Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
No. 13-4063
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:11-cr-00371-FDW-DCK-1)
Argued:
Decided:
May 8, 2014
PER CURIAM:
John Stacks appeals his conviction for being a felon in
possession
of
922(g)(1).
firearm,
Stacks
in
first
contravention
challenges
the
of
18
district
U.S.C.
courts
traffic
stop,
maintaining
that
the
officers
lacked
also
the
contends
court
that
his
improperly
conviction
and
should
prejudicially
be
vacated
admitted
lay
As explained below, we
I.
A.
Around four oclock the morning of March 18, 2011, Officers
Bryan Overman and Chandos Williams of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Police
Department
were
Corridor,
surrounding
Carolina.
The
assigned
Westpark
Westpark
to
patrol
Drive,
in
Corridor,
the
Westpark
Charlotte,
commercial
area
North
on
the
for
breaking
and
entering
motor
vehicle
cases,
particularly
As such, the
for
break-ins.
the
Id.
prevention
of
larceny
from
auto
or
vehicle
for more than seventeen years, nearly twelve of which were with
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, and nine of those
in the Steele Creek Division, where the Westpark Corridor is
located.
Police
Williams
Department
had
for
been
more
with
than
the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg
twenty
years,
and
spent
of
people,
mostly
employees
and
deliverymen
at
the
Cadillac
drive
past
them
on
Westpark
Drive.
The
As
J.A. 37.
As the
cul-de-sac),
the
officers
decided
to
stay
with
the
Id. at
Id. at 39.
to
license
run
Stackss
and
registration
through
the
DMV
Stacks.
Williams
asked
Stacks
why
he
was
in
the
where
he
had
taken
her. 2
While
he
was
standing
J.A. 74.
Williams, cognizant
that he was out there looking for people that had been breaking
2
into
cars,
thought
that
the
jacket
could
be
concealing
learning
times
for
Id. at 75.
that
armed
Stacks
had
robbery,
previously
Officer
been
arrested
Overman
rejoined
J.A. 43.
The
In response,
Stacks asked the officers if they had probable cause for their
request.
cause
and
asked
Stacks
to
exit
the
vehicle,
whereupon
The officers
returned to their vehicle and chased Stacks, but were not able
to apprehend him.
The firearm,
later
turned
that
himself
morning.
in
to
the
While
Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Stacks
was
in
custody,
Detective Jimmy Messer interviewed him and asked him about the
pistol recovered from the bushes on Westpark Drive.
Stacks told
Later
of
under
North
18
Carolina
U.S.C.
returned
922(g)(1)
an
with
indictment
being
charging
felon
in
On February 22,
violated
unreasonable
his
Fourth
searches
and
Amendment
seizures.
right
At
to
the
be
free
conclusion
of
of
is
not,
himself.
starting
J.A. 129.
with
the
identity
of
the
defendant
the
governments
evidence
was
tainted
as
fruit
of
the
district
court
denied
Stackss
suppression
motion.
See
stop
of
articulable
Stackss
suspicion
vehicle
that
was
criminal
based
on
activity
was
reasonable,
afoot,
and
258-71.
5
(Continued)
9
in
his
vehicle
at
all
deemed
the
stop
unconstitutional,
much
of
Detective
prior
Department
James
as
an
to
Helms
trial,
expert
of
the
witness
the
evidence
prosecution
identified
Charlotte-Mecklenburg
who
in
Id. at 13. 6
the
would
provide
Police
expert
as
an
J.A. 274.
expert
witness,
contending
that
he
lacked
the
Stacks further
who
were
in
10
asserted
that
because
the
terms
burner
and
iron
are
And,
Stacks
maintained
that
any
probative
Id. at
value
of
Id. at 285.
Helms,
and
introduced
the
recordings
of
the
of
the
recorded
conversations,
including
the
jury
returned
verdict
convicting
that
On June 5,
Stacks
of
the
Stacks
11
II.
A.
