Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176830
SERENO, CJ.:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd
Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay
Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1 The mass grave contained skeletal remains
of individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease"
(Operation VD) launched by members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the
Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military
informers.
While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally precludes a direct
invocation of this Courts jurisdiction, we take cognizance of these petitions
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry
Brigade of the Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan,
Leyte.4 Recovered from the grave site were 67 severely deteriorated
skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation VD. 5
The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team based in Regional
Office 8 was immediately dispatched to the mass grave site to conduct
crime investigation, and to collect, preserve and analyze the skeletal
remains.6Also, from 11-17 September 2006, an investigation team
composed of intelligence officers, and medico-legal and DNA experts,
conducted forensic crime analysis and collected from alleged relatives of
the victims DNA samples for matching.7
The Initial Specialist Report8 dated 18 September 2006 issued by the PNP
Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was inconclusive with
regard to the identities of the skeletal remains and even the length of time
that they had been buried. The report recommended the conduct of further
tests to confirm the identities of the remains and the time window of
death.9
However, in a Special Report10 dated 2 October 2006, the Case
Secretariat of the Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal Action Group
(IALAG) came up with the names of ten (10) possible victims after
comparison and examination based on testimonies of relatives and
witnesses.11
The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of
Operation VD. All of them swore that their relatives had been abducted or
last seen with members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never seen
again.
They also expressed belief that their relatives remains were among those
discovered at the mass grave site.
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral arguments that the
single Information filed before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte was defective for
charging 15 counts of murder, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Information and New Informations on 11 April 2007. 47 In an
Order dated 27 July 2007, Judge Abando held in abeyance the resolution
thereof and effectively suspended the proceedings during the pendency of
G.R. No. 176830 before this Court.48
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested
on 28 January 2008 by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge
Abando on 6 March 2007.49 On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and
Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of
Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative
Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant.50
On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order denying the
motion.51 Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for
Reconsideration52 dated 30 May 2008, but before being able to rule
thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order dated 12 June 2008 transmitting
the records of Criminal Case No. H-1581 to the Office of the Clerk of
Court, RTC Manila.53 The Order was issued in compliance with the
Resolution dated 23 April 2008 of this Court granting the request of then
Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales to transfer the venue of the case.
The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila) presided
by Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina (Judge Medina) and re-docketed as
Criminal Case No. 08-262163.54 Petitioner Echanis was transferred to the
PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 12 August 2008,
petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their Supplemental Arguments to
Motion for Reconsideration.55
In an Order56 dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the
proceedings of the case pending the resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this
Court.
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners. 109
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as
"such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested."110 Although the Constitution provides that probable
cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or
an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a
hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof. 111 In fact, the
judges personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not
mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a
warrant of arrest.112
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report
and supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for
the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on
the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the
prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.113
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando
painstakingly examined the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the
judge would have inevitably dismissed the charge against
them.114 Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not
point out facts and evidence in the record that were used as bases for his
finding of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. 115
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando
as the trial judge.116 Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial
judges in the issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba
v. Sandiganbayan117 as follows:
killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive
of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.124
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were
committed in furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the
political motivation behind the alleged murders can be clearly seen from
the charge against the alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as coconspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation
must be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which
only the accused knows.125 The proof showing political motivation is
adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to
present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to
determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga
Del Norte v. CA,126 if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the
alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion,
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information
may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any
time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial,
a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it
can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of
the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its
reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished
all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint
or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail
for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have
been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges
upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners
would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a
first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.127
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent, by a competent court in a valid indictment for which
the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment. 128
Ocampo shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by
this Court until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila.
Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G. Baylosis and Vicente P. Ladlad
shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court
until their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace
negotiations with the government are concluded or terminated, or until the
termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is
sooner.
SO ORDERED.
ROSALINDA PUNZALAN AND RAINIER PUNZALAN, complainants,
vs. JUDGE RUBEN R. PLATA, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Respondent Judge Ruben Plata is a judge and a father. As a judge,
he is hidebound to the judicial canon that he should "avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all his activities." [1] As a father, he has a
moral duty to care for and protect his family. In his effort to defend his
family at the expense of propriety, he sullied his judicial robe and must
therefore pay the price.
On February 18, 1998, Precioso R. Perlas and Ma. Teresa C.
Manansala, on behalf of complainants Rosalinda B. Punzalan and Rainier
B. Punzalan, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a Sworn
Complaint against respondent judge for grave misconduct, lack of moral
character and oppressive conduct unbecoming a judge.
The following facts gave rise to this complaint.
1. I.S. No. 97-11648 or Criminal Case No. 68742 for grave threats
allegedly committed on October 21, 1997, filed by Rolando Curampes and
Robert Cagara against Randall Punzalan, Rainier Punzalan, et al;
2. I.S. No. 97-11427 or Criminal Case No. 68848 for malicious mischief
committed on August 13, 1997, filed by Rosario J. Plata against Randall
Punzalan, et al.;
3. I.S. No. 97-11427 or Criminal Case No. 68849 for malicious mischief
committed on August 30 and 31, 1997, filed by Rosario J. Plata against
Rainier Punzalan, et al.
For maliciously causing the filing of these allegedly unfounded cases,
complainants seek the dismissal of respondent judge on the following
grounds, viz:
"(a) GROSS MISCONDUCT
8. I.S. No. 97-11766 for robbery allegedly committed on October 25, 1997,
filed by Judge Ruben R. Plata and Michael Plata against Randall Punzalan
and eleven eyewitnesses;
9. I.S. No. 97-11765 for malicious mischief allegedly committed on October
25, 1997, filed by Michael Plata against Randall Punzalan and eleven
eyewitnesses;
10. I.S. No. 97-11492 for grave threats allegedly committed on October 30,
1997, filed by Michael Plata against Rosalinda Punzalan.
xxxxxxxxx
A GOOD JUDGE invites the "peaceful settlement of disputes in the
community". A BAD JUDGE on the other hand,
encourages STRIFE, DISSENSION and DISCONTENTMENT in the
community.
The deliberate filing of the above false and concocted thirteen (13)
countercharges in such a flagrant and shameless manner clearly
demonstrates a serious flaw in the character of the respondent to be
anexemplary and respectable Member of the Bench.
xxxxxxxxx
Had Judge Plata been an ordinary law practitioner, his desperate attempt
to defend his son by unethically resorting to the Macheviallian (sic)
strategy of "OFFENSE IS THE BEST DEFENSE" would be
understandable. But being an incumbent and presiding Judge of a Court of
the Republic who among others, had sworn as follows'xxx; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I
will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; xxx.'
his oppressive conduct is simply UNACCEPTABLE not only to the legal
profession as a whole but more particularly to the other respectable
members of the Judiciary.
case ignores the fact that the exercise of the power is not for the purpose
of enforcing civil remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the
public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his profession. He
had acted in clear disregard of his duty as an attorney at the bar, and
without 'good fidelity' to his client. The public had rights which Mrs. Curtis
could not thus settle or destroy. The unworthy act had been fully
consummated. xxx"[27]
Lawyers are officers of the court tasked with aiding the court in its
dispensation of justice. There are weightier reasons why investigations
and complaints against judges should not be settled or compromised for
judges not only aid in the dispensation of justice but dispense justice
themselves. Respondent judge's execution of a compromise agreement to
have the instant administrative case dismissed is glaringly improper and
should not be countenanced.
As though respondent judge's execution of the compromise
agreement was not sufficient impropriety to merit reproof, he even failed in
bad faith to comply with his undertakings in the agreement. He rationalized
that he was not able to pay the first installment when it fell due because his
plan to secure financial assistance from a friend and to sell or mortgage
his lot in Muntinlupa did not materialize.Without these other financial
resources, his salary as a judge, according to him, was not sufficient to
cover the installment amount. There is a dearth of evidence, however, to
prove his efforts to secure financial assistance from his friend and to sell or
mortgage his lot in Muntinlupa. Respondent judge also miserably failed to
remedy the situation and show good faith in trying to comply with the terms
of the compromise agreement. He could have requested from the
complainants a few days extension for payment of the first installment or
he could have partially paid the first installment as his means would permit
him, but these he did not do. These omissions of respondent judge,
coupled with the absence of evidence on his efforts to raise the first
installment amount, lead us to conclude that respondent judge was even in
G. R. No. 173375
Petitioners,
Present:
- versus -
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
x--------------------------------------------------x
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
REYES,
DE CASTRO, JJ.*
Promulgated:
September 25, 2008
despite
the
of
or
discriminating
against
any
other
interested party. xxx
15. As of this date, no public hearing yet has ever
been conducted, hence, to the prejudice
of the undersigned;
16. With full sincerity and honesty, I believe that
there will be no more public hearing that
will be conducted due (to) the admission
made by Hon. Vice-Mayor Marcelino D.L.
Alvarez and Mr. Eduardo H. Almera as
contained in their Joint Affidavit.
[12]
On 1 July 2003, Hon. Rodolfo Beltran, Presiding Judge of RTCBranch 34, recused himself from the case without resolving the latest
motion filed by petitioners.[15]
of
Appeals
issued
Further, the Court of Appeals took exception to the fact that the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), being the official counsel of the People of
the Philippines in appeals before the appellate court and the Supreme
Court, was not served a copy of said petition. In its place, the Provincial
Prosecutor was the one furnished a copy thereof.
A.
B.
a. FIRST,
THE
SUBJECT
INFORMATION
DATED 5 JUNE 2002 WAS AN INVALID
INFORMATION, CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS
NOT SIGNED BY THE GOVERNMENT
PROSECUTOR CONCERNED ON THE DATE IT
WAS FILED ON 18 JULY 2002;
f. SIXTH,
WITH
DUE
RESPECT,
THE
HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER
THAT THE ACCUSED ARE ALREADY SERVING
DIFFERENT TERMS OF OFFICES AND THAT
mailed their Petition for Certiorari addressed to the Clerk of Court of the
Court of Appeals on 7 February 2006 instead of 8 February 2006 as shown
by the stamped date on the envelope, petitioners initially submitted (1) a
photocopy of the pertinent page of the Registry Book of the Cabanatuan
Post Office sans any official guarantee that it was a faithful reproduction of
the original; (2) an Affidavit of Service executed by one Lolita S. Rase
stating under oath that she was the one who served copies of the Petition
for Certiorari, by registered mail, to the parties of the subject case,
including that intended for the Court of Appeals, with an attached
photocopy of the registry receipt corresponding to the mail sent to the
appellate court; and (3) an Affidavit of Merit/Certification made under oath
by one Marita Pangandian, claiming to be the Assistant PostMaster of
Cabanatuan City Post Office, which stated that said office received for
mailing on 7 February 2006 four (4) parcels/mail matters addressed to (a)
Atty. Romeo Viloria; (b) the Clerk of Court of RTC-Br. 87, Gapan, Nueva
Ecija; (c) the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor; and (d) Court of Appeals
Clerk of Court. To be precise, the supposed Assistant PostMaster attested
in her affidavit that:
been sincere in his dealings with the courts. Needless to stress, a lawyer is
bound by ethical principles in the conduct of cases before the courts at all
times.[34]
It has been said time and again that the perfection of an appeal
within the period fixed by the rules is mandatory and jurisdictional. [35] But it
is always in the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require
it.[36] This Court is mindful of the policy of affording litigants the amplest
opportunity for the determination of their cases on the merits [37] and of
dispensing with technicalities whenever compelling reasons so warrant or
when the purpose of justice requires it.[38]
Assuming that we suspend the rules, in the interest of justice, and
direct the Court of Appeals to admit petitioners Petition for Certiorari even
if it was one day late, we would still affirm the dismissal of said Petition by
the appellate court considering petitioners failure to serve the OSG with a
copy of the same.
In addressing the issue, petitioners exploit the oft used defense in
the interest of justice; and the fact that they have now furnished the OSG
copies of the present petition, as well as other pleadings.
Failure to furnish the OSG a copy of the petition filed before the
Court of Appeals was a fatal defect.
We agree with the disposition of the Court of Appeals in that we
have stated in Salazar v. Romaquin[39] that Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. All
criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
prosecutor. However, in the Municipal Trial Courts or
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor
assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the
offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged
with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute
the case. This authority shall cease upon actual
THIRD DIVISION
STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B.
PINOTE,
Petitioner, vs
JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Branch 26,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense in
Criminal Case No. 1771 TB, People v. Vice Mayor Salvador Ramos, et al.,
for violation of Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to present
evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the
absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the
case.
State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13 and 20, 2004 undergoing
medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City, hence,
his absence during the proceedings on the said dates.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case on August 27,
October 1, 15 and 29, 2004, State Prosecutor Pinote refused to crossexamine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco,
he maintaining that the proceedings conducted on August 13 and 20, 2004
in his absence were void.
State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation on November
12, 2004 before the trial court, he restating why he was not present on
August 13 and 20, 2004, and reiterating his position that Judge Aycos act
of allowing the defense to present evidence in his absence was erroneous
and highly irregular. He thus prayed that he should not be coerced to
cross-examine those two defense witnesses and that their testimonies be
stricken off the record.
By Order issued also on November 12, 2004, Judge Ayco, glossing over
the Manifestation, considered the prosecution to have waived its right to
cross-examine the two defense witnesses.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by State
Prosecutor Pinote (complainant) against Judge Ayco (respondent), for
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious
Misconduct.
x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the
control and direction of the public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in
case there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be
authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional
State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of
the court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to
prosecute the case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of
a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise
withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a
whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely
the complaining witness.[1] It is on this account that the presence of a
public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital
state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law,
the bedrock of peace of the people.[2]
Respondents act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in
the absence of complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutor
designated for the purpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which
could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to
cross-examine the witnesses.
the case on the basis of the pleadings filed. Complainant submitted his
Manifestation[6] in a letter dated September 10, 2000.
In a Resolution issued on November 29, 2000, [7] the Court considered
respondent to have waived the filing of the required manifestation,
because he had not done so within the prescribed period.
The OCA Report and Recommendation
Anent the second issue, the record shows that there was indeed delay in
the resolution of the prosecutions offer of evidence. Even if we consider
respondent Judges explanation that complainant was not immediately
furnished with a copy of the Order dated November 24, 1997, the
resolution of the motion was still very much delayed.
On the loss of the necropsy report in Criminal Case No. 7613, complainant
failed to submit evidence that would make respondent Judge liable
therefor particularly since the control and supervision over all court
records, exhibits, documents, etc. within the branch pertains to the branch
clerk of court (OCA vs. Judge Amelita D.R. Benedicto, et al. A.M. No. 96-5176-RTJ, October 12, 1998). Respondent Judges Clerk of Court,
moreover, specifically declared that the Medico-Legal Necropsy Report
was not included because the Complainant-Police Officer failed to [attach
to] the complaint said document when it was filed x x x on December 18,
1989. (Ltr. Dated May 22, 1998 of Clerk of Court Simeon M. Polo to Pros.
Robert M. Visbal).[9]
This Courts Ruling
This Court agrees with the OCAs finding that respondent is guilty of
delay in resolving the prosecutions offer of exhibits in Criminal Case No.
9484. It believes, however, that the recommended penalty of reprimand is
too light, considering that this is respondents second offense.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Respondent asserts that the Order was in fact dated November 24,
1997. He explains that it was sent to the prosecution only in April 1998,
because of the inadvertence of the clerk of court.
Respondents contention is not meritorious. First, the alleged
inadvertence of the clerk of court in sending the prosecutions copy of the
November 24, 1997 Order only in April 1998 does not speak well of
respondents managerial competence. While the clerk of court, as
administrative officer,[10] is primarily tasked to send notices to parties and
their counsel, the judge is ultimately responsible for ensuring that court
personnel perform their tasks, and that parties are promptly notified of his
orders and decisions. Verily, [p]roper and efficient court management is as
much his responsibility. He is the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his official functions.[11]
Second, respondents assertion that the Order admitting the Offer of
Evidence was issued on November 24, 1997 is an admission of
liability. Section 15 (1), Art. VII of the Constitution, provides:
"Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from
date of submission [to] the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three
months for all other lower courts." (emphasis supplied)
In this case, it took respondent more than eight months to resolve the
prosecutions Offer of Evidence. In fact, the prosecution had filed two
Motions the first on September 1, 1997 and the second on November 20,
1997 -- urging respondent to resolve the question. That he did not delay
deliberately is not an excuse.
Once again, we remind judges that they must resolve matters
pending before them promptly and expeditiously within the constitutionally
mandated 90-day period. Failing to do so, they should ask for an extension
from the same court, citing meritorious grounds therefor. Otherwise, they
may be charged with gross inefficiency and sanctioned administratively.[12]
While the OCA recommends that respondent be reprimanded for the
foregoing, we believe that the penalty is too light. In Francisco Tan Sr v.
Judge Rodolfo Ramos,[13] the judge was already reprimanded for failure to
decide two cases within the reglementary period, with the warning that a
repetition of the same or similar violation will be dealt with more severely.
Accordingly, the proper penalty in the present case should be a fine
of three thousand pesos (P3,000).
Other Charges
prosecutor who should know, at the very least, the basic provisions of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
WHEREFORE, Judge Rodolfo C. Ramos is found GUILTY of gross
inefficiency and is hereby ordered to PAY a fine of three thousand pesos
GUERRERO, J.:
Automatic review of the judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court in Criminal
Case No. CCC-VI -6 Rizal (1 7857), imposing upon Joseph Casey alias
"Burl" and Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" the capital punishment for
the death of Alfredo Valdez. The dispositive portion thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Joseph
Casey alias "Buri" and Ricardo Felix alias "Carding
Tuwad", GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the
commission of the crime of Murder, under Article No. 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in an Information,
and hereby sentences them to suffer the PENALTY OF
DEATH, with accessory penalties as prescribed by law; to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Alfredo Valdez, in the
amount of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000) PESOS,
jointly and severally; and to pay the costs.
Continuing her testimony, she said that she saw the one with curly hair
overtake and stab the victim several times, while in the meantime, Ricardo
Felix stood nearby holding a gun which he later fired once at the victim. 4
Contrary to law. 2
On October 15, 1968, accused Ricardo Felix entered the plea of not guilty
upon being arraigned and trial was accordingly had.
Mercedes Palomo, 28, resident of 242 Mahinhin Street, San Juan, Rizal,
testified that on March 31, 1968, at around three o'clock in the afternoon,
while in the house of her aunt, she heard a shot coming from the pool
room located near her aunt's place. She then looked towards the direction
of the pool room and saw three men coming out, one of them being
pursued by the two others. She recognized the man being pursued as
Alfredo Valdez alias "G.I." She, however, did not know the names of the
pursuers but described one of them as a short man, with curly black hair
and black complexion while the other as having a fair complexion. When
asked as to whether she can Identify them, she answered in the affirmative
and pointed to Joseph Casey and Ricardo Felix. 3
retroperitoneal,
severe,
When he was through playing, he went out and saw the victim waiting for
him outside, accompanied by six or seven persons holding pieces of wood.
As the place had no other exit, he proceeded on his way together with one
person named "Rody." While passing by, the victim suddenly drew a
"balisong" and lunged it on him. But he was able to parry the thrust. He
then took hold of the victim's right hand and grappled with him. In the
process, he successfully wrested the knife from him. He then used the
weapon against him, hitting him about two or three times. While he was
contending with the victim, the latter's companions joined in and hit him
with pieces of wood, inflicting "gasgas" or abrasions on his back. 9
The other accused, Ricardo Felix, testified that he did not see Joseph
Casey on March 31, 1968. Likewise, he said that he knew the victim,
Alfredo Valdez; that he last saw him alive in a store on the same day that
he was killed when he was about to leave for Manila; and that he learned
that he was dead when he returned home. 10
On the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the court a quo rendered the
aforementioned judgment of conviction. It found that two aggravating
circumstances attended the commission of the crime, namely: employing
or taking advantage of superior strength and evident premeditation, one of
which qualified the killing to murder. Hence, this automatic review.
The able counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant raised the following
assignments of errors in a well-prepared brief:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in illegally trying appellant Casey
on the amended information without arraignment, and in
finding him guilty after such illegal trial.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
11
and the other with a long pointed weapon, 25 since it is also duly proved
that it was only accused-appellant Casey who assaulted and inflicted stab
wounds on him as the other accused-appellant merely stood nearby toying
with his gun, abuse of superiority cannot be said to have attended the
commission of the crime.
The third essential issue to be resolved is whether or not there is
conspiracy between the two accused in the commission of the crime.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 26 This
agreement need not be in writing or be expressly manifested. 27 It is
sufficient that there is a mutual implied understanding between the
malefactors as shown by their concerted action towards the fulfillment of
the same objective. In People v. Cadag, 28 it was held: "Conspiracy to exist
does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence; from the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were
united in its execution." To the same effect is the ruling in other cases
decided by this Court. 29
Pursuant to this uniform and consistent jurisprudence on the existence of
conspiracy by the mere proof of community of design and purpose on the
part of the accused, We hold that conspiracy exists in this case, True
enough that there is no direct showing that the accused had conspired
together, but their acts and the attendant circumstances disclose that
common motive that would make accused Ricardo Felix as a co-principal
with the actual slayer, Joseph Casey. Without doubt, he performed overt
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. In People vs. Peralta, 30 it was held
that such overt act may consist in actively participating in the actual
commission of the crime, in lending moral assistance to his coconspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or in exerting
moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to
executing the conspiracy. In the case at bar, Ricardo Felix's overt acts
consist in instigating the pursuit of the deceased, in firing a shot at him and
claim. The accused failed to present a medical certificate for the bruises he
allegedly sustained. He likewise failed to present anybody to attest to the
truth of his allegations. There is no clear and convincing evidence that the
elements of self-defense are present. On the other hand, the prosecution
had not only one but several eyewitnesses to the crime as shown by the
different affidavits attached to the records of the case. Although only one of
the eyewitnesses was presented in court, her lone testimony on what
actually transpired, negating the claim of self-defense, is more credible
than the version of Joseph Casey. Evidence, to be believed, must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in
itself. Human perception can be warped by the impact the events and
testimony colored by the unconscious workings of the mind. No better test
has yet been found to measure the value of a witness' testimony than its
conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind. 32
We likewise find that respondent court correctly denied the defense of alibi
of Ricardo Felix. Alibi, in order to be given full faith and credit must be
clearly established and must not leave any room for doubt as to its
plausibility and verity. 33 In the case at bar, said accused-appellant failed to
show clearly and convincingly that he was at some other place about the
time of the alleged crime. He merely said that he was at home and that he
went to Manila. 34 As pointed out by the Solicitor General, he did not even
specify the exact place at Manila where he had gone and the purpose for
going there. Then, while said defense was corroborated by Joseph Casey,
the latter's testimony lacks that character of trustworthiness since it is very
apparent that he was merely attempting to assume full and exclusive
responsibility for the crime. Finally, said defense is unavailing when there
is positive Identification. Prosecution witness, Mercedes Palomo, gave
distinct attributes of Ricardo Felix in her sworn statement that leave no iota
of doubt that he was one of the perpetrators of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court under automatic review is
MODIFIED in that the accused-appellants Joseph Casey and Ricardo Felix
are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide without
(1) G.R. No. 179003 which assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated
February 6, 2007 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No.
89346, entitled Yoshitsugu Matsuura & Carolina Tanjutco v. Hon. Raul
Gonzales, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Justice
and Antonio L. Tan, Jr.; and
(2) G.R. No. 195816 which assails the CAs Decision3 dated August 17, 2010
and Resolution4 dated February 23, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 95263, entitled
Julie O. Cua v. Antonio L. Tan, Jr., Hon. Raul M. Gonzales, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Justice and Hon. Ernesto L. Pineda, in his
capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of Justice.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 31, 1998, Tan filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Makati City a Complaint-Affidavit5 charging the respondents Yoshitsugu
Matsuura (Matsuura), Atty. Carolina Tanjutco (Tanjutco) and Atty. Julie Cua
(Cua) of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
allegedly committed as follows:
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Matsuura, or Mr. Jacinto, and the undersigned) had become hostile and
irreconcilable. A copy of the notarized Deed of Trust is attached as Annex "B"
and made part hereof.
5. Both documents (Annexes "A" and "B") were/are in the possessions of Mr.
Matsuura and/or his lawyer, CAROLINA TANJUTCO, who used these false
documents in the cases involving us;
6. Without prejudice to the filing of other charges in the proper venues, I am
executing this affidavit for the purpose of charging Mr. YOSHITSUGU
MATSUURA and ATTY. CAROLINA TANJUTCO for violation of Art. 172 (2) in
relation to Art. 171 (6) of the Revised Penal Code with regard to Annex "A",
and likewise charging MR. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and ATTYS. CAROLINA
TANJUTCO and JULIE O. CUA for violation of Art. 172 (1) in relation to Art.
171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, when through their concerted actions
they FALSELY made it appeared [sic] that the undersigned had participated
in notarization of the Deed of Trust (Annex "B") on 19 June 1997, and in
both instances causing prejudice and damages to the undersigned. 6
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For her defense, Tanjutco argued that Tans admission of having pre-signed
the subject deed only proved that he had willingly assigned his shares in TF
Ventures, Inc. to Matsuura. She also argued that Tan failed to present any
proof of her participation in the deeds falsification, and explained that she
had not yet known Matsuura at the time of the supposed notarization. 9
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For her part, Cua narrated that on June 19, 1997, a group that included a
person who represented himself as Antonio Tan, Jr. approached her law
office for the notarization of the subject deed. Tan presented his community
tax certificate (CTC) as indicated in the subject deed of trust, then was
sworn in by Cua as a notary public. Cua claimed to have conducted her duty
in utmost good faith, with duplicate copies of the notarized deed reported to
the Clerk of Court of Makati City. She denied having any business or interest
whatsoever with the law offices of Tanjutco.10
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It would appear that the subject deed of trust was indeed never notarized. If
the said document was purportedly notarized on June 19, 1997, the same
notarized copy should have been presented by respondent Matsuura. After
all, his Answer filed before the SEC was made with the assistance of
respondent Atty. Tanjutco. There being none, it may be concluded that the
notarization of the subject deed of trust was indeed made under doubtful
circumstances.17
The complaint against Cua was also dismissed. For the OCP, Tan failed to
overturn the presumption of regularity attached to the notary publics
performance of her official duty. Any irregularity attending the execution of
the deed of trust required more than mere denial from Tan. 13
The Secretary also held that Cua should have been alerted by the variance in
the deeds print styles, and the fact that the document was presented for
notarization almost five months from the date of its purported execution.
The dispositive portion of the Secretarys resolution then reads:
Tans motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file a petition
for review14 with the Department of Justice (DOJ).
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SO ORDERED.18
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At this point, Matsuura and Tanjutco filed with the CA the petition for
certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89346. The DOJs review of its
resolution on Cuas case continued with Tans filing of a motion for partial
reconsideration. Finding merit in the motion, the DOJ again reversed itself
and issued on December 12, 2005 a Resolution21 with dispositive portion that
reads:
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In CA-G.R. SP No. 89346, the CA held that given the elements of the crime,
the actual participation of respondents Matsuura and Tanjutco was not
sufficiently alleged, and the element of damage was not sufficiently shown.
The dispositive portion of its Decision23 dated February 6, 2007 reads:
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Cuas motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting her to file with the
CA the petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95263.
The Ruling of the CA
SO ORDERED.26
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Unsatisfied, Tan separately filed with this Court two petitions for review. G.R.
No. 179003 assails the CAs disposition of Matsuura and Tanjutcos petition,
while G.R. No. 195816 assails the CAs decision in the petition filed by Cua.
From these petitions are two main issues for this Courts resolution:
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(a) whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the two petitions
filed before it, assuming the role of a reviewing authority of the Secretary of
Justice; and
(b) whether or not the CA erred in upholding the finding of the OCP that
there exists no probable cause to indict Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua for the
crime of falsification.
This Courts Ruling
We emphasize that on February 13, 2012, this Court had already issued in
G.R. No. 195816 a resolution28 denying the petition, on the following
bases:
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Tan also moved to consolidate G.R. No. 1958156 with G.R. No. 179003,
which motion was allowed by the Court.
Before ruling on the main issues, we address Tans argument that the CA
erred in granting Cuas motion for extension of time to file her petition in CAG.R. SP No. 95263.
In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals,31 we emphasized that the Court has allowed
some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and
lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that the strict and
rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It
is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends
of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave
injustice to the parties.32Thus, we allowed the petition in Vallejo to proceed
even if it was filed almost four (4) months beyond the prescribed
reglementary period under the rules.
Pursuant to the foregoing doctrine, in the interest of substantial justice, and
given the merit that was ascribed by the CA to Cuas petition, we sustain the
appellate courts ruling on Cuas motion for extension of time to file her
petition for certiorari.
Courts possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary
investigations.
On the first main issue, the petitioner contends that the CA should not have
taken cognizance of the petitions for certiorari filed before it because
criminal proceedings shall not be restrained once probable cause has been
determined and the corresponding information has been filed in courts.
Citing jurisprudence, Tan argues that the institution of a criminal action in
court depends upon the sound discretion of the prosecutor.
Judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution covers
the courts power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by any
branch or instrumentality of the government in the discharge of its
functions. Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of
deference to the prosecutors findings, courts should not shirk from
exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine
whether the prosecutors findings are supported by the facts or by the law. In
so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary that
are exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and
remedial rules to settle cases and controversies. Indeed, the exercise of the
courts review power ensures that, on the one hand, probable criminals are
prosecuted and, on the other hand, the innocent are spared from baseless
prosecution.33
The Court agrees with the CA that the Secretary of Justice committed grave
abuse of discretion when the latter ruled in favor of Tan, in his complaint
against the respondents. Again, while the courts generally accord respect
upon the prosecutors or the DOJs discretion in the determination of probable
cause in preliminary investigations, the courts may, as an exception, set
aside the prosecutors or DOJs conclusions to prevent the misuse of the
strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. 36
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We then ruled in Tan v. Ballena34 that while the findings of prosecutors are
reviewable by the DOJ, this does not preclude courts from intervening and
exercising our own powers of review with respect to the DOJs findings. In
the exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as
when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of
probable cause is ignored, the CA may take cognizance of the case via a
petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.35
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Based on the grounds raised by the respondents in their petitions with the
CA, the appellate courts exercise of its power to review was also the proper
and most prudent course to take after the Secretary had successively issued
several resolutions with varying findings of fact and conclusions of law on
the existence of probable cause, even contrary to the own findings of the
OCP that conducted the preliminary investigation. Although by itself, such
circumstance was not indicative of grave abuse of discretion, there was a
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The Court affirms the CAs finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Secretary of Justice in reversing the rulings of the OCP that favored
Matsuura and Tanjutco.
(2) Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to
cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
In the Resolutions dated July 1, 2004 and April 4, 2005, the Secretary of
Justice directed the filing in court of two informations against Matsuura and
Tanjutco: one information for the crime of falsification under Article 172 (2),
in relation to Article 171 (6) of the RPC, and another information for a
violation of Article 171 (2) of the RPC. These penal provisions read:
xxx
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In the first information, the charge was under Article 172 (2), in relation to
Article 171 (6), for the alleged insertions in the deed of trust on its number
of covered shares, its date and the witnesses to the instruments execution.
In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,39 we identified the elements of falsification
under Article 171 (6) of the RPC, to wit:
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xxx
(2) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
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xxx
(6) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning.
xxx
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents.
The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
a fine of not more than 5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon:
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xxx
Tan had failed to adequately show during the preliminary investigation all
the aforementioned elements of the offense.
Petitioner Tan was not able to establish when and how the alleged
unauthorized insertions in the subject document were effected, and that
Matsuura and Tanjutco should be held liable therefor. To warrant an
indictment for falsification, it is necessary to show during the preliminary
investigation that the persons to be charged are responsible for the acts that
define the crime. Contrary to this, however, there were no sufficient
allegations and evidence presented on the specific acts attributed to
Matsuura and Tanjutco that would show their respective actual participation
in the alleged alteration or intercalation. Tans broad statement that the deed
was falsified after it was stolen by Matsuura merits no consideration in
finding probable cause, especially after the following findings of the OCP in
his Resolution dated July 13, 1998:
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signed it to give effect thereto, especially with the legal presumption that a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns. Otherwise, Tan would not have
voluntarily affixed his signature in the subject deed. In Allied Banking
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,43 we ruled:
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Under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns. Hence, the natural presumption
is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its
contents and consequences. Said presumption acquires greater force in the
case at bar where not only one document but several documents were
executed at different times and at different places by the herein respondent
guarantors and sureties.44 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)
While the presumption can be disputed by sufficient evidence, Tan failed in
this respect. We even find no merit in his claim that the incomplete
document was merely intended to convince Japanese friends of Matsuura to
extend credit to TF Ventures, Inc., as he failed to establish any connection
between the deed of trust and the credit sought.
It is then the Courts view that the petitioner had voluntarily executed the
subject Deed of Trust, with the intention of giving effect thereto. Even
granting that there were insertions in the deed after it was signed by the
petitioner, no sufficient allegation indicates that the alleged insertions had
changed the meaning of the document, or that their details differed from
those intended by the petitioner at the time that he signed it. The petitioners
bare allegation that "the change was without his consent and
authority"45 does not equate with the necessary allegation that the insertions
were false or had changed the intended meaning of the document. Again, a
violation of Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6), of the RPC requires,
as one of its elements, that "the alteration or intercalation has changed the
meaning of the document.46
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Neither was there sufficient evidence to support the element of damage that
was purportedly suffered by Tan by reason of the alleged falsification. As
correctly observed by the OCP:
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By his voluntary act of signing the Deed of Trust in favor of Matsuura, it can
be safely inferred that the document speaks for itself. Whether or not the
same document is notarized, the Deed has the effect of a binding contract
between the parties. The element of damage has not been sufficiently
shown.47
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The Court emphasizes that the element of damage is crucial in the charge
because the Secretary of Justice directed the filing of the first information for
an alleged falsification of a private document.
True, a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It does not require that
the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the
determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction, it should at least be more than mere suspicion. And while
probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need
to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential
accuseds constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and
fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses
in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false,
fraudulent or groundless charges. It is, therefore, imperative for the
prosecutor to relieve the accused from the pain and inconvenience of going
through a trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.49
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The Secretary of Justices directive upon the prosecutor to file the second
information against Matsuura and Tanjutco also lacked basis. It was
premised on an alleged violation of Article 171(2) of the RPC, by making it
Since Matsuura and Tanjutco are both private individuals, they can be
indicted for the offense only if it is shown that they conspired with Cua, as a
notary public, in the commission thereof.
Contrary to this requirement, however, the Secretary of Justice ordered in its
Resolution dated April 4, 2005 the filing of the second information against
Matsuura and Tanjutco, notwithstanding the order in the same resolution to
exclude Cua in the case. Such ruling evidently amounts to a grave abuse of
discretion because as correctly held by the CA:
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The mere circumstance that his relationship with Matsuura was already
strained at the time of the deeds notarization miserably failed to
substantiate the claim that he could not have appeared before Cua.
