TRIBALISM AND ELECTIONS IN ZAMBIA: AN

ANATOMY OF A FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS

BY

SOUTHERN AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE

CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES (SACCORD)
NOVEMBER, 2009

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMNS..........................................................................................................3

FOREWORD............................................................................................................3

INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................5

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK...................................................................................7

TRIBALISM IN ZAMBIA..........................................................................................10

THE RUN-UP TO THE 2011 ELECTIONS.................................................................17

RECOMMENDATIONS...........................................................................................18

REFERENCES........................................................................................................19

REFERENCES

ACRONYMNS
ANC African National Congress

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 2

FDD Forum for Democracy and Development

MMD Movement for Multiparty Democracy

MPs Members of Parliament

NP National Party

PF Patriotic Front

UNIP United National Independence Party

UP United Party

UPND United Party for National Development

UPP United Progressive Party

FOREWORD
To most Africans, one cannot be a pure African unless he or she understands their roots. An
African cannot understand his or her roots unless they identify their chief and village. In an
effort to identify the village and chief, one inevitably ends up finding their tribe. Therefore,
most Africans identify themselves on the basis of the village, chief and ultimately the tribe

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 3

that they belong. Africans are therefore tribal by nature because it is one of the key
foundations on which they identify themselves.

A large number of Africans cannot accept to forsake their tribe because it is the basis of their
identity. When it comes to building a nation-state on the African continent, this has to be
done on the recognition that people will be given the liberty to pay allegiance to their tribal
groupings. Although this approach is the most appropriate when it comes to maintaining
peace as it does not suppress the people’s rights, the approach is challenging when it comes
to governance of the state apparatus.

Tribalism has manifested itself in very gruesome civil wars on the African continent that have
left many people dead and many others scarred for life. One of the most frequently cited
example is the Rwanda genocide of 1994 that saw a tremendous loss of life due to tribalism.
It is perhaps for this reason that some political figures on the African continent have referred
to tribalism as a ‘cancer.’ Tribalism is a cancer in the sense that once it has not been
diagnosed on time, the disease can spread throughout society and lead to unimaginable
catastrophe. This may explain why there are always calls from concerned Zambian citizens
such as trade union leaders, NGO leaders, and some politicians to always keep this cancer
under surveillance because its consequences can be catastrophic.

On the African continent the trend is seemingly that the benefits of belonging to a particular
tribe are far greater than those of being a citizen of a particular country. In other words,
within the various African countries tribal identity is more valued than national identity.
When an individual is a president of a particular country, his or her tribesmen will equally be
given top positions in the government. This action may be explained in many ways, but what
is certain is that people have stronger affinity to their tribe.

The fact that tribal identity expresses itself in governance means that this has an impact on
the quality of governance. There are times when people are put into government portfolios
even though they are not competent for those positions. Often times, such appointments are
done for two reasons. One, people that are not suitable may be appointed simply because they
belong to the same tribe as that particular head of state and there is a need to fill-up such
positions. Two, unsuitable individuals may be appointed in the name of ‘tribal balancing’
because of the need to ensure that all the tribes are represented in the government. There is
nothing wrong with tribal balancing; as a matter of fact it should be encouraged by all means,
as long as it is done in the interest of the nation by ensuring that suitable candidates are given
such positions. There is equally nothing wrong with a leader appointing his or her fellow
tribes men and women as long as these are qualified for those particular positions and as long
as these appointments are fairly done so that they do not alienate other tribes.

Zambia has increasingly been seeing election campaigns that are based on tribalism. It is
unclear whether what we have in the country are tribal politics or they are strategic politics
that simply have the aim of getting the largest number of votes across the country. Because
tribalism has been a source of major conflicts on the African continent, the Southern African
Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD) under the Legislative and
Policy Tracking activity which falls under the Accountability and Good Governance

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 4

(AGOGO) Programme deemed it necessary to discover the extent to which tribalism and
elections are intertwined in Zambia.

This report sheds light on the concern that has been raised in Zambia as to whether there is
any connection between tribalism and elections. To what extent is the Zambian voting pattern
based on tribe? Are Zambians tribal in their voting patterns or this is just a myth? What can
be done to ensure that elections are not based on tribe in Zambia?

