The ‘Voter’s Uprising’ that is changing perceptions in THAILAND

April 2009
Junya Yimprasert
This article was first distributed at a Consultation on ‘Gender, Development and
Decent Work:
Building a Common Agenda’, OECD Headquarters, Paris, 27th April 2009.
Some errors in the initial draft have been corrected. A fully accurate account o
f the chaos and turmoil of the recent weeks, months and years in Thailand is not
possible.
FOREWORD
After the September 2006 military coup that deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shina
watra we pointed-out that whatever the justifications used to legitimise the Cou
p, the action of the military was as disloyal as always to the legitimate demand
s of the people, and we made a simple observation: “. . if there is going to be
anything resembling sustainable development in Thailand, the emphasis in Thai po
litics must be on making sure that the political demands of the new, urban class
es are satisfied without further undermining the livelihoods and life-styles of
the agrarian community upon which the future of Thailand depends.”.

Part One
80 years of struggle for democracy
End of absolute monarchy 1932
At dawn on 24 June 1932, the tiny People s Party Khana Ratsadon carried-out a li
ghtning and bloodess coup d’état that abruptly ended 150 years of absolute monar
chy under the Chakri Dynasty, and opened the way to democracy for Siam (Thailand
), but the road has been painful.
Khana Ratsadon consisted of an elite group of civilians, government officials, a
ristocrats and military officers. The coup was led by Pridi Phanomyong with Lieu
tenant Colonel Pibulsongkhram in charge of the military wing. Completely unknown
to the people of Siam, within the space of a few hours Siam was changed from an
absolute to a constitutional monarchy. The new but military-dominated Governmen
t introduced a Charter which did at least aim at some kind of democracy.
Khana Ratsadon came into power with the announcement of six primary tasks:
v To maintain absolute national independence in all aspects, including political
, judicial and economic...
v To maintain national cohesion and security...
v To promote economic well-being by creating full employment and by launching a
national economic plan...
v To guarantee equality for all...
v To grant complete liberty and freedom to the people, provided that this does n
ot contradict the afore-mentioned principles and...
v To provide education for the people.
Royalist opposition to the coup was strong and the Permanent Constitution that w
as adopted in December 1932 returned some authority to the Monarchy, but in 1935
King Prajadhipok, tired of the power-play, decided to abdicate.
Thailand’s first ‘democratic’ elections were held in 1933 - for half of the 156-
seat so-called People’s Assembly, the other half being appointed. This was the f
irst time that women were given the right to vote and stand for election. (It to
ok until 1949 for Thailand to actually elect a woman MP.)
The 1932 Constitution stated that sovereign power was held by the people of Siam
(Thailand), but in practice, after 77 years, such times have still not yet arri
ved.
Pridi v. Pibun
Pridi Phanomyong is none-the-less regarded as the founder of Thailand’s still na
scent democracy. Pridi was born in Ayutthaya in 1900 to a family of well-off ric
e farmers. He was an exceptionally bright student and completed law school studi
es in Thailand at the age of 19 and, with the help of a Thai government scholars
hip, completed doctoral studies in law, economics and politics at the Sorbonne i
n 1926. In Paris he founded the Khana Ratsadon with a group of Thai that include
d a young officer called Plaek Pibulsongkhram. In 1927 Pridi returned to Thailan
d and began a fast rise through the hierarchy.
Plaek Pibulsongkhram, known commonly as ‘Pibun’, was a graduate of the Royal Mil
itary Academy in Thailand and in France for advanced military tuition. After the
1932 coup d’état he fashioned himself into the first of a long string of Thai g
eneralissimos, functioning as Thailand’s war-time Prime Minister from 1938 to 19
44 and as an acting-Prime Minister or Dictator between 1948 and 1957.
Pridi worked assiduously for the six objectives of the Khana Ratsadon, and in 19
34 he and others founded the University of Moral and Political Science, known to
day as Thammasat University.
Between 1933 and 1946 Pridi served as Minister of Interior, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Minister of Finance, as Regent and as Prime Minister. As Minister of Fo
reign Affairs (1935 - 38) he oversaw the signing of the treaties that revoked th
e extra-territorial rights of 12 countries, thus returning Thailand to (almost)
complete independence for the first time since the Bowring Treaty with Great Bri
tain in 1855.
In 1938, as Prime Minister, the strongly anti-Chinese Pibun, opposed by Pridi, c
hanged the name of Siam to Thailand.
When the Japanese invaded Thailand in December 1941 and pro-Japan Pibun saw how
easily they pushed the British out of Malaysia, Pibun declared war on the Wester
n Allies - in January 1942.
Pridi refused to sign the declaration of war and was removed from Government. Wi
th Thailand’s still un-crowned King Ananda Mahidol being schooled abroad, Pridi
was given the symbolic rank of Regent, and it was as Regent that the thoroughly
anti-Japan Pridi turned to building the underground Free Thai Movement (Seri Tha
i).
With the war coming to a close the out-of-favour Pibun was ousted by the Seri Th
ai Movement, and Pridi became Thailand’s 7th Prime Minister in March 1946 - for
a few months.
In September 1945 an exhausted Thailand was glad of a visit from their young Kin
g-to-be, who was studying law in Switzerland, and in May 1946 they also welcomed
-in Pridi’s new Constitution, this time with a fully-elected 176-member House of
Representatives.
On 9 June 1946 young Mahidol, still only 21, was found in bed in the Grand Palac
e in Bangkok with a bullet through his head. Pibun the Dictator accused Pridi th
e idealist of being involved in the regicide, and Thailand descended into chaos.
(The truth behind the death of the King has remained shrouded in mystery. The e
xecution, on grounds of complicity in suspected murder, of two of the King’s ser
vants and a Senator in 1955 satisfied nobody.)
In November 1947 a powerful group of officers (including Sarit Thanarat and Than
om Kittikachorn, both dictators-to-be) staged a coup. Armoured vehicles were dis
patched to storm Pridi’s residence, but Pridi was already on his way to Singapor
e. Pibun, now a self-appointed Field Marshal, tore-up the 1946 Constitution and
took-on the role of Prime Minister.
To neutralise the House of Representatives, Pibun replaced Pridi’s 1946 Constitu
tion with a Charter that gave the Monarch a Supreme State Council, a 100-member
Senate and many other powers, including the right to declare martial law.
After a failed attempt at a come-back in February 1949, Pridi fled alone to Chin
a, leaving behind his wife, Phoonsuk, and six children. This so-called ‘Palace R
ebellion’, during which Pridi occupied the Grand Palace, was easily crushed by P
ibun, but not without some hours of heavy, street-fighting between Pibun’s milit
ary and Pridi’s supporters - who included the Royal Thai Navy. Immediately after
the Rebellion four socialist MPs (ex-Cabinet ministers) and many other leaders
were caught and executed without trial.
In China, Pridi was well-received by Zhou Enlai. In November 1952 Phoonsuk and h
er eldest son Pal were charged with offences against the internal and external s
ecurity of the Kingdom. During 84 days in detention, Phoonsuk slept on the floor
of a small cell with two other women, but never requested bail. When freed in F
ebruary 1953 she went in search of her husband, who she knew was somewhere in Ch
ina. In December 1953 she joined him with 2 of their six children. Pal joined th
em in 1957, after his release from prison. In China the family was more than wel
l-provided for, but, to be able to better connect with the world and with Thaila
nd, in 1969 the family moved to a small house in the Paris suburbs, where Pridi
died peacefully in May 1983. His passing was totally ignored by the Thai State.
After years of work to clear accusations, eventually, in 1999, the UNESCO Genera
l Conference added the name of Professor Dr. Pridi Phanomyong to the list of the
world’s Great Personalities. In 2005, on International Women’s Day, Than Phuyin
g Phoonsuk Phanomyong, President of the Pridi Phanomyong Foundation in Bangkok,
received the ‘Outstanding Women in Buddhism Award’ for her peaceful courage in t
he face of grave personal hardship and political crises.
Pibun’s 1949 Constitution turned the Supreme State Council into the King’s own P
rivy Council, gave the King the sole right to appoint all members of the Senate
and ruled that the House of Representatives required a 2/3 majority to over-rule
a royal veto.
In short the model of royalist-military control over the political life of the p
eople of Thailand was cast for the next 60 years.
At the age of 23, Bhumibol Adulyadej, younger brother of the deceased Ananda Mah
idol, was crowned King on 5 May 1950.
Coups, rebellions and popular revolts (incomplete):
1912 Palace Revolt (First movement for democracy)
1932 Coup d’État (end of absolute monarchy)
1933 Royalist coup (June)
1933 Royalist coup (‘Boworadet Rebellion’, October)
1935 Rebellion of the Sergeants
1939 Songsuradet Rebellion (royalists)
1947 Military coup
1948 Army General Staff Plot (anti-Pridi)
1949 Palace Rebellion (Pridi’s attempted come-back)
1951 Manhattan Rebellion (Navy rebellion, June)
1951 Military coup (‘Silent Coup’, November)
1953-55 Peace Rebellion (Uprising and crack-down)
1957 Military coup
1958 Military coup
1964 Air force Rebellion
1971 Military coup
1973 Uprising (October)
1976 Uprising and crack-down (October)
1976 Military coup (October)
1977 Military Rebellion (March)
1977 Military coup (October)
1981 Military rebellion (Young Turks)
1985 Military rebellion (Young Turks)
1991 Military coup
1992 Uprising (‘Bloody May’)
2006 Military coup
2009 Uprising (‘Voter’s Uprising’, April)
During the years of Pibun’s dictatorship, King Bhumibol remained a ceremonial fi
gure, but as Pibun’s power waned and social unrest grew, Pibun was challenged by
the man who had defeated Pridi’s coup - General Sarit Thanarat. In 1957 Pibun w
ent to the King for support. The King refused him and asked Pibun to resign. Whe
n Pibun refused, Sarit seized power in a US-backed, pro-royalist military coup.
The King imposed martial law and declared Sarit ‘Military Defender of the Capita
l’. Pibun fled to Japan, where he died in 1964.

