229 F.3d 435 (3rd Cir.

2000)

PI LAMBDA PHI FRATERNITY, INC., A CORPORATION

WITH ITS PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS IN
CONNECTICUT; PA GAMMA SIGMA CHAPTER OF PI
LAMBDA PHI FRATERNITY, AN UNINCORPORATED
ASSOCIATION OF INDIVIDUALS; PA GAMMA SIGMA
ALUMNI CHAPTER OF PI LAMBDA PHI FRATERNITY;
BRAD ZULICK; CHAD CRISP; JOSHUA LANG,
INDIVIDUALS, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE PA
GAMMA SIGMA CHAPTER OF PI LAMBDA PHI
FRATERNITY; KEVIN ARMOUR; JON MILLER,
INDIVIDUALS WHO DESIRE TO JOIN PI LAMBDA PHI
FRATERNITY, APPELLANTS
V.
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH; MARK NORDENBERG,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH;
ROBERT GALLAGHER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE INTERIM VICE- CHANCELLOR FOR
STUDENT AFFAIRS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
PITTSBURGH; DENNIS DONHAM, INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN HIS CAPACITY AS ASSISTANT VICE-CHANCELLOR
FOR STUDENT AFFAIRS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
PITTSBURGH; LEON HALEY, FORMER VICECHANCELLOR FOR STUDENT AFFAIRS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH; DAN COHEN,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
PITTSBURGH CITY COUNCIL MEMBER; CITY OF
PITTSBURGH; ELOISE HIRSH, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF PLANNING OF THE
CITY OF PITTSBURGH
No. 99-3685

U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

Argued: June 28, 2000

Filed October 25, 2000

On Appeal From the United States District Court For the Western District
of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 97-cv-00703) District Judge: Honorable
Donald E. Ziegler[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Edward A. Olds, Esquire (argued) 1007 Mount Royal Boulevard
Pittsburgh, PA 15223 Counsel for Appellants
Susan L. Wormer, Esquire (argued) Mark Nordenberg, Esquire Robert
Gallagher, Esquire Dennis Donham, Esquire Leon Haley, Esquire
University of Pittsburgh Office of General Counsel 3200 Cathedral of
Learning Pittsburgh, PA 15260 Counsel for Appellees
John J. Barrett, Jr., Esquire Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, Llp Centre
Square West 1500 Market Street, 38th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102-2186
Counsel for Amicus Curiae North- American Interfraternity
ConferenceBefore: Becker, Chief Judge, Sloviter, and Rosenn, Circuit
Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Becker, Chief Judge.

The University of Pittsburgh chapter of the Pi Lambda Phi fraternity (the

Chapter), believing that its members' constitutional rights of freedom of
association were violated by disciplinary action taken against it by the
University of Pittsburgh (the University), brought suit in the District Court
against the University, the City of Pittsburgh, and various individual
defendants. The disciplinary action in question occurred when the University
stripped the Chapter of its status as a recognized student organization after
several of its members were arrested in a drug raid at the Chapter's fraternity
house. The Chapter's international parent organization and several current and
prospective Chapter members joined the Chapter as plaintiffs.

Two types of association are protected by the federal Constitution: intimate

association (i.e., certain close and intimate human relationships like family
relationships) and expressive association (i.e., association for the purpose of
engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment). See Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). The Chapter argues that it

is a constitutionally protected group because its members engage in intimate

association or expressive association (or both), and asserts that its members'
associational rights were improperly infringed by the University's action.
3

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court granting summary

judgment in favor of the University and its co-defendants. We hold that the
Chapter does not possess rights of intimate association as the Supreme Court
explicated that concept in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) and Roberts. The Chapter's size,
membership criteria, and openness to the public all militate against its claim
that it engages in intimate association. We also hold, following the Supreme
Court's analysis in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000),
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), Duarte, and Roberts, that the
Chapter does not engage in constitutionally protected expressive association.
While the Court has not set a very high bar for expressive association, the
Chapter has failed to make a showing in the record that it meets even this
standard.

