Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164584

June 22, 2009

PHILIP MATTHEWS, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and JOSELYN C. TAYLOR, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Court of Appeals (CA) December 19, 2003
Decision1 and July 14, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59573. The assailed decision affirmed and
upheld the June 30, 1997 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil
Case No. 4632 for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages.
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor
(Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina.4 On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought
from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay
Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00.5 The sale was allegedly financed by
Benjamin.6 Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements thereon and
eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.7 All
required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino,
Joselyns sister.8
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8,
1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to
maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their
Boracay property.9
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of
Lease10 (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of
P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner
thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.1avvphi1
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his
(Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages11 against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition
and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns husband, any
transaction involving said property required his consent.
No Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and the petitioner in defeault. On March 14, 1994,
the RTC rendered judgment by default declaring the Agreement null and void.12 The decision was, however,
set aside by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 34054.13 The CA also ordered the RTC to allow the petitioner to file
his Answer, and to conduct further proceedings.
In his Answer,14 petitioner claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn. Since Joselyn appeared to be the
owner of the Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the consent of Benjamin. Moreover, as
appearing in the Agreement, Benjamin signed as a witness to the contract, indicating his knowledge of the
transaction and, impliedly, his conformity to the agreement entered into by his wife. Benjamin was,
therefore, estopped from questioning the validity of the Agreement.
There being no amicable settlement during the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
On June 30, 1997, the RTC disposed of the case in this manner:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:
1. The Agreement of Lease dated July 20, 1992 consisting of eight (8) pages (Exhibits "T", "T-1",
"T-2", "T-3", "T-4", "T-5", "T-6" and "T-7") entered into by and between Joselyn C. Taylor and
Philip Matthews before Notary Public Lenito T. Serrano under Doc. No. 390, Page 79, Book I,
Series of 1992 is hereby declared NULL and VOID;
2. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of SIXTEEN
THOUSAND (P16,000.00) PESOS as damages representing unrealized income for the residential
building and cottages computed monthly from July 1992 up to the time the property in question is
restored to plaintiff; and
3. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, for attorneys fees and other incidental
expenses.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC considered the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the
consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving the property. Benjamins right over
the Boracay property was bolstered by the courts findings that the property was purchased and improved
through funds provided by Benjamin. Although the Agreement was evidenced by a public document, the
trial court refused to consider the alleged participation of Benjamin in the questioned transaction primarily
because his signature appeared only on the last page of the document and not on every page thereof.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner still failed to obtain a favorable decision. In its December 19, 2003
Decision,16 the CA affirmed the conclusions made by the RTC. The appellate court was of the view that if,
indeed, Benjamin was a willing participant in the questioned transaction, the parties to the Agreement
should have used the phrase "with my consent" instead of "signed in the presence of." The CA noted that
Joselyn already prepared an SPA in favor of Benjamin involving the Boracay property; it was therefore
unnecessary for Joselyn to participate in the execution of the Agreement. Taken together, these
circumstances yielded the inevitable conclusion that the contract was null and void having been entered
into by Joselyn without the consent of Benjamin.
Aggrieved, petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari based on the
following grounds:
4.1. THE MARITAL CONSENT OF RESPONDENT BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS NOT REQUIRED
IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE DATED 20 JULY 1992. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT
HIS CONSENT IS REQUIRED, BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS DEEMED TO HAVE GIVEN HIS
CONSENT WHEN HE AFFIXED HIS SIGNATURE IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE AS
WITNESS IN THE LIGHT OF THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF
SPOUSES PELAYO VS. MELKI PEREZ, G.R. NO. 141323, JUNE 8, 2005.
4.2. THE PARCEL OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE IS THE
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF JOCELYN C. TAYLOR, A FILIPINO CITIZEN, IN THE LIGHT
OF CHEESMAN VS. IAC, G.R. NO. 74833, JANUARY 21, 1991.
4.3. THE COURTS A QUO ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH IS A PROVISION REFERRING TO THE ABSOLUTE
COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY. THE PROPERTY REGIME GOVERNING THE PROPERTY
RELATIONS OF BENJAMIN TAYLOR AND JOSELYN TAYLOR IS THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS BECAUSE THEY WERE MARRIED ON 30 JUNE 1988 WHICH IS
PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THIS CASE.
4.4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IN THE EXECUTION OF NOTARIAL DOCUMENTS.

4.5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO PASS UPON THE

COUNTERCLAIM OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT CONTESTED
AND DESPITE THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING SAID CLAIM. 17
The petition is impressed with merit.
In fine, we are called upon to determine the validity of an Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered
into by a Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband. In addressing the matter before us, we
are confronted not only with civil law or conflicts of law issues, but more importantly, with a constitutional
question.
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989. Said acquisition was evidenced by a
Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee. The property was also declared for taxation purposes under her
name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin sought the nullification of the contract on
two grounds: first, that he was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used in
purchasing the same; and second, that Joselyn could not enter into a valid contract involving the subject
property without his consent.
The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations of petitioner and respondent in light of
the Civil Code and Family Code provisions. They, however, failed to observe the applicable constitutional
principles, which, in fact, are the more decisive.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:18
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.1avvphi1
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands.19 The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the
national patrimony.20 Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public
domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is
owned by Filipinos.21
In Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,22 cited in Muller v. Muller,23 we had the occasion to explain the
constitutional prohibition:
Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of
Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that Section 5 is included in Article
XIII, and it reads as follows:
"Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may
leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens. x x x
xxxx
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots
and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly
buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries,
hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of

other uses and purposes that are not, in appellants words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor Generals Brief,
p. 6) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.24
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the
Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions.25 There is no rule more settled than this
constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own
lands through another. In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the
above constitutional provision. We had cases where aliens wanted that a particular property be declared as
part of their fathers estate;26 that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in the
name of another;27 that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens) favor;28 and that a contract of sale be
nullified for their lack of consent.29
In Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui,30 Felix Ting Ho, a Chinese citizen, acquired a parcel of land, together with the
improvements thereon. Upon his death, his heirs (the petitioners therein) claimed the properties as part of
the estate of their deceased father, and sought the partition of said properties among themselves. We,
however, excluded the land and improvements thereon from the estate of Felix Ting Ho, precisely because
he never became the owner thereof in light of the above-mentioned constitutional prohibition.
In Muller v. Muller,31 petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Germany. During the subsistence of their marriage, respondent purchased a parcel of land in Antipolo City
and constructed a house thereon. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of the petitioner. They
eventually separated, prompting the respondent to file a petition for separation of property. Specifically,
respondent prayed for reimbursement of the funds he paid for the acquisition of said property. In deciding
the case in favor of the petitioner, the Court held that respondent was aware that as an alien, he was
prohibited from owning a parcel of land situated in the Philippines. He had, in fact, declared that when the
spouses acquired the Antipolo property, he had it titled in the name of the petitioner because of said
prohibition. Hence, we denied his attempt at subsequently asserting a right to the said property in the form
of a claim for reimbursement. Neither did the Court declare that an implied trust was created by operation
of law in view of petitioners marriage to respondent. We said that to rule otherwise would permit
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
In Frenzel v. Catito,32 petitioner, an Australian citizen, was married to Teresita Santos; while respondent, a
Filipina, was married to Klaus Muller. Petitioner and respondent met and later cohabited in a common-law
relationship, during which petitioner acquired real properties; and since he was disqualified from owning
lands in the Philippines, respondents name appeared as the vendee in the deeds of sale. When their
relationship turned sour, petitioner filed an action for the recovery of the real properties registered in the
name of respondent, claiming that he was the real owner. Again, as in the other cases, the Court refused to
declare petitioner as the owner mainly because of the constitutional prohibition. The Court added that being
a party to an illegal contract, he could not come to court and ask to have his illegal objective carried out.
One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in an illegal contract may not maintain an
action for his losses.
Finally, in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 petitioner (an American citizen) and Criselda
Cheesman acquired a parcel of land that was later registered in the latters name. Criselda subsequently
sold the land to a third person without the knowledge of the petitioner. The petitioner then sought the
nullification of the sale as he did not give his consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was his
(petitioners) intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in
land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; thus, the sale as to him was null
and void.
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the
Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited
from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true
even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such
contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his
expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to
question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory
would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be

declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he
would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not
permit him to have.34
In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot be nullified on the
grounds advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity.
With the foregoing disquisition, we find it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the December 19, 2003 Decision and July 14, 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59573, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered
DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner Philip Matthews.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestao, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Jose
C. Mendoza, concurring; rollo, pp. 54-61.
2

Id. at 52.

Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Pepito T. Ta-ay; CA rollo, pp. 102-115.

Evidenced by a Marriage Contract; Exh "A," Folder of Exhibits of the Plaintiff.

The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Sale duly executed by the parties and registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Aklan; Exh. "D," Folder of Exhibits of the Plaintiff.
6

Rollo, p. 55.

Id.

The licenses and permits were under the name of Joselyns sister because at the time of the
application, Joselyn was still a minor.
9

Exh. "V"; Folder of Exhibits of the Plaintiff.

10

Exh. "T"; Folder of Exhibits of the Plaintiff.

11

Records, pp. 1-3.

12

Id. at 132-137.

13

Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, with Associate Justices Oscar M. Herrera and
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, concurring; Id. at 139-148.
14

Id. at 201-201-m.

15

Id. at 355.

16

Supra note 1.

17

Rollo, pp. 554-556.

18

A similar provision was set forth in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, viz:
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution states:
"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines."
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution also states:
"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the
public domain."

19

Muller v. Muller, G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006, 500 SCRA 65, 71; Frenzel v. Catito, 453
Phil. 885, 904 (2003).
20

Muller v. Muller, Id.

21

Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui, G.R. No. 130115, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA 421.

22

79 Phil. 461 (1947).

23

Supra.

24

Id. at 71-72; Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phil. 461, 473-476 (1947).

25

The instances when aliens may be allowed to acquire private lands in the Philippines are:
(a) By hereditary succession (Section 7, Article XII, Philippine Constitution).

(b) A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law (Section 8, Article XII,
Philippine Constitution). Republic Act No. 8179 now allows a former natural-born Filipino
citizen to acquire up to 5,000 square meters of urban land and 3 hectares or rural land, and
he may now use the land not only for residential purposes, but even for business or other
purposes.
(c) Americans who may have acquired tile to private lands during the effectivity of the
Parity Agreement shall hold valid title thereto as against private persons (Section 11, Article
XVII, 1973 Constitution).
26

Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui, supra. note 21.

27

Muller v. Muller, supra. note 19; Frenzel v. Catito, supra. note 19.

28

Muller v. Muller, Id.

29

Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74833, January 21, 1991, 193 SCRA 93.

30

Supra.

31

Supra.

32

Supra.

33

Supra.

34

Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra. at 103-104.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187490

February 8, 2012

ANTONIA R. DELA PEA and ALVIN JOHN B. DELA PEA, Petitioners,

vs.
GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA and FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO., Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this petition for review on certiorari seeks
the reversal and setting aside of the Decision1 dated 31 March 2009 rendered by the then Second Division
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90485,2 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision, dated December
18, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma Avila dated November 4, 1997 and the subsequent
sale on auction of the subject property to FEBTC (now Bank of the Philippine Islands) on March 15, 1999
are upheld as valid and binding.
SO ORDERED.3
The Facts

The suit concerns a 277 square meter parcel of residential land, together with the improvements thereon,
situated in Marikina City and previously registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Pea
(Antonia), "married to Antegono A. Dela Pea" (Antegono) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
N-32315 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.4 On 7 May 1996, Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila & Sons,
Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of P250,000.00 which, pursuant to the Promissory Note the former executed
in favor of the latter, was payable on or before 7 July 1996, with interest pegged at 5% per month.5 On the
very same day, Antonia also executed in favor of Aguila a notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the
property, for the purpose of securing the payment of said loan obligation. The deed provided, in part, that
"(t)his contract is for a period of Three (3) months from the date of this instrument".6
On 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of
respondent Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma), for the stated consideration of P600,000.00.7 Utilizing the
document, Gemma caused the cancellation of TCT No. N-32315 as well as the issuance of TCT No.
337834 of the Marikina City Registry of Deeds, naming her as the owner of the subject realty.8 On 26
November 1997, Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over said parcel in favor of respondent Far
East Bank and Trust Company [now Bank of the Philippine Islands] (FEBTC-BPI), to secure a loan facility
with a credit limit of P1,200,000.00.9 As evidenced by the Promissory Notes she executed from 12
December 1997 to 10 March 1998,10 Gemma obtained the following loans from Visayas Avenue Branch of
the FEBTC-BPI, in the aggregate sum of P1,200,000.00, to wit:
Promissory Note

