Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
No. 12-1167
LAKSHMI INJETI,
Plaintiff Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
Defendant Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:11cv-00584-RWT)
Argued:
Decided:
reviewing
her
application,
Immigration
Services
(USCIS)
application
for
status
LPR
U.S.
discovered
contained
Citizenship
that
her
and
prior
misrepresentation.
in
connection
had
with
submitted
first husband.
separate
fraudulent
death
proceeding,
certificate
for
her
sought
Court
for
review
the
of
USCISs
District
of
decision
Maryland.
in
the
U.S.
Finding
that
Injeti was ineligible for naturalization because she (1) had not
been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and (2) failed
to demonstrate good moral character, the district court granted
summary judgment for USCIS.
order,
arguing
that
she
both
conditions.
As
we
I.
A.
Injeti was born in Andhra Pradesh, India in 1960.
married
her
first
husband,
Rajurao
Mr.
Injetis
parents
Injeti
(Mr.
She
Injeti),
until
1981,
when
Injeti
moved
to
Though living
Injeti
citizen
According
marrying
Shaikh
to
whom
Injeti,
Shaikh
had
she
also
she
met
because
been
did
she
in
1988
not
while
obtain
believed
previously
living
divorce
Mr.
married,
Injeti
but
in
Qatar.
prior
was
Injeti
to
dead.
claims
1991
to
work
as
an
employee
of
Qatari
diplomat.
visa
petition
on
Injetis
behalf,
which
was
On
the
basis
of
the
approved
petition,
Injeti
filed
an
Injetis application
indicated that her husband, Shaikh, was applying with her, and
also listed the names of three children from her first marriage.
However, in response to a question about the identity of former
husbands
or
wives,
none.
J.A. 117.
Injetis
application
incorrectly
stated
261.
Nevertheless,
Injeti
signed
the
application,
J.A. 137.
Shaikh
Shaikh,
fraudulent
in
death
applying
for
certificate
LPR
for
status,
his
first
had
wife.
submitted
In
fact,
the
removal
proceedings,
Injeti
submitted
to
immigration
first
husband,
Mr.
Injeti.
According
to
Injeti,
she
Although USCIS
would later determine that the death certificate for Mr. Injeti
was
also
fraudulent,
terminated
the
in
removal
the
interim,
proceedings
an
against
immigration
Injeti,
judge
concluding
May
11,
naturalization
application,
2006,
with
this
Injeti
USCIS.
J.A. 27.
filed
Like
application
an
her
omitted
her
application
prior
for
adjustment
marriage
to
Mr.
J.A. 195.
as
direct
result
of
the
prior
inaccuracy
on
her
adjustment application.
prepared,
automated
in
part,
by
computer
software,
and
the
adjustment
J.A. 371.
application
to
the
naturalization
application.
become aware of either error until after both forms had been
submitted.
While Injetis naturalization application was under review,
USCIS received a letter from an individual named Anton, who
claimed to be the boyfriend of Injetis daughter Suvarna.
letter
stated
that
Injeti
and
Shaikh
had
each
The
submitted
that Injeti and Shaikh had threatened Suvarna not to tell the
truth to an immigration judge.
J.A. 254.
did
name,
listed
not
provide
Antons
last
it
two
officials
in
Injetis
purported
death
previously
submitted,
India,
who
informed
certificate,
was
them
which
fraudulent.
In
that
Mr.
Injeti
had
fact,
the
certificate
for
another
individual.
USCIS
did
not
U.S.
Court
for
the
filed
suit
in
the
District
In
connection
with
6
these
proceedings,
she
submitted
an
affidavit
from
her
attorney,
David
Rothwell,
She also
denied
Injetis
application
for
naturalization.
husband
from
her
adjustment
application
and
had
later
of
establishing
eligibility
for
naturalization.
and
did
not
possess
good
moral
character
as
J.A. 275.
After
conducting
additional
evidence,
USCIS
another
again
interview
denied
and
Injetis
considering
application.
First,
in the absence of proof that Mr. Injeti had died in 1988, USCIS
concluded that Injeti had been married to more than one person
J.A. 28.
with
Injetis
submission
certificate,
all
prevented
character.
Additionally,
her
of
from
because
fraudulent
establishing
Injeti
had
death
good
moral
procured
[her]
J.A. 31.
J.A.
for naturalization.
J.A. 32.
B.
application
pursuant
to
U.S.C.
1421(c).
The district
from the bench, the district court explained that Injeti was
8
ineligible
for
naturalization
because
she
had:
(1)
not
been
regarding
Injetis
permanent
resident
status,
the
information
from
her
J.A. 94.
application
for
adjustment
to
LPR
status, she did not have proper immigration status in the first
place
and
therefore
naturalization.
could
J.A.
95.
not
be
Second,
proper
because
candidate
for
she
the
made
J.A. 96.
