIL-AM V. RAMOS
FACTS:
Associated Reclamation &
Development Corporation executed on
March 29, 1961 a promissory note for
P11,765.00 in favor of General Acceptance
& Finance Corporation. Philippine American
General Insurance Co., Inc., on the same
date, executed a surety bond in the
amount of P11,765.00 to secure payment
of the aforementioned promissory note.
Subsequently, on April 5, 1961, the
spouses Eugenio Ramos & Pilar Miranda
435
438
Article 1927.
An agency cannot be
revoked if a bilateral contract depends upon
it; or if it is the means of fulfilling an
obligation already contracted or if a partner is
appointed manager of a partnership in the
contract of partnership & his removal fr. the
management is unjustifiable.
Article 1930. The agency shall remain in
full force & effect even after the death of the
principal, if it has been constituted in the
common interest of the latter & of the agent,
or in the interest of a third person who has
accepted the stipulation in his favor.
Baviera:
The compromise must be
judicially approved.
Jurado:
Q: What is a chattel mortgage?
A: By a chattel mortgage, personal property
is recorded in the Chattel Mortgage Register
as a security for the performance of an
obligation. If the movable, instead of being
recorded, is delivered to the creditor or a
third person, the contract is a pledge & not a
chattel mortgage.
Distinguish between
chattel mortgage &
pledge.
a
a
contract
contract
of
of
SAMONTE V. SAMONTE
Facts: Spouses Faustino & Bernardina
Samonte have 6 children. During their
marriage,
they
acquired
properties
consisting of 3 parcels of land. Wife died, &
the husband continued to administer the
conjugal properties fr. w/c income, Faustino
entered into long term leases of first class
fishponds in Bulacan. Later, F married
again w/o first liquidating the conjugal
properties of the first marriage & the
income
therefr..
Pltfs-the
children,
requested their father & the 2nd wife to
440
PREFERENCE OF CREDIT
Chapter. 2 CLASSIFICATION OF CREDIT
ART. 2242
With reference to specific
immovable property & real rights of the
debtor, the following claims, mortgages, &
liens shall be preferred, & shall constitute an
encumbrance on the immovable or real right;
Taxes due upon the land or building;
For the unpaid price of the real property
sold, upon the immovable sold;
Claims of laborers, masons, mechanics &
other workmen, as well as of architects,
engineers & contractors, engaged in
construction, reconstruction & repair of the
building, canals or other works, upon said
buildings, canals or other works;
Claims of furnishers of materials used in
the construction, reconstruction, or repair of
buildings, canals or other works upon said
buildings, canals or other works;
Mortgage credits recorded in the Registry
of property, upon the real estate mortgage;
Expenses for
the
preservation
or
improvement of real property when the law
authorizes reimbursement , upon the
immovable preserved or improved;
Credits annotated in the Registry of
Property, in virtue of a judicial order, by
attachment or executions, upon the property
affected, & only as to later credits;
Claims of co-heirs for warranty in the
partition of an immovable among them, upon
the real property thus divided;
ART. 2243.
The claims or credits
enumerated in the two preceding articles
shall be considered as mortgages or
pledges of real or personal property or liens
w/in the purview of legal provisions
governing insolvency. Taxes mentioned in
No. 1, article 2241, & No.1, article 2242,
shall first be satisfied.
ART. 2244.
With reference to other
property, real & personal of the debtor, the
following claims or credits shall be
preferred IN THE ORDER NAMED:
Proper funeral expenses for the debtor,
or children under his or her parental
authority who have no property of their
own, when approved by the court;
Credits for services rendered the
insolvent by employees, laborers, or
household helpers for one year preceding
the commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency;
Expenses during the last illness of the
debtor or of his or her spouse & children
under his or her parental authority, if they
have no property of their own;
Compensation due the laborers or their
dependents under laws providing for
indemnity for damages in cases of labor
accident or illness resulting fr. the nature of
the employment;
Credits & advancements made to the
debtor for support of himself or herself &
family during the last year preceding the
insolvency;
Support
during
the
insolvency
proceedings & for three months thereafter;
442
ART. 2248.
Those credits w/c enjoy
preference in relation to specific real
property or real rights, exclude all others to
the extent of the value of the immovable or
real right to w/c the preference refers.
Art. 2249.
If there are two or more
credits w/ respect to the same specific real
property or real rights, they shall be
satisfied pro rata, after the payment of the
taxes & assessments upon the immovable
property or real right.
ART. 2250. The excess, if any, after the
payment of the credits w/c enjoy
preference w/ respect to specific property,
real or personal, shall be added to the free
property w/c the debtor may have, for the
payment of the other credits.
ART. 2251.
Those credits w/c do not
enjoy any preference w/ respect to specific
property & those w/c enjoy preference as
to the amount not paid, shall be satisfied
according to the following rules:
In the order established in article 2244;
Common credits referred to in article
2245 shall be paid pro rata regardless of
dates.
Mamay
Baviera:
This
applies
only
employers engaged in business.
to
REPUBLIC V. PERALTA
Facts:
In the voluntary insolvency
proceedings of Qlty. Tobacco Corp., the ff.
Were the claims: (1) USTC Assn. EEs &
Workers Union for separation pay, (2) Fed. De
la Industria (labor union also) for sepn pay,
(3) B of Customs claims &, (4) BIR claims.
Issue: WON Ees claims preferred
Held: Wages under Art. 110 LC may be
regarded to include severance/termination/
separation pay.
The latter is addl
remuneration to w/c Ees become entitled, to.
Art. 100 LC has to be viewed in rel. to the
Civil Code as to preference of credits. The CC
provisions classify credits v. a particular
insolvent into 3 gen. Categories: (1) spec.
preferred Cts in 2241 & 2242, (2) ord.
preferred Cts in2244 & (3) common Cts in
2245. Special pref. Cts constitutes a lien or
encumbrance on the spec. mov. or immov.
prop. to w/c they relate. Art 2243 makes it
clear that these Cts shall be considered
445