Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
No. 01-1344
COUNSEL
Francis R. Laws, Richard P. Rieman, Jr., KOLLMAN & SHEEHAN,
P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. J. Stephen Simms, W.
Charles Bailey, Jr., GREBER & SIMMS, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellees William Witt and MDI; Timothy J. Capurso, HORN &
BENNETT, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee Kelly Witt.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
After discovering that one of its employees was embezzling funds
from the company, Appellant brought an action against that
employee, his wife, and a company the employee owned through
which he was funneling the money, asserting claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 (2000) and the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. 1962 (2000),
as well as state law claims. The district court granted Appellees
motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant
contends that the district court erred by dismissing the action. We find
no merit to its claims; consequently, we affirm.
Because the district court considered materials outside the pleadings and the jurisdictional and merits claims were intertwined, we
find that it effectively, if not formally, treated the motion to dismiss
as a motion for summary judgment. Herbert v. Saffell, 877 F.2d 267,
270 (4th Cir. 1989). "The district court, while it clearly has an obligation to notify parties regarding any court-instituted changes in the
pending proceedings, does not have an obligation to notify parties of
the obvious." Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth.,
149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998). In this case, the parties were on
notice of the possible conversion, given the courts express decision
to allow additional discovery before deciding the jurisdictional issue.
Furthermore, we find that the district court properly found no jurisdictional basis for Appellants RICO and Sherman Antitrust Act claims.
See Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 238-39 (4th Cir. 2000);
Oksanen v. Page Meml Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 708-09 (4th Cir. 1991).
For these reasons, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED