Persons Cases 081016

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
AUGUST 10, 2016
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915
April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and

MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,
Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in
his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
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a]
Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103,
171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324,
325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415,
427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551,
566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793,
800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050,
1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278,
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826,
1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b]
Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108,
116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188,
192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228,
231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273,
275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315,
325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385,
386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610,
611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839,
878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to
be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek
a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential
issuances is sought:
c]
65.
General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 &
d]
Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196,
1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547,
1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609,
1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723,
1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762,
1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807,
1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836,
1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860,
1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933,
1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044,
2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
AUGUST 10, 2016
e]
Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454,
457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532,
536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574,
593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707,
712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f]
Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22,
25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122,
123.
g]
Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have
this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential
issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the
meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we
quote:
SEC. 3.
Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal,
corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
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immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act

required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is
to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given due
course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the
1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held
that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would
be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he
has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or
some particular right to be protected, independent of that which
he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public
officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are
to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],"
nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws
[High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope
Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor
General to call a special election for the position of municipal
president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for
this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
AUGUST 10, 2016
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority

supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to
proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to
be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we
think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the
reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a
particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule,
because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for
the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and
reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general
rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The
circumstances which surround this case are different from
those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a
proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as
we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in cases of
this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private
citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by
no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners
were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed
be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.
Absolutely necessary matter
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official

Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date
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they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not

indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is
anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this
Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4
this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only
insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable
to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date
of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638
provides as follows:
Section 1.
There shall be published in the Official Gazette
[1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have
no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so
published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as
may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the President of the
AUGUST 10, 2016
Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general

applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to
be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine
Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance
that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the
debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for
the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno
such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no
means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually
been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees.
As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion
generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos,
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en
uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638
reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ."
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
4 of 67
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law

itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official
Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature"
or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or.
the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative
and executive orders need not be published on the assumption
that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of
instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that
the Official Gazette as the official government repository
promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders
and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain
their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have
no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision
might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
AUGUST 10, 2016
5 of 67
RETROACTIVE EFFECT
presidential decrees which were published only during the

pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether
the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had
been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The
answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a
law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing
no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago,
1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear,
however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of
the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to
have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed
to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in
the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among
the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs.
Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium
Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law
was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential

decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it
appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners
to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential
Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939,
inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no
copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter
may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs
has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In
Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The
cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent
officials considering the manifestation in their comment that
"the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall
have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other
publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they
shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish
in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
AUGUST 10, 2016
Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
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so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a

pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such
a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no
such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly
pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to
past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is,
to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to
what is required for any statute or presidential act to be
impressed with binding force or effectivity.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views
expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am
unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly
impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for
unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and
effect.
I shall explain why.
1.
It is of course true that without the requisite publication,
a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely
to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law.
My point is that such publication required need not be confined
to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is
an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too
be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so
would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a
statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To
2.
It is quite understandable then why I concur in the
separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth
what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case.
Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike
some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected
Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is
not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due
process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in
agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the
majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before
laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by
publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3.
It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that
law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable
in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be
to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by
Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4
Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the
Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
AUGUST 10, 2016
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EX POST FACTO-law that makes illegal an act that was legal when committed
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its

effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of
what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties
aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in
accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences
could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette,
then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions
based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to
question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I
am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by
our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act
is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its
ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due
process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness.
Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
executive act was issued under the police power, the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution may not always be
successfully invoked. There must still be that process of
balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case
be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could
arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as
far as it goes.
4.
Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence
goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the
effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself
in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws
taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is
itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It
does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional
command. A later legislative or executive act which has the

force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5.
Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in
the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and
executive acts not thus previously published in the Official
Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be,
in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted,
with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable
to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos,
Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the
concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law
connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only
under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice
that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded
to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be
punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on
due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public
is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its
penalties.
AUGUST 10, 2016
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required

by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative
Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary
rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice
that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public
and official repository where they are duly published) that
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of
the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their
effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for
their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and
meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso
perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant
to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The
best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2
provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not
15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents'
misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their
effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette
is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and
render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an
earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of
15 days following its publication which is the period generally
fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
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I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree

provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I
would like to state in connection with that proposition is that
when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the
decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the
decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity
mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity
if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or
shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of
laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the
parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is
process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of
laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for
their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two
things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does
not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take
effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may
provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity
date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the
Official Gazette.
AUGUST 10, 2016
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support

the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published
in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the
Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the
publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority
of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them,
"important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of
the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative
acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but
only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said
law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is
essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for
all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law,
especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its
own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law,
which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it
requires notice before laws become effective, for no person
should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary
fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
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I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my

vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official
Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished
decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views
expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am
unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly
impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for
unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and
effect.
I shall explain why.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
1.
It is of course true that without the requisite publication,
a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely
to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law.
AUGUST 10, 2016
My point is that such publication required need not be confined

to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is
an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too
be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so
would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a
statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To
so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a
pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such
a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no
such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly
pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to
past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is,
to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to
what is required for any statute or presidential act to be
impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2.
It is quite understandable then why I concur in the
separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth
what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case.
Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike
some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the
Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is
process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in
agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the
majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before
laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by
publication in the Official Gazette. 2
10 of 67
3.
It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that
law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable
in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be
to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by
Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4
Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the
Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its
effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of
what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties
aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in
accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences
could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette,
then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions
based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to
question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I
am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by
our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act
is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its
ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due
process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness.
Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
executive act was issued under the police power, the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution may not always be
successfully invoked. There must still be that process of
balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case
be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could
arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as
far as it goes.
4.
Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence
goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the
effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
AUGUST 10, 2016
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such

publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself
in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws
taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is
itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It
does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional
command. A later legislative or executive act which has the
force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5.
Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in
the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and
executive acts not thus previously published in the Official
Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be,
in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted,
with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable
to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos,
Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the
concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law
connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only
under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice
that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded
11 of 67
to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be

punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on
due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public
is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its
penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required
by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative
Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary
rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice
that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public
and official repository where they are duly published) that
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of
the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their
effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for
their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and
meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso
perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant
to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The
best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2
provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not
15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents'
misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their
effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette
is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and
render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an
AUGUST 10, 2016
earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of

15 days following its publication which is the period generally
fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree
provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I
would like to state in connection with that proposition is that
when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the
decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the
decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity
mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity
if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or
shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of
laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the
parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is
process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of
laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for
their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
12 of 67
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two

things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does
not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take
effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may
provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity
date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the
Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support
the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published
in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the
Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the
publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority
of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them,
"important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of
the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative
acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but
only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said
law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is
essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for
all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law,
especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its
own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law,
which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it
requires notice before laws become effective, for no person
should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary
AUGUST 10, 2016
fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that

such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
13 of 67
4
Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848;
Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of the Philippines vs.
Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs.
Social Security System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46
Phil. 179.
5
1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my
vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official
Gazette.
6
People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al.
vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.
7
82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.
308 U.S. 371, 374.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
93 Phil.. 68,.
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished

decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
10
The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after
Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the Government
Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding
the respective dates of publication in the Official Gazette of the
presidential issuances listed therein. No report has been
submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or nonpublication of other presidential issuances.
Footnotes
1
Section 6. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shag be recognized, access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shag be afforded the
citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
11
129 SCRA 174.
Fernando, CJ.:
2
Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas
vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs. City Mayor, 16 SCRA
151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao
vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.
1
Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He
mentioned in tills connection Article 7, Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin
Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71
ALR 1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A
16 Phil. 366, 378.
Ibid, closing paragraph.