Date

Amount

Maturity

BDS#970779

12/02/97

P300,000.00

04/30/98

BDS#970790

12/15/97

P100,000.00

04/14/98

BDS#980800

01/16/98

P100,000.00

04/30/98

BDS#980805

02/06/98

P100,000.00

04/30/98

BDS#980817

02/27/98

P150,000.00

04/30/98

BDS#980821

03/10/98

P450,000.00

04/30/98

On 3 March 1998, in the meantime, Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim to the effect, among others, that she was the true and lawful owner of the property which
had been titled in the name of Gemma under TCT No. 32315; and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma
utilized in procuring her title was simulated.11 As a consequence, Antonias Affidavit of Adverse Claim was
inscribed on TCT No. 337834 as Entry No. 501099 on 10 March 1998.12 In view of Gemmas failure to pay
the principal as well as the accumulated interest and penalties on the loans she obtained, on the other hand,
FEBTC-BPI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted over the property.
As the highest bidder at the public auction conducted in the premises,13 FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its
ownership over the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name under TCT No. 415392 of the
Marikina registry.14
On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin John B. Dela Pea (Alvin), filed against Gemma
the complaint for annulment of deed of sale docketed before Branch 272 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Marikina City as Civil Case No. 98-445-MK. Claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property, the
Dela Peas alleged, among other matters, that the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage Antonia
executed in favor of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono who had, by then, already died; that despite
its intended 1998 maturity date, the due date of the loan secured by the mortgage was shortened by Gemma
who, taking advantage of her "proximate relationship" with Aguila, altered the same to 1997; and, that the 4
November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma was executed by Antonia who was misled into
believing that the transfer was necessary for the loan the former promised to procure on her behalf from
FEBTC-BPI. In addition to the annulment of said Deed of Absolute Sale for being simulated and
derogatory of Alvins successional rights, the Dela Peas sought the reconveyance of the property as well
as the grant of their claims for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and the costs.15
Served with summons, Gemma specifically denied the material allegations of the foregoing complaint in
her 1 July 1998 answer. Maintaining that the realty was the exclusive property of Antonia who
misrepresented that her husband was still alive, Gemma averred that the former failed to pay the
P250,000.00 loan she obtained from Aguila on its stipulated 7 July 1996 maturity; that approached to help
prevent the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage constituted on the property, she agreed to settle the
outstanding obligation to Aguila and to extend Antonia a P50,000.00 loan, with interest pegged at 10% per

month; that to pay back the foregoing accommodations, Antonia agreed to the use of the property as
collateral for a loan to be obtained by her from FEBTC-BPI, hence, the execution of the impugned Deed of
Absolute Sale; and, that conformably with the foregoing agreement, she obtained loans in the total sum of
P1,200,000.00 from FEBTC-BPI and applied the proceeds thereof to the sums owed by Antonia. Together
with the dismissal of the complaint, Gemma also prayed for the grant of her counterclaims for moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and the costs.16
On 25 September 1999, the Dela Peas filed a supplemental complaint, impleading FEBTC-BPI as
additional defendant. Calling attention to Antonias 3 March 1998 Affidavit of Adverse Claim and the
Notice of Lis Pendens they purportedly caused to be annotated on TCT No. 337834 on 10 December 1999,
the Dela Peas alleged that FEBTC-BPI was in bad faith when it purchased the property at public auction
on 15 March 1999.17 In their 12 November 1999 answer, FEBTC-BPI, in turn, asserted that the property
was already titled in Gemmas name when she executed the 26 November 1997 real estate mortgage
thereon, to secure the payment of the loans she obtained in the sum of P1,200,000.00; and, that not being
privy to Antonias transaction with Gemma and unaware of any adverse claim on the property, it was a
mortgagee in good faith, entitled to foreclose the mortgage upon Gemmas failure to pay the loans she
obtained. Seeking the dismissal of the complaint and the grant of its counterclaims for damages against the
Dela Peas, FEBTC-BPI alternatively interposed cross-claims against Gemma for the payment of the
subject loans, the accumulated interests and penalties thereon as well as such sums for which it may be held
liable in the premises.18
On 14 April 2000, the RTC issued the order terminating the pre-trial stage and declaring Gemma in default
for failure to attend the pre-trial settings and to engage the services of a new lawyer despite due notice and
the withdrawal of her counsel of record.19 In support of their complaint, Antonia20 and Alvin21 both took the
witness stand and, by way of corroborative evidence, presented the testimony of one Alessandro Almoden22
who claimed to have referred Antonia to Gemma for the purpose of obtaining a loan. By way of defense
evidence, on the other hand, FEBTC-BPI adduced the oral evidence elicited from Eleanor Abellare, its
Account Officer who handled Gemmas loans,23 and Zenaida Torres, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) Document Examiner who, after analyzing Antonias specimen signatures on the 7 May 1996 Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage and 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale,24 issued NBI Questioned Documents
Report No. 482-802 to the effect, among others, that said signatures were written by one and the same
person.25
On 18 December 2007, the RTC went on to render a Decision finding that the subject property was
conjugal in nature and that the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia executed in favor of
Gemma was void as a disposition without the liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code.
Brushing aside FEBTC-BPIs claim of good faith,26 the RTC disposed of the case in the following wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants, as follows:
1). Declaring the Deed of Absolute dated November 04, 1997 in favor of defendant, [Gemma] as
null and void;
2). Ordering defendant [FEBTC-BPI] to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of the [Dela
Peas] involving the subject property now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 415392 in
the name of [FEBTC-BPI];
3). Ordering [Gemma] to pay the [Dela Peas] the following:
a). the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages; and
b). the amount of P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and
c). costs of the suit
On the cross-claim, [Gemma] is hereby ordered to pay [FEBTC-BPI] the amount of P2,029,317.17 as of
November 10, 1999, with twelve (12%) percent interest per annum until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.27

Aggrieved, FEBTC-BPI perfected the appeal which was docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. CV No.
90485. On 31 March 2009 the CAs Second Division rendered the herein assailed decision, reversing the
RTCs appealed decision, upon the following findings and conclusions: (a) the property was paraphernal in
nature for failure of the Dela Peas to prove that the same was acquired during Antonias marriage to
Antegono; (b) having misled Gemma into believing that the property was exclusively hers, Antonia is
barred from seeking the annulment of the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale; (c) Antonias claim that
her signature was forged is belied by her admission in the pleadings that she was misled by Gemma into
executing said Deed of Absolute Sale and by NBI Questioned Document Report No. 482-802; and, (d)
FEBTC-BPI is a mortgagee in good faith and for value since Gemmas 26 November 1997 execution of the
real estate mortgage in its favor predated Antonias 3 March 1998 Affidavit of Adverse Claim and the 10
December 1999 annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. 337834.28
The Issues
The Dela Peas seek the reversal of the assailed 31 March 2009 CA decision upon the affirmative of
following issues, to wit:
1) Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the house and lot covered by TCT No.
N-32315 conjugal property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Pea;
2) Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Antonia to (Gemma); and
3) Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding (FEBTC-BPI) a mortgagee/purchaser
in bad faith.29
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership,30
proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership.31 In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals,32 this Court categorically
ruled as follows:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption
must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired
during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with
strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses.33
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Peas
did not even come close to proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage between
Antonia and Antegono. Beyond Antonias bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was
purchased when she was already married,34 the record is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date
of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained. When queried about the matter during his cross-examination,
even Alvin admitted that his sole basis for saying that the property was owned by his parents was Antonias
unilateral pronouncement to the effect.35 Considering that the presumption of conjugality does not operate if
there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired,36 we find that the CA cannot
be faulted for ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonias exclusive property.
Not having established the time of acquisition of the property, the Dela Peas insist that the registration
thereof in the name of "Antonia R. Dela Pea, of legal age, Filipino, married to Antegono A. Dela Pea"
should have already sufficiently established its conjugal nature. Confronted with the same issue in the case

Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals,37 this Court ruled, however, that the phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of
the civil status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner.
Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired by the wife while she was still single and
registered only after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that
the same was acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. "Since
there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of
the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse."38
Viewed in light of the paraphernal nature of the property, the CA correctly ruled that the RTC reversibly
erred in nullifying Antonias 4 November 1997 sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the liquidation
required under Article 130 of the Family Code.39 That Antonia treated the realty as her own exclusive
property may, in fact, be readily gleaned from her utilization thereof as security for the payment of the
P250,000.00 loan she borrowed from Aguila.40 Despite Gemmas forfeiture of the right to present evidence
on her behalf, her alleged alteration of the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage to shorten the
maturity of the loan secured thereby was also properly brushed aside by the CA. The double lie inherent in
Antonias assertion that the same deed was altered by Gemma to shorten the maturity of the loan to "1997
instead of 1998" is instantly evident from paragraph 1 of the document which, consistent with 7 July 1996
maturity date provided in the Promissory Note she executed,41 specifically stated that "(t)his contract is for
a period of Three (3) months from the date of this instrument."42
Antonias evident lack of credibility also impels us to uphold the CAs rejection of her version of the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Gemma. In disavowing authorship of the signature appearing on said deed,43 Antonia contradicted the
allegation in the Dela Peas complaint that she was misled by Gemma into signing the same document.44
The rule is well-settled that judicial admissions like those made in the pleadings are binding and cannot be
contradicted, absent any showing that the same was made thru palpable mistake.45 Alongside that appearing
on the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage she admitted executing in favor of Aguila, Antonias signature on the
Deed of Absolute Sale was, moreover, found to have been written by one and the same person in
Questioned Document Report No. 482-802 prepared by Zenaida Torres, the NBI Document Examiner to
whom said specimen signatures were submitted for analysis.46 Parenthetically, this conclusion is borne out
by our comparison of the same signatures.
For all of Antonias denial of her receipt of any consideration for the sale of the property in favor of
Gemma,47 the evidence on record also lend credence to Gemmas version of the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the assailed 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale. Consistent with Gemmas claim that
said deed was executed to facilitate the loans she obtained from FEBTC-BPI which were agreed to be used
as payment of the sums she expended to settle the outstanding obligation to Aguila and the P50,000.00 she
loaned Antonia,48 the latter admitted during her direct examination that she did not pay the loan she
obtained from Aguila.49 Presented as witness of the Dela Peas, Alessandro Almoden also admitted that
Gemma had extended a loan in the sum of P50,000.00 in favor of Antonia. Notably, Alessandro Almodens
claim that the title to the property had been delivered to Gemma as a consequence of the transaction50 is at
odds with Antonias claim that she presented said document to the Registry of Deeds when she verified the
status of the property prior to the filing of the complaint from which the instant suit originated.51
With the material contradictions in the Dela Peas evidence, the CA cannot be faulted for upholding the
validity of the impugned 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale. Having been duly notarized, said deed
is a public document which carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution.52 Regarded as evidence of the facts therein expressed in a clear, unequivocal manner,53 public
documents enjoy a presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and
convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity.54 The burden of proof to overcome said presumptions
lies with the party contesting the notarial document55 like the Dela Peas who, unfortunately, failed to
discharge said onus. Absent clear and convincing evidence to contradict the same, we find that the CA
correctly pronounced the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid and binding between Antonia and Gemma.
Since foreclosure of the mortgage is but the necessary consequence of non-payment of the mortgage debt,56
FEBTC-BPI was, likewise, acting well within its rights as mortgagee when it foreclosed the real estate
mortgage on the property upon Gemmas failure to pay the loans secured thereby. Executed on 26
November 1997, the mortgage predated Antonias filing of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Register
of Deeds of Marikina on 3 March 1998 and the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. 337834
on 10 December 1999. "The mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is
imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfilment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted."57 When the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee consequently has the

right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property, and apply the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of the
unpaid loan.58
Finally, the resolution of this case cannot be affected by the principles that banks like FEBTC-BPI are
expected to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in that their dealings because their
business is impressed with public interest59 and their standard practice is to conduct an ocular inspection of
the property offered to be mortgaged and verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real owner or
owners thereof, hence, the inapplicability of the general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond the title
does not apply to them.60 The validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Antonia in favor of Gemma
having been upheld, FEBTC-BPIs supposed failure to ascertain the ownership of the property has been
rendered immaterial for the purpose of determining the validity of the mortgage executed in its favor as
well as the subsequent extrajudicial foreclosure thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed CA
Decision dated 31 March 2009 is, accordingly, AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alino-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate Justices

Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
2

CA rollo, CA-G.R. CV No. 90485, CAs 31 March 2009 Decision, pp. 113-131.

Id. at 130-131.

Exhibit "C," TCT No. N-32315, Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, Vol. II, pp. 4-5.

Exhibit "E," Promissory Note, id. at 9.

Exhibit "D," Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, id. at 6-9.

Exhibit "F," Deed of Absolute Sale, id. at 10-11.

Exhibit "G," TCT No. 337834, id. at 12-13.

Exhibit "7," Real Estate Mortgage, id. at 27-30.

10

Exhibits "1" to "13A," FEBTC-BPI Promissory Notes, id. at 15-26.

11

Exhibit "H," Affidavit of Adverse Claim, id. at 14.

12

Id. at 13.

13

Exhibit "9," FEBTC-BPIs Written Bid, id. at 31.

14

Exhibit "12," TCT No. 415392, id. at 34.

15

Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, Vol. 1, Dela Peas Complaint, pp. 1-4.

16

Gemmas Answer, id. at 28-40.

17

Dela Peas Supplemental Complaint, id. at 129-134.

18

FEBTCs Answer, id. at 148-155.

19

Id. at 204.

20

TSN, 26 May 2000; TSN, 30 June 2000.

21

TSN, 22 September 2000; TSN, 13 October 2000.

22

TSN, 12 August 2004.

23

TSN, 18 November 2004.

24

TSN, 20 July 2006.

25

Exhibit "13" and submarkings, Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, Vol. II, pp. 35-36.

26

Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, Vol. I, pp. 440-457.

27

Id. at 456-457.

28

CA rollo, CA-G.R. CV No. 90485, pp. 113-131.

29

Rollo, pp. 17-18.

30

Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120594, 10 June 1997, 273 SCRA 229, 236.

31

Manongsong v. Estimo, 452 Phil. 862, 878 (2003) citing Francisco v. CA, 359 Phil. 519, 526
(1998).
32

359 Phil. 519 (1998).

33

Id. at 526.

34

TSN, 30 June 2000, p. 5.

35

TSN, 13 October 2000, pp. 4; 6.

36

Go v. Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 107, 117.

37

449 Phil. 419, 431 (2003).

38

Id. at 431-432.

39

Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall
be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the
conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the
death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of said period no liquidation is made, any
disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated
marriage shall be void.
xxxx
40

TSN, 26 May 2000, p. 13

41

Exhibit "E," supra

42

Exhibit "D," supra

43

TSN, 26 May 2000, p. 20

44

Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, p. 2

45

Binarao v. Plus Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 154430, 16 June 2006, 491 SCRA 49, 54.

46

Exhibit "13."

47

TSN, 26 May 2000, pp. 18-19.

48

Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, pp. 33-37.

49

TSN, 26 May 2000, pp. 21-22.

50

TSN, 12 August 2004, pp. 6-12.

51

TSN, 26 May 2000, pp. 27-28.

52

Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 517 Phil. 380, 388 (2006).

53

Sps. Alfarero v. Sps. Sevilla, 458 Phil. 255, 262 (2003).

54

Meneses v. Venturozo, G.R. No. 172196, 19 October 2011.

55

Destreza v. Rinoza-Plazo, G.R. No. 176863, 30 October 2009, 604 SCRA 775, 785.

56

Santiago v. Pioneer Savings and Loan Bank, 241 Phil. 113, 119 (1988).

57

Article 2126, Civil Code of the Philippines.

58

Talmonte v. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd., G.R. No. 166970, 17 August
2011.

59

Rural Bank of Siaton (Negros Oriental) v. Macajilos, G.R. No. 152483, 14 July 2006, 495 SCRA
127, 140.
60

Alano v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 171628, 13 June 2011.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 146683

November 22, 2001

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C.
TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE,
BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
with modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte
in Civil Case No. 4593, declaring as void a deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T.
Comille in her favor and its subsequent resolution3 denying reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of
Lot No. 437-A located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street) and Calle Rosario (now
Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of the lot was 418 square meters.4
After the death of Zosima on October 3, 1980, Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino
Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her
share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to Francisco.5 On June 27, 1916, Francisco registered
the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds.6
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo,7 the
latter's cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian,8 and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his
house, as well as the store inside.9
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco.
Leticia Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room,10 while Erlinda
Tabancura,11 another niece of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his mistress.12
On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper who could enter the master's bedroom only when the
old man asked her to and that Francisco in any case was too old for her. She denied they ever had sexual
intercourse.13
It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco.14
Cirila testified that she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old widower when she
began working for the latter; that he could still walk with her assistance at that time;15 and that his health
eventually deteriorated and he became bedridden.16 Erlinda Tabancura testified that Francisco's sole source
of income consisted of rentals from his lot near the public streets.17 He did not pay Cirila a regular cash
wage as a househelper , though he provided her family with food and lodging.18
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated "Deed
of Donation Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square meters,
together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the
larger portion of 268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in

consideration of "the faithful services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years." The deed
was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.19 and later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner .20
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993, the lot which Cirila received from
Francisco had a market value of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of P28,550.00.21
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a deed
of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the decedent's
nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of
Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void under Article 87 of the
Family Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, holding the donation void
under this provision of the Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based on the testimony of
Erlinda Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of one "Cirila Comille." The documents
were (1) an application for a business permit to operate as real estate lessor, dated January 8, 1991, with a
carbon copy of the signature "Cirila Comille";22 (2) a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a
health certificate showing the signature "Cirila Comille" in black ink;23 and (3) the death certificate of the
decedent with the signature "Cirila A. Comille" written in black ink.24 The dispositive portion of the trial
court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille recorded as
Doc. No. 7; Page No. 3; Book No. V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Vic T.
Lacaya (Annex " A " to the Complaint) null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and lot subject of the deed unto the
plaintiffs within thirty (30) days after finality of this decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on June 19, 2000 the decision subject of this
appeal. As already stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion was based on (1) the
testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of documents purportedly showing Cirila's use of
Francisco's surname; (3) a pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as
Francisco's common-law wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been committed by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the common-law wife of the late
Francisco Comille is not correct and is a reversible error because it is based on a misapprehension
of facts, and unduly breaks the chain of circumstances detailed by the totality of the evidence, its
findings being predicated on totally incompetent or hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere
speculation, conjecture or possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in
Quiason, Philippine Courts and their J urisdictions, 1993 ed., p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence from the plaintiff to defendant.
(Bunyi v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 504; Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in away probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable jurisprudence in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil.
577, 584.26

The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the
circumstances of this case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (c) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is
contradicted by the evidence on record; and G) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.27 It appearing that the Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented by both
parties, the general rule should apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan,28 we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means
not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course,
means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be
interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital
relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such.
Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of
cohabitation; they are merely meretricious.29 In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient
proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties,30 a conviction of concubinage,31 or
the existence of legitimate children.32
Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided
under one roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila
gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their
public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive
partners akin to husband and wife.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other
indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents
apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As previously stated, these are an application for
a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor,33 a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a
health certificate,34 and the death certificate of Francisco.35 These documents show that Cirila saw herself as
Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer
filed by Francisco's lessees in "Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," RTC
Civil Case No.4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as "the common-law spouse
of Francisco." Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She was,
after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law.36 It is difficult to believe that she stayed with
Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the conclusion that
she was Francisco's common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

Per Associate Justice Bernardo Salas and concurred in by Associate Justices Presbiterio Velasco,
Jr. and Edgardo Cruz.
2

Per Judge Wilfredo C. Martinez.

Per Associate Justice Edgardo Cruz, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Teodoro Regino
and Presbitero Velasco, Jr.
4

Exh. A; Records, p. 66.

Exh. D; id., p. 71.

Exhs. E & 3; id., pp. 73, 102.

Also called "Letitia," "Letecia," and "Leticia Belosillo."

Also known as "Luzminda."

TSN (Leticia Bellosillo), pp. 12-15, Sept. 27,1994; TSN (Cirila Arcaba), p. 8, Aug. 14, 1994.

10

TSN (Leticia Bellosillo), p. 14, Sept. 27, 1994.

11

Also known as "Erlinda Tabangcura Vda. de Batocael."

12

TSN (Erlinda Tabancura), p. 17, Apri128, 1994.

13

TSN (Cirila Arcaba), p. 11, Aug. 14, 1996.

14

TSN (Leticia Bellosillo), pp. 14-16, Sept. 27, 1994.

15

TSN (Cirila Arcaba), p. 8, Aug. 14, 1996.

16

Id., p. 10; Rollo, p. 33.

17

TSN (Erlinda Tabancura), p. 12, Apri128, 1994; TSN (Cirila Arcaba), p. 8, Aug. 14, 1994.

18

TSN (Erlinda Tabancura), p. 9, Aug. 14, 1996.

19

Exh. C; Records, p. 69.

20

TSN (Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.), pp. 3-4, Feb. 13, 1995; Exh. 3-B; Records, p. 102.

21

Exh. B; Records, p. 68.

22

Exh. H-1; id., p. 154.

23

Exh. J-2; id., p. 155.

24

Exh. O-1; id., p. 159.

25

Decision, pp. 1-13; Rollo, pp. 36-48.

26

Petition, p. 7; Rollo, p. 9.

27

Martinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123547, May 21, 2001; Floro v. Llenado, 244 SCRA 715
(1995).
28

112 SCRA 113 (1982); See also A. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES 115-117 (1995).
29

52 Am Jur 2 50.

30

The Insular Life Company, Ltd. v. Ebrado, 80 SCRA 181 (1977); Matabuena v. Cervantes, 38
SCRA 284 (1971).
31

Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun, 129 SCRA 675 (1984),

32

People v. Villagonzalo, 238 SCRA 215 (1994); Bienvenido v, Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 676
(1994).
33

Exh, H-1; Records, p. 154.

34

Exh. J-2; id., p. 155.

35

Exh. 0-1; id., p, 159.

36

LABOR CODE, ARTS. 99-101.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY
REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING
MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code
considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of the most
exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a
common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679)
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the
other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose el uno al otro por
amor que han de consuno, [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale
Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem);
then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and
wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty
years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it
would not be just that such donations should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should
turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality
alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER
SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. The lack of validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to
defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was
legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil
Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.
DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called upon to decide whether
the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The
plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a
donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee
Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was
made at a time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latters stand. Hence this appeal.
The question, as noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it.
A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes,
who was appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should be
given. The conclusion reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls within the
prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of
this Court. The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiffs complaint alleging
absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question that the donation
made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article of
the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely because such a donation
was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that when the case
was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The
plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the
deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed
of Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on
February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That the donation of the land to
the defendant which took effect immediately was made during the common law relationship as husband
and wife between the defendant-done and the now deceased donor and later said donor and done were
married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962;
(5) That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of
the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared
in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A
donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the
marriage. When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20,
1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses.
They became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had
been executed." 6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between
the spouses during the marriage," policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates
of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in
the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of
the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon
the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose el uno al otro
por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the
rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et
uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular
connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the
law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32
ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who
incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law,
reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any other conclusion
cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a

laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be
differentiated, the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right
would be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be attended
with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any
occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a
part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would
not be attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used
must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu
que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin de sus disposiciones. 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix
Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28,
1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is
reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso
heirs to the property in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate
disposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee, J, took no part.
Endnotes:

1. Art 133 of the Civil Code provides: "Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be
void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither
does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any
family rejoicing."
cralaw virtua1aw library

2. 50 O.G. 3679 (1954).

3. Ibid., p. 3686.
4. Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 17-19.
5. Ibid, pp. 19-20.
6. Ibid, p. 21.
7. 50 O.G. 3679.
8. Art. 1334 of the former Civil Code was similarly worded: "All donations between the spouses made
during the marriage shall be void."
cral aw virtua1aw library

9. Buenaventura v. Bautista, 50 O.G. 3679, 3686 (1954).

10. The excerpt from Yellow Taxi and Pasay Trans. Workers Union v. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., 80 Phil.
833, 838 (1948) reads in full: "Esta interpretacin de la ley es insostenible. El espiritu que informa la ley
debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin de sus dispociones. No deben atenerse a la
letra de la ley cuando la interpretacin literal se separa de la intencin de la legislatura especialmente
cuando lleva a conclusiones incompatibles con objeto manifesto de la ley. Cuando hay conflicto entre la
interpretacin literal y la interpretacin fundada en el proposito de la ley, la ltima debe prevalecer." Cf.
Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil, 1051 (1957); Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, L-25326-27, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105;
Casela v. Court of Appeals, L-26754, Oct. 16, 1970, 35 SCRA 279.
11. According to Art. 1001 of the Civil Code: "Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the

widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or
their children the other half. (953, 837a)."

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991

SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON, JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO SICAT and CONRADO LAGMAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ROMARICO HENSON, respondents.
Feliciano C. Tumale for petitioners.
Benjamin Dadios and Bausa, Ampil, Suarez, Paredes & Bausa for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:p
Submitted for adjudication in the instant petition for review on certiorari is the issue of whether or not the execution of a decision in an action for collection of
a sum of money may be nullified on the ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at public auction are the alleged exclusive properties of a
husband who did not participate in his wife's business transaction from which said action stemmed.
1

They have three children but even during the early

years of their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time living separately. The former stayed in
Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage or on January 6, 1971, Romarico bought a 1,787
square-meter parcel of land in Angeles City for P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson 2 with money
borrowed from an officemate. His father need the amount for investments in Angeles City and Palawan. 3
Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January 6, 1964.

Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the
latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at 199,895 Hongkong dollars or P321,830.95. 4 When
Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of
their value.
On September 18, 1972, Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check for P55,000 which, however, was dishonored
for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and
Angeles City, Branch IV. 5 After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case on the ground that
Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature as no estafa was committed by the issuance of the check in
payment of a pre-existing obligation. 6
In view of said decision, Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico
Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money also in the same branch of the aforesaid court. 7 The records of
the case show that Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr. filed an answer with counterclaim but only in behalf of Katrina. When the
case was called for pre-trial, Atty. Albino once again appeared as counsel for Katrina only. While it is true that during
subsequent hearings, Atty. Expedite Yumul, who collaborated with Atty. Albino, appeared for the defendants, it is not
shown on record that said counsel also represented Romarico. In fact, a power of attorney which Atty. Albino
produced during the trial, showed that the same was executed solely by Katrina. 8
After trial, the court promulgated a decisions 9 in favor of the Wongs. It ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to pay
the Wongs HK$199,895.00 or P321,830.95 with legal interest from May 27, 1975, the date of filing of the complaint,
until fully paid; P20,000 as expenses for litigation; P15,000 as attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit.
A writ of execution was thereafter issued. Levied upon were four lots in Angeles City covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 30950, 30951, 30952 and 30953 all in the name of Romarico Henson ... married to Katrina Henson. 10
The public auction sale was first set for October 30, 1977 but since said date was declared a public holiday, Deputy
Sheriff Emerito Sicat reset the sale to November 11, 1977. On said date, the following properties registered in the