Cold War and the ‘People’s War’

Since 1932 the people of Thailand have had to face more than 20 attempted or suc
cessful military coups. The people have had to deal with 18 constitutions and 27
Prime Ministers, most of them military generals. In the 77 years since 1932 onl
y one elected Prime Minister has managed to complete the full 4-year term (the n
ow self-exiled, convicted, embattled Thaksin Shinawatra).
In 1954 the Vietminh pushed the French out of Vietnam and fear of communist insu
rgency took hold in Thailand.
The dictatorship of Field Marshal Sarit, and of those that followed him, concent
rated on building-up and promoting the role of the monarchy - mainly to legitimi
se their oppression of the poor (and their personal corruption). The military re
-introduced palace ceremonies to the Affairs of State and used billions of publi
c money to build palaces and royal projects all over the country, especially in
the north, north-east and south where they faced strong opposition from local po
pulations e.g. in the Phupan Mountains (1975) and in Songkla Province (1975) and
in the Khaokao Mountains (1985).
In this civil war, sometimes called the ‘People’s War’, which raged on into the
1980ies, hundreds of thousands of poor people were mindlessly classified as ‘com
munists’ and a threat to monarchy. Thousands went ‘missing’, were imprisoned wit
hout trial and/or murdered.
Sarit the monarchy-builder died in 1963 and received a royal cremation. His deat
h revealed the full depth of his personal corruption. Besides the 50 or so mistr
esses he retained, the squabbles over his fortune exposed the existence of wealt
h in terms of thousands of hectares of land, dozens of houses and hundreds of mi
llions in cash. He was replaced immediately by General Thanom Kittikachorn, his
long-time stand-in-dictator. In a public show against corruption Thanom confisca
ted 600 million Baht from Sarit’s ‘estate’ and returned it to Government use. Th
anom then appointed himself Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal, Admir
al of the Fleet and Marshal of the Royal Thai Air Force etc., and continued Sari
t’s pro-American, anti-Communist politics, thus ensuring himself massive US econ
omic and financial aid during the Vietnam War.
Between 1950 and 1987 the US provided Thailand with more than 2 billion USD in m
ilitary assistance.
From the early 1960ies Thai society was exposed, for the first time, to the full
onslaught of mainstream western culture, especially American culture. The growi
ng communist insurgencies in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia coupled with demands to
modernise Thai society placed the people of Thailand under enormous new pressure
s. Huge amounts of foreign capital flowed into the country to support not only t
he military build-up but the development of new infra-structure - the roads, dam
s, irrigation schemes and administrative centres required to tame and control th
e provinces and promote the so-called Green Revolution. As well, to sustain itse
lf as an independent nation-state, Thailand needed hospitals, schools and univer
sities. Forest cover was reduced from 53% to a mere 28% between 1961 and 1989. D
uring the same period the population doubled, from just over 26 million in 1960
to 54.5 million in 1990.
Millions of small farmers found themselves unable to cope with the Green Revolut
ion’s cash crop imperatives and the rising cost of living. Millions left the lan
d in search of money in the increasingly export-oriented industrial sprawl of Ba
ngkok. The Cold War years in Thailand, dominated by Thai militarism, American mi
litary bases, Green Revolution and export-oriented industrialisation, introduced
Thai society to the idea that - there’s nothing money can’t buy (50 000 GIs = 5
0 000 ‘GI-women’).
Extreme exploitation of cheap labour led to increasing industrial unrest and, as
the level of education rose, increasing numbers of young people became increasi
ngly critical of the Vietnam War, Thailand’s deep involvement with US imperialis
m and the immensely corrupt, autocratic character of the Thai state.

Uprising and crack-down - October ’73 & ’76

By October 1973, general public unrest reached a climax. Hundreds of thousands o
f students, workers, farmers and new middle-class intellectuals gathered in demo
nstrations on the streets of Bangkok - demanding an end to 10-years of despotic
rule under Thanom.
On 14 October 1973, when tens of thousands of people demonstrating the arrest of
13 student leaders at Democracy Monument began moving to the Palace to appeal t
o the King, they were assaulted by the army with hand-grenades and by machine-gu
n fire, both from the ground and from a helicopter - in which the son of Field M
arshal Thanom (Lt-Colonel Narong Kittikachorn) is reported to have been manning
the machine-gun. About one hundred students were murdered and several hundred wo
unded.
The King, faced by the largest public demonstration ever seen in Bangkok, was fo
rced to step into the open. Thanom was requested to leave the country and the Ki
ng appointed a new Prime Minister. However, the pride of the Thai military, well
-stuffed by the US and others, remained irked by the constantly increasing publi
c unrest.
By 1976 the military-controlled mass-media was letting it be known that killing
‘communists’ was OK - like ‘making merit’, and political assassinations had beco
me commonplace.
On 6 October 1976, in the name of “Nation, Religion and King”, a large force of
military and para-military thugs (New Force, Village Scouts, Red Gaurs etc.) mov
ed against students at Thammasat University who were protesting the return of Th
anom. (Thanom, in the robes of a monk, had been welcomed back to Thailand by the
royal family.)
According to official figures, on campus and in the adjacent Royal Grounds of th
e Grand Palace, 41 students were shot, burnt alive or beaten to death in an orgy
of violence, with over 700 wounded. Unofficial figures say many more.
Many of the students not imprisoned on that day fled to the ranks of the Communi
st Party of Thailand (CPT) in the jungle and villages, and hundreds of student l
eaders from universities all over Thailand followed them. They became known as t
he ‘October People’.
Three decades of fearfully destructive civil war led eventually to the issuing o
f an Amnesty by Prime Minister Prem in 1980. The CPT disappeared from the stage
and many of the October People returned to political life - as university lectur
ers, human-rights activists, NGO leaders and entrepreneurs, to the Democrat Part
y and some eventually to Thaksin’s party. Thanom himself lived-out his life in l
uxury and was given a royal cremation.

Prem’s era
General Prem Tinsulanonda, Thailand’s current ‘Master-of-military-coups’, Prime
Minister from 1980 - 1988, member of the Privy Council since 1988 and Chairman s
ince 1998, loves to play middle-man between the Monarchy and the Government and
the general public. He himself survived two attempted military coups - by the Yo
ung Turks - during his time as PM. (Note: All of the 18-member Privy Council are
appointed by the King. About half are Army Chiefs of Staff and the remainder fo
rmer Chief Justices, Prime Ministers etc.)
Prem managed the military coup of 1991 and the crushing of the May 1992 uprising
, and enjoyed architecting the military coup that ousted Thaksin in 2006, for wh
ich purpose he went around preaching (effectively it seems) that military and ci
vil service personnel are ‘Servants of the King’.
In fact Prem stands accused of kicking-out four elected Prime Ministers - Chatch
ai Choonhawan in 1991, Thaksin in 2006, Samak in 2008 and Somchai in 2008. Immed
iately after he had Abhisit, the current Prime Minister, in place in April 2009
he made a public address to explain what a good PM he will be.
After 40 years in politics ‘Pappa Prem’ continues to wield much power in Thailan
d.
For the tens of millions of people beaten-down by decades of military dictatorsh
ip, it required yet another bloody uprising in May 1992 to crack the walls so ca
refully built to exclude them from participation in governance.
The Bloody May massacre of 1992 saw 48 citizens shot dead in the streets of Bang
kok.
In a by-that-time standard procedure, the King stepped-out (after the massacre)
to mediate the uproar and appoint a new Prime Minister.
It took another 5 years of struggle after the Bloody May massacre to establish a
so-called People’s Constitution in 1997, and another 8 years before an elected
Prime Minister was able to complete a full 4-year term (in 2004).
Rise and fall of Thaksin (1994 - 2006)
Thaksin Shinawatra (59), of Chinese descent, was born into a wealthy merchant fa
mily in Northern Thailand, from Chiang Mai. He graduated from the Thai Police Ca
det Academy in 1973, studied criminal justice in the US, and reached the rank of
lieutenant colonel in the metropolitan police (in Thailand) before moving openl
y into business in 1987 and politics in 1994. Thaksin seemed to enjoy being on t
he front-line and, enormously ambitious, succeeded in becoming Thailand’s first-
ever elected PM to complete a 4-year term in office (2001 - 2004).
Thaksin did not appear strongly anti-Royalist. He did his best to buy the accept
ance and support of the monarchy. His style and approach to governance was that
of the corporate CEO, welcomed by some but alien and somewhat abhorrent to much
of the hierarchy that perceived him as a threat to the established order. He ran
fast over, around and under the Establishment when partnership did not suite hi
s purpose.
On the domestic front he managed a ‘rural-poor populist strategy’ which gave him
his solid majority in the electorate. In 2001 he kick-started Thailand’s first
ever universal health-care scheme - the ‘30 Baht Scheme’. He oversaw the impleme
ntation of a ‘0ne Million Baht Village Fund’, a scheme that provided every villa
ge in Thailand with a one million cash bonus to be administered at will. He atte
mpted to promote village productivity and assisted farmers in managing their deb
t burden. He introduced cheap loan programmes for low-income people to buy house
s and even taxis. How much of all this was political opportunism and how much ge
nuine concern is largely irrelevant. The rural poor, in the villages of Thailand
, yearned to be respectfully acknowledged. They were grateful and gave him their
support. He also promoted a vision of Thailand as the ‘Kitchen of the World’, n
ot an especially flattering title, but one that did underscore the importance of
the agricultural sector in Thailand’s future.
His ‘War on Drugs’ he did pursue with the most reactionary elements of the Estab
lishment. The countryside was cleaned-up - for a while, but some 2 500 people, i
nnocent and otherwise, lost their lives, often mercilessly. This brought him man
y enemies, especially amongst the NGOs and, needless-to-say, the drug trade is f
lourishing again.
With regard to foreign policy, his over-enthusiasm for neo-liberal globalisation
and the right he bestowed upon himself to negotiate as well as sign Free Trade
Agreements with less than minimal or zero consultation with those affected, was
much less than welcome. The immediate and long-term damage caused by Thaksin’s m
egalomanic manoeuvring on the global stage will take years to repair.
Also, without reserve, Thaksin channelled money to his own family. He was perhap
s no more crooked than the others, he just out-manipulated them at their own gam
e - in business and politics. In other words, in the mind of the Establishment,
Thaksin had to be got rid of. He has only his own super-ego to blame for his dow
nfall.
In February 2005 Thaksin won a landslide victory with 67% of the vote (19 millio
n votes), but in Thailand that still means next to nothing. His best enemies had
already decided that he had to go. A military coup was staged for September 200
6 - when Thaksin was in New York attending a meeting of the UN General Assembly.
Despite the usual tanks-in-the-streets phenomenon, the coup that deposed Thaksi
n’s government turned out to be bloodless. Convicted in-absentia for violating p
olitical ethics Thaksin has yet to return to Thailand.
The King approved the military junta that replaced Thaksin’s government, and thu
s also the restoration of Thailand’s customary feudal order - for a few more mon
ths.
The 2006 junta began as the ‘Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional
Monarchy’ but, a little too obvious, the name was soon changed to the Council fo
r National Security.