3
Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).
Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).
AUGUST 10, 2016
5
Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617,
January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.
6
Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396,
July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.
Teehankee, J.:
1
People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per
the late Chief Justice Paras.
2
Notes in brackets supplied.
Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.
Plana, J.:
*
See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The
legislature shall provide publication of all statute laws ... and no
general law shall be in force until published." See also S ate ex
rel. White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing
Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.
14 of 67
AUGUST 10, 2016

SUPREME COURT
Manila
15 of 67
LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
DECISION
EN BANC
NACHURA, J.:
G.R. No. 170338
December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON
PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY,
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275
December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI,

petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE
HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C.
AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON,
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a

wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of
the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured
unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a
controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present
administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of
the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as
the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections. These recordings were to become the subject of
heated legislative hearings conducted separately by
committees of both Houses of Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005,
then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a
privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a
congressional investigation jointly conducted by the
Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,
National Defense and Security, Information and
Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry,
several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But
on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director
Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former
NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent
House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of
the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged
AUGUST 10, 2016
and impassioned debate by the committee members on the

admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were
eventually played in the chambers of the House.2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees
decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless,
they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said
recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O.
Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for
Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4
docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent
House Committees be restrained from using these tape
recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations
in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He
further implored that the said recordings and any reference
thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and
the respondent House Committees directed to desist from
further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and
debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo
Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech,
"The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse,
Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole
unvarnished truth the whats, whens, wheres, whos and
whys" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the
perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to
participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons
speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National
16 of 67
Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who

had previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale,
purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing
electoral duties.7
In the Senates plenary session the following day, a lengthy
debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his
concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on
the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her
considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use,
possession, replay or communication of the contents of the
"Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative
investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP
(ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government
entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and
Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed
before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275,
seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled
legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended
legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article
III of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate
proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes
on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M.
Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and
AUGUST 10, 2016
Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on the petition on

September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of
the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the
Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to
intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R.
Nos. 170338 and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello
Garci" recordings, they have different objectivesthe first is
poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and
their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the
second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate
inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and
grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-IBefore delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first
resolve the issue on the parties standing, argued at length in
their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "[l]egal
standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental
act x x x," thus,
17 of 67
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he

can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural
technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the
stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23
articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing
ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings."24
The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a nonmember of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge
the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National
Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said
case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly
and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as
impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal
questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with
the Courts duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine
whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws,
and that they have not abused the discretion given to them."26
AUGUST 10, 2016
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing

to initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded
to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified
by the members of the respondent committees as one of the
voices in the recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner
Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House
committees actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court
recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify
their standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens,
taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm
conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will
further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and
proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in
the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the
continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the
blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the
conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.
28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein
through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the
intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He
further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and
wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of
the questioned hearings.29
18 of 67
Following the Courts ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of

Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranadas and
Agcaoilis and intervenor Sagges allegation that the
continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative
inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
32 It should be noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives,
yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as
in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own
rightsas taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens,
individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of
the legal professionwhich were also supposedly violated by
the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows
that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance
not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and
should be resolved for the guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the
liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the
more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal
standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor
Sagge.
- II -
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in

the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his
constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely
being citizens of the Republic.
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being

moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions
is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power
is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases
AUGUST 10, 2016
19 of 67
Basis
and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing

conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the
Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial
inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren
legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question
in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case
becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is
unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case
presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot
have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things,
cannot be enforced.38
Issue
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the

Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to
prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the
tape recordings and from including the same in their committee
report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the
records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the
recordings were already played in the House and heard by its
members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact that the
committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed
and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent
committees.40 Having been overtaken by these events, the
Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and
academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to
restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended
to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.41
- III As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the
same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the

constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended
to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.42 Publication
is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.43 What constitutes publication is set forth in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall
take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings
and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45
With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced
on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication
of these rules when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same
question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that
respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article
VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in
accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We
quote the OSGs explanation:
AUGUST 10, 2016
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the

Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure
governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate
is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact
a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published
its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation
conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally
infirm.
20 of 67
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court

sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that
the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not
dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in
the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its
day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts
separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress
before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it
states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring

Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization:
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall

be taken up at the next session in the same status.
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a

continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twentyfour members, twelve of whom are elected every three years
for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators
expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of
Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987
Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of
Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the
same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the
1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than
majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The
consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be
republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of
twelve Senators.47
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the

expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the
succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our

Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same
case, viz.:
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and

proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress
and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding
Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same
status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and
practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that
the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically
have a different composition as that of the previous Congress)
should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the
Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing
body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then
pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the
expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course,
continue into the next Congress with the same status.
AUGUST 10, 2016
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution

and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is
reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the
Senates main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators
elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of
office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate
committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which
should be presented at least one day before its consideration,
and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the
session shall be required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their
adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended or
repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into
account the new composition of the Senate after an election
and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at
the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators
shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its
main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their
adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is
conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state
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"(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does
not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules
until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in
the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be
presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would
continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next
Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution
requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the
duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent
upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries
in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules
clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent
Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to
sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it
could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its
main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules
have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they
are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to
the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the
Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of
AUGUST 10, 2016
22 of 67
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not

these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over
any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of

legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only
"in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Justice Carpios response to the same argument raised by the

respondents is illuminating:
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate

Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in
the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya.
While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication
does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited
by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are
concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still
could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate
Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear
contravention of the Constitution.
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the

Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not
sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that
the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any
other form of publication. Publication in accordance with
Taada is mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons
liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure
could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A.
No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the
internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary
purposes.51 In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of
electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.52 It
does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules
and regulations.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary

to discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED,
and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of
prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of
the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting
any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci"
tapes.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
AUGUST 10, 2016
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
*RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* On leave.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 168.

2 Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), pp. 7-9.
3 Id. at 9.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
4 Id. at 1-38.
5 Id. at 36-38.
6 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 215-220.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
23 of 67
7 Id. at 169.
AUGUST 10, 2016
24 of 67
8 An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other

Related Violations of the Privacy of Communications and for
Other Purposes.
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called

"Garci tapes," violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution
and/or Republic Act No. 4200. (Id. at 66.)
9 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 169-170.
18 Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention

filed on October 26, 2007.
10 Id. at 3-17.
19 Resolution dated November 20, 2007.
11 Id. at 7-13.
20 465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004).
12 Id. at 24.
21 Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, id.
13 Id. at 44.
14 Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, p. 6.
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 68-70.
22 Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27,

2004, 429 SCRA 736, 755.
23 G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400,
171489 and 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
16 Id. at 71-90.
24 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, id. at 218.
17 Id. at 62. The Court identified the following issues for
discussion in the October 2, 2007 Oral Argument:
25 G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441.
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring this suit.
26 Id.
2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the

Senate Committees governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation have been published, in accordance with Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution. Corollarily:
27 Reply in G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.

28 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 4.
29 Petition-in-Intervention, p. 3.
(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every

Congress.
(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the
constitutional requirement.
30 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 23, at 223.

31 460 Phil. 830 (2003).
32 Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, id. at 897.
AUGUST 10, 2016
33 Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra note

31, at 895.
42 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A

Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 679.
34 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5,

1994, 232 SCRA 110, 139.
43 Taada v. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 432-433 (1985).
35 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 184 Phil. 369, 377 (1980). This case

explains the standards that have to be followed in the exercise
of the power of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by
the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that
the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon
in order to decide the case.
36 La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 465 Phil.
860, 889-890 (2004).
25 of 67
44 As amended on June 18, 1987 by Executive Order No. 200

entitled "Providing for the Publication of Laws Either in the
Official Gazette or in a Newspaper of General Circulation in the
Philippines as a Requirement for their Effectivity".
45 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 179; Memorandum of
Respondents-Intervenors, pp. 9-10.
46 G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135-136.
47 Id. at 297-298.
48 Dated September 4, 2008.
37 Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, July 21,

2006, 496 SCRA 13, 46.
38 Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, G.R. No. 157033, March 28,
2005, 454 SCRA 130, 138.
39 Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), p. 9.
40 See news article "Separate findings, no closure" by Michael
Lim Umbac published in The Philippine Daily Inquirer on March
29, 2006; News item "5 House committees in Garci probe file
report on Monday" published in The Manila Bulletin on March
25, 2006.
49 TSN, Oral Arguments, March 4, 2008, (G.R. No. 179275),

pp. 413-414.
50 Entitled "An Act Providing for the Recognition and Use of
Electronic Commercial and Non-Commercial Transactions and
Documents, Penalties for Unlawful Use Thereof and For Other
Purposes," approved on June 14, 2000.
51 MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong
Corporation, G.R. No. 170633, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA
408. (Emphasis supplied.)
52 Sections 6, 7 and 10 of R.A. No. 8792 read:
41 Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No.