name of Romarico Henson "married to Katrina Henson" were sold at public auction: (a) two parcels of land covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30950 and 30951 with respective areas of 293 and 289 square meters at
P145,000 each to Juanito L. Santos, 11 and (b) two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
30952 and 30953 with respective areas of 289 and 916 square meters in the amount of P119,000.00 to Leonardo B.
Joson. 12
After the inscription on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30951 of the levy on execution of the judgment in Civil Case
No. 2224, the property covered by said title was extrajudicially foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Porac, Pampanga on
account of the mortgage loan of P8,000 which Romarico and Katrina had obtained from said bank. The property was
sold by the sheriff to the highest bidder for P57,000 on September 9, 1977. On September 14, 1978, Juanito Santos,
who had earlier bought the same property at public auction on November 11, 1977, redeemed it by paying the sum of
P57,000 plus the legal interest of P6,840.00 or a total amount of P63,840.00. 13
About a month before such redemption or on August 8, 1 978, Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the
decision in Civil Case No. 2224 as well as the writ of execution, levy on execution and the auction sale therein in the
same Court of First Instance. 14 Romarico alleged that he was "not given his day in court" because he was not
represented by counsel as Attys. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina; that although he did not file an
answer to the complaint, he was not declared in default in the case; that while Atty. Albino received a copy of the
decision, he and his wife were never personally served a copy thereof; that he had nothing to do with the business
transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her to enter into such transactions; and that the properties levied on
execution and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties and therefore, as to him, all the
proceedings had in the case were null and void.
On November 10, 1978, the lower court issued an order restraining the Register of Deeds of Angeles City from
issuing the final bill of sale of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30950 and 30951 in favor of Juanito Santos and
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30952 and 30953 in favor of Leonardo Joson until further orders of the court. 15 On
January 22, 1979, upon motion of Romarico, the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the sheriff from
approving the final bill of sale of the land covered by the aforementioned certificates of title and the Register of Deeds
of Angeles City from registering said certificates of title in the names of Santos and Joson until the final outcome of
the case subject to Romarico's posting of a bond in the amount of P321,831.00. 16
After trial on the merits, the lower court 17 rendered a decision holding that Romarico was indeed not given his day in
court as he was not represented by counsel nor was he notified of the hearings therein although he was never
declared in default. Noting that the complaint in Civil Case No. 2224 as well as the testimonial and documentary
evidence adduced at the trial in said case do not show that Romarico had anything to do with the transactions
between Katrina and Anita Chan, the court ruled that the judgment in Civil Case No. 2224 "is devoid of legal or
factual basis which is not even supported by a finding of fact or ratio decidendi in the body of the decision, and may
be declared null and void ... pursuant to a doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court to the effect that the Court of
First Instance or a branch thereof, has authority and jurisdiction to try and decide an action for annulment of a final
and executory judgment or order rendered by another court of first instance or of a branch thereof (Gianan vs.
Imperial, 55 SCRA 755)." 18
On whether or not the properties lenied upon and sold at public auction may be reconveyed to Romarico, the court,
finding that there was no basis for holding the conjugal partnership liable for the personal indebtedness of Katrina,
ruled in favor of reconveyance in view of the jurisprudence that the interest of the wife in the conjugal partnership
property being inchoate and therefore merely an expectancy, the same may not be sold or disposed of for value until
after the liquidation and settlement of the community assets. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against all the defendants, as follows:
(a) The Decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles City, Branch IV, rendered in
Civil Case No. 2224, entitled "RICKY WONG, ET AL. vs. KATRINA PINEDA HENSON and
ROMARICO HENSON", is hereby declared null and void, only as far as it affects plaintiff herein
Romarico Henson;
(b) The Writ of Execution, levy in execution and auction sale of the conjugal property of the spouses
Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda Henson which were sold at public auction on November 11,
1977, without notice to plaintiff herein, by Deputy Sheriff Emerito Sicat, are likewise declared null and
void and of no force and effect;
(c) Defendants Emerito Sicat and Conrado Lagman, in their official capacity as Sheriff and Register
of Deeds, respectively, are enjoined permanently from issuing and/or registering the corresponding
deeds of sale affecting the property;

(d) The aforementioned buyers are directed to reconvey the property they have thus purchased at
public auction to plaintiff Romarico Henson;
(e) As far as the claim for reimbursement filed by Juanito Santos concerning the redemption of the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30951 from the Rural Bank of Porac, which
foreclosed the same extrajudicially, is concerned, plaintiff Romarico Henson may redeem the same
within the period and in the manner prescribed by law, after the corresponding deed of redemption
shall have been registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds for Angeles City;
(f) Defendants Spouses Ricky Wong and Anita Chan are, with the exception of the defendants
Juanito Santos, Leonardo Joson, Sheriff and Register of Deeds, are ordered jointly and severally, to
pay the plaintiff Romarico Henson the sum of P10,000.00, corresponding to the expenses of
litigation, with legal interest thereon from the time this suit was filed up to the time the same shall
have been paid, plus P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, and the costs of suit; and
(g) The counterclaims respectively filed on behalf of all the defendants in the above-entitled case are
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
The defendants appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its decision of January 22, 1985 19 the said
court affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. It added that as to Romarico, the judgment in Civil Case No.
2224 had not attained finality as the decision therein was not served on him and that he was not represented by
counsel. Therefore, estoppel may not be applied against him as, not having been served with the decision, Romarico
did not know anything about it. Corollarily, there can be no valid writ of execution inasmuch as the decision had not
become final as far as Romarico is concerned.
On whether the properties may be levied upon as conjugal properties, the appellate court ruled in the negative. It
noted that the properties are Romarico' s exclusive capital having been bought by him with his own funds. But
granting that the properties are conjugal, they cannot answer for Katrina's obligations as the latter were exclusively
hers because they were incurred without the consent of her husband, they were not for the daily expenses of the
family and they did not redound to the benefit of the family. The court underscored the fact that no evidence has been
submitted that the administration of the conjugal partnership had been transferred to Katrina either by Romarico or by
the court before said obligations were incurred.
The appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court but the same was denied for
lack of merit on February 6, 1985. 20
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the Henson spouses were
duly represented by Atty. Albino as shown by their affidavit of August 25, 1977 wherein they admitted that they were
represented by said counsel until Atty. Yumul took over the actual management and conduct of the case and that
Atty. Albino had not withdrawn as their counsel, the lower court "did not commit an error" in serving a copy of the
decision in Civil Case No. 2224 only on Atty. Albino. Moreover, during the 2-year period between the filing of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2224 and the public auction sale on November 11, 1977, Romarico remained silent
thereby making him in estoppel and guilty of laches.
Petitioners further aver that there being sufficient evidence that the auction sale was conducted in accordance with
law, the acts of the sheriffs concerned are presumed to be regular and valid. But granting that an irregularity
consisting of the non-notification of Romarico attended the conduct of the auction sale, the rights of Santos and
Joson who were "mere strangers who participated as the highest bidders" therein, may not be prejudiced. Santos
and Joson bought the properties sincerely believing that the sheriff was regularly performing his duties and no
evidence was presented to the effect that they acted with fraud or that they connived with the sheriff. However,
should the auction sale be nullified, petitioners assert that Romarico should not be unduly enriched at the expense of
Santos and Joson.
The petitioners' theory is that Romarico Henson was guilty of laches and may not now belatedly assert his rights over
the properties because he and Katrina were represented by counsel in Civil Case No. 2224. Said theory is allegedly
founded on the perception that the Hensons were like any other ordinary couple wherein a spouse knows or should
know the transactions of the other spouse which necessarily must be in interest of the family. The factual background
of this case, however, takes it out of said ideal situation.
Romarico and Katrina had in fact been separated when Katrina entered into a business deal with Anita Wong. Thus,
when that business transaction eventually resulted in the filing of Civil Case No. 2224, Romarico acted, or, as
charged by petitioners, failed to act, in the belief that he was not involved in the personal dealings of his estranged

wife. That belief was buttressed by the fact that the complaint itself did not mention or implicate him other than as the
husband of Katrina. On whether Romarico was also represented by Atty. Albino, Katrina's counsel, the courts below
found that:
... Atty. Albino filed an Answer with Counterclaims dated July 25, 1975 solely on behalf of defendant
Katrina Henson. The salutary statement in that Answer categorically reads: ... COMES NOW THE
DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON by and through undersigned counsel, in answer to plaintiffs'
complaint respectfully alleges: ... .
That Answer was signed by GREGORIO ALBINO, JR., over the phrase COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON.
Again, when Civil Case No. 2224 was called for pre-trial on November 27, 1975, before then
Presiding Judge Bienvenido Ejercito, it is clearly stated on page 2 of the day's stenographic notes,
under "APPEARANCES that Atty. Albino, Jr. appeared as COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT KATRINA
HENSON". And when the case was called, Atty. Jose Baltazar, Sr. appeared for the plaintiffs while
Atty. Albino categorically appeared "FOR DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON".
It might be true that in subsequent hearings, Atty. Expedito Yumul 'appeared as counsel for the
defendants,' but the whole trouble is that he never expressly manifested to the Court that he was
likewise actually representing defendant "ROMARICO HENSON", for it cannot be disputed that Atty.
Yumul only entered his appearance in collaboration with Atty. Albino (see p. 2 tsn, January 26, 1976,
Espinosa), who in turn entered his initial appearance during the pre- trial, and through the filing of an
Answer, for defendant KATRINA HENSON. As a matter of fact, the Power of Attorney which Atty.
Albino produced during the pre-trial was executed solely by defendant KATRINA HENSON.
Accordingly, as collaborating counsel, Atty. Yumul cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
considered as duly authorized to formally appear likewise on behalf of defendant ROMARICO
HENSON for whom principal counsel of record Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr. never made any formal
appearance. On this score, it is not amiss to state that "A spring cannot rise higher than its source:.
Now, what about that statement in the aforementioned joint affidavit of the spouses KATRINA
HENSON and ROMARICO HENSON, to the effect that our first lawyer in said case was Atty.
Gregorio Albino, Jr., and sometime later Atty. Expedito B. Yumul took over ...
That statement which plaintiff ROMARICO HENSON was made to sign by Atty. Yumul on August
25,1977, after the filing of this case, allegedly for the purpose of dissolving the writ of execution, as
claimed in paragraph XIV of the complaint herein, and is satisfactorily explained by both plaintiff
herein and his wife, while on cross-examination by Atty. Baltazar, Sr., and We quote:
Q So, the summons directed your filing of your Answer for both of you, your wife and your good self?
A Yes, sir but may I add, I received the summons but I did not file an answer because my wife took a lawyer and
that lawyer I think will protect her interest and my interest being so I did not have nothing to do in the transaction
which is attached to the complaint.' (TSN, Jan. 14, 1980, pp. 52-53).
That plaintiff never appeared in Civil Case No. 2224, nor was he therein represented by counsel was impliedly
admitted by defendants' counsel of records thru a question he propounded on cross, and the answer given by
Katrina Pineda, to wit:
Q How about your husband, do you remember if he physically appeared in that Civil Case No. 2224, will you tell
us if he was represented by counsel as a party defendant?
A No, sir, he did not appear.
Q You are husband and wife, please tell us the reason why you have your own counsel in that case whereas
Romarico Henson did not appear nor a counsel did not appear in that proceedings (TSN, Feb. 25,1980, pp. 6-7).
xxx xxx xxx
A Because that case is my exclusive and personal case, he has nothing to do with that, sir. (TSN, Feb. 25, 1980,
p. 9). (Rollo, pp. 17-20)
Hence, laches may not be charged against Romarico because, aside from the fact that he had no knowledge of the transactions of his estranged wife, he
21

There is no laches or even finality of decision to speak

of with respect to Romarico since the decision in Civil Case No. 2224 is null and void for having been rendered
without jurisdiction for failure to observe the notice requirements prescribed by law. 22 Failure to notify Romarico may
not be attributed to the fact that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2224 acted on the presumption that the Hensons were
still happily married because the complaint itself shows that they did not consider Romarico as a party to the
was also not afforded an opportunity to defend himself in Civil Case No. 2224.

transaction which Katrina undertook with Anita Wong. In all likelihood, the plaintiffs merely impleaded Romarico as a
nominal party in the case pursuant to the provisions of Rule 3, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico as he has not yet had his day in court 23 and,
necessarily, the public auction sale is null and void. 24 Moreover, the power of the court in the execution of judgments
extends only over properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. 25
On the matter of ownership of the properties involved, however, the Court disagrees with the appellate court that the
said properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. Having been acquired during the marriage, they are still
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership 26 even though Romarico and Katrina had been living
separately. 27
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. 28 While
there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear
where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal
assets 29 and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the
determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during covertrue, the controlling factor is the source of
the money utilized in the purchase.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for with them her
obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. 30 In
addition to the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged in the
complaint and proven at the trial. 31
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the
conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows
money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the
proper sum; 32 when the administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts 33 or by the
husband 34 and when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. 35 Having failed to establish that any of these
circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to
them.
Petitioners' contention that the rights of Santos and Joson as innocent buyers at the public auction sale may not be
prejudiced, is, to a certain extent, valid. After all, in the absence of proof that irregularities attended the sale, the
same must be presumed to have been conducted in accordance with law. There is, however, a peculiar factual
circumstance that goes against the grain of that general presumption the properties levied upon and sold at the
public auction do not exclusively belong to the judgment debtor. Thus, the guiding jurisprudence is as follows:
The rule in execution sales is that an execution creditor acquires no higher or better right than what
the execution debtor has in the property levied upon. The purchaser of property on sale under
execution and levy takes as assignee, only as the judicial seller possesses no title other than that
which would pass by an assignment by the owner. "An execution purchaser generally acquires such
estate or interest as was vested in the execution debtor at the time of the seizure on execution, and
only such interest, taking merely a quit-claim of the execution debtor's title, without warranty on the
part of either the execution officer or of the parties, whether the property is realty or personalty. This
rule prevails even if a larger interest in the property was intended to be sold. Accordingly, if the
judgment debtor had no interest in the property, the execution purchaser acquires no interest
therein." (Pacheco vs. Court of Appeals, L-48689, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 382, 388-389 quoting
Laureano vs. Stevenson, 45 Phil. 252; Cabuhat vs. Ansery, 42 Phil. 170; Fore v. Manove, 18 Cal.
436 and 21 Am. Jur., 140-141. Emphasis supplied.)
Applying this jurisprudence, execution purchasers Santos and Joson possess no rights which may rise above
judgment debtor Katrina's inchoate proprietary rights over the properties sold at public auction. After all, a person can
sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell and the buyer can, as a consequence, acquire no more that what the
seller can legally transfer. 36 But, inasmuch as the decision in Civil Case No. 2224 is void only as far as Romarico and
the conjugal properties are concerned, the same may still be executed by the Spouses Wong against Katrina Henson
personally and exclusively. The Spouses Wong must return to Juanito Santos and Leonardo Joson the purchase
prices of P145,000 and P119,000 respectively, received by said spouse from the public auction sale.
The redemption made by Santos in the foreclosure proceeding against Romarico and Katrina Henson filed by the
Rural Bank of Porac, should, however, be respected unless Romarico exercises his right of redemption over the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30951 in accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the appellate court and the lower court in Civil Case No. 28-09 are hereby
AFFIRMED subject to the modifications above stated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 TSN. January 14,1980. p. 54.
2 Exh. I.
3 TSN, January 14,1980, p. 14.
4 Decision in Civil Case No. 2224, Exh. K, pp. 1-2.
5 Presided by Judge Bienvenido Ejercito.
6 Decision in Criminal Case No. 3205, Exh, J, p. 11.
7 Civil Case No. 2224.
8 Decision in Civil Case No. 2859, pp. 12-15.
9 Penned by Judge Felisa de la Fuente-Samson.
10 Exhs. Nos. A to D.
11 Exh. 5-Juanito Santos.
12 Exh. 6-Joson.
13 Exh. 4-Santos .
14 Civil Case No. 2859.
15 Record on Appeal, p. 25.
16 Ibid., p. 54.
17 Presided by Judge Ignacio M. Capulong. The presiding judge of Branch IV had earlier inhibited himself from taking cognizance of
the case. Hence, Civil Case No. 2859 was transferred to Branch V of the same court.
18 Pursuant to Section 9 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals now exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over
actions for annulment of judgments of the Regional Trial Courts (Islamic Da'Wah Council of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 80892, September 29,1989,178 SCRA 178; Liwag vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86094, December 20,1989,180 SCRA 420).
19 Penned by Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa and concurred in by Justices Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa and
Leonor Ines Luciano.
20 Rollo, p. 56.
21 Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988,160 SCRA 738, 747.
22 Portugal v. Reantasa L-46078, November 24,1988,167 SCRA 712.
23 New Owners/Management of TML Garments, Inc. v. Zaragoza, G.R. No. 75866, February 23,1989,170 SCRA 563; Vda. de Medina
v. Cruz, L-39272, May 4,1988,161 SCRA 36.
24 Ver v. Quetulio G.R. No. 77526, June 29,1988,163 SCRA 80.
25 Escovilla Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84497, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 109; Ong v. Tating, G.R. No. 61042, April 15,
1987, 149 SCRA 265.
26 G.R. No. 72321, December Art. 160, Civil Code Cuenca v. Cuenca, December 8, 1988, 168 SCRA 335.
27 Art. 178, Ibid., Flores v. Escudero, 92 Phil. 786.

28 Ahern v. Julian, 39 Phil. 607.

29 Art, 153 (2), Civil Code.
30 Art. 161, Ibid.; Lacson v. Diaz, L-1 9346, May 31,1965,14 SCRA 183.
31 Art. 172, Ibid.; Manaois-Salonga v. Natividad, 107 Phil. 268.
32 Art. 115.
33 Arts. 196,167 & 178.
34 Art. 168.
35 Art. 174.
36 See: Segura v. Segura, L-29320. September 19, 1988,165 SCRA 368, 374.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG (with aliases JOSE JO and
CONSING), respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three women and
fathered fifteen children. The first of these women, the herein petitioner, claims to be his legal wife
whom he begot a daughter, Monina Jo. The other women and their respective offspring are not
parties of these case.
In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property,
docketed as Civil Case No. 51, in addition to an earlier action for support, also against him and
docketed as Civil Case No. 36, in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35.
The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. On November 29, 1983, Judge German G.
Lee, Jr. rendered an extensive decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing arguments and considerations, this court
hereby holds that the plaintiff Prima Partosa was legally married to Jose Jo alias Ho
Hang, alias Consing, and, therefore, is entitled to support as the lawfully wedded
wife and the defendant is hereby ordered to give a monthly support of P500.00 to
the plaintiff Prima Partosa, to be paid on or before the 5th day of every month, and
to give to the plaintiff the amount of P40,000.00 for the construction of the house in
Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental where she may live separately from the defendant
being entitled under the law to separate maintenance being the innocent spouse
and to pay the amount of P19,200.00 to the plaintiff by way of support in arrears
and to pay the plaintiff the amount of P3,000.00 in the concept of attorney's fees.

As will be noticed, there was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of the
complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property.
Jo elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the trial court in the
complaint for support. 1 The complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property was dismissed for lack of a
cause of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code.
When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties came to this Court for relief. The private
respondent's petition for review on certiorari was dismissed for tardiness in our resolution dated February 17, 1988,
where we also affirmed the legality of the marriage between Jose and Prima and the obligation of the former to
support her and her daughter.
This petition deals only with the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property.
It is here submitted that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: a) the judicial separation of conjugal property
sought was not allowed under Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code; and b) no such separation was decreed by
the trial court in the dispositive portion of its decision.
The private respondent contends that the decision of the trial court can longer be reviewed at this time because it has
a long since become final and executory. As the decretal portion clearly made no disposition of Civil Case No. 51,
that case should be considered impliedly dismissed. The petitioner should have called the attention of the trial court
to the omission so that the proper rectification could be made on time. Not having done so, she is now concluded by
the said decision, which can no longer be corrected at this late hour.
We deal first with the second ground.
While admitting that no mention was made of Civil Case No. 51 in the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial
court, the petitioner argues that a disposition of the case was nonetheless made in the penultimate paragraph of the
decision reading as follows:
It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo,
the defendant in this case, subject to separation of property under Article 178, third paragraph of the
Civil Code, which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated herein.
The petitioner says she believed this to be disposition enough and so did not feel it was necessary for her to appeal,
particularly since the order embodied in that paragraph was in her favor. It was only when the respondent court
observed that there was no dispositive portion regarding that case and so ordered its dismissal that she found it
necessary to come to this Court for relief.
The petitioner has a point.
The dispositive portion of the decision in question was incomplete insofar as it carried no ruling on the complaint for
judicial separation of conjugal property although it was extensively discussed in the body of the decision. The drafting
of the decision was indeed not exactly careful. The petitioner's counsel, noting this, should have taken immediate
steps for the rectification for the omission so that the ruling expressed in the text of the decision could have been
embodied in the decretal portion. Such alertness could have avoided this litigation on a purely technical issue.
Nevertheless, the technicality invoked in this case should not be allowed to prevail over considerations of substantive
justive. After all, the technical defect is not insuperable. We have said time and again that where there is an
ambiguity caused by an omission or a mistake in the dispositive portion of the decision, this Court may clarify such
an ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment have become final. 2 In doing so, the Court may resort to the
pleading filed by the parties and the findings of fact and the conclusions of law expressed in the text or body of the
decision. 3
The trial court made definite findings on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property, holding that the
petitioner and the private respondent were legally married and that the properties mentioned by the petitioner were
acquired by Jo during their marriage although they were registered in the name of the apparent dummy.
There is no question therefore that the penultimate paragraph of the decision of the trial court was a ruling based
upon such findings and so should have been embodied in the dispositive portion. The respondent court should have
made the necessary modification instead of dismissing Civil Case No. 51 and thus upholding mere form over
substance.

In the interest of substantive justice, and to expedite these proceedings, we hereby make such modification.
And now to the merits of Civil Case No. 51.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties was due to their
agreement and not because of abondonment. The respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of the petitioner,
who declared under oath that she left Dumaguete City, where she and Jo were living together "because that was our
agreement." It held that a agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code
and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Its conclusion was that the only remedy
availabe to the petitioner was legal separation under Article 175 of the Civil Code, 4 by virtue of which the conjugal
partnership of property would be terminated.
The petitioner contends that the respondent court has misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code.
She submits that the agreement between her and the private respondent was for her to temporarily live with her
parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to separate
permanently. And even if they did, this arrangement was repudiated and ended in 1942, when she returned to him at
Dumaguete City and he refused to accept her.
The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect
the conjugal partnership, except that:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition
the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership property or
separation of property.
The above-quoted provision has been superseded by Article 128 of the Family Code, which states:
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial
separation of property, of for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership
property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to martial, parental or
property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abondoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling
without any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three
months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts
shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
Under the this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds:
1. Abondonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if
she said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged
absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although able to do
so. 5 There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
separation. 6 This idea is clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a spouse is deemed to
have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning."
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied
admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was
not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship.
Moreover, beginning 1968 until the determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the private
respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the
refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for
the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed
without just cause to comply with his obligations to the family as husband or parent. Apart form refusing to admit his
lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and
siring many children by them. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that prompted her to
file the actions against him for support and later for separation of the conjugal property, in which actions, significantly,
he even denied being married to her. The private respondent has not established any just cause for his refusal to
comply with his obligations to his wife as dutiful husband.
Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code, providing as follows:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouse have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
The amendments introduced in the Family Code are applicable to the case before us although they became effective
only on August 3, 1988. As we held in Ramirez v. Court of Appeals: 7
The greater weight of authority is inclined to the view that an appellate court, in reviewing a judgment
on appeal, will dispose of a question according to the law prevailing at the term of such disposition,
and not according to the law prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed judgement. The court
will therefore reverse a judgement which was correct at the time it was originally rendered where, by
statute, there has been an intermediate change in the law which renders such judgement erroneous
at the time the case was finally disposed of on appeal.
The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is based on the finding of both the trial and respondent
courts that the private respondent is indeed their real owner. It is these properties that should now be divided
between him and the petitioner, on the assumption that they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the
spouses half and half. As the private respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must include such properties
properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may have been registered in the name of other persons in violation
of the Anti-Dummy Law.
The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his extramarital flings and a succession of illegitimate
children, he must now make an accounting to his lawful wife of the properties he denied her despite his promise to
their of his eternal love and care.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the respondent court is MODIFIED. Civil Case
No. 51 is hereby decided in favor the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, and the conjugal property of the petitioner and the
private respondent is hereby ordered divided between them, share and share alike. This division shall be
implemented by the trial court after determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership,
including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Grio-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Chua, Segundino G., J., ponente, Coquia, Jorge R. and De Pano, Nathanael, Jr., P. JJ., concurring, promulgated on January 28,
1987.
2 Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellant Court, 152 SCRA 316; Alvendia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
181 SCRA 252.
3 Sentinel Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals. 182 SCRA 516.
4 Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled;

(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
5 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990 ed., Vol. 1, p. 398.
6 De la Cruz vs. De la Cruz, 22 SCRA 333.
7 72 SCRA 231.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 102692 September 23, 1996

JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.), INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJO M. VINLUAN, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a husband be held liable for the debts of his wife which were incurred without his consent and which did not benefit the conjugal
partnership? May a judgment declaring a wife solely liable, be executed upon conjugal property, over the objection of the husband?
These are the main questions raised in the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks nullification of
the Decision

in CA-G.R. SP No. 19178 of the Court of Appeals, 2 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, and the orders
dated July 24, 1989 and October 4, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 137, in Civil
Case No. 4186, as well as the notices of levy issued by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal dated February
8, 1989, are hereby declared null and void and set aside. No costs.
The Facts
This case was initiated in the trial court by a complaint 3 filed by petitioner against spouses Delilah A. Vinluan,
owner of Vinluan Enterprises, and her husband Capt. Alejo M. Vinluan (the private respondent before us), for
collection of a sum of money with damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4186 and tried in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 137. 4 The respondent appellate Court found the antecedent facts, to
be as follows: 5
The plaintiff-respondent Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as the
corporation) is engaged in the manufacturing and selling of various cosmetics, health, and body care
products, as well as medical drugs. On several occasions in the year 1982, the defendant, Delilah
Vinluan, purchased products of the plaintiff-respondent corporation, as she was also engaged in the
business of retailing Johnson products, among others. The defendants, under the name and style of
"Vinluan Enterprises," thus incurred an obligation of Two Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Eight
Hundred Eighty Pesos and Eighty-Nine (P235,880.89) Centavos, for which she issued seven (7)
Philippine Banking Corporation checks of varying amounts and due dates. When presented on their
respective due dates, however, the checks given in payment of the obligation bounced and were
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
Several demands thereafter for payment were to no avail, despite the accommodations given by the
plaintiff-respondent corporation by granting several extensions to the defendant spouses to settle the
obligation. It was only on January 5, 1983 that the defendants made a partial payment of Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, thereby reducing their principal obligation to P230,880.89. When no
further payments were made to settle the obligation despite repeated demands, the plaintiff-

respondent corporation was constrained to file a complaint (Annex "A") on June 8, 1983 against
defendant spouses Vinluan, for collection of the principal obligation plus interest, with damages.
Filed before the respondent Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 137, it was docketed as Civil
Case No. 4186.
After trial on the merits, on February 5, 1985, the respondent court rendered its Decision (Annex
"C"), the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the defendant
DELILAH A. VINLUAN to pay plaintiff Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc, the
sum of P242,482.40 with interest and penalty charges at the rate of 2% per
month from 30 January 1983 until fully paid, and the sum of P30,000.00 as
attorney's fees, and to pay the costs.
Defendants' counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of sufficient merit.
In arriving at the sole liability of defendant Delilah A. Vinluan, the trial court found after "meticulous scrutiny
and careful evaluation of the evidence on record" that there was "no privity of contract, whether direct or
indirect, between plaintiff and defendant-husband regarding the obligations incurred by defendant-wife."
According to the trial court, "(i)n fact, the acts performed, and the statements made, by defendant-husband,
and from which plaintiff derived the notion that said defendant is a co-owner of VINLUAN ENTERPRISES,
took place after the obligation involved in this action had been incurred or contracted by the defendant-wife,
albeit without the husband's knowledge or consent, as there was no allegation in the complaint that said
obligations were incurred by defendant-wife with her husband's consent, or that it was incurred for the benefit
of the family. . . ." 6
The trial court also found that private respondent never intimated in his conversations or meetings with, or in
any of his letters to, petitioner that "he was a co-owner of VINLUAN ENTERPRISES, much less did he
represent himself as such co-owner, to the plaintiff and to plaintiff's counsel . . . ." When private respondent
personally negotiated with petitioner and proposed a settlement of the subject obligations, these actuations
were not to be considered as admission of co-ownership of VINLUAN ENTERPRISES for "(a)fter all,
common sense and our inborn mores of conduct dictate that a husband must give aid and comfort to his
distressed wife." 7 The trial court further held that the defendant spouses had sufficiently established that the
defendant wife was sole owner of the business venture, that the conjugal partnership never derived any
benefit therefrom, and that the same closed due to continued losses. In sum, the court a quo held that private
respondent could not legally be held liable for the obligations contracted by the wife.
Thus, the court below issued a writ of execution 8 on February 3, 1989, directing the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal to execute the judgment on
the properties of the defendant-wife. However, the two notices of levy on execution 9 issued on February 8,
1989 covered not only her exclusive or paraphernal properties, but also the real and personal properties of
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Vinluan. The next day, her husband (herein private respondent) filed
a third-party claim 10 seeking the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties, followed by another third-party
claim reiterating the same demand with threat of possible lawsuit. Subsequently, petitioner corporation filed a
motion dated February 14, 1989 asking the court to fix the value of the properties levied upon by the sheriff.
In response to the third-party claims of private respondent, a comment and/or opposition dated March 6,
1989 was filed by petitioner.
Private respondent moved on July 1, 1989 to quash the levy on execution on the ground that the notices of
levy on execution did not conform to the final decision of the court and to the writ of execution. As expected,
petitioner opposed the motion. On July 24, 1989, the trial court issued the first assailed Order fixing the value
of the levied personal properties at P300,000.00, and denying the third-party claim and the motion to quash
the levy on execution. Citing the last sentence of Article 117 11 of the Civil Code, the court a quo ruled that: 12
Since Alejo Vinluan did not seek the intervention of the Court to air his objections in his wife's
engaging in business, coupled by the fact that he made several representations for the settlement of
his wife's account, Alejo Vinluan's consent thereto became evident. As such, even his own capital
may be liable, together with the conjugal and paraphernal property (I Paras 363, 1987 ed., p. 6; Art.
6-10, Code of Commerce). Withal, Article 172 of the New Civil Code categorically declares that
The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's
consent, except in the cases provided by law.

Granting arguendo that Alejo Vinluan did not give his consent, expressly or impliedly, the paraphernal
and conjugal property may still be held liable but not his capital (I Paras 363, 1978 ed.).
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the abovequoted first order (on the ground that it directly
contravened the decision itself which had already become final and executory) was denied via the second
contested Order dated October 4, 1989, where the trial court ruled: 13
The Court finds untenable movant-defendant's assertion that Art. 172 of the New Civil Code is not in
point. The consent of the husband is indeed vital in determining what properties shall be subsidiarily
liable in the event the paraphernal properties of Delilah Vinluan should turn out to be insufficient to
cover the judgment debt, as fully explained in the Order dated 24 July 1989.
Art. 122 of the Family Code which party provides that
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
xxx xxx xxx
is not applicable in that
This Code (Family Code) shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws (Art. 255, Family Code; emphasis supplied).
Plaintiff (petitioner herein), having acquired a vested right prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
said code is not a propos (sic). Even granting arguendo that the same is befitting, movant defendant
failed to realize that although Delilah Vinluan suffered losses in her legitimate business, the
experience she has gained redounded to the benefit of the family, and as such, the conjugal
partnership must bear the indebtedness and losses (I Paras 464, 1981 ed.). Moreover, had the
business Delilah Vinluan engaged in been a success, all profits would have been considered
conjugal; it is therefore but fair that the risks of the business should be borne by the conjugal
partnership (Miravite, Bar Review Materials in Commercial Law, 1986 ed., p. 89; J.N. Nolledo,
Commercial Law Reviewer, 1986 ed., pp. 6, 7; U.P. Law Complex, Answers to Bar Questions In
Commercial Law, 1986 ed., pp. 174, 175; Vitug, Commercial Law Reviewer, 1984, ed., p. 5).
There is a wide-embracing oversight when movant-defendant asserted that to hold the conjugal
partnership property liable for the indebtedness incurred solely by his wife would in effect modify the
Decision dated 5 Feb 1985 which is now final and executory. As afore-discussed, the conjugal
property is subsidiarily liable.
As indicated above, the private respondent elevated the matter to the respondent appellate Court, charging
the trial court with grave abuse of discretion for effectively reversing its own final judgment. The respondent
Court upheld the private respondent in its now-assailed Decision, and denied herein petitioner's subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner is now before us seeking review under Rule 45.
The Issues
Petitioner raised the following "issues of law" for consideration of this Court, to wit:

14

1. Whether or not the decision of the honorable trial court dated February 5, 1985 exonerating (sic)
defendant husband, private respondent herein, from the obligation contracted by the wife in the
pursuit of her business also absolves the conjugal partnership from liability.
2. Whether or not the subsequent order of the honorable trial court dated July 24, 1989 and October
4, 1989 is a reversal of its own original decision as found out by the honorable public respondent.
The pivotal issues in this case may be re-stated thus: whether or not the order of the trial court denying
private respondent's third-party claim and motion to quash levy on execution in effect amended the
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision which had long become final and executory, and if so, whether
same is proper or not. These issues shall be ruled upon together.
The Court's Ruling

Petitioner contends 15 that the purpose of impleading private respondent as co-defendant in petitioner's
complaint was to bind not only the defendant-spouses' conjugal partnership but also private respondent's
capital. The trial court resolved that it was not necessary that private respondent (as husband) be joined as
party-defendant in the suit below. Inasmuch as it appeared from the allegations in the complaint that private
respondent may be a co-owner of Vinluan Enterprises, the trial court nonetheless did not exclude private
respondent but passed upon the issue of such co-ownership to determine whether he may be held liable in
the same manner as his wife. Petitioner insists that the trial court in its decision merely made a finding that
the private respondent husband was not a co-owner of the business venture of his wife, which conclusion
("exoneration") only exempted his capital from the adjudged liability, but not the conjugal properties of the
spouses. Petitioner further argues that nowhere in the trial court's decision can there be found any
pronouncement absolving the conjugal property from liability, contrary to the findings of the respondent
Court.
Also, petitioner reasons that the enforcement of the decision against the conjugal property is merely
compliance with law, and that this Court in a long line of cases 16 held that a judgment is not confined to what
appears upon the face of the decision but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. 17
Additionally, petitioner pleads that the trial court's order did not modify its final and executory decision but
only clarified an ambiguity in the decision as to what properties are liable. As authority, it cites Republic vs.
De los Angeles. 18
Petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit.
Respondent Court correctly ruled that the trial court cannot, in the guise of deciding the third-party claim,
reverse its final decision. Commenting on the trial court's very patent "about-face" on the issues of consent of
the husband, benefit to the family, and the husband's liability for obligations contracted by his wife, the
appellate Court held, and we quote: 19
We see in these stark contradictions an attempt by the respondent Court to reverse itself, even when
the decision sought to be executed had already become final. The respondent Court has no authority
to modify or vary the terms and conditions of a final and executory judgment (Vda. de Nabong vs.
Sadang, 167 SCRA 232) and this attempt to thwart the rules cannot be allowed to pass. Even if the
respondent Court feels that it needed to reverse its findings to correct itself, the decision, whether
erroneous or not, has become the law of the case between the parties upon attaining finality (Balais
vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37). the respondent Court has no choice but to order the execution of the final
decision according to what is ordained and decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision
(National Steel Corp. vs. NLRC, 165 SCRA 452).
The dispositive portion of the decision charges the defendant Delilah Vinluan alone to pay the
plaintiff corporation, having already declared that the defendant-husband cannot be held legally
liable for his wife's obligations. Perhaps, when it was later discovered that the defendant Delilah
Vinluan did not have sufficient property of her own to settle the obligation, the conjugal properties of
the defendant-spouses became the object of the levy. But in order to bind the conjugal partnership
and its properties, the New Civil Code provides that the debts and obligations contracted by the
husband (or the wife) must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership (Article 161, par. 1); and that
the husband must consent to his wife's engaging in business (Article 117).
Thus, we see a belated effort on the part of the respondent Court to reverse itself by declaring that
the obligations incurred by the defendant wife redounded to the benefit of the family and that the
defendant husband had given his consent, in order to bind the conjugal partnership.
As We stated earlier, this cannot be done because the decision, along with the respondent Court's
original findings, had already become final and indisputable. The respondent Court already found
that the defendant husband did not give his consent; neither did the obligation incurred by the
defendant wife redound to the benefit of the family. Hence, the conjugal partnership, as well as the
defendant husband, cannot be held liable. As originally decreed by the Court, only the defendant wife
and her paraphernal property can be held liable. Since the power of the court in execution of
judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone
(Republic vs. Enriquez, 166 SCRA 608), the conjugal properties and the capital of the defendant
husband cannot be levied upon.
The settled rule is that a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and
hence may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes all the
issues between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest. 20 This is meant to preserve the stability
of decisions rendered by the courts, and to dissuade parties from trifling with court processes. One who has

submitted his case to a regular court necessarily commits himself to abide by whatever decision the court
may render. Any error in the decision which has not been considered in a timely motion for reconsideration or
appeal cannot be impugned when such error becomes apparent only during execution. This rule applies with
more force in the case of to decision judge who has limited prerogative during execution of the judgment. For
as correctly held by herein public respondent, aside from ordering the enforcement of the dispositive portion
of the decision, the trial judge can do nothing about the errors in the ratiocination of the decision or even alter
the dispositive portion by mere order issued subsequent to the finality of the decision. The issue having been
laid to rest, the court cannot on the pretext of determining the validity of the third-party claim and the motion
to quash levy on execution alter the scope of the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be
implemented.
Petitioner's arguments notwithstanding, the trial court's order cannot be said to be merely clarificatory in
nature. There is no ambiguity at all in the decision, for it categorically declared defendant Delilah A. Vinluan
solely liable, without any recourse provided against her husband. Thus, the case of Republic vs. Delos
Angeles, 21 holding that doubtful or ambiguous judgments are to have a reasonable intendment to do justice
and avoid wrong, does not apply here. as was later held in Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
22
"(w)here there is an ambiguity, a judgment shall be read in connection with the entire record and construed
accordingly. In such a case, it is proper to consider the pleadings and the evidence." (Emphasis supplied).
But the text of the trial court's decision points to no other person liable but Delilah Vinluan, and in fact made a
rather lengthy discussion on the exemption from liability of the conjugal partnership; hence, there can be no
ambiguity to speak of in the decision. And even more clearly, the body of the decision of the trial court
expressly exempted private respondent from liability by categorically ruling that "the defendant-husband
cannot, together, with co-defendant, legally be held liable for the obligations contracted by the wife." 23
Further, the trial court expounded: 24
. . . . What is more, it is an admitted fact that the subject obligations had partially been paid by the
defendant-wife herself. Thus, plaintiff implicitly averred that "defendant Delilah Vinluan, ding
business under the name and style of VINLUAN ENTERPRISES is one of the various customers of
the plaintiff's products' (Cf. p. 1, Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Brief); that "Delilah Vinluan . . . purchased
different Johnson products . . . , thus incurring an obligation of P235,880.89" (Cf. par. III, Complaint);
that "defendant Delilah Vinluan tried to pay (her) obligations . . . when she issued Philippine Banking
Checks . . . , but which checks upon presentment to the Bank were dishonored for the reason
"Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" (Cf. par. V, id.); that " . . . , defendant Delilah A. Vinluan appealed
to the company and also represented that she be given an opportunity to settle the accountability"
(Cf. par. VI, id.); that "defendant sent a letter to the company where she alleged that payment cannot
be made because they are "victims of some bad practices in the trade and that they are working on
some means to settle their accounts and all that they ask is time to settle." (Cf. par. VI, id.).
We take this occasion to reiterate the ruling of this Court in an early
case 25 that litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being essential to the effective
and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result, for, constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,
courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. Furthermore, public policy and sound practice
demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at
some definite date fixed by law. And this is better observed if the court executing the judgment would refrain
from creating further controversy by effectively modifying and altering the dispositive portion of the decision,
thus further delaying the satisfaction of the judgment. No matter how just the intention of the trial court, it
cannot legally reverse what has already been settled. Holding the conjugal partnership liable in the order
after the finality of the decision is evidently not just correcting a mere clerical error; it goes into the merits of
the case. And this is prohibited by the rules and jurisprudence.
We have elsewhere ruled that "should judgment of lower courts which may normally be subject to review
by higher tribunals become final and executory before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal,
they, too, become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any
way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other
official, branch or department of Government." 26
. . . (N)othing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion
of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court
rendering it or by the highest Court of land. They only recognized exceptions are the correction of

clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
and, of course, where the judgment is void.
Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory
judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose." 27
The respondent Court also commented on the sheriff's actuations as follows:

28

Furthermore, it is the duty of the sheriff to ensure that only that portion of the decision ordained and
decreed in the dispositive part should be the subject of the execution (Cunanan vs. Cruz, 167 SCRA
674). The writ of execution itself states that only the properties of the defendant wife were to be
levied upon. There was no mention even of conjugal properties. Hence, in levying on the properties
that did not exclusively belong to the judgment debtor, the notices of levy failed to conform to the
decree of the decision, and are, therefore, irregular and contrary to the Rules (Canlas vs. CA, 164
SCRA 160).
It is a rule firmly established in our jurisprudence that a sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property
not belonging to the judgment debtor. 29 A sheriff even incurs liability if he wrongfully levies upon the property
of a third person. 30 A sheriff has no authority to attach the property of any person under execution except
that of the judgment debtor. The sheriff maybe liable for enforcing execution on property belonging to a third
party. 31 If he does so, the writ of execution affords him no justification, for the action is not in obedience to
the mandate of the writ.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the herein petition is hereby DENIED, and the
Decision of the respondent Court is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 115-130.
2 Ninth Division, composed of J. Venancio D. Aldecoa, Jr., ponente, and JJ. Fidel P. Purisima (chairman) and
Alicia V. Sempio Diy, concurring.
3 Rollo, pp. 22-29.
4 Judge Santiago Ranada, Jr. presiding.
5 Rollo, pp. 116-117.
6 Rollo, p. 119.
7 CA Decision, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 120-121.
8 Rollo, p. 48.
9 Rollo, pp. 49-51.
10 Rollo, pp. 52-54.
11 Art. 117 of the Civil Code reads:
"Art. 117. The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business. However, the husband
may object, provided:
(1) His income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing, and
(2) His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds.