Lee M Habasonda

Executive Director

Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD)

November, 2009

INTRODUCTION
Tribalism has long been viewed as a serious threat to consolidation of democracy in Africa.
In many countries, including Zambia, the spectre of tribalism was used by the proponents of
the one-party state to justify the outlawing of political pluralism in the 1960s. It was argued at
the time that multiparty democracy was a luxury that African countries could ill-afford given
the exigencies of national development. This same argument was repeated in the 1990s when
the winds of democratic transition began to blow across the African continent following the
collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries. Fears

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 5

were raised that multiparty democracy posed the danger of heightening political instability in
already fragile states as political parties were likely to be based on ‘tribal’ affiliations.
Twenty years have elapsed since the Berlin wall collapsed and country after country on the
African continent embraced multiparty democracy. Democratic consolidation on the
continent continues to face many challenges, among them, the spectre of tribalism.

Tragic events on the African continent such as the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the 2008 post-
election violence in Kenya and the on-going civil strife in Somali, to mention only a few,
have lent credence to the argument that ‘tribalism’ is a threat to democracy and nationhood
which can no longer be ignored. The problem, however, is that this is one subject which is so
complex and emotive that it does not easily render itself to objective analysis. Although
‘tribalism’ is a concept that is widely used in everyday political parlance, there is, however,
little common understanding of the actual meaning of the term. As a matter of fact,
‘tribalism’ as used in modern politics bears very little resemblance to the original meaning
attached to the term by social anthropology. Without a thorough understanding of the social
character and material basis of ‘tribalism’ in modern politics, there can never be enduring
solutions to the destructive impact of this social phenomenon such as we have witnessed in
the countries referred to above.

Turning to Zambia specifically, ‘tribalism’ has been a recurring theme in the country’s
political discourse since independence from British colonial rule in 1964. Charges and
counter-charges of ‘tribalism’ in Zambia tend to reach high tension levels in run-ups to
general elections and when making appointments to public offices. Fortunately for Zambia,
the country has not witnessed the kinds of conflagrations such as what transpired in Rwanda
in 1994 or more recently in the 2008 post-elections violence in Kenya. It cannot, however, be
taken for granted that Zambia’s relative political serenity will always remain so. It will take a
political leadership committed to nation-building to steer the nation away from the
destructive consequences of unrestrained ‘tribalism.’

Against the above background, the main purpose of this study is to assess the extent to which
‘tribalism’ defines Zambia’s electoral contests and politics in general. More specifically, the
study aims at fulfilling the following objectives:

a) Establish the extent to which ‘tribalism’ is a factor in Zambia’s election contests and
power politics;
b) Objectively and impartially examine challenges and opportunities that ‘tribalism’
brings to Zambia’s politics;
Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 6
 c) Conduct analysis and make comments on how ‘tribalism’ characterises party support
and its implications for the 2011 elections;
d) Formulate recommendations on how Zambians can manage ‘tribal’ diversity in the
political processes.
This study is divided into five main parts. The next section following this introduction is the
conceptual framework which defines the key terms used in the study and establishes their
relevance to Zambia. This is then followed by a historical analysis of ‘tribalism’ in the
Zambian body politic from independence to the present based on anecdotal evidence. The
fourth section examines the role that ‘tribalism’ is likely to play in influencing party support
and implications thereof in the run-up to the 2011 elections. Finally, the study concludes with
recommendations on how Zambians can manage ‘tribal’ diversity in the political processes.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
To begin with, we must establish a working definition of ‘tribalism’. The term, though widely
used, is vague. South African born social anthropologist Archie Mafeje (1971) noted that:

Few authors have been able to write on Africa without making constant reference to
‘Tribalism.’ Could this be the distinguishing feature of the continent? Or is it merely a
reflection of the system of perceptions of those who write on Africa, and of their
African ‘converts?’(p60)

In other words, can we justifiably describe social behaviour in Africa as predominantly

‘tribalistic?’ Even before we give an answer to this question, we should ask two other related
questions: what is the antecedent of ‘tribalism?’ And what do we exactly mean by
‘tribalism?’

The Free Dictionary defines ‘tribalism’ in two ways. First, it is presented as “the
organisation, culture, or beliefs of a tribe”. Second, ‘tribalism’ is defined as a “strong feeling
of identity with and loyalty to one’s tribe or group.” This latter definition is the widespread
meaning attached to the concept in most discussions of African politics. This study notes that
this usage of the term ‘tribalism’ introduces a certain way of looking at society:

... “tribalism” taken in this sense usually carries a connotation that society is not only
divided into smaller groups, but that these groups are actively hostile towards one

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 7

 another. Thus “tribalism” connotes a society divided in civil conflict between myriad
small groups (http://en.wikipedia.org/Tribalism).