Furthermore, even if the Chapter does exercise rights of protected expressive

association, we conclude that the effect of the University's action here did not
have a close enough relationship to the Chapter's expressive activities to rise to
the level of a constitutional violation. In its freedom of expression
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has required a close relationship between the
state action and the affected expressive activity to find a constitutional
violation. In Dale, Duarte, and Roberts, because the state action directly
affected the groups' associational activities, the Court held that the state had to
show a compelling interest that justified the level of the burden imposed on the
groups' expression. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2456-57; Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549;
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the
Court applied a less stringent, medium scrutiny test to state action that had an
incidental effect on the right to free expression. See id. at 376-77. But neither
the compelling interest nor the O'Brien tests apply in the instant case, because
the University's action had merely an indirect and attenuated effect on the
Chapter's expressive activities. Because almost any government sanction could
be characterized as having some indirect effect on First Amendment activities,
see Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986), indirect and
attenuated effects on expression do not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.

For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court's grant of summary
judgment, albeit on somewhat different grounds than those used by the District
Court.1

I. Facts
6

Pi Lambda Phi is an international fraternity with a longstanding local chapter at

the University of Pittsburgh. On April 30, 1996, at the beginning of the
University's summer recess, the Pittsburgh police raided the house at 225 North
Dithridge Street, which is owned by the Chapter and serves as the home of
several Chapter members. During the raid, the police found various drugs and
drug paraphernalia, including heroin, cocaine, opium, and Rohypnol (the "date
rape" drug). Four Chapter members were arrested and charged with possession
of controlled substances. One of the arrested Chapter members was the "Risk
Manager" for Pi Lambda Phi, and a second was the president of the University's
Interfraternity Council (a student organization composed of representatives
from University fraternities). Another of these four was charged with and
convicted of possession and distribution of controlled substances, and was
expelled from the University.

On May 2, 1996, the University suspended the Chapter pending an

investigation into the matter. The University subsequently held a hearing on
whether the Chapter should be punished. While the University's investigating
panel found that there was "no direct relationship between the drug raid and the
[C]hapter itself," and no evidence that the absent members were involved in,
tacitly approved of, or were even aware of the drug activity, the panel did find
the Chapter "guilty of a lack of responsibility for its members for the events
that occurred at their house on the above date." The panel recommended three
years probation.2 [Id.]

The Vice Chancellor of student affairs, Dennis Donham (one of the individual
defendants in this action), reviewed the panel's decision and concluded that the
Chapter was responsible for the drug activity in its house under Section II.1 of
the University Compilation of Codes Governing Fraternity and Sorority
Activity, which states that "[c]hapters shall be held accountable for actions of
individual members and their guests." Donham decided that, instead of
probation, the University should revoke the Chapter's status as a "recognized
student organization" for one year. Donham also established several restrictions
on the Chapter's activities, including a prohibition on participation in
University-sponsored Greek activities and a prohibition on recruitment of new
members through the University "Rush" process. Donham issued a letter to the
Chapter on July 9, 1996, detailing this decision; the letter also stated that the
Chapter could reapply to be a recognized student organization on April 30,
1997, although it would have to conform to all the regulations and restrictions
placed upon it and subject itself to close scrutiny by the University.

The Chapter appealed Donham's decision to Leon Haley, the Vice Chancellor
for Student and Public Affairs. After a hearing, Haley upheld the sanctions.
The Chapter then appealed to Haley's successor, Robert Gallagher, the interim
Vice Chancellor for Student and Public Affairs, and Gallagher upheld Haley's
decision. Both Haley and Gallagher are named as defendants.

10

In late November 1996, a University Student Affairs hearing panel reviewed

the Chapter's status and concluded that it had complied with many of the key
requirements set forth in Donham's July 9th letter. The panel recommended to
Gallagher that the Chapter be recertified as a recognized student organization
on probationary status. Earlier that month, however, the University's
Interfraternity Council had voted to recommend to Gallagher that he not grant
recognized student group status to the Chapter at that time. Also around this
time, Dan Cohen, a member of the Pittsburgh city council, wrote a letter to
Gallagher expressing concerns regarding the possible recertification of the
Chapter. Cohen stated in his letter that the Chapter had "created a nuisance to
the [North Dithridge Street] neighborhood for years with loud parties,
vandalism, public urination, and litter," and he urged Gallagher not to recertify
the Chapter.