In case of disagreement on this question, the parents and grandparents as well as the family council, if any,
shall be consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will decide whatever may be proper and in the
best interest of the family.
12 Rollo, p. 67.
13 Rollo, pp. 80-81.
14 Petitioner, p. 7; rollo, p. 8.
15 Rollo, p. 9 et seq.
16 Including Cristobal vs. Melchor, 101 SCRA 857, December 29, 1980; Festin vs. Faderanga, 111 SCRA 1,
January 16, 1982; Budget Investment and Financing, Inc. vs. Mangoma, 153 SCRA 630, September 4, 1987;
Unson vs. Lacson, 2 SCRA 861, July 31, 1961.
17 Rollo, pp. 12-13.
18 41 SCRA 422, October 4, 1971; rollo, pp. 15-16.
19 Rollo, pp. 127-128.
20 Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 599, 604, August 23, 1995 citing Lim vs.
Jabalde, 172 SCRA 211, 223, April 17, 1989; Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88,
98, March 11, 1994; Alabanzas vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 204 SCRA 304, 318-319, November 29,
1991.
22 41 SCRA 422, October 4, 1971.
23 226 SCRA 257, 267, September 10, 1993.
23 Rollo, p. 121.
24 Rollo, pp. 119-120.
25 Li Kim Tho vs. Go Siu Kao, et al., 82 Phil. 776, January 31, 1949, cited in Gomez vs. Presiding Judge,
RTC Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439, October 24, 1995.
26 In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405, 457-458, February 21, 1995, citing numerous cases as
authorities.
27 Nual vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 26, 32, April 6, 1993, citing Francisco vs. Bautista, 192 SCRA 388,
392, December 19, 1990.
28 Rollo, p. 128.
29 Republic vs. Enriquez, 166 SCRA 608, 612, October 21, 1988 citing Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation vs. Rafferty, 39 Phil. 145, November 15, 1918; Bucoy v. Torrejon, Jurika & Co., 62 Phil. 831,
January 13, 1936.
30 47 Am Jur 857 ( 48).
31 Arellano vs. Flojo, 238 SCRA 72, 76, November 14, 1994.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155043. September 30, 2004]
ARTURO R. ABALOS, petitioner, vs. DR. GALICANO S. MACATANGAY, JR., respondent.
DECISION

TINGA, J.:
The instant petition seeks a reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48355
entitled Dr. Galicano S. Macatangay, Jr. v. Arturo R. Abalos and Esther Palisoc-Abalos, promulgated on
March 14, 2002. The appellate court reversed the trial courts decision which dismissed the action for
specific performance filed by respondent, and ordered petitioner and his wife to execute in favor of herein
respondent a deed of sale over the subject property.
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with improvements located
at Azucena St., Makati City consisting of about three hundred twenty-seven (327) square meters, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 145316 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati.
Armed with a Special Power of Attorney dated June 2, 1988, purportedly issued by his wife, Arturo
executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement (RMOA) dated October 17, 1989, in favor of
respondent, binding himself to sell to respondent the subject property and not to offer the same to any other
party within thirty (30) days from date. Arturo acknowledged receipt of a check from respondent in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), representing earnest money for the subject property, the
amount of which would be deducted from the purchase price of One Million Three Hundred Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,300,000.00). Further, the RMOA stated that full payment would be effected as soon as
possession of the property shall have been turned over to respondent.
Subsequently, Arturos wife, Esther, executed a Special Power of Attorney dated October 25, 1989,
appointing her sister, Bernadette Ramos, to act for and in her behalf relative to the transfer of the property
to respondent. Ostensibly, a marital squabble was brewing between Arturo and Esther at the time and to
protect his interest, respondent caused the annotation of his adverse claim on the title of the spouses to the
property on November 14, 1989.
On November 16, 1989, respondent sent a letter to Arturo and Esther informing them of his readiness and
willingness to pay the full amount of the purchase price. The letter contained a demand upon the spouses to
comply with their obligation to turn over possession of the property to him. On the same date, Esther,
through her attorney-in-fact, executed in favor of respondent, a Contract to Sell the property to the extent of
her conjugal interest therein for the sum of six hundred fifty thousand pesos (P650,000.00) less the sum
already received by her and Arturo. Esther agreed to surrender possession of the property to respondent
within twenty (20) days from November 16, 1989, while the latter promised to pay the balance of the
purchase price in the amount of one million two hundred ninety thousand pesos (P1,290,000.00) after being
placed in possession of the property. Esther also obligated herself to execute and deliver to respondent a
deed of absolute sale upon full payment.
In a letter dated December 7, 1989, respondent informed the spouses that he had set aside the amount of
One Million Two Hundred Ninety Thousand Pesos (P1,290,000.00) as evidenced by Citibank Check No.
278107 as full payment of the purchase price. He reiterated his demand upon them to comply with their
obligation to turn over possession of the property. Arturo and Esther failed to deliver the property which
prompted respondent to cause the annotation of another adverse claim on TCT No. 145316. On January 12,
1990, respondent filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners. Arturo filed
his answer to the complaint while his wife was declared in default.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint for specific performance. It ruled that the Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) ostensibly issued by Esther in favor of Arturo was void as it was falsified. Hence,
the court concluded that the SPA could not have authorized Arturo to sell the property to respondent. The
trial court also noted that the check issued by respondent to cover the earnest money was dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds and while it was replaced with another check by respondent, there is no showing that
the second check was issued as payment for the earnest money on the property.
On appeal taken by respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that
the SPA in favor of Arturo, assuming that it was void, cannot affect the transaction between Esther and
respondent. The appellate court ratiocinated that it was by virtue of the SPA executed by Esther, in favor of
her sister, that the sale of the property to respondent was effected. On the other hand, the appellate court
considered the RMOA executed by Arturo in favor of respondent valid to effect the sale of Arturos conjugal
share in the property.

Dissatisfied with the appellate courts disposition of the case, petitioner seeks a reversal of its decision
alleging that:
I.
The Court of Appeals committed serious and manifest error when it decided on the appeal without
affording petitioner his right to due process.
II.
The Court of Appeals committed serious and manifest error in reversing and setting aside the findings of
fact by the trial court.
III.
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that a contract to sell is a contract of sale, and in ordering petitioner to
execute a registrable form of deed of sale over the property in favor of respondent.1[1]
Petitioner contends that he was not personally served with copies of summons, pleadings, and processes in
the appeal proceedings nor was he given an opportunity to submit an appellees brief. He alleges that his
counsel was in the United States from 1994 to June 2000, and he never received any news or
communication from him after the proceedings in the trial court were terminated. Petitioner submits that he
was denied due process because he was not informed of the appeal proceedings, nor given the chance to
have legal representation before the appellate court.
We are not convinced. The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. Petitioners failure to
participate in the appeal proceedings is not due to a cause imputable to the appellate court but because of
petitioners own neglect in ascertaining the status of his case. Petitioners counsel is equally negligent in
failing to inform his client about the recent developments in the appeal proceedings. Settled is the rule that
a party is bound by the conduct, negligence and mistakes of his counsel.2[2] Thus, petitioners plea of denial
of due process is downright baseless.
Petitioner also blames the appellate court for setting aside the factual findings of the trial court and argues
that factual findings of the trial court are given much weight and respect when supported by substantial
evidence. He asserts that the sale between him and respondent is void for lack of consent because the SPA
purportedly executed by his wife Esther is a forgery and therefore, he could not have validly sold the
subject property to respondent.
Next, petitioner theorizes that the RMOA he executed in favor of respondent was not perfected because the
check representing the earnest money was dishonored. He adds that there is no evidence on record that the
second check issued by respondent was intended to replace the first check representing payment of earnest
money.
Respondent admits that the subject property is co-owned by petitioner and his wife, but he objects to the
allegations in the petition bearing a relation to the supposed date of the marriage of the vendors. He
contends that the alleged date of marriage between petitioner and his wife is a new factual issue which was
not raised nor established in the court a quo. Respondent claims that there is no basis to annul the sale
freely and voluntarily entered into by the husband and the wife.
The focal issue in the instant petition is whether petitioner may be compelled to convey the property to
respondent under the terms of the RMOA and the Contract to Sell. At bottom, the resolution of the issue
entails the ascertainment of the contractual nature of the two documents and the status of the contracts
contained therein.

1[1] Rollo, pp. 21-22.

2[2] Heirs of Elias Lorilla v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 638 (2000).

Contracts, in general, require the presence of three essential elements: (1) consent of the contracting parties;
(2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is
established.3[3]
Until the contract is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical
relation.4[4] In a contract of sale, the seller must consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price, the
subject matter must be determinate, and the price must be certain in money or its equivalent.5[5] Being
essentially consensual, a contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon
the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.6[6] However, ownership of the thing sold
shall not be transferred to the vendee until actual or constructive delivery of the property.7[7]
On the other hand, an accepted unilateral promise which specifies the thing to be sold and the price to be
paid, when coupled with a valuable consideration distinct and separate from the price, is what may properly
be termed a perfected contract of option.8[8] An option merely grants a privilege to buy or sell within an
agreed time and at a determined price. It is separate and distinct from that which the parties may enter into
upon the consummation of the option.9[9] A perfected contract of option does not result in the perfection or
consummation of the sale; only when the option is exercised may a sale be perfected.10[10] The option must,
however, be supported by a consideration distinct from the price.11[11]
Perusing the RMOA, it signifies a unilateral offer of Arturo to sell the property to respondent for a price
certain within a period of thirty days. The RMOA does not impose upon respondent an obligation to buy
petitioners property, as in fact it does not even bear his signature thereon. It is quite clear that after the lapse
of the thirty-day period, without respondent having exercised his option, Arturo is free to sell the property
to another. This shows that the intent of Arturo is merely to grant respondent the privilege to buy the
property within the period therein stated. There is nothing in the RMOA which indicates that Arturo agreed
therein to transfer ownership of the land which is an essential element in a contract of sale. Unfortunately,
the option is not binding upon the promissory since it is not supported by a consideration distinct from the
price.12[12]
As a rule, the holder of the option, after accepting the promise and before he exercises his option, is not
bound to buy. He is free either to buy or not to buy later. In Sanchez v. Rigos13[13] we ruled that in an
accepted unilateral promise to sell, the promissor is not bound by his promise and may, accordingly,
withdraw it, since there may be no valid contract without a cause or consideration. Pending notice of its
3[3] ART. 1318, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES; Santos v. Heirs of Jose Mariano and Erlinda
Mariano-Villanueva, G.R. No. 143325, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 284.
4[4] Ang Yu v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 109125, December 2, 1994, 238 SCRA 602.
5[5] Heirs of Juan San Andres v. Rodriguez, 388 Phil. 571 (2000).
6[6] Laforteza v. Machuca, 389 Phil. 167 (2000).
7[7] Heirs of Quirico Seraspi and Purificacion Seraspi v. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 306 (2000).
8[8] Ang Yu v. Asuncion, Supra note 4.
9[9] Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., 332 Phil. 525 (1996).
10[10] Cavite Development Bank v. Lim, 381 Phil. 355 (2000).
11[11] De la Cavada v. Diaz, 37 Phil. 982 (1918), Beaumont v. Prieto, 41 Phil. 670 (1916).
12[12] Atkins, Kroll and Co., Inc. v. Cua Hian Tek, 102 Phil. 948.
13[13] 150-A Phil. 714 (1972).

withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes of the nature of an offer to sell which, if acceded or consented
to, results in a perfected contract of sale.
Even conceding for the nonce that respondent had accepted the offer within the period stated and, as a
consequence, a bilateral contract of purchase and sale was perfected, the outcome would be the same. To
benefit from such situation, respondent would have to pay or at least make a valid tender of payment of the
price for only then could he exact compliance with the undertaking of the other party.14[14] This respondent
failed to do. By his own admission, he merely informed respondent spouses of his readiness and
willingness to pay. The fact that he had set aside a check in the amount of One Million Two Hundred
Ninety Thousand Pesos (P1,290,000.00) representing the balance of the purchase price could not help his
cause. Settled is the rule that tender of payment must be made in legal tender. A check is not legal tender,
and therefore cannot constitute a valid tender of payment.15[15] Not having made a valid tender of payment,
respondents action for specific performance must fail.
With regard to the payment of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), the Court is of the view that the amount is
not earnest money as the term is understood in Article 1482 which signifies proof of the perfection of the
contract of sale, but merely a guarantee that respondent is really interested to buy the property. It is not the
giving of earnest money, but the proof of the concurrence of all the essential elements of the contract of sale
which establishes the existence of a perfected sale.16[16] No reservation of ownership on the part of Arturo is
necessary since, as previously stated, he has never agreed to transfer ownership of the property to
respondent.
Granting for the sake of argument that the RMOA is a contract of sale, the same would still be void not
only for want of consideration and absence of respondents signature thereon, but also for lack of Esthers
conformity thereto. Quite glaring is the absence of the signature of Esther in the RMOA, which proves that
she did not give her consent to the transaction initiated by Arturo. The husband cannot alienate any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.17[17]
However, it was the Contract to Sell executed by Esther through her attorney-in-fact which the Court of
Appeals made full use of. Holding that the contract is valid, the appellate court explained that while Esther
did not authorize Arturo to sell the property, her execution of the SPA authorizing her sister to sell the land
to respondent clearly shows her intention to convey her interest in favor of respondent. In effect, the court
declared that the lack of Esthers consent to the sale made by Arturo was cured by her subsequent
conveyance of her interest in the property through her attorney-in-fact.
We do not share the ruling.
The nullity of the RMOA as a contract of sale emanates not only from lack of Esthers consent thereto but
also from want of consideration and absence of respondents signature thereon. Such nullity cannot be
obliterated by Esthers subsequent confirmation of the putative transaction as expressed in the Contract to
Sell. Under the law, a void contract cannot be ratified18[18] and the action or defense for the declaration of
the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.19[19] A void contract produces no effect either against or in
favor of anyoneit cannot create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers.20[20]

14[14] Article 1191, CIVIL CODE.