‘Tribalism’ as understood in the above sense is traced to ‘tribes’, which in turn are commonly
defined as “self contained”, autonomous communities practicing subsistence economy with
no or limited external trade (ibid). ‘Tribes’ in this sense are separate political communities,
each claiming exclusive rights to a given territory and managing its affairs independently of
external control.

‘Tribes’ and ‘tribalism’ in the sense in which they have been defined above are historical
categories that refer to antiquated primordial behaviour which no longer exist in its pure form
in most of modern Africa, Zambia inclusive. The history of most of pre-colonial Africa was
the history of conquest and incorporation of the weak by the strong. The imposition of
colonial rule and the concomitant introduction of the cash economy accelerated the process of
disintegration of ‘tribes’ in their pristine nature. Thus, the advent of colonialism found the so-
called ‘tribes’ of Africa already co-mingled socio-cultural entities. In Zambia, for example,
the Lozis of Western province are a heterogeneous group of diverse ethnic communities. The
same can be said of the Bemba of Northern and Luapula provinces.

Imposition and maintenance of the nation state by, first colonialism, and later the post
colonial state, together with the spread of the capitalist economy, have meant that the ‘tribe’
as defined by social anthropology has lost some of its essential distinguishing features.
Specifically, no group in Zambia can today claim to exist as a separate political community
with exclusive control over its own territory. Equally difficult to come across is a social
group that has not been drawn into the cash economy through the spread of the capitalist
relations of production.

Not surprisingly, the challenges associated with defining ‘tribes’ in modern Africa has led to
the use of an alternative term referred to as ethnicity. Ethnic groups, unlike tribes, are
identified by the close cultural affinity which usually includes language and customs. There is
a significant difference here; if ‘tribes’ are considered to be one of the earliest forms of social
organisations among humans, ‘ethnicity,’ on the other hand, by emphasising language and
culture is not restricted to a specific historical period or territorial enclave. Thus, in the case
of Zambia, reference to the Nyanja ethnic group usually includes Nsenga, Chewa, Ngoni and
Tumbuka speaking peoples, regardless of their abode in the country. Similarly, the Lozi
ethnic group would include all groups that speak silozi language.

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 8

Given the discussion so far, the question we are now confronted with is whether ‘tribalism’ as
defined above carries valid and adequate explanatory power to describe dominant political
behaviour in Africa in general and Zambia in particular. Clearly, the answer to this question
cannot be in the affirmative. As a general rule, it cannot be said that African society is
divided into smaller groups that are actively hostile to one another. Without ignoring latent
hostilities that exist between certain groups in some countries, the norm, however, is that
most ethnic groups in Africa like elsewhere in the world, live side by side each other for long
periods of time in a state of relative tranquillity.

In addition, it is difficult to scientifically prove that ‘tribalism’ is the dominant social identity
among Africans. Africans have multiple social identities which manifest depending on the
issues at hand. In the urban setting, for example, workers usually organise themselves in trade
unions for the purpose of fighting for higher wages and better conditions of service at the
workplace. In the case of Zambia, trade unionism among workers of diverse ethnic origins
was the immediate precursor to the nationalist struggle for independence. Again, when
Zambians could no longer put up with the increasingly autocratic nature of the one-party
system, the unity which was displayed by the social forces transcended ethnic differences. In
other countries, again depending on prevailing objective conditions, religious differences,
more than ethnicity informs the nature of social conflict.

At this point we need to explain the continuing influence of ‘tribalism’ in African politics,
despite the fact that the objective historical material conditions under which this phenomenon
constitutes itself are no longer tenable in most countries. From our introductory remarks we
saw that ‘tribalism’ is an explosive force with devastating destructive power in African
politics. Yet if ‘tribes’ do not exist as understood by social science what then is the driving
force behind this anachronistic phenomenon? To answer this question, we again return to
Mafeje (1971) who suggests that ‘tribalism’ is an ideology imposed by colonial authorities
and perpetuated by African political elites to maintain a power position, not in the tribal area,
but in the modern capital city, and whose ultimate aim is to undermine and exploit the
supposedly tribesmen(p65). Seen from this perspective, ‘tribalism’ serves the purpose of
oversimplifying, mystifying, and obscuring the real nature of economic and power relations
between Africans.

‘Tribal’ consciousness was fomented and encouraged by the colonialists through their policy
of divide and rule. In the post-independence era, the ideology of ‘tribalism’ has become a
handy weapon in the arsenal of desperate political elites jostling for power. Politicians resort

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 9

to manipulation of the emotions of suffering ordinary voters who are made to believe that
their plight is due to conspiratorial acts by people of different ethnic origins who do not care
for their welfare. In this way conflict is fuelled by social perceptions that development
imbalances and inequality are generated by ‘tribal’ contests for control of resources, whether
economic or political. This study argues that to a large degree ‘tribalism’ represents false
social consciousness. It is meant to build the political capital of elites by projecting a social
mentality of ‘them’ versus ‘us’ among ordinary citizens. Politicians who run out of ideas find
it much easier to appeal to nebulous ‘tribal’ sentiments than address concrete social class
issues that affect peasants or workers.

To reiterate, ‘tribalism’ is an ideology of false consciousness with little or no relevant

grounding in objective material conditions. It is used by desperate political elites with an
insatiable lust for attaining or preserving power at all costs and with little regard for the social
consequences that follow the championing of such a retrogressive ideology. We will now turn
to the examination of how ‘tribal’ ideology has played out in Zambian politics.

TRIBALISM IN ZAMBIA
The ideology of ‘tribalism’ has many applications. For our purposes, however, the discussion
of ‘tribalism’ will be confined to electoral politics. In so doing, this study takes a broad
overview of the role of tribalism in all the three republics, namely 1964-1972, 1973-1991,
and 1991 to date. In all these instances, the study will show that desperate political elites have
been responsible for perpetrating this social scourge. A favourite strategy of such politicians
is to raise the ‘bogey’ of ‘tribalism’ in reference to their opponents as a way of concealing the
same activities which they condemn in others.

First Republic 1964-1972

Zambia ascended to independence in 1964 under a multiparty system in which the ruling
party the United National Independence Party (UNIP) was clearly dominant while the main
opposition African National Congress (ANC) was weak but viable (Chikulo 1979:201).
Already at that early stage there were calls by UNIP zealots to introduce a one-party state, but
these were resisted by President Kenneth Kaunda who held the view that the ANC would die
Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 10
a natural death as UNIP grew in strength. This was referred to as the ‘snowball or band
wagon’ effect (Rasmussen 1969: 407). In other words, Kaunda’s position was that although
he was in support of a one-party state, he would, however, not bring himself to legislate
against opposition political parties. Kaunda and those who shared his views were soon to
change their position because of developments within and outside UNIP.

Firstly, contrary to Kaunda’s expectations the “snowball effect” did not materialize. The
ANC did not atrophy. As a matter of fact, the opposition party grew in strength in successive
elections. In particular, the ANC began to gain ground between 1968 and 1973. This partly
came about as a result of the proscription of the United Party (UP) a party that was formed in
1966 and quickly managed to strengthen itself in Western Province and along the line of rail.
Alarmed by this development, UP was banned in 1968. The leaders of UP urged their
members to transfer their support to the ANC, an act which had the instant effect of reviving
the fledgling fortunes of the main opposition political party. A revived ANC caused UNIP to
reconsider its approach to introduction of the one-party state. A resurgent ANC was looking
more and more like an alternative government. Fearful of losing its grip on power, UNIP
decided to use legislation to outlaw opposition political parties and introduce a one-party
state in December 1972.

Secondly, the resurgence of the opposition between 1968 and 1973 had more to do with
factionalism within the ruling UNIP than anything else. The ideology of ‘tribalism’
accentuated factionalism within the ranks of UNIP as political heavyweights jostled for
power. A change to the electoral rules of UNIP introduced open contests for positions in the
party’s Central Committee. In turn, positions in the Central Committee coincided with
Cabinet positions. Thus, competition to be elected to the Central Committee became intense.
Not surprisingly, the UNIP Central Committee elections at the party’s General Conference
held at Mulungushi in 1967, were hotly contested. This represented a radical departure from
the previous practice were the party president would present a list of already agreed upon
names of members of the Central Committee for endorsement by the General Conference.

