TORTS

25. Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-51806

Facts: Earnest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen, was Honorary Consul General of Israel in
the Philippines. He went to MIA to meet his future son-in-law. As the plane was landing, he and
his companions went to the viewing deck to watch the arrival of the plane. While walking, Simke
slipped on an elevation 4 inches high and fell on his back, breaking his thigh bone in the process.
He underwent a 3-hour operation and after recovery he filed a claim for damages against the
Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), which was the government entity in charge of the airport.
Issue: WON CAA was negligent.
Held: CAA contended that the elevation in question had a legitimate purpose for being on the
terrace and was never intended to trip down people and injure them. It was there for no other
purpose but to drain water on the floor area of the terrace. But upon ocular inspection by the
trial court, it was found that the terrace was in poor condition. Under RA 776, the CAA is charged
with the duty of planning, designing, construction, equipping, expanding maintenance and etc of
the MIA.
Responsibility o f CAA:
Pursuant to Art.1173, the fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission o that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time, and of the place. Here, the obligation of the CAAA in
maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure the safety of
the viewers using it. As these people come to look where the planes and the incoming
passengers are not to look down on the floor or pavement of the viewing deck, the CAA should
make sure that no dangerous obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent
any undue harm to the public.
Contributory Negligence
Under Art.2179, contributory negligence contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of
the plaintiff, although not the proximate cause of his injury, CONTRIBUTED to his own damage.
The Court found no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, considering the ff test
formulated in the early case of Picart vs. Smith:
the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of the
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to personal judgment of the actor in
the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blame worthy, or negligent
in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
the question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot be here of much value but this
much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which
ae before them or known to them. They are not, and are supposed not to be omniscient of the
future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to
suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration foresee harm
as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions

to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm. Followed by the ignoring of the
suggestion born of this prevision. Is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower court could not have
reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering the attendant factual
circumstances. Even if the private respondent had been looking where he was going, the step in
quetsion could not easily be noticed because of the construction.
26. Rakes vs. AG, 7 PHIL 359
Facts: Rakes was a laborer employed by Atlantic. While transporting iron rails from a barge to
the companys yard using a railroad hand car, Rakes broke his leg when the hand car toppled
over and the rails fell on him. It appears that the hand car fell due to a sagging portion of the
track that gave with the weight of the rails. Atlantic knew of the weak state of the rail but did
nothing to repair it. When Rakes filed an action for damages, Atlantics defense was that Rakes
injuries were caused by his own negligence in walking alongside the car, instead of in front or
behind it, as the laborers were told to do.
Issue and Ruling #1:
WON Rakes was negligent?
YES. Rakes was negligent. He disobeyed the orders of his superiors when he walked alongside
the car instead of in front or behind it.
Issue and Ruling #2:
WON Atlantic is liable to Rakes?
YES. The negligence of Rake will not totally bar him from recovering anything from Atlantic,
although the liability of the latter will be mitigated as a result of Rakes contributory negligence.
This is because although Rakes contributed with his own negligence, the primary cause of the
accident was still weak rails which Atlantic refused to repair.
Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without
which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt.
Where he contributes to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot
recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may
recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less
a sum deemed equivalent for his own imprudence.
We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa or negligence, may be understood in 2
different senses: either as culpa, substantive and independent, which on account of its origin
arises in an obligation between the 2 persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as
an incident in the performance of an obligation; or as already existed, which cannot be presumed
to exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing
obligation.