37 F.

3d 1493
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished
dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law
of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the
Fourth Circuit.

Anthony GRANDISON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
William Donald SCHAEFER, Governor, State of Maryland;
James
N. Rollins, Former Warden, Maryland Penitentiary; Richard
Lanham, Sr., Commissioner; Sue A. Schenning, Deputy State's
Attorney, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 93-7207.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 1994.
Decided Oct. 17, 1994.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
at Baltimore. Walter E. Black, Jr., Chief District Judge. (CA-92-2312-B)
Anthony Grandison, Appellant Pro Se.
Stephanie Judith Lane-Weber, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore,
MD, for Appellees.
D.Md.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.
Before WIDENER, HAMILTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:

Anthony Grandison, a prisoner sentenced in federal court to a term of life plus

1

ten years and a term of twenty-one years, and sentenced in state court to two
death sentences, appeals the district court's dismissal of his civil action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988), in which he alleged, inter alia, that the State of
Maryland wrongfully sought and obtained a warrant of execution for him to be
executed during November 1990. Specifically, Grandison claimed that
Defendants could not enforce the death sentence against him absent consent of
the United States and agreement by the United States that his federal sentences
were "satisfied or waived." Grandison then filed a motion to amend his
Complaint to include Baltimore County, Maryland, as a Defendant.

On March 25, 1993, the district judge denied Grandison's motion for leave to
amend his Complaint, and granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. Grandison
served and filed a timely motion for reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e),
which the district court denied on July 16, 1993. Grandison then filed a second
motion for reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), in which he claimed that
an earlier order by District Judge Murray, holding that Grandison was a federal
prisoner on loan to the State for trial only, which order was affirmed by this
Court, precluded the decision by the district court that the State was free to
impose sentence on him before he has served his federal sentences. On July 26,
1993, the district court summarily denied Grandison's second motion for
reconsideration, stating that the arguments presented in the motion merely
reiterated those raised in earlier motions.

Grandison filed a notice of appeal on August 25, 1993, specifically appealing

only the district court's order of March 25, 1993, granting Defendants' motion
to dismiss and denying Grandison's motion for leave to amend, and its order of
July 26, 1993, denying Grandison's second motion for reconsideration.1 We
affirm the district court's order of July 26, 1993, and dismiss the appeal as
untimely as to the district court's order of March 25, 1993.

We only have jurisdiction over the denial of Grandison's second motion for
reconsideration. The first motion for reconsideration tolled the appeal period as
to the underlying order.2 Dove v. CODESCO, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th
Cir.1978). The district court denied the first motion for reconsideration on July
14, 1993. Consequently, Grandison had thirty days from that date to appeal the
final order. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a). Instead, he filed his second motion for
reconsideration, which is properly construed as a motion pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), and which does not toll the appeal period. In such a case,
the notice of appeal must be filed within the appeal period measured from the
underlying judgment. Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257,
268-69 (1978). Accordingly, the notice of appeal, filed on September 25, 1993,
is only timely as to the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. See

Dove v. CODESCO, 569 F.2d at 809.

5

Because Grandison's second motion for reconsideration does nothing more than
restate his earlier claims, the district court's denial of the motion was not an
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310, 312 (4th
Cir.1982) (denial of Rule 60(b) motion reviewed for abuse of discretion; relief
not authorized for mere reconsideration of legal issues). Accordingly, we affirm
the district court's denial of Grandison's Rule 60(b) motion, and dismiss his
appeal of the earlier order as untimely.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.

The certificate of service on Grandison's notice of appeal was dated August 25,
1993. On October 19, 1993, Grandison wrote to the district court stating that he
had not heard from the clerk's office regarding his appeal, stating that he "filed"
the notice on August 25, 1993, and enclosing a carbon copy of the notice of
appeal
The district court held that the notice of appeal was untimely, because the court
did not receive the order until October 21, 1993, attached to Grandison's
correspondence. Grandison then filed a motion for reconsideration under oath
stating that on August 25, 1993, he gave the notice of appeal to correctional
officers for filing.
Based on Grandison's affidavit, the district court found that he delivered the
notice of appeal to correctional officers on August 25, 1993, granted
Grandison's motion for reconsideration, and accepted the notice of appeal for
filing.

This first motion for reconsideration was served within ten days of entry of the
final judgment and calls into question the correctness of the judgment. It is
therefore properly construed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)