Silk Road To (Economic) Heaven

7/18/2016
SilkRoadto(economic)heavenPerspective
Perspective
Silk Road to (economic) heaven

Talmiz Ahmad
Updated Jun 18, 2016 08:37pm
India, Afghanistan and Iran signed a major trade deal on May 23, which will create a
strategic port in Iran to connect the country's oil with India's energy-hungry market |
AFP
ew Delhi is concerned about the China-Pakistan Economic

Corridor project (CPEC), part of the new Silk Road, but it need
not despair as India is an important part of the existing multi-polar
Asia architecture.
The signing of the Chabahar port development agreement and the
tripartite pact on a trade and transit corridor linking India, Afghanistan
and Iran during Prime Minister Narendra Modis recent visit to Iran has
re-opened the discussion in New Delhi about what position it should
adopt on the Chinese-sponsored logistics project, One Belt, One Road
http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153432/silkroadtoeconomicheaven
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adopt on the Chinese-sponsored logistics project, One Belt, One Road

(OBOR).
Some background to this would be useful.
In September 2013, during a visit to Kazakhstan, Chinas president, Xi
Jinping, announced a Chinese initiative the setting up of
connectivities across the landmass of Eurasia and the waters of the
Indian Ocean that would collectively be known as the OBOR. He
anchored this vision in the old Silk Road, which in his view had
originated with the encounters of imperial envoy Zhang Qian (200-113
BC) with Central Asian civilisations over two millennia earlier.
Also read: Mother ChinaA 'Chinese revolution' sweeps across Pakistan
Since then, the OBOR has become the most important element in
Chinese economic and political diplomacy, as its leaders, officials and
academics attempt to fine-tune their thinking and get more
supporters governments, officials and the corporate on board for
this dramatic enterprise that has the potential to fundamentally
transform the worlds communications, and its economic and political
landscape.
The old Silk Road
The old Silk Road had a vibrant life of over three millennia, linking Asia
with Europe and emerging as the principal conduit for the movement
of global trade, merchants, preachers, professionals and intellectuals. It
was marked by hundreds of market towns: Xian, Chengdu, Kunming
and Kashgar in China; Khotan, Samarkhand and Bokhara in Central
Asia; Taxila, Persepolis, Bagram, Kandahar and Merv in India and Iran,
and Tyre and Antioch in the Mediterranean.
The sea routes linked the ports of Northeast, Southeast and South Asia
with the Arabian Peninsula, and then through the West Asian caravan
routes, and the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea routes, went westwards
to the Mesopotamian and Egyptian empires and culminated in Greece
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to the Mesopotamian and Egyptian empires and culminated in Greece

and Rome.
These new connections were in the areas of energy, trade and
investment, and were shaped at a time of great economic resurgence
across Asia. Thus, a decade before Xis announcement of the OBOR, a
thriving Silk Road connectivity had already come to link the Asian
countries and constitute their most important economic relationship.
The impact of these connections was both material and civilisational:
China and India, as the American academic Craig Lockard has noted,
were the great pre-modern centres of world manufacturing,
producing iron, steel, silk, cotton and ceramics for world markets.
Beyond commerce, over the centuries these land and sea routes also
facilitated the movement of religious and civilisational concepts
beliefs and practices of Zoroastrianism, Nestorian Christianity,
Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam interacted with each other through
these time-honoured links and shaped the civilisations of
Mesopotamia, Persia, India and China and imbued western culture
with these ancient Asian reflections and belief-systems.
The new Silk Road connections
The old Silk Road ceased to have much regional importance from the
15th century onwards on account of political and military disruptions
across Eurasia, and the discovery of sea routes from the West to Asian
markets. These sea routes in time led to western military and political
control of the high seas, including the Indian Ocean, as also of almost
all of the Asian lands, which now came under British, French or Dutch
control. Thus, the main economic links of Asian countries were now
with European states, with the centuries-old intra-Asian commercial
and civilisational connectivities now consigned to the margins of their
day-to-day experience.
This scenario of western political and economic domination of Asia
began to change after the end of the Cold War. First, from the 1990s,
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began to change after the end of the Cold War. First, from the 1990s,
Asian countries such as China and India began to achieve high growth
rates and emerge as major economic powers. Second, these high
growth rates in Asia generated a substantial increase in demand for
energy resources, particularly for oil and gas. These were available in
plenty in West Asia, leading to a shift in energy supplies from west to
east. This surge in energy demand also meant that the West Asian
producers came to enjoy extraordinary inflows of financial resources
for domestic infrastructure and welfare development, and to invest in
world markets.
The third factor that served to change the global power equation was
the emergence of the Central Asian republics as sovereign states and
their ability to play an independent role in the global energy and
geopolitical scenario. These developments together brought an end to
Western hegemony over Asia and for the first time in two hundred
years gave Asian countries the opportunity to re-establish age-old
connectivity with each other.
These new connections were in the areas of energy, trade and
investment, and were shaped at a time of great economic resurgence
across Asia. Thus, a decade before Xis announcement of the OBOR, a
thriving Silk Road connectivity had already come to link the Asian
countries and constitute their most important economic relationship.
The OBOR thus proposes giving a physical shape to the existing rich
and substantial ties.
The OBOR routings
Reflecting at the land and sea routes of the old Silk Road linkages, the
OBOR has land and sea dimensions that converge at certain points,
which together constitute an extraordinary seamless connectivity that
embraces all of Eurasia and the Indian Ocean littoral. The Eurasian
land connection, known as the New Silk Road Economic Belt or
simply the Belt, is made up of railways, highways, oil and gas
pipelines, and major energy projects.
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pipelines, and major energy projects.
Old Silk Road - Network of interlinking trade routes across Eurasia trading various goods
with different countries
Beginning at Xian, the legendary starting point of the old Silk Road, the
OBOR will have two routings: one, across China to Kazakhstan and
then Moscow, and the other through Mongolia and southern Russia to
Moscow. Both routes will merge and then go on to European cities
Budapest, Hamburg and Rotterdam. The southern route will branch
into one that will cross Iran and Turkey, and end at Budapest. It will
have another branch from the Pakistani port of Gwadar to the Chinese
city of Kashgar in the western province of Xinjiang.
The sea route, known as the Maritime Silk Road or simply the Road,
made up of ports and coastal development, begins from Chinas
eastern ports and goes on to Southeast Asia, South Asia, East Africa
and then on to West Asia and the Mediterranean, embracing Greece
and Venice and ending at Rotterdam. Both routes, again recalling the
old Silk Road, will have a series of loops and branches, with the two
main routes also meeting at important junctions, such as Gwadar,
Istanbul, Rotterdam and Hamburg.
According to Korean scholar Jae Ho Chung, when completed, the
OBOR will include 60 countries, with two-thirds of the worlds
population, 55 percent of the global GDP and 75per cent of global
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energy reserves. It will consist of 900 infrastructure projects, valued at

about 1.3 trillion US dollars. Much of the funding is expected to come
from Chinese banks, financial institutions and special funds. The Hong
Kong-based South China Morning Post has described the OBOR as the
most significant and far-reaching project the nation has ever put
forward.
Promoting the OBOR
The OBOR initiative has captured world attention for the sheer range
and audacity of the concept, the extraordinary ambition that lies at its
base and the significant resources technological, human, financial
and political that will need to be garnered globally to realise the
vision. Since the first announcement, Chinese officials and
commentators have debated the project, fleshed out several loose ends
and sought to bring as many countries as possible on board as
partners.
These have included a series of engagements with policymakers in
countries on the OBOR routes. The OBOR was of course initiated in
Central Asia and China has obtained the support of these republics
with promises of massive investment for regional development. Xi has
said China will support the construction of 4000 kilometres of railways
and 10,000 kilometres of highways in Central Asia, with nearly 16 billion
US dollars of Chinese funding.
When completed, the OBOR will include 60 countries, with twothirds of the worlds population, 55 per cent of the global GDP and 75
per cent of global energy reserves. It will consist of 900 infrastructure
projects, valued at about 1.3 trillion US dollars.
The next most important interaction China has had on the OBOR is
with Russia. China has benefited from Russian estrangement from the
West following the events in Ukraine and the consequent abandoning
of the Russian Greater Europe project that would have linked
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of the Russian Greater Europe project that would have linked

Vladivostok with Lisbon and developed energy, financial,
technological and defence ties with Moscow. This has led to Russian
acceptance of Chinas presence in Central Asia and the merging of
Russian President Vladimir Putins Eurasian Economic Union project
with the OBOR.
In October 2013, Xi reached out to the ASEAN countries and sought to
bring them within the fold of the maritime route by invoking 14th
century Chinese mariner Zheng He (1371-1433/35), who explored South
and Southeast Asia, and proposing the building of a close-knit ChinaASEAN community. Following this, Xi met a Gulf Cooperation Council
delegation in January 2014 and attempted to make West Asia a partner
in the OBOR as well.
The drivers of the OBOR
In promoting the OBOR, China is being driven by domestic and foreign
considerations. The urge to achieve development in all of Chinas 31
provinces is a major factor and all provinces have already affirmed
their active participation in different aspects of the enterprise. The
western province of Qinghai has indicated that it will build a rail,
highway and aviation network to link the provinces and countries
along the OBOR; Guangdong province along the coast will execute
some major infrastructure projects, such as a power plant in Vietnam
and an oil refinery in Myanmar.
The realisation of the OBOR will of course see the western province of
Xinjiang playing a major role its cities of Urumqi, Kashgar and
Khorgos will be at the centre of many of the proposed routes. OBORrelated projects will also provide an outlet for China to use its
overcapacity in steel, cement and construction materials, as also its
surplus financial reserves.
Also read: Andrew Small on China's influence over Pakistan
Chinese scholar Tingyi Wang of Tsinghua University has explained that
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Chinese scholar Tingyi Wang of Tsinghua University has explained that

while the OBOR is prompted by Chinas interests in energy, security
and promotion of economic ties, it is actually driven by the vision of a
greater Eurasian idea that calls for strengthening economic and
cultural integration across this whole swathe of territory and building
a new type of international relations underpinned by win-win
cooperation. Wang summarises the Chinese strategy as to guarantee
its interests in this region and at the same time cooperate with the
other powers.
Former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran sees the OBOR not just
as economic initiative but one that has clear political and security
implications; it is for Saran a carving out by China of a continentalmarine geo-strategic realm.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
The one aspect of the OBOR that has caused the greatest concern in
India, both in regard to its land and maritime implications, is the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Finalised in April 2015 on
the basis of 51 agreements, the CPEC consists of a series of highway,
railway and energy projects, emanating from the newly developed port
of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, all of which taken together will be
valued at 46 billion US dollars. These projects will generate 700,000
jobs in Pakistan and, when completed, add 2-2.5 per cent to the
countrys GDP. The CPEC has been described as a flagship project for
the OBOR.
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Pakistans Gwadar Port | AFP
Gwadar will be developed as a deep-water port capable of handling

300-400 million tonnes of cargo per year. A new 1100-kilometres
motorway from Karachi to Lahore will be completed, while the
Karakoram Highway from Rawalpindi to the Chinese border will be reconstructed. Railway lines across the country will be thoroughly
upgraded and expanded, with the road and railway network reaching
Kashgar in Xinjiang. Oil and gas pipelines will be constructed, including
a gas pipeline from Gwadar to Nawabshah, carrying gas from Iran.
Most of the money will be spent on energy projects about 10,400
MW of electricity will be developed between 2018-20, besides
renewable energy, coal and liquefied natural gas projects. An 800kilometres optic fibre link to boost telecommunications in the GilgitBaltistan region is already under construction. These projects will
promote national economic development through industrial parks and
special economic zones.
Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations described CPEC as
part development scheme, part strategic gambit in a recent report.
By investing heavily in Pakistans development, particularly in its
backward regions, China is clearly addressing its own concerns
relating to security problems whose roots are in Pakistan. The most
important of these is the threat from the East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM), made up of Chinese-dissident Uighur militant
groups that have taken sanctuary in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
areas and are said to be linked to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The ETIM
aims its violence at targets in China and also at Chinese interests in
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aims its violence at targets in China and also at Chinese interests in