Part Two
3 years of PAD chaos
The People’s Alliance for Democracy, the PAD, was founded by the Bangkok media t
ycoon Sonthi Limthongkul in February 2006, for the purpose of bringing-down Thak
sin.
Sonthi had been an ally of Thaksin - declaring at one time that Thaksin was the
best PM that Thailand had experienced, but they parted company and, in mid-2005,
with accusations of corruption and disloyalty to the Crown, Sonthi turned again
st Thaksin. When Thaksin shut-down Sonthi’s TV programme, Sonthi launched his ow
n 24-hour Asia Satellite TV.
With ASTV increasingly effective as a tool for spreading negative gossip about T
haksin, Sonthi was able to ally the State Enterprise Labour Relation Confederati
on with members of the Democrat Party and with a wide assortment of NGOs, celebr
ities, intellectuals and civil servants. Decked-out in yellow, this assortment o
f mainly middle-class Bangkokians called itself the People’s Alliance for Democr
acy.
Claiming that Thaksin was the sole cause of Thailand’s innumerable problems, and
completely ignoring the fact that, whatever Thaksin was not, he was a legally e
lected PM with a huge electoral majority, the PAD conjured-up some ‘new politics
’ which included replacing most elected politicians with appointed “good people”
. Appointed by who was left to imagination.
The Democrat Party boycotted the 2006 election and refused to acknowledge that 1
6 million Thai had voted for Thaksin. The PAD slandered Thaksin’s voters, mainly
small farmers, as illiterate morons too ignorant to participate in democracy. T
he Democrat Party and PAD let it be known that they wanted the King to intervene
and appoint a new PM, but the King considered that proposal out-of-order.
The PAD placed itself in a win-or-lose situation and, with slogans like ‘Thaksin
out no matter what’, began to court the assistance of like-minded military.
The September 2006 military coup was sprung, as said, when Thaksin was in New Yo
rk - a bloodless Coup with press pictures of pretty Bangkokians posing with flow
ers as chums of soldiers and tanks.
Immediately after the Coup many of the intellectual elite, whose feathers Thaksi
n had ruffled for one reason or other, came forward with the usual platitudes ‘.
. although the Coup was wrong we could do nothing about it.’ . . ‘For the sake
of the nation it is best for all to allow the Junta to arrange a new election’.
Etc.
The Junta’s first step was to annul the hard-won People’s Constitution of 1997.
The second step was to give General Surayud Chulanont, a member of the Privy Cou
ncil, a list of tasks that included forming a new Government, writing a new Cons
titution, dissolving Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT), arranging a General El
ection, and increasing the military budget by 33%.
General Surayud became Thailand’s 24th Prime Minister in October 2006 and schedu
led a General Election for December 2007.
Thaksin, wrongly or rightly accused of rigging the 2006 General Election, saw hi
s TRT Party dissolved by the Constitutional Court on 13 May 2007.
Of the 377 elected Members of Parliament in the TRT Party, 111 of the leading MP
s were banned from politics for 5 years. Those not banned had just enough time f
or a re-mould before the December election and stood for re-election as the Peop
le Power Party (PPP). The Thai Parliament has 480 seats.
The election of December 2007 was the third electoral contest between ‘Thaksin’s
people’ and the Democrat Party.
With Thaksin in self-imposed exile and 111 of his leading MPs banned from politi
cs, the way seemed clear for the Democrat Party and, with the eager support of t
he PAD, the Democrat Party campaigned vigorously with high hopes of victory.
But, alas alack, Thaksin’s people won the day, with the PPP taking 233 seats (wi
th 14 million votes), leaving the Democrat Party with 164 seats.
Again the PAD leadership, which included a Democrat Party MP, refused to accept
the result, and resumed their agitation: all traces of ‘Thaksin cronyism’ and hi
s ‘family business’ must be wiped from the pure face of Thai politics.
Short on leaders, the PPP set up government under the large frame of Samak Sunto
rnvej, best known for his interest in cooking.
By this time the PAD leaders were on their way to losing their cool altogether,
clarifying their new democracy model with a proposal that 70% of MPs should be g
ood people appointed by good people and only 30% elected.
The PAD’s actions became increasingly wild and lawless.
In May 2008 yellow-clad PAD demonstrators laid siege to Government House. The Ro
yal Thai Army and Royal Thai Police informed PM Samak that they were unable to c
lear Government House. Reason, law and order began to disintegrate. After 3 mont
hs of siege, on August 26 the PAD mob (yellow-shirts) occupied Government House.
It seems that the State Enterprise Labour Relations Confederation had promised
a General Strike, but in the event only some sectors of the Confederation respon
ded.
For three months Thailand’s Cabinet was chased around Bangkok by the PAD until t
he Chiefs of the Army and Police suggested to Samak that he dissolve the Parliam
ent, but this didn’t suit the Democrat Party - who had no chance of winning an e
lection. The PAD ‘strategy’ worked better with ‘Samak out’, but Samak was in no
mind to give in easily, so he gave the Premiership to Thaksin’s brother-in-law,
Somchai Wongsawat, which did nothing to please the PAD. Somchai achieved the dis
tinction of becoming the first PM in Thailand to have never seen the inside of G
overnment House.
The PAD became increasingly provocative. At the start of October demonstrators a
ttacked National Broadcasting TV, the Ministry of Finance and several other gove
rnment buildings, cutting their water and electricity supplies.
On 7 October the PAD mob attacked the Parliament House - and what a fiasco. Unde
r Government orders the Royal Thai Police attempted to defend the Parliament but
(without military backing) found themselves in a sticky situation. The PAD mob
fought magnificently with ping-pong bombs, catapults, bricks and metal pipes, st
abbing at police with flagpoles and staves and attempting to run them over with
pickup trucks. Democrat Party leaders were cheered out of the main entrance of t
he Parliament House while PM Somchai & Company had to escape by climbing over a
fence. In clouds of tear gas the police were beaten back and ended-up defending
their own Bangkok Police Headquarters. Five police received gunshot wounds, one
front-line PAD woman died and one of the PAD‘s own para-military leaders (an ex-
police lieutenant) died when the bombs he was carrying in his own car exploded o
utside Parliament House. In total, according to the Public Health Ministry, 443
people were wounded.
The PAD leadership had frequently indicated that they had support in the Palace.
This claim seemed validated when the Queen, a princess, members of the Privy Co
uncil and the military high command and leaders of the Democrat Party, including
Abhisit, showed-up for the cremation of the dead PAD woman. For the Thai public
this was their ‘Eye-opening Day’.
Never-the-less, Somchai, with his Cabinet in retreat in the north of Thailand, w
as proving a tougher-than-expected cookie and showed no signs of capitulation. I
ncreasingly desperate the PAD’s actions became increasingly desperate.
On 25 November the PAD mob descended in free-style on Bangkok’s ultra-modern int
ernational airport (a successful Thaksin project). With strong indications that
the Palace was supporting the PAD, the Police and Army did no more than shuffle
their feet, and the PAD mob had no problem in taking-over and completely shuttin
g-down both of Bangkok’s international airports and four other important airport
s including Phuket. Their action stranded more than 80 aircraft and 300 000 tour
ists and stopped all international and domestic flights for over a week.
On 26 November the Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army proposed that Somch
ai dissolve his cabinet and that the PAD stop demonstrating, but nobody agreed.
And so, on 2 December, the Constitutional Court stepped-in once again and ordere
d the dissolution of the PPP and also the two other main parties of Somchai’s go
verning coalition. On 3 December the PAD left the airports and ended their demon
strations.
At long last Abhisit Vejjajiva, the Eton and Oxford educated leader of the Democ
rat Party and active PAD supporter, was able to proffer himself to the exhausted
and depleted Parliament. On 15 December Abhisit finally acquired his much await
ed Premiership, and proceeded immediately to reward PAD leaders for their effort
s, most notably with the portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In the street fighting between May and December 2008 about 800 people were wound
ed and 8 people died. More than 160 legal cases have been filed against the PAD,
but as yet no disciplinary action has been taken by any authority against any P
AD leaders or supporters. (The Police are said to be investigating!)
All this has, naturally, contributed to a growing sense of disgust amongst the m
ajority of the population, and also to a growing anger.
Already on 2 September 2008 there had been a street battle between PAD yellow-sh
irts and the red-shirts of the new United Front for Democracy against Dictatorsh
ip (UDD) that was gathering strength to oppose them. In that battle 40 people we
re wounded and one red-shirt beaten to death.