We first address Stackss challenge to the district courts
ruling on his suppression motion that is, his contention that
the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the March
18, 2011 traffic stop.
one,
which
we
review
de
novo.
See
United
States
v.
As the Supreme
in
opposing
suppression
motion,
we
review
the
See
United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2012).
1.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures by the Government, and its protections extend to brief
12
v.
Ohio,
392
U.S.
(1968),
the
Supreme
Court
has
under
reasonable
the
suspicion
Fourth
that
Amendment
criminal
if
activity
supported
may
be
by
afoot.
v.
Sokolow,
marks omitted).
reviewing
courts
490
U.S.
1,
(1989)
(internal
United
quotation
to
look
at
the
totality
of
the
is
somewhat
abstract,
and
reminded
that
might
well
elude
an
untrained
person.
Id.
(internal
in
an
in
this
area
of
analysis;
however,
[a]n
individuals
expected
criminal
activity,
standing
Illinois v.
We consider,
Although this
reasonable suspicion.
617
(4th
Cir.
1997)
and
internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
In
addition
to
being
high
crime
area,
the
Westpark
of
hotels,
interstate.
restaurants,
and
nightclubs
near
major
very little traffic other than Stacks while they surveilled the
area, namely a handful of workers and deliverymen going in and
out of the hotels on the strip.
J.A. 34.
The suspiciousness of
Cir. 2005) (observing that lateness of the hour may raise level
of suspicion); see also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 129-30 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that
[f]actors such as the time of day, the number of people in the
area, [and] the character of the neighborhood may be relevant
in the reasonable suspicion analysis).
15
Stackss
reaction
to
the
officers
further
supports
the
toward
Stacks,
and
the
two
vehicles
passed
as
Stacks
the
driving
cemented
commercial
slowly
the
J.A. 39.
nature
through
officers
of
the
the
parking
reasonable
and
lots,
the
Cadillacs
Stackss
suspicion
that
reaction
Stacks
was
nevertheless
contends
that
the
officers
lacked
Court
has
previously
explained,
We disagree.
factors
that
may
As
be
F.3d 168, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at
277-78).
That
is
certainly
the
case
here.
Stacks
could,
the
factors:
the
high
crime
area,
the
early
morning
hour,
possessed
reasonable
suspicion
that
Stacks
may
have
reversible
as
firearms.
to
error
his
292
allowing
understanding
of
Detective
slang
Helms
terminology
to
for
abuse of discretion.
286,
in
(4th
Cir.
Moreover,
as
we
have
explained,
with
fair
assurance,
after
pondering
all
that
happened
without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the
judgment
was
not
substantially
swayed
by
the
error.
Id.
maintains
that
because
Detective
Helms
was
not
issue.
observe his calls from jail, Stacks contends, Helms should not
have been permitted to opine on the slang terms Stacks used in
those calls.
We agree.
Pursuant
to
Federal
Rule
of
Evidence
701,
lay
opinion
See United
The
that
the
district
court
abused
its
discretion
in
and
See
not
his
observations
from
the
the
witness.
omitted).
Here,
Id.
there
at
292-93
similarly
(internal
is
no
doubt
quotation
that
marks
Detective
18
Accordingly, his
in
light
of
the
ample
additional
evidence
courts
error
was
harmless.
As
we
have
explained,
court
fair
must
determine
assurance
. . .
if
the
that
Government
the
judgment
has
proved
was
not
343 F.3d 273, 286 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)).
In
addition
to
the
temporal
and
geographic
proximity
between the traffic stop and the discovery of the firearm, the
jail calls included numerous references, both veiled and non, to
Stacks possessing and disposing of a firearm after the March 18
traffic stop.
Stacks
conceded
as
much
when
he
argued
before
the
district court that words like burner and iron are commonly
used in popular culture, and it would not assist the jury for a
witness to opine on their meaning.
J.A. 276.
19
with fair assurance that the jury was not substantially swayed
by the admission of Detective Helmss testimony. 7
III.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we reject Stackss contentions
of error and affirm the judgment of conviction.
AFFIRMED
20