Pakistan.
Gwadar port, which will be developed and operated by Chinese
companies will have both economic and strategic advantages for
China. It will enable China to route the oil and gas purchases from the
Gulf through pipelines that would bypass the West-dominated Malacca
Straits, thus providing China with one more alternative route, besides
the Sittwe-Kunming pipeline in Myanmar. Again, control over Gwadar
would give China a permanent naval presence in the western Indian
Ocean and a commanding position at the mouth of the Gulf. This
dramatic expansion of the Chinese naval forces into what India sees as
its home-ground is a matter of long-term concern for India.
Indias response to the OBOR
Indias official response to the OBOR has been cautious and relatively
muted, but a perusal of academic writings and news reports affirm that
India has deep concerns about the implications of the OBOR for its
strategic interests. India shares the view of several countries in
Northeast and Southeast Asia that far from being an enterprise
founded on wide and substantial cooperation, the OBOR could in fact
be the vehicle for Chinas influence, if not hegemony, across Asia. After
all, China is promoting the OBOR just when it is flexing its muscles in
East Asia, particularly in regard to asserting its territorial claims
unilaterally in the South China Sea.
India has more immediate and specific concerns, which pertain to the
CPEC. The CPEC was announced within a month of the publication of
the OBOR vision and action plan document, which had highlighted the
need for extensive consultations across Asia. Clearly, no such
consultations took place with India and the CPEC was presented
Chinese-dissident Uighur. While India might share Chinas position
that extremism should be countered with development, it cannot
accept that the CPECs logistical projects should pass freely through
large parts of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
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Also read: An in-depth report on the pursuit of Kashmir

Officially, India has focused on the absence of consultation from the
Chinese side. Speaking at the inauguration of the Raisina Dialogue on
Asian Connectivity in Delhi in March, Indian Foreign Secretary S.
Jaishankar said, The key issue is whether we will build our
connectivity through consultative processes or more unilateral
decisions. we cannot be impervious to the reality that others may
see connectivity as an exercise in hard-wiring that influences choices.
Indias connectivity projects
However, the logistics scenario in Asia is not as bleak from the Indian
perspective as it might appear at first sight. While the OBOR captured
global imagination when it was first announced over two years ago, it
is important to recall that India is itself at the centre of major regional
connectivity projects; these might lack the dramatic value of the
OBOR, but taken together, they bring a number of solid partners and
have the capacity of transforming the regional economic and
geopolitical landscape to Indias advantage. India, thus, has little need
to feel insecure about the OBOR.
Five points will govern Chinas approach to project execution policy
coordination, infrastructure connectivity, free movement of goods,
financial integration and people-to-people bonds.
The most important Indian connectivity project is of course the trade
and transit corridor from Chabahar in Iran to Afghanistan, to link with
the highway network of the latter; India has already contributed to this
network with the Zaranj-Delaram highway.
This project has the greatest economic and strategic value for India
since it provides unimpeded access to Afghanistan, enables India and
Iran to contribute together to the economic development and political
stability of Afghanistan, besides of course confronting the
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stability of Afghanistan, besides of course confronting the