The 1967 elections split UNIP into two ethnically based factions. Bloc voting saw the
alliance of Bemba and Tonga speaking politicians unseat the Ngoni-Lozi faction. The biggest
upset was the defeat of first Republican vice-president Reuben Kamanga to Simon Mwansa
Kapwepwe. This disturbed the carefully crafted ethnic balance within the party and led to the
emergence of a perceived Bemba dominance which left many discontented factions in its

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 11

wake. The political fall-out quickly spread to the provinces as regional movements sprang up
overnight to champion the causes of displaced political elites:

For instance, the Umodzi ku M’mawa (Unity in the East) grew in Eastern Province, as
an expression of the resentment within UNIP at the elimination from top positions of
prominent Eastern politicians, notably the ex-Vice President Reuben Kamanga who
was replaced by Simon Kapwepwe. In the Central Province the Bantu Botatwe
Association was formed by the Ila-Lenje-Tonga group within UNIP with the objective
of removing Kapwepwe from the post of the Vice-President. (Chikulo 1979:203).

UNIP and Republican President Kenneth Kaunda, were greatly disturbed by this development
and Kaunda in particular blamed his fellow leaders for fomenting ‘tribalism’ among the
ordinary people (Molteno 1974). To arrest the deepening of factionalism within the party,
Kaunda presented proposals for the amendment of UNIP’s electoral rules which aimed at
balancing regional representation with respect to membership on the Central Committee. The
new measures were perceived as targeting Bemba politicians who saw the institutional basis
of their power eroding. The resentment which this generated resulted in the formation of a
breakaway faction, the United Progressive Party (UPP) in 1971. Simon Kapwepwe who
became leader of UPP justified the formation of the new party on the grounds that he and his
colleagues were motivated by a desire to safe-guard the interests of persecuted Bemba
speaking politicians. This position quickly attracted loud condemnation from Kaunda and his
allies who remained in UNIP, branding UPP a ‘tribal’ and ‘regional’ party inimical to the
interest of national unity. This label, however, did not prevent UPP from winning a hotly
contested parliamentary by-election in Mufulira West held in 1971 to fill the position left
vacant by Kapwepwe. Pressures within UNIP to declare a one-party state mounted and on
13th December 1972, legislation was passed to declare Zambia a one-party state, despite loud
protests from opposition politicians.

Second Republic 1973-1991

The second republic from 1973 to 1991 could be described as the era of ‘containment’ of
‘tribalism.’ This does not mean that ‘tribalism’ disappeared, like most dissent during the one-
party era it simply went ‘underground.’ The autocratic nature of one-party dictatorship meant
that the party, and particularly its leader, Kenneth Kaunda was able to superimpose its will
over the people in nearly all spheres of life. Kaunda carefully crafted an elaborate system of
‘tribal balancing’ which in effect meant ensuring regional representation in the high echelons
of the party. This extended to appointments to the civil service, parastatal companies and
Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 12
foreign missions. The system appeared to work for a while as it had the semblance of
appeasing political opponents. This system, however, quickly reached its limitations as it
became obvious that its main purpose was not to foster national unity and economic
development, but to reward Kaunda loyalists and guarantee the survival of the regime at all
costs. By suppressing dissent and allowing only conformist voices, Kaunda’s ‘tribal
balancing’ soon became a recipe for political decay and economic stagnation. The system
also strengthened ‘tribal consciousness’ as loyalists appointed to parastatal jobs in turn
recruited their own ‘tribesmen’ to safe-guard their own positions. In no time, some parastatals
came to be associated with certain ‘tribes’ from the region of the chief executive officers.

Social discontent and political disaffection mounted under the one-party rule. These were
precipitated by political decay and economic stagnation. UNIP’s inability to redress the
growing development challenges gave rise to popular discontent. Not surprisingly, there was
such an overwhelming response to calls for change when the winds of multiparty democracy
blew across the country in 1990 and 1991. UNIP tried to resist change by arguing that
reverting back to plural politics would result in the emergence of ‘tribal’ parties and endanger
the political unity of the nation. In the end, it was the popular will that triumphed and there
was a resounding defeat for UNIP handed out by the newly formed Movement for Multiparty
Democracy (MMD) which won the October 31, 1991. This was after the republican
constitution was amended to legalise formation of opposition political parties.

In sum, ‘tribalism’ may appear to have been temporarily contained during the one-party era,
but it was inadvertently kept alive by the regime’s preoccupation with survival at the expense
of national development which could have guaranteed political stability and national unity.

Third Republic 1991 to date

It should not surprise us that the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1991 has brought to
the surface the ideology of ‘tribalism’ which had gone ‘underground’ during the era of the
one-party state. Restoration of the freedom of political association has opened the political
arena to open and intense political contestation. In the process, unscrupulous politicians
seeking to gain political mileage over their opponents will stop at nothing to discredit their
rivals. Not surprisingly, ‘tribalism’ has once again become a deadly weapon in the race for
political power.

The MMD was a cohesive force when it faced the challenge of removing UNIP from power.
Once in government, however, cracks began to appear in the party as different factions that

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 13

had hurriedly come together in 1991 sought to consolidate their positions. There were
widespread perceptions from the early years of the MMD government that President
Frederick Chiluba was favouring Bemba speaking politicians in a bid to strengthen his grip
on power. Before long, simmering discontent gave way to a new breakaway party, the
National Party (NP). The MMD quickly labelled the NP as a ‘tribal’ and ‘regional’ party
confined mainly to Western Province where its first leader Arthur Wina came from. It is
instructive to remember that this charge was not raised when the same Wina was made
president of the MMD at the time of its formation in 1991. Suddenly because he was now
pitted against the same party he helped to found he had become a ‘tribal’ leader! Suffice to
say that NP made a good initial showing by winning a significant number of parliamentary
seats vacated by its leaders who had defected from the MMD in the ensuing by-elections. The
NP was later to fizzle out due to its inability to resolve internal leadership squabbles and
establish a nation-wide presence.

The ideology of ‘tribalism’ did not come into prominence for the rest of the duration of the
Chiluba regime until 1998 and the controversial general elections of 2001. Two factors were
responsible for the fresh impetus given to ‘tribal’ sentiments within the Zambian body politic
during this period. Firstly, Chiluba’s attempt to change the republican constitution and
contest for a third term became so divisive that it weakened the MMD’s ability to thwart
political opposition. As opposition to the ‘third term’ campaign mounted, 22 senior members
of the MMD were expelled from the party on the eve of the 2001 general elections. The
expelled politicians went on to form two new political parties, the Forum for Democracy and
Development (FDD) and the Heritage Party. The two new parties between them carried a
substantial following from the MMD. This meant that the MMD was in a very weak position
on the eve of the 2001 tripartite elections.

Secondly, even before factionalism within the MMD led to breakaway parties, a new party
was formed in 1998 led by Anderson Mazoka which stirred the interests of elites in the
country. The United Party for National Development (UPND) as the new party came to be
known fielded a team of some well known experienced figures from the corporate world and
public service. The party was able to quickly establish structures across the country and was
increasingly looking more like a government in waiting.

The reaction of the ruling MMD to the threat posed by the UPND was akin to that of UNIP
when the latter was confronted with the challenge from UPP. The MMD’s immediate
response to the UPND challenge was to label UPND a ‘tribal’ party because of the

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 14

overwhelming support the party received in Southern Province were Mazoka its leader hailed
from. MMD leaders constantly harped on this accusation until it became part of the public
political discourse. Matters were not helped by the resounding defeat of the MMD by the
UPND in Southern province, were both Mazoka and his parliamentary candidates won by
large margins against the MMD’s Levy Mwanawasa and his MMD parliamentary candidates.
The 2001 voting pattern showed that the UPND won in Southern, Western and North-
Western provinces whereas the MMD won in the predominantly Bemba speaking Northern,
Luapula, Copperbelt and Central provinces. Eastern province was shared between UNIP and
the FDD.

Those who see politics and elections in Zambia through ‘tribal’ lenses were quick to point to
the above voting pattern as evidence of the influence of ‘tribalism.’ We must remind
ourselves that ‘tribalism’ according to our definition above carries with it enduring loyalties
and attachment to one’s group. We argue in this study, however, that this is an obfuscation of
reality. The question we are confronted with is: what happened to the Bemba-Tonga alliance
which we saw in 1967 at the UNIP Mulungushi General Conference? Similarly, why did the
Lozi choose to vote with the Tongas in 2001, when the two were considered to be political
enemies in 1967? It is important to understand that ‘tribalism’ is too simplistic an
explanation of the voting patterns in Zambia!

There was a serious crisis within UPND when its founding leader Anderson Mazoka died and
a struggle to succeed him ensued. The party was divided into two main factions. First, there
were those within the party who pressed for the ascension of Sakwiba Sikota to the
presidency of the party because of his position in the party hierarchy as the most senior
official after Mazoka. The other faction coalesced around prominent businessman Hakainde
Hichilema who up to that point was little known as a member of the UPND. The supporters
of Hichilema argued that the UPND’s unwritten rule was that replacement of a member of the
party’s National Management Committee (NMC) was to be by a person from the same
‘tribe.’ Thus, in the case of Mazoka, a fellow Tonga was to replace him to maintain the
party’s carefully crafted system of ‘tribal balancing.’ Clearly, this position could be
interpreted in many ways. It is difficult to simply state that this can be taken as evidence of
Tonga ‘tribalism’ because it seems to be more of a coincidence that a possible replacement
happened to come from the same region where the party enjoyed massive support.

The political fall-out from the UPND succession struggle only served to reinforce ‘tribal’
sentiments. Sakwiba Sikota who lost to Hakainde Hichilema opted to leave the party and

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 15

form his own United Liberal Party (ULP). Sikota failed to rise above the accusations which
he levelled against his rival by surrounding himself with fellow Lozis in the new party.
Clearly, with such a parochial base, Sikota has not propelled his political career with his new
party.

The evidence of ‘tribalism’ becomes even more difficult to prove when the voting pattern in
the 2006 tripartite elections is analysed. In 2006, the MMD’s main challenge came from
Michael Sata’s Patriotic Front (PF). Sata swept most of the votes in the so-called Bemba
speaking regions of Northern, Luapula, Copperbelt and Central Provinces, losing only in the
Namwanga and Mambwe speaking parts of Northern Province. It is oversimplistic to allege
that Sata won in these regions because he is a ‘tribalist.’ Certainly, Sata did try to play the
‘tribal’ card by insinuating that Bemba speaking peoples suffered under Levy Mwanawasa.
There is, however, no empirical evidence to suggest that the ‘tribal’ ideology is what won
him the vote in these regions. An explanation could be that Sata exerted most of his efforts in
mobilising supporters in these provinces and he struck a responsive chord in the hearts of
those who listened to him.

Hichilema retained the UPND’s dominance in its Southern province stronghold, albeit with a
reduced overall majority. More interesting, however, was the MMD’s performance in
Eastern, North-Western and Western provinces, where the party made serious in-roads by
displacing the FDD, UNIP and UPND. Again, this cannot be put down to ‘tribal’ politics,
there was something more at play. The neglect by opposition parties to effectively reach these
areas accounted for their loss to the MMD more than anything else. The 2008 presidential by-
election showed more or less a similar pattern to 2006.

THE RUN-UP TO THE 2011 ELECTIONS

One could argue that what will influence the outcome of the 2011 elections is not ‘tribalism’
although there will be no shortage of charges and counter-charges of the same. There are
widespread perceptions that 2011 will be watershed elections and the MMD will not be able
to ward off the opposition onslaught because of the deepening intra-party wrangles that
threaten the party with disintegration. Clearly, the MMD is faced with need for a leadership
that can quickly unite the party and seal the rifts within its ranks before 2011 if it is to stand a
chance in the elections. It would take great magnanimity and self-sacrifice from President
Rupiah Banda to achieve this feat, a likelihood which looks very remote at the moment.

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 16

To the naked eye, the UPND-PF Pact at the moment appears to be the strongest challenge to
the ruling MMD. Certainly, facts on the ground seem to suggest no other alternative.
Between them the UPND and PF have the largest numbers of opposition Members of
Parliament (MPs). They both command a large following in their regional strongholds. A
combined force of the two should no doubt cause the MMD sleepless nights. We believe that
the two pact members are working on this calculation to defeat the MMD. In this scheme, it
cannot be said that ‘tribalism’ is the major consideration. What we have here is political
expediency which seems to have diffused the alleged Bemba-Tonga political rivalry. It
cannot be concluded, however, that some people within or outside either of the two parties
will not seek to exploit ‘tribal’ sentiments in order to advance their own political ambitions.

Indeed, in the Kasama Central parliamentary by-election of October 2009 there were serious
attempts to use ‘tribalism’ by both the MMD and the opposition PF-UPND Pact to
outcompete each other. The ruling MMD was reported to have rejected the nomination of the
frontrunner in the primaries on account of the fact that his father came from Southern
province. The PF-UPND Pact candidate, on the other hand, went on record to appeal to the
electorate to vote for him because he was the ‘son of the soil’ whereas his MMD opponent
was depicted as coming from a non-Bemba speaking part of the province. Again, it is
difficult to scientifically prove that the ensuing victory of the PF-UPND Pact candidate was
due to his ‘Bemba’ identity. There were other factors at play, most importantly the
electorate’s perception that the MMD had performed poorly with regard to delivery of
development in the area. We argue that the PF-UPND Pact simply capitalised on this main
factor.

