Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
No. 05-4048
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Jane Ely Pearce, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Christine Witcover Dean, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender,
Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF
OPINION
SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
Christopher Crudup appeals his 36-month term of imprisonment
imposed after the district court revoked his supervised release.
Crudup claims that the length of his revocation sentence is unreasonable.1 We affirm.
I.
In 1996, Crudup pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery and was
sentenced to 63 months imprisonment to be followed by 36 months
of supervised release. The district court imposed several conditions on
Crudups supervised release, including that he must not engage in any
criminal conduct, he must submit to drug-screen urinalysis, and he
must work regularly at a lawful occupation. After serving his term of
imprisonment, Crudup was released from federal prison in 2000 and
began his 36-month term of supervised release.
In July 2002, Crudup was arrested on various state charges, including assaulting a police officer with a deadly weapon and fleeing to
avoid arrest. In September 2002, Crudup pleaded guilty in state court
to the assault and flight charges and was sentenced to approximately
two years of confinement in state prison.
The federal probation officer assigned to supervise Crudup filed a
motion to revoke Crudups supervised release based on the state
offenses. During the supervised release revocation hearing, the district
court determined that Crudup violated the terms of his supervised
1
Crudup does not challenge the district courts decision to revoke his
supervised release.
See United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239 (2nd Cir. 2005); United
States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cotton,
399 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173
(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Tedford, 405 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir.
2005); United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2006).
Having excised the standards of review statutory provision applicable to sentencing, the Supreme Court proceeded to "infer appropriate
review standards from related statutory language, the structure of the
statute," and other practical considerations. Booker, 543 U.S. at 26061. Based on these considerations, the Supreme Court inferred a new
standard of review for sentencing appeals: "[A]ppellate courts [must]
determine whether the sentence is unreasonable with regard to [the
factors in] 3553(a)." Id. at 261.4
Because Booker reviewed an original guideline sentence imposed
after conviction and not a supervised release revocation sentence, the
question remains whether Bookers unreasonableness standard applies
to revocation sentences.5 Based on our review of the structure of
statements were mandatory and binding. Because the Supreme Court has
not decided this issue, we cannot state with certainty that the post-Booker
Supreme Court would deem 3742(e)(4) to still be valid as applied to
supervised release revocation sentences. Thus, we are bound by the
Supreme Courts broad ruling excising 3742(e) in its entirety.
4
Consistent with the mandate of Booker, we now follow the unreasonableness standard in our review of original sentences. See United States
v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Green, 436
F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2006); Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432. We have not, however, specifically addressed the proper standard of review for supervised
release revocation sentences in a post-Booker published opinion.
5
We do not interpret Booker as ruling that supervised release sentences
must be reviewed under the unreasonableness standard instead of the
plainly unreasonable standard. In stating that its new unreasonableness
standard was a practical replacement for the mandatory guidelines, the
Supreme Court in Booker noted that appellate courts were already familiar with the unreasonableness standard because they had experience
applying it in several contexts, including in reviewing supervised release
and probation revocation sentences. 543 U.S. at 262. The Supreme Court
cited several illustrative cases, including United States v. White Face,
383 F.3d 733, 737 (8th Cir. 2004), United States v. Salinas, 365 F.3d
582, 588 (7th Cir. 2004), and United States v. Olabanji, 268 F.3d 636,
637 (9th Cir. 2001). In these three cases, the circuit courts reviewed the
revocation sentences under the "plainly unreasonable" standard of
review. It would be odd to suggest that the Supreme Court intended to
replace the "plainly unreasonable" standard when it cited cases which
used that very standard.
The circuit courts that have considered this issue post-Booker either
decline to decide whether plainly unreasonable or unreasonableness is
the proper standard, use Bookers unreasonableness standard, or state
that unreasonableness is the same as, or similar to, the plainly unreasonable standard. See Miqbel, 444 F.3d at 1176 n. 5 (ruling that Bookers
unreasonableness standard displaces plainly unreasonable standard);
Sweeting, 437 F.3d at 1106 (deciding that unreasonableness essentially
the same as plainly unreasonable standard); Lewis, 424 F.3d at 243
(adopting Bookers reasonableness standard); Kirby, 418 F.3d at 625-26
n.3 (declining to decide if plainly unreasonable or Bookers unreasonableness standard is proper standard because sentence affirmable under
either standard); Tedford, 405 F.3d at 1161 (ruling that reasonableness
has always been the proper standard and remains so after Booker); Cotton, 399 F.3d at 916 (deciding that the Supreme Courts citation to White
Face in Booker indicates that unreasonableness is the same standard as
plainly unreasonable).
The Booker Court specifically noted that 3583 was not affected by
its decision and remains "perfectly valid." 543 U.S. at 258.
court of appeals should review a sentencing departure from a mandatory guideline range to determine if it is "unreasonable." In contrast,
3742(e)(4) provided that the court of appeals should review sentences for offenses for which there is no applicable mandatory guideline range to determine if it is "plainly unreasonable." Because there
is no indication that Congress intended the word "plainly" to be surplusage, the best interpretation of these two terms in their context is
that they are not coterminous. Congress clearly intended the word
"plainly" to modify "unreasonable" in some way. See Chickasaw
Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 85 (2001) (recognizing the
canon of statutory interpretation requiring a court to give effect to
every word of statute unless giving effect would be repugnant to
remainder of statute); United States v. Williams, 364 F.3d 556, 559
(4th Cir. 2004).