Frustration boils over

After watching in sober amazement as the great and powerful Thai forces of law-a
nd-order sat back and allowed the yellow-shirts and royalists to take their lega
lly-elected Government hostage, wreck Government House, attack Parliament House,
occupy both of Bangkok’s main airports and four other international airports, a
nd after watching the blatant manipulations that brought Abhisit and his Democra
t Party to power, the level of disgust felt by many sectors of the voting public
in Thailand reached boiling-point.
When the UDD called for mass-mobilization a red wave of protest began rising ove
r the landscape.
On 26 March 2009 people began to assemble outside Government House - this time i
n red shirts. By 8 April half a million protestors representing a wide spectrum
of grass-root civil organizations were making their presence felt through peacef
ul assemblies, not only in Bangkok but also in about 40 of Thailand’s 77 provinc
ial capitals.
After nearly 80 years of non-stop political corruption, uprisings, coups and vio
lent oppression, it is obvious to most outsiders that the root cause of the fail
ure of democratic procedure in Thailand stems from fear of the monarchist establ
ishment’s carefully accumulated instruments of power, which, as each crisis of g
overnance emerges, are used to execute whatever is required to ensure that the m
ajority of Thai people cannot participate effectively in the political life of t
he country.
In Bangkok in April, the number of people protesting their frustration with the
State administrators, in particular with the Privy Council, reached around 300 0
00, the largest number of protesters on the streets of Bangkok since 1973.
As usual, during times of direct confrontation between the people and their patr
ons, in April 2009 Thailand’s mainstream media failed to provide the public with
accurate reportage on the scale or ferocity of either the uprising or crack-dow
n, and, as usual, in the people’s hour of crisis, studiously side-stepped the re
al reasons why hundreds of thousands of people representing tens of millions of
rural, urban and industrial workers, were demonstrating.
In this manner Thailand’s hamstrung mainstream media usually contributes to the
confusion and, by default, to the deepening of social divisions.

ASEAN Summit violence

The eager-beaver Abhisit Government had planned an ASEAN Summit for 10 - 13 Apri
l in the east coast resort of Pattaya. Anti-Abhisit demonstrators went to Pattay
a to deliver a statement to the ASEAN Secretary General - to underline the fact
that Abhisit had no mandate from the people to represent Thailand.
The Statement was delivered to the ASEAN Secretary General in the Pattaya Hotel
on 10 April, by about 2 000 people. However, some Abhisit aides had, foolishly,
already given the green light to para-military royalist forces to disrupt the de
monstration. As the protesters withdrew from the hotel they were attacked by abo
ut 500 thugs with ‘Protect the Monarchy’ across their shirts.
Thousands of people from Bangkok and Pattaya moved rapidly to support the anti-A
bhisit protest in Pattaya. On the morning of 11 April several thousand descended
on the Pattaya Hotel. The Summit was cancelled. Abhisit, his authority badly st
ung, fled the scene in a Blackhawk helicopter, vowing to restore law-and-order a
nd declaring the red-shirts the "enemies of the nation".
To this point in time the somewhat divided Police and Army had kept themselves o
ut of the play, but some units did respond to Abhisit’s call for help in Pattaya
. The leader of the protesters in Pattaya was arrested by police in the early ho
urs of 12 April and then handed to the Army.
After the arrest of the Pattaya leader, a former TRT MP, the confrontation betwe
en the Government and the protesters passed out of all control.

The battle for D-Station

On 12 April Abhisit declared a state-of-emergency in and around Bangkok, and iss
ued orders for demonstrators to be cleared from outside Government House within
4 days, and for all UDD communication channels to be cut, especially their on-li
ne satellite TV, the so-called Democracy Station, ‘D-station’ or DTV, that had b
een set-up in January (2009) to counter the PAD’s ASTV.
For UDD leaders responsible for the demonstration at Government House it was ess
ential to be able to maintain communication with the vast number of demonstrator
s in different parts of Bangkok, with their tens of millions of supporters acros
s Thailand e.g. in the provincial capitals of Chiang Mai, Udon Thani and Khon Ka
en, with the Thai public in general, as well as with the international community
. In other words ‘D-station’, their only communication channel, had to be defend
ed.
In the afternoon of 12 April army units with tanks and armoured vehicles started
to appear on the streets in different parts of Bangkok, moving in on Government
House where red-shirts had set-up road-blocks. Exactly who gave the orders rema
ins unclear. The movement of the troops appears to have been somewhat un-coordin
ated, some units displaying more resolve than others, with some covering the nam
e of their units to avoid being identified.
Violent confrontation broke-out at Din Daeng, an important inter-section just no
rth of Government House, with the military resorting to tear gas and live ammuni
tion.
A 500-strong column of regular soldiers, commandos with automatic weapons and a
humvee mounting a 50mm machine gun advanced to take control of a ThaiCom buildin
g in north Bangkok, where several hundred demonstrators had gathered to guard ‘D
-station’ transmission.
In the still dark hours of the morning of 13 April a wide area around Government
House was turned into a war zone, with chaotic fighting between red-shirts, arm
y units, para-military gangs and also local residents that formed gangs mainly t
o defend local people and property. The battles raged out-of-control for several
hours. From Din Daeng violence spread to other parts of the city. And there are
reports of ‘non-red’ people being paid to commit arson and so on. Many innocent
people were caught-up in the ruckus.

Withdrawal
Din Daeng fell to the army at around 07.30, Victory Monument at around 12.30. Ar
my units with tanks and heavy machine guns closed-in on Government House. With r
ed-shirt numbers dwindling UDD leaders, with arrest warrants on their heads, sur
rendered on the morning of 14 April - to avoid further bloodshed. They were take
n to different army camps, charged for a variety of crimes and later released on
bail for sums in the region of 10 000 euro.
Amidst the lies, cover-ups and exaggerations, accurate casualty figures take tim
e to emerge - in Thailand often months or years. Two people were shot dead. At l
east 100 people were wounded, some by gunfire. About 20 soldiers were wounded. S
ome reports say more than 50 people are missing. In military crack-downs in Thai
land, the military usually take care to remove the dead or near-dead from the ba
ttlefield e.g. as in the May 1992 uprising, when about 20 of the 46 bodies known
to have been removed by the military were never seen again.
Exactly who was responsible for what will never be acknowledged, but the people
ask - and the ASEAN and the International Community must ask - what in the name
of hell is the reason why tanks and heavy infantry keep appearing on the streets
of Bangkok?
Summation
It is not famine, poverty or money that is bringing the poor onto the streets in
their hundred of thousands, nor a great love of Thaksin the business tycoon - a
lthough he did play a significant role with his ‘phone-ins’ urging revolution.
As poor people will do everywhere, the tens of millions of poor people in Thaila
nd are rising in protest because they can no longer abide the autocratic double-
standards of their patrons and administrators, a perfect example of which is pro
vided by Abhisit, twice defeated in elections, active supporter of the long list
of yellow-shirt major crimes, and now, as Prime Minister, himself throwing oppo
sition leaders in jail.
The people came onto the streets demanding . .
- reinstatement of their hard-won People’s Constitution (1997);
- a General Election to bring back electoral justice;
- a stop to the non-stop interference of the King’s Privy Council under General
Prem Tinsulanonda in the struggle of the Thai people for their democratic rights
.
The military crack-down in April was all too familiar. Abhisit may have received
some praise from above, but it will be the brave, grass-root women and men who
stand firm for the democratic rights of the people who will be honoured in Thai
history, not Oxford graduates who order tanks and commando units to confront the
legitimate protests of the poorest citizens with live ammunition.
2009 is no longer 2006, no longer 1992 and no longer 1976. After 80 years of str
uggle and quasi-democracy, Thailand’s new generation pro-democracy activists hav
e decided to stand their ground. As the new wave of democracy activists grows, t
he autocrats will find it harder and harder to paint their strategies with yello
w and gold.
The UDD leaders were arrested and charged. The PAD leaders that vandalised Gover
nment House, attacked Parliament House and attacked and occupied international a
irports now sit smug in a royalist government.
How come the International Community finds playing-along with the sick games of
the Thai power-elite so easy? How come it is still talking and wheeling and deal
ing with Thailand? Is the body-count too low? It would not be difficult for the
International Community to condemn the forms of suppression and oppression pract
iced in Thailand. It would be so refreshing for all if they would.
Beneath the marketed image of Thailand, tens of millions of poor people are bein
g actively, cruelly, and also artfully, prevented from realising their potential
as citizens of the 21st century.
The ‘surrender’ of the people’s leaders in April 2009 marks not the end but the
beginning of a new phase in the struggle of the poor to remove the corrupt hiera
rchies that block their road to equal rights, democracy, sustainable development
and peace.
Part Three
The specter of civil war?
Besides the loss of just a dozen or so lives and a few hundred injured here and
there, what has three years of PAD-inspired, Palace-supported, political chaos p
roduced?
The September 2006 military coup had several objectives: to destroy the 1997 Peo
ple’s Constitution, to weaken the power of elected Government and to strengthen
the power of bureaucracy in the name of the Monarchy.
The recent years of political chaos have brought a raft of ugly, new legislation
, for instance: Section 17 of the Emergency Decree of 2005 (introduced by Thaksi
n) exempts, in very loosely defined ‘emergency situations’, high-ranking persons
, state officials and police from civil, criminal or disciplinary liability prov
ided that their actions are ‘performed in good faith, non-discriminatory and not
unreasonable in the circumstances’. In other words the decree openly breeches T
hailand’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil an
d Political Rights.
Thailand’s archaic Lès Majesté laws (from the Latin laesa maiestas ‘injury to ma
jesty’) are being increasingly abused, and the Democrat Party is attempting to r
aise the penalty for alleged disrespect for Monarchy from 3 - 15 years to 5 - 20
years imprisonment.
In Thailand today there is growing a miserable kind of sickness around Lès Majes
té, as people have started to sneak information to the authorities about whom th
ey think is being disrespectful, or not respectful enough. It is a sickness than
can wipe the last real shine from the smile of the Thai - a very debilitating s
ickness.
With regard to international trade, after ousting Thaksin the military Junta jus
t jumped straight into his shoes, adopting exactly the same non-democratic appro
ach to negotiating Free Trade Agreements. (In April 2007 General Surayad signed
a wide-ranging, far-reaching FTA with Japan that was already in force by Novembe
r.)
When Abhisit finally reached power he distributed 2000 Baht (40 euro) to 8 milli
on employed people as some kind of ‘stimulus package’, but somehow forgot the 23
million informal sector workers (small farmers, self-employed and un-employed).
The 2006 military coup and last 3-years of chaos have been thoroughly successful
in increasing distrust of the state machinery and Monarchy, and in deepening th
e divide between rich and poor.
On the positive side the chaos has served to shake-up the grass-root sectors and
the more enlightened sectors of the middle-class. Thailand is experiencing a ne
w wave of farmers, factory workers, students, academics and grass-root movements
that are determined to resist being bottled-up as pawns, fodder and bell-boys f
or the benefit of Thailand’s image, own greedy elite and multi-national corporat
ions.
New wave fighters for democracy
During the 19 September Coup in 2006, Nuamtong Praiwan, a 60 year-old taxi-drive
r and life-long human rights activist, rammed his taxi into a military tank. He
survived the impact but decided to complete his protest by hanging himself on 31
October 2006. His decision sent a shock-wave through Thailand’s grass-root comm
unities, and a warning to Thailand’s increasingly self-indulgent middle-class th
at the ‘un-educated’ know and care about the meaning of democracy.
The name of Nuamtong has been raised again and again in the pro-democracy moveme
nt. Bangkok has over 100 000 taxi-drivers. On 8 April 2009 taxi-drivers came in
large numbers to assist the red-shirt protest outside Government House. On 9 Apr
il many took action to jam the streets of Bangkok. On 10 April several hundred t
axis were engaged in transporting people from Bangkok to the protest against Abh
isit’s ASEAN Summit in Pattaya. When the Army brought tanks onto the streets of
Bangkok on 12 April, taxi-drivers risked their taxis and their lives to block th
e tanks and protect the people.

New wave cyber army

When all media channels were cut or tightly censored in the May 1992 Uprising, i
t was telephones and fax machines that mobilised people and kept them informed.
In April 2009 it was the people’s cyber army that kept information flowing.
Calling for the Government to crush the red-shirts, the chat boards of conservat
ive reactionaries showed their concern for the image of Thailand in relation to
economic stability, foreign investment and tourism.
With Abhisit doing all possible to control the media, the cyber chat boards supp
orting the people’s protest played an important role in countering the absurd ac
cusation that the red-shirts were wreaking havoc with Thailand’s fragile ‘stabil
ity’.
With little or no space in Thailand’s mainstream media for airing their thoughts
and feelings, the new wave of people’s representatives in cyber space are worki
ng hard to by-pass censorship, and inform and warn their sisters and brothers of
the dangers they face and why.
Through cyber space the irony of the military crack-down in April is identified
as a clone of the 1976 crack-down - 33 years ago. Through cyber space the absurd
ity of needing mass demonstrations in the 21st century to oppose institutions of
monarchy is discussed and analysed. Through cyber space people across the natio
n are being brought closer to discussion about why, when it comes to welfare and
services, civil servants, academics and white collar workers receive preferenti
al treatment.
How come the poor are accused of being a threat to ‘stability’?
The regular citizenry needs little help to understand that it is not they who ha
ve sent Thailand into recession, and it is not they who are the reason why Abhis
it is now begging for 23 billion USD.
The poor know that it will be they who suffer in the struggle to pay-back Abhisi
t’s loans - the debts of the elite. The Thai know only too well that the wealth,
privileges and splendour of the high echelons of Thai society are entirely depe
ndent on the schemes the ruling elite maintain to limit the participation of the
tens of millions of poor people in genuine, democratic procedure.
After the ‘surrender’ of the red-shirt leaders in April, the chat boards became
a source of comfort, a space where poor people could share events as they had ex
perienced them, and their frustration at being confronted with yet another milit
ary crack-down.
The cyber army plays an important role in helping to track and inform on the hea
lth and whereabouts of arrested leaders, and in the search for the dead and miss
ing. In countering government-controlled misinformation the chat-boards throw up
important questions. What kind of government blocks discussion on real issues a
nd permits statements like ‘red-shirts are not Thai, not human and should be sho
t on sight’? How come the Monarchy, Army, Police and the whole academic communit
y do not actively condemn such incitement?
The poor are becoming increasingly conversant with understanding that the ‘stabi
lity’ they are being accused of disrupting is, in term of sustainable developmen
t, a false construct.
In speaking to the crowd, a co-ordinator of the Farmer’s Network said . . “Farme
rs have been classified as illiterate fools when it comes to democracy, but we h
ave always participated in the people’s demonstrations against dictatorship - in
1973, 1976, 1992 and 2006. We were never strong enough, but if the military cra
ck-down on demonstrations this time, the farmers will block every road to Bangko
k..”
The anger of poor working women was in evidence throughout the April uprising. W
omen took a leading role in the action at the ASEAN Summit in Pattaya. After Abh
isit declared a ‘state-of-emergency’ in Bangkok it was women who found and chase
d him. It was women who commandeered public buses to block the roads against mil
itary tanks. In our struggle for democracy the stories of these bold working-wom
en will be cherished.

Love or fear of monarchy?

Thai people are educated to love their monarchy unconditionally and unquestionab
ly. The problem is that people face the 21st Century, not the 19th Century. The
Thai have no other option than to question the repetitiveness of military crack-
downs on the legitimate interests of the majority of the population.
As citizens of a world that has now identified and agreed to stand-up for univer
sal human rights, modern-day Thai are duty-bound to question the use of Lès Maje
sté laws which, with origins in Ancient Rome, have always been related to the bo
lstering of political power. All phenomena can be connected but most people agre
e that the connection between Lès Majesté laws and love is tenuous and, in today
’s world, nothing less than highly suspect.
It would be extremely foolish for the Palace and the Army to ignore the extent t
o which people all across Thailand (and across the world) are questioning the re
lation between their Monarchy and their Parliament.
Largely silenced by fear of Lès Majesté laws, Bangkok-based media is no longer a
ble to represent the majority of the people of Thailand and, consciously or not,
tends to aggravate rather than mediate the growing divide between the interests
of the rural community and those of the new urban middle-class.
Some observers avoid confrontation with the, at present, increasingly odorous ap
plication of Lès Majesté laws, by saying they will fade with time. That’s for su
re, but in the meantime, in both passive and active form, they continue to prote
ct the vast, capital wealth and business interests of the Monarchy (by far the r
ichest Monarchy in the world). Thailand’s Lès Majesté laws are an effective tool
for constructing the image of ‘the land of smiles’, a cruel instrument that dip
lomatic missions love to compliment and multi-national sharks love to exploit. F
or them Thailand is Paradise.
If in the 21st century the specter of civil war rises over the horizon of a coun
try that is endowed with all the natural resources that any society could ever h
ope for, there must be some substantial reasons.
All analysis of Thailand’s current domestic crisis places the Monarchy at the ep
icentre of debate, that is to say - the Palace and Privy Council face real probl
ems - surely not because of the poor people but because of what they do.
Thailand needs a Royal House and the Thai want to love their King and Queen, and
so can it be, when the Royal House recognises that it must make way for democra
cy. It would make life much easier for the Royal Household if it did.
In the modern world, military Juntas are an anathema, a truly ugly phenomenon sy
mbolising retarded governance.
Are the ASEAN peoples going to allow their future prospects to be over-ruled by
a resurgent militarism?
Together for democracy
The growth of the Port of Bangkok was no accident, and nobody has benefited more
than the Crown Property Bureau - the wealthiest landlord in the world.
Nobody wants a yellow-red confrontation in Bangkok to drag Thailand any further
into the mud, let alone to civil war.
Thailand’s rural communities and urban poor are just saying that ‘We’ve had enou
gh . . of seeing our lives degraded. We are no longer prepared to vote for the i
nterests and well-being of the urban middle-class. Why should we?’.
Too many Bangkokian academics and journalists have become accustomed to imaginin
g that their own voices are the only voices that matter.
Why should the rural people tolerate double-standards cooked in Bangkok - by Abh
isit and his so-called Democrat Party? Because this party knows it cannot win at
the ballot box?
Why should the small farmers, the rural blood of Thailand, and their children wh
o slave in export-oriented Free Trade Zones, allow themselves to be manipulated
out of existence in the name of ‘economic stability’? Who’s economic stability?
The rural blood of Thailand is Thailand. Without healthy, productive, joyous rur
al communities Thailand is nothing - an empty soap-box tied-up with a yellow ban
d.
We all need to protect ourselves from the excesses of the neo-liberal capitalist
agenda, which by definition places economic stability above social welfare and
is, beneath all propaganda about democracy and freedom, too frequently just wait
ing to party with privy councils and wink at military juntas.
The current, predicted, expected and necessary melt-down of the trans-national g
lobal finance institutions provides a moment for people across the planet to re-
assess the politics of liberation - bottom-up. This is now happening in Thailand
, but the people’s pro-democracy movement in Thailand needs to be recognised by
people on the outside. This is important because the success of the pro-democrac
y movement in Thailand has great significance for the whole Indo-China Peninsula
, for not just tens but for hundreds of millions of poor and displaced persons.
In the current economic depression nobody can know what the future will be, but
in the name of peace, justice and human rights, in the name of sustainable devel
opment, challenging unjust ‘comparative advantage’ and the pyramids of capitalis
m is the sanctioned order of the day.
In fact Thaksin Shinawatra did his bit. He was responsible for his own downfall,
but he can be thanked too, and will be well-remembered by the rural poor - for
letting them know that they exist and are important in their own right, and for
kick-starting a new wave of resistance against autocratic governance.
The current phase of struggle of the rural peoples of Thailand is extremely impo
rtant, not just because they form the majority of the population, but because th
e future of the economy of the planet is all about food security and investment
in organic productivity. What happens in Thailand with respect to rural cultures
and traditions and to the hugely valuable knowledge of Thailand’s small farmers
and fisher-folk has significant impact on what happens to cultural and biologic
al diversity across the whole Indo-China Peninsula, and thus also, as one of the
most productive and simultaneously bio-diverse areas of the planet, on the futu
re of all humankind.
For Thailand’s sake (and the Monarchy), it is absolutely necessary for the rural
communities - the workers, the women and men of the land that are the true guar
dians of this great ‘garden of the world’ - to stand their ground and not stoop
to the low practices of the PAD and Abhisit’s mis-named Democrat Party.
The red-shirts in Thailand, who have fought so many battles over the past 70-80
years, need the recognition, support and solidarity of worker and small farmer m
ovements around the world.
The villages of Thailand still have honest women and men. New leaders will rise
to throw-off the cobwebs of intrigue and the dross of Americanisation - to re-es
tablish the dignity of the people of Thailand in the light of common struggle to
rebuild the global economy on a sound, organic, sustainable, egalitarian founda
tion.
The days of compromising the fundamental principles of human rights in order to
serve fabricated concepts of ‘economic stability’ designed to feed false concept
s of progress are at an end.
The privileged civil servants and urban middle classes need to understand that t
hey face a choice: share the profits of progress with the farmers and workers (u
pon the strength of whose backs our life-style depends) or face a civil war whic
h cannot be won.
The common aim of all self-respecting Thai has to be the strengthening of parlia
mentary democracy. The half-baked, half-wit schemes the mess of Thai politics pr
oduces, like the PAD’s 70:30 (or was it 74:26?) proposal for appointed and elect
MPs, must be placed where they belong - in the garbage can with the ice-cream w
rappers.
One can note here that the People’s Constitution of 1997 was also far from perfe
