Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
2d 679
This is a diversity contract action in which appellee, real estate broker, sued
appellant for a commission for producing a purchaser ready, willing and able to
purchase certain real estate in Shaler Township, Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania as appellee claimed appellant had commissioned it to do. The
case was tried to the court and resulted in a finding that appellee was entitled to
its commission as it contended.
Appellant urges that (1) Gumberg Co. did not produce a purchaser ready,
willing and able to contract and (2) that Gumberg Co. was not entitled to a
commission until consummation of the transaction, including payment of the
purchase price.
There is not much dispute regarding the underlying facts. From our own study
of the record, there is convincing evidence to support the following factual
exposition. Appellee's Stanley Gumberg in 1957, acting for the owners of the
particular land involved then unimproved, sold it to appellant. The latter
erected a warehouse on it and the following year sold it with a long lease back
Gumberg asked Simon to prepare the general closing papers. Later he received
the promised letter from Duquesne (P Ex 1) dated June 23rd which confirmed
the transaction. He notified Strauss of this and at the latter's direction sent the
letter to him. On June 27th Gumberg called Strauss by telephone. Strauss told
him a problem had developed but did not mention its nature. Strauss found the
difficulty to be that Walworth did not have the right to repurchase the property
in the then present circumstances as had been presumed and that Northwestern
would not sell it. Gumberg did not think that Duquesne ever withdrew its offer
but that it simply "realized that the situation was hopeless and therefore just
sort of faded out of existence." He said that later Duquesne bought the land
directly behind Walworth's and put up its own building.
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tried to obtain the premises from Northwestern first, for $515,000 and later for
$550,000, during the period it had the Duquesne proposal of $630,000. Plainly
the latter sale was defeated solely because Walworth was unable to deliver the
property. Gumberg had no responsibility for that. Its commitment, which it
fulfilled, was to produce a purchaser ready, able and willing to buy on
Walworth's expressed terms. There was no misunderstanding on the part of
appellant. The provision in the Duquesne letter for Walworth to sign and return
the option agreement, far from showing lack of "congruence" on the terms of
the sale, meant that Walworth was to approve in writing the terms to which
both parties had agreed. The evidence gives every indication that those
approved terms would then have been submitted to and approved by the
Duquesne Board at its July meeting. There was nothing in this branch of the
transaction to signal the counter offer appellant suggests. There were no special
incidents in Gumberg's representation of Walworth. It was to produce a proper
buyer which it did. There were no other terms or conditions that Walworth
desired in the agreement. We do not have a situation as was before the Court in
Smith v. McCann, 205 Pa. 57, 54 A. 498 (1903). Nor, in the light of the facts, is
our problem where the agent merely procures an option as in Miller v. Hays, 71
Pa.Super. 523 (1919).
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Even though Walworth had no legal right at the time to force the return of the
warehouse facility to it, probably the only real reason this sale was not
consummated was because Walworth overplayed its hand with Northwestern in
not informing that concern of Duquesne's $630,000 offer.
Within this caption appellant contends that it could have and did defeat
Gumberg's commission by simply not performing its agreement with
Duquesne. In taking this position appellant overlooks the unescapable fact that
its relationship with its agent Gumberg was completely independent of such
negative action. Gumberg had fully performed its bona fide assignment for
appellant. It had produced a buyer. If Walworth could not or would not go
through with the sale to the buyer that did not alter its obligation to pay the
Gumberg Company its earned commission.
Appellant's other argument is that the Gumberg Company was not entitled to a
commission until such time as the sale of the warehouse was consummated and
Walworth released from its obligations as tenant. That argument is well
answered by appellant in its brief when it states: "Where it is implicit under the
circumstances that the payment of the broker's commission is contingent on
consummation of the transaction, no commission is earned and due until the
transaction is consummated, including the payment of the purchase price. * *
The same is true where the circumstances show that the owner and the broker
understood that no obligation to pay a commission would arise until the owner
accepted and executed an agreement of sale." We consider these principles
sound. We also consider that they are not applicable to this appeal. The trial
court found on overwhelming evidence that Mr. Gumberg had fulfilled his
obligation to Walworth when he produced Duquesne ready, willing and able to
buy on Walworth's expressed terms. Those terms were never repudiated by
Walworth. The latter, as later developments showed, just did not have the
existent right to deliver the property and by reason of the questionable way it
dealt with its lessor lost the excellent opportunity it had to obtain the right. The
trial court correctly decided that under the facts "Walworth's inability to acquire
title, therefore, did not discharge its contractual obligation to pay the Gumberg
Co. a commission upon the production of a ready, willing and able purchaser."
See Restatement, Contracts 455; Rick v. Moyer, 296 Pa. 176, 178, 180, 145
A. 793 (1929). As said in Simon v. H. K. Porter Co., 407 Pa. 359, 362, 180
A.2d 227, 229 (1962):
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"A broker earns his commission when he produces a purchaser who is ready,
willing and able to contract at the price and terms fixed by the vendorprincipal, notwithstanding the refusal of the principal to sign the agreement of
sale, Wilson v. Hays, 283 Pa. 271, 129 A. 59 (1925), or without reference to the
outcome of the sale, Schamberg v. Kahn, 279 Pa. 477, 124 A. 138 (1924). See
also Detchon v. McSorley, 301 Pa. 493, 152 A. 689 (1930); Perry v. Spellman,
194 Pa.Super. 555, 168 A.2d 615 (1961)."
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See also Aber v. Pennsylvania Company for Insurance, 269 Pa. 384, 112 A.
444 (1920); Clark v. Battaglia, 47 Pa.Super. 290 (1911).
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Notes:
Gentlemen:
This letter will confirm our recent informal agreement whereby Duquesne
Light Company expressed its intention to purchase the above described
property subject to approval by the Board of Directors of this Company, for a
total consideration of $630,000.
It is hereby understood and agreed that the sale shall be made upon the
following terms and conditions:
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Closing shall take place on or before September 29, 1961 at which time the
balance of the purchase price shall be paid upon delivery of deed
Real estate taxes and any charges for utilities shall be pro rated as of the date of
the delivery of deed
Walworth Company shall be responsible for all federal, state and any and all
local realty transfer tax stamps
It will be appreciated if Walworth Company will signify its acceptance of the
above terms and conditions by signing the Acceptance appearing at the bottom
of this letter and returning a duplicate executed copy of the same to the
undersigned.
Very truly yours,
PHILIP A. FLEGER
ACCEPTANCE