15[15] Cebu International Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 844; Far East Bank
& Trust Company v. Diaz Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 38588, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 659.
16[16] San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. v. Huang, 391 Phil. 636 (2000).
17[17] Article 166, CIVIL CODE.
18[18] Article 1409, CIVIL CODE.
19[19] Article 1410, CIVIL CODE; Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 133895, October 2, 2001, 366
SCRA 395.

True, in the Contract to Sell, Esther made reference to the earlier RMOA executed by Arturo in favor of
respondent. However, the RMOA which Arturo signed is different from the deed which Esther executed
through her attorney-in-fact. For one, the first is sought to be enforced as a contract of sale while the second
is purportedly a contract to sell only. For another, the terms and conditions as to the issuance of title and
delivery of possession are divergent.
The congruence of the wills of the spouses is essential for the valid disposition of conjugal property. Where
the conveyance is contained in the same document which bears the conformity of both husband and wife,
there could be no question on the validity of the transaction. But when there are two documents on which
the signatures of the spouses separately appear, textual concordance of the documents is indispensable.
Hence, in this case where the wifes putative consent to the sale of conjugal property appears in a separate
document which does not, however, contain the same terms and conditions as in the first document signed
by the husband, a valid transaction could not have arisen.
Quite a bit of elucidation on the conjugal partnership of gains is in order.
Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no
indication that they have adopted a different property regime, their property relations would automatically
be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.21[21]
The subject land which had been admittedly acquired during the marriage of the spouses forms part of their
conjugal partnership.22[22]
Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This right is clearly
granted to him by law.23[23] More, the husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not entitled as of right
to joint administration.24[24]
The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of the conjugal partnership, cannot validly
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.25[25] Similarly,
the wife cannot dispose of any property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the conformity of the
husband. The law is explicit that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands
consent, except in cases provided by law.26[26]
More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of
each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an
equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a
result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or
remanente liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution.27[27] Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until
the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is

20[20] Gochan v. Young, G.R. No. 131889, March 12, 2001, 354 SCRA 207.
21[21] ART. 119, CIVIL CODE.
22[22] ART. 160, CIVIL CODE.
23[23] ART. 165, CIVIL CODE.
24[24] Ysasi v. Hon. Fernandez, et.al., 132 Phil. 526 (1968).
25[25] ART. 166, CIVIL CODE.
26[26] ART. 172, CIVIL CODE.
27[27] Nable Jose v. Nable Jose, 41 Phil. 713 (1916); Manuel v. Losano, 41 Phil. 855 (1918).

finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be
divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.28[28]
In not a few cases, we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership
without the consent of the wife when there is no showing that the latter is incapacitated is void ab initio
because it is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Article 166 of the Civil Code.29[29] Since
Article 166 of the Civil Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that acts or transactions executed against this
mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorizes their validity.30[30]
Quite recently, in San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,31[31] we ruled that
neither spouse could alienate in favor of another, his or her interest in the partnership or in any property
belonging to it, or ask for partition of the properties before the partnership itself had been legally dissolved.
Nonetheless, alienation of the share of each spouse in the conjugal partnership could be had after separation
of property of the spouses during the marriage had been judicially decreed, upon their petition for any of
the causes specified in Article 19132[32] of the Civil Code in relation to Article 21433[33] thereof.
As an exception, the husband may dispose of conjugal property without the wifes consent if such sale is
necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities mentioned in Articles 161 and 162 of the Civil Code.34[34] In
Tinitigan v. Tinitigan, Sr.,35[35] the Court ruled that the husband may sell property belonging to the conjugal
partnership even without the consent of the wife if the sale is necessary to answer for a big conjugal
28[28] Quintos de Ansaldo v. Sheriff of Manila, 64 Phil. 115 (1937).
29[29] Nicolas v. Court of Appeals, No. L-37631, October 12, 1987, 154 SCRA 635; Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, 215 Phil. 380 (1984); Tolentino v. Cardena, 123 Phil. 517 (1966).
30[30] ART. 5, CIVIL CODE.
31[31] 357 Phil 631 (1998).

32[32] ART. 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be
decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.In case of abuse of
powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, or in case of abandonment
by the husband, separation of property may also be ordered by the court, according to the provisions of
Articles 167 and 178, No. 3.
In all these cases, it is sufficient to present the final judgment which has been entered against the
guilty or absent spouse.
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the
conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of
the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests.
Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures
as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of Articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in Articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable.

33[33] ART. 214. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her
own separate estate, without the consent of the other. All earnings from any profession,
business or industry shall likewise belong to each spouse.

liability which might endanger the familys economic standing. This is one instance where the wifes consent
is not required and, impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary.
Significantly, the Family Code has introduced some changes particularly on the aspect of the administration
of the conjugal partnership. The new law provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership is
now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of administration does not include the power to
dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership.36[36] In all instances, the present law
specifically requires the written consent of the other spouse, or authority of the court for the disposition or
encumbrance of conjugal partnership property without which, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void.37[37]
Inescapably, herein petitioners action for specific performance must fail. Even on the supposition that the
parties only disposed of their respective shares in the property, the sale, assuming that it exists, is still void
for as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest
until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non habet. No one can give what he has not.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil
Case No. 90-106 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati is ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.
34[34] ART. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon
property of either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of
either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband and wife, and
of legitimate children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course.
ART. 162. The value of what is donated or promised to the common children by the husband, only for
securing their future or the finishing of a career, or by both spouses through a common agreement shall also
be charged to the conjugal partnership, when they have not stipulated that it is to be satisfied from the
property of one of them, in whole or in part.

35[35] No. L- 45418, October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 619.

36[36] ART. 124, FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
37[37] Ibid.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-63025 November 29, 1991
RAMON C. ONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCO BOIX and ARSENIO CAMINO AS DEPUTY SHERIFF OF
CAMARINES NORTE, respondents.
Jose L. Lapak for petitioner.
Jose M. Abola for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:p
The instant petitioner for certiorari seeks are reversal of the decision ** of herein public respondent Court of Appeals dated October 24, 1977 in CA-G.R. No.
47063-R and its resolution dated January 14, 1983 denying herein petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
The record shows that on November 16, 1961, Ramon C. Ong filed a complaint against defendants Arsenio Camino as Deputy Sheriff
of Camarines Norte and Francisco Boix, to annul the auction sale of a parcel of land, allegedly owners conjugally by plaintiff and his
former wife Teodora B. Ong, awarded in favor of Boix, as highest bidder, in an auction sale conducted on October 10, 1958 by the
Deputy Sheriff of Camarines Norte, herein defendant Camino, pursuant to a writ of execution dated August 8, 1958 (Exhibits "C", "2A") issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, to enforce its decision in Civil Case No. 33396, entitled, "Francisco Boix,
Plaintiff vs. Teodora B. Ong and Ramon C. Ong, Defendants" wherein judgment was rendered to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff, ordering the defendant Teodora B. Ong to pay to
the plaintiff the sum P2,827.83, with interest of 8% per annum on the sum of P1,000.00 from September 5, 1955,
on the sum of P827.83 from December 30, 1955 plus 15% on the total amount of P2,827.83 as attorney's fees;
and the further amount of P2,503 with interest at 6% per annum from date of the filing of the complaint, and the
costs of the suit. (Exhibit "1")
The title to the property, in favor of the execution-creditor Boix was duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Camarines
Norte (Exhibit "4").
It is not disputed that plaintiff's wife, Teodora B. Ong conducted her own logging business in Camarines Sur. In furtherance of her
business operation, on August 18, 1955, she secured from Francisco Boix a loan in the amount of P2,827.83. Unfortunately, because
of mismanagement, Teodora defaulted in her obligation. This prompted Boix to file a complaint, based on the promissory notes
executed by Teodora, to collect the sum legally due plus interest against Teodora and Ramon Ong, the latter being joined as husband
of the former. Defendant-spouses were declared in default and judgment was rendered, as aforesaid, in favor of Boix.
After the aforementioned decision became final and executory, Boix moved to execute the judgment. The motion was granted and a
corresponding writ of execution, dated August 8, 1958 (Exhibits "C", "2-A"), was issued. Accordingly, the Sheriff of Camarines Norte
levied and attached a parcel of land situated at Diego Linan St., Daet, Camarines Norte, declared under Tax No. 05378 in the sole
name of Teodora B. Ong, subject-parcel of herein suit. In a notice of levy on Execution dated August 22, 1958 (Exhibit "2-B"), and
notice of Public Auction sale dated September 10, 1958 (Exhibit "2-C"), auction sales was held on October 10, 1958 and as already
mentioned, defendant Boix was adjudged highest bidder. A writ of possession was issued to place the execution-creditor in possession
of the property levied upon and sold on execution. A corresponding Certificate of Sale (Exhibit "H") was also issued in favor of Boix.
Subsequently, thereafter, Ramon C. Ong filed an Omnibus motion dated October 2, 1961 (Exhibit "D") with the same Court of First
Instance of Manila asking to quash the writ of possession, which was denied in an order dated December 6, 1961. A motion for
reconsideration dated December 29, 1961 (Exhibit "F") was likewise denied in an order dated February 10, 1962 (Exhibit "G"). (Pp. 14, Decision; pp. 11-14 Rollo)
Consequently, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals to annul the auction sale allegedly irregularly executed on the following grounds, namely,
that the property was conjugal and thus could not be held liable for personal debts contracted by the wife, and that the there was no valid publication thus
making the auction sale void.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, prompting petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. Said motion was denied on
January 15, 1983; hence, the present petition.

Petitioner contends that the auction sale of the property in dispute is null and void, having been made on a date different from that reflected in the
advertisement thereof, aside from having been published in a newspaper which is not of general circulation in the province where the property is situated.
According to the petitioner, respondent court's failure to touch on such a jurisdictional issue constitutes grave abuse of discretion which justifies a reversal of
its decision affirming the finding of the trial court which in itself constitutes a misappreciation of facts.
The other argument advanced by the petitioner is that the subject property is really conjugal which the wife in the case at bar could not legally bind, and
considering that the indebtedness was contracted by the wife only, the levy of the subject property not owned exclusively by the wife owned jointly with the
husband is improper.
Against petitioner's argument that the auction sale is null and void is the trial court's assessment of the validity thereof, that is, that the notice of public
auction sale was published in accordance with law. Such a factual finding of the trial court is entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal.
"Factual questions should be resolved by the lower courts and the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction as a rule to reverse the findings of the lower courts
except in a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion" (Korean Air Lines vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 211). In the instant case, petitioner failed to
show any grave abuse of discretion committed, by the lower court in appreciating private respondent's allegation that petitioner was previously notified of the
supposed transfer of the date of public auction from September 25, 1958 to October 10, 1958.
Petitioner's other argument is also based on factual considerations. Against the Court of Appeals' finding that the subject property is paraphernal property, in
view of the fact that it was "declared, under Tax No. 05378, in the name of Teodora B. Ong while the house erected thereon was declared under Tax No.
06022 in the name of Ramon C. Ong and Teodora B. Ong (Exhibits "B", "2-B", "2-C, "4") (Decision, p. 4) is petitioner's claim that the subject property is
conjugal. Petitioner stresses heavily on the fact that since the surname "Ong" (which is the surname of the husband Ramon C. Ong) was carried by Teodora
in the aforesaid declaration, that indicates that the subject property was acquired during the marriage. By reason thereof, the property in dispute is
presumed to be owned jointly by both spouses.
We disagree. The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said property was
acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife's name, but the house built
thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such circumstances, coupled with a careful scrutiny of the records of the present case, We hold
that the lot in question is paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for the personal debts of the wife.
Thus, it was held in the case of Maramba vs. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474, that
The presumption that property is conjugal (Art. 160, New Civil Code) refers to property acquired during the marriage. When there is no
showing as to when the property was acquired by a spouse, the fact that the title is in the spouse's name is an indication that the
property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court, the party who invokes the presumption that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal
partnership (Art. 160, New Civil Code) must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. (Cobb-Perez, et al. vs. Lantin, et al., 23 SCRA 637; Jose
Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp., 36 SCRA 289). In the same manner, the recent case of PNB vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 435 affirms
that:
When the property is registered in the name of the a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by
said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Art. 160 of the Civil
Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.
Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of argument that the property in dispute is conjugal, the same may still be held liable for the debts of the wife in
this case. Under Art. 117 of the Civil Code, the wife may engage in business although the husband may object (but subject to certain conditions). It is clear
from the records that the wife was engaged in the logging business with the husband's knowledge and apparently without any objection on his part. The acts
of the husband show that he gave his implied consent to the wife's engagement in business. According to Justice Ameurfina-Herrera (then Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals) in her concurring opinion, the rule that should govern in that case is that the wife's paraphernal properties, as well as those of their
conjugal partnership, shall be liable for the obligations incurred by the wife in the course of her business (Arts. 117, 140, 172, 203, and 236, Civil Code; Art.
10, Code of Commerce, cited in Commentaries on Phil. Commercial Laws, Martin, T.C. Vol. 1, 1970 Revised Edition, pp. 14-15). After all, whatever profits
are earned by the wife from her business go to the conjugal partnership. It would only be just and equitable that the obligations contracted by the wife in
connection with her business may also be chargeable not only against her paraphernal property but also against the conjugal property of the spouses.
Let it be noted that due to the length of time that this case has remained pending, private respondents Francisco Boix and Arsenio Camino have allegedly
already died in the process. No proper substitution of parties have apparently been made. Nevertheless, despite such supervening events, for failure on the
part of petitioner to show any grave abuse of discretion or reversible error committed by respondent appellate court, We deem it wise to affirm the said
court's decision. Besides, the decision of the trial court is in accordance with law and the evidence presented.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.

# Footnotes
** Penned by the then Associate Justice (now deceased) Simeon M. Gopengco and concurred in by Associate Justices Ameurfina A.
Melencio-Herrera and Vicente G. Ericta.