NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 10-4666
_________
JOSEPH COMPRELLI, M&J COMPRELLI
REALTY, LLC, JOSEPH SUPOR III, J.
SUPOR & SON TRUCKING & RIGGINGS
CO., INC. and S&B REALTY CO.,
Appellants
v.
TOWN OF HARRISON, HARRISON
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, THE
TOWN COUNCIL OF THE TOWN OF
HARRISON, and PAUL J. ZARBETSKI,
CLERK OF THE TOWN OF HARRISON,
________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2:10-cv-03013)
District Judge: Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 13, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
and STENGEL,* District Judge
(Filed: February 16, 2012)
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OPINION
______
*

Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel, United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

STENGEL, District Judge.

This case involves a zoning dispute and concerns a lengthy history involving
Appellants, Mr. Comprelli, M&J Comprelli Realty, Joseph Supor III, J. Supor & Son
Trucking & Rigging Co., Inc. and S&B Realty (collectively Comprelli), and Appellees,
the Town of Harrison (the Town), Harrison Redevelopment Agency (the Agency),
the Town Council of the Town of Harrison (the Council), and Paul J. Zarbetski, Clerk
of the Town of Harrison (the Clerk).1
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, our recitation of the facts and
procedural history is brief. Since 1988, Comprelli has owned commercial surface
parking lots (the Parking Lot) located at 1000 Frank E. Rodgers Boulevard South in the
Town of Harrison. In 1998, the Town Council adopted a redevelopment plan (the
Redevelopment Plan), which encompassed Appellants parking lots, changing the
zoning such that surface parking lots were no longer a permitted use. In 2003, the Town
adopted an amended Redevelopment Plan allowing for certain interim uses, including
surface parking lots, subject to Planning Board approval.
In 2008 and 2009, Comprelli obtained licenses to operate up to 1,050 parking
spaces on his lot. However, when Comprelli filed for yet another renewal of his licenses
in 2010, the Clerk noticed that Comprelli had not filed the required plat showing the

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1367. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. We exercise plenary review of the District Courts
grant of the motion to dismiss. See Omnipoint Communications Enters., L.P. v. Newton
Township, 219 F.3d 240, 242 (3d Cir. 2000).
2

requested 1,050 spaces. The last plat on file was for 198 spaces, so the Clerk issued a
license for that amount and advised Comprelli that any increase in spaces would require
Planning Board approval.
Comprelli filed suit in federal court2 and, in addition to this action, commenced
suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey in lieu of prerogative writs.3 The state action
was dismissed by Judge Velazquez with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and failure to state a cause of action. On November 16, 2010, the District Court
entered an order dismissing Comprellis Sherman Act claim pursuant to the Parker
doctrine4 and dismissing the remaining claims as barred by res judicata based on the
States order. After a motion for reconsideration, Judge Velazquez, modified the state

Appellants claimed constitutional violations of equal protection (Count One), due

process (Count Two), and improper restraint on and partial taking of property (Count
Three). The complaint also alleged violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, et seq.
(Count Four) and 1983 (Count Eight). Finally, Appellants asserted state law claims
under the New Jersey Antitrust Act, N.J.S.A. 56:9-1, et seq. (Count Five), tortious
interference with contractual relationships (Count Six), and tortious interference with
prospective economic advantages (Count Seven).
3

The state action alleges all of the same counts as the federal complaint, but does not
include Federal Complaint Counts Four through Seven. See Joseph Comprelli, et al. v.
Town of Harrison, et al. No. HUD-L-3169-10 (Oct. 19, 2010).
4

The Parker doctrine or state-action doctrine shields state governments from antitrust
liability for anti-competitive actions taken in their capacity as sovereigns to further policy
goals. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 255 (3d Cir. 2001). The
Parker doctrine applies indirectly to local municipalities where the suppression of
competition is an authorized implementation of state policy. City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370, 373 (1991).
3

courts dismissal order on January 13, 2011, dismissing Counts One through Three
without prejudice.5
Despite the modified state court order for Counts 1-3, the District Court declined
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, as all federal causes of
action were barred by either res judicata or the Parker doctrine. Comprelli timely
appealed.
II.
Comprelli claims that the District Court erred by finding that the federal claims
were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the claims were dismissed in error
and the state court modified its dismissal of the state law claims to dismiss without
prejudice. Comprelli also contends that the District Court erred by failing to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. We disagree.
Res judicata bars a subsequent suit on the same cause of action when there is a
judgment in a prior suit involving the same parties. CoreStates Bank, NA v. Huls
America, Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1999). In applying the doctrine, the District
Court must accord preclusive effect to the prior decisions of state courts. Rycoline
Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unltd., 109 F.3d 883, 887 (3d Cir. 1997). See also Marrese v. Am.
Acad. Of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 381 (1985) (federal courts look first at
the state preclusion law in determining the preclusive effects of a state court judgment).