In determining whether a sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first
decide whether the sentence is unreasonable. In conducting this
review, we follow generally the procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our review of original sentences, as outlined
in our recent opinion in Moreland, 437 F.3d at 434, with some necessary modifications to take into account the unique nature of supervised release revocation sentences. For instance, as mandated by
3583(e), not all the original sentencing factors of 3553(a) can be
considered when reviewing a revocation sentence. According to
3583(e), in devising a revocation sentence the district court is not
authorized to consider whether the revocation sentence "reflect[s] the
seriousness of the offense, . . . promote[s] respect for the law, and
. . . provide[s] just punishment for the offense," 3553(a)(2)(A), or
whether there are other "kinds of sentences available," 3553(a)(3).
In addition, we also recognize that determining whether a revocation sentence is unreasonable "entails a deferential appellate posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion." See Salinas,
365 F.3d at 588 (quoting United States v. Marvin, 135 F.3d 1129,
1136 (7th Cir. 1998)). Although a district court must consider the
"helpful assistance" contained in the Chapter 7 policy statements,
Davis, 53 F.3d at 640, along with the statutory requirements of 3583
and the 3553(a) factors applicable to revocation sentences, "the
court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence
and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum,"
10
Lewis, 424 F.3d at 244 (quoting United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d
63, 69 (2d Cir. 1997)).8 Moreover, we agree with the Second Circuit
that "a courts statement of its reasons for going beyond non-binding
policy statements in imposing a sentence after revoking a defendants
supervised release term need not be as specific as has been required
when courts departed from guidelines that were, before Booker, considered to be mandatory." Lewis, 424 F.3d at 245.9
If we determine based on this review that a revocation sentence is
not unreasonable, the sentence should be affirmed. In such a circumstance, we do not proceed to the second prong of our review because
it necessarily follows that a sentence that is not unreasonable is also
not plainly unreasonable. However, if we determine that the revocation sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable, we must
then decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable, relying on
the definition of "plain" that we use in our "plain" error analysis.
Thus, for purposes of determining whether an unreasonable sentence
is plainly unreasonable,"[p]lain is synonymous with clear or,
equivalently, obvious." See Hughes, 401 F.3d at 547 (quoting
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)).
B.
Having defined the proper standard of review, we now decide
8
It makes sense that district courts are given broader latitude to impose
statutory maximum revocation sentences. The risk of a district court
imposing an overly aggressive term of imprisonment is greatly reduced
in the revocation sentence context. No matter how serious the revocation
conduct and how extensive the defendants criminal history, the longest
possible revocation sentence a district court can impose is five years. See
18 U.S.C. 3583(b)(1),(e)(3).
9
It would be an odd result if Booker were interpreted to reduce the
level of discretion district courts have always had to devise revocation
sentences under policy statements that have uniformly been deemed nonbinding while giving district courts more discretion to impose original
sentences under guidelines that were deemed binding until Booker. Such
a reading of Booker would place the loose, flexible grid system envisioned by the Sentencing Commission for revocation sentences on the
same level as the precise guideline system devised for original sentences.
11
whether Crudups 36-month revocation sentence is within the applicable statutory range, see Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546-47, and is not plainly
unreasonable. Because we decide that Crudups sentence is within the
prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable, we affirm.
First, Crudups 36-month revocation sentence is within the applicable statutory range. When Crudup was originally sentenced in 1996,
the district court imposed a 36-month term of supervised release to
commence after Crudup completed his term of imprisonment. After
being released from prison, Crudup was subject, pursuant to
3583(e)(3), to a maximum 36-month term of imprisonment if the
district court were to find by a preponderance of the evidence that he
violated any of the conditions of his supervised release. See id.
(authorizing the district court to "revoke a term of supervised release,
and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of
supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted"
in his original sentence) (emphasis added).
Second, Crudups revocation sentence is neither procedurally nor
substantively unreasonable. Procedurally, the district court expressly
considered the Chapter 7 advisory policy statement range of 5 to 11
months imprisonment,10 and Crudup does not argue that the district
court failed to consider any pertinent 3553(a) sentencing factors.
Substantively, the district court sufficiently stated a proper basis for
its conclusion that Crudup should be sentenced to the maximum statutory sentence. The district court noted in particular Crudups admitted
pattern of violating numerous conditions of his supervised release
any one of which would have subjected Crudup to the same advisory
5 to 11 month range despite the fact that the district court had
repeatedly extended leniency to Crudup in an effort to encourage his
compliance. The district court also noted Crudups need for substance
abuse treatment, and it recommended that Crudup receive intensive
10
We note that the district court correctly did not take into account
Crudups 2002 state court convictions in calculating his criminal history
for revocation purposes. Pursuant to 7B1.4(a), the proper criminal history for revocation sentence purposes is the "criminal history applicable
at the time the defendant originally was sentenced to a term of supervision."
12
substance abuse training while incarcerated. See United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 1218-19 (10th Cir. 2004) (cataloguing opinions
affirming the imposition of lengthy revocation sentences to allow
defendants to undergo substance abuse treatment while in custody);
3553(a)(2)(D) (authorizing the district court to consider whether the
sentence would provide the defendant with needed substance abuse
treatment). Based on the broad discretion that a district court has to
revoke supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment up to
the statutory maximum, Lewis, 424 F.3d at 244, we cannot say that
the district courts imposition of the statutory maximum sentence
against Crudup is unreasonable. Because we conclude that Crudups
sentence is not unreasonable, it necessarily follows that his sentence
is not plainly unreasonable.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Crudups 36-month
revocation sentence is not plainly unreasonable, and we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED