Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
No. 11-1804
Argued:
Decided:
December 4, 2012
the
B.
Williams,
III,
challenges
the
notice
of
tax
I.
A.
Williams worked for Mobil Oil Corporation from 1973 until
his
retirement
in
1998.
In
the
1990s,
he
was
tasked
with
Mobil,
services
Williams
concerning
began
providing
pipeline-related
2
consulting
contracts
and
to
other
foreign
governments.
in
connection
with
his
consulting
work.
That
same
Islands
corporation.
Williams
was
the
sole
owner,
use
telephone
of
its
and
credit
Williams name.
between
1993
office
space,
card
that
well
were
as
issued
Swiss
and
mobile
billed
in
and
2000
were
received
for
Williams
oil
and
use the ALQI name in his dealings with third parties and did not
maintain corporate accounting records.
Smekhova was paid a stipend of $5,000 to $10,000 per month
from
the
salary
or
ALQI
accounts,
commission.
but
Williams
Funds
were
did
not
transferred
pay
from
himself
the
ALQI
cards
and
other
bills
reflecting
Williams
personal
ski vacation.
Swiss
accounts
during
the
relevant
period
and
over
$1.1
disclosed
his
ownership
interest
in
Subsequently,
ALQI
and
the
In 2003,
Williams amended his 1999 and 2000 tax returns 2 to report the
investment income earned on the funds in the ALQI accounts, and
he paid the additional tax due.
to
purchase
$72,000
worth
of
art,
but
did
not
incur
all
expense,
including
5
paperwork,
appraisal,
Abbey
Art
would
arrange
for
the
donation
after
the
If
Abbey Art was unable to facilitate the art donation for any
reason, the Agreement required Abbey Art to refund Williams
payments.
Agreement
Additionally,
for
Williams
Abbey
Arts
non-payment
sole
was
to
remedy
retain
under
the
payments
In the event
price
of
market
$102,000
value
of
(approximately
the
art)
less
24%
of
the
Williams
appraised
$3,600
fair
deposit.
Williams paid Abbey Art $98,400 before the end of 1997 and on
his federal income tax return for that year, Williams claimed a
charitable contribution deduction of $425,625.
In December 1999, Williams wrote Abbey Art requesting that a
gift
of
art
be
made
on
his
behalf
to
Florida
International
Certain pieces of
art
were
with
an
appraised
value
of
$250,525
donated
at
On his 1999
federal tax return, Williams claimed the full fair market value
of the art as a charitable contribution deduction.
In 1999, Williams paid Abbey Art $4,600, and in October
2000, Abbey Art arranged a gift of additional artwork with an
appraised value of $98,900 to Drexel University.
Williams paid
the
consulting
fees
deposited
7
into
The Commissioner
the
ALQI
accounts
that
Williams
was
only
to
charitable
for
at
Commissioner
least
one
assessed
underpayments
year
prior
to
the
accuracy-related
resulting
from
the
donations.
penalties
disallowed
The
on
the
charitable
deductions.
Williams challenged the notice of deficiency by filing a
petition
in
the
Tax
Court.
The
Tax
Court
granted
partial
that the consulting fee and investment income deposited into the
ALQI accounts between 1993 and 2000 was attributable to Williams
individually.
and
assessment
related penalties.
of
civil
review
fraud
and
accuracy-
tax
the
Tax
Courts
decision
applying
the
same
(4th
Cir.
1999).
Questions
of
law
and
statutory
Id.
2009); see also Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
II.
Williams first argues on appeal that the Tax Court erred in
holding
violation
that
of
his
18
guilty
U.S.C.
plea
to
7201
collaterally
criminal
tax
evasion
estops
him
in
from
issue
(2)
was
actually
litigated
(3)
and
was
Creek
Mining
468
F.3d
213,
217
and
jurisdiction,
necessarily
that
determined
determination
is
by
(4th
Cir.
2006)
[O]nce an issue is
a
court
conclusive
of
in
competent
subsequent
153 (1979).
A taxpayer is collaterally estopped from denying civil tax
fraud when convicted for criminal tax evasion under 18 U.S.C.
7201 for the same taxable year.
10
F.2d 353, 355 (4th Cir. 1966); DiLeo v. Commr, 96 T.C. 858,
885-86 (1991), affd, 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992); see generally
United States v. Wight, 839 F.2d 193, 196 (4th Cir. 1988) (The
doctrine of collateral estoppel may apply to issues litigated in
a
criminal
case
which
party
does
not
explicitly
seeks
to
relitigate
in
require
finding
of
fraud,
the
Williams contends
of
payment
of
taxes,
the
elements
of
which
are
not
that
he
is
not
collaterally
estopped
from
denying
civil
tax
fraud for the entire eight year period set forth in the notice
of deficiency, or for any particular year therein.
We reject this argument because, in addition to lacking
merit,
it
has
been
waived.
Williams
failed
to
raise
this
reason why we should depart from our ordinary rule in this case,
and we see no reason to do so.
B.
Williams also takes issue with the Tax Courts finding that
his
conviction
denying
civil
for
fraud
tax
for
evasion
each
collaterally
year
from
estops
1993
him
through
from
2000.
12
to this claim.
information charges Williams with tax evasion for each year from
1993 through 2000:
From in or about 1993, through in or about April 2001,
. . . J. BRYAN WILLIAMS, the defendant, unlawfully,
willfully and knowingly did attempt to evade and
defeat a substantial part of the income tax due and
owing by J. BRYAN WILLIAMS . . . for the calendar
years 1993 through 2000, by various means, including,
among others by (a) arranging for approximately $7.98
million in payments which were income to Williams to
be made into the secret Alqi accounts in Switzerland
he controlled; and (b) preparing and causing to be
prepared, signing and causing to be signed, and filing
and causing to be filed, false and fraudulent U.S.
Individual Income Tax Returns, Forms 1040, for the
calendar years 1993 through 2000, on which he failed
to disclose his interest in the secret Alqi bank
accounts in Switzerland, and on which, in the years
set forth below, he failed to report the approximate
amounts of income set forth below, and upon which
income there was a substantial additional tax due and
owing to the United States of America:
Calendar
Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Approximate
Amount of Income
$1,029,518.72
$752,479.52
$998,723.14
$3,917,762.57
$1,670,891.49
$133,371.90
$109,167.59
$256,234.64
13
Williams
admitted
during
his
allocution
at
his guilty plea hearing that he knew the funds deposited into
the ALQI accounts were taxable to him.
Williams acknowledged
that for the calendar year tax returns for 93 through 2000,
[he] chose not to report the income to [the IRS] in order to
evade the substantial taxes owed thereon, until [he] filed [his]
2001 tax return.
Williams continued:
I therefore believe
than
those
contained
in
the
superseding
information.
not
deny
any
fact
or
allegation
concerning
tax
demonstrate
his
tax
evasion
scheme
continued
from
1993
until the time he filed his 2001 tax return, as charged in the
information.
C.
Williams
final
contention
with
respect
to
collateral
guilty
plea,
neither
analyzed
the
actual
accounts
and
the
tax
amount
the
Commissioner
implications
of
arising
deficiencies
nor
for
Williams
from
each
the
tax
had
ALQI
year. 6
Thus, argues Williams, the fraud penalties were not actually and
necessarily decided by the court in his criminal case.
Williams confuses the issues.
Moreover,
Williams
reliance
on
United
States
v.
International Building Co., 345 U.S. 502, 505-06 (1953), is
misplaced.
Williams claims International Building stands for
the proposition that collateral estoppel is not appropriate when
the decision of a prior court is the result of compromise or
negotiation rather than a full review of the facts.
But
International Building involved a pro forma acceptance by the
Tax Court of an agreement between the parties to settle their
controversy for reasons undisclosed.
Id. at 505.
Indeed, in
International Building, the Commissioner agreed to withdraw his
proofs of claim for tax deficiencies filed in International
Buildings bankruptcy proceeding, upon a stipulation that the
withdrawal was without prejudice and did not constitute a
determination of or prejudice the rights of the United States to
any taxes with respect to any year other than those involved in
the claim. Id. at 503. The parties filed stipulations in the
pending Tax Court proceedings that there was no tax liability
for the years 1933, 1938, and 1939, and the Tax Court entered
formal decisions to that effect. No factual findings were made,
no briefs were filed, and no hearings were held.
The Supreme
Court held that while the Tax Courts decisions were res
judicata with respect to tax claims for 1933, 1938, and 1939,
they did not collaterally estop the Commissioner from assessing
deficiencies for the years 1943, 1944, and 1945.
Id. at 505.
International Building is plainly distinguishable from the
instant case.
7
16
What
As we
guilty
liability
plea
for
and
civil
allocution,
tax
fraud
Williams
penalties
In light of
cannot
for
the
now
deny
years
in
III.
Williams next argues that the Tax Court erred in finding
him individually liable for tax on the consulting fee income
deposited
into
the
ALQI
accounts
between
1993
and
2000.
17
604,
610
(1987),
affd,
855
F.2d
Haag v. Commr, 88
855
(8th
Cir.
1988)
(1) the
corporation
meaningful
has
sense;
corporation
and
the
and
the
right
(2)
to
direct
there
person
or
must
control
exist
contract
or
in
some
between
the
similar
indicium
Haag, 88
testified
that
he
had
no
written
employment
ALQI.
He
stipulated
that
he
was
the
sole
operational
director and officer of ALQI and the only person with authority
to
act
Williams
on
the
had
companys
exclusive
behalf
in
signature
its
business
authority
over
activities.
the
ALQI
accounts from 1993 through 2000 and was the sole person from
whom Banque Indosuez would accept instructions with respect to
those accounts.
testimony,
there
consulting
clients
even
consulting
agreements,
is
knew
notes
no
evidence
ALQI
existed.
or
other
Apart from
that
Williams
There
records
that
are
no
reflect
records at all for the period at issue, except for bank records
maintained by Banque Indosuez and a single balance sheet and
profit
and
loss
statement
dated
June
30,
2000.
Williams
bank
records
and
incorporation
documents
in
the
course of his work, he did not see any general ledgers, profit
and loss statements or balance sheets for ALQI, nor did he see
any consulting contracts.
an
to
effort
ALQIs
to
use
legitimize
of
Banque
ALQIs
operations,
Indosuezs
office
Williams
space,
its
Swiss cell phone and credit card, as well as the fact that
clients
accounts.
deposited
consulting
Williams
insists
fees
that
directly
ALQI
into
employed
the
ALQI
Smekhova
to
and
that
But
ALQI,
Smekhova,
not
like
19
Williams,
paid
Williams,
had
her
no
for
her
written
fact that Mr. Williams business and personal expenses were paid
out of these same Swiss bank accounts does not prove that his
clients contracted with ALQI or that ALQI was anything other
than
the
receptacle
consulting income.
Williams
into
which
Mr.
Williams
diverted
his
argues
that
because
ALQI
is
not
sham
whether
ALQI
is
But
business
entity
is
Id.;
20
doctrine
because
taxpayer
can
assign
income
to
that he knew that most of the funds deposited into the A[LQI]
accounts, and all of the interest income were taxable income to
[him], but admitted he chose not to report the income to the
Internal Revenue Service in order to evade the substantial taxes
owed thereon.
The Commissioners determinations of income are entitled to
a presumption of correctness, and the taxpayer bears the burden
of proving them wrong.
Cir. 2009).
the
preponderance
of
the
evidence,
that
the
Id.
IRSs
income
find that Williams is liable for tax on the corpus of the ALQI
21
accounts,
in
addition
to
the
passive
income
earned
on
those
funds. 9
IV.
Williams final argument on appeal is that the Tax Court
erred in limiting his charitable contribution deductions to his
basis in the art donated through Abbey Art, rather than allowing
deduction of the arts fair market value.
Williams contends
that the Tax Court erroneously found the Art Purchase Agreement
to be an option contract, ignoring both the mutual understanding
of the parties and the plain language of the Agreement.
For the
deduction
is
allowed
for
any
charitable
if
the
contribution
is
verified
Id.
property
the
other
than
money,
under
the
regulations
of
the
charitable
22
is
modified
appreciated property.
in
26 C.F.R. 1.170A-1(c)(1).
situations
involving
donations
This
of
not
have
qualified
as
long-term
capital
gain
if
the
property had been sold by the taxpayer at its fair market value,
determined as of the time of the contribution.
170(e)(1)(A).
deduction
of
26 U.S.C.
capital
gain
appreciation
but
if
the
gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset 10 held for more
than one year.
26 U.S.C. 1222(3).
10
In
In order to
23
of
(1935).
holding.
Williams
executed
the
Art
McFeely
argues
v.
that
Purchase
Commr,
he
296
acquired
Agreement
in
U.S.
the
102,
art
December
when
1996.