100150, January 5, 1994, 229 SCRA 117, 135-136; Agustin v.
De la Fuente, 84 Phil. 515, 517 (1949).
Sec. 6. Legal Recognition of Data Messages. - Information

shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely
AUGUST 10, 2016
on the grounds that it is in the data message purporting to give

rise to such legal effect, or that it is merely referred to in that
electronic data message.
Sec. 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents.
Electronic documents shall have the legal effect, validity or
enforceability as any other document or legal writing, and
(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that
requirement is met by an electronic document if the said
electronic document maintains its integrity and reliability, and
can be authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent
reference, in that
(i) The electronic document has remained complete and
unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement and any
authorized change, or any change which arises in the normal
course of communication, storage and display; and
(ii) The electronic document is reliable in the light of the
purpose for which it was generated and in the light of all the
relevant circumstances.
(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in
the form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides
consequences for the document not being presented or
retained in its original form.
(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or
retained in its original form, that requirement is met by an
electronic document if
(i) There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the
document from the time when it was first generated in its final
form; and
26 of 67
(ii) That document is capable of being displayed to the person

to whom it is to be presented: Provided, That no provision of
this Act shall apply to vary any and all requirements of existing
laws on formalities required in the execution of documents for
their validity.
For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the
functional equivalent of a written document under existing
laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the
admissibility of electronic data messages or electronic
documents, except the rules relating to authentication and best
evidence.
Sec. 10. Original Documents. (1) Where the law requires
information to be presented or retained in its original form, that
requirement is met by an electronic data message or electronic
document if:
(a) The integrity of the information from the time when it was
first generated in its final form, as an electronic data message
or electronic document is shown by evidence aliunde or
otherwise; and
(b) Where it is required that information be presented, that the
information is capable of being displayed to the person to
whom it is to be presented.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in
the form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides
consequences for the information not being presented or
retained in its original form.
(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):
AUGUST 10, 2016
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the

information has remained complete and unaltered, apart from
the addition of any endorsement and any change which arises
in the normal course of communication, storage and display;
and
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the
light of the purpose for which the information was generated
and in the light of all relevant circumstances.
27 of 67
AUGUST 10, 2016

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137873
April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
28 of 67
the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform

assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the
elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction
thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2)
companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death
when the [p]latform he was then on board and performing
work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the
removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted
to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but
without a safety lock.1
KAPUNAN, J.:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a
construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from
the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District
investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated November 25,
1990, stating that:
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in
Pasig, Metro Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival
(DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around
2:15 p.m. of the same date.
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages
against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The
employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior
availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow
Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place,

while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and
Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at
the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance
Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam
(steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid
plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners
and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or
pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.

3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juegos earning
capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
AUGUST 10, 2016
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on
the following grounds:
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE
ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR [sic] IS APPLICABLE
TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE
2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING
DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is
hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled otherwise.
It held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an
exception to the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is,
which are derived from his perception.4 A witness, therefore,
may not testify as what he merely learned from others either
because he was told or read or heard the same. Such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as
proof of the truth of what he has learned.5 This is known as the
hearsay rule.
29 of 67
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the

general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to
written, as well as oral statements.6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible
deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and
untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested
assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and
exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule,
therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by crossexamination.8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9
among which are entries in official records. Section 44, Rule
130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing
the work of Chief Justice Moran, enumerated the requisites for
admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another
person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of
his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information.
AUGUST 10, 2016
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites.
Petitioner contends that the last requisite is not present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in
question, also testified before the trial court. In Rodriguez vs.
Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report,
the officer who signed the fire report also testified before the
trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for
the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained in
the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the
testimony of the officer who executed the report.
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and
was available for cross-examination, the portions of the report
which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of
his perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of
the report, such as the summary of the statements of the
parties based on their sworn statements (which were annexed
to the Report) as well as the latter, having been included in the
first purpose of the offer [as part of the testimony of Major
Enriquez], may then be considered as independently relevant
statements which were gathered in the course of the
investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact
that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not
apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the
making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for
petitioners on his Report and made himself available for crossexamination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it
30 of 67
proved that certain utterances were made (but not their truth),
was effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned
Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does
away with the testimony in open court of the officer who made
the official record, considers the matter as an exception to the
hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record
admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. The underlying reasons for this exceptionary
rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon
v. Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily
needed; the occasions in which the officials would be
summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are
numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work
something is not done in which testimony is not needed from
official sources. Were there no exception for official
statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the
greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or
delivering deposition before an officer. The work of
administration of government and the interest of the public
having business with officials would alike suffer in
consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a
certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not
extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec.
1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it
presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy
and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge
of their duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be
true under such a degree of caution as to the nature and
circumstances of each case may appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major
Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report. In that case
AUGUST 10, 2016
the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been

ripe for determination, and this Court would have agreed with
the Court of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since
the aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The
statements given by the sources of information of Major
Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information," there being
no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to
give the statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the
purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained
therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the
testimony of PO3 Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanuevas
testimony which were of his personal knowledge suffice to
prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator
crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juegos remains at the
morgue,12 making the latters death beyond dispute. PO3
Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises
of the building the day after the incident13 and saw the
platform for himself.14 He observed that the platform was
crushed15 and that it was totally damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva
also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the
police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain
was detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt.
17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3
Villanuevas testimony that the cause of the fall of the platform
was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed
that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to
certain exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not
admissible.19
31 of 67
Petitioners contention, however, loses relevance in the face of

the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the
doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere
fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of
the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
specific proof of negligence.20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this
wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and
while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not
generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was
due to negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction
speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or
instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances
accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on
the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged
with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which
caused the injury complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and that the occurrence
resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of
things would not happen if those who had its control or
management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or,
as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was
caused by the defendants want of care.21
AUGUST 10, 2016
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity,

i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available.22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory
that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which
causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has
the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has
no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the
happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The
inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact
that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or
innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but
inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes
a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause,
reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the
cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant
in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res
ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of
necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the
peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is
within the power of the defendant to show that there was no
negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendants
negligence is beyond plaintiffs power. Accordingly, some court
add to the three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party
had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of
the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence
has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the
accident.23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are
present in the case at bar:
32 of 67
There is no dispute that appellees husband fell down from the

14th floor of a building to the basement while he was working
with appellants construction project, resulting to his death. The
construction site is within the exclusive control and
management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project
superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in
complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of
any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within the
knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other
hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the
accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies
where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the
following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind
which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due
to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the
basement while performing work in a construction site unless
someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As
explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia
and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the
exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the
second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence
was attributed to the appellees deceased husband[;] thus[,]
the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a
reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence
arises. x x x.24
what
should be
only typed
AUGUST 10, 2016
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for

the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the
presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise
since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident
which befell respondents husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of
the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendants negligence is
presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the
plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the
burden then shifts to defendant to explain.26 The presumption
or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence
and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption,
such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the
inference.27 It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its
defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising.
Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play
only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine
has been established.1wphi1.nt
33 of 67
to testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence

is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the
adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the
commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not
prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his
own language in writing the affiants statements which may
either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.29
Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its
due care any more than private respondent can use it to prove
the cause of her husbands death. Regrettably, petitioner does
not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or
presumption of negligence arising from the application of res
ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the
incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously
availed of the death benefits provided under the Labor Code
and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceaseds
employer damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman

Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police investigator as
evidence of its due care. According to Fabros sworn
statement, the company enacted rules and regulations for the
safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and
the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabros sworn statement as
proof of its due care but, in arguing that private respondent
failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioners
employees, also assails the same statement for being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabros sworn statement is hearsay and
inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under the
hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand
Article 173. Extent of liability. Unless otherwise provided, the

liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to
the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to
receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents.
The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the
recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six
hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight
hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws whose benefits
are administered by the System or by other agencies of the
government.
3
Providing the
claimant
CHOICE OF
REMEDIES
AUGUST 10, 2016
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of

the Workmens Compensation Act, provided that:
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a
personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against
the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of
said injury x x x.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act
allowed recovery under said Act as well as under the Civil
Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court
finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining
Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death
of the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging
that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules
and regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the
protection of the employees, the heirs of the deceased
employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court
of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs
sought relief from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of
remedies, majority of the Court En Banc,31 following the rule in
Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured
employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection
or choice of action between availing themselves of the workers
right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the
regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual,
moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail
34 of 67
themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited

compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act and
sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaa vs. Cebu
Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker
has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Workmens Compensation Act or to
prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for
higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said
case to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code despite
having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmens
Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in
its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a
quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely
Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and
Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation to
the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and
all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except
Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in
installments x x x. Such allegation was admitted by herein
petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated
may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up the
defense that the claims were filed under the Workmens
Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of
the committee created to investigate the accident which
established the criminal negligence and violation of law by
Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of
Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter
dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
a. Court
allowed them
to still sue
under Civil
Code despite
having
availed of
benefits
AUGUST 10, 2016
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the

benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act, such my not
preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
not giving attention because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has
been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased
miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had
petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules
and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not
have sought redress under the Workmens Compensation
Commission which awarded a lesser amount for
compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on
ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it
was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However,
should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the
lower court, the payments made under the Workmens
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that
may be decreed in their favor. [Underscoring supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of
remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs.
Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper
Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again
recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act
could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages
sustained by workers in the course of their employment could
be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the
exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In Floresca,
this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that the
claimants may invoke either the Workmens Compensation Act
or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence
that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that
the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will
preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy.
35 of 67
The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid

under the Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for
damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening
facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first
remedy. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondents case came under
the exception because private respondent was unaware of
petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent
filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy
of the police investigation report and the Prosecutors
Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against
petitioners personnel. While stating that there was no
negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint, the
prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at
all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the
exception in Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the
alleged negligence of appellant as early as November 25,
1990, the date of the police investigators report. The appellee
merely executed her sworn statement before the police
investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her
relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the accident. She
did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to
Homicide" against appellants employees. It was the
investigator who recommended the filing of said case and his
supervisor referred the same to the prosecutors office. This is
a standard operating procedure for police investigators which
appellee may not have even known. This may explain why no
complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the
public prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991,
to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged
by complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide."
It is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance to
AUGUST 10, 2016
appear before the public prosecutor as can be inferred from

the following statement in said memorandum: "Respondents
who were notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to
present controverting evidence," thus there was no reason for
the public prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice
of appellants negligence cannot be imputed on appellee
before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she
received the first payment therefrom. Her using the police
investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9,
1991 may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the
February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the Prosecutors Office
dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence,
stating therein that: "The death of the victim is not attributable
to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at all and
as shown by the records this case is civil in
nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing,
We are more inclined to believe appellees allegation that she
learned about appellants negligence only after she applied for
and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact
that will make this case fall under the exception held in the
Floresca ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent
ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached
only elementary school for her educational attainment; that she
did not know what damages could be recovered from the death
of her husband; and that she did not know that she may also
recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that
private respondent "failed to allege in her complaint that her
application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended
by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted
36 of 67
during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or

adjudicate that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have
been ignorant of the facts because as early as November 28,
1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal
complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide"
against petitioners employees. On February 6, 1991, two
months before the filing of the action in the lower court,
Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although
there was insufficient evidence against petitioners employees,
the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly show that
prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January
2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also
knew of the two choices of remedies available to her and yet
she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election
between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars
any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected
remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act
of election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of
election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible
unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it
is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose
of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy,
but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong.38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in
a waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that a
claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the
Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under
the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is
deemed to have waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
AUGUST 10, 2016
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has

knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must
be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the
person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the
partys rights or of all material facts upon which they depended.
Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon
which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates
waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given
under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that
person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge
upon which to make an intelligent decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise
of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences.
That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be
illustrated on the record or by the evidence.40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a
remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address
petitioners contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private
respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had
availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for
petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as
an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to
plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer;41
otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for
petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction
37 of 67
over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the

proceedings before the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the
facts that led to her husbands death and the rights pertaining
to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of
knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that
served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of
petitioners employees, of which private respondent
purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a
resolution stating that there may be civil liability. In Floresca, it
was the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation
of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation
of government rules and regulations, for that matter, however,
is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the courts
have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the
courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle
that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been
misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew
that her husband died in the elevator crash when on November
15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from
the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November
25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form.
Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27,
1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the
remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was
filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was
not aware of her rights.
AUGUST 10, 2016
38 of 67
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code,

ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system
(Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim
ignorance of this Courts ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of
remedies.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial

Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in
its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award
decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the
ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant
to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other
respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is

limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws.42 This may be
deduced from the language of the provision, which,
notwithstanding a persons ignorance, does not excuse his or
her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing
private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory
nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be
held against her.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnote
1 Exhibit "A," Records, pp. 60-61.
2 Rollo, pp. 79-80.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of

damages. The records do not indicate the total amount private
respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears
from Exhibit "K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial
payment representing the accrued pension from November
1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to
the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly
pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will
eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of
P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is
subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial
court for such determination. Should the trial court find that its
award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already
received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be
deducted from the trial court' award of damages. Consistent
with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent
double compensation.
3 Id., at 19.
4 Sec. 36, Rule 130.
5 People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312 (1983).
6 31A C.J.S. Evidence 194. See also Philippine Home
Assurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 479 (1996).
7 5 J. H. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System
of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 3 (3rd Ed.).
8 San Sebastian College vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 138
(1991).
9 See Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sections 37-47.
AUGUST 10, 2016
10 16 SCRA 448 (1966). See also People vs. San Gabriel, 253
SCRA 84 (1996).
39 of 67
27 Id., at 1947.
11 273 SCRA 607 (1997).
28 People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 (1984); People vs. Quidato,
297 SCRA 1 (1998).
12 TSN, December 20, 1991, p. 9.
29 People vs. Ramos, supra.
13 Id., at 28; TSN, January 6, 1992, p. 29.
30 136 SCRA 141 (1985).
14 Id., at 29; Ibid.
31 Justices Aquino, Melencio-Herrera, and Gutierrez dissented.
15 Id., at 33.
32 151 SCRA 333 (1987).
16 Id., at 34.
33 157 SCRA 446 (1988).
17 Id., at 24 and 28.
34 164 SCRA 317 (1988).
18 Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sections 49-50.
35 Rollo, pp. 90-91. Underscoring by the Court of Appeals.
19 Id., Sec. 48.
36 Id., at 90. Underscoring by the Court of Appeals.
20 Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 (1988).

See also Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334 (1996); Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 143
SCRA 657 (1986).
37 Id., at 5.
38 Id., at 2.
39 Castro vs. Del Rosario, et al., 19 SCRA 196 (1967).
21 57B Am Jur 2d, Negligence 1819.

