Pascual (illegitimate) vs Pascual (legitimate)

Facts: Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother
of the decedent Don Andres Pascual.
Don Andres Pascual died intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious
children and was survived by his surviving spouse (Adela Soldevilla de Pascual), Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr.,
brother of the full blood of the deceased (Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose C. Pascual, Susana
C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.) brother of the half blood of the deceased, Children of
Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased (AvelinoPascual, IsocelesPascual, LoidaPascual-Martinez,
Virginia Pascual-Ner, Nona Pascual-Fernando, Octavio Pascual, GeranaiaPascual-Dubert), Acknowledged natural
children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased (Olivia S. Pascual, Hermes S. Pascual), Intestate of
Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented by (Dominga M. Pascual, Mamerta P.
Fugoso, Abraham S. Sarmiento, III, Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay, Eleuterio P. Sarmiento, Domiga P. San Diego, Nelia P.
Marquez, Silvestre M. Pascual, Eleuterio M. Pascual)
The surviving spouse, filed with the RTC, a case for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband.
On December 18, 1973, surviving spouse filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration,
where she expressly stated that the acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual (Olivia Pascual and Hermes
Pascual), are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual.
Again, the surviving spouse executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the
younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that
they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual.
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT which provides
that the Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the
final determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual
and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual., over the vehement objections of the herein
petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual.
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia
Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their
uncle.
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in
Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights before the RTC but was denied.
Thereafter, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed their case to the CA but was also denied.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue/s: Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural
children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Ruling: YES. Petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate
estate of the decedent Andres Pascual.
In Diaz v. IAC,
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted
to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the
right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the
persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right
of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate
grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to
represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate
child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992.
Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state Article
982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children are transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.
Note: Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.

Bravo vs Bravo
Facts: Spouses Mauricio Bravo and Simona Andaya Bravo owned two parcels of land registered under TCT Nos. 58999
and 59000 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on 23 May 1958. The Properties contain a large residential dwelling, a
smaller house and other improvements.
Mauricio and Simona had three children - Roland, Cesar and Lily, all surnamed Bravo. Cesar died without issue.
Lily Bravo married David Diaz, and had a son, David B. Diaz, Jr. ("David Jr."). Roland had six children, namely, Lily
Elizabeth Bravo-Guerrero ("Elizabeth"), Edward Bravo ("Edward"), Roland Bravo, Jr. ("Roland Jr."), Senia Bravo,
Benjamin Mauricio Bravo, and their half-sister, Ofelia Bravo ("Ofelia").

Simona executed a General Power of Attorney ("GPA") appointing Mauricio as her attorney-in-fact. In the GPA,
Simona authorized Mauricio to "mortgage or otherwise hypothecate, sell, assign and dispose of any and all of my
property, real, personal or mixed, of any kind whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any interest therein
Subsequently, Mauricio mortgaged the Properties to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP) for P10,000 and P5,000, respectively.
Mauricio executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage ("Deed of Sale") conveying the
Properties to "Roland A. Bravo, Ofelia A. Bravo and Elizabeth Bravo ("vendees"). The sale was conditioned on the
payment of P1,000 and on the assumption by the vendees of the PNB and DBP mortgages over the Properties.
Deed of Sale was notarized by Atty. Victorio Q. Guzman and entered in his Notarial Register. However, the Deed
of Sale was not annotated on TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000. Neither was it presented to PNB and DBP. The mortage loans
and the receipts for loan payments issued by PNB and DBP continued to be in Mauricios name even after his death on 20
November 1973. Simona died in 1977.
Edward, represented by his wife, Fatima Bravo, filed an action for the judicial partition of the Properties. Edward
claimed that he and the other grandchildren of Mauricio and Simona are co-owners of the Properties by succession.
Despite this, petitioners refused to share with him the possession and rental income of the Properties. Edward
later amended his complaint to include a prayer to annul the Deed of Sale, which he claimed was merely simulated to
prejudice the other heirs.
David Jr., whose parents died in 1944 and who was subsequently raised by Simona, moved to intervene in the
case. David Jr. filed a complaint-in-intervention impugning the validity of the Deed of Sale and praying for the partition of
the Properties among the surviving heirs of Mauricio and Simona. The trial court allowed the intervention.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court upheld Mauricios sale of the Properties to the vendees. The trial court ruled that the sale did not
prejudice the compulsory heirs, as the Properties were conveyed for valuable consideration. The trial court also noted that
the Deed of Sale was duly notarized and was in existence for many years without question about its validity.
Court hereby DENIES the JUDICIAL PARTITION of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
Dissatisfied, Edward and David Jr. ("respondents") filed a joint appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC, declared the Deed of Sale void and ordered the partition
of the Properties.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue/s: Whether or not a co-owner may demand the partition of the common property.
Ruling: YES. Any co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has
repudiated the co-ownership.
Petitioners have consistently claimed that their father is one of the vendees who bought the Properties. Vendees
Elizabeth and Ofelia both testified that the "Roland A. Bravo" in the Deed of Sale is their father, although their brother,
Roland Bravo, Jr., made some of the mortgage payments. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Paggao, made the same clarification
before the trial court.
As Roland Bravo, Sr. is also the father of respondent Edward Bravo, Edward is thus a compulsory heir of Roland
Bravo, and entitled to a share, along with his brothers and sisters, in his fathers portion of the Properties. In short, Edward
and petitioners are co-owners of the Properties.
As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partition of the Properties. Any co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This action for partition does not
prescribe and is not subject to laches.