Matsuura had precisely explained that the transfer of the shares of stock was
part of an attempt to compromise a dispute that existed between them. In
addition, we have explained that the alleged theft of the document by
Matsuura was sufficiently rebutted during the preliminary investigation.
On the basis of the foregoing, the reasonable probability of the respondents
participation in the commission of the crime of falsification was not
sufficiently established during the preliminary investigation. Even the failure
of Matsuura and Tanjutco to attach a notarized copy of the deed to their
pleading filed with the SEC fails to support a finding of probable cause. On
the contrary, the circumstance that an unnotarized copy of the deed was
submitted to the SEC weakens the argument that the alleged falsification
and wrongful notarization was resorted to by the respondents to suit their
interests. It showed that the respondents believed in the value of
the deed to their case even if it was not notarized. We then affirm the CAs
ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 96263 that the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion, by gross misapprehension of facts, when it
ordered the filing of the information against Cua. Although Tan assails the
CAs grant of the petition on such basis, jurisprudence provides that grave
abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of jurisdiction; or to
violations of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. It also refers to
cases in which, for various reasons, there has been a gross misapprehension
of facts.53
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(1) In G.R. No. 179003, the petition for review is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals' Decision dated February 6, 2007 and Resolution dated July 24,
2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89346 are AFFIRMED.
(2) In G.R. No. 195816, petitioner Tan's motion for reconsideration is
DENIED.
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SO ORDERED.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by
petitioner Bernadette L. Adasa, seeks to nullify and set aside the 21
July 2004 Decision1 and 10 June 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76396 which nullified the Resolutions of
the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Resolutions of the DOJ reversed
and set aside the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iligan City, which found on reinvestigation probable cause against
petitioner, and directed the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to
withdraw the information for Estafa against petitioner.
Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan
City, petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ on 15
October 2001.
In a Resolution dated 11 July 2002, the DOJ reversed and set aside
the 30 August 2001 resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iligan City and directed the said office to withdraw the Information for
Estafa against petitioner.
The said DOJ resolution prompted the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iligan City to file a "Motion to Withdraw Information" on 25 July 2002.
On 26 July 2002, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of said
resolution of the DOJ arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed
outright the petition for review since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70
mandates that when an accused has already been arraigned and the
aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary
of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or
even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright. Respondent
claimed Section 12 thereof mentions arraignment as one of the
grounds for the dismissal of the petition for review before the DOJ.
In a resolution dated 30 January 2003, the DOJ denied the Motion for
Reconsideration opining that under Section 12, in relation to Section 7,
of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from
entertaining any appeal taken to him even where the accused has
already been arraigned in court. This is due to the permissive language
"may" utilized in Section 12 whereby the Secretary has the discretion
to entertain an appealed resolution notwithstanding the fact that the
accused has been arraigned.
evaluate the pertinent circumstances and the facts of the case in order
to determine which ground or grounds shall apply.
Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not
give the appeal or petition for review due course and must dismiss the
same. This is bolstered by the fact that arraignment of the accused
prior to the filing of the appeal or petition for review is set forth as one
of the grounds for its dismissal. Therefore, in such instance, the DOJ,
noting that the arraignment of an accused prior to the filing of an
appeal or petition for review is a ground for dismissal under Section 12,
must go back to Section 7 and act upon as mandated therein. In other
words, the DOJ must not give due course to, and must necessarily
dismiss, the appeal.
Likewise, petitioners reliance on the principle of contemporary
construction, i.e., the DOJ is not precluded from entertaining appeals
where the accused had already been arraigned, because it exercises
discretionary power, and because it promulgated itself the circular in
question, is unpersuasive. As aptly ratiocinated by the Court of
Appeals:
True indeed is the principle that a contemporaneous interpretation or
construction by the officers charged with the enforcement of the rules
and regulations it promulgated is entitled to great weight by the court in
the latters construction of such rules and regulations. That does not,
however, make such a construction necessarily controlling or binding.
For equally settled is the rule that courts may disregard
contemporaneous construction in instances where the law or rule
construed possesses no ambiguity, where the construction is clearly
erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary exists, and where the
court has previously given the statute a different interpretation.
order was likewise void. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a void
judgment is a complete nullity and without legal effect, and that all
proceedings or actions founded thereon are themselves regarded as
invalid and ineffective for any purpose.14 That respondent did not file a
motion for reconsideration or appeal from the dismissal order of the
trial court is of no moment. Since the dismissal was void, there was
nothing for respondent to oppose.
Petitioner further asserts that Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 applies
only to appeals from original resolution of the City Prosecutor and does
not apply in the instant case where an appeal is interposed by
petitioner from the Resolution of the City Prosecutor denying her
motion for reinvestigation. This claim is baseless.
1avvphi1.net
Present:
Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent ExParte Manifestation and Motion before the trial court to
defer acting on the public prosecutors recommendation on
the proper offense until after the appellate court resolves
his application for injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to
grant him time to comment on the prosecutors
recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for the
judicial determination of probable cause.[10] Petitioner also
separately moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda with
prayer to defer action on the admission of the Amended
Information.[11]
The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed
orders, viz: (1) Order of February 7, 2007[12] that admitted