The position of this study with regard to the 2011 elections is that it should not be taken for
granted that the UPND-PF Pact will emerge victorious. The Pact has many intractable issues
to sort out before it can be regarded as the obvious successor to the MMD. Many of these
issues have not even begun to be tackled. At the moment the driving force of the Pact is the
numerical strength which it wields to oust the MMD. The Pact will also need to shed off
obvious negative aspects which put off many potential supporters. The emergence of a third
force should also be a source of worry to both the MMD and the PF-UPND Pact. There are
many discontented politicians and voters who do not see either the MMD or the PF-UPND
Pact as an alternative. Zambians should prepare for surprises.

Let it suffice to say that as the country inches towards 2011 elections, it will be the party with
the widest national appeal that will be the hot favourite to carry the day. Clearly, a tag of

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 17

‘tribalism’ or ‘regionalism’ will not help any party to be the first at the finishing line.
Depending on political maturity, however, politicians are bound to discreetly or openly use
the ‘tribal’ card to edge past opponents. In some cases, smearing opponents with the ‘tribal’
tag will be widely repeated. The problem with this approach, however, is that it has the effect
of alienating constituencies that are labelled ‘tribalist’ from whoever is espousing the
ideology. In the final analysis, it is not using the ideology of ‘tribalism’ in whichever way
that will prove decisive in winning the 2011 tripartite elections. The elections will be won,
not on a ‘tribal’ platform, but on ability to successfully build a strong electoral coalition that
will appeal to the widest section of the population.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The gist of this paper has been to argue that ‘tribalism’ is false consciousness which is
manipulated by desperate politicians seeking advantage over their rivals. It is not embedded
in objective material reality. It camouflages exploitative economic and power relations. Thus,
this paper tends to agree with writers who view ‘tribalism’ as an ideology rather than an
accurate description of social behaviour among Africans, Zambians in particular. This,
however, is not meant to discount the explosive force of ‘tribal’ feelings. Those who
perpetrate the ideology of ‘tribalism’ are conscious of the emotive nature of the phenomenon
because of its subtle correlations with the self-identity of social groups. This is what makes it
a dangerous ideology. A small spark of ‘tribal’ ideology if it coincides with perverse poverty
and structural inequality can easily ignite a huge conflagration with disastrous consequences.
This is why a dismissive approach to allegations of ‘tribalism’ is an inadequate response to
the problem. This paper would, therefore, like to conclude with some concrete measures
which Zambians can take to avoid falling into the ‘tribal’ conflicts which have engulfed other
nations in Africa:

 Recognising that politicians are the main purveyors of the ideology of ‘tribalism,’ it is
important for civil society concerned with good governance and development to
intensify civic education on the nature and dangers of ‘tribalism,’
 Advocate for inclusion of stiff and enforceable penalties in the electoral laws and
electoral code of conduct against any aspiring candidate or political party found guilty
of peddling ‘tribal’ ideology in their electoral campaigns,
 Sponsor research on the causes and effects of ‘tribalism’ in fuelling political and
social conflicts in Africa,

Tribalism and Elections in Zambia 18

  Promote dissemination of information on cases of best practices in handling ‘tribal’
related conflicts from Zambia’s past and around the world,
 Facilitate inter-party discussions on ways and means of dealing with ‘tribalism’ in the
Zambian body politic.
 Zambia needs to introduce an electoral formula of proportional representation which
will ensure that all the tribes in Zambia are represented.

REFERENCES
Mafeje, A (1971) ‘The Ideology of Tribalism’ in the Journal of Modern African Studies

Molteno, R (1974) ‘Cleavage and Conflict in Zambian Politics: A study in sectionalism’ in

W. Tordoff, (ed) Politics in Zambia. Los Angeles and Berkeley. University of California
Press

Chikulo, B (1979) ‘Elections in a One-Party Participatory Democracy’ in B. Turok, (ed)

Development in Zambia: A Reader. London and New Jersey. Zed Books Ltd.

Rasmussen, T (1969) ‘Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia,’ in the

Journal of Modern African Studies, 7

Mutesa, F (1992) ‘The Post Cold War Era and the Emergence of Multipartyism in Africa’ in
Internationales Afrikaforum 28, 3.Munich and Berlin. Weltforum Verlag

http://en.wikipedia.org/Tribalism

www.lumrix.net/medical/sociology/tribalism

www.thefreedictionary.com/tribalism

The Post Newspaper, various issues

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