depredations of the Taliban. Over the long term, India would be in
position to limit Pakistans quest for so-called strategic depth in
Afghanistan, an aspiration that has caused great death and destruction
in that country.
But, the importance of this project goes well beyond Afghanistan: it
provides a highway across the relatively peaceful northern part of
Afghanistan to all the Central Asian republics, culminating at Almaty in
Kazakhstan.
The other connectivity project with which India is associated is the
International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC). Initiated in
September 2000, over a decade before the OBOR, the INSTC had
initially brought together India, Iran and Russia in an effort to create
multi-modal links (ship-rail-road) from India to Europe, via the Gulf,
Central Asia and Russia. The partnership was later expanded to include
Turkey and the other Central Asian republics. A dry-run to check its
viability was also successfully conducted in August 2014, after which
transit and customs agreements were approved in September 2015.
These connectivity projects received a boost recently when the Indian
cabinet approved Indias accession to the Ashgabat Agreement. This
multi-modal transport agreement, that brings together India, Oman,
Iran and the Central Asian republics, was initiated in April 2011, two
years before the OBOR was announced. Its routing will be linked
closely to the INSTC projects.
Closer home, India is looking at a number of connectivity proposals:
these include the development of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands in
the Bay of Bengal into a maritime hub, including a dry dock and a shipbuilding facility. Again, at the Sri Lankan port of Trincomalee, India has
been looking at setting up a petroleum hub, besides activating the 80year old tank farm in the strategically-located port city. India has also
announced that it will develop a number of connectivity projects in
South Asia, valued at 5 billion US dollars.
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South Asia, valued at 5 billion US dollars.
India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi and China's President Xi before a meeting in Xian,
in China's Shaanxi province, on May 14, 2015 | AFP
An OBOR-related project that involves India directly is the

Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, or BCIMEC. It will involve a combination of infrastructure and trade facilitation
arrangements between the four countries, as road, air and water links
are set up from Kolkata to Kunming in Southeast China at a total cost
of 22 billion US dollars. Conceived in the 1990s, the BCIM-EC was
formally endorsed by the four countries in December 2013 and is
viewed as a part of the OBOR connectivity projects. While India will
benefit in terms of the development of the Kolkata port and the
opening up of the economic potential of the northeast states, China
will obtain one more route bypassing the Malacca Straits.
China clearly does not have the monopoly for envisaging major
connectivity projects in Asia, and India is fully capable of leading a
number of important projects for its economic and geopolitical benefit.
Other extenuating factors
Besides the fact that India is a major role-player in a number of
strategically important connectivity projects in its neighbourhood,
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strategically important connectivity projects in its neighbourhood,

there have been a number of developments relating to OBOR-related
projects that constitute a reality check on Chinese ambitions and
encourage a more cooperative mind-set on its part.
First, there is little doubt that China has recognised the need for more
extensive and intensive dialogue with principal role-players such as
India, whose participation in the OBOR would be crucial for the
success of the project. Thus, Chinese officials and academics are
anxious to remind us that the OBOR is still an evolving concept; in a
paper presented in August last year at the Cambridge Research
Meeting, Wang said, [The] OBOR is still an unclear and unspecific
conception, without an authoritative definition.
Actually, lots of debates and discussions about this new Silk Road are
still going on inside and outside China. He recognised the numerous
challenges that the project faced, particularly from complex religious
and ethnic issues, active terrorism and extremism, historical divisions
across the region and competing geopolitical interests.
Similarly, according to Jia Qingguo,member of the standing committee
of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference and dean of
international relations at Beijing University, the idea is still at the
planning stage. It will take years to come to fruition and will face many
serious challenges along the way. Finally, Lu Xiankun, a former
Chinese trade negotiator, pointed out that the OBOR is far from a
fixed blueprint with detailed actions to be taken by all countries along
the OBOR and that many aspects need to be developed, designed and
consulted before concrete actions can take place.
The one aspect of the OBOR that has caused the greatest concern in
India, both in regard to its land and maritime implications, is the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Second, China has already begun to understand the daunting
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Second, China has already begun to understand the daunting

