Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
No. 06-4210
No. 06-4285
COUNSEL
ARGUED: David Glenn Barger, WILLIAMS MULLEN, McLean,
Virginia, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Laura C. Marshall, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
ON BRIEF: Michael R. Sklaire, WILLIAMS MULLEN, McLean,
Virginia, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Chuck Rosenberg, United
States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
OPINION
KING, Circuit Judge:
Marc J. Blatstein appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered by federal agents conducting warrant searches of his
office and residence in Fredericksburg, Virginia. After having his
suppression motion denied, Blatstein was convicted in the Eastern
District of Virginia of one count of mail fraud, in contravention of 18
U.S.C. 1341. This conviction was predicated on Blatsteins conditional guilty plea, pursuant to which he reserved his right to appeal
the courts adverse suppression ruling. Blatstein contends that the evidence underlying his conviction was obtained through the execution
of constitutionally invalid search warrants. The Government, meanwhile, has cross-appealed Blatsteins sentence of 12 months and one
day in prison. As explained below, we affirm the denial of Blatsteins
suppression motion, but vacate his sentence and remand.
I.
Defendant Marc J. Blatstein was a licensed podiatrist who operated
a solo podiatry practice in a Fredericksburg strip mall. In May 2004,
federal law enforcement officials began to investigate Blatsteins
practice, based on their suspicion that he was fraudulently billing his
patients health insurers. On July 14, 2004, in the course of this investigation, FBI Agent Jeffrey Howard sought warrants to search
Blatsteins office and residence for records relating to his practices
billing and finances. Agent Howard submitted an affidavit to a United
States magistrate judge in support of his warrant applications (the "affidavit"). The affidavit asserted that there was probable cause to
believe Blatstein had violated 18 U.S.C. 1347 and 1341, which,
respectively, prohibit health care fraud and mail fraud.
The affidavit explained the pertinent federal statutes as follows:
Section 1347 of Title 18 makes it an offense for any person to knowingly and willfully execute, or attempt to execute, a scheme or artifice
to (1) defraud any health care benefit program; or (2) obtain, by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,
any of the money or property owned by, or under the custody or control of, any health care benefit program. A "health care benefit program," for purposes of 1347, is "any public or private plan or
contract, affecting commerce, under which any medical benefit, item,
or service is provided to any individual." 18 U.S.C. 24(b). Section
1341 makes it an offense to use the United States mail to execute a
scheme or artifice to defraud. 18 U.S.C. 1341.
The affidavit of Agent Howard provided detailed information indicating that Blatstein had contravened 1347 and 1341. According
to the affidavit, Blatstein had billed his patients insurers for the use
of outpatient surgical facilities provided by an entity called the Central Park Ambulatory Surgical Center ("CPASC"), which had no
physical existence and was not known to or licensed by the Commonwealth of Virginia. In this regard, the affidavit reported information
obtained from two former employees of Blatstein, whom the affidavit
designated Cooperating Witnesses 1 ("CW-1") and 2 ("CW-2"). CW1 advised investigators that Blatstein billed surgical facility fees for
procedures performed at his podiatry office, despite CW-1s repeated
warnings to Blatstein that he could not legitimately charge such fees
for procedures not performed at a physically separate facility. CW-1
also related that, although Blatsteins employees handled billing for
other procedures, Blatstein insisted on personally completing the
paperwork relating to his billing for surgical facilities. According to
the affidavit, Blatstein did not disclose to CW-1 his practice of submitting bills that purported to be from CPASC. In fact, CW-1 first
heard of CPASC not from Blatstein, but from someone who called a
telephone line reserved for Blatsteins exclusive use and asked for the
Central Park Ambulatory Surgery Center.
Citations herein to "J.A. ___" refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
B.
In its cross-appeal, the Government contends that the sentencing
court erred in imposing a variance sentence without providing reasonable notice of its intent to do so. The Government acknowledges that
it failed to object to this asserted error at Blatsteins sentencing hearing, and that we consequently must review the sentencing courts procedure in this regard for plain error only. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b);
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 32(i)(1)(C) obliges a sentencing court to "allow the parties attorneys to comment on . . . matters relating to an appropriate sentence." In Burns v. United States,
501 U.S. 129 (1991), the Supreme Court held that, under this provision of Rule 32, a court may not depart on a ground not identified as
a ground for departure in either the presentence report or a prehearing
submission by the parties, unless the court provides the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a departure and informs
them of the departures basis. See id. at 138-39.4 In reaching this
result, the Court reasoned that "Rule 32s purpose [is] promoting
focused, adversarial resolution of the legal and factual issues" critical
to sentencing, and that meaningful adversarial testing is impossible if
the parties lack adequate notice of the issues to be resolved. Id. at 137.
In 2002, the holding of Burns was codified as Rule 32(h). See Fed.
R. Crim. P. 32 advisory committees notes ("Rule 32(h) is a new provision that reflects Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138-39
(1991).").5
sion on which Blatstein relies, we do not reach or address the question
of whether Agent Howards omission of that provision from the affidavit
was an intentional falsification or exhibited reckless disregard for the
truth.
4
At the time Burns was decided, the provision that is now Rule
32(i)(1)(C) was numbered Rule 32(a)(1). See Burns, 501 U.S. at 135.
5
Rule 32(h) provides as follows:
Before the court may depart from the applicable sentencing
range on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence report or in a partys prehearing submission, the court
must give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating
such a departure. The notice must specify any ground on which
the court is contemplating a departure.
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departure "on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence report or in a partys prehearing submission" (emphasis
added)); see also United States v. Spring, 305 F.3d 276, 282-83 (4th
Cir. 2002) (Rule 32s requirement of opportunity to comment not satisfied even though courts ground for departure was identified in PSR,
where PSR listed several possible grounds for departure and court
failed to notify parties of planned departure or bases thereof). The
sentencing court here failed to give such notice, and it thereby erred.
In Spring, we decided that a sentencing courts failure to give
notice of a planned departure, as required by Rule 32, constitutes
plain error, and that it satisfies the substantial rights prong of Olano
plain-error review. See 305 F.3d at 282. Although Spring involved an
upward departure that affected the substantial rights of a defendant,
we have recognized that the substantial rights of the Government are
similarly entitled to protection from plain error. See United States v.
Perkins, 108 F.3d 512, 517 (4th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we are constrained to conclude that the courts Rule 32 error was plain and
affected the Governments substantial rights.
Spring also recognized that an unpreserved Rule 32 notice error
should be corrected on appeal if the party opposing the departure
raises contentions that, if developed in response to reasonable notice,
might have dissuaded the sentencing court from departing. See 305
F.3d at 282-83; accord United States v. Evans-Martinez, 448 F.3d
1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, it appears that the Government,
given a fair opportunity to prepare, could have raised meritorious
objections to the grounds on which the court varied. Notably, the
Government has presented forceful challenges to several of the factors on which the court relied in varying downward, including
Blatsteins "early efforts to make amends for his wrong doing," the
impact that his conduct had on his profession and his family, and the
possible savings to the federal government from shortening
Blatsteins prison time. Because the parties were not on notice that the
court planned to vary downward on these grounds, the variance was
not subjected to meaningful adversarial testing. Consequently, Burns
and Spring, our controlling precedents, oblige us to correct the sentencing courts plain error under Rule 32.6
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district courts ruling on
the suppression motion. We vacate Blatsteins sentence and remand
for resentencing proceedings consistent with Rule 32.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED
IN PART, AND REMANDED