40 28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver 202.
22 Id., at 1824.
41 Records, pp. 17-18.
23 Id., at 1914.
24 Rollo, pp. 87-88.
25 Whether the doctrine raises a presumption or merely an inference
is subject to debate. See 57B Am Jur 2d, Negligence 1925-1928.
26 Id., at 1920.
42 I Tolentino, A.M. Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil

Code of the Philippines 19 (1995).
43 Records, p. 100.
AUGUST 10, 2016
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-24421. April 30, 1970.]
MATIAS GONGON, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, THE
SPOUSES AMADA AQUINO and RUFINO RIVERA, THE
OFFICE OF THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, and
THE OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
40 of 67
2. ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF PREFERENTIAL RIGHT, CONTRARY

TO PUBLIC POLICY. Petitioners waiver of his preferential
right over the lot being contrary to the avowed policy laid down
in Commonwealth Act No. 539, such waiver is null and void.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Enrique M. Fernando for Petitioner.
Bengzon & Bengzon for respondents spouses Amada Aquino,
Et. Al.
Solicitor General for other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REFORM; LANDED ESTATES; POLICY

GOVERNING DISPOSITION OF LANDED ESTATES; CASE
AT BAR. The intendment of Commonwealth Act No. 539,
governing the acquisition and disposition of landed estates is
to award lots to those who may apply, the first choice to the
bona fide "tenants," the second to the "occupants," and the
last, to "private individuals," if the parties affected thereby
stand on equal footing or under equal circumstances. Where
the parties cannot be said to be in equal footing respondent
spouses have their house on another lot they already own
which is bigger than that where petitioner constructed his
house justice and equity command that petitioner be given
the preferential right to purchase the lot in question to carry out
the avowed policy of the law to give land to the landless.
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of

Appeals which affirmed the dismissal by the Court of First
Instance of Manila of Matias Gongons complaint to set aside
the decision of the Land Tenure Administration as affirmed
by the Office of the President awarding Lot 18-B, Block 23
of the Tambobong Estate, to herein private respondent Amada
Aquino, wife of her co-respondent Rufino Rivera. The decision
appealed from likewise ordered Gongon to turn over the
possession of the litigated lot to Amada Aquino, to pay the
rentals due at the rate of P6.00 a month from 1949 until such
possession is restored to her and to pay attorneys fees in the
amount of P1,000.00.
Lot 18-B, Block 23, with an area of 274 square meters, is a
portion of the Tambobong Estate in Malabon, Rizal, which used
to belong in its entirety to the Roman Catholic Church. The lot
was originally leased to Amada Aquino. who in turn sublet it in
1934 to Matias Gongon for a term of 15 years at a nominal
monthly rental of P6.00. The sublessee constructed his
residential house on the property and since then has been
living there, together with his family.
Meanwhile, the Tambobong Estate was purchased by the
Government from the Roman Catholic Church on December
AUGUST 10, 2016
31, 1947 under the provisions of Section 1 of Commonwealth

Act No. 539, which authorized the President of the
Philippines." . . to acquire private lands or any interest, through
purchase or expropriation, and to subdivide the same into
home lots or small farms for resale at reasonable prices and
under such conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants
or occupants or to private individuals who will work the lands
themselves and who are qualified to acquire and own lands in
the Philippines." In due time Matias Gongon filed an
application with the defunct Rural Progress Administration for
the purchase of Lot 18-B, Block 23, claiming preferential right
as bona fide occupant. The application was opposed by
Amada Aquino, who also filed her own application, alleging that
as bona fide tenant or lessee she had the preferential right to
purchase the lot. After investigation, the Director of Lands
the Bureau of Lands having then taken over the functions of
the Rural Progress Administration rendered a decision on
May 31, 1965 approving Gongons application, he being the
actual occupant. On appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, this official set aside the order of the
Director of Lands and gave due course to Amada Aquinos
application.
Matias Gongon moved for reconsideration, but his motion was
denied by the Land Tenure Administration, which had
meanwhile taken over the functions, powers and duties of the
Landed Estate Division of the Bureau of Lands upon the
enactment of Republic Act No. 1400. Matias Gongon then
appealed to the Office of the President, which thereafter
affirmed the decision of the Land Tenure Administration.
Accordingly, on February 24, 1961 the Land Tenure
Administration executed a deed of sale of Lot 18-B in favor of
Amada Aquino, as a result of which she obtained, on March
10, 19761, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84738 in her name.
41 of 67
On April 24, 1961 Matias Gongon filed the instant case in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the decisions of the
Land Tenure Administration and of not in question to him; to
cancel its registration in the name of Amada Aquino and to
have it registered in his name instead. The complaint likewise
contained a prayer for attorneys fees and costs.
It is noteworthy that the Land Tenure Administration, in a
manifestation it filed in the lower court on May 27, 1961, made
common cause with herein appellant Matias Gongon, stating
(in part) as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That at the time it issued the said Order, the LTA Board of
Administrators was newly constituted and therefore it has not
had sufficient time to study thoroughly the legality or wisdom of
the Bureau of Lands policy giving preference right to tenants to
purchase the lots leased by them over and above the actual
occupants or sublessees thereof; hence, it just affirmed the
said decision of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources as a matter of sound administrative policy.
That after a serious study of the issues of facts and of law in
cases identical to the case at bar, the LTA Board of
Administrators found out that it would be more in keeping with
the spirit and intention of the laws (Commonwealth Acts Nos.
20 and 539 and Republic Act No 1400) governing acquisition
and disposition of the landed estates (including the Tambobong
Estate) if it followed the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court in the case of Marukot, Et. Al. v. Jacinto, Et Al., (GR.
Nos. L-8036-38) promulgated on December 20, 1955, giving
the actual occupants or sublessees the preference to purchase
the lots occupied by them as against tenants or lessees who
do not occupy the same; hence answering defendant
subsequently reversed the policy followed by the Bureau of
Lands and adopted by the doctrines laid down in the Marukot
case."cralaw virtua1aw library
AUGUST 10, 2016
As heretofore stated, the lower court dismissed the complaint.

In due time the plaintiff elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. In affirming the decision appealed from the appellate
court pointed out (1) that the finding of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, as affirmed by the Office of
the President, to the effect that appellant Matias Gongon had
waived whatever right he might have had over the lot in
question was factual in nature and could not be reviewed by
the courts; and (2) that appellant could be not considered as a
bona fide occupant of the lot because his possession as
sublessee was in effect possession by the lessee, citing Article
524 of the Civil Code.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
Court of Appeals, Matias Gongon filed the present petition for
review, contending that the appellate court erred in failing to
recognize his right as sublessee-tenant to the lot in question
and in not cancelling the sale thereof to respondent Amada
Aquino as well as its registration in her name; in holding that
he had waived his right to the lot in question in favor of
respondents-spouses Amada Aquino and Rufino Rivera; and in
ordering him to pay rentals at the rate of P6.00 a month from
1949, plus attorneys fees and costs.
The two issues posed in this appeal are (1) whether or not
petitioner has the preferential right to purchase the lot in
question; and (2) if he has, whether or not the alleged waiver of
whatever right he might have had over said lot is valid.
The first issue involves a conflict of claims between a lessee
and a sublesee insofar as the right to purchase the property is
concerned. Several decisions of this Court have been cited
and discussed by the parties. Parenthetically, it may be noted
that in those cases the concept of possession by a sublessee
under the Civil Code, which according to the Court of Appeals
42 of 67
in its decision under review was in effect possession by the

lessee sublessor, was not considered by this Court applicable
at all in construing the term "occupant" under Commonwealth
Act No. 539.
In Grande v. Santos (98 Phil. 62), the registered lessee sublet
two portions of the lot to two different persons. In giving the
right of preference to the registered lessee this Court took into
consideration a number of circumstances: that the lot was a
small one of only 144 square meters; that the lessee was
himself an actual occupant of part thereof; and that to
subdivide said lot into three portions would, owing to the
extremely limited size of each, lead to frictions, conflicts,
misunderstandings and perhaps disturbances of the peace
consequences which Commonwealth Act No. 539 precisely
sought to avert.
On the other hand, Marukot, Et. Al. v. Jacinto and Director of
Lands (supra, 98 Phil. 128) this Court awarded to the
sublessees the portions of the lot they were occupying, as
against the claim of the lessee. This case differed from the
Grande case not only in that the lot involved had a bigger area
some 500 square meters but principally in the fact that
the lessee was not actually occupying the lot but had his
residence on another property altogether. This Court did not
rule on whether a "tenant" that is, a lessee, should enjoy
priority over an "occupant" who is a sublessee, because after
awarding the portions covered by the sublease to the actual
occupants, the registered lessee still got about 300 square
meters, or 100 square meters more than the total area
awarded to the sublessees.
In Santiago, Et. Al. v. Cruz, Et Al., (98 Phil. 168), the right of
preference was given to the registered tenant. In interpreting
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 539, this Court said that
"the intendment of the law is to award the lots to those who
Compared cases
AUGUST 10, 2016
may apply in the order mentioned", that is, "the first choice is
given to the bona fide tenants, the second to the occupants
and the last to private individuals." The Court also took into
consideration the fact that the sublessees executed a
document expressly agreeing to vacate the lots anytime the
tenant so required, together with the affidavit of one of the
sublessees acknowledging the right of the tenant to purchase
the lot and renouncing whatever rights he might have to
purchase it.
However, in the subsequent case of Gutierrez v. Santos, Et. Al.
(107 Phil. 419), the ruling in the Santiago decision was clarified
and given a restrictive application, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Now, we say that the above order of preference should be
observed if the parties affected stand on an equal footing or
under equal circumstances, for only in that way can the
provision of the law be implemented with equity, justice and
fairness to all and in keeping with the spirit of giving land to the
landless so that he may have a land of his own. But the order
need not be rigidly followed when a party, say a bona fide
tenant, has already in his name other lots more than what he
needs for his family, for certainly to give him the preference
would work injustice to the occupants."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case at bar it is not disputed that respondent spouses
have their house on another lot (lot No. 34, block No. 7) in the
Tambobong Estate. Furthermore, respondent Rufino Rivera is
the registered bona fide tenant of still another lot, also in
Tambobong, with an area of 2,761 square meters, which is
considerably bigger than the lot in question, where petitioner
and his family constructed their residence and where they have
been living since 1934. It cannot be said, therefore, that the
parties herein stand on an equal footing or under equal
circumstances. Justice and equity command that petitioner be
43 of 67
given the preferential right to purchase in order to carry out the

avowed policy of the law to give land to the landless.
On the second issue petitioners position is that his preferential
right could not be validly waived, such waiver being against
public policy. Under Article 6 of the new Civil Code "rights may
be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law." The old Civil Code (Art.
4) carried a similar provision, although it mentioned only public
interest or public order.
That Commonwealth Act No. 539 lays down a public policy
there can be no doubt. In the case of Juat v. Land Tenure
Administration, G.R. No. L-17080, January 28, 1961, this
Court, thru Mr. Justice Felix Angelo Bautista. ruled in this
wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . It may also be stated that the avowed policy behind the
adoption of such measure, is, as aptly observed by the Court
of Appeals, to provide the landless elements of our population
with lots upon which to build their homes and small farms
which they can cultivate and from which they can derive their
livelihood without being beholden to any man (Pascual v.
Lucas, 51 O.G., No. 4, p. 2429), such measure having been
adopted in line with the policy of social justice enshrined in our
Constitution to remedy and cure the social unrest caused by
the concentration of landed estates in the hands of a few by
giving to the landless elements a piece of land they can call
their own."cralaw virtua1aw library
Being contrary to public policy, the alleged waiver of his right
made by herein petitioner should be considered null and void.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. The
award of the lot in question to respondent Amada Aquino is set
AUGUST 10, 2016
aside; transfer certificate of title No. 84738 of the Registry of

Deeds of Rizal is ordered cancelled; and petitioner is declared
to have the preferential right to purchase the said lot. Costs
against respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Zaldivar,
Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Castro, Fernando, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., took no part.
44 of 67
AUGUST 10, 2016
FIRST DIVISION
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL G.R. No. 162155
REVENUE and ARTURO V.
PARCERO in his official
capacity as Revenue District
Officer of Revenue District
No. 049 (Makati),
Petitioners, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY
GROUP, INC.,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 28, 2007
x-----------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the

August 1, 2003 decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution
denying reconsideration.[3]
45 of 67
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent

Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit
of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to
petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue
District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR),[4] he explained that the increase in the cost of labor and
materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and
collecting receivables caused the real estate industry to
slowdown.[5] As a consequence, while business was good
during the first quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses
amounting to P71,879,228 that year.[6]
According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was
not liable for income taxes.[7] Nevertheless, respondent paid
its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total
amount of P26,318,398.32.[8] Therefore, respondent was
entitled to tax refund or tax credit.[9]
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required
respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim.
[10] Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon.
Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review[11] in the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it
was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a
judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit.[12] It invoked Section
229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected.
-- No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the
recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged
to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or
of any penalty claimed to have been collected without
authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in
AUGUST 10, 2016
46 of 67
any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or

credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit
or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax,
penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap
year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days[14] after
respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the
reglementary period.[15]
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the

expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax
or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise
after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner
may, even without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax,
where on the face of the return upon which payment was
made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously
paid. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.[16]

Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.[17]
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision
of the CTA.[18] It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not
distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According
to the CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the
fact that a particular year is a leap year.[19]
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on
April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit
commenced on that date.[13]
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights,
it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five
days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours,
and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be
computed by the number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the
last included. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period

under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the
periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April
15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days
each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit
shall be neither interpreted nor construed.[20]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.[21]
Thus, this appeal.
Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an
exemption, should be strictly construed against claimants.[22]
Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against
respondent inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the
prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits)
begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted
returns.[23] Hence, the claim should have been filed on or
before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the
time respondent filed its final adjusted return.
AUGUST 10, 2016
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for

review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period
provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis,
however, is not.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned
from the filing of the final adjusted return.[24] But how should
the two-year prescriptive period be computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that
when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be
equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v.
Tecson,[25] we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days
regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.[26]
However, in 1987, EO[27] 292 or the Administrative Code of
1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof
provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. Year shall be understood to be twelve
calendar months; month of thirty days, unless it refers to a
specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains;
day, to a day of twenty-four hours and; night from sunrise to
sunset. (emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is a month designated in the calendar

without regard to the number of days it may contain.[28] It is
the period of time running from the beginning of a certain
numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding
numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient
number of days in the next month, then up to and including the
last day of that month.[29] To illustrate, one calendar month
from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to
47 of 67
January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008
will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.[30]
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration
that the law is revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly
(when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be
reasonably reconciled with the previous one).[31] Section 27,
Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987
states:
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express

repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the
laws to be abolished.[32] Thus, the provision above only
impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the Administrative
Code of 1987.
Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal
must have been clearly and unmistakably intended by the
legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law
encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and
they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.[33]
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same
subject matter the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil
Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular
year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,
however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless
AUGUST 10, 2016
to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of

days is irrelevant.
July 15, 1998

to
August 14, 1998
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner

of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of
legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
5th
calendar month
August 15, 1998
to
September 14, 1998
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative

Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period
(reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted
return[34] on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months,
computed as follows:
6th
calendar month
September 15, 1998
to
October 14, 1998
Year 1
1st
calendar month
April 15, 1998
to
May 14, 1998
7th
calendar month
October 15, 1998
to
November 14, 1998
2nd
calendar month
May 15, 1998
to
June 14, 1998
3rd
calendar month
June 15, 1998
to
July 14, 1998
4th
calendar month
8th
calendar month
November 15, 1998
to
December 14, 1998
9th
calendar month
December 15, 1998
to
January 14, 1999
10th
calendar month
48 of 67
AUGUST 10, 2016
January 15, 1999

to
February 14, 1999
July 15, 1999

to
August 14, 1999
11th
calendar month
February 15, 1999
to
March 14, 1999
17th
calendar month
August 15, 1999
to
September 14, 1999
12th
calendar month
March 15, 1999
to
April 14, 1999
Year 2
13th
calendar month
April 15, 1999
to
May 14, 1999
18th
calendar month
September 15, 1999
to
October 14, 1999
14th
calendar month
May 15, 1999
to
June 14, 1999
20th
calendar month
November 15, 1999
to
December 14, 1999
15th
calendar month
June 15, 1999
to
July 14, 1999
21st
calendar month
December 15, 1999
to
January 14, 2000
16th
calendar month
22nd
calendar month
19th
calendar month
October 15, 1999
to
November 14, 1999
49 of 67
AUGUST 10, 2016
January 15, 2000

to
February 14, 2000
23rd
calendar month
February 15, 2000
to
March 14, 2000
24th
calendar month
March 15, 2000
to
April 14, 2000
50 of 67
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
C E RTI F I CATI O N
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14,
2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from
the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was
filed within the reglementary period.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is
REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to
expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled
Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify

that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and
concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador
AUGUST 10, 2016
and Jose C. Mendoza of the Special Fifteenth Division of the

Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 21-25.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and
concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador
and Jose C. Mendoza of the Former Special Fifteenth Division
of the Court of Appeals. Id., pp. 26-28.
[4] Id., pp. 37-42.
[5] Id., pp. 39-40.
[6] Id. This was the period of economic slowdown known as the
Asian (Financial) Crisis which started in mid-1997.
[7] Id., p. 41.
[8] Summary of Tax/Payments for 1997:
Quarter
Corporate Income Tax
Creditable
Withholding Tax
TOTAL
1st
P 3,440,082.00
P 687,783.00
P 4,127,865.00
2nd
15,694,502.00
633,175.00
16,327,677.00
3rd
2,419,868.81
3,154,506.51
5,574,375.32
4th
288,481.00
288,481.00
P 21,554,452.81
P 4,763,945.51
P 26,318,398.32
51 of 67
Id., p. 40.
[9] Id., p. 41.
[10] Id., pp. 78-79.
[11] Docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 6113. Id., pp. 192-199.
[12] Penned by Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta and
concurred in by Associate Judges Amancio Q. Saga (retired)
and Ramon O. de Veyra (retired). Dated December 15, 2000.
Id., pp. 187-190.
[13] CIR v. CA, 361 Phil. 359, 364-365 (1999).
[14] The computation was as follows:
April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 ----------------------- 365 days
April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 (leap year) ---------- 366 days
TOTAL 731 days
[15] Rollo, p. 190.
[16] Id., p. 191.
[17] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64782. Id., pp. 180-186.
(This case observes the procedure in RA 1125 prior to the
amendments of RA 9282.)
[18] Id., pp. 21-25. Under RA 9282 which took effect on April
22, 2004, decisions of the CTA are now appealable to the
Supreme Court.
[19] Id., p. 24.
[20] Id.
[21] Id., pp. 26-28.
[22] Id., p. 13.
[23] Id., p. 15.
[24] TAX CODE, Sec. 229 and supra note 12 at 367. See also
ACCRA Investments Corporation v. CA., G.R. No. 96322, 20
December 1991, 204 SCRA 957. See also CIR v. Philippine
American Life Insurance Co., G.R. No. 105208, 29 May 1995,
244 SCRA 446.
[25] 139 Phil. 584 (1969).
[26] Id., pp. 588-589 citing People v. del Rosario, 97 Phil 70, 71
(1955).
[27] Executive Order
[28] Gutierrez v. Carpio, 53 Phil. 334, 335-336 (1929).
AUGUST 10, 2016
[29] Section 9, Time, 74 AmJur 2d 593 citing Re Lynch's

Estate, 123 Utah 57, 254 P2d 454.
[30] This is pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Civil Code which
provides that [i]n computing a period, the first day shall be
excluded, and the last day included.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 22, Sec. 1. The section provides:
Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of
time prescribed or allowed by this Rules, or by the order of the
court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event
from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be
excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day
of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday
or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time
shall not run until the next working day. (emphasis supplied)
[31] Jose Jesus G. Laurel, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
CASES AND MATERIALS, 1999 ed., 176 citing Black's Law
Dictionary, 4th ed., 1463.
[32] Agujetas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106560, 23 August
1996, 261 SCRA 17, 32.
[33] David v. Commission on Election, G.R. No. 127116, 08
April 1997, 271 SCRA 90, 103.
[34] Supra note 25.
52 of 67
AUGUST 10, 2016

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678
53 of 67
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis

Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter
S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis.
June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,
oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors
appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E.
A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law,
from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated
April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the
executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of
Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the

Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following
order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have
been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving
children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E.
Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a
resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September
15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will,
paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen
and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts
totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time
to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the
various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting
partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
AUGUST 10, 2016
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration,

the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to
$240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of
P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of
partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the
testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary
estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition
on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him,
proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued
an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
executor's final account, report and administration and project
of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied
the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas
law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been
denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositorsappellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which
law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
54 of 67
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even
discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine
is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has
a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling
for the application of the law of the place where the properties
are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however,
of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore
not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never
invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they
argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned
in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the
Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e)
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject
to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
AUGUST 10, 2016
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary

provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he
the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph
three, of the Civil Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code
afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted
the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing
without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of
the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their
purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the
national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
55 of 67
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's

national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two
wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that
such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled
in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article
16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since
the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount
of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy
of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in
toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
AUGUST 10, 2016
1He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be

included in this case as one of the oppositors-appellants; to file
or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition;
to submit his brief after paying his proportionate share in the
expenses incurred in the printing of the record on appeal; or to
allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters but this
Court resolved to deny the motion.
2San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.
3Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay,
95 Phil. 500.
56 of 67
AUGUST 10, 2016

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188289
August 20, 2014
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,

vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May
2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV No.
88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.
The factual antecedents are as follow:
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were
married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They
resided in California, United States of America (USA) where
they eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot
two children, namely: Jerome T.
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT.
Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was engaged in courier
service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San
Francisco, California.
During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in
the Philippines and in the USA:
57 of 67
PHILIPPINES
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. located at 1085
Norma Street, Sampaloc, Manila (Sampaloc property)
P1,693,125.00
Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. m. located at
Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora
P400,000.00
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares located at Maria
Aurora, Aurora
P490,000.00
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. located at Sabang
Baler, Aurora
P175,000.00 3
3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin Maria Aurora, Aurora
P750,000.00
USA
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly City, California
$550,000.00
(unpaid debt of $285,000.00)
Furniture and furnishings
$3,000
Jewelries (ring and watch)
$9,000
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck
AUGUST 10, 2016
$13,770.00
Bank of America Checking Account
$8,000
Bank of America Cash Deposit
Life Insurance (Cash Value)
$100,000.00
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities
$56,228.00
4
The Sampaloc property used to beowned by Davids parents.
The parties herein secured a loan from a bank and mortgaged
the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed,
the couple paid a total of P1.5 Million for the redemption of the
same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to
the Philippines in 2001. In December 2002,Leticia executed a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the
Sampaloc property for P2.2 Million. According to Leticia,
sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and
lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed
that David agreed toand executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia
in the presence of Davids father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3
December 2003 stating that: 1) the P1.1Million proceeds from
the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be paid to and
collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to
Leticia P750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the amount
of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that
David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the
conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines.5 David
was able to collect P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the
Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid balance of P410,000.00.
58 of 67
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia

filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the
divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29
June 2005.6 The California court granted to Leticia the custody
of her two children, as well as all the couples properties in the
USA.7
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial
Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler,
Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and
Davids failure to comply with his obligation under the same.
She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal
properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease
and desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the
declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of
her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as
share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5)
the payment ofP50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation
expenses.8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution
of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that
the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the
USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorneys fees of both parties be charged
against the conjugal partnership.9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed
acts of abandonment and marital infidelity which can result
intothe forfeiture of the parties properties in favor of the
petitioner and their two (2) children.
AUGUST 10, 2016
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties

in California, U.S.A. and the same can be included in the
judicial separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by
petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and respondent David A. Noveras
will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latters property
rights over their conjugal properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to
reimbursement of onehalf of the P2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds
of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the P1.5
[M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras,
including interests and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties should be
distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorneys feesand litigation expenses of
the parties were chargeable against their conjugal properties.
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
Whether or not the two common children of the parties are
entitled to support and presumptive legitimes.10
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the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of California,

County of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the
marriage of the parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles
presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new
titles be issued in the name of the party to whom said
properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A.
Noveras in the preceding paragraph are hereby given to
Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner
LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive
legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles
covering the said properties.Their share in the income from
these properties shall be remitted to them annually by the
respondent within the first half of January of each year, starting
January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America
awarded to petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in
paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two
minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their
presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on
the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share
in the income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to
them annually by the petitioner within the first half of January of
each year, starting January 2008;
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby
declared DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe
parties in the Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded to
respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in the
United States of America remaining in the sole ownership of
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and
Jena, respondent David A. Noveras shall give them US$100.00
as monthly allowance in addition to their income from their
presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall
take care of their food, clothing, education and other needs
while they are in her custody in the USA. The monthly
allowance due from the respondent shall be increased in the
future as the needs of the children require and his financial
capacity can afford;
AUGUST 10, 2016
6. Of the unpaid amount of P410,000.00 on the purchase price

of the Sampaloc property, the Paringit Spouses are hereby
ordered to pay P5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and
P405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the respondent
may be paid to him directly but the share of the two children
shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint
account tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal from which
shall only be made by them or by their representative duly
authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such payment/
deposit shall be made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after
receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the passbook of the joint
account to be submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court of
this Court within the same period. Said passbook can be
withdrawn from the Clerk of Court only by the children or their
attorney-in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorneys fees incurred by the
parties shall be shouldered by them individually.11
Art 16 applies
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US

citizens, the laws that cover their legal and personalstatus are
those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties
are divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their
marriage issued by the Superior Court of California, County of
San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties
marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial court
considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of
the absolute community of property regime with the
determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the
children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal
property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first
classified their property regime as absolute community of
property because they did not execute any marriage settlement
60 of 67
before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article

75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in
accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption,
Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take
judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit
any proof of their national law. The trial court held that as the
instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the law for
the grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute
community properties cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia and
her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia
failed to prove abandonment and infidelity with preponderant
evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the
reimbursements she is praying for considering that she already
acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the
principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine
properties to David, subject to the payment of the childrens
presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89
of the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation made by David
of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts
Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine
properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the
common childrens presumptive legitime, the appellate court
ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount of
P520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED.
Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the assailedDecision dated December
8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil
Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the
parties in the Philippines are hereby divided equally between
AUGUST 10, 2016
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and

respondent David A. Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia
Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall pertain to her minor
children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the
said properties. Their share in the income therefrom, if any,
shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first
half of January, starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia
Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to pay the amount
ofP520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their
presumptive legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property
inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited
to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the
latters names. The payment/deposit shall be made within a
period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy of this Decision
and the corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe
Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period, withdrawable only
by the children or their attorney-in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay
petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the amount of P1,040,000.00
representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:
61 of 67
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler,

Aurora; the local civil registry of Quezon City; the Civil
RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building,
Times Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the
children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals
should have recognized the California Judgment which
awarded the Philippine properties to him because said
judgment was part of the pleading presented and offered in
evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing
Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to
unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that the latter
was already granted all US properties by the California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia
are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the
Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the
Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court
awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect
to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for
judicial separation ofconjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce
decree which severed the bond of marriage between the
parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its
AUGUST 10, 2016
62 of 67
authenticity must beproven as facts under our rules on

evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.14
attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court

having a seal, under the seal of such court.
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and

the national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of
Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of
the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven
as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.15
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed

the requirement on certification where we held that "[petitioner
therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of
the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign
divorce decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing
said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it
appears that there is no seal from the office where the divorce
decree was obtained.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents

of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an
official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or
copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the
legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of
the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case may be, and
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented

in evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity,
as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not
presented.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as

the lower courts did with respect to the property regime of the
parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter
because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between
Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of
the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in
proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements
must be made before the celebration of marriage. An exception
to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially
approved and refers only to the instances provided in Articles
66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial
separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of
the Family Code, to wit:
AUGUST 10, 2016
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient

cause for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a
penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially
declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner
has been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter
or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as
provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the
marriage settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been
separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is
highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the
presentation of the final judgment against the guiltyor absent
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree
ofjudicial separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no
abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation of
properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code.
The trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code
quoted above, must be for a valid cause and the spouse is
63 of 67
deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the
conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of
not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic]
abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or
her whereabouts within the period of three months from such
abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent
has returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora,
Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there
after the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been
going back to the USA to visit her and their children until the
relations between them worsened. The last visit of said
respondent was in October 2004 when he and the petitioner
discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of
marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of
their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can also be
considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the
Philippines.19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial
separation of property was not tackled in the trial courts
decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the
petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia
and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that
reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual
abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the
spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David
decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own
business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David
has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented
herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in
the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she
saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the
AUGUST 10, 2016
Consent for Operation form.20 Third and more significantly,

they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California
court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually
separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial
separation of absolute community of property should be
granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community
property automatically dissolves the absolute community
regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe
Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
64 of 67
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall

be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets,
the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions
of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the
spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute
community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of
such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing
the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles
43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the increase
in value between the market value of the community property
at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market
value at the time of its dissolution.
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the
marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the
dissolution of the absolute community regime and the following
procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime,
the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
properties of each spouse.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be

delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the
partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with
whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.
Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have
chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In
case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking
into consideration the best interests of said children. At the risk
of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial
court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the
Court of Appeals on the trial courts Decision with respect to
liquidation.
AUGUST 10, 2016
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did
not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David
and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states
that real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall
only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with
respect to the share of the spouses in the absolutecommunity
properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their
childrens presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court
explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the
proceeds of the Sampaloc property.1wphi1 While both
claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras
property, absent a clear showing where their contributions
came from, the same is presumed to have come from the
community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to
reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the
sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute
community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of
P120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be
charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of
P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on
Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal
case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had
not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share
equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of
P120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of P1,040,000.00.
65 of 67
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he
legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of
one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the
mother." The children arc therefore entitled to half of the share
of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community,
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the
same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds
from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00.
Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the
amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes
therefrom.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.**
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
AUGUST 10, 2016
ATTE STATI O N
3 Id. at 2.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
4 Id. at 27-28.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division Chairperson
6 Id. at 77.
C E RTI F I CATI O N
8 Id. at 4-5.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
9 Id. at 23-26.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
12 Rollo, pp. 36-37.
66 of 67
5 Id. at 16.
7 Id. at 79-81.
10 Id. at 267.
11 Id. at 287-288.
13 G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.

Footnotes
14 Id. at 281-282.
* Per Raffle dated 28 July 2014.
15 Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, 26 June 2013.
** Per Special Order No. 1757 dated 20 August 2014.
16 591 Phil. 452, 470 (2008).
1 Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now

Supreme Court Associate Justice) with Associate Justices
Portia Aliflo-Hormachuelos and Rosmari D. Carandang,
concurring. Rollo, pp. 26-37.
17 Processual presumption means that where a foreign law is

not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption
is that foreign law is the same as ours. See EDI-Staffbuilders
Intl. Inc. v. NLRC, 563 Phil. 1, 22 (2007).
2 Presided by Judge Corazon D. Soluren. Records, pp.

262-288.
18 Sta. Maria, Persons and Family Relations Law, Fourth

Edition, 2004, p. 396.
19 Records, p. 280.
20 TSN, 9 March 2006, p. 13.
21 Rollo, pp. 34-35.
AUGUST 10, 2016
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

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Republic of the Philippines

April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

AUGUST 10, 2016

immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

AUGUST 10, 2016

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official

they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

AUGUST 10, 2016

Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general

public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

AUGUST 10, 2016

presidential decrees which were published only during the

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

AUGUST 10, 2016

Relova, J., concurs.

so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

AUGUST 10, 2016

ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its

command. A later legislative or executive act which has the

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

AUGUST 10, 2016

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

AUGUST 10, 2016

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

AUGUST 10, 2016

My point is that such publication required need not be confined

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

AUGUST 10, 2016

application. I am not in agreement with the view that such

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

AUGUST 10, 2016

earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

AUGUST 10, 2016

fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that

1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.