challenges that would need to be addressed before the OBOR can
become a reality. Wang, in his paper on OBORs connections with the
Arab Gulf countries, noted the deep knowledge-gap between China
and the Arab world, and even quoted a western observer who referred
to their ties as unnatural.
Besides the geopolitical issues noted above, almost all the OBOR
projects will be imbued with operational, financial, legal and
regulatory, and sovereign risks on account of the wide diversity in the
countries involved, and their geographical, political and economic
situations. Thus, the Economist Intelligence Units April 2015 report on
the OBOR pointed out that just changes in governments following
elections could place certain approved projects in jeopardy, as in Sri
Lanka, or local activist groups could question certain projects on
environmental grounds, as has happened recently with dam projects in
Cambodia and Myanmar.
Hence, not surprisingly, while early writings on the project seemed to
be China-centric, the principal focus of present-day comment by
Chinese writers is on the need for participating countries to work
closely together. Thus, Huang Yiping, a journalist for Caijing, and Chu
Yin, associate professor of international relations at Tsinghua
University, warned that the vision would not move forward if China
were to adopt crude great-power diplomacy and excessive
centralised planning.
Zhang Yuanyuan, speaking at a conference in Ulaanbaatar in October
2015, emphasised the three togethers in implementing OBOR
designing together, working together and sharing benefits together.
Xiankun made this point robustly when he said, OBOR emphasises a
lot the need to integrate itself with the development strategy of OBOR
countries, instead of imposing dragon claws on them.
These considerations have led Yuanyuan to note that five points will
govern Chinas approach to project execution policy coordination,
infrastructure connectivity, free movement of goods, financial
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infrastructure connectivity, free movement of goods, financial

integration and people-to-people bonds. Thus, Yuanyuan is echoing
the remarks of Jaishankar who said Asian connectivity would need to
take into account institutional, regulatory, legal, digital, financial and
commercial connections, besides the common cultural and
civilisational thread that runs through Asia.
To allay regional misgivings, Yan Xuetong advocated that China
needs to improve its image and expand friendly relationships
through a new diplomatic approach in the neighbourhood.
Third, the problems that are already hampering the CPEC projects in
Pakistan should reassure India that it is much easier to draw lines on
the map than it is to realise projects on the ground. As of now, almost
every aspect of the CPEC is mired in some controversy or difficulty.
There have been criticisms in provincial assemblies over the routing of
the railways and highways, and over non-transparency in financial
matters.
There has also been opposition from Baloch nationalists and Gwadar
residents. While the Balochis fear large-scale migration of outsiders
and have attacked Chinese projects and workers, the people of Gwadar
fear eviction from their homes. A dedicated force of 10,000 personnel
has been deployed to protect the Chinese workers.
While both China and Pakistan remain committed to the successful
completion of the proposed projects, this flagship proposal does
exemplify the daunting difficulties that other OBOR projects will face
as well. To divert attention from these problems, Pakistans army chief
General Raheel Sharif declared that India has openly challenged the
CPEC and is blatantly involved in destabilising Pakistan.
Fourth, interactions with other countries appear to have made clear to
China that there are misgivings about the OBOR in several Asian
capitals. Hence, Chinese writers are at pains to assert that the OBOR is
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capitals. Hence, Chinese writers are at pains to assert that the OBOR is
nothing like the Marshall Plan: it is not the result of occupation; it will
not be a tool of geopolitics; and all countries, the US, Japan, Russia
and India, are welcome to join it.
To allay regional misgivings, Yan Xuetong advocated that China needs
to improve its image and expand friendly relationships through a
new diplomatic approach in the neighbourhood. Chinese comment
now tends to play down the geopolitical aspects of the OBOR: the need
for greater sensitivity and accommodativeness is the central feature of
the vision document and action plan. The paper upholds the
centrality of policy coordination across Asia, the need for trade
liberalisation and financial integration, and above all, the importance of
promoting people-to-people links. It recognises that the OBOR
would be meaningless without policy coordination in crucial areas
such trade, finance and investments.
Thus, though initiated by China, the OBOR can no longer be a Chinese
project; for its success, it now needs to be an Asian enterprise.
Multi-polar Asia
In his remarks at the inauguration of the Raisina Dialogue, Jaishankar
urged that China eschew the unilateral approach in promoting its
connectivity projects on account of their obvious geopolitical
implications. In this context, he observed that such a cautious
approach was particularly important in Asia in the absence of an
agreed security architecture in Asia. Instead, he advocated a multipolar Asia, which he felt would be best achieved through openminded consultations on the future of connectivity.
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Workers transfering goods from a cargo container to trucks at the Kalantari port in city
of Chabahar, Iran | AFP
Jaishankars intervention has placed the connectivity issue at the heart