Manuel vs Ferrer
Facts: Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated the suit. During his
marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel
was born.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a
donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other
parcels of land were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their
own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold
and so raised her as their own "daughter".
Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period
of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his. Juan Manuel died intestate. Two years later, Esperanza Gamba also
passed away.
A month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the
three parcels of land (all still in the name of Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication with
the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles were issued
in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar.
Thereafter, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and
Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the
1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the
aforesaid instruments.

The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a quo for summary judgment.
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate
brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.
Consequently, Petitioners' filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the trial court.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue/s: Whether or not legal heirs can inherit from the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate without
any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Ruling: NO. Under Article 992, An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain", firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie and,
then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court and De la Puerta v. Court of
Appeals. In Diaz, we have said:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and
the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood,
but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family
there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled:
1. That where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the
former's inheritance;
2. That the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child;
3. That a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the
legitimate grandparent;
4. That the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate
brother of her natural father; and
5. That an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father.

Chua vs CFI of Negros Occidental

Facts: Jose Frias Chua was married with Patricia S. Militar alias SyQuio he sired three children, Ignacio, Lorenzo and
Manuel.
When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with
whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929,
Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the second
marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first marriage.
In Intestate Proceeding, the lower court issued an order adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of
Lot and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot in favor of
Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of
Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication, TCT was issued by the Register of
Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of the Lot.
Thereafter, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother
Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of the Lot.
Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her
son Juanito as a result of which TCT covering the whole Lot was issued in her name.
Then, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line
except her brother and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage
and dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the
first marriage filed the complaint before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying
that the one-half (1/2) portion of the subject Lot which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to Consolacion
de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declared as a reservable property for the reason that the lot in question was subject
to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code, Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of
individually the complaint of petitioners.
Consequently, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner.
Hence this instant.
Issue/s: Whether or not that the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal. (Instant petition is focused on the first
requisite of reserve troncal - Whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose
Frias Chua, gratuitously or not)
Ruling: YES. The lot in question is subject to reserva troncal.
In Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient
does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges;
what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it,

without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does
nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, "the essential thing is that the person who transmits
it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation."
It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second
marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.
Record
(Exh. "D") of the Probate Court in Intestate Proceeding No. 4816
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon
Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will
and testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931. As long as
the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the
property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. it does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs,
in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20. This does not
change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. This being the case the lot in question is
subject to reservatroncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.

Notes: The pertinent provision of reserve troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which said
property came.
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the
following requisites must exist, to wit:
(1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous
title;
(2) that said descendant died without an issue;
(3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came.

Cano vs Director of Lands

Facts: In a different case, the CFI of Sorsogon issued an order the Lots No. 1798 and 1799 be registered in the name of
Maria Cano but with the understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to the right of reservation in favor of Eustaquia
Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of the Civil code.
In October 1955, counsel for the reserve (reservatorio) Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral Court, alleging
the death of the original registered owner and reservista, Maria Cano, praying that the original Certificate of Title be
ordered cancelled and a new one issued in favor of movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and that the Sheriff be ordered to place
her in possession of the property.
The motion was opposed by Jose and Teotimo Fernandez, sons of the reservista Maria Cano, who contended
that the application and operation of the reserve troncal should be ventilated in an ordinary contentious proceeding, and
that the Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the motion.
In view of the recorded reserva in favor of the appellee, as expressly noted in the final decree of registration, the
lower court granted the petition for the issuance of a new certificate, for the reason that the death of the reservista vested
the ownership of the property in the petitioner as the sole reservatorio troncal.
The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order, insisting that the ownership of
the reservatorio cannot be decreed in a mere proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496, but requires a judicial administration
proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as the reservatorio entitled to the reservable property, are to be declared. In
this connection, appellants argue that the reversion in favor of the reservatorio requires the declaration of the existence of
the following facts:
(1) The property was received by a descendant by gratuitous title from an ascendant or from a brother or sister;
(2) Said descendant dies without issue;
(3) The property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging the line from which said property came.
Issue/s: Whether or not the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista.
Ruling: NO. Reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of
the reservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), said
property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's
lifetime.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the
prepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts
of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by the reservatario may be entered in the property records without necessity of estate
proceedings, since the basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled that the reservable property
cannot be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa,(like appellants herein) so long as

a reservatario within the third degree from the prepositus and belonging to the line whence the property came, is in
existence when the reservista dies.
Notes:
Reservatario Guerrero
Reservista Maria Cano
Reservable Property Lot No. 1799