The three counts were Count One (Inverse Condemnation), Count Two (Failure to Issue
Required Parking License for 1,050 Spaces), and Count Three (Improper Revocation of
Parking License).
4

Under New Jersey law, for the application of res judicata to a given action requires (1)
the judgment in the first action is valid, final and on the merits6; (2) the parties in both
actions are the same or are in privity; and (3) the claims in the second action arise from
the same transaction or occurrence as the claims in the first. Watkins v. Resorts Intl
Hotel & Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 412 (1991).
Appellants argue that the claims dismissed with prejudice were in error and thus
cannot be banned by the doctrine of res judicata. The District Court properly stated, and
we agree, that the preclusive effect of a final judgment cannot be challenged on the basis
of errors in its legal conclusion. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394,
398 (1981) (A judgment merely voidable because based upon an erroneous view of the
law is not open to collateral attack, but can be corrected only by a direct review and not
by bringing another action upon the same cause of action.).
Additionally, Appellants contend that because the state courts decision was
amended, dismissing Counts One through Three without prejudice, the District Court
erred in barring Appellants claims under res judicata. Appellants Br. at 23-25. As the
District Court appropriately reasoned, [w]ith the exception of the Sherman Act claims,
the remaining counts dismissed without prejudice arise under New Jersey law.
Therefore, the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. Hedges v.
Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000); 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, the
6

It is well established that a judgment entered with prejudice is the equivalent of a

judgment entered on the merits and is considered a final judgment. Citizens Voices
Assn v. Collings Lakes Civic Assn, 396 N.J. Super. Ct. 432, 444 (App. Div. 2007).
5

District Court properly dismissed Counts Five, Six, and Seven as there were no
remaining federal claims, and Appellants had an entirely adequate state court venue in
which to pursue their claims.
Comprelli also argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his Sherman Act
claim pursuant to the Parker doctrine because Appellees were motivated not by
redevelopment but by monetary gain. We disagree.
Although under Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.
1997), the District Court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff when considering a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007), held that
[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level. The District Court must distinguish between factual allegations and [t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
Therefore, in analyzing the Appellants Sherman Act claim, the Court must
determine if the assertions in the complaint are enough to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. As explained in A.D. Bedell Wholesale
Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2001), the Parker doctrine
shields state governments from antitrust liability for anti-competitive actions taken in
their capacity as sovereigns. The Parker doctrine does not apply directly to local
municipalities; however, a municipalitys restriction of competition may be an
implementation of protected state policy. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,
6

Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1991). For instance, a local governments actions are protected
under Parker where the suppression of competition is the foreseeable result of what
the statute authorizes. Id. at 373. The statute at issue is New Jerseys Local
Redevelopment and Housing Law N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq., which is a zoning
regulation that delegates broad authority to municipalities and redevelopment entities to
rehabilitate blighted areas. See N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-8. The Supreme Court has held that
[t]he very purpose of zoning regulation is to displace unfettered business freedom in a
manner that regularly has the effect of preventing normal acts of competition, particularly
on the part of new entrants. Omni, 499 U.S. at 373.
Appellants argue that the Parker doctrine does not apply because the purpose of
Appellees actions was not to further the Towns redevelopment plan, but rather
monetary gain. Appellants Br. at 7, 37. Therefore, its actions were not taken in
connection with a valid redevelopment plan, and cannot be protected as such. The
District Court did not err in finding that nothing in Plaintiffs complaint suggests that the
Towns actions were not taken in connection with a valid redevelopment plan.
Appellants legal conclusions were unsupported, and the District Court is not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1950. Therefore, we find that the District Court properly dismissed Appellants Sherman
Act claim.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Courts dismissal in all
respects.