of emerging regional and global strategic scenarios, highlighting the
importance of matters such as the nature of the world order that is
taking shape at present, what role India will assume to define it, and
where it will finally fit itself in these structures. Unfortunately, the
discussion on these issues, in India and in several other world capitals,
is often distorted by zero-sum thinking, a simplistic view that
separates us and them into firm dichotomous categories. This is
also what informs much Indian academic response to initiatives and
projects with which China is associated.
There is little doubt that, as a major country, with pride in its history
and civilisational values and the sense of its own destiny, China will be
Indias rival and will compete for influence in different sectors
geographical, political, economic, cultural and ideational. But, this will
still leave huge spaces where there will be a convergence of interests,
and it is here that the two nations will explore how they can
coordinate their capabilities to achieve the best results. Such
cooperative efforts will take place both bilaterally and within
multilateral fora, such as the BRICS, G-20, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation and even the UN Security Council; they can also take
place in regard to the OBOR.
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Also read: Ishrat Husain on the corridors of power between Beijing and
Islamabad via CPEC
Both countries accept the importance of expanding connectivities in
Asia, a continent that is rich in resources but unable to move these to
markets where they are required. If connectivity projects were to be
negotiated among the various stakeholders and decisions taken in
accordance with the cooperative spirit, the strategic value of the
projects would increasingly give way to their more important
economic value, which would be the true win-win that Chinese
policymakers have been emphasising lately. This would open the space
for an active Indian role in respect of projects that serve its interests,
such as BCIM-EC and those that would promote links to Central Asia
and Russia.
This would apply to the security scenario as well. In coming years, it is
most unlikely that a neat Asian security architecture will be put in
place. At the same time, no sharp, dichotomous lines are likely to
divide major world powers immutably. We will continue to have several
polarities representing diverse interests, with different poles coming
together from time to time to support specific issues. India will of
course need to manoeuvre actively among the various interest groups,
depending on the issues at stake.
Thus, while India has every reason to watch developments relating to
Gwadar with close attention, there is no reason to despair: India is not
without assets of its own in the shape of its place at Chabahar and its
naval partnership with Oman. Indeed, India enjoys far greater
influence in the Gulf than China does and is a more acceptable roleplayer in addressing the security concerns of that region in conflict.
The major powers in the region Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey will
also avoid firm alliances with world powers and, like India, will
generally pursue policies of flexible alignment. A multi-polar Asia
already exists and India is an important part of it.
There is no need to fear the OBORboth the OBOR and China need
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There is no need to fear the OBORboth the OBOR and China need
India as a partner.
This was originally published in The Wire, India
The writer is the former Indian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and
the UAE.
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Silk Road To (Economic) Heaven - Perspective

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Silk Road To (Economic) Heaven - Perspective

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7/18/2016

ew Delhi is concerned about the China-Pakistan Economic

adopt on the Chinese-sponsored logistics project, One Belt, One Road

to the Mesopotamian and Egyptian empires and culminated in Greece

pipelines, and major energy projects.

energy reserves. It will consist of 900 infrastructure projects, valued at

of the Russian Greater Europe project that would have linked

Chinese scholar Tingyi Wang of Tsinghua University has explained that

Pakistans Gwadar Port | AFP

Gwadar will be developed as a deep-water port capable of handling

aims its violence at targets in China and also at Chinese interests in

Also read: An in-depth report on the pursuit of Kashmir

stability of Afghanistan, besides of course confronting the

South Asia, valued at 5 billion US dollars.

An OBOR-related project that involves India directly is the

strategically important connectivity projects in its neighbourhood,

Second, China has already begun to understand the daunting

infrastructure connectivity, free movement of goods, financial

Jaishankars intervention has placed the connectivity issue at the heart

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