CHAPTER II REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE

Qualifications
Labo v. COMELEC (176 SCRA 1)
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
RAMON L. LABO, JR., vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN
BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL

FACTS:
Petitioner Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on January 20, 1988.
Private respondent alleged that he was a foreigner and filed a petition for quo warranto
against the petitioner. He averred that the issue in this case is not his citizenship but the
issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry,
considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time. The
Supreme Court proceeded to resolve the issue regarding his citizenship as it involved
an important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest.

There were two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's

citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982,
and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. The second was rendered by
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that
the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines.

The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr.,
with Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and
Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without prejudice to
the issue of the respondent's citizenship being raised anew in a proper case."
Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while Commissioner Felipe was for
deferring decision until representations shall have been made with the Australian
Embassy for official verification of the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian.

The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam DefensorSantiago and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration

and Deportation. It is important to observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC,
there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a
citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred
from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport,
and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this country in 1980. The
decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the Australian Government
dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still
an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976

The petitioner does not deny that he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705,
which he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the
immigration authorities that he was an alien and registered as such under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. He later asked for the change of his status
from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant
Certificate of Residence No. 223809. He also categorically declared that he was a
citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even
sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a
foreigner. 18

Issue: Whether or not Labo is a Filipino citizen eligible to hold public office

Answer: No. Labo is no longer a Filipino citizen.

Holding:
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did
not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or
finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He
became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and
positive process. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of
Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance. Renouncing all other allegiance,
he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."

The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst
only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious
argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization
in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an
oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which
are applicable to the petitioner.

Petitioner asserts his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found
that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did
not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD
No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner
claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.

The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January
18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the
Constitution itself because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for
mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in
material part as follows: Sec. 42. Qualifications. An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines,

The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to
the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of
the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen. These qualifications are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the
office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting
requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first
place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as
mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed
the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple
reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election,
he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a

citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve
as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the
same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City.

Disqualification
Dumlao v. COMELEC
GR NO. L- 52245
JANUARY 22, 1980
FACTS
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of
Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in
the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer,
a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is
also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of Paragraph 1,
Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Section 4 disqualifies any
retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits AND who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement
of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective local office from which he has retired
For their part, Petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the assail the validity of
Paragraph 2, Seciton 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which disqualifies any person who
was convicted of a crime given that there was judgment for conviction and the prima
facie nature of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes. They also
question the validity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 53 which requires the accreditation of
some political parties by respondent COMELEC for being contrary to section 9(1), Art.
XII(C) of the Constitution.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action
2. Whether or not the assailed statutory provisions are unconstitutional
RULING

1.
No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case
should have never been merged. Dumlaos issue is different from Igots. They
have separate issues.
Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for
judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of
the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case;
(2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to
decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
2.

In Dumlaos stand, there is no violation of equal protection. It is subject to

rational classification. Here, persons over 65 are classified differently from
younger employees to promote emergence of younger blood. The tiredness of
the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is
that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for
the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would
like to assume again. The constitutional guarantee is not violated by a
reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to
all those belonging to the same class.
Regarding Igot's petition, the challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from
running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed
against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully
heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made
between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges
have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public
office. A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to
be substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was meritorious.
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
52 is hereby declared valid and the second paragraph of section 4 Batas
Pambansa Bilang 52 is declared null and void.