11

On December 4, 1996, Gallagher decided to continue the Chapter's nonrecognized status, as he felt that another term was needed for a full appraisal of
the Chapter. He stated in a deposition that he was influenced by: (1) the
seriousness of the drug offense; (2) the fact that the Interfraternity council, a
peer group of the Chapter, had voted against recognizing the Chapter; (3) the
fact that the Chapter had yet to bring into the house a Graduate Resident
Advisor, which Gallagher considered to be a key required condition in
Donham's July 9th letter; and (4) concern for other University students and for
members of the community who lived near the Chapter house.

12

On February 27, 1997, the Student Affairs panel held a second hearing on
whether the University should restore the Chapter's status as a recognized
student organization, and again it recommended that the University should do
so as of April 29, 1997. The panel concluded that the Chapter had continued to
make progress in addressing its earlier problems by bringing in a Graduate
Resident Advisor (who had written the University's Office of Student Affairs
with a positive review), by expelling unruly members, and by raising its
average GPA up to the highest of any fraternity on campus. On April 18, 1997,
before the University ruled on this Student Affairs panel recommendation, the
Chapter filed this lawsuit. On May 15, 1997, the University again decided not
to recertify the Chapter as a recognized organization. Gallagher based this

decision on then recently-disclosed information that the Chapter's Risk

Manager had been arrested in the drug raid and that drugs had been purchased
in the house several days before the raid, thus supporting the inference that
Chapter members had openly possessed and used drugs in the house during the
academic year. Gallagher's letter to the Chapter announcing this decision stated
that the University would entertain further petitions by the Chapter for
recertification beginning May 15, 1998. Even though counsel for the University
stated at oral argument (on June 28, 2000) that she knew of nothing that would
prevent the University from recertifying the Chapter, the Chapter had not
submitted any further petitions or requests for recertification to the University
up to that time.
II. Procedural History
13

This civil action, brought under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleged violations of the
Chapter members' rights of association under the First Amendment, as well as
violations of their Equal Protection and Due Process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The University meets the state actor requirement for defendants in
S 1983 actions. See Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 99 (3d
Cir. 1984) (holding that "the actions of the University [of Pittsburgh] are
actions taken under color of state law for purposes of section 1983"). The
Chapter voluntarily dismissed the Due Process claims as well as all claims
against the city defendants. After some discovery and testimony at fact-finding
hearings, the University defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted
by the District Court.

14

The District Court concluded that the Chapter was primarily engaged in social
activities rather than in expressive or intimate association, and that its
associational activities were therefore not protected by the First Amendment.
The Court held further that even if the Chapter's associational activities were
protected by the First Amendment, the government interest underlying the
University's action merited whatever associational abridgements did occur.
This timely appeal followed. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. S 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We set forth
the familiar standard of review of grants of summary judgment in the margin.3

15

III. The Chapter's Freedom of Association Claims

16

The Supreme Court has held that there are two kinds of freedom of association
that are constitutionally protected: intimate association and expressive
association. The Court summarized these two forms of associational freedom in

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984):

17

In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue
intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding
the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this
respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of
personal liberty. In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to
associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment--speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the
exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this
kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.

18

Id. at 617-18. The Chapter contends that both kind of associational rights are
implicated in this case. The Supreme Court has held that these two rights may
coincide in a particular group's association. See id. at 618. We follow the
Court's lead in considering each of the associational rights separately.
A. The Right of Intimate Association

19

The right of intimate association involves an individual's right to enter into and
maintain intimate or private relationships free of state intrusion. The types of
relationships that give rise to this right may take various forms, but the
Supreme Court has held that these relationships must be "distinguished by such
attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin
and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the
relationship." See id. at 620. Family relationships are the paradigmatic form of
protected intimate associations, as they "by their nature involve deep
attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and
beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life." See id. at 619- 20.
In determining the nature of a given relationship, relevant factors to consider
include a group's "size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other
characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent." See id. at 620.