107
he
The
Commissioner asserts that Williams did not acquire the art until
he paid for it, which in each case was within a year of the
donation.
In determining the date of acquisition of property:
[N]o hard-and-fast rules of thumb can be used, and no
single factor is controlling.
Ownership of property
is not a single indivisible concept but a collection
or bundle of rights with respect to the property;
consequently, we must examine the transaction in its
entirety.
The date of the passage of legal title is
not the sole criteria; the date on which the benefits
and burdens or the incidents of ownership of the
property were passed must also be considered, and the
legal consequence of particular contract provisions
must be examined in the light of the applicable State
law.
Hoven
v.
Commr,
56
T.C.
50,
55
(1971)
(internal
citations
omitted).
The Tax Court did not look to state law in resolving this
issue, however, and the Commissioner insists that state law has
no applicability here.
cite United States v. Heller, 866 F.2d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir.
1989),
for
the
proposition
that
federal
tax
law
disregards
24
Circuit
application
has
recognized
interpretation
federal law.
law
are
of
the
that
Internal
[t]he
Revenue
Code
is
and
matter
of
not
controlling
in
these
federal
determinations.
agreement
at
the
heart
of
the
parties
dispute.
Id.
Williams argues we should do the same here and look to New York
law 11 in interpreting the Art Purchase Agreement, and he cites to
our
decision
States,
571
in
F.3d
Volvo
Cars
of
North
373
(4th
Cir.
America,
2009),
in
LLC
v.
support
United
of
that
contention.
In that case, Volvo had written-off excess inventory that
it purportedly sold to a warehouser pursuant to the terms of a
1983 contract, thereby reducing its taxable income for the 1983
tax year.
Volvo
The IRS found these were not bona fide sales because
retained
control
over
the
11
inventory
even
after
it
was
25
transferred.
that
the
contract
did
not
address
inventory
Volvo appealed.
whether
covered
the
1983
contract
previously
In determining
inventory
previously
of
the
property.
Commerce,
legal
interest
which
the
taxpayer
had
in
the
472
U.S.
713,
722
(1985)).
As
the
Supreme
Court
stated in National Bank, [t]his follows from the fact that the
federal statute creates no property rights but merely attaches
consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state
law.
51, 55 (1958)).
To be sure, the economic substance of the transaction is
the primary concern in the instant case.
that the parties contracted for the sale of art simply because
their signatures appear on a document entitled Art Purchase
Agreement.
nature
of
legal
interest
conveyed
26
by
the
Agreement,
as
determined
that
Williams
charitable
contribution
parties
assumed
when
they
executed
the
Art
Purchase
Under
from
Prop.
all
Corp.
four
v.
corners
Blue
Cross
of
&
the
Blue
agreement.
Shield,
450
which
the
seller
completes
his
performance
with
Id. at 2-401(2).
27
an
offer
consideration
open;
paid,
the
it
confers
right
to
upon
the
purchase
optionee,
at
later
for
date.
[U]ntil the
at
325.
The
contract
ripens
into
fully
enforceable
Id.
to
the
art
did
not
pass
upon
execution
of
the
Rather,
[t]he
to]
specific
items
purchased
by
the
Client
[were
be
physical
possession
of
12
the
art
or
donated
it
to
28
charitable institution.
Agreements
terms,
purchase price.
until
Williams
paid
the
balance
of
the
from
to
the
initial
perform
under
$3,600
the
payment,
contract.
Williams
Williams
had
was
no
not
required to follow through with the purchase, and Abbey Art had
no right to require specific performance of the full balance of
the purchase price.
paying
the
appraiser,
packaging
and
shipping
the
art,
and
Abbey
Art
was
required
to
refund
Williams
the
Thus, the
Arguably, even if
title did pass for $300,000 worth of art upon execution of the
Agreement in 1996, it still would not account for the extra
$125,000 worth of art donated to Drexel University in 1997, the
$250,525
worth
of
art
donated
13
to
Florida
International
30
the long-term gain calculation did not begin until he paid for
and acquired a present interest in the art.
In each instance,
this occurred less than one year from the date of his donation.
Williams
paid
for
the
December
1997
donation
to
Drexel
did
not
err
in
concluding
that
Williams
charitable
V.
Because
Williams
has
not
met
his
burden
of
proving
the
AFFIRMED
31