ct. For instance the worker’s movement is campaigning to remove an article - tha
t appeared for the first time in 1997 - stipulating that only ‘bachelor degree p
eople’ can stand for election to Parliament - and so on.
Democracy is not a ‘western invention’. In some form or other democracy has exis
ted and been practiced throughout human history, to some degree or other, whenev
er and wherever people can experience life without dictatorship - from the Kalah
ari to the Amazon to Greenland to the Tibetan Plateau to the villages of Norther
n Thailand.
Democracy belongs to the natural process of the evolution of human consciousness
. It is not a product of greed or capitalism. As a viable alternative to dictato
rship, it evolves and emerges, through - and as result of people having to face
the management of - population growth, increased literacy, diminishing non-renew
able resources, increasing economic risk, and our common-sense demand for peace
and establishment of social, egalitarian civilization.
There is no escape from democracy in the 21st century - and no need to avoid it.
In a world where all are literate, in contact with each other and looking at the
 future with hope, interest and honest, common concern, a ‘Parliament of the Peo
ple’ cannot be evaded or avoided.
The symbolic Head of State, the Faith of the Land, and the Military, have nothin
g to fear from a ‘Parliament of the People’, if they have the moral courage, hon
esty and wisdom to respect the decisions of the majority.
Closing words
For more than 70 years parliamentary democracy in Thailand has been hopping arou
nd with it’s feet tied - one step forward one step back and down again, in some
kind of a pathetic ‘dance with the generals’.
Today the people of Thailand are in the process of cutting the thongs that preve
nt them from growing-up into the 21st Century. Contemporary photos of civilian r
ed-necks taking control of tanks in the streets (whatever the colour of their sh
irts) are symbolic of the fact that, in the world today, educated, regular, rank
and file soldiers are loathe to act against civilians.
The people of Thailand are tired of divisive authority, of seeing and hearing op
pressed fractions of the population beaten-down and crushed whenever and whereve
r they attempt to make themselves heard. Thailand as a society is tired of seein
g legitimate human interests, whether those of the small farmers or the Muslims,
or the hill tribes or the millions of Thai sweat-shop workers, or millions of B
urmese migrant workers, seconded to preservation of the image of a glittering, h
egemonic hierarchy.
There will be no peace or stability or maturity of mind and spirit in Thailand u
ntil the institutions of the Monarchy stop abusing power and wealth. The militar
y generals that created Thailand’s post-war Monarchy - with billions in US ‘AID’
, have totally failed to balance the two main, perfectly compatible requests of
the Thai people - to have a Monarch they can love and a just, healthy, democrati
c order.
The extremes of behaviour seen in Thailand today are tearing the country into pi
eces. The threat of a protracted, messy, underground civil war, which could dest
abilise the whole region, is once again fouling the horizon.
By constantly appealing to the monarchy to settle their differences, Thailand’s
intelligentsia is forever delaying the need to grow-up - to be responsible, to t
ake responsibility for the on-going poverty of tens of millions of our own peopl
e, not to mention responsibility for scenes of tragic carnage in our streets.
Who is responsible for the on-going oppression of the hopes of the poor - for re
cognition and justice? Is it colonialism, the big-bad-outside-world, some secret
inside mystical force? Or could it be the Thai people themselves who are respon
sible for their own suffering?
What kind of ‘Thai-ness’ is this that we practice now: this occasional, almost r
itualistic granting of permission to occasionally kill a few dozen people on the
pretext that this avoids a greater body-count?
Is this what Thailand calls democracy? Is this the Thai-ness with which we want
to identify, with which we want to be identified?
The traditional state policy of allowing the state bureaucracy, at every level,
to exploit the Monarchy for the purpose of legitimising suppression and oppressi
on of poor people must be radically reversed - through the establishment of real
parliamentary democracy. This is the only way Thai people can prevent themselve
s from becoming a joke on the global stage, if not a failed state.
The current Thai government has no democratic legitimacy.
Thailand needs a General Election now, but acting-Prime Minister Abhisit knows h
e cannot win. He will delay a General Election for as long as possible, in order
to be able to take maximum advantage of state-controlled media and all the othe
r subversive weapons that corrupt State administration has managed to accumulate
during decades of corrupt power-building. In other words, Abhisit and the neo-l
iberal elitists are ‘banking’ on their own wishful thinking that time is on thei
r side - that resistance to their collective hypocracy will fade!
Once again the Thai electorate, especially the poor and working classes, is, yet
again, having to face the spectacle and phenomenon of gross, governmental corru
ption.
It is Thailand’s increasingly alienated masses, not their rotten government, tha
t needs the support of the international community, of the movement of Global Un
ions and civil rights activists around the world - who probably also need to dis
card at least some of the dazzling image they may have of Thailand, and take mor
e notice of ground-level realities in Thailand, and the relation between ground-
level realities in Thailand and the political stability and welfare of the whole
region.
The ASEAN has failed the people of Burma and cannot afford to repeat such incomp
etence.
With the Thai Monarchy at the centre of a potentially massive, violent furore, i
t is to be hoped that Thailand’s Royal Household will see the light of day and u
se their influence to instruct their Privy Council to revise itself, support the
return of the People’s Constitution and permit a free and fair General Election
before the yellow-red civil war, which the Privy Council has fostered, makes th
e situation impossible for all.
In the 21st century ‘stability’ resides on the other side of a door called unive
rsal human rights, and Abhisit’s cabinet cannot, as we say, ‘cover the sky with
their hands’.
The people will not retreat, the red-shirts will not turn yellow and the world w
ill not stop watching Thailand’s super-rich Monarchy and it’s bevy of generals i
n the Privy Council.
The Thai want to love their Monarchy, and may continue to do so if the generals
would be the gracious gentlemen they would like to be, and let the people get on
with the work of building democratic institutions, and let the Royal Household
get on with the Royal Household’s work of setting a true example - in honesty, h
umility, tolerance, compassion and self-sufficiency, for which military assistan
ce is not required.
I wish to say that this was a difficult article to start writing, because it tal
ks about things which people in Thailand don’t dare talk about. Having written w
hat I have written I feel a strong sense of release, and I know that I want to s
hare this feeling with 60 million other people in Thailand, especially with wome
n and with all our young, new wave democracy fighters.
◊ ◊ ◊ ◊ ◊ ◊ ◊
Note of acknowledgement.
I could not write this article without assistance from a native English speaker
who has a compassionate understanding of Thai history and the struggle of rural
people to maintain their livelihoods, dignity and respect. I thank my friend Rik
u for his assistance with this article. JY.