20

Applying these precepts to the case at hand, we conclude that the Chapter is not
the type of association that warrants constitutional protection as an intimate
association. In both Roberts and Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987), the Court found that the Jaycees
and the Rotary Club were not protected intimate associations because, inter alia,
the local clubs were not small in size (ranging from fewer than 20 to 900

members), they actively recruited members from the public, they were not
sufficiently selective in their admission policies, and the clubs performed many
of their activities in public or invited members of the public to attend. See
Duarte, 481 U.S. at 546-47; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621.
21

Similarly, the University chapter of Pi Lambda Phi is not a particularly small

association. While the number of students in the Chapter was reduced to 22
after certain members had been expelled and the University had prohibited the
Chapter from recruiting new members for a year, the chapter had inducted 20
new members during the fall of 1995, before the drug raid. Extrapolating over
four years, the Chapter, when recruiting and existing normally, would have
approximately 80 members at any one time. At all events, a range of 20 to 80
members would put the Chapter within the same size range as the local Rotary
Clubs that the Court held did not engage in intimate association in Duarte, 481
U.S. at 546.

22

Furthermore, the Chapter actively recruits new members from the University
population at large and it is not particularly selective in whom it admits. The
international organization of Pi Lambda Phi strongly encourages its chapters to
recruit new members aggressively so as to continue the growth of the
organization. The Chapter also invites members of the public into its house for
social activities and participates in many public University events. All of these
elements--the Chapter's size, lack of selectivity, and lack of seclusion in its
activities--support our conclusion that the Chapter lacks the essential
characteristics of constitutionally protected intimate association. We thus find
the claim that the Chapter and its members enjoy a constitutional right to
intimate association to be without merit.
B. The Right of Expressive Association

23

In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000), the Supreme Court
used a three-step process to analyze the Boy Scouts' expressive association
claim, which roughly follows the analytical structure that the Court employed
in Roberts and Duarte to examine such claims. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-23;
Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548-49. First, the Court considered whether the group
making the claim engaged in expressive association. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at
2451. The Court then analyzed whether the state action at issue significantly
affected the group's ability to advocate its viewpoints. See id. at 2452. Finally,
it weighed the state's interest implicated in its action against the burden imposed
on the associational expression to determine if the state interest justified the
burden. See id. at 2456.

24

In the case before us, the District Court ended its analysis at step one,
concluding that the Chapter was not a constitutionally protected expressive
association because it was essentially a social organization. The analysis
required at this step is slightly more complicated, however, as social
organizations may receive constitutional associational protection in certain
cases. The Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment "right to
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (emphasis
added). Thus,"[t]he First Amendment's protection of expressive association is
not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come within its ambit, a group must
engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private." Dale, 120
S. Ct. at 2451. We must therefore engage in a more detailed examination of the
Chapter and its expressive characteristics.

25

1. The Chapter's Allegedly Expressive Character

26

The Supreme Court has cast a fairly wide net in its definition of what comprises
expressive activity. In Roberts, the Court considered whether the Jaycees
engaged in expressive association. It noted that the Jaycees was a national
organization with local chapters throughout the country. The purpose of the
Jaycees was to develop "a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic interest" in
its members, Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting the Jaycees' bylaws), and
the organization made available to its members various programs, products, and
activities toward this end. See id. at 613-14. While there was a strong social
component to the Jaycees (e.g., its bylaws included the goal of developing
friendship among young men, see id. at 613), the Court found the right to
expressive association "plainly implicated" by the "various protected activities
in which the Jaycees engages." Id. at 622. The "various protected activities"
were summarized in Roberts as follows:

27

[A] not insubstantial part of the Jaycees' activities constitutes protected

expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs. Over the years,
the national and local levels of the organization have taken public positions on
a number of diverse issues, and members of the Jaycees regularly engage in a
variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities.

28

Id. at 626-27 (citations omitted).

29

In Dale, the Supreme Court was very succinct in addressing the associational
nature of the Boy Scouts of America. The Court first held that it was
"indisputable" that the Boy Scouts engaged in expressive association, given that

the group's general mission is " `[t]o instill values in young people.' " Dale, 120
S. Ct. at 2452 (quoting the Boy Scouts' mission statement). The Court then
quoted Justice O'Connor's quite expansive definition of expressive association
contained in her Roberts concurrence: " `Even the training of outdoor survival
skills or participation in community service might become expressive when the
activity is intended to develop good morals, reverence, patriotism, and a desire
for self-improvement.' " Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
30

The expansive notions of expressive association used in Roberts and Dale

demonstrate that there is no requirement that an organization be primarily
political (or even primarily expressive) in order to receive constitutional
protection for expressive associational activity. The Court has made it clear,
however, that there is a de minimis threshold for expressive activity claims. In
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), the plaintiffs claimed that they
had an expressive associational interest in mingling at a dance hall. The
Supreme Court firmly rejected this claim, holding that, although the patrons
were associating with one another, they were not engaging in First Amendmentprotected expression while doing so. "There is no suggestion that these patrons
`take positions on public questions' or perform any of the other similar
activities described in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club
of Duarte." Id. at 25.4 The Court thus held that protected expression does not
include any possible expression. See id. ("It is possible to find some kernel of
expression in almost every activity a person undertakes--for example, walking
down the street or meeting one's friends at a shopping mall--but such a kernel is
not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First
Amendment.")

31

The record does not support the Chapter's claim that its level of expression rises
to the de minimis standard required by Stanglin, Roberts, and Dale for
constitutionally protected expressive association. Nothing in the record
indicates that the Chapter ever took a public stance on any issue of public
political, social, or cultural importance. The Chapter argues that it engages in
expressive activity through its charity work and by promoting the ideals
embraced by its parent organization. The specific facts that the Chapter offers
in the record to support this claim, however, fall far short of sustaining the
assertion that it engages in a level of expressive association that is sufficient for
constitutional protection.

32

While the international organization of Pi Lambda Phi has an admirable history

that includes being the country's first non-sectarian fraternity, there is no
substantial evidence in the record that the University chapter of Pi Lambda has

done anything to actively pursue the ideals underlying this stance. Although
members of the Chapter claimed in their deposition testimony that the Chapter
still promotes these ideals, they did not give any specific examples of how it
does so. Furthermore, while Pi Lambda Phi's international organization runs
various programs aimed at individual development, there is no evidence in the
record that even a single member of the University chapter participated in any
of these programs.
33

The Chapter also points to a couple of relatively minor acts of charity

performed in 1996 as proof of its expressive aspects, but these are
underwhelming. The Chapter represents that it once helped run a Halloween
haunted house for the Pittsburgh School for the Blind, raised $350 through
selling raffle tickets for a charity called the Genesis House, and ran a
"Breakfast with Santa" to raise money for Genesis House. [74-75a] The
Chapter's counsel admitted at oral argument that this was the extent of the
Chapter's charitable activities. A few minor charitable acts do not alone make a
group's association expressive, and community service must have more than a
merely incidental relationship to the group's character for such service to
implicate the constitutional protection of expressive association. The Chapter
has not shown in the record that its sporadic acts of community service are
related to its basic nature or goals.

34

In sum, an organization must do more than simply claim to be an expressive

association in order to receive the benefits of constitutional protection. The
Chapter's contentions along these lines, along with its meager showing of a few
minor acts of community service, are insufficient to meet the minimum
requirements for an expressive association. Therefore, the Chapter's claim of
infringement of its right to expressive association fails. We add that we are not
holding that fraternities per se do not engage in constitutionally protected
expressive association. It is entirely possible that a fraternity (or sorority, or
similar group) could make out a successful expressive association claim under
the rules laid out in Stanglin, Roberts, and Dale. We hold only that the
University chapter of Pi Lambda Phi has failed to make out such a claim on the
record before us.

35

2. The Chapter's Claim of Infringement of Its Expressive Rights

36

Even if the Chapter had survived the first step of the Dale expressive
association analysis by making a sufficient showing that it engages in
constitutionally protected expressive association, its claim that this right has
been infringed would still fail. The second step in the Dale analysis involves
determining whether the state action at issue significantly affected the group's

ability to advocate its viewpoints. The Chapter's argument at this stage relies
heavily on Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), where the Supreme Court
considered the expressive associational rights claim of a group of students
whose petition to have their newly formed chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS) recognized as a campus student group was rejected by Central
Connecticut State College (CCSC). The Court concluded that, because the
college had a general policy of allowing students to form groups, the selective
refusal to allow SDS to become an official group on the basis of its
philosophical position would be an unconstitutional abridgment of the right of
expressive association. The Court held that "denial of official recognition,
without justification, to college organizations burdens or abridges that
associational right." Id. at 181.
37

The Chapter argues that its situation is closely analogous to the SDS group in
Healy. It contends that the practical effect of the University's withdrawal of its
recognition of the Chapter is even more severe than CCSC's denial of
recognition was for the SDS in Healy, because the Chapter cannot now
participate in University-sponsored Rush activities, rendering it difficult, if not
impossible, to recruit new members. As a non-recognized organization, the
Chapter submits, its chapter will vanish altogether.

38

Whether or not it is true that the Chapter is in danger of disappearing--and we

are by no means persuaded that the record supports this allegation--Healy does
not dictate the result suggested by the Chapter. In fact, Healy specifically
contemplated a situation such as the one before us, where a university acts out
of non-ideological motives to directly restrict a group's non-expressive activity,
even when those actions would have an indirect effect on expressive activity.
The Court noted in Healy that if the reason for denying the SDS recognized
status was grounded in reasonable concerns about management of violence, the
denial could be upheld: "Associational activities need not be tolerated where
they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially
interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education." Id. at
189.

39

Furthermore, the Court stated in Healy that a university has the power to
withdraw recognition if an organization breaks university rules: "[A college
administration] may also impose sanctions on those who violate the rules. We
find, for instance, that the Student Affairs Committee's admonition to
petitioners in this case suggests one permissible practice--recognition, once
accorded, may be withdrawn or suspended if petitioners fail to respect campus
law." Id. at 194 n.24. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the Chapter
violated University rules, and Healy clearly contemplates the University's

power to withdraw recognition from the Chapter without a constitutional

violation of associational rights.
40

The Supreme Court's post-Healy free expression jurisprudence also supports

our conclusion. The Court has applied three different levels of scrutiny to state
burdens on expression, depending on the character of the relationship between
the state action and the protected expression. The most rigorous standard of
review is triggered when the state action directly burdens expressive rights.
Roberts, Duarte, and Dale all involved this kind of direct effect; in each of these
cases, a state law mandated that the group accept members with whom the
group did not want to associate. The Court recognized this as a direct burden on
the associational expressive rights of the respective groups, because the state
action directly affected the groups' associational abilities. The Court thus
required the state to show a compelling interest that justified the level of the
burden imposed on the groups' expression. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2456-57;
Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.

41

U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) established an intermediate scrutiny test
for regulations that have an "incidental" effect on expression. The state action at
issue in O'Brien consisted of a federal law that criminalized the burning of draft
cards. O'Brien burned his draft card to communicate an anti-war political
message and was prosecuted under the federal law. In his defense, O'Brien
argued that the law infringed his First Amendment expressive rights. The
Supreme Court noted that the regulation did not abridge free speech on its face,
as "there is nothing necessarily expressive" about the prohibited conduct. Id. at
375. But the Court also recognized that the prohibited conduct could be used to
communicate a political message and held that, when "speech" and
"nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a regulation
of the "nonspeech" element is an incidental restriction on the "speech" element,
and thus must meet an intermediate four-part test. See id. at 376- 377; see also
Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2456-57 (declining to apply the intermediate standard of
review from O'Brien to the regulation at issue because the O'Brien test applies
to regulations that have an "incidental effect" on protected speech, but the
regulation as applied to the Boy Scouts "directly and immediately affects
associational rights").

42

Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986), sets out the appropriate
structure for analyzing a state action that neither directly regulates protected
expression nor has an "incidental effect" on such expression. In Arcara, the state
closed down a bookstore because prostitution was occurring on the premises in
violation of state law. The owners of the book store claimed that this state
action violated their First Amendment right to sell books. The Court rejected

this claim because the state action regulated constitutionally unprotected

conduct that did not itself contain or manifest protected expression, and thus the
action did not merit even the intermediate scrutiny of the O'Brien analysis. See
Arcara, 478 U.S. at 704-05. Since the protected expression was only indirectly
affected by the state action (via the sanction imposed on unprotected conduct),
the Court held that no First Amendment violation had occurred, because "[a]ny
other conclusion would lead to the absurd result that any government action
that had some conceivable speech-inhibiting consequences, such as the arrest of
a newscaster for a traffic violation, would require analysis under the First
Amendment." Id. at 708 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
43

In the case at bar, the state action had neither a direct nor even an incidental
effect on the Chapter's protected associational rights. Unlike in Dale, the
University's action does not require the Chapter to associate with anyone, nor is
the regulation directed on its face at the Chapter's expressive or associational
activities. Unlike in O'Brien, the University's regulation did not sanction
conduct that had both speech and nonspeech elements; the regulation was
applied simply to the Chapter's drug activity. The Chapter makes no claim that
its members engaged in drug activity in order to communicate a political
message, nor does it claim that there is any direct connection between its
members' drug activity and their First Amendment expression. Therefore, the
University's action neither directly nor incidentally affected the Chapter's
expressive interests.

44

The University's withdrawal of recognition of the Chapter because of its drug

activities thus fits neatly under an Arcara analysis. Like the bookstore, the
Chapter members' expressive rights were inhibited by a state sanction of
activities that themselves had no protected expressive element, and were
entirely unrelated to the Chapter members' expressive activities.5 Therefore, the
effect of the state action on the expressive rights was indirect, and there is thus
no constitutionally impermissible infringement on the Chapter's right of
expressive association. 6

45

The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

Notes:
1

The Chapter also brought an Equal Protection claim, but we reject this claim
for the reasons stated below in note 6.

It appears from the record that, at the time of this panel's decision, the

University was not aware that the Chapter's Risk Manager was one of the
Chapter members arrested, nor did it know that drugs had been purchased in
the Chapter's house several days before the raid. The University's Interim Vice
Chancellor Robert Gallagher later concluded on the basis of this subsequently
revealed information that the other Chapter members must have been aware of
the drug activity. See infra at 440.
3

We exercise plenary review over a District Court's grant of summary judgment

and review the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom
summary judgment was entered. See Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v.
American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993). Summary
judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if, viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See F.R.C.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, the judge's
function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but
to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

The "other similar activities" referred to in the above quote from Stanglin
include engaging in "a variety of commendable service activities" and
"humanitarian service [and] high ethical standards in all vocations." Duarte,
481 U.S. at 548.

The Chapter also submits that the University's action is unconstitutional

because it infringes on the associational rights of all of the Chapter's members
in order to punish the drug activity of only a few. This argument fails because
the Supreme Court has long recognized that, in a school context, the
government has great latitude to keep reasonable order through its regulations,
and the University has reasonable grounds for concluding that the Chapter's
general atmosphere is conducive to disruptive and illegal activity.
"Associational activities need not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable
campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of
other students to obtain an education." Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189
(1972); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 513
(1969) (holding that the "special characteristics of the school environment"
allow a state-run school to prohibit actions that "materially and substantially
disrupt the work and discipline of the school").

The Chapter also alleges that the University treats fraternities and sororities
differently from other student organizations in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, of course, provides that a state
shall not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws." U.S Const. amend. XIV, S 1. The Chapter argues that it was treated
differently insofar as it was held accountable as an organization for the
individual actions of its members when other students and student organizations
are not held similarly accountable. This claim fails for two reasons. First, as the
District Court noted, there is ample evidence in the record that the University's
rules on the vicarious accountability of fraternities and sororities for their
members' conduct is effectively the same as its rules on the vicarious
accountability of all University students for guests and visitors in their rooms,
which are set forth in the University's Student Code of Conduct and Judicial
Procedures. Because there is no substantial difference between the way the
University holds fraternities and individual students accountable, the Chapter
has failed to show that an equal protection issue even arises here.
Second, the Chapter's claim would fail even if it had shown that the University
treats fraternities differently from other students. "Unless laws create suspect
classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights, it need only be
shown that they bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose."
Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23 (1989) (citations and internal quotations
omitted). Because fraternity membership is not a suspect classification, and
because there is no fundamental right at issue here (since the Chapter's
expressive association claim fails), any different treatment of the Chapter by
the University should be reviewed under the rational basis test. The District
Court found that the University had a rational basis for treating fraternities
differently from other students and groups, and we have no reason to question
that finding. Fraternities and sororities are the only University student
organizations that maintain their own off-campus housing for students, so it is
clearly rational for the University to subject them to certain rules that do not
apply to other student organizations.