Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
2d 1143
violate his rights under the double jeopardy clause and the equal protection
guarantee of the constitution. He also contends that it violates the "law of the
case" doctrine.
We conclude that the sentences imposed by the district court after remand are
in contravention of our directive in Gallagher I and in violation of
Fredenburgh's rights under the double jeopardy clause. We therefore vacate
Fredenburgh's sentences and remand to the district court for resentencing.
Pursuant to the jury's verdict of guilty, the district court judge originally
sentenced Fredenburgh as follows:
A. For a period of 5 years on each of Counts 1, 22, 24, 18 and 4, said terms of
imprisonment to be concurrent with each other;
B. For a period of 5 years on each of Counts 30, 14, 38 and 12, and 2 years on
Count 41, said terms of imprisonment to be concurrent with each other and
consecutive to the sentence under A;C. For a period of 5 years on each of
Counts 13, 27, 16, 36 and 35, and 2 years on Count 43, said terms of
imprisonment to be concurrent with each other and consecutive to the sentences
under A and B.
9
Execution
of sentences under C and B is hereby suspended, and defendant is placed
on probation for a period of 5 years to follow release from supervision under A.
13
Following his conviction and sentence, Fredenburgh, along with his codefendants, took a direct appeal to this court. Finding error in the district court's
jury instructions, this court reversed the convictions of all of the defendants on
the 656 and conspiracy counts. United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028 (3d
Cir. 1978). In addition, this court held that there was insufficient evidence to
support Gallagher's convictions on the counts charging him with violations of
18 U.S.C. 1014. Id. at 1047. The court concluded, however, that there was
sufficient evidence to sustain Fredenbrugh's convictions on the 1014 counts,
and it affirmed those convictions. Id. at 1047-49.
14
15
16
17
18
his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of two (2) years on
each of Counts 41 and 43 to run consecutively. The execution of said sentence
on Count 43 is hereby suspended and defendant is placed on probation for a
period of five (5) years; said probation to commence following release from
supervision on sentence imposed on Count 41.
19
20
21
22
23
We have no doubt that the court would initially have imposed jail sentences on
the (suspended sentence counts) had it not thought one jail sentence enough,
and we are entirely willing to accept its view that less than one is not enough.
The difficulty is that following affirmance of the judgments on these counts the
district court lacked power to do what it sought to accomplish.
24
353 F.2d at 516. See United States v. Benedetto, 558 F.2d 171, 179 n.5 (3d Cir.
1977).
25
Even if the district court judge on remand did have the authority to vary those
sentences which had been affirmed on appeal, See Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 35, the
judge would be prohibited by the double jeopardy clause from increasing those
sentences. To this extent, at least, the constitution protects the expectations
created in a defendant when he is properly convicted and sentenced. As this
court stated in United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1970),
26
Added punishment under a valid sentence simply because the defendant has
successfully shown the invalidity of the sentence under another count is a plain
violation of the constitutional protection. It may not be justified because the
sentencing judge would have imposed the higher penalty if he had been aware
of the invalidity of the sentence imposed on the other counts.
27
426 F.2d at 619. See United States v. Frady, --- U.S.App.D.C. ----, --- F.2d ---(1979); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Henry, 533 F.2d 876, 879 (3d Cir.
1976).
28
When the court of appeals vacates the sentences imposed on convictions which
it affirms and remands to the district court for resentencing, the district court
judge is of course empowered to impose a new sentence on the defendant
pursuant to the directive of the court of appeals. Since there is generally no
appellate review of sentences properly imposed, See e. g., United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972); Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1931); Government of
the Virgin Islands v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1974), there are really
only two circumstances in which a court of appeals will vacate a sentence
imposed on a count where the conviction on that count is affirmed on appeal.
First, it will do so when, although the judgment of conviction is proper, the
judgment of sentence is for some reason illegal. See United States v. Gomez,
593 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc); United States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544
(3d Cir. 1971) (en banc). Second, the sentence may be vacated, even though the
conviction on that count is valid and the sentence is within the scope of the
sentencing judge's authority, if the court of appeals perceives that the sentence
was influenced by other error committed during the trial. See United States v.
West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1087 (3d Cir. 1975). Here too, as in the circumstances
previously described, when the case is remanded for resentencing, the district
court judge is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause from imposing a
harsher sentence than that imposed initially. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1874); United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615 (3d Cir.
1970). Perhaps the best explanation for this rule is that a defendant's initial
expectations as to the maximum sentence he must serve on a valid judgment of
conviction should not be defeated by increasing his sentence after it has been
determined that he was sentenced illegally or that other trial error may have
tainted his sentence.
29
30
There can be no dispute that the two year custodial sentence and consecutive
two year suspended sentence entered on Fredenburgh's conviction on the
1014 counts when this case was remanded to the district court are more severe
than the two consecutive two year suspended sentences originally imposed on
those counts. By increasing Fredenburgh's punishment on resentencing, the
district court departed from the resentencing directive we issued in Gallagher I.
In doing so, the district court judge also resentenced Fredenburgh in a way
which violates the double jeopardy clause.7 For these reasons, we will vacate
the sentences imposed by the district court on resentencing, and will remand
again for resentencing.
III
31
The judgment of sentence imposed by the district court will be vacated. The
case will be remanded for resentencing. Because Fredenburgh will undoubtedly
Honorable Louis C. Bechtle, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation
The original indictment, handed down on April 12, 1976, contained 44 counts.
By order of the court of October 6, 1976, with the consent of the parties, the
number was reduced to 20 counts with some new numeration. During trial, 4
additional counts were severed on motion of the government, thereby reducing
the total number of counts to 16. See United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d
1028, 1031 n.1 (3d Cir. 1978)
Following issuance of the resentencing order, the district court judge granted a
temporary stay, directing Fredenburgh to this court for a permanent stay.
Fredenburgh then filed a notice of appeal. He moved before this court for a
permanent stay pending disposition of his appeal by this court. On September
7, 1978, this court denied Fredenburgh's motion for a permanent stay.
Subsequently, a petition for bail pending appeal was filed with the Supreme
Court, and on October 4, 1978, Justice Brennan signed an order granting the
petition, thereby releasing Fredenburgh on bail