Classes of Interpretation

Interpretation has been classified as:

(1) Literal (Interpretatio restrictiva) -is where the letter is closely followed, as where, in interpreting a
statute, the term man is given an exclusively masculine sense, and where metaphorical terms are
construed literally.
(2) Liberal (Interpretatio extensiva) is the ascription to words of their largest sense. Of this we have an
illustration in the interpretation of the words regulate commerce in the constitution of interpretation.
(3) Arbitrary (Interpretatio predestinata) is that which subordinates interpretation to pre-assuraed
construction, making the word mean that which the interpreter thinks most consistent with a preconceived
scheme of his own. In this way construction is erroneously made the basis of interpretation, and not
interpretation the material for construction.
(4) Authoritative (Interpretatio declarativa) is that which accepts the meaning of a term as it has been
affixed by the state acting either through its legislature or its judiciary.

When is there room for interpretation or construction?

The final consideration is, in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Codes provisions and its
implementing regulations, the workingmans welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate
spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor (Abella v. NLRC, G.R. No. 71812, July 30,1987,152 SCRA 140;
Manila Electric Company v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 78763, July 12,1989), and Article 1702 of the Civil Code
which provides that in case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in
favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer. [Songco v. NLRC, GR L-50999 March 23, 1990].
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. [Amores
v. HRET, GR 189600, June 29, 2010].

When can courts construe or interpret the law?

It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. When the law is clear
and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. As has been our
consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no occasion for
interpretation; there is only room for application.
Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has
no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed.
Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true intent.
Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or
of referring to two or more things at the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or
more possible meanings, in which case, the Court is called upon to exercise one of its judicial functions,
which is to interpret the law according to its true intent.
CASE: RCBC v. IAC, G.R. No. 74851, December 9, 1999

Intrinsic or internal aids in Statutory Interpretation

Intrinsic or internal aids in Statutory Interpretation are those found within the statute
itself.

Other enacting
words

An examination of the whole of a statute, or at least those parts which deal

with the subject matter of the provision to be interpreted, should give some
indication of the overall purpose of the legislation. It may show that a
particular interpretation of that provision will lead to absurdity when taken
with another section.

Explanatory notes
as aids to
interpretation

The use of explanatory notes in statutory interpretation is new.

Some laws have their own interpretation sections such as Definition of Terms.

Aids found in all laws:

Long title

It became established that the long title could be considered as an aid to

interpretation. The long title should be read as part of the context, as the
plainest of all the guides to the general objectives of a statute.
Example:
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10361]
AN ACT INSTITUTING POLICIES FOR THE PROTECTIONAND WELFARE
OF DOMESTIC WORKERS

Preamble

That part of a statute explaining the reasons for its enactment and the
objects sought to be accomplished. It usually starts with the word
Whereas. It is therefore clearly permissible to have recourse to it as an
aid to construing the enacting provisions.
Preambles ceased to be used in recent legislation. It is replaced by, inter
alia, Declaration of Policies.
Examples:
PREAMBLE: WHEREAS, under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 705, the
Bureau of Forest Development is vested with authority and jurisdiction over
all forest lands including watershed reservations;
DECLARATION OF POLICIES: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State
recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.

Short title

There is some question whether the short title should be used to resolve
doubt.
Example: The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012

Punctuation

When the meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty

of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and
adopt that construction of the statute which will give it effect. The
construction finally adopted should be based upon something more

substantial than the mere punctuation found in the printed Act. If the
punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in
apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute as
thus punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not
conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when
necessary, to give to the Act the effect intended by the Legislature,
disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting
others where necessary. [G.R. No. L-8848, U.S. v. Hart, Miller and
Natividad].

Body

The main and operative part of the statute containing its substantive and
even procedural provisions. Provisos and exceptions may also be found in
the body of the law.

Punctuation and Grammar: An Aid to Interpretation and Construction

While punctuation can assist in the interpretation of statutes, care must be taken: The following citations
can be noted to arrive at if Grammar is material or not. Likewise punctuation is dealt with here in details.
Although Canadian courts consider punctuation part of the legislation, they are unwilling to place much
reliance on it as an aid to interpretation. The primary reason for this distrust is its inherent unreliability.
Many of the conventions governing punctuation, especially comma placement, are fluid and unstable.
Practices vary from one region to another and may change rapidly over time.
Also, considerable discretion is left to individual writers to vary punctuation as a matter of taste or style.
And not least of all, even competent users of language often make mistakes out of carelessness or
uncertainty. For these reasons, the courts are rightly cautious of attaching too much significance to a
single punctuation mark.
A debate on punctuation cannot take the place of an interpretation based on the legislative context and
ordinary meaning of words. The reliability of punctuation as a tool of interpretation has indeed.[1] been
questioned, . . .Punctuation is a rational part of English composition, and is sometimes quite significantly
employed. I see no reason for depriving legal documents of such significance as attaches to punctuation in
other writings.[2] Punctuation is but one tool to help in the determination of legislative intent[3].
In Caridnal, V.R.[4] MAHONEY J. wrote,
Punctuation cannot render a single interpretation so certainly correct as to obviate the need to refer to
the entire enactment in the interpretation of one of its provisions but it is certainly to be considered.
The court is capable of assessing punctuation and grammar without expert or other opinion.[5] To resolve
a syntactic ambiguity in a statute the courts may elicit the punctuation used in that part of the statute but
do so with caution because many conventions governing punctuation are fluid and unstable especially with
the use of the comma[6].
In Canada the courts look at punctuation in interpreting statutes with some caution. In the Interpretation of
Legislation in Canada by Pierre Andr Cot (2nd Ed.) there appears at p. 62 and 63:
In Canada, punctuation is considered to be a part of the stature and may be looked at in its
interpretation:In construing the clause it is my opinion that we should have regard to the punctuation
The ratio decidendi of those cases which held that punctuation in a Statute ought not to be regarded was
that statutes as engrossed on the original roll did not contain punctuation marks. We were informed by
counsel that in British Columbia statutes are presented to the Legislature for passing and are passed
punctuated as they appear in the copies printed by the Queens Printer; consequently the foundation of
the earlier decisions has been removed.
But even admitting that punctuation is part of the enactment, the question of its relative weight remains.
As with other parts of a statute, the authorities indicate that this will vary according to the circumstances.

Punctuation, particularly the comma, is essential to written communication, and judges cannot totally
ignore it. However, they will hesitate to base a decision solely on the presence or absence of particular
punctuation marks. Several reasons justify such caution: . . . punctuation is not subject to rigorous and
well-defined rules. To the extent that rules exist, they are poorly understood and may not have been
respected, with the result that a document may be . . . copiously, if not carefully, punctuated.[footnotes
ommitted][7]Replying to arguments based on punctuation, the courts will not only refer to its unreliable
nature but also the context and object of the statute.
[1] In Laurentide Motels Ltd. v. Beauport (Ville), 1989 CanLII 81 (S.C.C.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 705 at 755, per LHEUREAUX-DUBE J
[2] Housten v Burns 1918] A.C. 337 per LORD SHAW of Dunfermline ,See also: The Queen v. Alaska Pine and Cellulose Co. [1960]
S.C.R. 686
[3] R. v. C. L. , 2005 NSFC 21
[4]In Caridnal, V.R. {1980} F.C. 149 at 154-55
[5] R. v. Galbraith, 2008 ONCJ 761,the court observed that: The opinion regarding grammar and punctuation was from someone not
established as an expert, and the opinion offered is not needed in the matter related to Provincial Offences Act, s. 50(3) was being
discussed.
[6] See: Driedger on the Construction of Statutes at pp. 276-277. At p. 277 the author states:
. . . A comma before the qualifying words ordinarily indicates that they are meant to apply to all antecedents while the absence of a
comma indicates that they are meant to apply to the last antecedent alone. . . . Further in the case of Mawson Hotels Ltd. v. Solie,
1997 CanLII 11194 (SK Q.B.) it was observed that
In the matter before me there is a comma before the qualifying words, respecting any materials, equipment or appliances used or
installed in a building, structure or premises. An application of the rule would lead to the interpretation that the qualifying words
apply to all antecedents. Such an interpretation is in conflict with the purpose of the legislation and would lead to an unreasonable
outcome. I find that the placement of the comma leads to an interpretation which conflicts with the purpose of the legislation. Thus
the purpose of the legislation must take precedence. per HRABINSKY J
[7] Bell v. Canada (Attorney General), 2001 NSSC

Statutory Construction vis-a-vis Judicial Legislation

When is it construction and when is it judicial legislation?
To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has been, is
judicial. However, the courts do and must legislate to fill in the gaps in the law. The Court decided to go
beyond merely ruling on the facts of the existing law and jurisprudence. (Floresca v. Philex Mining;
Republic v. CA and Molina)
1. Floresca v. Philex Mining, G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
Does the CFI (RTC) have jurisdiction over the complaint?
Pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code which provides that: No judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. It argues that the application or
interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said
law since the Courts application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. Yet, the Court argues that the Court can
legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code. However, even the legislator himself recognizes that
in certain instances, the courts do and must legislate to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of
the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the
law may apply.
2. Republic v. CA and Molina, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997
Guidelines presented by the court.
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the
Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, psychological incapacity. In addition to resolving
the present case, the court finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code. In the present case, it appears to that there is a difficulty, if
not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations of the respondent
spouse. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. Hence, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case visa-vis existing law and jurisprudence. For psychological incapacity to prosper, three characteristics should
manifest: gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.

How must legislative intent be ascertained?

Legislative Intent.
The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the
legislature, to the end that the same may be enforced.
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
VERBA LEGIS
If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and express a single, definite, and sensible
meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning which the legislature intended to
convey.
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
harmonious whole. (Aisporna v. CA; China Bank v. Ortega; PVA Board of Administrators v. Bautista)
1. Aisporna v. CA, G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982
Legislative intent of the Insurance Act: Whether an insurance sub-agent or proxy is covered by Section 189
of the Insurance Act.
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as
agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while the second paragraph
defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the
penalty to be imposed for its violation.
2. China Banking Corp. v. Ortega, G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973
Whether a banking institution can validly refuse a court process garnishing the bank deposit invoking the
provisions of R.A. No. 1405 (An Act prohibiting Disclosure of or Inquiry into, Deposits with any Banking
Institution).
The gist of the pertinent provisions of RA 1405, Sec. 2., is that although transactions with banking
institutions in the Philippines are absolutely confidential, there are exceptions such as when there is
written permission from the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of the competent court
in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of litigation. In the present case, China Bank was in default because the
court merely required the bank to inform the court whether or not the defendant had a deposit with the
bank for the purposes of garnishment. However, the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution
process.
3. Board of Administrators, PVA v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-37867, February 22, 1982
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to pension from 1955 instead of from 1968.
The purpose of Congress in granting veterans pensions is to compensate a class of men who suffered in
the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered, and more importantly,
those who have become incapacitated for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in the
line of the duty. R.A. No. 65 (Veterans Bill of Rights) or Veteran Pension Law is, therefore, a governmental
expression of gratitude to and those who rendered service for the country, by extending to them regular
monetary aid. If the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the application, then the
noble and humanitarian purposes for which the law was enacted could easily be thwarted or defeated.