II.
A.
Courts
review
application de novo.
decision
denying
naturalization
Similarly, we review
To
qualify
for
naturalization,
an
applicant
bears
the
(2)
has
character
been,
during
and
the
still
is,
relevant
person
time
of
periods.
good
8
moral
U.S.C.
term
lawfully
admitted
for
permanent
residence
one
of
our
sister
circuits
has
8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20).
aptly
noted,
[t]his
10
not
mere
procedural
regularity.
In
re
obtained
was
otherwise
not
See id.
In
indication
of
other
words,
fraud,
an
LPR
status
even
alien
by
in
cases
has
not
fraud--or
where
been
who
there
is
lawfully
no
admitted
if
her
BIA
has
applied
this
non-fraud
doctrine
in
other
through
petitioner
oversight.
the
has
fraud
received
of
LPR
third
parties
status
due
to
to
those
where
an
administrative
the
fraud
or
misrepresentation
of
third
parties);
that
petitioner
had
not
been
lawfully
admitted
Every
other
circuit
that
has
addressed
the
BIAs
that
status
immigration laws. 3
was
in
substantive
compliance
with
the
Nevertheless,
Injeti
contends
that
she
was
J.A.
lawfully
admitted for permanent residence because the misrepresentation-which she explains resulted from a mistake by her attorney--was
not fraudulent or willful, and was immaterial to her eligibility
2
This does not mean that any time a person applies for
naturalization, she must affirmatively come forward with proof
to refute every conceivable basis for concluding that her
admission did not comply with applicable law.
Rather, such
proof is required only where there is some articulable reason to
suspect that the applicants admission was improper.
12
for LPR status in the sense that she was not excludable on the
true facts.
we
reject
misrepresentation
in
We disagree.
Injetis
her
application
contention
was
that
immaterial
the
to
her
(noting
numerous
that
the
contexts).
Kungys
As
materiality
one
circuit
test
court
applies
has
in
concluded,
the
government
need
not
establish
that
but
for
the
and
which
might
well
13
have
resulted
in
proper
I. & N. Dec. 288, 289 (B.I.A. 1975) (quoting Matter of S-- & B-C--, 9 I. & N. Dec. 436, 448-49 (A.G. 1961)); see also Cooper v.
Gonzales, 216 F. Appx 294, 297 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying the
BIAs materiality standard); Gozun v. Atty Gen., 375 F. Appx
276, 279 (3d Cir. 2010) (deferring to the BIAs definition of a
material misrepresentation as reasonable).
To the extent that these materiality standards differ, we
need
not
determine
which
of
the
two
applies
here
because
Cf. Solis-Muela v.
14
1182(a)(2)(A)(i),
had
natural
Injetis
tendency
to
omission
influence
of
her
the
prior
evaluation
marriage
of
her
off
inquiry
into
the
propriety
of
her
second
The
misrepresentation
the
was
therefore
material,
whether
or
not
Injetis
explained
misrepresentation
previously,
and
as
was
our
fraudulent
sister
or
willful.
circuits
have
Indeed,
arguing
that
her
admission
was
consistent
with
applicable law, and thus that she was legally entitled to LPR
status, Injeti attempts to rely on 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i),
which designates as inadmissible any alien who seek[s] to
15
procure
admission
material
fact.
by
fraud
Injeti
or
argues
willfully
that
her
misrepresenting
admission
was
not
Nor,
bar
against
aliens
who
have
committed
crime
of
moral
To be
sure, Injeti would not have been entitled to adjust her status
to
permanent
resident
had
Admissibility,
however,
condition
adjustment
statute
for
governing
she
is
to
adjustment
been
statutorily
necessary,
LPR
of
but
status.
status
inadmissible.
not
Indeed,
makes
sufficient,
while
the
admissibility
Id.
(emphasis added).
One such regulation, 8 C.F.R. 103.2(a)(2), requires the
applicant
to
certify
that
all
16
information
contained
in
the
See also
regardless
of
whether
the
misrepresentation
on
her
application was willful, and even if she did not commit bigamy.
Cf. In re F---- M----, 7 I & N Dec. 420, 421-22 (B.I.A. 1957)
(concluding that a visa granted on the basis of an application
that contained a material misrepresentation was not a valid
one,
despite
[applicant]
the
made
record
the
fail[ing]
to
establish
misrepresentation
that
willfully
the
and
purposefully).
17
and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment
for USCIS on this ground.
C.
In addition to finding that Injeti had not been lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, the district court also held
that Injetis unlawful acts bar[red] a finding of good moral
character.
one
of
J.A. 96.
the
statutory
prerequisites
renders
an
applicant
Fedorenko
v.
United
States,
449
U.S.
490,
506
(1981)
In
benefits
to
which
her
character
is
relevant,
we
good
moral
character.
In
doing
so,
we
express
no